Plassey to Partition Shekar Bandopadyay.pdf

https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam From Plassey to Partition:...

https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India Sekhar Bandyopadhyay Victoria University a/Wellington Orient Longman https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION: A HISTORY OF MODERN INOlA ORIENT LONGMAN PRIVATE LIMITED Registered Office 3-6-752 Himayatnagar. Hyderabad SOO 029 (AP.), INDIA e-mail: hyd2_orlongco@sanchametin Other Offices Bangalore, Bhopal, Bhubaneshwar, Chcnnai, Emakulam, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Kolkata, Lucknow, Mumbai, New Delhi, Patna C Orient Longman Private Limited 2004 Reprinted 2004, 2006 ISBN 81 2SO 2S96 O Maps by Cartography Department Sangam Books (India) Private Limited, Hyderabad Typeset by Linc Arts Phototypcscttcrs Pondicherry Printed in India al Chaman Enterprises Delhi Published by Orient Longman Private Limited 1124 Asaf Ali Road New Delhi 110 002 e-mail: [email protected] The external boundary and coastline oflndia as depicted in the maps in this book arc neither correct nor authentic. https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Contents List of Maps IX Preface X Glossary XIV l.ist of Abbreviations xx 1. Transition of the Eighteenth Century 1 1.1 Decline of the Mughal empire 1.2 Emergence of the regional powers 12 1. 3 Foundation of the British empire 37 2. British Empire in India 66 2.1 The imperial ideology 66 2.2 Parliament and the empire 75 2.3 Extracting land revenue 82 2.4 The apparatus of rule 96 2.5 Empire and economy 122 3. Early Indian Responses: Reform and Rebellion 139 3.1 Social and religious reforms 139 3.2 Peasant and tribal uprisings 158 3.3 The revolt of 1857 169 4. Emergence of Indian Nationalism 184 4.1 Historiography of Indian nationalism 184 4.2 Agrarian society and peasant discontent 191 4.3 The new middle class and the emergence of nationalism 205 4.4 Foundation of the Indian National Congress 218 s. Early Nationalism: Discontent and Dissension 227 5.1 The moderates and economic nationalism 227 5.2 Hindu revivalism and politics 234 https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam viii Contents 5. 3 The rise of extremism and the swadcshi movement 248 5.4 Muslim politics and the foundation of the Muslim League 262 6. The Age of Gandhian Politics 2 79 6. 1 The carrots of limited self-government, 1909- 19 279 6.2 The arrival of Mahatma Gandhi 284 6.3 Khilafat and non-cooperation movements 297 6.4 Civil Disobedience movement 311 6.5 The act of 1935, "Paper Federation" and the prmces 323 7. Many Voices ofa Nation 334 7.1 Muslim alienation 334 7.2 Non-Brahman and dalit protest 342 7.3 Business and politics 358 7.4 Working class movements 369 7.5 Women's participation 381 8. Freedom with Partition 405 8.1 Quit India movement 405 8.2 The turbulent forties 424 8.3 Towards freedom with partition 438 Postscript 473 Appendix 47 5 Bibliography 479 Index 5 14 https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam List ofMaps Map 1: The Mughal empire in 1707 6 Map 2: The regional powers of the eighteenth century 21 Map 3: British territories in India in 1857 46-47. Map 4: British India and the princely states, c. 1904 116-117 Map 5: India in 1947 458-459 https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Preface T his book proposes to present in eight thematic chapters a general history of India under British rule. It focuses more on the Indian people, than on the colonial state or the "men who ruled India". It highlights the perceptions of the ruled, their cultural crises and social changes, their rebellion, their search for identity and their attempts to negotiate with a modernity brought to them through a variety of colonial policies. Above all, it narrates the story of how the Indian nation was gradually emerging, with all its contradictions and ten­ sions, under the domineering presence of Westem imperialism. In recent years there has been a tremendous outpouring of re­ search publications in this area. And therefore, it is time to relate these specialised research findings and theoretical interventions to the whole story, Tucked away in my island abode down under-sep­ arated from my primary sources by thousands of miles-I thought this would be an ideal project for me. This book tries to provide, on the one hand, a story with adequate empirical details needed by stu­ dents for history courses and by general readers. On the other hand, acknowledging that there can be multiple interpretations of a histor­ ical event, the narrative is consciously situated within its proper historiographical context. The book, in other words, summarises the findings and conclusions of an enormous body of research litera­ ture that has been produced in the last two decades or so on the colonial history of India. However, although it presents a synthetic history, it does not offer an eclectic view. The narrative has carved its way carefully through the undulated terrains of Indian historio­ graphy. Sometimes, it has taken sides, sometimes it has treaded a middle path, but on occasions it has also been innovative and unor­ thodox. In other words, it refers to the debates and critically exam­ ines them to arrive at its own conclusions about the establishment and functioning of colonial rule and also the emergence of a pluralist and polyphonic nationalism in India. The book begins with a discussion of the political transformation of India in the eighteenth century, marked by the decline of the Mughal empire at the one end and the rise of the British empire on https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Preface xr the other, and in between them a period of uncertainty, dominated by some powerful regional successor states that emerged because of a decentralisation of Mughal authority. It then discusses the ideol­ ogy behind empire building, the historical controversies about the nature of British imperialism, the way a colonial economy unfolded itself and impacted on the Indian society. Then come the responses of the Indian people, their cultural adaptations, social reforms, and finally, their armed resistance, the most violent manifestation of which was the revolt of 1857. The chapters following this discuss the rise of modem nationalism in India, the controversies about its nature, its transformation under the Gandhian leadership, and the emergence of mass politics under the aegis of the Indian National Congress. This narrative seeks to take the discussion of nationalism beyond that constricted discursive space where nation-state is situ­ ated at the centre and the existence of a homogeneous nation is uncritically accepted and it is supposed to have spoken in one voice. This book acknowledges the historical significance of the mass movement against colonial rule-the largest of its kind in world his­ tory in terms of its sheer scale-but shows that the masses rarely spoke in one voice. If Congress represented the mainstream of nationalism in India that found fulfilment in the foundation of the Indian nation-state, there were several powerful minority voices too, such as those of the Muslims, non-Brahmans and dalits, women, workers and peasants, who had different conceptions of freedom, which the mainstream nationalism could not always accommodate. In this nationalist movement dalit concerns for the conditions of cit­ izenship, women's yearning for autonomy, peasants' and workers' longing for justice jostled unhappily with Congress's preoccupation with political sovereignty. The celebrations of independence in August 1947 were marred by the agonies of a painful and violent partition, signalling the stark reality of Muslim alienation. This book, in other words, is mindful of the diversities within unity, and narrates the story of a polyphonic nationalism where different voices converged in a common struggle against an authoritarian colonial rule, with divergent visions of future at the end of it. The making of this pluralist nation in India is a continually unfolding story that does not end where this book finishes, i.e., at the closing ofthe colo­ nial era. Nevertheless, the end of colonial rule constitutes an impor­ tant watershed, as after this the contest for 'nation-space, acquires new meanings and different dimensions. The present endeavour however remains modest in its scope and focuses only on the colo­ nial period of that continuing saga of adjusrment, accommodation and conflict. https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam xn Preface While writing this book, if there is one single text of historical writing that has influenced me most, it is Sumit Sarkar's Modern India, 1885-1947 (1983), which I have used extensively as a source of information as well as ideas, of course, not always agreeing with all his views. I have acknowledged the debt in the text as far as possi­ ble, but the debt is far too much that I can possibly acknowledge formally in every detail. I have also used some other books quite ex­ tensively, primarily as sources of information. Mention must be made of the works of S.R. Mehrotra (1971), Philip Lawson (1993), David Hardiman (1993), Geraldine Forbes (1998) and Ian Copland (1999). However, ultimately, this book projects my own under­ standing of Indian history. And as there is no unposirioned site of historical knowledge, this narrative is coloured by my own prefer­ ences and predilections-or in plain words, by my views on Indian nationalism, which will be self-evident in the narrative. I offer no apology for that However, no interpretation, as we all now acknow­ ledge, is absolute. For other interpretations, readers may follow the bibliography given at the end of this book I am indebted to many for writing this book, which has been tak­ ing shape in my mind for a very long time. My first and foremost debt is to my students over the last twenty-five years, at Calcutta University in India and at Victoria University ofWellington in New Zealand. They have heard earlier versions of many chapters of this book in their class lectures and tutorial discussions. Through their questions and comments they have constantly challenged me to think about Indian history in newer ways, and in the p rocess have enriched my understanding of the subject It is also time to acknow­ ledge my longstanding intellectual debt to my teachers from whom I had my lessons of history. I had the privilege of being trained by some of the most eminent historians of modem India, like the late Professors Amales Tripathi and Ashin Das Gupta and Professors Benoy Bhushan Chaudhuri, Arnn Dasgupta, Barun De, Nilmoni Mukherjee and Rajat Kanta Ray, all of whom have left their marks on my understanding of Indian history. Some of my friends, Rudrangshu Mukherjee, Parimal Ghosh, Samira Sen, Subho Basu and Rajar Ganguly have read various sections of the manuscript and have given their valuable suggestions. Gautam Bhadra has been gen­ erous as ever in sharing with me his incredible bibliographic know­ ledge. I am also thankful to my former colleagues at Calcutta University with whom I discussed many of my ideas in their early formative stage. My present colleagues in the History Programme at Victoria University of Wellington presented me with a collegial and https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Preface xl 11 intellectually stimulating working environment, without which I would not have been able to write this book. I also wish to thank the Research Committee of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sci­ ences at Victoria University of Wellington for sponsoring the project with generous research and travel grants, and also the staff of the Victoria University library for supplying me innumerable books and articles used in this book through its inter-library loan system. Spe­ cial thanks are also due to several people at the Orient Longman: to Sonali Sengupta who first put the idea of this book into my head, to Nandini Rao who sustained my enthusiasm over the years by main­ taining her faith in the project, and to Priti Anand who finally made this book possible. I am also indebted to the anonymous reader for pointing out some significant omissions in the manuscript and for making some valuable suggestions for improvement. And finally, I am immensely grateful to Veenu Luthria, whose meticulous editing has saved me from a lot of embarrassment. My family as usual has been enormously supportive. My parents have always been sources of inspiration for me. My wife Srilekha ungrudgingly took the responsibility of looking after the household, tolerated my endless grumblings, encouraged me constantly and kept a watchful eye on the progress of this book. My daughter Sohini, with her growing interest in history, has been a source of inspiration in many ways than she knows. It is to her and to other young minds, keen to learn about the historic struggles of the people of India, that this book is dedicated. Despite my best efforts there will certainly be many errors in the book, for which I alone remain responsible. https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Glossary abwab extra legal charges exacted by landlords adalat court ahimsa non-violence akbra gymnasium a mil revenue official am/a zamindari official anjuman local Muslim association ajlaf Muslim commoners atma sakti self strengthening ashraf Muslim respectable class or elite ashram Hindu religious organisation a trap Muslim commoners-same as a;Jaf azad free; liberty azad dastas guerrilla bands babu a disparaging colonial term for educated Bengalees babas Muslim religious meeting bakasht land where permanent tenancies had been converted into short-term tenancies bhadralok Bengali gentlemen, belonging to upper caste bhadramahila Bengali gentlewoman bhaichara brotherhood bhakti devotional religion cha pa tis flattened wheat bread chakri office job charkha spinning wheel chaukidari system of village ward and watch chautb one-fourth of the revenue claimed by the Marathas cutchery a court oflaw; a zamindar's court or office dadan advance dadani merchants who procured goods by paying advances to primary producers https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Glossary xv da/(s) faction(s) Dal Khalsa Sikh religious organisation initiated by Guru Govind Singh dalam revolutionary units dalapati leader of factions daJit oppressed-term used by the untouchables to identify themselves dalwai prime minister of the Mysore state daroga local police officer dastak permits issued by the local councils of the East India Company certifying their goods for the purpose of tax exemption desbpande revenue collector desbmukh revenue officer dharma religion; also, code of moral conduct Dharmashastra Hindu religious texts diku foreigner-term used by the tribals (San­ thals) to identify outsiders di wan treasurer ·diwani revenue collecting right diwani adalat civil court durbar royal court [arman Mughal imperial order fatwa Islamic religious declaration [auidari adalat criminal court fitna sedition fituris a tradition of tribal rebellion ghatwali service tenure for village watchmen garbhadhan consummation of marriage at the begin­ ning of puberty gtras customary dues gomustah Indian agent of the East India Company goonda(s) hooligan clements Gran th sacred text gurdwara Sikh place of worship harijan(s) literally, God's children-a phrase used by Gandhi to identify the untouchables hartal strike hundi bill of exchange iiaradari revenue farming system ijaradar revenue farmer iiaka area https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam xvi Glossary revenue paymg estate distributed among the Mughal aristocrats jam a estimated land revenue income janm{ holder of janmam tenure jat a personal rank of a Mughal military com­ mander or mansabdar jatha(s) Sikh bands of warriors jati caste [atra rural theatrical performance jhum shifting (slash and burn) cultivation jotedar(s) intermediary tenure holders kanamdarlkanakkaran holder of kanam tenure karma action or deed; the Hindu belief that ac­ tions in the present life determine a per­ son's fate in the next life kazi Muslim judge khadi homespun doth khalsa Sikh order of brotherhood kbalisa royal land khanazad hereditary Muslim aristocrats in the Mughal court khudkasht(s) peasants with occupancy rights khutba Friday prayers in the mosque kisan peasant kotwal Mughal police official in charge of an urban centre kulin some castes among the Brahmans and Kayasthas ofBengal who are considered to be the purest lathiyal(s) musclemen who fought with bamboo dubs mah al fiscal unit in north India mahatma great soul-epithet given to Gandhi by the people of India masand a deputy of the Sikh guru maul avi Islamic religious teacher mulgujar landholding primary zamindar mansabdar Mughal military commander/aristocrat mansabdari system of organisation of the Mughal aris­ tocracy Manusmriti religious text believed to be written by the ancient lawgiver Manu. https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Glossary xvu meli(s) anti-feudal demonstrations mir bahshi Mughal imperial treasurer mirasidar holders of hereditary land rights (mirasi) in south India mis ls combinations of Sikh ardars based on kin­ ship ties mistri jobbers mo(ussil small town or subdivisional town moballa an area of a town or village mufti Mu lim learned per on, expert in religious laws muktiyar namah power of attorney mullah Muslim priest mushaira public recital muttadars estate holders nakdi mansabdar mansabdars who were paid in cash nankar revenue free land nari babinis women brigades nawab Mughal provincial governor nazim official title for the Mughal provincial gov­ ernors pahikasht(s) vagrant peasants panchayat village council pattadar(s) landowners pat ii village headmen patni subinfeudatory tenures patta written agreement between the peasant and the landowner peshkash fixed amount paid by an autonomous ruler to the Mughal emperor peshwa prime minister of the Maratha ruler pir Islamic preacher podu a tribal term for shifting cultivation preva­ lent in the Andhra region pra1a nation/ subjects/tenants praja mandal nationalist people's organisations in the Indian Princely states prati sarkar parallel government pundit an expert in Hindu religious texts purdah a Persian word, literally meaning curtain, used to define the seclusion of Indian women https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam xvm Glossary qaum community based on common descent raj rule raj a autonomous ruler Ramrajya kingdom of the mythical king Rama rashtra state risalas units of the army of Haidar Ali of Mysore sahajdharis non-khalsa Sikhs sahib Indian term for the Europeans sahukar money lender sajjad nishins custodians of sufi shrines sarrun association sanad Mughal imperial order sangathan orgarusanon saranjam transferable land rights sardar(s) chiefs of Maratha, Rajput or Sikh clans; also the term for jobbers through whom workers were recruited in Indian indus­ tries sardesbmukhi a term for Maratha revenue demand sarkar government; also, rural district saryagraha a method of non-violent agitation devi ed by Mahatma Gandhi sati the custom of widows sacrificing them­ selves on the funeral pyre of their dead husbands satoar a numerical rank for Mughal military com­ manders indicating the number of horse­ men they were supposed to maintain seba dal() volunteer corps sepoy Indian soldier in the British army-origi­ nating from the Indian word sipabi shakri primal power sharif respectable Muslim shastra Hindu religious texts sharia Islamic law subah Mughal province sud a tribal term for foreigners prevalent in the Choto Nagpur region suddhi purification; reconversion movement star­ ted by Arya Samaj swadeshi indigenous political movement to boycott foreign goods and institutions and use their indigenous alternatives https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Glossary xix swaraJ self-rule su/araj ziladish independent district magistrate t aluqdars large landlords in Awadh tankha jagir hereditary possessions of the Rajpur chiefs under the Mughals tehsildar subordinate police officer than a police station; al o unit of police jurisdic­ tion of twenty to thirty square miles tinkathia a system that bound peasants to produce indigo in three twentieth part of their land tufan dal( ) revolutionary village units Upanishad ancient Hindu scripture ulama Muslim priests ulgulan rebellion of the Mundas um mah community based on allegiance to the common Islamic faith utar forced labour vakil(s) representatives/advocates at the Mughal courts vama fourfold division of Hindu society uarnashramadharma code of conduct maintaining the fourfold division of Hindu society Vaishnavaites followers of V aishnavism uatan hereditary land rights Vedanta Upanaishads or texts written at the end of the Vedas Vedas ancient Indian scriptures wazir prime minister zabt Mughal system of land measurement zamindar( s) landlords zenana the women's quarter in the inner part of the house zillah administrative district https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam Abbreviations AICC All India Congress Committee AITUC All India Trade Union Congress ATLA Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association ASSOC HAM Associated Chambers of Commerce AISPC All India States People's 'Conference AfKS All India Kisan Sabha BHU Banaras Hindu University BPKS Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha BPKS Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha CID Central Investigation Department CNMA Central National Mohammedan Association CPI Communist Party of India CSP Congress Socialist Party DK Dravida Kazhagam FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries GIP Great Indian Peninsular (Railway) ICS Indian Civil Service INA Indian National Army IoA Instrument of Accession IJMA Indian Jute Mills Association J LA jamshedpur Labour Association KPS Krishak Praja Party PCC Pradesh Congress Committee RAF Royal Air Force RIAF Royal Indian Air Force RIN Royal Indian Navy RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh SGPC Siromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee TIS CO Tata Iron and Steel Company https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam chapter one Transition of the Eighteenth Century 1. 1. DECLINE OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE Founded by Zahiruddin Babur in 1 526 and expanded to its full glory by Emperor Akbar in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Mughal empire began to decline rapidly since the reign of its last great ruler Aurangzeb (i658-1707). Even in the first half of the sev­ enteenth century its capital Delhi was considered to be the major power centre in the entire eastern hemisphere; b ut within fifty years the signs of decline of this mighty empire were unmistakably visible. Some historians ascribe Aurangzeb's divisive policies for this rapid decline-« particularly blamed are his religious policies, which alien­ ated the Hindus who constituted the majority of the subject popula­ tion. His expansionist military campaigns in western India against the two autonomous states of Bijapur and Golconda and against the Marathas are also believed to have sapped the vitality ofthe empire. But some other historians believe that the roots of Mughal decline lay in institutions and systems intrinsic to Mughal administration, rather than in personalities or specific policies. There is, however, less dispute about the fact that the process of decline had set in during the time ofAurangzeb and that it could not be arrested by his weak successors. The situation was further wors­ ened by recurrent wars of succession. The Mughal army was weak­ ened, allegedly because of a lamentable dearth of able commanders; there was no military reform and no new technology. This weaken­ ing of the Mughal military power encouraged internal rebellions and invited foreign invasions. The M arathas under Shivaji had time and again challenged Aurangzeb's imperial rule. After his death the Maratha plunders increased-in 1738 they plundered even the sub­ urbs of Delhi. This was followed by the Persian invasion under Nadir Shah in 1 738-3 and the sack of Delhi, which was a tremen­ dous blow to the prestige of the empire. A brief recovery followed and the first Afghan invasion in 1 7 4 8 was repelled. But the Afghans https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 2 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION under Ahmad Shah Abdali again struck back, took over Punjab and sacked Delhi in 1 756-57. To repel the Afghans, the Mughals sought help from the M arathas; but the latter were also defeated by Abdali at the battle of Panipat in 1 761. The Afghan menace did not last long, because a revolt in the army forced Abdali to retire to Afghani­ stan. But the political situation in north India certainly signified the passing of the glorious days of Mughal empire. Earlier historians like Sir J.N. Sarkar (1 932-50) believed that it was a crisis of personality-weak emperors and incompetent com­ manders were responsible for this downfall of the mighty Mughal e mpire. But then, other historians like T.G.P. Spear (1973) have pointed out that there was no dearth of able personalities in eigh­ teenth-century India. It was indeed a period marked by the activities of such able politicians and generals as the Sayyid b rothers, Nizarn­ ul-Mulk, Abdus Samad Khan, Zakaria Khan, Saadat Khan, Safdar Jung, Murshid Quli Khan or Sawai j ai Singh. But unfortunately, all these able statesmen were preoccupied more in self-aggrandisement and had little concern for the fate of the empire. So at times of crises, they could not provide leadership and even directly contributed to the process of decline. But this need not be considered as personal failures, as it was more due to the weaknesses inherent in the Mughal institutions, which had evolved gradually in the sixteenth and seven­ teenth centuries. The Mughal empire has been described as a "war-state" in its core.1 It sought to develop a centralised administrative system, whose vitality depended ultimately on its military power. The emperor stood at the apex of this structure, his authority resting primarily on his military might. Below him the other most important element in this structure was the military aristocracy. In the late sixteenth cen­ tury, Akbar had organised this aristocracy through his mansabdari system, which meant a military organisation of the a ristocracy, its basis primarily being personal loyalty to the emperor. Every aristo­ crat was called a mansabdar, with a dual numerical rank-jat and sawar-jat signifying his personal rank and sawar the number of horsemen he was required to maintain. This dual numerical rank also indicated the position of a particular nobleman in the overall Mughal bureaucracy. Sometimes they were paid in cash (naqdi mansabdar); but most often they were paid in the form of a jagir or landed estate, the estimated revenue income {Jama) of which would cover his personal salary and the maintenance allowance for his soldiers and horses. There were two types of j agir- transferable or tankha jagir and non-transferable or uatan jagir. Most of the j agirs https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF THE E I G HTE ENTH CENTURY 3 were transferable-the non-transferable jagirs were only a device to incorporate the locally powerful rajahs and zamindars into the Mughal system, by proclaiming their autonomous chiefdoms their vatan jagrrs. Appointment, promotion or dismissal of mansabdars and alloca­ tion or transfer of jagirs were done only by the emperor and so the members of the aristocracy only had personal loyalty to the emperor himself Any form of impersonal loyalty-national, ethnic or reli­ gious-could not develop in Mughal India and so the entire imperial edifice stood on a "patron-client relationship" existing between the emperor and the ruling class.2 The effectiveness and the permanence of this relationship depended on the personal qualities of the emperor and the constant expansion of resources, which explains the constant drive towards territorial conquests in Mughal India. Buethere were no more conquests since the late years of Aurangzeb, and this was supposedly followed by a period of constant shrinkage of the resources of the empire. This is what ruptured, as some histo­ rians argue, the functional relationship between the emperor and the aristocracy, on which depended the efficiency of the imperial administration. To understand how this diminishing loyalty of the aristocrats could affect the Mughal empire, a close look at the composition of this ruling class is called for. Lineage or ethnic background was the single most important factor in matters of appointment as rnansab­ dars. A great majority of the Mughal nobles were outsiders who had come from various parts of central Asia. But they were gradually Indianised, although this Indianisation took place without any coherent policy ofthe empire. The aristocracy was therefore divided into various ethno-religious groups, the most powerful among them being the Turani and the Irani groups. Those who came from the Turkish speaking regions of central Asia were called the Turanis, while those who came from the Persian speaking regions of present­ day Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq were called the Iranis. The Turanis were Sunnis and the Iranis were Shias, which lent a religious colour to their mutual animosity and jealousy. Though the Mughals belon­ ged to the Turani ethnic lineage, they did not show any personal favour to the Turanis. The other groups among the nobility were the Afghans, Sheikhjadas or the Indian Muslims and the Hindus. The latter group mainly consisted of the Rajputs and Marathas, whose incorporation was because of specific political needs of the empire. After Aurangzeb conquered the two Deccani kingdoms of Bijapur (1685) and Golconda (1689), the noble men who were in the https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 4 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION employ of those two kingdoms were absorbed into the Mughal aris­ tocracy and they came to form what is known as the Deccani group. It was primarily during the last years of Aurangzeb, due to the incor­ poration of the Maratha and Deccani nobles, that the composition of the Mughal aristocracy underwent a dramatic change, which brought to the surface the latent contradictions within its ranks.3 The mutual rivalry and competition among these groups of nobles, as it is argued by some historians, came to a head supposedly because of an eighteenth century economic crisis. About four-fifths of the land-revenue income of the Mughal empire was under the control of the rnansabdars; but this income was very unevenly dis­ tributed. In the middle of the seventeenth century, out of about 8,000 mansabdars, only 445 controlled 6 1 per cent of the revenue income of the empire. 4 This naturally created jealousy and tension within the aristocracy, particularly when the resources of the empire were stagnant or even diminishing. This economic situation-known as the "jagirdari crisis" of the eighteenth century-has been defined by Satish Chandra in the following words: "The available social sur­ plus was insufficient to defray the cost of administration, pay for wars of one type or another and to give the ruling class a standard of life in keeping with its expectations".5 This happened because of the unusual increase in the number of mansabdars at a time when the area to be distributed as jagir (or paibaqi) remained stagnant or even declined. Revenue collection, particularly in the south, fell far short of the estimated income, diminishing in turn the real income of the jagirdars in disturbed areas. To make matters worse, there was a con­ tinuous price rise since the late seventeenth century, as the supply of luxury goods flowed towards the European markets, putting the Mughal aristocracy in further distress. 6 As too many mansabdars were now chasing too few jagirs, many of them had to remain jagir­ less for years; and even when a jagir was assigned, there was no guar­ antee that they would not be transferred within a short period The entire aristocracy, therefore, suffered from a tremendous sense of personal insecurity. This jagir crisis was not, however, a new phenomenon, as there had always been gaps between collection of revenue and the esti­ mated revenue income of a particular jagir. The crisis increased dur­ ing the last years of Aurangzeb, mainly because of the Deccan wars. There was now a rise in the number of mansabdars and the politi­ cal turmoil made the collection of revenue a more difficult task J.F. Richar ds ( 1 975) has argued that the problem was to some ex­ tent artificial and due to wrong policies of Aurangzeb, who was https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 5 constantly expanding the size of the royal land or khalisa. There was a 23 per cent revenue increa e after the conquest of Bijapur and Golconda. But instead of distributing this extra income among his mansabdars, Aurangzeb wanted to use these resources to finance his Deccan campaign. So the newly conquered lands were incorporated into the royal khali a land, its revenue income going directly into the imperial treasury to meet the salary demands of the soldiers fighting in the south An opportunity to solve the jagirdari crisis was thus lost and therefore Richards thinks that this crisis was artificial and not due to any real scarcity of re ources. He has shown, however, that revenue collections in the Deccan were gradually falling, while Satish Chandra argues that Deccan always was a deficit area. So, it is difficult to say conclusively how the conquest of Bijapur and Gol­ conda would have really solved the jagir problem. But whether artificial or real, the jagir crisis is believed to have led to an unhealthy competition among the nobles in order to have con­ trol over good jagirs. Group politic at the Mughal court became an order of the day, each group wanting to have influence over the emperor to get access to good jagirs. After the death of Bahadur Shah in 1712, the problem reached crisis proportions, as now the low-ranking officials found it real hard to maintain their lifestyle with what they got from their jagirs, as revenue collection became increasingly difficult. The problem intensified further during the reigns of Jahandar Shah (17 12-13) and Farruksiyar ( 1 7 1 3 - 1 9). It did not improve at all during the reign of Muhammad Shah ( 1 719- 48), when mansabdari ranks were distributed indiscriminately for political reasons, leading to further inflation in the numbers of aris­ tocrats. To meet their increasing demands, portions of khalisa land were converted into jagir. This measure could not fully solve the problems of the man abdars, but impoverished the emperor. Nizarn­ ul-Mulk, after becoming wazir (prime minister) tried to solve the problem through a redistribution of land. But he could not follow it through, because of strong opposition from within the court. 7 Politicking at the imperial court was at its height during this time. More generally, the Mughal nobility was divided into three warring factions: the Irani group led by Asad Khan and his son Julfiqar Khan, the Turani group, led by Ghazi Uddin Khan, Feroz Jung and his son Chin Qulich Khan (Nizam-ul-Mulk) and the Hindustani group led by the Sayyid brothers, Khan-i-Dauran, some Afghan lead­ ers and some Hindus. These factions were not organised around eth­ nicity or religion, but more on family ties, personal friendship and above all selfish interests. This faction fighting never went beyond https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 6 FROM Pl. AsSEY TO PARTITION I \ I I C.. ( BA Y OF BENGAL ARABIAN SEA Provine I ( ltlbah) h dq rtcfl Main roads nd car v n rout o 200 a rn Sal MAP 1: The Mughal empire in 1 707 https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF T H E E I G HTEENTH CENTURY 7 the imperial court, nor lapsed into violent confrontations. No one questioned the divine right of the Timurids to rule; but every group tried to extend their influence over the emperors to control the dis­ tribution of patronage. Proximity of any particular group to the centre of power naturally alienated the others and this gradually affected the personal bonds of loyalty between the emperor and his noblemen, as disaffected groups found no reason to espouse the cause of the empire. And what was worse, this resulted in corruption in the army. No mansabdar maintained the required number of sol­ diers and horses and there was no effective supervision either. This weakening of the army was fatal for the empire, as ultimately the stability of the empire depended on its military might. That the Mughal army was no longer invincible was successfully shown by the Maratha leader Shivaji. This decline of the army became more palpable, as there was no fresh technological input or organisational innovation. The nobles now were more interested in carving out autonomous or semi-autonomous principalities for themselves, which resulted in a virtual fragmentation of the empire. Recurring peasant revolts in the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries are also believed to have been a major cause of the decline of the Mughal empire and it is not unlikely that the crisis of the ruling elites had something to do with them. An empire im­ posed from above and its gradually increasing economic pressures were perhaps never fully accepted by the rural society; and the regional sentiments against a centralised power had also been there. Peasant unrest was therefore a recurrent theme in the history of the Mughal state ever since its inception. But fear of the Mughal army always acted as a deterrent and prevented the problem from blowing out of proportion. In the late seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, as the weaknesses of the central power became apparent and the Mughal army faced successive debacles, and at the same time the oppression of the Mughal ruling class increased, resistance to impe­ rial authority also became widespread and more resolute. In most cases, these rebellions were led by the disaffected local zamindars and backed fully by the oppressed peasantry. Eventually the com­ bined pressure of the zamindars and peasants often proved to be too much for the Mughal authority to withstand. These revolts can be interpreted in various ways. They can be por­ trayed as political assertion of regional and communitarian identities against an intruding centralising power or as reactions against the bigoted religious policies of Aurangzeb. The latter interpretation seems to be more unlikely, as in the later pan of his reign, Aurangzeb https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 8 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION was showing more liberalism towards the non-believers and in fact wooing many of the Hindu local chieftains in a cool calculating move to win their loyalty and solve the political problems of the empire by isolating his enemies. 8 But the real reasons behind these revolts, as some historians argue on the other hand, could be found in the property-relations of the Mughal empire. Whether or not the emperor was the owner of all lands in his empire is a debatable issue; but he certainly had an unquestionable right over the income of the land which was collected in the form of land revenue, the amount of which was gradually increasing since the Sultani period. Irfan Habib ( 1 963) has shown that the Mughal land-revenue system rested on a compromise: the peasant was left with sufficient provision for sub­ sistence while the surplus, as far as possible, was extracted by the state in the form of land revenue. It is not true that the Mughal peas­ ant was left with no surplus at all; for continuing production, he was certainly left with some, while differentiation within the peasantry also indicates that. But on the whole, although larger pea ants could withstand the pressure, the smaller peasantry increasingly felt op­ pres ed. 9 Usually in the zabt areas (where a detailed land survey was undertaken) the revenue demand was one-third of the produce, but the actual a mount varied from region to region. In some areas it was half of the produce and in fertile regions like Guj arat it was as high as three-fourths. Part of it, collected from the khalisa land, went to the imperial treasury, while the larger portion (80 per cent in Aurangzeb's time) went to the jagirdars. Below the demand of the state and above that of the peasants, there was another kind of demand on the income of the land, and that was the demand of the local landlords or zamindars. There was differentiation among the zarnindars.P Some of them, like the Raj put chiefs of Rajasthan, were fairly big rajas with considerable local political power. They were incorpo rated into the Mughal bureaucracy, as in return for a fixed payment (peshkash) and loyalty to the emperor, their autonomous power over their own territory or uatan was recognised. At the bottom were the mulgujari or primary zamindars, who had an independent right over the land and in many cases it was through them that revenue was collected from the peas­ ants and in return they got n an kar or revenue-free land. Between these two groups were the intermediary zamindars who collected revenue from their own zamindari as well from other primary zamin­ dars, Below the zamindars were the peasants who were also differen­ tiated: the khudkashts were peasants with occupancy rights, while the pahikashts were vagrant peasants. There were close community https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 9 relations based on caste, clan and religion between the primary zamindars and the peasants. This was an important source of power for the zamindars, many of whom controlled small armies and fort. The Mughal administration in the interior could not therefore func­ tion without their active cooperation. Akbar had tried to tum the zamindars into collaborators; but from the late years of Aurangzeb, particularly after the war of succession ( 1 707 -8) following his death, the loyalty of the zamindars definitely began to flounder.'! In the Deccan, towards the last years of Bahadur Shah's reign, all the zamindars, both primary and intermediary, turned against the Mughal state with the active support of the hard pressed peasantry.12 One major reason for the open defiance of the local landlords might have been the increasing oppression of the jagirdars. T he ear­ lier emperors tried to keep them in check through a system of rota­ tion. Irfan Habib (1963) has argued that because of this Mughal system, and by taking advantage of it, the jagirdars o ppressed the peasantry. As they were :frequently transferred, they did not develop any attachment or any long-term interest in the estate and tried to exact as much as possible during their short tenures, without any consideration for the peasants. T heir natural oppressive propensities remained within certain limits only because of constant imperial supervision; but this supervisory system totally collapsed in the eigh­ teenth century. T he overrnighiy nobles who could resist or defy transfer, developed local power bases and by using that tried to ex­ tract as much as possible. T his trend was quite visible in Golconda after its subjugation.' ! Later, in the last years of Bahadur Shah's reign, a number of jagirdars in the Deccan made compromises with the Maratha sardars (chiefs) and that arrangement allowed them to collect as much as possible from the peasantry. Sometimes they collected advances from the amils (revenue officials), who in turn extorted as much as they could from the peasants. 14 On the other hand, those who were more :frequently transferred found the local conditions too turbulent for the collection of revenue. To solve this problem and to squeeze maximum benefit within a short period, they devised the ijaradari system, through which revenue-collecting right was farmed out to the highest bidder. The revenue farmer's demand was often much higher than the actual revenue demand and the pressures ultimately moved downward to the primary zamindars and the peasants. During the rime of Farruksiyar's reign even khalisa lands were being given over to the ijaradars, The Mughal compromise is believed to have completely broken down as a result, and the primary zamindars began to defy the Mughal state for their own share of the surplus. In the outlying and https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 10 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION more disturbed areas, such as Deccan, zamindari defiance became an order of the day. Even in the heart of Mughal north India in the eighteenth century, there was a widespread tendency among the zamindars to defy the central authority, withhold revenue payment and to resist the Mughal state when it forcibly tried to collect it.is Because of their community ties with the peasants, they could easily mobilise them against the MughaJ power. For the peasants also, this zamindari initiative solved the problem of leadership, as they often found it difficult to challenge on their own a centralised authority and continue their struggle for a very long time. The peasant griev­ ances in late Mughal period were, therefore, often organised around religious and regional identities. The M aratha sardars took advan­ tage of the peasant grievances; the jat peasants were mobilised in north India by their zamindars; the Sikhs rose in revolt in Punjab; and the Rajput chiefs withdrew their allegiance in Rajasthan. All these revolts led to the formation of autonomous kingdoms in dif­ ferent parts of the empire, further attenuating the authority of the Mughals. The eighteenth century thus witnessed the rise of a variety of regional states, some of which built on "older local or regional tradirion(s) of state formation", others focused on ethnic identity and associated "notions of 'community"'.16 By the end of the cen­ tury, effective rule of the Mughal emperor was confined only to a narrow stretch around the capital city of Delhi. In 185 8 when the English deposed the last emperor Bahadur Shah II, they only ended the fiction of his imperiunl. To some historians, however, poverty and economic pressure do not seem to be a wholly adequate explanation for these rebellions and the eventual decline of the Mughal state, since there had been significant regional variations in local economies. The recent 'revi­ sionist' literature, therefore, wants us to move away from this cen­ trist view and to look at the situation from a different perspective­ the perspective of the periphery. The Mughal decline, according to this new history, is the result of the rise of new groups into economic and political power and the inability of a distant and weakened cen­ tre to control them any longer. In the entire history of Mughal em­ pire there is more evidence of prosperity and growth than of decline and crisis. There is no denying that even in the eighteenth century there had been regions with surplus resources, like for example, M o radabad-Bareilly, Awadh and Banaras; but the Mughal state could not appropriate this surplus and the resources accumulated in the hands of local zamindars. 17 Bengal was another surplus area. In eastern Bengal, vast stretches of forest land was being reclaimed https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTIJRY 11 around this time and the settlers of these new areas gave distinct reli­ gious and political orientation to their newly established agrarian communities, while the provincial officials could easily carve out for themselves new revenue units around these agrarian settlements. " The rising agricultural production in some areas and monetisation of the economy, in other words, made available more resources at the disposal of the zamindars and peasants, and powerful local lin­ eages, who gained distinctively greater advantage and confidence vis­ a-vis the imperial centre." Taking advantage of a weakening central control, they now found it more convenient to repudiate their alle­ giance to a centralised imperial power and assert their autonomy, while still maintaining the cultural and ideological framework of the Mughal state. Possibilities for such diffusion of power had always been t here in Mughal India, it has been argued. There were corporate groups and social classes who enjoyed, despite a supposedly obtrusive central authority, various kinds of rights that constituted, in CA Bayly's terminology, their "portfolio capital", which they could invest to reap huge profits. 20 According to this school of history, throughout the Mughal period there had been a constant process of reconcilia­ tion and adjustment between the central power and the regional elite. Mughal sovereignty, as Andre Wink has argued, rested on a "balancing system of continually shifting rivalries and alliances." The Mughal system was prepared to accommodate ''jitna " or sedi­ tion, and always tried to incorporate the ascendant localised powers, either indigenous or foreign, into its concept of universal dominion and on the effective functioning of this mechanism of conciliation and coercion depended its continued existence. " The Mughal pro­ cess of centralisation, in other words, left enough space for the continued existence of rival principles of organisation. Frank Perlin, in this context, has talked about the existence of a "'library' of cate­ gories and techniques", implying a multiplicity of systems of govern­ ance, methods of measurement and techniques of collecting revenue, varying widely in space and rime. There was multiplicity of rights, like the concept ofvatan in the Deccan, which meant heritable rights that could not be taken away even by kings. Attempts at centralisa­ tion could not eliminate those rights in the eighteenth century.22 So, as Muz.affar Alam sums up the situation, around this time, because of decentralisation and commercialisation, a group of "upstarts" had come to monopolise the resources ofthe empire at the exclusion of the hereditary Mughal nobility or the khanazads. 23 These upstarts were the new regional power elite who rose to prominence in the https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 12 FROM PL.ASSEY TO PARTITION provinces and successfully contested the centralising tendency of the MughaJ state. This group included the jagirdars who defied transfer and thus became local rulers, and the revenue farmers-or the new "entrepreneurs in revenue"-who "combined military power with expertise in managing cash and local trade". 24 "Consistent economic growth and prosperity", rather than poverty and crisis, thus pro­ vided "the context of the local political turmoil"." The Mughal sys­ tem, in other words, had always left a space for the rise of powerful regional groups and significant economic and social changes in the eighteenth century brought that possibility into sharper focus. But then these new developments were not properly recognised or accommodated within the system, and hence its eventual demise. It is difficult to arrive at a convenient middle ground between the 'conventional' and 'revisionist' histories; nor is it easy to dismiss either of them. The revisionist history has been taken to task for underestimating the cohesiveness of the Mughal empire and for ignoring the contemporary Muslim concepts of centralised sover­ eignty. These critics, on the other hand, have been assailed for cling­ ing on to a mindset that is accustomed to look at the Mughal empire only as a centralised structure. 26 If there is any shared ground at all, as Athar Ali admits in his critique of the revisionist historiography, it is in the common recognition of the fact that the zarnindars or the intermediary classes "constituted a centrifugal force" in the Mughal structure. 27 We may, however, conclude by saying that the idea of 'decline' is perhaps an inadequate theme for understanding the eigh­ teenth century in Indian history. The Mughal system continued even long after the de facto demise of the empire, which was followed by the emergence of a number of regional powers. The eighteenth cen­ tury in Indian history is not a dark age, nor an age of overall decline. The decline of one pan-Indian empire was followed by the rise of another, the intervening period being dominated by a variety of powerful regional states. This century should, therefore, be consid­ ered, as Satish Chandra (1991) has argued, as a distinct chronologi­ cal whole. 1.2. EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL POWERS By 1761 the Mughal empire was empire only in name, as its weak­ nesses had enabled the local powers to assert their independence. Yet the symbolic authority of the Mughal emperor continued, as he was still considered to be a source of political legitimacy. The new states did not directly challenge his authority and constantly sought his sanction to legitimise their rule. In many areas of governance these https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 13 states continued the Mughal institutions and the administrative sys­ tem; where changes occurred- and they did occur, of course-they came r ather lowly, to accommodate the altered power relations in the regions. The e mergence of these scares in the eighteenth century, therefore, repre enred a transformation rather than collapse of the polity. It signified a decentralisation of power and not a power vac­ uum or political chaos. These new states were of various kinds with diverse histories: some of them were founded by M ughal provincial governors, some were set up by the rebels against the Mughal state; and a few states which asserted their independence were previously functioning as autonomous but dependent polities. Bengal, Hyderabad and Awadh were the three successor states of the M ughal empire, in the sense chat they were founded by Mughal provincial governors who never formally severed their links with the centre, but virtually exercised autonomy in matters of execution of power at the local level. The province or the subah of Bengal gradu­ ally became independent of Mughal control after M urshid Quli Khan became the governor in 1717.2s Initially, Aurangzeb had ap­ pointed him the diwan (collector of revenue) of Bengal to streamline the revenue administration of the province. Then in 1710 Bahadur Shah reappointed him in this position after a short _break of two years. When Farruksiyar became the emperor, he confirmed Murshid Quli in his position and also appointed him the deputy governor of Bengal and governor of Orissa. Later in 1717 when he was appointed the governor or Nazim of Bengal, he was given the unprecedented privilege of holding the two offices of nazim and diwan simulta­ neously. The division of power, which was maintained throughout the Mughal period to keep both the imperial officers under control through a system of checks and balances, was thus done away with. This helped Murshid Quli, who was already known for his efficient revenue administration, to consolidate his position further. He did not of course formally defy Mughal authority and regularly sent rev­ enue to the imperial treasury. Indeed, the Bengal revenue was often the only regular income for the beleaguered Mughal emperors dur­ ing periods of financial stringency and uncertainty. But behind the veneer of formal allegiance to the Timurid rulers, Murshid Quli began to enjoy a considerable amount of a utonomy within his own domain and initiated almost a dynastic rule. He was indeed the last governor of Bengal appointed by the Mughal emperor. The foundation of Murshid Quli's power was of course his very successful revenue administration, which even in the days of politi­ cal chaos elsewhere in the e mpire, made Bengal a constant revenue https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 14 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION paying surplus area. It is difficult to determine whether or not he was oppressive or that revenue demand during his period increased significantly; but revenue collection had shot up by 20 per cent between 1700 and 1722. This efficient collection system was oper­ ated through powerful intermediary zamindars. Murshid Quli sent his inves tigators to every revenue-paying area to make a detailed survey and compelled the zamindars to pay in full and on time. For this purpose, he encouraged the development of a few powerful zamindaris at the expense of smaller inefficiently managed zamin­ daris, while refractory zamindars were punished and some of the jagirdars were transferred to the outlying province of Orissa, their e states being converted into khalisa or royal land.29 The period between 1717 and 1726 therefore witnessed the emergence of a few landed magnates. These magnates assisted the nazim in the timely collection of revenue and with his patron­ age they also expanded their own estates. 3 0 Indeed, by the time of Murshid Quli's death in 1727, fifteen largest zamindariswere respon­ sible for about half of the revenue of the province. But along with the rise of the zamindars as a new powerful elite in the province, there was also the growing importance of merchants and bankers during this period. Bengal always had a lucrative trade, and the political stability and increase in agricultural productivity during Murshid Quli's period provided further impetus to such trading activities. In the seventeenth century, silk and cotton textile, sugar, oil and clarified butter from Bengal went through overland route to Persia and Afghanistan via a number of north and west Indian dis­ tributing centres and on the oceanic route through the port of Hughli to the Southeast Asian, Persian Gulf and Red Sea ports. Dur­ ing the political turmoil of the eighteenth century, traffic through the overland route partially declined, but oceanic trade thrived with increasing investment from the European Companies-the Dutch, the French and the English. During the first half of the century, Europe certainly became the major destination for goods from Ben­ gal, and this had a significant impact on the textile industry in the region. Bengal always enjoyed a favourable balance of trade, with surplus bullion brought in by the European Companies to buy Ben­ gal goods and this was absorbed smoothly into the cash economy and revenue remittance structure. On the Indian side this trade was dominated by a variety of merchants-Hindus, Muslims and Armenians. Some of them were magnates, like the Hindu merchant Umi Chand or the Armenian tycoon Khoja Wajid who controlled a fleet of ships. And they enjoyed a very cordial relation with the state https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITION OF THE E I GHTEE NTH CENTURY 15 and bureaucracy, as the Mughal state traditionally never tried to squeeze the merchants." On the other hand, the constant pressure on the zamindars to pay revenue in time and its regular remittance to the imperial treasury in Delhi brought powerful financiers and bankers into great demand. They provided securities at every stage of the transaction and enjoyed unprecedented patronage of the gov­ ernor, thus providing the main supportive pillar of his power. The most significant story of such collaboration was the rise of the bank­ ing house of j agar Seth, who eventually became the treasurer of the provincial government in 1730, with strategic control over the mint. Apart from zamindars, merchants and bankers, Murshid Quli also ensured the loyalty of the officials, by appointing his friends, rela­ tives and loyalists in important positions and driving his potential enemies out of the province-a situation which could not be dreamt of in the heyday of the Mughal empire." Murshid Quli, however, never did sever his formal connections with the Mughals and continued to send the annual Bengal revenue to Delhi regularly. But within his own domain he acted as an autono­ mous ruler and in a true dynastic fashion named his daughter's son Sarfaraz Khan his successor. But Sarfaraz was ousted by his father Shujauddin Muhammad Khan (Murshid Quli's son-in-law), who took control of the two provinces of Bengal and Orissa in 1727 and had his position endorsed by the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah. He too maintained the relationship with the Mughal court, but enjoyed autonomy in matters of local administration, which was supported by the new forces of Bengal politics, the zamindars, mer­ chants and the bankers. By the 1730s, as Philip Calkins argues, "the government of Bengal began to look more like government by co­ operation of the dominant forces in Bengal, rather than the imposi­ tion of the rule from outside"." However, it is also true that this gradual rise in the power of the merchants, bankers and zamindars also meant a relative diminution of the authority of the nazim. This became quite evident in a coup in 1739-40, in which Shujauddin's son Sarfaraz Khan, who had become the new nazim, was ousted by his army commander Alivardi Khan, with the help of the banking family ofj agat Serhs and a few powerful zamindars. Sarfaraz had to go not just because he was an inefficient administrator, but because he had alienated the house of Jagat Seth, and had lost the support of a few powerful officials. With his deposition the office of the nazim went to an able military general, Alivardi Khan, who later obtained imperial sanctions for his appointment. It was Alivardi's reign, which marked a virtual break with the Mughals. All major appointments were now made without any https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 16 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION reference to the emperor and finally, the regular flow of revenue to Delhi was stopped. Although there was never any formal defiance of the Mughal authority, for all practical purposes an autonomous administration, free of all sorts of imperial control, had now emer­ ged in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The major problems for Alivardi came from outside: he had to face Maratha depredations and Afghan rebellion. The Marathas from the west in their search for a pan­ Indian empire invaded Bengal a number of times, causing immense damage to life and property. Ultimately in 1751, Alivardi came to terms with the Marathas by agreeing to pay chauth (one-fourth of the revenue) and handing over Orissa. But in the meanwhile some rebel Afghan troops under the leadership of Mustafa Khan had taken over Patna in 1748 and thus had posed another great chal­ lenge to his authority. Alivardi eventually succeeded in putting down the Afghans and recovered Pama. However, one major fallout of the Maratha raids was the disruption of Bengal trade, particularly of the overland trade with north and west India. But it was short-lived and the recovery was aided by a massive increase in European trade, both corporate trade of the Companies and private trade of their officials. They could not immediately dislodge the Indian merchants from the market, but it certainly signified the beginning ofEuropean dominance in the trading world ofBengal, preparing the ground for an eventual English takeover of the province34-a development we shall discuss in detail later. Alivardi died i n 1756, nominating his grandson Siraj-ud-daula his successor. But his succession was chal­ lenged by two other contenders for the throne, Shaukat Jung (Faujdar of Purnea) and Ghaseti Begum (Alivardi's daughter). This resulted in intense court factionalism, as the overmighty zamindars and com­ mercial people felt threatened by an extremely ambitious and asser­ tive young nawab." This destabilised the administration of Bengal, and the advantage was taken by the English East India Company, which acquired a foothold in Bengal politics through what is popu­ larly known as the Plasscy conspiracy of 1757 that ended the rule of Siraj-ud-daula. This story of yet another transition i n Bengal politics we shall see in a short while. The autonomous kingdom ofHyderabad was founded in 1724 by a powerful noble at the imperial court, Chin Qulich Khan, who eventually took the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf ]ah I. Known as the leader of the Turani party, he felt frustrated in court politics due to the haughty assertion of power by the Indian Muslirh faction led by the Sayyid brothers, who had emperor Farruksiyar killed and Muhammad Shah installed on the throne as a puppet ruler in 1719. https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSmON OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 17 To save the Timurid rule from being subverted in this way, Nizam­ ul-Mulk organised the Turani and Irani noblemen against the Sayyids and ultimately defeated and killed them in 1720. Muham­ mad Shah was restored to the throne and Nizam-ul-Mulk acted as his wazir from 1722 to 1724. But eventually he found that carving out an autonomous principality in the Deccan for himself was more attractive. In Hyderabad, Mubariz Khan, the Mughal governor of Deccan, was ruling almost as an independent king. In 1723 the nizam de­ feated Mubariz and the following year he took over as the Subahdar of Deccan and consolidated his power around Hyderabad. The actual independence of the Hyderabad kingdom may be dated from 17 40 when finally the nizarn left north India to settle there perma­ nently. He subdued the refractory zamindars and showed tolerance towards the Hindus who had economic power in their hands and as a result, Hyderabad witnessed the emergence of a new regional elite who supported the nizarn. By the rime ofhis death in 1748, the state of Hyderabad was a recognisable power in Deccan politics, acknow­ ledging Mughal suzerainty only in a symbolic sense. Coins were still minted in the name of the Mughal emperor; his name also figured in the khutba or the Friday prayers. But for all practical purposes, the nizarn acted independently, conducting wars, signing treaties, con­ ferring mansabs and making important appointments without any reference to the emperor. Soon, however, after the death of the first nizam, Asaf j ah I, Hyderabad began to experience a series of crises. While Maratha depredations continued to be a major source ofanxiety, a war of suc­ cession ensued between his son Nasir Jung and grandson Muzaffar Jung, the advantage of that disunion being taken by the French under Dupleix. Muzaffar emerged victorious from this contest with French support and gave handsome monetary rewards and territo­ rial concessions to the French. But that did not end his problems, as during the subsequent years, the Marathas, Mysore and the Carnatic-all settled their territorial scores against Hyderabad. The situation improved again after 1762 during the period ofNizam Ali Khan, whoseized control of the administration and during his long reign lasting up to 1803, he settled border disputes with his neigh­ bours, giving Hyderabad the much desired political stability. The Hyderabadi administrative system did not try to destroy the indigenous power structures within the territory, but sought to incorporate them into a "patron-client relationship" with the cen­ tral power. The locally entrenched semi-autonomous rulers were allowed to govern their inherited territories in return for an annual https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 18 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION tribute or peshkash paid to the nizam, The locally powerful traders, money lenders and the military aristocracy also played a crucial role in the Hyderabad polity, by providing valuable financial and mili­ tary support to the nizam, who emerged as the chief patron within the polity. Under this new administration, the old Mughal institu­ tions were not totally thrown out, but they underwent substantial changes in content. Land revenue was collected through powerful intermediary revenue farmers; but unlike the Mughal practice, there was very little attempt to keep them under control. The jagirs under this new system became hereditary and the mansabdari system only retained a few of its Mughal features. There was also a remarkable change in the composition of the nobility: while the older military aristocracy retained some of its power, some new men with exper­ tise i n revenue and financial management rose from lower ranks. On the whole, "power remained widely diffused" in the Hyderabadi administrative structure.36 By the end of the eighteenth century, Hyderabad represented a relatively new political system with a whole range of new participants, who had diverse origins and social background. Another Mughal province that became autonomous in the course of the eig hteenth century was Awadh. Saadat Khan was appointed the Mughal governor of Awadh in I 722 with the difficult charge of subduing rebellions by the local rajas and chiefs. He accomplished this task within a year and in appreciation, the emperor Muhammad Shah conferred on him the title ofBurhan-ul-Mulk. Soon after this, Saadat Khan returned to the capital to consolidate his position in the imperial court, but ended up in a quarrel with one of Muhammad Shah's favourites and was again forced to return to Awadh. Frus­ trated in court politics, Saadat then decided to build up a power base in Awadh and as a first step had his son-in-law Safdar Jung recog­ nised by the emperor as his deputy governor. The other step towards the establishment of his dynastic rule was to make the office of di wan virtually independent of all imperial control. The revenues of Awadh from then on were handled by a Punjabi Khatri official who functioned under Saadat Khan and never reported anything to the imperial office. The problem of refractory zamindars in Awadh was solved in time and a new land revenue settlement was introduced with the revenue demand increasing by more than half. The jagirdari system was reformed, with jagirs being granted to the local gentry, while a rich flow of trade kept the province affluent. This resulted in the creation of a new regional ruling elite, consisting mainly of Indian Muslims, Afghans and Hindus who became Saadat's main support base. But https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam T RA N S m O N OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTU RY 19 the latter kept the communication channels open with the imperial court. Indeed, during this whole period he constantly expanded the frontiers of the Awadh subah, but never without the formal ap­ proval of the emperor. He also nurtured his old ambitions in impe­ rial court politics, but only to be frustrated again in 1739-40 when the position of m ir bakshi (imperial treasurer) went to the nizam, despite the services he had rendered during the invasion of the Persian king Nadir Shah. He considered this a betrayal and in vengeance changed sides to join the Persian invader. But he could not suffer the arrogance and haughty behaviour of Nadir Shah and the day after the occupation of Delhi, in sheer frustration and despondency, he poisoned himself to death. However, by the time he died in 1740, Saadat had certainly developed in Awadh a semi­ autonomous regional political system, with vastly reduced financial commitment to, but no formal disjunction with, the Mughal rate. Nadir Shah remained the emperor of India for just two months and he settled the succession question in Awadh by accepting twenty million rupees as peshkash from Safdar Jung. Muhammad Shah later confirmed this appointment and conferred on him an imperial title. But Safdar Jung's opportunities really came when both Muhammad Shah and the Nizam-ul-Mulk died in 1748 and he was appointed wazir by the new emperor Ahmad Shah. Safdar Jung extended his sphere of influence by using the new imperial position, the most important of these gains being the seizure of Farukhabad from the Pathans. But on the other hand, this self-aggrandisement of the wazir soon alienated both rhe imperial family as well as the court nobles who ultimately contrived his ouster in 1753. The year marked an important turning point in the political history of north India, as Richard Barnett points out, by signifying "the visible secession of Awadh and Allahabad from the remainder of the dwindling em­ pire,,.3 7 The formal connection was yet to be severed fully. After Safdar Jung's death in late 1754, his only son Shuja-ud-daula was again appointed the governor of Awadh by the puppet emperor Alamgir 1 1. And Shuja too successfully maintained the autonomy of the Awadh subah without ever formally defying the symbolic authority of the Mughal emperor. When in December 1759 on the death of Alamgir II, the fugitive crown prince staged his own coro­ nation as Shah Alam II, he named Shuja his wazir. Although this position was merely fictional, Shuja maintained his power within his own domain and was a much sought after ally for both the parties when Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Abdali arrived again in India to engage the Marathas in the Third Battle of Panipat (1761). Shuja https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam 20 FROM PLASSEY TO PARTITION joined the Afghan invader to see his local opponents, the Marathas, humbled and weakened; but throughout this confrontation he behaved like an independent partner in an alliance of equals. Within his own domain of Awadh and Allahabad his autonomy and power remained unchallenged till his encounter with the English East India Company in 1764.JS Apart from these successor states formed by Mughal governors, the other states that emerged in eighteenth-century India were those founded by rebels against the Mughal state, such as the Marathas, the Sikhs, the Jars and the Afghan kingdoms of Farukhabad and Rohilkhand. Among them it was perhaps only the Maratha state that had the potential co develop into a new pan-Indian empire replacing the Mughals; but that potential was never fully realised because of the nature of the Mararha polity itself. In the seventeenth century it began as a small kingdom in western India, founded by the legend­ ary Maratha chief Shivaji, against stiff opposition from the local Muslim kingdom of Bijapur and the pressure of the mighty Mughal army. Soon after his death in 1680, it was troubled by dynastic factionalism and the constant pressure of the Mughal policy o f con­ quest in the Deccan. Local deshmukhs (revenue officers) and zarnin­ dars took advantage of the situation by sometimes aligning with the Mughals and sometimes joining hands with the Marathas. Two of Shivaji's sons, first Shambhaji and then Rajaram, ruled briefly and battled incessantly with the Mughal army. When Rajaram died in 1699, one of his queens, Tarabai, began to rule in the name of her infant son Shivaji 11; but Aurangzeb's army during this period con­ quered Maratha forts one after another, keeping Tarabai constantly on the move. From late 1705, however, the tide began to turn against Aurangzeb and when he died in 1707 after forty years of futile warfare in the Deccan, the Marathas still remained to be subjugated. The Maratha kingdom was, however, certainly weakened and the process was further exacerbated after the release of Shahu, Shivaji's grandson, from the Mughal prison in 1707. There were now two rival contende rs for the throne and during the next eight years, Maharashtra was immersed in a full-scale civil war between the forces of Shahu and those of Tarabai, who intended to rule in the name of Shivaji II. The loyalty of the Maratha sardars and deshmukhs shifted constantly between the two Maratha factions and the Mu­ ghals, the situation of anarchy becoming all-pervasive by 17 12- 13. But, helped by a group of new independent sardars, as well as a number of Brahman banking families, and an able Chitpavan Brah­ man peshu/a (prime minister), Balaji Vishwanarh, Shahu ultimately https://telegram.me/UPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/FreeUPSCMaterials https://telegram.me/MaterialforExam TRANSITIO OF T H E EIGHTEENTH CENTIJRY 21 """ 1 !- !.. :. Approx i m ate fronuers of the reg ions in 1 8th C. I nternal boundar