Philosophy Final Exam Notes PDF

Philosophy ‘Philia’ : Love Sophia: Wisdom Philosophy: love of wisdom No definite definition as there are many. We zoom in on thought and decision-making so we can: ○ Clarify Language ○ Identify our starting assumptions: every conversation includes a safe or unsafe assumption. ○ Check the logical steps that move us from starting points to conclusions: ○ Enter into dialogue with rival positions. ○ In these ways, we can see whether our conclusions (and actions) hold up to critical scrutiny. Overall, philosophers reflect on our beliefs. Why? ○ Our beliefs and values help motivate and define who we are. So the beliefs and values that you have gives you the basis of an outlook you have in the morning. – It basically sets an intention and affects the perspective that you have on life. Essentially it affects your life and your thoughts. Your reality reflects your values and beliefs. So your thoughts create your reality. ○ Thus, it’s worthwhile to know where those beliefs come from. Maybe our beliefs come from those and things around us growing up. So you are you surround yourself with. Areas of Philosophy: Metaphysics: Nature of reality, God, human nature… Epistemology: Knowledge, belief formation, evidence, philosophy of science… Ethics: ○ Moral obligations/duties/actions, evaluations ○ Applied Ethics Abortions, animal rights Aesthetics ○ Beauty, art, aesthetic value… Political Philosophy ○ Role of the state, rights, society…. Can we justify having no government? What does it mean to live in a justice society Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics ○ Not as traditional and shouldn’t be a category Metaphysics: Kind of questions we ask in metaphysics: ○ What is the appropriate description of reality? ○ What kinds of substances exist in reality: physical? Non-physical? ○ What is the nature of the universe? ○ Does the universe have purpose? ○ Is reality uniform? Organized? Chaotic? ○ Human Nature: Are we free? DO we have free will? Are we (human beings) purely physical beings? Are we purely natural beings? What kinds of things are our minds? Do we have an objective purpose? Or is it entirely subjective? ○ What is life? What is death? What does it mean to be alive? Do we have a specific goal? What do we mean when we say somebody is dead? When do we declare someone dead? What things in the word are contingent? Necessary? It seems like we are here continently but we did’t need to be here. What is the relationship between events? Causation? Are they plausibly related? What does it mean to say that one event causes another event? Does normativity exist? Nomativity: to be contrasted with. We are talking about how the world ought to be. For example, “You shouldn’t had hit the kid who stole the candy.” ○ What exists? Does god exist? What kind of things exist? Only physical things? What is real? Does any world exist outside my mind and perceptions? ○ Do we have free will? ○ What does it mean to be human? ○ Are our minds physical or nonphysical? ○ Can something change its properties but remain the same thing? ○ What is one referring to when one uses the word “I”? For example: Who am I? God: Why it matters? Our first topic in Metaphysics: Does God exist? Philosophers are concerned with an accurate description of the world Personal feelings, histories, bad experiences with religion are not relevant to God. The status of God’s existence tells us much about the nature of ourselves, the universe. REMEMBER OUR CAUTIONARY NOTE ABOUT PSEUDOINTELLECTUAL APPROACHES IN PHILOSOPHY? In Addition: Cautionary Note about Arguments Good arguments don’t need to be proven with existence. ○ Notice: Very little of what you believe is because emotional which clouds other open mind views. VOCABULARY AND TECHNICAL TERMS The unfortunate aspect of philosophy Note this isn’t as true in other fields, for example, organic chemistry But in philosophy, it’s a bit different Examples: the word truth, and argument (is not meant to be a negative way of communicating, just a way of showing evidence or rational thoughts to prove a point). DEFINING THE TOPIC 1. God: something then which nothing greater can be conceived. Or another way is a perfect being. 2. God: a) Powerful: omnipotent b) All loving: omnibenevolent c) All knowing : omniscient d) inficient or divisible e) simple f) lacking in nothing, nothing to add to god to make god better. NOTE: Religion isn’t our topic, but just focus on does such a being like god exist? Aquinas 1. Argument from change/motion ○ We see change and motion all around us ○ To change is just to move from potentiality to actuality. i. Acorn into oak tree ii. Acorn potential to be oak tree ○ Something cannot be both potentially x and actually x at the same time in the same way. (Something cannot in relation to the same thing in the same way both be the cause of change and also be the thing that change). Ex: An acorn does not become an Oak tree on its own, something else must be involved. i. So something cannot, in relation to the same thing in the same way, both be the cause of change and also be the thing that change. ii. Ex. An acorn doesn’t become oak tree iii. And an acorn doesn’t become an oak tree because of it is an acorn, something else must be involved. ○ That is, if x changes/moves, then it is based on change. ○ Therefore, whatever undergoes change must be changed by something else. ○ But this cannot go back to be the very thing that is causing the same change. i. If it did, there would be no change. ○ We must therefore posit a first cause of change not itself being changed by anything. And this everyone understands to be god. #2-ARGUMENT FROM EFFICIENT CAUSATION Efficient causes come in series Something cannot be its own sufficient cause or it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. ○ X cannot be self caused. But the series of efficient causes cannot go back to infinity. If there were no first cause then there would be no second cause. But there obviously are last causes. We must therefore posit a first efficient cause. And this everyone understands to be god. #3-ARGUMENT FROM NECESSITY Some things can either exist or fail to exist. It is impossible however that everything is contingent. Thus there must had been a time where it failed to exist. But if there had been such a time, there would be nothing now. Because nothing comes from nothing. Therefore, not every entity can fail to exist. So there must be something that is necessary. But if something exists out of necessity, well either this necessity is or isn’t caused by something else. And the series of necessary beings whose necessity is caused by another cannot go back to infinity for the reasons we already stated. Conclusion We must therefore posit something that is necessary. And something that does not owe its necessity to anything else. And this everyone understands to be god; a being necessary being. A being that necessary exists that doesn’t owe its existence to anything else. #4-ARGUMENT FROM GRADATION/DEGREES We find things in existence come in degrees, some things are better, some things are truer, some things are more noble than others. He means this as objectively so. There is, given 2 and 3, something that causes in all other things their being, their goodness, and whatever other perfections they have. And this is what we call God. #5-ARGUMENT FROM GOVERNANCE Everything, even unconscious things, act for a purpose. (Not random but with regularity, which we call laws. Such as laws of nature). Something that lacks consciousness can tend toward an end only if it directed by something that is conscious and intelligent. So for example an arrow is directed by an archer. It can’t be achieved by chance, it must be guided. Therefore, there is something intelligence which guides something in nature toward an end. Once again, we call this God. AQUINAS’ CONCLUSION ON GOVERNANCE 1. Nature acts with purpose. 2. But unintelligent things don’t act with purpose unless given purpose by something intelligent. Where god is the intelligent being. We must trace natural events back to God as the first cause. Parley William Paley: The argument from design - Forget about god while listening to the story. - Walking on beach and foot hits a stone. Then you wonder how the stone got there and it seemed out of place. The rock could’ve been here by chance and these things happen. Then you come across a watch on the beach, and you wonder how the watch got there. The scenario for the watch changes. Why can’t the reasons be the same? Because the rock and the watch have different perspectives. Focusing on the watch, it doesn’t matter if you seen the making of the watch. - Design implies designer - Notice: There cannot be a same explanation for the existence of the rock and a watch. - Arrangement, disposition of parts, relations of instruments to a particular use imply a designer. Therefore it must’ve had a maker who formed its purpose. - So if we want to know about the design, we need to appeal to the designer of the watch. We can’t simply appeal to the watch it came from before. We’re going to need to appeal to the designer of the watch. - And we would certainly say that the watchmaker of the first watch which then reproduced other watches was really the designer of them all. - Ignorance of what it takes to make the watch does not weaken the conclusion. - Conclusions: - The conclusion that there must have been a watch maker that understands the parts of the watch is invincible. - Discovery of the watch’s ability to reproduce other watches only increases our admiration for the design. - Or maybe this? - We are on the beach, we find a watch, and our alternate answer is maybe this watch took no skill, there was no art, and there was no intelligence to make the watch. Despite the evidence, skill, and art presented. - But this is absurd! - “Yet this is atheism.” - Design argument is interpreted in different ways. - The way the argument evolved: - One form: the arguement from fine tuning: the universe is so specifically fine-tuned that if the parameters of the universe were slightly adjusted, then we wouldn’t have a universe ft for life or anything but destruction. The chances of us living in the universe is so small that it is mathematically impossible which is more feasible. Therefore it is more likely that the universe is designed by a designer. - other form: No reasonable person would think that a book, pamphlet or any literature form of context would appear without being brought up about by a mindful person. Some philosophers argued that nature is filled with remarkly complex information. For example, DNA is a complex creation with the mathematics and coding. - Last form: Math was used and applied to the world to solve practical issues. Math was invented to solve problems. Even atheists noted, that mathematical applicability holds for exponentially more complex issues and can be used in fact to discover the existence of objects. (For example, Neptune was discovered via math). Question we need to ask: What explains the pervasive explicability of math in nature? From simple to the most complex and not even yet experienced cases in nature. It seems like the universe is ordered Mathematically. Or it instantiates mathematical principles. It seems that math is applicable beyond experience. It seems that math seems to be a part of the very nature that is everywhere, so we can that nature was designed with a mathematical system in mind. Or it was modelled on some platonic mathematical model. Therefore reality seems to be based on math. That leaves open the question but why? So why is math so darn applicable? Anselm St. Anselm 1033-1109 In 1093 became Archbishop of Canterbury Wrote on a variety of topics: ○ Proofs for God’s existence ○ Human freedom ○ Sin ○ Redemption ○ Divine nature The Ontological Argument Does God exist? ○ It is one thing for an object to exist in someone’s understanding, and another for tat person to think that that exist. ○ Surely God exists in the understanding. Something than which nothing greater can be conceived. ○ Principle: If you understand x, then x exists in your understanding. ○ And you all understand what is meant by God. ○ So God does exist in the understanding The most famous objection to the Ontological argument is made by the monk, Gaunilo, recounts the ontological argument. Gaunilo agrees with the conclusion (God exists) but he doesn’t agree with the reasoning. He suggested why. But Anselm responds by saying that Gaunilo misrepresents the argument. SO Anselm suggests that Gaunilo is not worth replying to because he is misrepresenting the argument. Therefore, there is no need to address the criticism. But something than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the understanding. ○ Why not? If it were to exist just in the understanding, we could conceive it to exist in reality as well. In which case it would be greater. If so, then “God” that exists in the understanding and not in reality, you are not thinking of God. Which is absurd: it violates the definition of god. Therefore, something than which nothing greater can be conceived is defined as god. To conclude otherwise is none sense, according to Anselm Anselm’s Reworded Argument 1. That than which nothing greater can be thought can be thought. 2. If that than which nothing greater can be thought can be thought, it exists in reality. Therefore, that than which nothing greater can be thought exist in reality. Premise 2 Everything seems to depend on the plausibility of premise 2 ○ Is the premise true? ○ If that than which nothing greater can be thought it exist in reality. Such a being (than which nothing greater can be conceived) has features that cannot belong to a possible but non-existent being. ○ Why not? Because a being whose none existence is possible is less great than a being that exists necessary. Therefore, these features must belong to a being that is not possible and exists or cannot fail to exist. Consequence of being able to think of such a being: ○ If a perfect being is even a possible being, it actually exists. Critique #1 Some of the biggest critics have been theists ○ Thomas Aquinas Aquino’s: Term god is too ambiguous for people. ○ He briefly says God so defined doesn’t actually entail his existence. Unless you grant that he actually exist. Unless you grant that such a being exists, it won’t exist. Aquinas says that the argument is not a convincing one. At least not to theists. Anselm’s Revenge: The new modal ontological argument “The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.” –Russell History of Western Philosophy 1. If god possibly exist, then he necessary exist. 2. God possibly exist 3. Therefore, we can conclude that god exist, necessarily. Logic behind this powerful argument: How can we understand something is possible? What does it mean to say x is possible? ○ There is a possible world which x exist. Modal Ontology 1. It is possible that God exists. That means there is a possible world in which god exists. One attribute is necessary existence. Necessary existence is tantamount to every possible world. So if god exists in one possible world, then by definition, god must exist in every world. 2. But our world is a possible world. 3. So god exists in our world. Russell Is Aquinas correct? Russell—famous 20th Century atheist philosopher—once exclaimed in his autobiography 1967: ○ "Great God... the Ontological Argument is sound!” -Autobiography of Bertrand Russell Vol. 1 Bertrand Russell (in 1972) seemed to think the Ontological Argument was rather clever: ○ “The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.” -History of Western Philosophy Some supporters include: Leibniz, Plantinga, Descartes, Kurt Godel (mathematician, logician) among others Russell’s Summary of Aquinas’ First Cause Arguement First Cause Arguement 1. Everything we see has a cause. – It grounds Aquinas’s argument. 2. It can’t go back to infinity. 3. There must’ve been a first cause. 4. We can the first cause “God” Russell’s Critique We can ask the question, “Who made god?” Why? ○ Because if everything has a cause, then it follows, logically speaking, that god must have a cause. So the argument fails as is. Critic: Russell does not adequately acknowledge the very basic definition of god. That god cannot be caused. Russell: ○ Response: God cannot by definition owe his existence to anything else. ○ But… Notice that the argument`s plausibility comes from the assumption that there are no exceptions to the claim that everything must have a cause! So either the theist maintains that 1. Everything has a cause or 2. Not everything has cause If a.) then god has a cause too which is absurd. If b.) the argument is invalid because it doesn’t follow that the world needs a cause. One Kind of Design Arguement The world has been designed in such a way to be conducive to life. Especially Human life. It is not reasonable to think it is just plain luck that the world is suitable with other certain things. When another philosopher summarizes the argument, are they accurately representing the argument? Russell’s Criticism Russell believes that the previous argument lacks understanding. Since Darwin, we shouldn’t be impress by the argument. Russell says that living things re adaptable to the environment, and that the environment were not made for certain organisms. Instead, living organisms adjust to their environments. An Atheist Response: The Problem of Evil, part 2 == Russell to Mackie Ok, Ok, maybe the above argument doesn’t prove God and evil are logically incompatible. But there’s still something at least very suspicious about the amount of evil we see in the world. So evil and God are not compatible ○ But the existence of what looks to be like so much gratuitous evil (evil that serves no greater purpose or good) Alternatively: If God does have reasons for allowing evil, they seem unknown or unknown to us, making belief in an all-loving God unreasonable. It seems like a loving God, even if He has reasons for allowing evil. It doesn’t seem he can be all-loving because of the veil that already exists. It’s everywhere, evil is everywhere. How can God exist if evil exist? Why are people suffering? How can God allow such cruelty? Turning Evil on its head The entire thrust of the problem of evil understands that “evil” means the things are not the way they ought to b in an objective sense. There is only how the world ought to be. ○ Nothing you say about the world will tell me/you about how it ought to be. ○ For example, science may tell us what it is to be healthy, fit, intelligent, or the conditions that are conducive to survival… But it won’t be able to tell us if of these things are good or why should we have an obligation to have these things until the end. There is no objective designer or purpose for the universe. Immanuel Kant Critic of Ontological Arguement: Immanuel Kant He is perfect and therefore has every perfect making property. ○ Example: ○ So, we can say by definition that God is all powerful. But the problem with Anselm’s argument is that existence is not a property. ○ Take any object, x….. X has lots of properties but we tend to ignore the existence. Defending Anselm: A response to Kant Kant and the criticism to Anselm’s argument ○ Existence is not a perfect-making property Kant is correct that existence is a property neede. ○ But thought existence is not a property, it is a necessity of property. A being that necessarily exists is a being that continently exists or doesn’t exist at all. William Craig One reply to Russell: A New First Cause Arguement The Cosmological Argument 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. Or can also be worded as: If something begins to exist, it has a cause. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. The universe has a cause. 1. Premise 1: whatever seems to exist has a cause. Out of nothing has a cause. So Nothing comes from nothing. 2. Premise 2 appears both philosophically and scientifically support. Many models support the work that the universe did have a beginning. The argument is a valid argument. So if you accept premises 1 and 2 Then you are forced to accept the conclusion. ○ Therefore, the universe has a cause. Validity is expressing the point of an argument, how they relate to an argument. If the premises is true, so must the conclusion. And that is a valid argument. Example of a valid argument: Socrates is mortal ○ - Socrates is a man ○ - Men are mortal ○ -Therefore Socrates is mortal. Suppose one of the premises is false, it doesn’t make the argument invalid. It makes the argument valid. Difference between validity and sound: ○ sound: not only is the argument is valid but the premises are true. The highest compliment we can pay to the argument. All premises must be true. ○ Valid: if premises are true, conclusion must be true. 2 Arguments As the cause of all time and space, the first cause must be… ○ Timeless (there was no timeless) and immaterial. But it must also be a powerful (something itself that is uncaused). ○ Why? ○ 2 reasons 1. Because the first cause must be beyond space and time, so you have to entertain objects that are beyond space and time. a. And there there are only two things that fit that description i. Abstract object such as numbers ii. An intelligent mind. 2. How else could a timeless cause give rise to a temporal effect (the universe)? Ie. if the cause is permanently present, the effect would be permanently present. So the cause of the universe is not only transcendent (exceptional); but also a personal mindful being. Replying with a dilemma Think of the argument just given: note that it is an intuition pump ○ It isn’t a deductively valid argument anymore ○ The atheist is pointing out that it is really difficult to wrap our heads around why god allow evil. But let’s make this argument have even sharper teeth: evil - > meditate on it, don’t skip the details. Evil: THings are not the way they are meant to be. They ought not to be that way. It shouldn’t be that way. But this poses a dilemma for the atheist 1. Either you mean this as some object fact about the world: it shouldn’t be this way. 2. Or you take this as an issue with just a mere opinion. You prefer it not be this way. Then the arguement has no sharp teeth. An unintended consequence of the Problem of Evil Contrary to what the atheist might think ○ The problem of evil is a bigger problem for atheism. 1. If evil exists, god exists => atheist has no shortage of answers. 2. Evil exits, God exist. 3. Therefore, evil exist. Conclusion about the problem evil This critic of the problem of evil still hasn’t happened => person can’t explain why there is so much evil. So it is a bigger problem to have evil and no God. Logic behind if evil exists, god exists. ○ why? We are making a judgement. Do we we have an obligation to…? Atheist’s naturalism doesn’t ground their beliefs. Mackie The conceptual Argument Against God’s Existence The very concept of God is incoherent (logically incoherent or absurd). Recall that God is perfect But if so, then God must have this property. ○ He’s all-powerful! For example: Can God create a rock so heavy, he cannot lift? ○ If God can do anything, then God can create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it. But if he can create a rock that he cannot lift, it contradicts the property that God is perfect and all-powerful. If he cannot create such a rock, then it also contradicts the property that god is perfect and all-powerful. ○ Therefore the concept of god is absurd. A Deductive Argument Against the Existence of God: The Problem of Evil 1. God is by definition perfect. 2. But an all-loving and all-powerful God would not permit to exist. 3. If evil exists, either a. God is all loving but simply lacks the power to stop evil. b. Or God is all powerful but lacks the desire for evil ( so is God all loving?) 4. Either way, God cannot be both all-loving or all-powerful if evil exists. 5. But evil exists. 6. But the definition of God requires both god to be both all-loving and all-powerful. 7. So God does not exist. Reply to Frankfurt Premise 1 is correct: it’s simply the definition of God But what reason is there for thinking premise 2 is correct? ○ All-loving and all-powerful god. For the atheist to be entitled to this premise… ○ That there is no possible world in which an all-loving or all powerful god would permit evil. But that’s not a promising strategy ○ Think about that: The atheist must argue if God is all-loving and all-powerful, evil would not exist. So long as there is even a possibility that a vastly wise and perfect being has no ability of being evil. Frankfurt Dilemma (for atheist) : Either God must obey the laws of logic or God does not. 1. If He does not need to obey the laws of logic, then it is an easy way out. It is an easy reply to the conceptual meaning of god’s existence. If God does not need to obey the laws of logic, then god can create a rock he cannot lift. 2. But if God is bound by logic, then God cannot create such a rock. How can we can God is limited by logic? Frankfurt says it is not an actual limitation, it is merely an expression. To reword Frankfurt stuff: “God cannot do x, where x is nonsense, meaningless incoherent.” But isn’t that saying nothing more than God cannot do x where x is nonsense, meaningless, incoherent. “Can God do x, yes or no? Either way, atheist is saying you no.” X is an incoherent mess so it doesn’t make sense what you are asking God to do. Question: Do we think a perfect being must obey the laws of logic? Or do we think a perfect being doesn’t need to obey the laws of logic? Becker Becker’s Postulate Oskar Becker was a logician, mathematician, philosopher He postulated the following: The modal status of a proposition (with the exception of actuality) is always necessary true. What does this postulate mean? It means that if x is a necessary being, then it is necessary a necessary being. Likewise, x is a contingent being, then it is necessary a contingent being. Conclusion after Aquinas Reworded without possible worlds 1. If God exists then he has necessary existence. (by definition) 2. Either God has necessary existence, or he doesn‘t. 3. If God doesn‘t have necessary existence, then he necessary doesn’t have necessary existence. (“Becker’s Postulate”: Principle in modal logic) => describes modal status of god. 4. Therefore, Either God has necessary existence or he doesn’t.(from 2&3) 5. If God necessarily doesn‘t have necessary existence, then God necessarily doesn’t exist. (from 1) 6. Therefore, ○ Either God has necessary existence or necessary he doesn’t exist. => if god exist in all world, then if he doesn’t exist, he doesn’t exist in any world. 7. It is not the case that God necessary doesn’t exist. 8. Therefore: ○ God has necessary existence. 9. If God has necessary existence then God exist. 10. Therefore, God exist. Conclusions: Atheist: whatever problems arise arent’ evident to God’s existence The existence has serious consequence for moral theory. They are wrong regardless of our opinions. What is it about the world that makes such a thing wrong? What is it about the world that makes such a thing true? If not, what natural fact about the world explains the existence of moral obligations? Metaphysics: describing reality We can make a distinction between the two following questions about existence: 1. What exists? => ex. Does God exist? 2. What kind of things exist? => more physical based. Ex. Does unicorns exist? These are importantly different questions Just because we have an answer to one question, doesn’t mean we have an answer to the other question 1. We might have an answer to #1: 2. We might have an answer to question #2: John Locke: impurist and questions how we relate to reality? Much imperse tradition comes from Locke Reality= the way the world is, regardless of our opinion. Therefore “my reality”=nonsense ○ “I perceive it to be that way”=me talking as if it’s my reality because that’s how I think of it, even though my reality isn’t determined by how I think of it We should understand that reality is just an expression and shouldn’t be taken literally Locke’s Goal Ancient philosophers tried to explain how it is that the mind can feel sensations, perceptions of the world, and ideas ○ i.e. they wondered what the relationship was between: mind & world. How do we come to have ideas about the world? Indirect realism or representation realism: Locke’s view and so his purpose behind it. => if we think something exist, it doesn’t exist. Motivation: make a distinction b/w reality and the perception of reality. Locke on Sensations We have sensations These sensations have particular qualities to them. (That’s how we identify them). And over time we have come up with ideas or concept of these sensations (labels: hot, cold, darkness) Common view: objects in the world cause us to have these sensation. We often think of these ideas of sensations coming from positive qualities that exist in the object. Privation in the Subject Locke: when we carefully reflect, they are not caused by a positive quantity, some are caused due to lack of quality. ○ Example: we have concepts of both darkness and coldness. => darkness is caused b/c of lack of light. Cold because lack of heat. So we should be careful to make a distinction between these perceptions It’s one thing to be able to distinguish between black and white ideas. It’s quite another thing know what causes us to have a sensation of seeing black as opposed of seeing white. Sensation Cause by Absence Both black and cold are positive ideas in our minds. We think of a shadow as something an object is lacking something in its qualities. Lesson: some sensations occur because of a positive quality in an object, but sometimes it is because of the lack in something. Terms: Ideas and Qualities We have ideas in the mind Ideas: the immediate objects of perception. (Ideas are act of perceiving) The power to produce an idea, Locke calls a “quality”. ○ Ex. Snow has the power or qualities to create ideas such as white, snowball, cold. Notice an important difference: 1. Ideas are in our minds. 2. Qualities are in some case in the object out there in the world. Qualities are about the external worlds, whereas ideas only exists in our minds. Primary Qualities So qualities are to be found in the object Locke: But not all qualities are of the same sort Locke: Some qualities are primary. Primary qualities are the kind of qualities that are essential to the object. No matter what you do to the object, it must have its qualities. Secondary Qualities Then there are other types of qualities, Secondary qualities These qualities are not actually in the objects themselves. Instead, secondary qualities are really nothing more than the powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. An object’s bulk, figure, are presented by sound, taste, and sight. Qualities and Ideas How do bodies(physical objects) produce ideas in us? Physical objects are not in our minds but they produce ideas, then they must have a relation. Therefore our brains and minds produce it. Color blue is secondary. Ideas and Resemblances Primary qualities really do exist in objects, but the ideas we have of Primary qualities are really only resemblances of them ○ Locke: There is nothing like the ideas in our mind in the actual physical object. They appear as mental representations of stuff in our mind. Some people want claim that the idea of hot is actually in the fire. ○ not true, conceptual error. Locke: not true => conceptual error. Evidence: Fire and its Qualities Consider that when you are near a fire you feel warmth. Now consider when you get too close; you feel pain, but nobody says pain is in the fire. Locke: But that’s simply inconsistent, why is warmth in the fire and not pain? Locke’s view: neither pain nor warmth is in the fire. Therefore secondary qualities: they don’t exist in the object in us. Notice a difference Secondary qualities depend on there being a perceived. Secondary qualities are all about perception or appearances. All sensations are in the mind, not object. But this isn’t true with primary qualities. Primary qualities are not dependent on there being a perceived. Summary: Real Qualities in the World Primary qualities real qualities in the object like shape or location or motion. Secondary qualities aren’t real qualities in the object => result of primary qualities. ○ produced in us by primary qualities Third kind of quality: the power to change primary qualities. ○ fire can change ice to water Summary, but in different words Primary: objective in nature or mind independent. ○ real in world ○ ex. Shape, location, or motion. Secondary: subjective in nature or perceived or mind dependence. ○ appearances and perception Primary vs Secondary Berkeley: impurist Lived around the same time as Locke, overlapping with his life and living a bit later Anglo-Irish philosopher Critical of views offered by Locke and others On Human Knowledge Berkeley: 3 objects of human knowledge 1. Ideas imprinted on the senses (taste, smell) 2. Ideas formed by memory or imagination (hard/soft/cold) 3. operations of the mind. Thoughts, ideas or operations of the mind cannot exist without mind. When we perceive/talk of objects We experience a variety of sensations: Table ex: ○ senses create ideas of objects ○ objects exist, can be perceived ○ Idea of odor is perceived by someone What does “x” should like if no one has ever heard it? - easy to answer but unintelligent question Essentially Perceived To be, is to be perceived Your Strange Idea “It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men (sic), that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.” Berkeley: Very strange that people believe in the existence of physical objects, (mind- independent objects) ○ contradictory ○ no non-mental things Contradiction: An Argument-least clear 1. Light, colours, heat,cold, figures, extension…are simply, things we see and feel (sense) a. extension: spatial magnitude i. occupying space 2. What are these things other than sensations of perceptions (ideas) - rhetorical 3. Impossible to see or feel anything without an actual sensation o that thing. 4. Impossible to conceive in my thoughts, any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. 5. Contradiction for an idea to exist in an unperceived thing Ideas exist in minds not anywhere outside of the mind. Critic - Shallow Point Ideas of objects only exist because there is a mind that exists. Ideas exist ○ exist in minds But: (critic) ○ Ideas in mind (mental), but ideas are about something (physical) outside of our minds. Berkeley: ○ Perceptions in mind but.. are you directly perceiving these ‘physical things’ or ‘indirectly’? If directly: then you agree with Berkeley. You don’t believe in physical objects If we perceive directly, then they are the ideas in our minds = no physical If indirectly: no evidence for this, doesn’t make sense. The Argument, Reworded 1. When we perceive an object, we perceive light, color, hot, cold, … 2. All of preceptors are nothing but sensations, sensations are the condition in which we can perceive. 3. Impossible to think of an object that’s distinct from the sensation or perception of it. 4. Conception of a house but a set of ideas. 5. But ideas exist only when perceived. 6. It is a contradiction to any that a house that which is essentially perceived can exist apart from being perceived. Berkeley’s Attack on Matter Primary qualities: extension, shape, in motion/rest, solidity. Secondary: sensible qualities: colour, taste To believe in matter is to believe in patterns Primary qualities are still ideas in the mind. Recall: Primary vs Secondary Dissolving Primary and Secondary Every quality depends on a perceive Acknowledges color, taste,…, are sensations, subjective + mind-dependent. Berkeley’s Challenge: Reflect on primary qualities: try to conceive of motion, extension in those objects without including secondary qualities. ○ cannot be done ○ cannot extract primary qualities without sensible (secondary) qualities. ○ primary depends on the secondary quality perception ○ once you remove the sensible qualities you are left with no object. What we know from experience Berkeley: we aren’t showing merely that we don’t have access to the correct colour/extension/motion of an object Practical Considerations We might think it is more practical to think external bodies exist ○ To explain the sensations we have Useless Matter: Ockham’s Razor? To believe in physicality presents a harder new, larger gap to bridge Need to explain why objects would exist out the mind No Good Reason Berkeley: If bodies exist, we can’t know they exist, we are at the same place, not- knowing ○ no good reason to believe matter exists To be is to be perceived Your senses only give you knowledge of ideas and objects of perceptions Don’t worry He’s not saying: ○ our minds cause things to exist = ridiculous Rather: ○ real things that exists are nothing but an idea ideas exist Forms of Idealism - 2 forms There are many forms of Idealism Potential Critic If all things around are ideas, why do I not have any choice about what I perceive? Why are some ideas present without my consent? There seems to be a permanent to these ideas that seem more impactful. Either they exist or someone else is doing the perceiving. Berkeley’s Response The critics are corrupted. However we account for these stuff, we can’t entertain the idea that these stuff exist. Things are big perceived are more vivid and not distracted by emotions. The laws of natures are testimony to wisdom. We can regulate our emotions with these objects. Ex. Food nourishes us. If it is real, it is there. Metaphysically Berkeley will say it is “God” or “Mind” Real vs Imaginary The things you are thinking of and vanishes are imaginary. The ideas that are real are not caused by you but by someone else. So for example, trees are real but they are not physical. Dragons are creative and imaginary. We can come up with imaginary stuff. Given that ideas exist, it can’t be another human being causing these ideas. Authoring Reality Think and examine how it is that nature allows this. It is a “Mind” or call it “God” that is authoring reality. Therefore anything that reality exists in reality his mind. God (Mind) and Human Beings Because god thinks of it, it exist. God is necessary to explain reality. Permanent things due to god. Mediated Knowledge Our knowledge of the world people and mind mediated by God. God is grounding of the possibility what we perceive. He is the grand tour of the knowledge we perceive. Q and A: What is real? - Berkeley’s perspective Does the table really exist? Yes it is a real table but if you say it exist but it is not real, Berkeley will say just choice one. Is it flat? Does it have 4 sides? Berkeley would say yes Does it have a length, for example 4 feet long? Berkeley would say yes. Berkeley would say the table exist if it exist and if you see it, it is there. Summary of Berkeley’s Argument He doesn’t believe physical objects exist, but he is saying the objects are real in nature. They are not mind independent objects. Real objects all exists in your mind. Plato believed in physical objects but Berkeley believes it exists in nature. Berkeley is a monist: everything that exist is in the mind of “God”. So if “God” stopped thinking, it would cease to exist. After Idealism Phenolism: seen as offspring or child of Berkeley and radical imperialism. Idealism vs Phenomenalism Difference in how they account for the permanence of an object: ○ For example: In what sense is that table real if everyone left? An idealis would say there is still a mind perceiving it. Phenomalists would that to say that something is real, is to say no more that if I were to go in the room, I would see the table. In what sense is the table real if nobody is around to perceive it and nobody will ever be around to perceive it? ○ Phenomenalist: you detached reality from experience. What is there to say an object that doesn’t exist can be experienced. ○ It’s like saying what is there to taste if there isn’t anyone tasting it. Initial Concern: Inevitable Inference Berchert Russell: His question: WHy do humans inevitably, even before the ability to reflect, think we have access to external physical objects? So inevitable inference. Why do we make this inference? Which account? Russell says: idealist account, there is nothing literally besides the perceptions themselves. Notice the consequence of that. The universe is being perceived mistakenly. ○ arrogance and mysticism to it ○ Somehow you can peel the veil and see from the perspective of God. Another account: If there is something out there. The threat of Solipsism Any anti-realist view that doesn’t also include the existence of “God” entails Solipsism. If all you can do is perceive your perceptions only, aren’t your external environment just colours. Aren’t we in the danger of Solipsism? Berkeley: I cannot transcend experience but experience is all I have to experience. Because solipsism is correct, other perceptions don’t exist. Russell’s view on Berkeley: ○ Russell defend Locke’s position on realism. ○ We have to apprehend objects of our minds. There is always going to be. ○ Russell thought: “stop resisting obvious claims” One way we can push back is: “we can make a distinguish between the act of understand and the thing that is understood.” Maybe what is understood is also mental. But it is the truth to realism. ○ Russell says: There is no such thing as perceptual existence as non perceptual. But we can perceive the difference between perceptual space and physical space. Ex. Think of a circle and see the top and bottom. That circle in your mind is different in your mind and on paper. Chrisholm Personal Identity Chisholm will introduce us to the problem of personal identity. It’s a problem not only about the identity of an object but also ourselves. That is, it’s a problem about: ○ How is it possible for something to exist through time? ○ How is it possible that we exist through time? The problem of Identity: Ship of Theseus Suppose you got a wooden ship, if you replace one wood with aluminum and suppose the ship survives. You don’t say “Oh, it is not the same!” Then if you replace another wood, the ship still exists. Suppose you keep replacing the wood, now we can ask if it is still the ship of Theseus. Aluminum Ship Chisholm: suppose someone kept the woods and remade it. Which is the real ship? So if the aluminum is the ship of Theseus, at what point did it cease to be the Theseus since the ship was that when we slowly began replacing wood with aluminum. What if we had two ships: If we have the two ships built from different materials, did we change ships if we exchanged them? No Change Some might be tempted to say that something only x has its properties. X & y are identical if and only if they have all the same set of properties in complement. Problematic because it is inconsistent in what we know. Self-Application Just try to apply such a view to yourself. You know that you don’t have the same properties as you did one year ago. But given the previous principle: set of properties in common. ○ That would mean there are two you(s), you now and a you a year ago. ○ Chisholm: and of course there are not two you. The sensible view seems to be: that the present view has one set of properties, the past you had a different set of properties. But they are both you. Chisholm’s View on Physical Objects The problem of identity with physical objects exists only because of our use of this rather important term: identity. ○ First sense: Strict sense: AKA logical sense or philosophical sense (Even if one single part of x changes, it is no longer x) - tedious and inefficient to think this way: close mindset. ○ Second Sense: Loose sense: AKA practical sense (It’s not useful in everyday - open minded). Second sense But of course we don’t find this useful everyday. Oftentimes, we are not clear which sense we are using. So they are more unconscious when switching between the senses. Chisholm’s Solution to the Problem of the ship of Theseus When we replace/exchange one plank No longer the same ship yes, it is the same ship Rebuild ship with mixed parts? Not the same ship yes, it is the same Rebuild with original parts Yes the same ship whatever we use useful so yes You and me exchanging all parts We only swap when every part has been swapped Whatever we say to the process about who owns the ship. Yes! Chisholm’s Overall View According to Chisholm, a physical thing is nothing but the parts that make it up. Note: this is a great example of how a philosopher is attempting to dissolve the problem by clarifying language. Clarifying language led to confusion about identity. A Potential Problem But if Chisholm’s view of identity is true, what about my identity? Strictly: Aren’t I the same as I was yesterday or last year? Chisholm seemed to think it was obvious that… ○ We know we are literally the same thing (I know I am the same thing as yesterday). Even though we recognize we’ve changed parts and properties. For example, Sure you have a birth date. What now? How do we remain if our physical parts are always changing? Chisholm’s: Physical perspective might be easier. Could that be a way out of this problem. Dennett Style of writing: Hypothetical scenario of what happened to him. Not a true story but teaches about problems with social identity. Philosophers want answers to the question, “What am I?” The Secret Mission NASA determined a way to get to the Earth’s Core. They asked Dennett to retrieve and deactivate a missile but it is radioactive. Person will be leaving brain behind else he will die. Dennett says he has surgery so no information is lost because his nerves are being stretched. When he woke up, he was told he was in Houston and when he looked up, he saw an antenna. When he went to go see his brain, it was in a fluid. He wasn’t convinced it was his. When he woke up, he asked “am I staring at my brain or is my brain being stared at?” Now, Where Am I? So I decide to name things to get stuff sorted out in my head ○ Yorick is the name I’ll give to my brain. ○ Hamlet is the name I’ll give to the rest of my body. Now where am I? Am I in the chair thinking it or in the liquid thinking it? Alternative Answers to the question: Where am I? 1. Wherever Hamlet, there goes Dennett. a. But it seems to be refuted in the answer. If Jones and Smith switch brains, who is who? 2. Where Yorick, there goes Dennett a. Yorick isn’t sufficient. But these two seem unappealing. Identity as a point of view? Dennett is wherever he thinks he is. The claim is: at any given time, a person has a point of view and the location of that point of view is the location of the person. Points of View There are other cases of people who use machines or instruments to look at or experience things (drones/robots/Virtual Reality). So where I am they can’t just be my point of view. On the mission, Houston and Tulsa: 790KM So imagine me on the mission: my brain is competing with my new prosthetic system while my body is flying, I am in two places. Problem: When he came back, his body was never retrieved in Tulsa but his brain still remained. They put him to step to find a different body. Disembodied “I”: Named new body “Hubert” He switched the switch off, he didn’t faint. Hubert (computer duplicate) and Yorick(brain) 2 Dennetts? But consider what this means if it doesn’t matter which one I use. ○ 1. Yorick ○ 2. Hubert What happens now if someone disconnects Hubert or Yorick from the new body and to a new body? There would be two people but which one would be Dennett. There are several possible Hamlet Yorick, or Hubert. Survival: Disembodied if they switch the switch off either one of the factors changed. Switching: When he flips the switch, he felt horrible. New Body, New Person: True Suppose the brains get separate bodies ○ Which one is Dennett? Snowden Some General Points on Personal Identity Personal Identity: When I refer to I, what is this I? Or what makes me me? Identity as Body Some think that I am simply my body. So if someone asks you where you are, wouldn’t you just answer according to your location? The problem with personal identity as body: This view of “I” doesn’t allow for identity overtime. Identity as Memory Some philosophers think the problem is a becomes b. Where a is a set of physical properties (body -> physical property) and b is a different set of physical properties that make up that physical properties. Maybe a is b just because b remembers what it was like being a. Problem with memory: ○ But this still doesn’t explain how one can exist through time. ○ Example: the schoolboy, the young lieutenant and the elderly general We want to be able to account for how someone can go through life and identify existing through time. ○ Elderly general can almost nothing of what happened to the young schoolboy Overview of Snowdon’s View Overview: will argue for thoughts are misleading. ○ Our identity is found in the acknowledgement that we are animals. Note: This is a purely physicalist view. Snowden is aware of the thought but he thinks the thoughts are misleading like Dennetts. They pull our attention in misleading ways. Our Identity Snowdon: we can and should agree to the following: ○ I am an animal (homosapien) ○ I am essentially that animal Once we accept that, the problem of personal identity becomes easier to handle The Problem: are those statements 1 and 2 correct? Snowdon: they are true but philosophers created thought experiments that make our intuition reject them. Brain Out of Body Experiments Consider the thought experiments where the brain is removed from the body and placed in a vat of liquid. We think as the “I” being in the brain but it is the vat liquid or in the body. We have a strong intuition where I am with my brain. Why the Intuition? We have the intuition that ”I” follows the brain because we have an intuitive sense that I am a person ○ A person: this thinking intelligent thing that has reason & can reflect on things and time. (Lockean) It’s by virtue of us being humans that we are persons. Existing Animals Can we exist without being human? Snowdon: (5): If an object is an animal, it is not possible that object to carry on existing with remaining an animal. An animal not just a trivial or arbitrary concept ○ It’s an explanatory unit. ○ It’s a material thing that persists through time. ○ And it’s also an identity concept. ”I” am tied to this concept: human being. It is not easy to consciously abandon the view that I am a human being. Body or Brain Transplants We would exist even if we weren’t that animal. Therefore I would exist in a different body. Snowden questions this because it abstracts the way we think of ourselves. I am not just a thinking thing but a thinking animal. These intuitions are problematic. Psychological Traits and Bodies We seem to think identity lies in being a person. Snowdon: but having those traits depends on bing a certain animal. What’s he saying? ○ Our personhood is necessarily linked to our humanity or physical body. Our idea of personhood is derived of a more primary concept of a human being. As long as the animal persists, so do I. You can lose capacities, for example losing a leg. It is still you because that’s the animal that get into the accident. Snowdon’s Conclusions He thinks we should understand the idea of personhood. As long as the animal persist, we persist. Include duplicate wedding. Descartes The Philosophical Study of the Mind Involves several topics such as: personal identity, free will. Something odd about Humans We have properties: ○ For example: Weight, height, shape… ○ Properties are properties of some thing. ○ These are properties of the bodies ○ Notice these are physical More of the same kind of properties? But we also have other properties such as: beliefs, emotions, dispositions, perceptions. 1. What are these properties of? Our body? Brain? Mind? 2. What kinds of properties are they? The Mind-Body Problem “We have a certain common sense picture of ourselves as human beings which is very hard to square with our overall ‘scientific’ conceptions of the physical world. We think of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that science tells us consists entirely of mindless and meaningless physical particles. Now, how can we square these two conceptions?” –John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science,1984) Response to the above: Related puzzle: We are conscious Trees are not conscious What explains this difference? The Mind-Body Problem ○ What is the relation between the mind and the body? Mind: consists of spiritual essence Body: Consists of physical essence A theory that accounts for the two conceptions: ○ Commonsense conception of ourselves ○ Overall scientific conception of the physical world We’re trying to explain the very existence of human beings as conscious, mindful, rational, free agents in the world. Two Approaches 1. Monism: The view that there is only one kind of substance/stuff that makes up objects. Most monism are physicalist Except for Berkeley (Idealist) 2. Dualism: Physical and mind. Non physical mixed with physically. 2 Types of Dualism as a Theory of Mind Dualism: The view that the mind is non physically. a) Interactionism: mind & body causing interaction with one another. b) Non-Interactionism: maintain mind and body are different sort. Descartes’ view is interactionism. His particular view is called dualism. Some Quick Reasons to Believe Dualism 1. How we know about our minds is in a substantially (uniquely) different way than how we know about our bodies. Immediate access to our minds Vs physical objects (mediate access). 2. Mental content is private or subjective in nature. Bodies are public and subjective. 3. What we know about our minds is clearer than we what know about bodies 4. We seem to have free will. Decartes Philosopher, Scientist, Mathematician The “Father of Modern Philosophy” Early supporter of Rationalism Discourse on the Method Meditations on First Philosophy Meditation 1: Goal: are of epistemology/knowledge and strong foundation. The sceptical worry: some beliefs that I was convinced were true bu they turned out to be false. The problem: how can I tell which of my current beliefs are true/reliable/trustworthy? The solution: attempt to reject all of his current beliefs, if he finds his belief to reject, then discount -> doubt method. Beliefs come from senses: The problems with knowing (Argument for increasing skepticism) ○ Mistaken perceptions ○ Dreams/Matrix/Insanity: example, maybe I am not sitting here but instead I am at home dreaming. ○ Demons: 2+2=4 (There could be some beings that are powerful yet deceitful: We can call them demons. This being is called delusion). Mediation 2: Overall themes: ○ 1. Description of the human mind ○ 2. And how it is better known than the body First Item of Knowledge ○ Descartes: “There is an irresistible consequence, if the demon is deceiving me, I must exist. If the demon doesn't exist, then neither do I.” “I think therefore I am” “I exist” ○ When I claim I know I exist, what is it that I am claiming to exist? But what am I? ○ I thought of myself as a physical body, but I can’t claim to exist right now. So when I say I exist, I can’t mean body. Thinking! “I am a thinking thing.” “What am I?…A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and has sensual perceptions, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.” Notice the upshot: even if my body doesn’t exist, I essentially exist. ○ Referring to “I” is referring to the thinking part. The Wax Passage One goal: To determine the essential nature of the particular body of wax, a physical object (body). Secondary goal: How do we identify this particular body? Take a Body: For Example a Piece of Wax Picture piece of wax Ask yourself how you identify it? As a candle or wax? Do you answer with smell, color, or assign ownership such as “my friend’s candle” Light the candle and walk away Is it the same piece of wax or candle? Its smell, shape, and space occupation have changed. Thus they are not essential features for the candles. What are the essential features? Descartes on Essence “The candle was not after all the sweetness of the honey, or the fragrance of the flowers, or the whiteness, or the small, or the sound, but was rather a body which presented itself to me in these various forms a little while ago, but which now exhibits different ones...take away everything which does not belong to the wax, and see what is left: merely something extended, flexible, and changeable.” Conclusion on Body The essential nature of bodies is extension. ○ What he means: Located in space or occupying space or to have a space attitude. One thing you can’t eliminate from a physical object is extension. Notice a Consequence When all essential features are taken away, we are left with extension. When we do that with ourselves, we are left with thinking and not extended. So I can’t essentially be a physical thing. (Not suggesting that physical stuff doesn't exist, but the differences between the essential nature of thinking). Summary of Argument #1 1. All physical things are essentially extended things. 2. But I (my mind) is essentially a thinking thing. 3. And thinking things are not essentially extended things. 4. So I (my mind) am not essentially an extended thing. Therefore, I (my mind) am not essentially a physical thing. Just talking about thinking thing or “I” Meditation 6 One goal: identify and argue for the distinction of mind and body. Another goal: establish knowledge of the existence of the physical world. His use of the expression “clarity and distinctness” ○ C/D about x= x is something that is not obscure, vogue and not confused with something else. The Real Distinction Argument (1) Whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand could be exactly as I understand it. Premise 2 (1) If I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another, then they must be distinct. -> This is an identity claim. For example: You meet up with someone in the hallway and talk about movies and actors. Your friend says he is the actor from stepbrothers. Then you wonder if you are both thinking of the same person. So you begin describing his features and more movies he is in. After comparing them you gain more clarity that you are talking about the same person. Another example: Wayne Gretzky is referred to as the great one. others may assume it could be Micheal B Jordan, so clarity and distinction helps. Therefore premise 2 is correct: If x and y don’t share the same properties, they are not the same. If x and y are the same, they are one thing. Descartes on Distinctions “Thus, simply by knowing that I exist and seeing at the same time that absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing, I can infer correctly that my essence consists solely in the fact that am a thinking thing. It is true that I may have...a body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the one had I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body...” The Argument 1. Whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand could be exactly as I understand it. 2. If I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another, then they must be distinct. 3. I have a clear understanding of my mind (example, I know what’s going on in my mind) 4. I can clearly and distinctly understand my mind apart from my body. Therefore the mind and body must be distinct. -> The mind is not the body. The mind is another word for brain. Descartes says it is impossible because if they were identical, I wouldn't be able to distinct one from another. Example: headache -> mental state but what about the brain? The Divisibility Argument “...there is a great difference between the mind and the body; inasmuch as the body is by its very nature divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind, or myself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I understand myself to be something quite single and complete...I recognize that if a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind.” “As for faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and so on, these cannot be termed parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, and understands and has sensory perceptions. By contrast, there is no corporeal or extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts...This one argument would be enough to show me that the mind is completely different from the body...” Divisible Argument Summarized 1. I can divide physical objects. 2. But I cannot divide myself. 3. If bodies/physical objects can always be divided but my mind can’t then my mind cannot be physical. 4. This entails that my mind cannot be a brain. 5. Therefore, my mind is not the same as my brain. 6. Nor can it be physical at all. 7. So the mind must be something none physical. Notice: You cannot divide the mind but you can divide the body. The three Arguments 1. Arguments from nature 2. Real distinction 3. Divisible argument Dualism Therefore, the mind must not be physical. Thus, human beings are a unit of separate sensations, body and mind: dualism A warning! “...I am not merely present in my body as a sailor as present in the ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and my body form a unit.” Descartes’ view on Brains and Minds “...the mind is not immediately affected by all parts of the body, but only by the brain...Every time this part of the brain is in a given state, it presents the same signal to the mind...” “any given movement occurring in the part of the brain that immediately affects the mind produces just one corresponding sensation...” Notice There is a difference between saying A. neurological events (brain processes) cause mental states (beliefs, pain, fear). B. neurological events/processes are mental states. Descartes says A is correct and not B! Some people relate brain state with mental state and are identical. Criticism of Dualism Criticize a theory strategy: ○ listen to theory and once you feel something is wrong but you don’t know what it is. -> So you demonstrate the view generates problems. The view leads to absurd and philosophers hate it too because it doesn’t show what is wrong. The Problem of Mental Causation Descartes: The mind is constantly thinking. The body has an extension Question: By virtue of what do these two interact? How is it that two completely different substances that share no similar features, how is it that these two things can interact with each other? ○ Not sufficient enough to abandon the view. ○ Dualist says that is like saying what is the color of 5? SO they are not difficult to answer, they are ridiculously absurd. How much does pain weigh? How tall is envy? Is Happiness round or sharp? Searle About him: University of California Berkeley Controversial Philosopher Philosopher of Language: Speech Acts, Intentionality Critical of most theories of mind ○ Particularly computationalism Minds, Brains, and Programs Overview of Article ○ Defines his terms ○ Defines strong AI and computationalism ○ Confronts chinese argument Functionalism Functionalism: the view that mental states are functional states. Mental states are relational states. What makes a mental state a mental state is that it follows a particular rule on functionalism. Jones believes the cat is on the mat What does that mean to a Functionalist? ○ Jones is some state ‘x’ that is related to a functionalist would say: Jones is in some state x that is related to y that perceives cat to be on the hat, to z where the light is reflecting into his retina that causes him to see the cat. The Person as the System Think of yourself as a system ○ There are particular inputs to the system (body): stimuli ○ There are particular outputs of the system (body): behavior Some Upshots of Functionalism Are these functional states physical in nature? ○ On this account, the physicality of the object is irrelevant One way is to talk of functions in terms of computations. ○ Computation: just is the manipulation of formal symbols. Minds are information processes. Computationalism The computational theory of mind is the view that the mind functions as a digital computer. ○ Mind= information processor. ○ Note: Digital computer = symbol manipulator or a Turing machine. ○ Turing machine: is a specification of a set of sequences of machine states So the idea (the mind) is that the mind is some sort of sequence being substantiated. Thinking as Computation The idea is the mind works like this: ○ Neurons can be described in terms of programs like running machines. The mind is to the brain as a computer program is to a digital computer. Computationalist (not a figure of speech): the mind is a program running on a digital computer/turing(biological) machine. The Turing Test Once we treat thinking as computation, we now have an easy test for intelligence Test: ○ Take a person and computer, hide both from human and observer. Human observer asks questions to human and computer. If the observer can’t tell the difference, the computer passes the test. It means the computer knows how to think but it is not a human. If intelligen people can’t tell the difference between how a human answers and how a computer answers, it proves the Turing test. The Turing Test If the computer passes the test, it is intelligent. Passing the test shows the computer has the right inputs, outputs, and causal relations. Vocab: Strong and Weak AI (views on why Searle does not like view!) Weak AI: Computers provide a powerful tool in helping us explain cognitive states. Strong AI: view that appropriately programmed computers can be said to understand and have cognitive states. Strong AI claimed we can write programs for our computers that duplicate our understanding. For Example: The Burger Story When humans understand stories, they understand things that are not explicitly mentioned in the story. You understand more that is mentioned. ○ For example: going out for the night, your friends paid for the drinks and your friend ate. Story A: Man orders burger and burger is burnt. Man gets angry and leaves without paying. Story B: Man’s burger is well cooked, so he leaves a big tip. Did the man eat the burger? Story A: NO. Story B: Yes! Machine Answers 1) According to strong AI, these machines can be said to understand the burger stories. 2) To the extent that the machine understands the story, it explains the human ability to do such thing. Searle This way of describing the mind is trendy and sounds exciting. ○ But it is also deeply mistaken. Conclusive evidence: Chinese Room Argument. ○ Imagine you don’t speak Chinese. You are in a room where you can pass papers to person A and B.You are given a Chinese symbol for each slots. You are to do as the Chinese symbol indicates from the rule book. Those symbols are asking you questions and answers are already written. After a while you become so good that you become indistinguishable from Chinese symbols. Notice! My answering the Chinese questions is just like a computer in the I am performing computations operations on defined specified elements. A computer does the exact same thing. Therefore, we’re functionally equivalent. Searle on the Chinese Room But I do not understand a word of Chinese. ○ “I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing. For that reason Schank’s program understands nothing of any stories.” ○ “We can see that the computer and its program do not provide sufficient conditions of understanding since the computer and the program are functioning, and there is no understanding.” Turing Test Criticized In other words, the Turing Test is not a sufficient test for thinking and understanding. Why? ○ Because I can pass the Turing test with colours and still understand nothing in Chinese. ○ So strong AI is false as is any function using the Turing test. Questions of Clarification: Q & A with Searle // DO I understand Searle’s view? According to Searle, could a machine think? ○ Yes, we are machines and it is not a figurative speech. Could a human made machine think? ○ Yes, only if the machine can think exactly like humans, thus it has to be a replica of that machine. Can digital computers think? ○ Yes, we are such digital computers (not a figure of speech). Could something think or understand solely in virtue of being a computer with the right sort of program? ○ No because it is defined syntactically. Alternate Argument Premise 1: Programs are formal (syntactical) Premise 2: minds have content/symatic contents Premise 3: Syntax is not identical nor sufficient by itself for semantics Therefore programs are not sufficient nor identical with minds. Strong AI is false. The strong AI Confusion Why o some people suppose that running a computer program is constitutive of mutual processes? ○ Because some people think that what humans do with their mind is information processing in the same way a computer processes information. ○ The program computer does not do information processing; computers manipulate formal symbols. Two kinds of Intentionality Intentionality: something is intentional when it is about something else. (1) Intrinsic (something that is about getting something else): the intentionality is intrinsic to the system. Mental state such as thirst, so a thought about getting water. So thought is directed at something else. (2) Derived: only in virtue of it going intentionally by something outside of itself. For example, we give intentionally. It is directed because someone assigned it that status. (a) Example, saying “computer is being stubborn” which concludes that computers are incapable of being stubborn, we are just setting the intention. (b) An example is a legend on a map. “The programmed computer understands what the car and the adding machine understand, that is, exactly nothing. The computer understanding is not just partial or incomplete; it is zero.” -Searle Appeal to Behaviourism Searle thinks there is a residual behaviourism in philosophy of mind and behaviours in psychology are different. Searle thinks there is residual behaviourism that doesn’t go away. ○ We are tempted to postpone mental states to computers to be like humans. ○ So humans are trying to give mental states to things that are not human. Criticism for Chinese arguments: the system’s reply: ○ Criticism: misrepresenting us because you are saying you understand Chinese. Computation says it is indistinguishable. The entire system does understand Chinese. Searle says “although the individual doesn’t but the conjunction understands” It is ultimately B.S. Suppose this guy spits out a perfect ability to understand Chinese, he still doesn’t understand a thing about Chinese. Neither does the system. One final Kick at Strong AI Mind: information processor ○ But if mind is processing the same way as the Chinese analogy the mind is not thinking. John Searle on the Philosophy of Mind “The study of the mind starts with such facts as that humans have beliefs, while thermostats, telephones, and adding machines. If you get a theory that denies this point you have produced a counterexample to the theory and the theory is false...What we want to know is what distinguishes the mind from thermostats and liver...Strong AI wouldn’t have a hope of telling us that.” Conclusions: Computers don’t process information the same way our minds do. The only meaning is derived intentionally. Final Remarks Only special kinds of machines can think. What is special about us is not that we are digital computers. Anything can be described on some level as abstatioling a program. Not a figure of speech. ○ Even a rock can be described as a computer program. Running a program is so trivial. Thomas Nagel About him: Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University Ethics/Politics Supervised by John Rawls himself Consciousness Consciousness: an organism has consciousness if And only if there is something that it is like to be that organism. ○ Also called subjective to experience ○ How to be subjectively to be an organism ○ How one presented to the mind, subjectively. If there is nothing that is to be x, x can be conscious. Reductive accounts Nagel: Look back through philosophy of mind and why history lacks success. Why is it a difficult area for philosophers and scientists? Nagel thinks reductive accounts fail to give accounts. Every account without fail is incomplete. Nagel on Physicalism Physicalism: view the mind can be viewed in physical terms Physicalism is to be defended, psychological experiences must be given a physical account. Must have a physical description of perception. Nagel believes subjectivity is a big problem Because every subjective phenomenon is essentially (by definition) connected with a single point of view. However it seems inevitable that an objective physical theory will abandon that point of view. Take for example: Bats Bats are similar biologically speaking they are conscious. They perceive objects by sonar. Bats have a different experience than we do. What is it like to be a bat? Difficult, even if I had every physical fact about bats. At best, what is it like for me to behave as a bat? Not what is it like to be a bat? Facts about subjective experience may be comprehensible in human terms. Think minds are mysterious? If Nagel is correct then the problem is Mind-Body Problem ○ If facts of experience are accessible only from 1 point of view, you can only get those facts from one point of view. Therefore it is a mystery how a genuine character experiences. Physical operations are observed by third parties. Experience is fundamentally subjective. Physicalism cannot capture all there is. Mental experiences But experience is intimately related to a point of view ○ It seems hard to understand what it means to have an objective of experience. What is left of being a bat? It would presume that there is no character to explore the force of experience. Why Reduction Fails The process of reduction is a move to the more objective in nature. Move away from descriptions of our impressions. Go beyond properties that are only detectable from humans. Distinction between appearance and reality. Appearance vs Reality Science/Philosophy ae in the business of giving a description of reality and not mere appearances. Experience, again But experience does not appear to fit this pattern The idea of moving from appearance to reality makes no sense whatsoever “If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a similar view point—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us further away from it.” -Nagel Notice Subjectivity and objectivity are not simply different ways of talking about/explaining something, x. Appearance is the reality. Appearance is the very thing we are trying to explain. Our study is the appearance itself. -> Our experience is subjective in nature. Reduction Failures Once you carve off experience from reality you carve off what you want to explain. It seems a necessity to have objective descriptions, objection description seems to care about reality. We don’t want that. The Problem of Physicalism (“To seek objectivity is to be an error”) If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjectivity character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done.” Does it mean physicality is false? ○ Nagel’s Response: NO. Mental state are physical states, we just don’t know which is. Butterfly example Are an ignorant guy who puts a caterpillar in the safe and locks it. When he opens the safe in a week, the caterpillar is gone and a butterfly is there. Thus there is the same evidence that the butterfly could’ve been the caterpillar. Perhaps we too have no clue that our minds are physical. Physical Descriptions Mental states are physical. Maybe they are reducible. Reducible theories always fail Maybe despite all the physical stuff, there are no conceptual tools to back it up. Therefore there could be no way to make mental states physical. What are my experiences like apart from what they appear to me? Nagel’s Proposal We need to try and get an objective description of phenomonological events, experiences, perceptions. ○ By expanding our concepts. Example: ideas that don’t make sense. ○ capture concepts in a new perspective. ○ define what we mean when we say something is physical. ○ Entertain, we don’t have a grasp on causation. Issues: If we can expand the physical, notice that dualism is dooming. Often dualists will challenge the ideology. Regardless of what happens it must cover an objective gap. Conclusion Nagel: ○ He realizes that modern person often does not want a dualist framework. ○ So the mind is defined as a way that has been successful in the past. ○ All objective terms are broken down away from mere subjective terms because physicalism needs to be developed more to be described with the mind. (New) Mysterianism Nagel is not mysterian Mysterianism: view of the body mind problem cannot be solved. ○ No dualism, mind theory and say too much to solve. Weak mysterianism: humans are not simply smart enough to solve. Strong mysterianism: the problem is in principle unsolvable. One Argument on why mysterianism works Human beings are as intelligent as we are, the mind body problem is too big to solve. The problem is not a singular problem, it comes with a host of problems. Ho do we get point of view? What is consciousness? How does mental states cause physical states? How do we explain a unified conscious soul? For us to solve the mind body, we must be intelligent and have a more complex mind. Even if we were intelligent, mind body would become harder to figure out. Genuine Mystery This is not an argument from lack of knowledge. We offer arguments in what we do know. Genuine mystery: humans have no hope of solving. Why the mystery? One reason Some think it has nothing to do with intelligence but with nature of mind. Therefore by virtue of mind, they cannot understand themselves. Cognitive closure General idea behind mysterianism ○ We are cognitively closed to the solution of the mind-body problem. Ex: elephant is cognitively closed to part of physics. Humans are cognitively closed to the mind-body. Can God be a candidate for closure? Yes it can. Hume Is free will compatible with a determined future? The problem “How can we square this self-conception of ourselves as mindful, meaning creating, free, rational, etc., agents with a universe that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, unfree, unrational, brute, physical particles?” –John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology David Hume The will: “the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind” Hume: We can’t give a mere precise definition of “will” than this. We don’t need a more precise definition. And we understand that it’s a sort of liberty that is at odds with some sort of necessity. Necessity in Bodies (Physical objects) It’s widely acknowledged that the operations of bodies are necessary. We can say that the acts of all matter are acts of necessity. Like law of inertia: ○ The force that moves is the force that will come back, etc. Necessity as Uniformity When we look at the world and the physical objects interacting… We see a connection between objects And we notice uniformity of these bodies We make an inference to cause of relationships. Hume: We must allow that there is a principle of necessity governing the cohesion of the parts of matter, even though we don’t experience relationships. Human Action But we can also notice that there is a uniformity of human action (We observe patterns of human behaviour -> there is some kind of general human nature). So we might think that necessity governs human action. Denial The only way to deny this necessity or comparison with other physical objects is to deny that human uniformity exists. Hume’s view on such a Denial Consider how we think of the external natural world ○ Things are causily related, like the law of inertia. ○ When we encounter extraordinary cases where there is no cause for effect, what do we do? We don’t abandon the view that x causes y. Instead we say epistemology access to effect has changed. But it the union between some motives and following actions seems as certain as anything in nature ○ There are exceptions of course But why should we treat these exceptions of unpredictability any differently that we do of exceptions in nature? ○ X causes y ○ X causes w, not y ○ Motive leads to (causes) y ○ Motive leads to (causes) w, not y We can see irregularities in nature, which don’t bring us to the conclusion that nature lacks necessity. So by virtue of what do we think any irregularity between motive and action is an indication of motive and necessity. Consider Irregularity in Human Action Take the case of clear irregularity: a mad man ○ Humes is not convinced irregularity is the way. ○ We don’t know what we mean when we use the term will or necessity. Motive and Action: Union If we can establish a motive between action, we should say there is a necessity. ○ Example: When we judge people, we judge what they did and what motivated them. Everyone does this and anyone who denies doing this is confused. Influencing the mind We seem to acknowledge that physical objects can causily necessitate some mental states Change the figure and motion and you’ll change mental states? But motives, emotions, intentions and so on… can have just as much impact on the mind. Cause is mental, it doesn’t make it less necessity. Our commitment to Free Will We think we are free for three reasons 1. We find it difficult to admit that we are governed by necessity, even though we admit our will is influenced by our view of things. a. associate necessity with force and constraint. 2. Our experience seems to be one of freedom. (We have a false sense of liberty) a. We are subjected to the will, but we don’t have the experience subjected to will. 3. Religion: some require free will. Hume, for one to be responsible for their actions, there need to be a causily sufficient connection between our motives and actions ○ “’Tis only upon the principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however common opinion may incline to the contrary” Does Necessity Destroy? Sometimes people claim that necessity would destroy merit or dement (if we have necessity, we can’t have moral responsibility) Hume: this is nothing but confused thinking (inconsistent thinking) ○ They are not blamed when doing something evil when they are caused to do so. ○ Hastily and overwhelmed with passion, they are not blamed. ○ Why are criminals labelled as such in the first place? Why are criminals who repent no longer considered as animals? Crimes are criminal? Dependence is rehabilitation? Necessity can’t have moral responsibility. Conclusions Hume here is putting forth a version of compatibilism. Determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. If someone does what they want, they are responsible for their actions. Frankfurt Harry Frankfurt Traditionally: free will is about free action. Frankfurt: we can separate free will from free action. ○ Free will is actually about desires but not picking those desires. ○ free will: being able to have control over one’s desires. Frankfurt on Hume Traditionally philosophers have thought that if our actions are determined we can’t be morally responsible with what we do. Hume disagreed: as long as we can act differently, someone is morally responsible. Frankfurt: Hume was wrong. ○ We don’t need to be able to do otherwise in order to be morally responsible for our actions. Frankfurt Vocabulary 1. First-order desires: desires to do this or that (specific things). a. Example: desire to eat a cake 2. Second-order desires: wanting to have different desires than one current has a. example: might have a desire to stay home but wishing to go to the gym. Some comments on desires Frankfurt: it is possible to want something without being self aware of such a desire. ○ One might consciously deny the desire ○ You could want something and not know you want it. Example: when someone is annoying you, and you feel frustrated because you don’t know if you want them to stop. Desire and the Will But sometimes we mean “Jones wants to X” in a different sense We mean to link X with Jones’ motivation to act in a particular way And when we do this, we are identifying Jones’ will. So the will as he wants to define it is “the desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs…or would be motivated when or if he acts.” So the will is identical with one or more first-order desires. ○ However they don’t mean the same thing. For example One can have a second ordered desire with having a first order desires. Example: a physician might want to help her patients to understand the addition. She thinks she can do so by taking drugs. Consequences, the will shouldn’t be associated with second ordered desires. Second-order desire as the Will Even though second-order desires are not one’s will. Sometimes a second-order desire is to be identified with what a person wants their will to be. A second-order desire to have a particular will is called a “second-order volition” Frankfurt: being able to have second-order volition is a necessary condition to be a person. Second-order Volition Example A drug addict has will to take drugs. But they may have a second-order volition, they may wish his desires were such that they refrain from taking drugs. They may not want to will to take drugs. Some addicts may not want drugs but continue to do so. -> unwilling addicts. Action and the Free Will According to one tradition: ○ Free will is fulfilling desires. Frankfurt: it’s not entirely clear what it is to want, or to do ○ But this still does seem to capture in part of what it means to act freely. second-order volition: will they want or will they don’t want. Sufficiency and doing what one wants Doing what one wants is not sufficient for freedom of will. ○ Animal fulfill their desires. Necessity and doing what

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