PHIL 1002 Week 5 - Lecture 1.pptx

The Idea of Moral Status The idea of Moral Status In other words, there are certain objects of reality, which we owe specific duties. Consider the following: A woman is in her backyard, and she kicks her ball. A woman is in her backyard, and she kicks her kitten (with beautiful...

The Idea of Moral Status The idea of Moral Status In other words, there are certain objects of reality, which we owe specific duties. Consider the following: A woman is in her backyard, and she kicks her ball. A woman is in her backyard, and she kicks her kitten (with beautiful eyes, even) in the face. A woman is in her backyard, and she kicks a man she employed as a gardener on the face (kicks his teeth in) for no reason. A woman is in her backyard, and she must either kick a ball or a kitten in the face, or else her gardener dies. What is it about the Gardener that makes him worthy of direct special consideration, as opposed to the ball or maybe the kitten? So, when we say that a thing has moral status, we are saying that that thing matters (morally) and that we owe that thing certain moral duties, for its own sake. The Idea of Moral Status Thaddeus Metz argues that some things have full moral status (FMS), while others have partial moral status (PMS). And we should agree with him, as such a move appeals to our intuitions when we are in a trade-off situation. Take the following example: You are driving and your brakes fail. You are faced with two choices. Run over that massive St Bernard ( a massive type of dog) and use its body to bring the car to a stop, or you can run over that burly man who just stepped out of the gym and use his massive body to bring the car to a stop. Who would we run over? Most people would choose to run over the St Bernard because we intuitively believe that the man is more important than the dog. The Idea of Moral Status But we know the dog is not unimportant: What if we imagined the same scenario but the choice was between a dead racoon or the living St Bernard? It is hardly the case that we would say: it doesn’t matter which of them I run over. We would likely run over the dead animal. What this tells us is that there are degrees to moral status: No moral status (usually inanimate things), partial moral status and full moral status. What is this Full Moral Status? What is this full moral status?: Beings with full moral status are beings that we owe a strong and compulsory duty not to interfere with their lives (causing their death or suffering, using as a means to our ends without their permission, preventing them from pursuing their interests insofar as they do not harm others, etc.); a strong, but not compulsory, duty to aid (within the ubuntu view, this would be arguably compulsory); and a strong and compulsory duty to treat fairly. All beings with FMS are equals and are owed these duties equally. What is partial moral status?: Entities with partial moral status are those entities that we do not owe a compulsory duty to treat fairly all the time or that we do not owe a compulsory duty not to interfere with their lives, interests, etc. Entities with no moral status are entities that we owe no moral obligations. For what entities does the question of full moral status arise? The question of moral status is important since it determines the duties we owe to certain entities. Often, we assume that all adult cognitively unimpaired human beings have full moral status (FMS) (although there are historical instances where this universal agreement did not hold). The same thinking is sometimes extended to all cognitively unimpaired human infants and children, as well as human infants and adults with mild to severe cognitive impairments. Individuals such as these have a higher moral status than animals, and also have FMS. However, there is no such consensus about the full moral status of human fetuses (at any stage of development), humans incapable (perhaps irreversibly so) of consciousness, and even sophisticated animals like dogs, elephants, apes, dolphins, etc. For those incapable of consciousness, one would have to ask questions about their moral status, especially when it comes to making decisions about euthanasia, abortion, etc. Suppose one is in a seemingly irrevocable vegetative state, or in cases related to anencephalic babies. Would we say they have full moral status and can we make decisions on their behalf? Full Moral Status explored FMS usually involves the following; (i) a very stringent moral presumption against interfering with the entity with FMS in various ways such as harming it or undermining its wishes without justifiable reasons. (ii)a strong reason to be beneficent towards this entity when it is in difficulty (although it is not always considered an absolute requirement). (iii)a strong reason to always treat that entity fairly. All beings with FMS are owed the same duties regardless of circumstance, and so have equal moral status - even to the extent that one life with FMS is worth the same as one or more with FMS – so one cannot kill one and use his organs to save many (especially if deontologism is taken seriously). Stringent Presumption against Interference It is an extremely strong moral reason against interfering, regardless of whether this interference results in harm. Perhaps one can think of a circumstance where non-interference is sacrificed for the common good or to save the lives of a vast majority, but one might think of such circumstances as exceptions, not rules. The reason not to interfere with beings with FMS is stronger than the reason not to similarly interfere with beings that have some, but not full, moral status. The requirement does not apply to certain types of paternalistic interference (especially as it has to do with children and young teens, or individuals in a vegetative state) Which factors are or are not relevant to the degree of wrongness of killing beings with FMS? Is the death penalty enough? Is the lives of others enough? Strong Reason to Aid Some philosophers believe that there are strong (but not as strong as the requirement not to interfere) reasons to provide help to entities with FMS (e.g., Jaworska 2007 and Quinn 1984). The reasons to aid beings with moral status are stronger in terms of beings with FMS than with beings that have partial moral status (PMS). One important point to make here is that while we may have reasons to aid certain entities with FMS over others with FMS, it does not necessarily entail that the being that has been helped has a higher moral status. So, a stronger reason to aid one being rather than another does not necessarily entail that the aided being has a higher moral status. Strong Reason to Treat Fairly Beings with FMS, for some scholars, matter equally and so ought to be treated equally (Broome 1990 and Jaworska 2007). Except in special circumstances, we owe a duty to share benefits and burdens to all entities with FMS with equity in mind. This duty does not apply to entities with PMS. But what is that property or properties that may grant an entity FMS? Grounds for Full Moral Status Sophisticated Cognitive Abilities This view takes FMS to be grounded on the possession of sophisticated rational/cognitive capacities. Kant is famous for grounding dignity and moral status on autonomy, rationality and the capacity to set ends/goals. Other intellectual capacities include the following: the capacity for self-awareness; being future-oriented in one’s desires and plans; capacity to value, the capacity to care and be sympathetic, etc. However, since most (but not necessarily all) animals lack sophisticated cognitive capacities, they are not accorded the same moral status as an unimpaired adult human. One objection to this view is that it would exclude infants and grant them only partial moral status, the same as certain animals. It seems intuitive that a human baby has more moral status than, say, a dog. And that we may grant them FMS. Capacity to Develop Cognitive Capacities Another way to ground FMS is by grounding it in the potential to develop sophisticated capacities. This is what is often referred to as the “potential account” or “potentiality” (Stone 1987). It is also possible to think of potentiality as only grounding partial moral status or as some sort of enhancer of moral status. The potentiality account includes infants, very young children, and even fetuses. Potential to Develop Cognitive Capacities One objection that can be raised against the potentiality account is that in certain cases, it seems counter-intuitive, especially for FMS. You may have the potential to earn some degree from the University, but it is unlikely that you can go get a job based on that potential. A small child (a potential adult) doesn’t have the rights of adults to own property or to watch any television program it wants (Boonin 2003, p. 48), [even though it has the potential to be an adult]. Still, there is room to press back on some aspects of this objection. We do, after all, often treat people with potential differently from those without it. We often give people extra support based on their potential. Maybe this points to enhanced PMS? Rudimentary Cognitive Capacities Another option could be to lower the standards for the kind of cognitive capacities that could ground FMS. Say we ground it on the capacity to experience pain/pleasure, interests, partly of a rational nature consciousness. However, such a grounding might be too inclusive. Some animals would be considered on the same level as young infants, which seems counterintuitive once there is a need for a trade-off. Member of Cognitively Sophisticated Species Perhaps there is something special about being human, as opposed to being any other animal, when it comes to grounding FMS. So, one move that could be made is to ground FMS in membership of the human species. One problem, though, would be the possibility of non-human but cognitively sophisticated beings. It would seem strange to deny them moral status because they don’t belong to the human species. One move to solve this problem would be to say: having sophisticated cognitive capacities or belonging to the human species is necessary and sufficient for FMS. Member of Cognitively Sophisticated Species A few other issues are: the biological criteria of belonging to a certain species seems arbitrary, and so there is no real reason, beyond speciesism, why this biological criteria is relevant. Even if we appeal to intellectual and emotional capacities as the other side of the disjunction, it is still unclear why individuals of the species who lack these capacities still have full moral status. It would seem that those capacities (intellect and emotions) are not actually relevant in this account, and we are back to the original problem of arbitrariness.