Pevenhouse Chapter 2 - Realism in International Relations

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Pevenhouse

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realism international relations power politics

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This document presents a summary of realism in international relations and its foundational concepts like power, emphasizing its historical and theoretical context.

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**Pevenhouse Chapter 2** **2.1 Realism** **Realism**: A broad intellectual tradition that explains international relations mainly in terms of power. See also idealism and neorealism. **Idealism**: An approach that emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather tha...

**Pevenhouse Chapter 2** **2.1 Realism** **Realism**: A broad intellectual tradition that explains international relations mainly in terms of power. See also idealism and neorealism. **Idealism**: An approach that emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone, as key influences on international relations. See also realism. Realism is a central theoretical framework in international relations (IR) that explains interactions mainly in terms of power. It contrasts with idealism, which emphasizes international law, morality, and organizations. Idealism believes humans are inherently good and that states can work together to address shared goals. Realism developed as a response to the perceived unrealistic idealism of the liberal tradition, particularly active between World War I and World War II. Idealists, like U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, believed in the potential for states to work together to overcome mutual problems through structures like the League of Nations. Realism remains a dominant and influential theory in IR, shaping how scholars and policymakers understand global politics. The hopes of idealists were dashed when the League of Nations failed to stop aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s. After World War II, realists criticized idealists for focusing on how the world ought to be rather than its realities. Realists, influenced by the war's harsh lessons, aimed to understand power politics without wishful thinking. Realism then provided the foundation for the Cold War policy of containment, guiding U.S. policymakers to avoid appeasing the Soviet Union and China as they had with Hitler at Munich in 1938. Realists draw from a long tradition, including the teachings of Chinese strategist Sun Tzu from 2,000 years ago. During the "warring states" period, Sun Tzu advised rulers on using power to advance their interests and ensure survival, arguing that moral reasoning was less useful in the face of armed and dangerous neighbors. Around the same time in Greece, Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War, emphasizing the power dynamics among city-states and stating, "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." Later, in Renaissance Italy, Niccolò Machiavelli advised princes to focus on practical actions to maintain power, including manipulating the public and forming military alliances. Today, "Machiavellian" describes excessively manipulative power tactics. In the seventeenth century, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes described a chaotic "state of nature" where, without government, people pursue their own self-interests, akin to the "law of the jungle" (also \"state of nature\" or \"state of war\"). He advocated for a strong monarchy, or Leviathan, to impose order. Realists view Hobbes and other historical figures as evidence that power politics is a timeless and cross-cultural concept. After World War II, scholar Hans Morgenthau argued that international politics is governed by objective, universal laws based on national interests defined in terms of power, rather than psychological motives. He believed no nation has a universal morality and that actions should be based on prudence and practicality. Morgenthau opposed the Vietnam War, arguing in 1965 that a communist Vietnam would not harm U.S. national interests. In 2002, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, leading realists were among 33 IR scholars who signed a New York Times ad warning that the war was not in America's national interest. This shows that realists do not always favor military power, though they recognize its necessity at times. The ad targeted neoconservatives in the Bush administration, who advocated using American power, especially military force, to achieve ambitious and moralistic goals like democratizing the Middle East. Therefore, realism is based on the principle of dominance. Realists view political power as separate from and more important than morality, ideology, and other social and economic factors. They believe that ideologies, religions, and cultural factors do not significantly influence state actions regarding national power. Realists assume that international relations are best explained by states acting as autonomous actors, rationally pursuing their own interests in a system of sovereign states without a central authority. **2.2 Power** **Defining Power** Power is a central concept in international relations, especially for realists, but it is difficult to define or measure. It is often defined as the ability to get another actor to do something they would not have done otherwise, or to prevent them from doing something they would have done. Essentially, power is treated as influence, with powerful actors being those who can affect others more than they are affected in return. **Power**: The ability or potential to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done. One issue with defining power as influence is the difficulty in knowing what a second actor would have done without the first actor's power, leading to circular logic. Power is not influence itself but the potential to influence others. Many IR scholars believe this potential is based on tangible and intangible characteristics or possessions of states, such as size, income levels, and armed forces. This concept, known as power as capability, is easier to measure and avoids circular logic. Measuring a state's capabilities to explain its influence is complex and involves various factors like population, territory, military forces, etc. The best single indicator of a state's power might be its GDP, which reflects size, technological level, and wealth. However, GDP is an imprecise measure, with different methods yielding varying results, especially between wealthy and developing countries. For example, most figures in this book use traditional methods of GDP, but an alternative method gives GDP estimates that are about 50 percent lower for countries that are traditionally classified as \"wealthy\" and about 50 percent higher for those that are traditionally classified as \"developing,\" including China. Power also relies on nonmaterial elements, such as national will, diplomatic skill, popular support for the government, etc. Effective mobilization and strategic deployment of capabilities are crucial. Some scholars highlight the power of ideas, which can maximize influence through psychological processes, including nationalism, religion, and ideology. International influence can be achieved by shaping the rules of behavior and changing how others perceive their interests, known as soft power. For instance, the United States has promoted the values of free markets and free trade globally. While realists emphasize dominance to exert power, they acknowledge that states can achieve their interests through other means. They also recognize that power alone doesn't fully explain outcomes, as real-world events are influenced by various factors, including accidents and luck. Power is a relational concept, meaning a state has power only relative to other states. Realists focus on relative power, which is the ratio of power between two states. They are concerned with whether a state is falling behind or overtaking rivals, rather than absolute changes in capabilities. For example, realists view the growing military budgets of rising states like China as a threat to the relative power gap enjoyed by the United States, despite its \$700 billion defense budget. **Estimating Power** The logic of power suggests that the more powerful state will generally prevail in wars. Estimates of relative power, considering military capabilities, popular support, and especially the size of each nation's economy (GDP), indicating population and income per person, help explain outcomes. A strong economy enables a state to fund a large army, gain popular support (by providing consumer goods), and secure allies. For example, Libyan revolutionaries struggled in 2011 against Muammar Gaddafi's government with its heavy weaponry. When the government was about to crush the rebels, the U.S. and NATO allies launched an air campaign that turned the tide. The rebels eventually claimed victory, highlighting the power disparity: NATO's GDP advantage was about 300:1, and their forces were technologically superior and backed by UN legitimacy. Gaddafi was killed, his supporters defeated, and NATO suffered no casualties. Despite the decisive outcome of the conflict in Libya, the exercise of power carries risks of unintended consequences. In 2012, fighters who had supported Gaddafi took weapons to northern Mali, seizing control of half the country. France intervened in 2013 to stop them, but militants then crossed into Algeria, where they seized hundreds of foreign hostages at a gas facility and killed dozens of them when the Algerian army attacked. Libya itself remained unstable, with competing groups claiming control by 2018. This shows that a strong economy can help win a war, but it doesn't eliminate complexity and luck in the long term. **Elements of Power** State power is eclectic, including both tangible and intangible elements. Tangible elements, include total GDP, population, territory, geography, and natural resources. Intangible elements include political culture, patriotism, education, scientific and technological strength, credibility of commitments, and the ability to influence other states through culture and values. All these aspects are long-term elements of power. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 highlighted the significance of long-term power resources. Initially, Japan's superior military power allowed it to occupy Southeast Asian territories and push U.S. forces out. However, the United States' greater long-term power resources, particularly its economic potential, enabled it to rebuild and expand its military capabilities over the following years, eventually surpassing Japan's power. Actors face trade-offs due to limited resources. For example, investing in military forces can reduce funds for foreign aid, and using resources to buy consumer goods for loyalty can limit military spending. Power elements are fungible to some extent, meaning they can be converted into one another. Money is the most fungible capability as it can be used to acquire other capabilities. Realists prioritize military force as the key element of national power in the short term, viewing other elements like economic strength, diplomacy, and moral legitimacy as important only if they can be converted into military power. However, the nature of conflicts can make military power just one of many important elements. Robert Gates, former U.S. secretary of defense, emphasized the need for increased spending on diplomacy and economic aid, especially in asymmetric warfare where conflicts are political and not simply related to the military. He also pointed out that the United States had more military marching bands than foreign service officers. General Jim Mattis echoed this sentiment, highlighting the need for funding the State Department to avoid increased military costs. Following the 9/11 attacks, U.S. spending on foreign aid rose significantly alongside military spending. Morality can enhance power by boosting the will to use it and attracting allies. States have long clothed aggressive actions in rhetoric about their peaceful and defensive intentions. For instance, the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama was named \"Operation Just Cause.\" However, overuse of moralistic rhetoric for self-interest can damage a state's credibility. Geopolitics refers to the use of geography as an element of power, often linked to the logistical needs of military forces. The key factor in geopolitics is location. States can enhance their power by using geography to boost military capabilities, such as securing allies and bases near rival powers, controlling strategic trade routes, or key natural resources. Control of oil pipeline routes in Central Asia is a significant geopolitical issue today. Additionally, the melting of the continental ice shelf has opened new military shipping routes, creating new geopolitical challenges for Russia and the United States. **Geopolitics**: The use of geography as an element of power and the ideas about it held by political leaders and scholars. **2.3 The International System** States interact based on long-established "rules of the game" that define statehood and govern inter-state relations, shaping the international system. **Anarchy and Sovereignty** Realists argue that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no central government to enforce rules. Unlike domestic societies where governments enforce laws (both democracies and dictatorships), the international system lacks such authority, making cooperation difficult. States rely on self-help, allies, and international norms to navigate interactions, with the power of one state countered by others. This lack of central enforcement exacerbates collective goods problems in international relations. **Anarchy**: In IR theory, a term that implies not complete chaos but the lack of a central government that can enforce rules. Some believe that only a world government can solve the problem of anarchy in international relations, while others think international organizations and agreements can provide adequate order. However, most realists argue that international relations will always be anarchic and dangerous. In this anarchic world, realists stress the importance of prudence in foreign policy, suggesting that states should focus on the capabilities of other states rather than their intentions. Despite the anarchy in the international system, it is not chaotic. Most state interactions follow established norms of behavior, which are shared expectations of proper conduct. While norms evolve slowly over time, the fundamental norms of the international system have remained largely unchanged for centuries. **Norms**: The shared expectations about what behavior is considered proper. Sovereignty, the most important norm, means that a government has the right to govern its own territory without interference from higher authorities. In principle, states are autonomous and equal in status, though not necessarily in power. Sovereignty implies non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. While states try to influence each other (exert power) on matters of trade, alliances, war, etc., they are not supposed to meddle in the internal politics and decision processes of other states. However, some states claim sovereignty allows them to treat their people as they wish, even in ways that others find abhorrent. This makes foreign intervention, such as in cases of alleged genocide, particularly challenging as it infringes on a state's sovereignty, even if done for altruistic reasons. **Sovereignty**: A state\'s right, at least in principle, to do whatever it wants within its own territory; traditionally, sovereignty is the most important international norm. The absence of a "world police" makes enforcing international agreements challenging. For instance, in the 1990s, North Korea violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by refusing nuclear facility inspections. Despite international efforts using incentives and threats, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2002 and developed nuclear weapons, conducting its first test in 2006. This was the first nuclear test in a decade. Although an agreement was reached in 2008 to halt nuclear production, North Korea refused inspections, citing sovereignty. It continued its nuclear and missile tests in subsequent years, highlighting the difficulty of enforcing international norms in a sovereignty-based system. In practice, states often struggle to prevent interference in their internal affairs. Issues like human rights and self-determination are increasingly of international concern. Election monitors check for fraud, and international organizations watch for genocide in ethnic conflicts. Additionally, global economic integration and telecommunications, such as the Internet, facilitate the spread of ideas across borders. States are fundamentally based on territory, and respecting the territorial integrity of all states within recognized borders is a key principle of international relations. Many current borders were established through past wars, where victors claimed territory from the defeated, or were arbitrarily drawn by colonizers. The interstate system's territorial nature originated when agrarian societies depended on agriculture for wealth. Today, trade and technology drive wealth creation, making the territorial state potentially less significant. Information-based economies are instantly connected across borders, rendering the concept of a state's hard shell outdated. The rapid advancement of information technologies may significantly impact the territorial state system in the future. States have established diplomatic norms to facilitate interactions, treating embassies as the territory of the home state. For example, in 2012, Ecuador's embassy in Britain sheltered WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, preventing British authorities from extraditing him to Sweden without violating Ecuador's territorial integrity. After 2,487 days, Ecuador withdrew Assange's asylum, sparking a debate about his extradition to the U.S. He was wanted conspiring to release troves of classified information. In contrast, in 1979, Iranian students took over the U.S. embassy in Iran, holding diplomats hostage for 444 days, which has strained U.S.-Iranian relations ever since. States acknowledge that espionage is a common practice between them, and it is each state\'s responsibility to prevent spying. In 2002, China found advanced listening devices on its new presidential plane, a Boeing 767 refurbished in the U.S., but chose not to escalate the issue as the plane hadn\'t been used yet. A U.S.-China summit proceeded as planned the following month. Despite the end of the Cold War, espionage persists, even among friendly nations. Realists in international relations (IR) recognize that the rules often lead to a **security dilemma**. This occurs when states' actions to ensure their own security (like increasing military forces) end up threatening other states. In response, those states also increase their military forces, which then threatens the original state. This cycle is a major cause of arms races, where states spend large amounts of money on weapons that ultimately do not provide true security. **security dilemma**: A situation in which actions that states take to ensure their own security (such as deploying more military forces) are perceived as threats to the security of other states. The security dilemma arises from the anarchy in the international system. Without a world government to detect and punish aggressors, states must prepare for the worst. Realists view this dilemma as unsolvable, while liberals believe it can be addressed through the development of institutions. Changes in technology and norms are challenging the traditional principles of territorial integrity and state autonomy in international relations (IR). Some scholars believe states are becoming obsolete as main actors, with some integrating into larger entities and others fragmenting into smaller units. However, other scholars see the international system and state units as enduring, with the balance of power being one of its most lasting features. **Balance of Power** In the anarchy of the international system, the most effective check on the power of one state is the power of other states. The term "balance of power" refers to the concept of using the power of one or more states to balance that of another state or group of states. This can refer to any ratio of power capabilities between states or alliances, a relatively equal ratio, or the historical process of forming counterbalancing coalitions to prevent one state from dominating an entire region. **balance of power**: The general concept of the power of one or more states being used to balance that of another state or group of states. The term can refer to (1) any ratio of power capabilities between states or alliances, (2) a relatively equal ratio, or (3) the process by which counterbalancing coalitions have repeatedly formed to prevent one state from conquering an entire region. The theory of balance of power suggests that regular counterbalancing maintains the stability of the international system. This stability means that state sovereignty remains intact and does not collapse into a universal empire. However, this stability does not equate to peace; it is maintained through recurring wars that adjust power relations. Alliances are crucial in maintaining the balance of power. While building up one's own capabilities is a form of power balancing, forming alliances against a threatening state is often quicker, cheaper, and more effective. During the Cold War, the United States used military and political alliances to encircle the Soviet Union and prevent its territorial expansion. Some states act as balancers, shifting their support to oppose the strongest state or alliance. Historically, Britain played this role in Europe for centuries, and China did so during the Cold War. States do not always balance against the strongest actor. Sometimes, smaller states "bandwagon" with the most powerful state instead of balancing against it. After World War II, most major states joined the U.S. bloc rather than forming a coalition to contain U.S. power. States may balance against threats rather than raw power; for example, U.S. power was greater than Soviet power but less threatening to Europe, Japan, and later China. Small states may also play rival powers against each other, as Cuba did during the Cold War by receiving Soviet subsidies. Some small states may not mobilize to balance against threats due to domestic reasons. In the post-Cold War era, balance-of-power theory predicted closer relations among Russia, China, and Europe to counter U.S. dominance. Russian Chinese relations improved significantly, especially in arms trade and border demilitarization. French leaders also criticized U.S. "hyperpower." However, with U.S. power stretched thin in Afghanistan and Iraq, a weak economy, and rising Chinese power, more countries are now balancing against China rather than the U.S. In 2012-2013, Japan made military agreements with South Korea and the Philippines and reaffirmed its U.S. ties in response to China's growing power. **Power Distribution** Some realists believe that the most important characteristic of the international system is the distribution of power among states. This concept can apply globally or regionally, but it usually refers to the more powerful actors in the international system. Each state's power is balanced by that of other states, maintaining a balance of power. Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is a 1980s adaptation of realism. It explains international events based on the international distribution of power rather than the internal characteristics of individual states. Neorealism is more "scientific" than traditional realism, proposing general laws to explain events. However, it has lost some of the complexity of traditional realism, which considered factors like geography, political will, diplomacy, etc. Recently, neoclassical realists have aimed to reintroduce some of these elements. **Neorealism**: a theory of international relations that emphasizes the influence of the international system's structure on state behavior. See also realism. Polarity refers to the distribution of power within the international system, whether globally or regionally. This concept includes both the underlying power of various participants and their alliance groupings. Figure 2.3 illustrates different potential configurations of powerful actors. ![](media/image2.png)A multipolar system has five or six independent centers of power not grouped into alliances, with each state participating independently and on relatively equal terms. While stable, wars frequently occurred to adjust power relations. Tripolar systems, with three centers of power, are rare due to the tendency for two-against-one alliances to form. The "strategic triangle" of the U.S., Soviet Union, and China during the 1960s and 1970s is an example. Some scholars envision a future tripolar world with power centers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. A bipolar system has two predominant states or rival alliance blocs. The U.S.-Soviet standoff provided stability, but pre-World War I Europe did not. Therefore, scholars do not agree about whether bipolar systems are relatively peaceful or warlike. A unipolar system has a single center of power, known as hegemony. **multipolar system**: An international system with typically five or six centers of power that are not grouped into alliances. Some argue that peace is best maintained by a relatively equal power distribution (multipolarity) because no country can easily dominate. However, empirical evidence for this theory is weak. Instead, the opposite view has more support: Peace is best preserved by hegemony (unipolarity) and next best by bipolarity. Power transition theory suggests that the largest wars occur when a rising power challenges the top position in the status hierarchy. Deadly interstate conflicts are most likely when power is relatively equally distributed. Status quo powers try to maintain the existing rules, while challengers may seek to change them. If a challenger does not start a war to displace the top power, the top power may provoke a "preventive" war to stop the challenger's rise before it becomes too great a threat. **power transition theory**: A theory that the largest wars result from challenges to the top position in the status hierarchy, when a rising power is surpassing (or threatening to surpass) the most powerful state. When a rising power's formal status diverges from its actual power, it may experience relative deprivation, where its people feel they are not doing as well as others or as they deserve, despite absolute improvements. Germany's rise in the nineteenth century made it powerful, but being excluded from colonial territories and other status symbols created tension that may have contributed to the two world wars. China and the United States may face a similar dynamic in the future, with China increasingly opposing international rules and norms it believes favor the U.S. Meanwhile, the U.S. may fear that China's growing economic and military power will challenge its own. The 2017 National Security Strategy, a periodic document that outlines the nation\'s security priorities, highlighted China's challenges to American power, and in a 2018 speech, then Vice President Mike Pence asserted that the U.S. would not back down. According to power transition theory, peace among powerful actors is achieved when one state holds a clear top position and the positions of other states in the hierarchy are well-defined and align with their actual power. **Hegemony** Hegemony refers to one state holding a preponderance of power in the international system, allowing it to dominate the rules and arrangements of international political and economic relations. This state is called a **hegemon**. While hegemony usually means world domination, it can also refer to regional domination. Antonio Gramsci used the term to describe the complex of ideas that rulers use to gain consent for their legitimacy and maintain control without force. In international relations, this extends to the dominance of ideas like democracy and capitalism. **Hegemony**: the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted. See also hegemonic stability theory. Most studies of hegemony highlight two examples: Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States after World War II. Britain's dominance followed the defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars, leading to the Pax Britannica (1815-1914), where Britain controlled world trade and naval capabilities. The U.S. predominance came after defeating Germany and Japan, with the U.S. GDP making up more than half of the world's total in the late 1940s. The U.S. military could single-handedly defeat any other state or combination of states, and only the United States had nuclear weapons. The U.S. also led in shipping, military power, technology, productivity, and standard of living. As power disparities from major wars diminish over time, hegemonic decline may occur, especially when hegemons overextend themselves with costly military commitments. IR scholars disagree on the extent and speed of U.S. hegemonic decline and whether it will lead to international instability. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that hegemony provides order like a central government in the international system. It reduces anarchy, deters aggression, promotes free trade, and provides a hard currency as a world standard. Hegemons can help manage conflicts among states and enforce rules unilaterally, avoiding the collective goods problem. They can also maintain global free trade and promote economic growth. **hegemonic stability theory**: The argument that regimes are most effective when power in the international system is most concentrated. See also hegemony. This theory credits U.S. hegemony for the peace and prosperity after World War II, as it established a global economic framework supporting stable and free trade, and a security framework preventing wars between powerful states. In contrast, the Great Depression and World War II are attributed to a power vacuum in the international system, with Britain unable to act as hegemon and the U.S. unwilling to take on the role. According to hegemonic stability theory, hegemons, as the largest international traders, have an inherent interest in promoting integrated world markets where they dominate. As the most advanced state in productivity and technology, a hegemon does not fear competition but that its superior goods will be excluded from other markets. Therefore, hegemons use their power to achieve free trade and the political stability that supports it. This theory suggests that hegemony provides both the ability and motivation to create a stable political framework for free international trade. However, not all IR scholars agree with this theory. From the perspective of less powerful states, hegemony can seem like an infringement on state sovereignty and may appear unjust or illegitimate. For example, China resented U.S.-imposed economic sanctions for 20 years after 1949, during the peak of U.S. power, when China was surrounded by U.S. military bases and hostile alliances. Even today, Chinese leaders use "hegemony" as an insult, and they are not impressed by the theory of hegemonic stability. Even within the United States, there is considerable ambivalence about U.S. hegemony. Historically, U.S. foreign policy has alternated between internationalist and isolationist moods. The U.S. was founded as a breakaway from the European-based international system, and its 19th-century growth was based on industrialization and expansion within North America. Although the U.S. acquired overseas colonies like the Philippines and Puerto Rico, it did not embrace an imperial role. During World War I, the U.S. waited three years to intervene and later refused to join the League of Nations. U.S. isolationism peaked in the late 1930s, with 95% of the public opposed to participating in a future European war and about 70% against joining the League of Nations or cooperating with other nations to stop aggression. Internationalists like Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson supported U.S. leadership in world affairs, a view vindicated by the failure of isolationism to prevent World War II. Post-war U.S. leaders, fearing Soviet and Chinese Communism, promoted strong internationalism during the Cold War, making the U.S. an activist superpower. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. internationalism was tempered by cost concerns and a new isolationist camp reacting to globalization. The 2001 terrorist attacks renewed support for U.S. interventionism, but recent opposition to the Iraq War, prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, and economic challenges have spurred a new isolationist trend, culminating in the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, who prioritized American interests. A second area of U.S. ambivalence is between unilateralism and multilateralism in international engagement. Multilateral approaches, working through international institutions, enhance U.S. power and reduce costs but limit its freedom of action. For example, the U.S. cannot always get the UN to comply with its wishes. Polls show that most U.S. citizens support working through the UN and other multilateral institutions. In the 1990s, the U.S. fell over \$1 billion behind in its UN dues and declined to participate in international efforts like a climate change treaty, a conference on racism, and the International Criminal Court. The 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq, with few allies and no UN approval, was a strong expression of U.S. unilateralism. In the late 2000s, the Obama administration emphasized multilateral approaches to international conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Iran. NATO gained importance in Afghanistan and the 2011 Libya campaign, and UN dues were repaid. However, skepticism about the UN and international agencies grew among U.S. Congress members and the Trump administration, favoring unilateralism. The Trump administration withdrew from a global climate treaty, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, UNESCO, and cut funding for the World Health Organization, and criticizing NATO allies. President Biden supports international organizations and multilateral solutions, but geopolitical realities have hindered progress on international treaties and UN actions. **The Early Westphalian System, 1500-2000** The modern international system, characterized by powerful states, sovereignty, balance of power, and periods of hegemony, is often traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This treaty established the principles of independent, sovereign states that continue to shape international relations today. These rules began forming in Europe in the sixteenth century and did not originate at Westphalia. A key aspect of this system was the ability of one state or a coalition to balance the power of another, preventing the creation of a universal empire. The power-balancing system focuses on a few states with strong military capabilities and global interests. Since the sixteenth century, its structure has remained stable, with the most powerful states forming and breaking alliances, fighting wars, and making peace to prevent any single state from dominating the others. The specific members of this system have changed over time, but the balance of power among the top states has been a constant feature. The most powerful states in sixteenth-century Europe were Britain (England), France, Austria-Hungary, and Spain. The Ottoman Empire (Turkey) recurrently fought with the European powers, especially with Austria-Hungary. Today, that historic conflict between the (Islamic) Ottoman Empire and (Christian) Austria-Hungary is a source of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia (the edge of the old Ottoman Empire). In the Thirty Years' War (1618--1648), the Catholic Hapsburg countries, including Austria-Hungary and Spain, were defeated by mostly Protestant northern European countries---France, Britain, Sweden, and the newly independent Netherlands. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia established the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which have defined the international system ever since. Defeated states might lose some territories but generally remain independent rather than being absorbed by the victors. In the eighteenth century, Britain's power increased with industrialization, making France its main rival. While Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire declined, Russia and Prussia (modern Germany's predecessor) rose as major powers. During the Napoleonic Wars (1803--1815), France was defeated by a coalition including Britain, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. The Congress of Vienna (1815) ended the war and reaffirmed state sovereignty principles. The Concert of Europe, which followed, saw the five most powerful states cooperating to prevent war, a precursor to the UN Security Council. Britain acted as a balancer, joining alliances against the dominant European power. By the early twentieth century, the United States, Japan, and Italy had emerged as new rising powers. The Westphalian system, initially European, became global. Industrialization expanded the influence and military strength of powerful states. After Prussia's victories over Austria and France, a larger Germany challenged Britain's dominance. In World War I, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire were defeated by a coalition including Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and the United States. Following a 20-year interlude, Germany, Italy, and Japan were defeated in World War II by a coalition of the United States, the UK, France, Russia (the Soviet Union), and China. These five World War II victors are now the permanent members of the UN Security Council. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union, former allies, became adversaries in the Cold War, which lasted for 40 years. Europe was divided into East and West blocs, with Germany split into two states. Globally, each bloc sought to gain allies and influence, often by supporting opposing sides in regional and civil wars. The Cold War ended around 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to a more cooperative international system among powerful states, reminiscent of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. **2.4 Alliances** An **alliance** is a coalition of states coordinating their actions to achieve a common goal, often formalized in written treaties and focused on international security. These alliances typically endure over time and across various issues. Shorter-term arrangements, like the U.S.-led forces in Iraq, are called coalitions. However, the terms can be ambiguous. For example, countries with formal alliances can still be adversaries, such as the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s or NATO members Greece and Turkey today. Conversely, countries can have the practical equivalent of an alliance without a formal treaty. **Purposes of Alliances** Alliances aim to enhance their members' power by combining capabilities. For smaller states, alliances can be crucial, while for powerful states, alliances shape the power structure in the system. Alliances can change quickly and decisively, often forming in response to perceived threats. When a state's power grows and threatens its rivals, those rivals often form alliances to counter it. This occurred with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Hitler's Germany in the 1940s, and Napoleon's France in the 1800s. Realists highlight the fluidity of alliances, viewing them as marriages of convenience based on national interests, which can change over time. This fluidity supports the balance-of-power process. However, breaking an alliance can damage a state's reputation and complicate future alliances. Therefore, states often stick to alliance terms even when it's not in their short-term interest. Due to international anarchy, the possibility of turning against an ally always exists. As British statesman Lord Palmerston said in 1848, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are perpetual and eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow." Realists would agree with his perspective. There are numerous examples of fluid alliances. Anti-Communist Richard Nixon cooperated with communist Mao Zedong in 1972. Joseph Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with fascist Adolf Hitler, then later allied with the capitalist West against Hitler. The United States supported Islamic militants in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, then attacked them in 2001. Such reversals in international alignments often surprise many people, but realists are not surprised. The fluidity of alliances intensifies the security dilemma. With only two states, each can balance capabilities for defense without the ability to attack successfully. However, if a third state can ally with either side, each state must build defenses against the potential alliance of its enemy with the third state. This increases the threat and makes the security dilemma more challenging to resolve. Alliance cohesion refers to how easily members maintain their alliance. Cohesion is typically high when national interests align, and cooperation becomes routine and institutionalized. Alliances formed by states with differing interests against a common enemy may dissolve if the threat diminishes, such as the U.S.-Soviet alliance in World War II. Even with high cohesion, like NATO during the Cold War, conflicts can arise over burden sharing, or who bears the costs of the alliance. **alliance cohesion**: The ease with which the members hold together an alliance; it tends to be high when national interests converge and when cooperation among allies becomes institutionalized. **burden sharing**: The distribution of the costs of an alliance among members; the term also refers to the conflicts that may arise over such distribution. Powerful states often form alliances or commitments with smaller states, known as client states. Extended deterrence involves a strong state using threats to deter attacks on its weaker clients, like the U.S. threatening to attack the Soviet Union if it invaded Western Europe. These powerful states risk being drawn into wars over minor regional issues if their clients go to war. If they don't support their clients, they may lose credibility, but if they do, they might face costly wars. The Soviet Union worried about this with its commitments to China, Cuba, Syria, and Egypt. President Trump once said he wouldn't defend Montenegro against Russia, causing concern among NATO allies. However, the Ukraine War has strengthened NATO's alliance cohesion, with President Biden expressing strong support for the alliance. **NATO** Currently, two major formal alliances dominate international security, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) being the more powerful. NATO includes Western Europe and North America, and its 30 members account for nearly half of the world's GDP. The members are the United States, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro. At NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, military staff from member countries coordinate plans and direct field exercises. The NATO allied supreme commander has always been a U.S. general, and each state contributes its own military units, maintaining their national culture, language, and equipment specifications. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**: A U.S.-led military alliance, formed in 1949 with mainly Western European members, to oppose and deter Soviet power in Europe. It is currently expanding into the former Soviet bloc. See also Warsaw Pact. NATO was founded in 1949 to deter Soviet power in Europe. Its Eastern European counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, was established in 1955 and disbanded in 1991. During the Cold War, the U.S. stationed over 300,000 troops in Europe, later reduced to about 100,000 after the Cold War ended. NATO remained intact for stability, despite an unclear mission. Article V, the core of NATO, requires members to defend a fellow member under attack. Initially meant to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union, it was first invoked after the 2001 terrorist attacks to defend the U.S. In 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden expressed interest in joining NATO, with Finland joining in spring 2023 and Sweden on the path to accession. **Warsaw Pact**: A Soviet-led Eastern European military alliance founded in 1955 and disbanded in 1991. It opposed the NATO alliance. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO first used force in Bosnia in 1994 to support a UN mission. A "dual key" arrangement gave the UN control over NATO's actions, but the UN feared retaliation against its peacekeepers if NATO attacked Serbian forces. Consequently, NATO's threats and symbolic airstrikes were undermined by UN hesitations, damaging NATO's credibility. However, later NATO actions in the Balkans, such as the air war for Kosovo in 1999 and peacekeeping in Macedonia in 2001, were more successful in terms of alliance cohesion. **Public Opinion and International Relations** **U.S. Public Opinion and NATO** For over 70 years, NATO has been a military alliance safeguarding the interests and security of Western Europe and North America. Public support for NATO was strong during most of the Cold War. However, after the Cold War ended, some questioned the alliance's value, particularly its cost to the United States. President Donald Trump called for greater contributions from alliance partners and, as a presidential candidate, described NATO as "obsolete." Despite doubts about NATO's future, the alliance remains popular among the American public. A clear majority consistently view NATO as "somewhat positive" or "very positive," with support staying around or above 60 percent throughout the post-Cold War period. While NATO's popularity was higher immediately after the Cold War, there has been little variance in American public opinion, with very few polls showing less than 50 percent support for the alliance. While Americans generally have a favorable view of NATO, many believe allies should contribute more in terms of troops and money. As is often the case in public opinion polls, respondents may favor a policy until they are asked how much the policy costs. Public opinion polls indicate that a plurality of Americans think NATO does too little. However, public opinion in other NATO countries is very supportive of the alliance. A Pew survey of 16 NATO member states showed a median favorability of 53% and a disapproval of 27%. Only Greece (51%) and Turkey (55%) had a plurality viewing NATO unfavorably. Increasing criticism of NATO seems to have led the public to value it more. A 2017 Gallup poll found the highest percentage of Americans with a favorable view of NATO since 1989. Since 2011, the number of Americans with a negative view of NATO has steadily declined. Support for NATO surged further after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with a March 2022 Pew Foundation survey showing 69% of Americans believed the United States benefited from NATO membership. NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya was effective, using air power to support rebels in overthrowing Libya's dictator. Backed by the UN Security Council and the Arab League for a no-fly zone, and with European countries providing most combat planes, NATO considered the operation a great success. NATO troops from several member countries fought Taliban forces in Afghanistan. From 2003 to 2014, these forces, known as the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), were under NATO leadership. At its peak (2010-2012), over 100,000 troops served in ISAF, with contributions from NATO (with NATO states providing the bulk of the forces) and non-NATO states like Australia, New Zealand, and Jordan. The ISAF mission ended in 2015, replaced by the Resolute Support mission. In 2021, all NATO-aligned military forces withdrew from Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to regain power. The European Union formed its own rapid deployment force, Eurocorps, partly due to military weaknesses shown in the 1999 Kosovo war, where the U.S. was the main contributor. While Eurocorps often works with NATO, it provides Europe more independence from the U.S. In 2003, the EU sent peacekeeping forces to the Democratic Republic of Congo, marking the first multinational European military operation outside NATO. In 2004, NATO and U.S. forces withdrew from Bosnia, handing over peacekeeping to the EU, as they had in Macedonia. However, NATO forces, including U.S. soldiers, remain in Kosovo. NATO's recent eastward expansion beyond the Cold War dividing line is a significant issue. Since 1999, former Soviet bloc countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have joined, followed by others such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Finland. Georgia, Sweden, Bosnia, and Macedonia aspire to join in the future. Integrating new members' militaries with NATO requires increased military spending. NATO expansion aims to solidify new democracies and protect against potential Russian aggression. However, the 2003 Iraq War bypassed and divided NATO members, with France and Germany opposing the war and Turkey refusing U.S. ground forces access. U.S. leaders have shifted some operations to new Eastern European members while reducing forces in Germany. Russian leaders view NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe as aggressive and anti-Russian, seeing it as reasserting dividing lines closer to Russia's borders. This perception strengthens nationalist and anti-Western political forces in Russia. To address these concerns, NATO created the Partnership for Peace, which includes almost all Eastern European and former Soviet states, including Russia. However, tensions between Russia and NATO have escalated, especially after Russia's invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, with NATO heavily arming Ukraine. In 2016, Russia moved to protect its ally, the Syrian government, and has expanded military cooperation with countries like Venezuela and China. **Other Alliances** The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty is a bilateral alliance where the United States maintains nearly 50,000 troops in Japan, along with weapons, equipment, and logistical support. Japan pays the U.S. several billion dollars annually to cover about half the cost. The alliance was established in 1951 during the Korean War to counter the potential Soviet threat to Japan. **U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty**: A bilateral alliance between the United States and Japan, created in 1951 against the potential Soviet threat to Japan. The United States maintains troops in Japan and is committed to defend Japan if that nation is attacked, and Japan pays the United States to offset about half the cost of maintaining the troops. The U.S.-Japan alliance, rooted in the post-World War II U.S. military occupation of Japan, is quite asymmetrical. The United States is committed to defending Japan if attacked, but Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation. U.S. troops are stationed in Japan, but not the other way around. While the U.S. is part of multiple alliances, Japan's primary alliance is with the U.S. Additionally, the U.S. contributes a significantly larger share of military power in this alliance compared to its share in NATO. Japan's constitution, written by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur after World War II, renounces the right to wage war and maintain military forces. However, this prohibition has been interpreted more loosely over time. In 2015, Japan's parliament approved a law allowing the use of military force overseas. Japan's Self-Defense Forces are strong enough for territorial defense but not for aggression. It is a powerful army but smaller than Japan\'s economic strength could support. Public opinion in Japan generally restrains militarism and precludes the development of nuclear weapons, influenced by the destruction of Japanese cities by nuclear weapons in World War II. Some Japanese leaders believe Japan's security role should match its economic power. Japanese troops have participated in non-combat roles in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2004), and Japan seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UN is also encouraging Japan to fully participate in peacekeeping missions. The United States has leveraged its alliance with Japan to project power in Asia, particularly during the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1964-1975), with Japan serving as a key staging area. The ongoing U.S. military presence in Japan symbolizes America's commitment to Asian security affairs. Parallel with the U.S.-Japan treaty, the United States maintains military alliances with several other states, including Australia and South Korea, where 35,000 military personnel are stationed under a bilateral alliance dating to the Korean War. Close U.S. collaboration with militaries in other states such as Israel makes them de facto U.S. allies. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) includes nine former Soviet republics, excluding the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Russia is the leading member, with Ukraine being the second largest. While there is some military coordination within the CIS, plans for a joint military force were unsuccessful. Kazakhstan and Belarus are closely aligned with Russia, whereas Ukraine is the most independent and never officially ratified the CIS agreement. Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 2009 following its 2008 military conflict with Russia. **Regional Alignments** Most international alignments and coalitions are not formalized in alliances, beyond the discussed alliances and regional IGOs. Powerful actors in the international system have developed close relationships, though China and Russia remain somewhat independent. During the Cold War, many states joined a nonaligned movement to stay apart from the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. This movement, led by India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, was weakened by the membership of states like Cuba, which were clearly aligned with one of the superpowers. **nonaligned movement**: A movement of developing countries, initially led by India and Yugoslavia, that attempted to stand apart from the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. At the turn of the century, the 53-member Organisation of African Unity re-formed as the African Union (AU), a stronger organization with a continent-wide parliament, central bank, and court. The AU's first major test was the 2004 allegations of genocide in Darfur, Sudan, leading to the deployment of 3,000 AU troops alongside a larger UN peacekeeping force. The AU also deployed forces, mainly Ugandan, in Somalia to combat Islamist militants. These forces were withdrawn at the end of 2017 after the AU and UN Security Council agreed to transfer security responsibilities to the Somali army. In Asia, China has been loosely aligned with Pakistan against India, which was aligned with the Soviet Union. The U.S. also favored Pakistan but has improved relations with both India and China since the Cold War. China has a loose alliance with North Korea, valuing it as a counterbalance to South Korea, though it has concerns about North Korea's stability. Long-standing U.S. allies in Asia include Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand. The Arab Israeli conflict led to a general anti-Israel alignment among Arab countries for decades, but this changed when Egypt (1978) and Jordan (1994) made peace with Israel. In August 2020, the UAE also established formal ties with Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process fluctuates, with varying degrees of Arab solidarity and opposition to Israel. Notable conflicts include Israel's war with Hezbollah in 2006 and the 2023 invasion of Gaza following a Hamas attack. Israel and Turkey once had a close military relationship, but relations deteriorated after Israel killed Turkish protesters on a ship trying to break the blockade of Gaza in 2009. In 2023, Turkey's president labeled Israel a "terrorist state" due to the Gaza war. Israeli-Palestinian relations have been stagnant since 2011. Sectarian strife between Shias and Sunni has been a major division since 1979, with Iran and Saudi Arabia, each representing each branch respectively, vying for influence in regional conflicts like the civil wars in Syria and Yemen. The United States has maintained close relations with Egypt since 1978 and cooperates closely with Turkey (a NATO member), Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. U.S.-Iranian relations have been strained for over 40 years since the 1979 revolution. However, Iran, with its Shi'ite population, has close ties with Iraq's new U.S.-backed government, dominated by Shi'ite religious parties. Turkey, an increasingly Islamist Sunni state, is politically distant from both Iran and Saudi Arabia, with whom it has competing regional ambitions. Turkey also competes with Russia, despite having common enemies in the Kurds and ISIS, as they are on opposite sides of the conflicts in Syria and Libya. The fluidity of alliances makes them unpredictable for scholars and policymakers. Currently, international alignments, including military alliances and trade relationships, center on the United States. While independent-minded states like China and Russia counterbalance U.S. hegemony, there is little evidence of a formal rival power alignment emerging. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has, if anything, unified the NATO alliance. China claims its relationship with Russia has no limits, and India remains a close trade partner with Russia. The long-term effects of the invasion will continue to unfold in the coming years. **2.5 Strategy** Actors use strategies to achieve favorable outcomes in bargaining situations with others. States utilize their power capabilities to influence each other's actions. Bargaining is an interactive process that requires considering the interests of other actors while pursuing one's own goals. **Statecraft** Classical realists focus on **statecraft**, the art of managing state affairs and navigating power politics among sovereign states. Power strategies involve planning and deploying power capabilities to achieve goals. A key aspect is selecting the right capabilities to develop, given limited resources, to maximize international influence. This requires foresight, as capabilities may need to be developed years in advance and are often not interchangeable in the short term. A central dilemma is deciding the size of standing military forces to maintain in peacetime---enough to prevent a quick defeat in war, but not so much as to strain the economy. Strategies also shape policies for when a state is willing to use its power capabilities. The will of a nation or leader is hard to estimate. Even if leaders make explicit their intention to fight over an issue, they may be bluffing. In recent years, China\'s strategic actions align with the concept of rational power deployment, particularly in its efforts to prevent Taiwan\'s independence. China views Taiwan as part of its territory, a position supported by the UN and, officially, the U.S. After the 1949 civil war, Taiwan's government, initially representing all of China, gradually sought independence, with many Taiwanese now favoring it. Despite lacking the military power for a successful invasion, China has consistently threatened war if Taiwan declares independence, which has so far deterred such a declaration. In 1996, China conducted military exercises near Taiwan, prompting the U.S. to send aircraft carriers as a warning. Not risking war by declaring independence, Taiwan instead has engaged in diplomacy to gain influence in the world. It lobbies the U.S. Congress, asks for admission to the UN and other world organizations, and grants foreign aid to countries that recognize Taiwan\'s government (in 2023, 13 \[or 14 counting Vatican City\] mostly small states in the Caribbean and Oceania). China has used diplomacy to counter Taiwan's moves by breaking diplomatic relations with countries that recognize Taiwan and punishing any steps towards Taiwanese independence. Half of the countries that recognize Taiwan are in the Caribbean and Central America, leading to a competition for influence in the region. China uses various positive and negative leverages to counter Taiwanese ties with these countries. For example, in Panama, China has implicitly threatened to restrict access to Hong Kong or re-register ships in the Bahamas (The Bahamas broke with Taiwan in 1997 after a Hong Kong conglomerate, now part of China, promised to invest in a Bahamian container port). Similarly, when Kiribati recognized Taiwan in 2003, China broke off relations and removed a satellite-tracking station, highlighting its determination to prioritize Taiwan even at a cost to other national goals like its space program. China has used two of its eleven UN Security Council vetoes to block peacekeeping forces in countries that recognized Taiwan. These vetoes show China's willingness to play a spoiler role if its Taiwan interests are threatened. For example, when Macedonia recognized Taiwan in 1999, China vetoed a UN peacekeeping mission there during instability in Kosovo. Macedonia switched its diplomatic recognition to China in 2001. When its Taiwan interests are secure, China cooperates on global issues. For instance, it did not veto the 1991 Gulf War UN resolution despite opposing the war. However, since 2019, China has joined Russia in vetoing resolutions on Syria and Venezuela. China's strategies involve various capabilities, such as missiles, diplomats, and industrial conglomerates, to influence its key international issue. This amplifies China's power. The strategy of deterrence involves threatening punishment to prevent negative actions, with success measured by the absence of attacks. **Deterrence**: The threat to punish another actor if it takes a certain negative action (especially attacking one\'s own state or one\'s allies). See also mutually assured destruction (MAD). Advocates of deterrence believe conflicts are more likely to escalate into war when one party is weak. Building military capabilities can convince the stronger party that military leverage won't succeed, reducing the likelihood of violence. Compellence, used when deterrence fails, involves threatening force to make another actor take action. It's generally harder to get a state to change course (compellence) than to refrain from changing course (deterrence). **Compellence**: The threat of force to make another actor take some action (rather than, as in deterrence, refrain from taking an action). **Escalation** is a strategy used to compel compliance by applying a series of increasingly severe negative sanctions to induce action. Less severe actions establish credibility, while the pattern of escalation highlights the high costs of future sanctions if there is no cooperation. The second actor is expected to comply if the potential costs of escalating punishments outweigh the costs of compliance. However, escalation can be dangerous, as seen during the Cold War when scholars worried that conventional war could lead to nuclear war if superpowers used escalation strategies. An arms race is a reciprocal process where states build up military capabilities in response to each other, leading to a runaway production of weapons. This mutual escalation of threats erodes confidence, reduces cooperation, and increases the likelihood of a crisis or accident causing one side to strike first. The U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race vividly illustrated this process, resulting in arsenals of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on each side. **arms race**: A reciprocal process in which two or more states build up military capabilities in response to each other. **Rationality in International Relations** Most realists (and many non-realists) assume that those who wield power in statecraft behave as rational actors in their efforts to influence others. This view has two implications for international relations (IR). **rational actors**: Actors conceived of as single entities that can \"think\" about their actions coherently, make choices, identify their interests, and rank the interests in terms of priority. [First], the assumption of rationality implies that states and other international actors can identify and prioritize their interests, with actions aimed at advancing these interests. Many realists assume that the actor (usually a state) exercising power is a single entity capable of coherent decision-making, known as the unitary actor assumption or strong leader assumption. Although this is a simplification, as internal conflicts often exist (e.g., politicians, parties, economic sectors, or regions of a country), realists believe that the exercise of power aims to advance the national interest---the interests of the state itself. **national interest**: The interests of a state overall (as opposed to particular parties or factions within the state). The interests of a state can be complex and multifaceted, including the interests of government agencies, domestic groups, the need to prevail in conflicts, and the ability to cooperate internationally. There is no simple answer to what constitutes a state's interests. Some realists define the national interest as maximizing material power, while others compare power in international relations to money in economics, viewing states as competing for power in the international system. [Second], rationality implies that actors perform a cost-benefit analysis, calculating the costs and benefits of possible actions. Applying power incurs costs and should yield commensurate gains. One must add up different dimensions in such a calculation. States typically do not start wars they expect to lose unless the political benefits outweigh the costs. However, it is challenging to compare intangible political benefits with tangible war costs. Even victory may not justify the costs. Rational actors can miscalculate, especially with faulty information, and human behavior and luck can be unpredictable. **cost-benefit analysis**: A calculation of the costs to be incurred by a possible action and the benefits it is likely to bring. These assumptions about rationality and the actors in IR are simplifications that not all IR scholars accept. But realists consider these simplifications useful because they allow scholars to explain in a general way the actions of diverse actors. **The Prisoner\'s Dilemma** Game theory is a branch of mathematics focused on predicting bargaining outcomes. It involves settings where two or more players choose among alternative moves, resulting in a set of payoffs (utility) for each player. Payoffs can be tangible or intangible items of value. Game theory aims to deduce likely outcomes based on players' preferences and possible moves. Games are sometimes referred to as formal models. **game theory**: A branch of mathematics concerned with predicting bargaining outcomes. Games such as Prisoner\'s Dilemma and Chicken have been used to analyze various sorts of international interactions. Scholars first extensively used game theory in international relations (IR) during the 1950s and 1960s to understand U.S.-Soviet nuclear war contingencies. Moves involved decisions on using nuclear weapons, and payoffs were the war outcomes. Recently, the use of game theory to study international interactions has grown, especially among realists who accept rationality assumptions. Analyzing a game mathematically assumes each player chooses moves rationally to maximize their payoff. Different situations are represented by different classes of games, defined by the number of players and the structure of the payoffs. A key distinction is between zero-sum games, where one player's gain equals the other's loss, and non-zero-sum games, where both players can gain or lose. In zero-sum games, communication or cooperation is pointless due to opposing interests. In non-zero-sum games, coordinating moves can maximize the total payoff, though players may still compete for a larger share of that payoff. **zero-sum games**: Situations in which one actor\'s gain is equal to the other\'s loss, as opposed to a non-zero-sum game, in which it is possible for both actors to gain (or lose). The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game illustrates a collective goods problem common in international relations (IR). In PD, rational players make choices that result in all players being worse off than if they had chosen differently. Although they could achieve better outcomes collectively, as individual rational actors, they fail to do so. This occurs because each player acts in their own self-interest, leading to suboptimal outcomes for all. **Prisoner\'s Dilemma (PD)**: A situation modeled by game theory in which rational actors pursuing their individual interests all achieve worse outcomes than they could have by working together. The original Prisoner's Dilemma story involves two prisoners questioned separately by a prosecutor. The prosecutor can only convict them of illegal gun possession unless one confesses. Each prisoner is told that if he confesses and the other doesn't, he will go free, while the other gets a long prison term. If both confess, they get reduced terms. If neither confesses, they serve short sentences for the gun charge. The story assumes no chance for retaliation, only immediate outcomes matter, and each prisoner cares only about himself. The Prisoner's Dilemma has a single solution: both prisoners will confess. Each person reasons that confessing will either result in a shorter sentence if the partner also confesses or freedom if the partner doesn't. This leads both to confess, resulting in longer sentences for both, whereas cooperation (remaining silent) would have led to shorter sentences. Therefore, The Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates how focusing solely on individual interests can lead to worse outcomes for everyone involved. Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations are common in international relations (IR), such as in arms races. For example, India and Pakistan must decide whether to build nuclear arsenals. Without an arms control agreement with strict verification, neither can know if the other is secretly building up. Analyzing the game involves assigning values to each possible outcome for each player, known as preference ordering. Misjudging these values can lead to incorrect conclusions. The plausible preferences regarding possible outcomes in an arms race are: 1. **Best outcome:** One player develops a nuclear arsenal while the other does not, gaining leverage despite the expense. 2. **Second best:** Neither player goes nuclear, avoiding both leverage and expense. 3. **Third best:** Both players develop nuclear arsenals, incurring major expenses without gaining leverage. 4. **Worst outcome:** One player forgoes nuclear weapons while the other develops them, leading to potential extortion. **The game can be summarized in a payoff matrix:** - **Payoff Matrix:** The first number in each cell is India's payoff, and the second is Pakistan's. A 4 indicates the highest payoff, and a 1 the lowest. - **Cooperation vs. Defection:** Refraining from building nuclear weapons is called cooperation, while proceeding is called defection. - **Strategic Dilemma:** Each state's leader reasons that if the other goes nuclear, they must too; if the other doesn't, they should still go nuclear. - ![](media/image4.png)**Prediction:** The model predicts an inevitable Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race, though both would benefit from avoiding it. **Explanation of Each Cell** 1. **(3,3) - Both Cooperate:** - **India's Payoff:** 3 - **Pakistan's Payoff:** 3 - **Outcome:** Both countries refrain from building nuclear weapons. This is the second-best outcome for both, as they avoid the expense of building arsenals and maintain stability. 2. **(1,4) - India Cooperates, Pakistan Defects:** - **India's Payoff:** 1 - **Pakistan's Payoff:** 4 - **Outcome:** India refrains from building nuclear weapons, while Pakistan proceeds. This is the worst outcome for India, as it becomes vulnerable to extortion. For Pakistan, this is the best outcome, as it gains leverage without facing immediate competition. 3. **(4,1) - India Defects, Pakistan Cooperates:** - **India's Payoff:** 4 - **Pakistan's Payoff:** 1 - **Outcome:** India proceeds with building nuclear weapons, while Pakistan refrains. This is the best outcome for India, as it gains leverage. For Pakistan, this is the worst outcome, as it becomes vulnerable to extortion. 4. **(2,2) - Both Defect:** - **India's Payoff:** 2 - **Pakistan's Payoff:** 2 - **Outcome:** Both countries proceed with building nuclear weapons. This is the third-best outcome for both, as they incur significant expenses without gaining leverage over each other. The dilemma here parallels the Prisoner's Dilemma. Each state's leader reasons: - "If they go nuclear, we must; if they don't, we'd be crazy not to." This reasoning leads to both countries defecting (building nuclear weapons), resulting in the (2,2) outcome, which is less beneficial than cooperation (3,3). The model predicts an inevitable Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race, although both states would do better to avoid one. In 1998, India tested nuclear weapons, and Pakistan quickly followed. In 2002, they nearly went to war, with potential deaths projected up to 12 million. The ongoing arms race is costly and dangerous, with both sides now having dozens of nuclear missiles. Avoiding this arms race would benefit both as a collective good, but the lack of strong central authority in the international system prevents this. This example shows why realists are pessimistic about cooperative solutions to collective goods problems, like those in the Prisoner's Dilemma. IR scholars have analyzed many games beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). One example is the game of Chicken, where two players speed toward a head-on collision, and the first to swerve is considered "chicken." Each player reasons that if the other doesn't swerve, they must, but if the other swerves, they won't. The player who commits irrevocably not to swerve will win. Similarly, during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, some scholars argue that President John F. Kennedy "won" by appearing ready to risk nuclear war if Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev didn't back down and remove Soviet missiles from Cuba. There are alternative explanations for the crisis's outcome, however. The game of Chicken sheds light on deterrence, which involves convincing another actor not to take an action it otherwise would. In Chicken, one driver commits to not swerving to win, like state leaders convincing others they will respond harshly if attacked. However, not swerving risks disaster for both sides, making it hard to convince the other side of the willingness to risk crashing (fighting a war). Game theory often studies interdependent decisions, where each player's outcome depends on the actions of the other.

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