Comparative Politics: Japan PDF

and in Comparative Politics SECO N D EDITION PATRICK H. O'NEIL I KARL FIELDS I DON SHARE ~ W.W. NORTON & COMPANY Independent Publishers Since 1923  J Why Study This Case? Japan offers an important...

and in Comparative Politics SECO N D EDITION PATRICK H. O'NEIL I KARL FIELDS I DON SHARE ~ W.W. NORTON & COMPANY Independent Publishers Since 1923  J Why Study This Case? Japan offers an important case for the study of contemporary politics, perhaps foremost to educate a Western audience about what Japan is not. Too much of our understanding of Japan is influenced by dangerously misleading stereo- types. For example, Japan is not small. It has a landmass greater than that of Germany or Great Britain; a population larger than that of all non-Asian countries other than the United States, Brazil, Nigeria, and Russia; and an economy fourth in size only to those of the United States, China, and India. defenseless. Despite the constitution's famous Article 9, which renounces war, Japan possesses a Self-Defense Force second only to the U.S. military in technical sophistication and boasts defense expenditures comparable to or greater than those of all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) except the United States. unique. In its political stability, state involvement in the economy, cultural conformity, and even ethnic homogeneity, Japan may differ from the United States, but in these and other ways, often the United States is exceptional, not Japan. If Japan is more "normal" than we might have assumed, it nonetheless remains an intriguing case that defies generalization and begs further investigation. Politically, an authoritarian vanguard of low-ranking nobles launched a sweep- ing revolution from above in the latter half of the nineteenth century, modernizing Japan under the mercantilist slogan "rich country, strong military." Its milita- rist successors waged wars of imperialist expansion during the first half of the twentieth century, leading to stunning defeat in 1945. American occupiers then - 331  RUSSIA Sea of Okhotsk Kuril Islands occup:ed by Ille Soviet Union since 1945. today adm n s1ered oy RJss a. but so. thern ,s'ands.i.~ r? CHINA claimed by Japa r~\'l>0v (/.,e +-v~' 17.~., ~ ~ Yellow ,... Sea. PACIFIC OCEAN East China Sea. Bonin , Islands. Senkaku , (Japan) Islands Minami Daito ·· Jima N. -~..._,1S~kishima Islands (Japan) 0 + ,oo 100 20Qn"i _..:_r - --' :xxu.m two Jlma (Japan) Philippine Sea launched a second revolution from above, replacing authoritarian rule with a lib- eral democratic constitution written entirely by the Americans (in just six days) and unamended by the Japanese in more than seven decades. For six of these past seven decades, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has governed Japan. Moreover, elected politicians have historically deferred to Japan's non elected career civil servants, who for much of this period have written most of Japan's laws. Over the past two decades, significant reforms have been implemented, yet political change has not come readily to Japan. This situation raises several important questions: Where does political authority reside in Japan? How has Japan's externally imposed democracy evolved over the years? And does Japanese democracy differ in substantial ways from other advanced industrial democracies? Economically, under conditions of state-directed industrialization, imperial- ism, and war, Japan's authoritarian leaders forged a highly centralized economy over the course of the first half of the twentieth century. Concerned about Japan's economic stability in a heightening Cold War, the United States allowed the war- torn nation to retain many aspects of its state-led economic structure. Japan therefore extended its wartime mercantilist economy into peacetime, forging an alliance among career bureaucrats, conservative politicians, and big-business elite that propelled Japan's economy for several decades.1 By the 1980s, Japan had achieved and in many cases surpassed the levels of technological prowess, commercial competitiveness, and economic prosperity of the advanced Western industrialized nations. By the early 1990s, however, this seemingly invincible economy began a dra- matic and persistent decline. Japan has experienced nearly three decades of stagnant or slow economic growth and lagging industrial production. For much of this period, banks were in crisis, unemployment climbed, and the stock market languished. Japan's workforce is graying even as its population rapidly shrinks. Adding tragic and unprecedented insult to these decades of economic stagna- tion, in 2011 a devastating 9.0 earthquake and tsunami struck northeast Japan, killing tens of thousands and damaging several nuclear power plants. This catastrophe further hobbled the country's economy, threatened its energy infra- structure, exacerbated political instability, and severely strained state capacity to deal with the humanitarian disaster. Although Japan remains wealthy and most of its citizens relatively prosperous, few countries have faced such a striking peace- time turnaround in economic fortune. How does one account for this dynamic of rapid growth followed by precipitous decline and long-term stagnation? What have been the causes of Japan's economic success and its more recent failures? Must Japan change, and if so, how and when? Only by understanding Japan, its institutions, and where it has come from will we be able to make sense of where it may be headed. Why Study This Case? 333  Historical Development of the State Despite the many cultural oddities that European PREMODERN JAPAN: ADAPTING traders and missionaries discovered when they first arrived in sixteenth-century Japan, they had actu- CHINESE INSTITUTIONS ally stumbled on a nation and sociery whose his- By the seventh century, Japan's tribal hunters and torical development bore striking similarities to early rice cultivators came under the powerful cul- that of their own countries. As in Europe, isolated tural influence of Tang dynasty China. Among the tribal anarchy had gradually given way to growing most significant and lasting of the dynasty's cul- national idenciry and the emergence of a primitive tural exports were Buddhism, Confucianism, the state. Aided by clearly defined natural borders and Chinese written language, and the trappings of imperial and bureaucratic institutions borrowed material culture (including modes of dress, archi- from neighboring China, the Japanese stare grew tectural sryles, and even the use of chopsticks). in both capacity and legitimacy. Gradually, a feudal Tang China also had a profound influence on military aristocracy came to mle over an increas- political reforms, inspiring the country's leaders to ingly centralized and sophisticated bureaucratic establish an administrative system modeled on the state for many centuries, even as it allowed Japan's Tang imperial state. To finance this new bureau- emperors to continue to 1·eign symbolically. cracy, the state introduced sweeping land reform, Whereas in Europe gradually weakening feu- purchasing all land and redistributing it among dalism gave way co powerful modernizing mon- peasants so that it could be taxed. However, the archs and ultimately middle-class democracy, meritocratic civil bureaucracy soon evolved into a Japan's version of centralized feudalism persisted hereditary, self-perpetuating ruling elite supported until Western imperialism prompted change in the by a declining tax base. Squeezed mercilessly, the nineteenth century. Faced with external threats to peasants, either for survival or protection, were their nation's sovereignty, authoritarian oligarchs forced to sell out to local wealthy officials who had further centralized state power and consciously managed co arrange tax immunity for their own retained the emperor as a puppet to legitimize their lands. efforts to catch up with the West. During this Meiji From the eighth to the twelfth centuries, politi- era, the oligarchs, borrowing this rime not from cal power and wealth steadily shifted from the cen- China bur from the institutions of modern Euro- tral government to independent rural landowners, pean stares, established a modern Japanese state and the urban-centered imperial system gradually that grew in autonomy and capaciry as it became disintegrated into a formalistic body concerned a formidable military and industrial power. In fur- only with the trappings and rituals of state. In the ther emulating the Western imperial powers,Japan countryside, territorial nobles or lords, known as also began to establish its own empire, obtaining daimyo, governed the lands they occupied, which colonies in Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910). In the were farmed by former peasants, who had become 1930s, Japan continued its expansion, capturing their serfs. The lords and their properties were pro- Manchuria (1931), invading China proper (1937), tected by warrior retainers, or samurai. and sweeping through Southeast Asia at the same As their power grew, the landed aristocrats time that it launched its arrack on Pearl Harbor became increasingly dissatisfied with the ineffec- and the United States (1941). However, this course tual rule of the court. Over the course of the next of imperial expansion and military conquest ended 400 years, from the thirteenth through the sixteenth with defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1945, centuries, power completely shifted to this military who defanged Japan's militarist stare bur allowed aristocracy. Different clans vied for supremacy, and its mercantilist bureaucracy ro remain intact. ascendant clans established a government known Before turning to Japan's contemporary political as the bakuftt (literally, "tent government''). This was institutions, we first examine the development of a period of continual warfare based on attempts at the Japanese stare. establishing a line of succession and a semblance of 334 JAPAN TIMELI NE Political Development 645 China-inspired Taika political reforms introduced. 1192 Minamoto Yoritomo declared first shogun. 1603 Tokugawa shogunate established. 1853-54 Japan forcibly opened by U.S. Commodore Matthew C. Perry. 1867-68 Meiji Restoration takes place. 1894-95 First Sino-Japanese War is fought. 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War is fought. 1912-26 Era of Taisho democracy. 1937-45 Second Sino-Japanese War takes place. 1941 Pacific War begins. 1945 Japan is defeated and surrenders in World War II. 1945-52 The United States occupies Japan. 1955 liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is formed. 1993-94 LDP briefly loses majority in Diet's House of Representatives to an opposition coalition. 2007 LDP loses majority in Diet's House of Councillors. 2009 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gains majority in House of Representatives and forms a coalition government. 2011 Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters take place. 2012 LDP regains a majority in the House of Representatives and forms a coalition government with Shinzo Abe as prime minister. 2016 LDP coalition retains a supermajority in House of Representatives elections. 2019 LDP coalition wins a majority in House of Councillors elections, but loses its supermajority. unity through military conquest, during which the TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE: emperor was largely clisregarded. But in Japan, unlike in Europe, the imperial household was neither abso- CENTRALIZED FEUDALISM lutely empowered nor completely displaced. The By the end of the sixteenth century, feudal wars had emperor had become not so much a person as a come to a head, and Japan was slowly but surely uni- reigning symbol; whoever spoke in the name of the fied by the Tokugawa shogunate, which imposed imperial chrysanthemum crest spoke with legiti- an enforced peace for the next two and a half cen- mate authority. The emperor became a puppet in the turies. Successive shoguns from the Tokugawa clan hands of aspiring daimyo, who never destroyed the ruled over chis feudal hierarchy in the name of the head of state but forced him to anoint the strongest emperor, successfully shoring up the shogunate's among chem shogun, or dominant lord. authority and keeping the daimyo in check through Historical Development of the State 335 \  an effective strategy of divide and rule at home and seeking coaling stations and trading opportunities sakoku, or closed-country isolation, abroad. for American ships, he unsuspectingly came on this The power of a local daimyo rested, in turn, system, which was apparently stable but internally on the size and productivity of the hereditary fief ripe for change. The ruling class had status and or feudal domain he controlled, the peasants who privilege but was heavily indebted and, in the case rilled the land, and, most important, the number of many low-ranking samurai, even impoverished. of samurai the domain could support. The warrior The merchants were wealthy but socially disdained, retainers lived with their lords in castle towns that lacking both political power and social status. served as the fortresses and administrative centers Many Japanese, particularly among the lower ranks from which the lords governed their domains. Bue of the samurai, had become dissatisfied with what as the Tokugawa-enforced peace settled over the they saw as an increasingly ineffectual Tokugawa countryside, the samurai were gradually converted government and were ready for revolt. Perry did from warriors co civil officials with fiscal, legal, not cause chis revolc, but he certainly facilitated it. and other administrative responsibilities. These Foreign pressure created a crisis of legitimacy for samurai-turned-bureaucrats cackled civilian tasks Tokugawa rule, which lacked the military capacity in the same devoted, selfless manner in which they co resist the unfair trade demands of the Americans had been trained to carry out their martial respon- (and, subsequently, Europeans). sibilities. These efficient, skilled, disciplined, and A decade of political chaos ensued, prompting highly respected bureaucrats would come to serve a revolution launched not from below, by restive the country well as it faced the challenges of abrupt peasants or even aspiring merchants, but from modernization in the nineteenth and twentieth above, by a handful of junior samurai officials. centuries. Much like Germany's nineteenth-century modern- Although Tokugawa Japan's political system izers, this aristocratic vanguard was committed co ~vas remarkably stable, its social organization sweeping change cloaked in traditional trappings. and economy developed volatile contradictions. They recognized chat the preservation of Japanese Tokugawa society was strictly hereditary and rig- sovereignty required the end of the feudal regime idly hierarchical; individuals were born into a par- and the swift creation of a modern economic, ticular station and could neither move between political, social, and, perhaps most important, classes nor, for the most part, even advance within military system capable of holding its own against their own class. The samurai class was at the top of the Western powers. But rather than deposing the the hierarchy, but not all samurai were equal. This symbolic leader of the old regime, the modernizers diverse warrior class ranged from the wealchy and launched their reforms in the name of the 16-year- powerful shogun and daimyo to the lowly retainers old emperor Meiji, ostensibly "restoring" him co his barely getting by on a subsistence stipend of rice. rightful ruling position. Next down on the social rung were the peasants, who formed the bulk of the remaining subjects, fol- lowed by artisans and craftsmen, and finally, at (or MEIJI RESTORATION: REVOLUTION near) the bottom of the social hierarchy, the mer- FROM ABOVE chants.2 As in other Confucian societies, commer- The group of junior samurai who led the Meiji cial activities, including moneylending, and chose Restoration in 1868 came co be known as the Meiji people who participated in chem were viewed with oligarchs. What began as a spontaneous rejection great disdain. Despite being socially despised, how- of the Western threat by xenophobic nationalises ever, by the nineteenth century these merchants quickly gave way to regime change led by a hand- had established sophisticated and lucrative trading ful of low-ranking samurai promoting emulation networks throughout Japan. Moreover, they had of and catching up with the West. These oligarchs established themselves as the financiers of the life- served as a vanguard in establishing the founda- styles of the upper ranks of the samurai, who over tions of the modern Japanese state. time grew increasingly indebted to the merchants. Their first priority was co make Japan a strong \Vhen Commodore Matthew C. Perry and wealthy state capable of renegotiating the arrived with his fleet of U.S. warships in 1853 unequal treaties the West had imposed on the 336 JAPAN  country. Under the slogan "rich country, strong was becoming a nation of diverse economic and military," they promoted their mercantilist view of political interests no longer easily subsumed under a strong relationship between economic develop- a single banner or slogan, and pressure to change ment and industrialization on the one hand, and the highly authoritarian system was building. The military and political power in the international desire for change became increasingly apparent arena on the other. They dismantled the feudal state during the reign of the Taisho emperor ( 1912-26), and converted the decentralized feudal domains to particularly in the era of Wilsonian democraq1 centrally controlled political units. They jettisoned after World War I. By that time, the original Meiji the feudal economy, eliminated hereditary fiefs, oligarchs had passed from the scene, and efforts returned land to the peasants, and introduced a by their bureaucratic and military successors to land tax that provided steady revenues co the state. maintain the state autonomy of the Meiji political Perhaps most surprisingly, they destroyed their system faced challenges from civil society: a middle own class, ending samurai privileges. class demanding democratic rights, laborers orga- In 1889, the oligarchs adopted an imperial con- nizing for better working conditions, and peasants stitution (patterned after the German constitution) rioting against onerous taxes. and presented it as a "gift" from the emperor to In an era that came to be known as Taisho his subjects. It specified not the rights and liber- democracy (1912-26), efforts by these groups ties of the citizens but the duties and obligations and their liberal political proponents to institute that the subjects owed the emperor and the state. democracy were significant but shore-lived and ulti- The constitution created some of the formal insti- mately unsuccessful. Different groups increasingly tutions found in Western democracies, including a sought to exercise influence in the political realm, bicameral parliament known as the Diet, though and with some success; competitive political parries its members were chosen by a limited franchise were established and flourished by the early years and exercised little real authority. The constitu- of the century, the first commoner was appointed tion vested all executive power in the emperor, prime minister in 1918, elected governments alter- who appointed the cabinet ministers and retained nated during the 1920s, and universal male suffrage supreme command over the military. The oligarchs was granted by 1925. further legitimized chis power structure by promot- ing an emperor-centered form of Shintoism as the THE MILITARIST ERA: IMPERIAL mandatory state religion and by inculcating both national patriotism and emperor worship in the EXPANSION AND DEFEAT education system. By the end of the I 920s, a number ofevents stymied Buttressed by the traditional and charismatic Japan's first genuine but short-lived effort to estab- legitimacy of a reigning emperor and the rational- lish liberal democracy. The Great Depression and legal legitimacy of an equally symbolic (and largely rising global protectionism dealt trade-dependent powerless) parliament, the oligarchs had obtained Japan harsh blows, bringing about increased labor both the authority and the autonomy to promote agitation and political unrest as the economy weak- painfully rapid development and to create a mod- ened. This domestic instability, combined with ern military. These twin goals of developing a rich anti-Japanese sentiment in China, spurred rising country and a strong military were carried out by nationalist and fascist sentiments at home and a literate and highly respected bureaucracy, an reemerging militarism and adventurism abroad. aggressive and increasingly influential military, and As in Europe and elsewhere, the emergence of such a sec of state-supported but privately owned indus- forces led in the early 1930s to a period of politi- trial conglomerates known as zaibatsu. cal polarization and increased political violence By the end of World War I, the Meiji oligarchs in which democracy became the chief victim. One had successfully renegotiated the inequitable trea- Western observer labeled chis period an era of"gov- ties with the West and established a fragile but rap- ernmenc by assassinacion."3 idly growing economy. However, Japan's foreign The era of Taisho democracy ended with the policy and economic successes were not matched Japanese army's seizure of Manchuria in 1931 in the domestic political realm. By the 1920s,Japan and the assassination of the lase elected head of Historical Development of the State 337 ,  government by naval cadets in 1932. Over the next past and then for democratization to establish decade, the military steadily expanded its control of American-style democratic values and institutions. the state, ruling in an often uneasy alliance with the Demilitarization proceeded swiftly and included bureaucracy and the zaibacsu. AJchough most his- not only the purging of all professional military torians are not comfortable labeling the Japanese officers, key wartime politicians, and zaibatsu lead- militarist state fascist, the emperor-based system ers, but also the disbanding of ultranationalist lent itself co the establishment of a near-totalitarian associations and political parties. These thorough state, one with many similarities co the European purges destroyed the military class and replaced fascist states. The state sought co bring under its entrenched politicians with technocrats (in most auspices or otherwise eliminate virtually all plu- cases, former bureaucrats) and zaibarsu families ralise groups and autonomous organizations. le with professional managers. Most dramatically, the censored the press, repressed all forms of political new "Japanese" constitution (quickly drafted by dissent, crushed political parties and ocher forms of MacArthur's staff and adopted by the Dier in 1947 free association, and seized near-complete control almost unaltered) included Article 9, the so-called over industrial production. Peace Clause. The clause stipulated that Japan Also, like its fascist allies in Europe, Japan pro- would "forever renounce war as a sovereign right" moted an ultranacionalisc ideology and expansion- and never maintain "land, sea, and air forces, as well ist foreign policy, with the intent of extending its as other war potential." empire. At the height of its power,Japan's so-called Changing the status of the emperor- Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of con- constitutionally and in the eyes of the Japanese quered lands included most of the eastern half of citizens-to no longer be a political force was key to China, Sakhalin and some of the Aleutian Islands, MacArthur's democratization efforts. The consti- Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indochina, Thai- tution reduced the emperor's stature from godlike land, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and portions of and inviolable to simply symbolic, and it trans- the South Pacific. But as in Europe, Allied forces ferred sovereignty to the Japanese people. Ocher met, stemmed, and turned back Japanese aggres- measures of this regime change included extending sion b)' 1944. Costly and stunning defeats at sea and suffrage to women; clarifying relations among the on land, followed by the destructive U.S. firebomb- prime minister, the cabinet, and the two houses of ing of Japanese cities in early 1945 and the atomic the Diet; guaranteeing civil rights and freedoms; bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of breaking up the zaibatsu and imposing antitrust that )'ear, prompted Japan's unconditional surren- measures; encouraging labor unions and other der on September 2, 1945. interest groups; redistributing land to the peasants; and reforming the education system. U.S. OCCUPATION: The two-stage approach of demilitarization and democratization remained largely in place for the REINVENTING JAPAN first two years of the occupation, but the onset of the Japan's defeat and destruction were devastatingly Cold War (compounded by the communist victory complete: militaril)', industrially, even psychologi- in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean cal!)'. Under these conditions, foreign (specifically, War in 1950) led to a "reverse course" in occupa- American) pressure once again provided the impe- tion policies. The earlier desire to fully demilita- tus for revolurionar)' change in Japan. Although rize and democratize Japan gave way to a plan that the seven-rear occupation ofJapan was technically would make Japan a full, albeit still unarmed, ally an Allied operation, it remained overwhelmingly of the West. In an effort to rebuild the economy, a U.S. enterprise managed by a single individual: occupation authorities scaled back the deconcen- the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in cracion of industry and prohibited labor strikes. Japan, General Douglas MacArthur. They purged and in some cases (re)jailed leftist Like Commodore Perry's arrival nearly a century labor activists even as they released and rehabili- earlier, the American occupation ofJapan following tated numerous conservative politicians. Notably, World War II is significant both for what it changed in all the twists and turns of occupation policy, the and for what it did not. The initial plan called for wartime bureaucracy of technocratic planners was demilitarization to exorcise Japan's militant feudal left intact, in part because the American occupiers 338 JAPAN needed it and in part because the United States saw Bureaucrats the bureaucrats simply as civil servants compelled to carry out the orders of the military government. Today, some occupation reforms are univer- sally considered to have been both successful and beneficial. Ochers largely failed, whereas still ochers remain highly controversial and even contradictory. For instance, on paper, Japan has one of the most liberal political systems in the world. But by default and design, its postwar state featured a core elite of experienced bureaucrats closely allied with con- servative politicians (many of them former bureau- crats) and big-business executives. Many aspects of Politicians Business leaders chis ruling triad, or iron triangle, have persisted Iron Triangle throughout the subsequent seven decades and have Japan's postwar corporatist and elitist state structure is been credited for Japan's remarkable postwar devel- often referred to as an iron triangle, and has limited the opment as well as blamed for its more recent eco- political influence of Japanese citizens and other pluralist nomic troubles. We now turn co an examination of interests. this contemporary political structure. Political Regime Is Japan a democracy? The persistent relevance of imported democracy, inviting a closer look at both Japan's ruling triad of bureaucrats, politicians, the formal institutions and substantive practices of and business leaders has led to much controversy Japan's political regime. on this issue. In important ways, Japan's political structures and procedures are democratic. The rights and liberties enshrined in Japan's 1947 con- POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS stitution certainly exceed those of the U.S. Con- THE CONSTITUTION "We, the Japanese people..." stitution and are perhaps globally unrivaled. Its The opening phrase of Japan's unamended 1947 citizens are well protected by the rule oflaw, and its constitution reveals what are perhaps the docu- electoral system is probably no more corrupt than ment's two most significant aspects: its American that of ocher advanced liberal democracies. Unlike imprint and the transfer of sovereignty from the its American counterpart, Japan's political arena emperor co theJapanese people. Although America's hosts both socialist and communist parties, argu- allies called for the prosecution of Emperor Hiro- ably resulting in a greater range of political debate hito as a war criminal, General Douglas MacArthur and choice than in the United States. insisted chat the emperor renounce his divinity but Yet these formal institutions and procedural be allowed co retain his throne to offer continuity safeguards of democracy do not cell the whole story. and legitimacy to both the occupation government The initial dominance and persistent influence of and the new democratic regime. The constitution the postwar bureaucracy and its conservative polit- reduces the emperor's godlike stature to chat of a ical and corporate allies have led some analysts to "symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, conclude that Japan's democracy is dysfunctional, deriving his position from the will of the people if not an outright mockery. Long-standing politi- with whom resides sovereign power." To empower cal practices and informal levers and linkages of Japanese citizens, the American framers of the Jap- power have constrained the full functioning of this anese constitution constructed an elaborate system Political Regime 339 1  Essential Political Features Legislative-executive system: Parliamentary Legislature: Diet Lower house: House of Representatives Upper house: House of Councillors Unitary or federal division of power: Unitary Main geographic subunits: Prefectures Electoral system for lower house: Mixed single-member districts and proportional representation Chief judicial body: Supreme Court of representative institutions, including universal softening the resistance of pacifists to formally suffrage, a parliamentary legislature in which the amend the constitution. cabinet is responsible ro the Diet (rather than to rhe emperor), and an independent judiciary. The constitution also introduced a greater measure of THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT devolved authority by increasing the role of local THE HEAD OF STATE Japan can lay claim to the elected officials. oldest unbroken line of monarchs in the world. Although the constitution has never been Although the Meiji constitution was invested with amended, a growing number of conservative total authority by the nineteenth century, the impe- politicians-if not the general public-have advo- rial institution from ancient times had always been cated rewriting Article 9, the Peace Clause, in an controlled by de facto rulers. The 1947 constitu- effort to make Japan, in their words, a "normal" tion eliminated even chis derivative authority, mak- country. In 2015, the LOP-led coalition govern- ing the role of the emperor wholly symbolic. Like ment managed to pass legislation char effectively the British queen, the monarchy symbolizes the reinterprets the clause, permitting Japan for the unity and continuity of contemporary Japan. The first rime to engage in "collective defense" with emperor also performs purely ceremonial casks, its allies, chiefly the United States. Amending the such as formally appointing both the prime min- constitution requires the approval of supermajor- ister and the chief justice of the Supreme Court, ities of two-thirds of all members in both houses receiving foreign ambassadors, and representing of parliament and simple majority approval in the nation on many important ceremonial occa- a national referendum. From 2016 co 2019, the sions at home and abroad. LOP-led government held supermajorities in The Japanese throne is both hereditary and both chambers, but still did not put forward an parrilineal; no female heir is permitted to rule in her amendment to even revise, let alone eliminate, the own right. Emperor Hirohito (who reigned from Peace Clause. Such a move continues ro face wide- 1926 to 1989) was succeeded by his eldest son, Aki- spread opposition, and popular support for the hito (who reigned from 1989 co 2019). Akihito was pacifist constitution remains generally strong. A in turn succeeded by his eldest son, Naruhito, who 2019 survey found that 56 percent of those polled ascended to the throne in 2019 as Japan's 126th opposed constitutional revision while only 32 per- emperor. Emperor Naruh ito and his wife, Empress cent expressed support. Nonetheless, the growing Masako, were both educated abroad, at Oxford Uni- military strength and regional ambitions of neigh- versity and Harvard University, respectively, and boring China as well as heightened threats from are seen as likely to continue the legacy of Akihito, an unpredictable and nuclear-armed North Korea spreading a message of pacifism and continuing are strengthening the resolve of conservatives and to humanize Japan's monarchy. Although polls 340 JAPAN  ( c - - - -M 4 ~ - in-is-te_r_. Cabinet ( ---------J~ 1' House of Council!o~~ House of Representatives (-----------) ( - Bi~-B~~iness and Other Corporate Interests ) T. T LINES OF CONTROL ( I S LE~T~~;;-7 ➔ Formal ---) Informal Structure of the Government show that recent generations of Japanese citizens, belong co the right party but also curry sufficient like their European counterparts, find themselves favor and rise high enough in a dominant faction increasingly less connected to the throne, signif- within that party. icant events, such as Akihito's abdication and As the ruling party for over six decades since its Naruhito's coronation, generate enormous pub- formation in 1955, the LOP historically has fostered lic interest and a deeper sense of attachment than prospective party leaders more concerned with fac- polls seem to indicate. tional ties, personal connections, and backroom bargaining than with promoting a particular ideo- THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET As logical or policy agenda. Faction leaders typically in other parliamentary systems, in Japan, the prime brokered chis selection process and rotated the office minister serves as head of government and draws of LOP president (and therefore the prime minis- from the Diet at least the majority of cabinet mem- ter) among various factions somewhat frequently. bers who serve as ministers, or heads, of Japan's Therefore, although Japanese prime ministers have 19 bureaucratic ministries and ocher key agencies. been experienced and savvy politicians, they tend co The prime minister is always chosen from the lower be older, have less policy expertise, and, with notable house, the House of Representatives, and is elected exceptions, serve for far shorter tenures than do by the members of that chamber. This has meant their counterparts abroad. The recent exceptions that the leader of the majority party in the House to this rule have been the tenures of Prime Minis- of Representatives (or leader of the dominant party ter Junichiro Koizumi (2001-06) and Prime Min- in a ruling coalition) has always been elected prime ister Shinzo Abe (2006-07; 2012-present), who as minister. Elections in the lower chamber muse be of 2019 became Japan's longest-serving head of held every four years, but prime ministers serve only government. as long as they maintain the confidence of the mem- But following Koizumi's d eparture in 2006, bers of the House of Representatives as well as the three successive LOP prime ministers came and members of their own party. The LO P's long domi- went in just th ree years before the LOP lost the nance in government enhanced the role of internal, 2009 lower house elections (and therefore the gov- factional party politics and required that successful ernment) to the opposition Democratic Par ty of candidates for the office of prime minister not just Japan (DPJ). And although the OPJ was elected Political Regime 341  Though he served for only one year in his first term (2006-07), Prime Minister Abe was reelected to lead the LDP ruling coalition in 2012, making him Japan's longest-serving head of government. b}' a landslide with a mandate to reform politics on the expertise, experience, and connections of as usual, the DPJ-led government likewise put up the unelected bureaucrats within the ministries three prime ministers in just three years before over which they ostensibly preside. the LDP returned to power in 2012. Overall, a Current prime minister Abe's extended tenure total of 38 prime ministers have led the coun- and more forceful leadership have led scholars co try since 1945 (compared with 16 for the United point co Japan as another example of the "presiden- Kingdom and just nine for Germany). These tializacion" of parliamentary systems in contempo- short-lived governments were further weakened rary democratic regimes. Although the bureaucracy b}' what the Japanese call a twi sted Diet, in which remains "at the center stage of policy making" in no ruling party or coalition controls both cham- Japan, elite recognition of the need for more decisive bers of pa rlia m ent, from 2007 until 2013. In addi- and consistent national leadership in a globalized, tion to divided government, scholars also point fast-paced world and subsequent electoral and gov- co disgruntled voters (particularly following the ernmental reforms have strengthened the role of the DPJ government's handling of the 2011 tsunami, prime minister. 5 earthquake, and nuclear disaster), weak politi- cal leaders, and the rise of new media as possible THE LEGISLATURE The 1947 constitution reasons for the typicall}' brief tenure of Japan's establishes Japan's legislature, or Diet (from the prime ministers.~ But whatever the cause, this Latin dieta, meaning "assembly''), as the "highest rapid turnover of elected h eads of government organ of state power" and claims exclusive law- has m ade these political leaders very dependent making authority for the bicameral pa rliament. 342 JAPAN The Japanese Diec has two directly elected cham- THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM The 1947 constitution bers: the House of Representatives and the House established for Japan a court system with a high of Councillors. degree of judicial independence from the other The House of Representatives, the lower branches of government. In practice, however, the house, has 465 members elected for four-year LOP over the years has used its political domi- terms. As in other parliamentary systems, the gov- nance, appointment powers, and ocher adminis- ernment typically dissolves the lower house before trative mechanisms to manipulate the courts and the term has expired co call elections from a posi- ensure judicial decisions in accordance with its tion of strength. Alternatively, a vote of no confi- political interests. This process was made easier dence can force dissolution, as it did most recently because, unlike the dual system of federal and scare in 1993. General elections have taken place on aver- courts in the United States, the Japanese system is age every two to three years since 1947. The upper unitary-all civil, criminal, and administrative mat- chamber, the House of Councillors, comprised ters are under the jurisdiction of a single hierarchy. 245 members as of 2020 (the chamber added three Ar the cop is the constitutional court, or Supreme seats in 2019 and will add an additional three sears Court, whose 15 members are appointed by the in 2022), elected for fixed six-year terms (staggered cabinet and subject to a retention referendum every so that half the chamber stands for election every 10 years. three years). Unlike the lower house, the upper This combination-of a unitary judicial system house cannot be dissolved. As in other parliamen- dominated for many decades by a single conser- tary systems, Japan's constitution grants the lower vative party-has rendered Japan's courts particu- house far more power than the upper; the House larly subservient and, like the political party that of Representatives can override any House of Coun- served as their political patron, distinctly conser- cillors decision on significant legislation with a vative. Even though the Supreme Court is invested two-thirds majority vote. However, recent elections with the constitutional power of judicial review, in both houses have permitted first the opposi- it has seldom used this authority and has been tion DPJ and then the opposition LOP to use their extremely hesitant to declare policies or statutes position in the upper house co obstruct or at least unconstitutional. Since its creation in 1947, the slow the policies and embarrass the leadership of Court has struck down only nine laws on constitu- the party in government. Significantly, any effort tional grounds and has steadfastly refused to rule to amend the constitution's Article 9, the Peace on matters relating to what is arguably postwar Clause, would require two-thirds majority support Japan's most significant constitutional issue: chal- in both chambers in addition to majority support lenges to Japan's military and security activities in a national referendum. under Article 9.6 Many veteran politicians have established exper- tise in particular policy areas as well as close ties to bureaucrats and interest groups that have jurisdic- THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM tion over or interest in chose policy areas. These so- As with other political institutions in Japan, the elec- called "tribal" or z.oku legislators hold a substantial toral system is both a cause and consequence of the degree of influence over policy formerly reserved for LDP's long-standing reign. Postwar LOP govern- bureaucratic experts and may also feel less obligated ments maintained grossly disproportionate voting to support the government's position on a given districts favoring rural, conservative voters who kept issue. The importance of pursuing pork-barrel the LOP in power and established additional elec- projects for home-district constituencies has also toral rules chat clearly favored the party's interesrs.7 weakened legislators' allegiance co the govern- Only in recent decades have reforms begun to chip ment. Therefore, despite being elected on platforms away at these LOP advantages and shift the landscape promising dramatic reforms co address Japan's eco- of electoral institutions and outcomes in Japan. nomic woes, successive governments have been slow Representatives in the two chambers of the Diet to promote reforms over the objections of these are elected according co different rules. The 245 experienced and entrenched politicians bound members of the upper House of Councillors (which to networks of bureaucrats, businesses, and local wilt increase co 248 by 2022) serve fixed six-year constituencies. terms, with half of the body facing election every Political Regime 343  three years. Councillors are elected according to a established a new mixed electoral system. Under mixed system of proportional representation in a this system, the larger portion of the 465 seats- nationwide election for 99 seats and mulcimember initially set at 300, but most recently reduced to districts (MMDs) coinciding with Japan's 47 prefec- 289-are elected from single-member districts tures for the remaining 146 seats. (SMDs). The remaining 176 seats are chosen by Before 1994, the electoral system used to deter- proportional representation from 11 regional con- mine membership in the House of Representatives stituencies, in which seats are assigned to the par- resembled the MMD system used for the upper ties according to their share of the total bloc-wide house.8 In 1993, a series of notorious scandals, votes. As in the German system, candidates may unpopular tax measures, and precipitous eco- both run in their own districts and be included in nomic decline led numerous LOP members of par- a regional party list, to safeguard their seats in case liament to defect from the parry and form or join of defeat in their home SMD. opposition parties. These defections brought into The architects of these reforms sought to shift government an opposition coalition chat lost no electoral competition away from both the LDP's time in reforming the rules governing lower house highly personalized factional politics and the local elections (among other changes). These reforms candidate-based campaign organizations known Q '.----::- A common sight during Japan's election season-a white-gloved campaign worker advocates for her candidate from a loudspeaker-equipped van. 344 JAPAN as koe11!uii to national party politics between two OTHER INSTITUTIONS dominant parties offering genuine policy alcerna- BUREAUCRACY AND THE IRON TRIANGLE tives. The 1994 reforms also began a process (still Arguably, the Japanese state's most influential-yet far from complete) of reapportioning districts to entirely extra-constitutional-institution of policy- reflect demographics more accurately, giving more making authority remains the bureaucracy. As in equitable clout to the much more numerous (and other liberal democracies, the Japanese civil service typically less conservative) urban voters. staffs the roughly 20 or so ministries and agencies In 2015, the minimum age for voting was low- comprising the Japanese state, bur it is at once ered from 20 to 18. Because the government auto- smaller in size and greater in influence than any of matically registers all eligible voters, virtually all its Western counterparts. potential voters in Japan are registered. Accordingly, Ministers appointed to head these ministries voter turnout in national elections has been rela- are typically elected members of parliament who tively high, historically between 60 and 75 percent. obtain their appointments based on political cri- But significantly, even as the system has become teria, not policy expertise. Therefore, these cabinet more competitive and politicians have increased ministers rely almost entirely on the career civil their power vis-a-vis the bureaucracy, voter turnout servants within their ministries to formulate, facil- has declined, with turnout in recent elections hover- itate, and ultimately implement and enforce laws ing closer to 50 percent Although there are a num- and policies. In each ministry, an administrative ber of reasons for the decline, paramount among vice minister with some 30 to 35 years of experi- them are popular distrust of politicians across the ence in that particular ministry heads these efforts, party spectrum as well as disillusionment with the presiding over a staff ofJapan's brightest, who will- political process and with government's seeming ingly subject themselves co grueling workweeks for incapacity to bring about genuine reforms. relatively meager compensation. Enduring linkages among senior bureaucrats, LOCAL GOVERNMENT conservative politicians, and corporate executives Japan is divided into 47 administrative divisions, form what has been referred to as an iron triangle, known as prefectures, each with its own elected gov- in which the determination and implementation of ernor and legislature.Japan is nonetheless a unitary policies are often facilitated not by formal negotia- (not a federal) system in which most political power tions, hearings, or parliamentary votes but by extra- is invested in the central government. legal directives from government officials to the The prefectural governments decide many local private sector. Known as administrative guidance, issues and are able to raise sufficient taxes to cover these policy directives are often communicated over about one-third of their expenditures (what the Jap- the phone between former colleagues or during anese call 30 percent autonomy). These subnational after-work drinking sessions among friends. In the governments depend on the central government, past, ruling bureaucrats traditionally dominated however, for the remainder of their budget and for these associations, while reigning LOP govern- much of their policy directives. Central authori- ments made sure chat the party's most important ties delegate all local authority (at the prefectural constituents, including corporations (from which and municipal levels) and can, and sometimes do, the party received massive campaign funds) and retract that authority. The national government rice farmers (on whose can override the decision of any local governor and overrepresented vote the has done so most notably in the case of Okinawa, party depended), were whose elected local officials have attitudes toward well taken care of with the overwhelming U.S. military presence there that producer-oriented indus- trial and financial pol- I n @:' --- - - differ significantly from those of national leaders. l} l I.!:' [('1·, Okinawans are nor alone, however, in wishing for icies and protectionist f,0;_-; )~ the devolution of more authority and increased trade barriers. Represen- local autonomy, and an increasing number of tatives of Japan's large regionally based parties have emerged in recent corporations in cum years. offered firsthand policy Political Re gime 345  advice to the bureaucrats and generally accepted bureaucracy and in Japan's iron triangle has led the business-friendly policies and guidance they many co conclude chat this "well-oiled, conservative received in return. machine" is undergoing a "regime shift," in which Ties between the bureaucracy and business are parliament, interest groups, and even Japanese cit- further enhanced by an additional practice. Each izens are gaining political influence.9 Where, then, year, a contingent of retiring but nonetheless highly does power reside in the Japanese state? It is fair qualified bureaucrats in their 40s and 50s undergo co say that there is no single locus of power in the amalwdari ("descent from heaven"), either to try their Japanese state. Even during the era of the bureau- hand in politics or, more commonly, to take senior cracy's greatest strength, from the 1950s through positions in the ve1y corporations they previously the 1970s, powerful prime ministers still often held regulated. In tum, the corporations that employ sway over the bureaucracy. And some of Japan's retired civil servants gain not just their skills but most famous and successful corporations, such also their connections, giving the private sector sub- as Sony and Honda, achieved their status in part stantial clout in the policy-making process. At any because they defied bureaucratic dictates. given time, the ranks ofJapan's policy elite comprise Scholars critical of the Japanese state have people who not only share a common outlook but described it as headless and susceptible to the kind also often attended the same prestigious schools and of uncoordinated drift that led to a quixotic war may have worked for decades in the same ministry. against the United States in the first half of the Long credited with leading the postwar eco- twentieth century, followed by unsustainable trade nomic miracle, Japan's elite bureaucracy is now surpluses with virtually every industrialized coun- understandably a logical culprit for the country's try in the century's second half More recently, crit- more recent decades of economic malaise and ics have pointed co the regime's seeming inability growing political dysfunction. The bureaucracy's to reform sufficiently its twentieth-century mer- reputation has been badly tarnished not just by the cantilist economy to cope with the challenges of economy's poor performance but also by a series a twenty-first-century globalized economy. 10 Will of scandals and gaffes. These include revelations Japan be able to reform, and if so, what will be the of kickbacks from politicians and corporations, a impetus? Because elements within the iron triangle variery of costly cover-ups, and the mishandling have demonstrated little willingness or incentive to of natural disaster recovery efforts following the change, many observers argue chat it is necessary 1995 earthquake in Kobe and the triple tragedy of to look beyond this ruling triad and perhaps even the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima beyond Japan to locate the forces and pressures nuclear catastrophe. Declining confidence in the capable of bringing about needed change. Political Conflict and Competition THE PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS loyal opposition. During this period of LOP dom- Like postwar Italy or Sweden, Japan until recent inance, several other parties joined the JSP in years has offered an example of an advanced opposition by caking advantage ofJapan's former industrial democracy governed by a predominant electoral system co carve out niches in the Japanese party system. With the exception of two opposi- electorate among voters who felt excluded by both tion government interludes in the early 1990s and the larger parties. These included the Japan Com- from 2009 co 2012, the LOP has dominated all munist Party OCP), which consistently embraced other parties from the time of its formation as the policies co the left of the JSP, and the more moder- merger of two conservative parties in 1955 until ate Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and Komeico the present. For the first 40 years, the Japan Social- (literally "Clean Government Party"), which ist Party OSP; renamed the Social Democratic occupied a middle ground between conservative, Party, or SOP, in 1996), which formed as a merger pro-business LOP politics and the socialist (and of leftist parties in 1955, served as its perennial pacifist) platform of the JSP. 346 JAPAN  This remarkably stable one-and-a-half-party almost all cases also a contest for che office of prime system, an important component of the equally minister. stable iron triangle, remained intact for nearly These contests fostered the emergence of fac- four decades. However, the bursting ofJapan's eco- tions, or mini-parties, within the LOP and a clien- nomic bubble in che early 1990s, combined with celist system in which candidates had to vie for the the LOP government's inept and unpopular efforts support of patrons within the party who could pro- to address the structural economic problems chat vide loyal faction members with campaign funds, prolonged the economy's slide, led in 1993 co a official party endorsements, appointed positions historic vote of no confidence in LOP rule and the within the party and the government, and other defection of LOP parliamentarians co an opposi- favors. These faction leaders in turn could count on tion coalition. Two successive shore-lived opposi- the support of their faction members in the party's tion coalitions held power long enough Guse under all-important presidential elections. At the local a year) co implement electoral reforms chat fostered level, in an effort to obtain sufficient votes in their the emergence of the OPJ, a party strong enough home districts, each candidate also constructed a for two decades co legitimately and consistently local support group or koenkai. challenge LOP rule and co form a government from Although factions have become less significant 2009 co 2012. And while the LOP has continued in recent years thanks to electoral reforms that to dominate Japan's national policies, important among other things have prohibited campaign to this control has been its reliance on a coalition donations to the factions, clientelism and informal partner, the much smaller Komeico. To understand personal relationships remain important institu- both the resilience of and resistance to this one- tions in the LOP and in all ofJapan's political par- and-a-half party system, it is necessary to examine ties. Both campaign contributions and votes are both the long-dominant LOP and che smaller par- secured through expanding circles of co-optation ties chat have emerged co both challenge and sus- of businesses and other large interest groups as well tain this dominance. as through clientelisc currying of favor among local communities and individuals by means of pork- THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY Although barrel projects, favors, and gifts. As in any democ- the LOP no longer has a guaranteed lock on Japan's racy, projects in the home district, such as bridges parliament, the party has managed co control gov- and schools, create jobs and deliver votes, and the ernment for all but a handful of years since its lucrative contracts and licenses awarded co cor- founding in 1955. The nature of chis rule has led porations co build these projects bring campaign some observers co conclude that the LOP has been donations. woefully misnamed; it is conservative, not liberal. Persistent-indeed, mounting-corruption scan- Its internal politics have been highly authoritarian, dals, combined with growing dissatisfaction with not democratic. And its factional divisions have LOP mismanagement of the 1990s economic made it more a collection of mini-parties than a downturn, prompted the defection of a number of single, unified party. LOP members of parliament co an opposition coali- The LOP can perhaps best be understood as tion chat wrested power briefly from the LOP in the a collection of politicians acting as independent 1990s. But after a year in exile, the less than pop- political entrepreneurs, bound together in a highly ular LOP nonetheless returned to office as pare of pragmatic electoral machine in which ideological a series of coalition governments. As Japan entered consistency has never taken priority over winning. its second decade of economic malaise, the LOP Over the years, the party established electoral rules received a boost in support when voters pinned their and engaged in campaigns and elections with the hopes for economic recovery and political reform express purpose of staying in power by maintaining on the promises of maverick politician Junichiro I a majority (or at least a healthy plurality) of seats in Koizumi, who served as LOP prime minister from parliament. But the LOP became more than just a 2001 to 2006. He won three consecutive elections political machine for members of parliament. The with promises to halt Japan's economic malaise and party's persistent control of the government meant take on the country's conservative bureaucratic and that the competition for the LOP presidency was in political elite (including his own LOP) and their Political Conmct and Competition 347  deeply entrenched constituencies (see "House of election chat more than doubled the LOP's seats Representatives Election Resulcs by Major Political in the lower house while promising both to revive Parry, 2000-2017," below). che economy through a three-pronged strategy chat Alchough LOP parry rules at the time required has come co be known as Abenomics and to stand the popular prime minister co seep down in 2006 up co China in an increasingly dangerous dispute after five years as parry president, his government over islands claimed by both countries (see "Terri- managed roimplemencanumberofmodesrreforms, torial Tempests," in Current Issues, p. 356). In a bid including the privatization ofJapan's postal savings to strengthen his party's hand in carrying out con- system. Bue Koizumi's successor, Shinzo Abe, an troversial reforms, Abe called for elections in 2014, ardent Japanese nationalise supported by the LDP's held on co nearly all of the LDP's seats, and with the more conservative wing, returned Japan co LOP LDP's Komeito coalition partner, maintained the policies as usual, including factional infighting, two-thirds majority of seats necessary to override cozy arrangements with bureaucrats, and corrup- any potential veto by the upper house. tion scandals. Abe presided over a stunning defeat Toning down his personal nationalist senti- in the 2007 upper house elections chat denied ments and making genuine progress with his eco- the LOP a majority in the chamber and "twisted" nomic revitalization strategy, Abe and the LOP Japan's parliament. The LOP next lose control of followed the 2009 and 2014 lower house victory the lower house and government in an even more with solid wins in both the 2013 and 2016 upper dramatic drubbing in the 2009 House of Repre- house elections. These electoral results gave the sentatives elections chat brought the DPJ co power. LOP, with its coalition partner, two-thirds major- For reasons discussed lacer, the DPJ also cycled just ities in both chambers of the Diet. This mandate as quickly through three prime ministers in three gave the government confidence to push forward years and lose even more dramatically in the 2012 with some of the more painful measures of eco- election than the LOP had in 2009. The surprising nomic reform, including passing a controversial agent of this LOP turnaround was none other than tax increase and negotiating trade deals chat threat- a rejuvenated Shinzo Abe. Abe led the LOP in an ened the protection of rice farmers. House of Representatives Election Results by Major Political Party, 2000-2017 PARTY (ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL CHANGE) YEAR LOP (RIGHT) DPJ (CENTER) KP (CENTER) SOP (LEFT) OTHERS TOTAL SEATS 2000 239 129 29 19 64 480 2003 237 177 34 6 26 480 2005 296 113 31 7 33 480 2009 119 300 21 7 33 480 2012 294 57 31 2 96 480 2014 291 73 35 2 74 475 2017 284 61t 29 69tt 22 455 ' Total seats reduced from 480 to 475 for the 2014 election and to 465 for the 2017 election. 'This total includes parties associated with the "Koike coalition" (exp lained on p.351), including the Party of Hope and the Nippon lshin no Kai. "This total includes parties associated w ith the "Pacifist coalition· (explained on p.351). including the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the Japanese Communist Party. Key to party acronyms: LOP: Liberal Democratic Party OPJ: Democratic Party of Japan KP: Komeito SOP: Social Democratic Party. 348 JAPAN  l! I ~: I I Elected with a mandate to reform Japan's economy, Prime Minister Abe's LOP government has sought to use their domi- nant position to push for constitutional reform as well. The string ofelectoral victories also gave Abe suf- matters, leans toward pacifism and has never fully ficient confidence to act more boldly on the nation- committed to supporting a revision of Article 9. alist front. In 2013, he paid a visit to the controversial Finally, parliamentary approval would still require Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan's war dead, ratification by a majority of voters in a national ref- including those executed as war criminals at the end erendum, something polls indicate Japan's citizenry of World War II. In 2015, in the face of widespread is not yet prepared to do. Though frustrating to Abe popular protest, his government forced through the and his conservative LOP government, this dead- Diec divisive legislation reinterpreting Article 9 as lock over constitutional reform is probably a good authorizing Japanese troops to fight (defensively) sign for Japanese democracy. At least for now, given overseas for the first time since 1945. The superma- the choice between a constitutionally unfettered joricies in both chambers also opened the legislative standing army and constitutional pacifism, the Jap- path for Abe and his governing coalition co pursue anese people continue co embrace the latter. And as outright revision of the constitution. Abe pledged in long as Abe and the LDP make an effort to cackle 2017 co revise the constitution by 2020, promising Japan's economic and social challenges, voters are to pass an amendment to formalize the legal status not willing co kick them out. of the Self-Defense Force. But the LDP coalition lost its supermajority in the 2019 upper house elections, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN AND ITS dampening prospects for constitutional reform. FRAGMENTED SUCCESSORS Capitalizing on In addition, the LDP's Komeito coalition partner, mounting public frustration with LOP rnle while consistently supporting the LOP in most during the 1990s and anticipating the intended Political Confiict and Competition 349  Japanese paying their respects at the controversial Yasukuni Shrine that honors the nation's war dead. The Shinto shrine draws criticism from Japan's neighbors because it enshrines the spirits of the Japanese convicted of war crimes and those of the Korean and Taiwanese colonial subjects impressed into the Japanese imperial army. consequences of the electoral reforms to favor large, China, and reduce the American military footprint organized political parties, the OPJ formed in 1998 in Japan's island prefecture of Okinawa. as a merger of several reform-minded opposition But Hatoyama's government failed to deliver on parties. Capitalizing on voter frustration with the its promises, and the parry replaced Hatoyama with LOP, the OPJ secured upper house electoral vic- Naoto Kan in the hopes of improving its prospects tories in 2004 and 2007 and in 2009 obtained a in the 2010 upper house elections. But the OPJ and majority of seats in the House of Representatives its coalition partners fared poorly in the elections, elections and swept the LOP from power. losing their upper house majority and once again Elected into office on a platform of bold prom- giving Japan a twisted parliament in which the DPJ ises and with a significant mandate for carrying held a majority in the lower chamber but the LOP- our political, economic, and social reforms, the led opposition dominated the upper house. Fol- OPJ nonetheless struggled both to realize its cam- lowing that election, Kan and the DPJ government paign pledges and to retain the support of voters. struggled to keep its coalition together, carry our The DPJ's first prime minister, Yukio Hato}'ama reforms, or even maintain a consistent policy posi- (2009- 10), came to office vowing co weaken the tion. The tragic earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear iron triangle by shifting political authority from disaster of 2011 further stalled hope of dramatic bureaucrats to elected politicians and to devolve progress and prompted Kan's resignation later central political authority co local communities that year and the parry election of Yoshihiko Noda and citizens. The Hatoyama government promised to replace him. An increasingly vocal public and to jump-start the economy, improve relations with invigorated media voiced strong criticism of the 350 JAPAN DPJ government's inept handling of the nuclear second LOP motivation for retaining the coalition crisis and cleanup and its inability co revive Japan's has been the longstanding goal of revising the con- economy. stitution. Because supermajoricy approval in both Voters resoundingly rejected the DPJ in the chambers will be necessary to trigger a national ref- 2012 lower house election that brought the LOP erendum, the LOP recognizes it will need to case a back co government, a defeat from which the DPJ wide net and persuade many current pacifists of the never really recovered. Despite a 2016 merger with need for change. Horse trading with the Komeito is another party and a name change, the new "Demo- seen as one means of getting there. cratic Party'' (DP) also struggled and in the weeks This leads to a third motivation for coalition leading up to the 2017 election splintered into cooperation. Over the past two decades, the LOP three separate parties. The first of these, the Parry and Komeito have worked out a strategy for lower of Hope, was established by former news broad- house elections that increases both votes and seats caster and LOP defense minister Yuriko Koike, for both parties. With Japan's mixed electoral sys- who was elected as Tokyo's first female governor tem, nearly two-thirds of the seats are contested in in 2016 (without the support of the LOP, which single-member districts. Both parties have agreed had put forward another candidate). But because to "reserve" each of these 289 districts for one of Koike restricted Party of Hope membership to only the two parties, with the other parry not fielding a those candidates who supported revising Article 9, competing candidate. In practice, this has meant many former Democratic Parry members refused that the LOP has surrendered a handful of districts to join, choosing to remain in a far weakened DP to the much smaller Komeito and asked LOP voters or join a third pacifist offshoot, the Constitutional in chose districts to case their votes for the Komeito Democratic Parry of Japan (CDP). Predictably, the candidate. In return, Komeico "stands down" its divided opposition-a "Koike coalition" and a "Pac- candidates in all other SMD constituencies and ifist coalition"-handed the LOP an easy victory in mobilizes its voters to support the LOP candidate. the 2017 lower house election and again in the 2019 This bargain earns both parries more seats than upper house contest. they would otherwise obtain and in many elections has made the difference in securing LOP single- THE KOMEITO COALITION PARTNER These parry and coalition victories. It has also allowed election outcomes pose a final puzzle: If the LOP the far smaller Komeito (as of 2020, just 29 seats remains dominant in its own right and faces such in the lower house and 28 in the upper house) co a weak and divided opposition, why does it retain "punch significantly above its weight" and exer- a much smaller coalition partner chat is at best cise consequential leverage over its senior coalition ambivalent about the LDP's key platform issue of partner. 11 constitutional revision? The Komeito (literally "Clean Government Party") derives much of its support from the Buddhist lay organization Soka CIVIL SOCIETY Gakkai, which has long been opposed to revising Because the reforms that brought about Westerniza- Article 9 on pacifist grounds. Given this constitu- tion and democracy were imposed from above (and, ency, Komeito leaders have expressed at most luke- in many cases, from outside), Japan's political sys- warm support for the LDP's constitutional reform tem historically fostered a tradition of "top-down" efforts. Bue in spite of this disagreement between bureaucratic society rather than a "bottom-up" the two parties, the LDP's most immediate reason civil society whose citizens independently orga- for preserving the alliance is that it has often needed nized and participated in political, economic, and Komeito support (and the support of other smaller social affairs. Like ocher authoritarian systems, the parties and independents) just to secure a simple Meiji and militarist states fostered corporatist and majority of sears. For example, while the LOP held mercantilist institutions to harness Japan's indus- a comfortable single-parry majority in the House of trial society in the service of mode rnization and Representatives in 2019, in House of Councillors imperialism. Although the U.S. occupiers des troyed elections that year the LOP lost its majority and ma ny aspects ofJapanese authoritarianism and car- needed the additional Komeico seats just to retain ried our sweeping political, social, and economic its coalition m ajority and avoid a twisted Diet. A reforms, they retained the bureaucracy and, out of Political Conflict and Competition 351  fear of communism, squelched many of the nascent Big business and agriculture are not the only civic groups they had initially fostered. interest groups to have offered their campaign In pursuing economic development and polit- contributions and votes in exchange for favorable ical stability, the postwar Japanese stare organized policies and a share of the benefits ofJapan's post- or co-opted interest groups that were important to war economic boom. Small and midsize businesses these goals, such as business and agriculrural asso- and retailers have been very well organized and have ciations, and formed associations for facilitating parlayed their electoral support into tax breaks, their political participation. In exchange for their subsidies, and protection from larger firms. Japan's support, these groups have had their interests well half-million construction firms are another group represented (and protected), and they have pros- worth mentioning, most of which are small, unpro- pered. During the postwar decades of economic ductive, and well cared for by an inefficient and cor- growth, chis symbiotic relationship expanded to rupt government bidding system for public works. include many ocher smaller groups and constituen- Japan's faltering economy and growing corrup- cies in a system of distributional welfare. Indepen- tion scandals involving both the LOP and DPJ/DP dent labor unions, consumer organizations, and and their supporters have cast new light on the eco- other civic groups have been notably absent from nomic and political costs of the country's corporate these arrangements. welfare system. Critics argue that the LDP's varied The third point of the iron triangle, in addition and growing host of constituencies led to distribu- to politicians and bureaucrats, is Japan's large cor- tional tyranny, fueled Japan's economic crisis, and porations and the large industrial groupings (kei- stifled political change. Corporatist arrangements rctsu) to which they belong. These players have have also long excluded interests deemed poten- been proponents of and participants in Japan's tially harmful to the goals of either rapid indus- postwar development. Big business exercises polit- trialization or corporate welfare, including trade ical influence through the Japanese Federation of unions, consumers, environmentalists, and wom- Economic Organizations, which voices the con- en's groups. As Japan's postindustrial and post- cerns of large corporations, offers policy recom- materialist society grows more complex and the mendations to the government, and provides the political marketplace more competitive, and in lion's share of campaign contributions. Another the wake of natural disasters such as the Kobe key pillar of political support has been the agri- earthquake in 1995 and the 2011 earthquake, tsu- cultural sector, whose highly organized political nami, and nuclear disaster in Fukushima, a host interests are channeled through local agricultural of nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations cooperatives to the national "peak organization" have emerged and are strengthening Japan's civil known as Japan Agriculture OA). Agriculture's society. These civic associations include groups key political contribution has been its capacity to representing pacifists, nationalists, environmen- provide a dependable and geographically concen- talists, antinuclear advocates, whaling advocates, trated bloc of votes. In exchange, governments have AIDS activists, religious organizations, and many enacted policies that favor farmers, including price other interests that are broadening and deepening supports, relatively low taxes, and protection from Japan's civil society and enhancing pluralism in this agricultural imports. advanced industrial democracy. 12 Society ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY national identity has come at the expense of several Few national populations view themselves as minority groups, who have been prevented from racially and ethnically homogeneous as do the Japa- developing a Japanese identity and enjoying the full nese. Because immigrants constitute only 1 percent privileges of citizenship as Japanese nationals with of the population and foreign nationals com- a separate ethnic heritage. These minorities include prise only 2 percent, this perception is grounded the indigenous Ainu in the north and Okinawans in demographic reality. This strong ethnic and in the south; descendants of Koreans, Chinese, and : 352 JAPAN  Ethnic Groups Religions Koreans Christian 0.4% 1.5% Other Chinese \ 6.9%, ___ o.so~ / \\' ~ Other 1% / '\ / ,, I I , I I Shinto Buddhist 70.4% 69.8% Japanese :::J Note: Percentages sum to greater than 100 percent because many Japanese practice both Shintoism and Buddhism. Southeast Asians; and the children of mixed ances- most acute problem Japan faces, far more so than try and foreigners. Although not racially separate, other advanced countries, is that of a declining the 2 to 4 million burakumin ("social outcasts"), workforce. Whereas most advanced societies have whose ancestors worked in the "unclean" occupa- expanded their labor pools by more fully integrating tions such as grave digging, butchery, and tanning, women and immigrants into the workplace, Japan are also seen as a minority group and have faced has been far more hesitant to embrace either group. intense prejudice. Discrimination against these And even ifJapanese women were fully empowered, minority groups in areas such as employment economists argue that the only long-term hope for and marriage has been widespread and persistent. stabilizing Japan's population and workforce is to Those individuals who have sought to assimilate by increase and sustain immigration over many years. taking on Japanese names, mastering the Japanese Absent chis source of workers, consumers, and tax- language, and adopting Japanese cultural mores payers, experts predict that Japan's economy will have generally nonetheless remained socially mar- not just decline but may very well collapse. ginalized and culturally scorned. In recent years, as the labor shortage has However, scholars note that demographic and become more acute, the government has made a economic necessity may eventually compel the renewed effort to promote female participation in social integration and mobility that cultural obsta- the workforce and in 2019 passed labor legislation cles and state policy have prevented. Japan finds admitting up co 345,000 short-term guest workers itself at the forefront of a problem confronting (not immigrants) over the next five years. Econo- many advanced industrial societies: the conver- mises and demographers gence of an aging population and dwindling fertil- warn chat if Japan is not ity rates. The ratio ofJapanese senior citizens co the prepared to overcome its total population was only 12 percent in 1990, but it racism and sexism, which is expected to climb to nearly 40 percent by 2050. By have prevented immi- midcentury, demographers predicc,Japan will have grants and women from 1 million centenarians and 30 percent fewer people fully contributing to the overall, and nearly 1 million more people will die workforce, the country each year than are born. may close the door on its L~ -. -. l.~ The graying of Japan's population brings eco- lase, best chance to regain (~Ji'(t"~ ' nomic challenges that ocher countries certainly face its status as an economic as well, including health and financial care. Bue the powerhouse. 13 Society 353  IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE equality remain less important than being accepted Japan's historical experiences with Shintoism, Bud- by the group and holding a rightful position in chat dhism, Confucianism, feudalism, militarism, and group's hierarchical division of labor. Perhaps not bureaucratism have certainly shaped the norms and surprisingly, Japanese are often inclined to accept values chat guide Japanese political behavior. So the political status quo rather than advocate for have its experiences with the West, from imposed change. In a recent poll, nearly three-fourths of inequitable treaties and democratic institutions co respondents identified themselves as having a military defeat and the embrace of Western popular political stance ranging from conservative to neu- culture. In efforts to attribute political behavior co tral, whereas less than one-fourth saw themselves as culture, scholars often point co the group confor- progressive or close to progressive.14 mity and social hierarchy that pervade most aspects Japan's persistently weak economy (combined of Japanese life. The basic unit of Japanese society with the forces of globalization and an ongoing gen- is not the individual but the group, as manifested erational change in values) has led to greater income in such institutions as the family, the company, the inequality and economic insecurity, and it may lead political faction, and the nation.Japanese are social- to greater diversity of political attitudes and per- ized to defer to the needs of the group and co make haps even co a shift in politica