Congressional Elections Outline Fall 2024 PDF

Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Topic 8 Congressional Elections Lecture 8.1: Constitutional Framewo...

Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Topic 8 Congressional Elections Lecture 8.1: Constitutional Framework of Representation in Congress Lecture 8.2: Do Congressional Elections Satisfy Political Equality? Lecture 8.3: Do Congressional Elections Satisfy Popular Sovereignty?  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Lecture 8.1 Constitutional Framework of Representation in Congress Only States Get Representatives (Constitution) Conflict over how to apportion seats to states? – Large states (population) vs. small states (equal) – people vs. geography The “Great Compromise”—Bi-cameral Legislature (Constitutional convention) – House: number of seats based on state population (only people in states get representation) – Senate: each state has two Senators regardless of population Popular control of representatives in Congress – House: Direct election; short term (2 yrs.) – Senate: Indirect election; longer term (6 yrs.); staggered elections (one-third every two yrs.) Direct election since 1913 (17th Amendment), but Longer term & stagger elects. make the Senate more insulated from popular opinion than House Which chamber is more representative of America? House more representative: Large states & small states represented in proportion to their populations Senate not representative: large states under-represented (.4); small states over-represented (5.9 times) Small states over-represented in electoral college. Why? Large & small states get two senators  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Census (Constitution; Federal Government) Enumeration of all persons in the U.S. – Once per decade—years ending in “0” – Primary purpose—reapportionment of House seats to states – Recent debate about counting only part of the population for purposes of reapportionment Citizens only Voting eligible citizens Citizens & legal residents (exclude unauthorized immigrants) Legality uncertain: Constitution calls for enumeration of all persons Reapportionment (Federal Government/Congress) Re-allocation of House seats to states Originally, added more seats to the House as new states admitted—avoided conflict In 1910, House size fixed at 435—created zero sum conflict – States gain or lose seats to reflect population growth & shifts – No reapportionment after 1920 Census—Why? Population shift from country to cities: many incumbents from rural areas likely to lose Partisan politics: likely change in party control – Reapportionment Act of 1929—established automatic system of reapportionment Reapportionment 2020 – House Seats Gained and Lost after 2020 Census (map)  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold – Continues pattern of population shift from Northeast & Midwest to South & West (new fig) House Seats in Each Region 180 160 South & Bdr 140 120 100 West Midwest 80 Northeast 60 40 20 0 1910 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Census Redistricting (States) Re-drawing House district lines after reapportionment Completed by year ending in “2” Single-member districts—one district for each representative District lines drawn by the state legislature (33 states) – States legislators motivated by partisan & electoral politics – May undermine democratic principle of political equality – Incentive to gerrymander legislative districts Some states use independent commissions (to reduce political influence) – Independent commissions: 8 states – Politician commission/hybrid: 3 states What about the other 6 states? (33 state legsl. + 11 indep. commission = 44)  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Lecture 8.2 Do Congressional Elections Satisfy Political Equality? Redistricting & Malapportionment Political equality requires that every vote has equal weight – Political equality in single-member districts: each district must have the same number of people – Political pressures to preserve district boundaries Incumbent pressure to keep same constituents; urban/rural division Population of House districts varied greatly—malapportioned – Malapportionment Distribution of legislative seats does not accurately reflect the distribution of the pop. (where people live) 1920 census—revealed population shift from majority rural to majority urban – two-thirds urban by 1960; three-fourths urban by 1990 Most people lived in cities, but legislative seats remained mostly rural Urban residents under-represented, and urban votes had less weight – An illustration AN ILLUSTRATION: SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS & POLITICAL EQUALITY Suppose a state has 4 representatives in the House State has a population of 100 State legislature creates 4 single-member districts with equal population – Representation: ¼ pop. elects ¼ of reps. in each district – Vote weight: 𝟏⁄𝟐𝟓=𝟏⁄𝟐𝟓=𝟏⁄𝟐𝟓=𝟏⁄𝟐𝟓 in each district  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold REDISTRICTING SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL EQUALITY Suppose 25 people move into District 2 – 20 from Dist. 3; 5 from Dist. 4 Districts no longer have equal representation – Dist. 3 over-represented: 5% pop. elects 25% of reps. – Dist. 2 under-represented: 50% pop. elects 25% of reps. Votes no longer have equal weight in each district – Dist. 3 vote weight: 1⁄5 (20%) – Dist. 2 vote weight: 1⁄50 (2%) Redistrict (redraw lines) to achieve political equality REDISTRICTING SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL EQUALITY Suppose 25 people move into District 2 – 20 from Dist.3; 5 from Dist. 4 Districts no longer have equal representation – Dist. 3 over-represented: 5% pop. elects 25% of reps. – Dist. 2 under-represented: 50% pop. elects 25% of reps. Votes no longer have equal weight in each district – Dist. 3 vote weight: 1⁄5 (20%) – Dist. 2 vote weight: 1⁄50 (2%) Redistrict (redraw lines) to achieve political equality Simple: Divide District 2 into two districts; combine the 25 people left in the south into a new district  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold REDISTRICTING SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL EQUALITY Suppose 25 people move into District 2 – 20 from Dist.3; 5 from Dist. 4 Districts no longer have equal representation – Dist. 3 over-represented: 5% pop. elects 25% of reps. – Dist. 2 under-represented: 50% pop. elects 25% of reps. Votes no longer have equal weight in each district – Dist. 3 vote weight: 1⁄5 (20%) – Dist. 2 vote weight: 1⁄50 (2%) Redistrict (redraw lines) to achieve political equality Simple: Divide District 2 into two districts; combine the 25 people left in the south into a new district Not simple politically: Incumbents’ choices – run against each other; move to new Dist. 4; retire; or – Pressure legislature to keep lines the same The Struggle to Achieve Political Equality Colgrove v. Green (1946)—“political question” Baker v. Carr (1962)—“justiciable issue” Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)—“One person, one vote” – Each legislative district must contain about same number of people – Controversial—states viewed redistricting as an internal state matter – But this case applied to the federal government—U.S. House districts Reynolds v. Simms (1964) – Applied “one person, one vote” to both houses of the state legislature – More controversial—some states viewed this as a violation of federalism – Most state legislatures designed similar to bicameral U.S. Congress House: more members representing smaller districts with similar populations Senate: fewer members representing larger districts combining counties/regions regardless of pop. – U.S. Senate is “malapportioned”—each state has two Senators regardless of population – Why is this decision not a violation of federalism & states’ rights to govern internal affairs?  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold U.S. Constitution requires “malapportioned” Senate—each state represented by two Senators 14th Amendment requires states to provide every person “equal protection of the laws”—state legislatures represent people not geography S.Ct. has extended “one person, one vote” to other legislative bodies By 1970s, legislative districts at all levels largely satisfied political equality Gerrymandering & Political Equality Gerrymander—Drawing districts to benefit one interest & hinder another – A simple illustration G I Suppose a state has with The state will elect to Congress in State legislature needs to create with the following ach district must be The districts must comply with required by 6 Both options satisfy all constraints one is politically neutral the other is a gerrymander Which option will the state legislature choose? Let s  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold – Gerrymanders are unfair, but may satisfy political equality “one person, one vote” Why is political inequality unconstitutional, but political unfairness is not? Depends on the type & purpose of the gerrymander—racial vs. partisan – Racial gerrymanders Negative—originally used in the South to disenfranchise African Americans Affirmative—1965 Voting Rights Act – Prohibited states w/ history of discrimination from diluting votes of racial minorities – e.g., majority-minority districts gives minority voters more power (typically not called a “gerrymander” – S.Ct. ruled such districts constitutional to enhance black representation Some limitations – Shaw v. Reno (1993)—race may be a factor, but not the only one – Shelby County v. Holder (2013)—struck down pre-clearance in Sect. 5 of Voting Rights Act Allen v. Milligan (2023)—upheld Sect. 2 of Voting Rights Act that prohibits diluting votes of Black residents Continuing debate: “Descriptive” vs. “Substantive” representation – Partisan gerrymanders Original was partisan: “Gerrymandering, Then & Now” Fig. 0.6  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Gerrymandering, Then & Now The illustration is a blatant partisan gerrymander (both parties do it) Can gerrymanders be so partisan that they are unconstitutional? – Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)—“political question” Excessive partisanship in districting may be unjust & incompatible with democratic principles, but Federal judges have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties These issues present non-justiciable political questions – The controversy is likely to continue – Recall: redistricting “political question” in Colgrove v. Green (1946); justiciable in Baker v. Carr (1962) – New Justices appointed since 2019 may affect how this dispute is resolved  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Lecture 8.3 Do Congressional Elections Satisfy Popular Sovereignty? Elections & Popular Sovereignty Popular sovereignty: Highest political authority in the hands of ordinary citizens Representatives must be responsive & accountable to the people – Responsiveness: Representatives respond to wants & needs of constituents – Accountability: Constituents have periodic opportunities to assess responsiveness & hold unresponsive representatives accountable (i.e., replace them) Elections create insecurity of tenure that provides – Incentives for representatives to pay attention to constituents, & the – Mechanism to hold unresponsive representatives accountable – To created insecurity of tenure: 1. Representatives must want to be reelected, & 2. Elections must be competitive Do Congressional Elections Satisfy Popular Sovereignty? Members of Cong. want to be reelected (Incumbents Seeking Reelection: Hse. avg. 92%; Sen. avg. 82%) Figure: Percentage of Incumbents Seeking Reelection  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold When incumbents run, they almost always win – Rarely defeated in primary (Figure 10.5 Incumbents Defeated in Primaries) Figure 10.5: Incumbents Defeated in Primaries – Large percentage win general election (Figure 10.8 Incumbents Reelected) Figure 10.8: Incumbent Reelection Rates in the House & Senate  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Increasing incumbent reelection rates over time (Figure 10.8) – House average re-election: 1946-1966 = 89%; 1968-2018 = 94% – Senate average re-election: 1946-1988 = 75%; 1990-2018 = 87% Figure 10.8: Increasing Incumbent Reelection Rates (revised) Why do incumbents have an advantage in elections? – Maybe incumbents get reelected because they do a good job representing constituents! My personal observations: most members of Cong. do care about & respond to their constituents – But “good job” is normative—difficult to test using the scientific method – Anecdotal evidence of inherent advantage regardless of job performance Examples: corruption; sex scandals; inability to do any job at all Did members engineer a reelection advantage themselves? Mayhew 7 “The Case of the Vanishing Marginals” – Marginal (competitive) district—constituents evenly divided; either party can win – Number of marginal dists. declined (after 1966)—more incumbents winning w/ bigger vote margins – Use perks of office Newsletters, trips home, “casework” for advertising, position-taking, credit-claiming – Turn marginal districts safe emphasizing “constituency attention” rather than responding on policy – If so, elections do not provide realistic opportunity to hold representatives accountable – Studies at individual level, find that vulnerable incumbents do exploit “perks” of office more, but  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold – Evidence of pay-off at election time was puzzling (at first)! Negative relationship!—incumbents who “hustle” the most do worse than those who are less attentive Also, a negative relationship between incumbent spending & vote margin/reelection Why is that? (NOT because constituency service & high spending costs votes) – Incumbents raise & spend more money when they face an experienced, well-financed challenger – Challengers are able to raise enough money to be competitive only if signs that the incumbent is vulnerable – High campaign spending by an incumbent is an indication of vulnerability (not strength) Most important explanation of incumbency advantage – Incumbents win because they face inexperienced, under-financed challengers First law of electoral politics: “You can’t beat somebody with nobody” Corollary: “You can’t beat somebody with somebody nobody ever heard of” – Professionals & amateurs (a thought exercise using football games) – Most races with an incumbent running—professional vs. amateur (somebody nobody ever heard of) – Open seats more competitive—professional vs. professional Competitive races enable voters to identify & replace unresponsive representatives – Greater competition in open seats – Movement to impose “term limits” to create more competitive races typical limit is 2 years – Would term limits make members of Congress more responsive & accountable? Not likely—Term limits fail the “un-test” Term limits are: Unconstitutional, Undemocratic, & Unnecessary Unconstitutional – 23 states passed laws imposing term limits for Congress in 1990s – States cannot change qualifications for Cong. set by Const. (U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 1995) – Requires a constitutional amendment to impose term limits on Congress (as 22nd Amd. did for Pres.) States can (and some have) imposed term limits of state legislators  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold Undemocratic – Takes away voters’ power to choose who they want to represent them – Will not make MCs pay more attention to voters than to big special interests Breaking the electoral connection will not make representatives more responsive to constituents What is a common job of former MCs? Professional (well paid) lobbyist – Increase influence of lobbyists & unelected staff What’s another name for a first-year member of an organization? Freshman! A “fish” doesn't know how things work? Who does? Unnecessary – Perception that Cong. dominated by “out of touch octogenarians who’ve been there 30 yrs. or more” – 12-year term limits will invigorate Cong. with new blood & new ideas – Incorrect perception: average length of service less than 12 yrs. (Fig. 12.3) Figure 12.3: Average Length of Service in Congress 16 14 14 13 13 13 Proposed term limit 12 Average years served 10 House Senate 8 6 4 2 0 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020  Copyrighted material Students enrolled in Professor Bond’s POLS 206 class may make a copy for personal use, but it may not be reproduced or sold And term limits would result in loss of competence & integrity (Fig. 12.2) – Members who served 7+ terms scored higher than those who were defeated – Suggests that elections filter out members less able to do the job well Figure 12.2: Competence and Integrity of House Members