IPM LZ PDF: Overview of Instruments for Intellectual Property Protection

‭IPM01:‬‭Introduction‬ ‭Overview‬‭of‬‭Instruments‬‭for‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬‭Protection‬ ‭Intellectual‬‭Capital‬‭versus‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬ ‭‬ ‭More‬‭than‬‭IP:‬‭Intellectual‬‭capital‬‭comprises‬‭all‬‭immaterial‬‭resources‬‭that‬‭could‬‭be‬ ‭considered‬‭as‬‭assets‬‭with‬‭som...

‭IPM01:‬‭Introduction‬ ‭Overview‬‭of‬‭Instruments‬‭for‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬‭Protection‬ ‭Intellectual‬‭Capital‬‭versus‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬ ‭‬ ‭More‬‭than‬‭IP:‬‭Intellectual‬‭capital‬‭comprises‬‭all‬‭immaterial‬‭resources‬‭that‬‭could‬‭be‬ ‭considered‬‭as‬‭assets‬‭with‬‭some‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭assignable‬‭capitalized‬‭value‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭the‬‭context‬‭of‬‭a‬‭firm,‬‭intellectual‬‭capital‬‭comprises‬‭IPR,‬‭human‬‭capital‬‭and‬‭what‬ ‭could‬‭be‬‭called‬‭‘relational‬‭capital’‬ ‭Collective‬‭versus‬‭Individual‬‭IP‬ ‭‬ ‭We‬‭define‬‭IP‬‭in‬‭a‬‭broad‬‭sense‬‭as‬‭property‬‭directly‬‭related‬‭to‬‭the‬‭creativity,‬ ‭knowledge‬‭and‬‭identity‬‭of‬‭an‬‭individual‬ ‭‬ ‭IP‬‭of‬‭a‬‭collectivity‬‭of‬‭individuals‬‭may‬‭in‬‭turn‬‭be‬‭broadly‬‭thought‬‭of‬‭as‬‭property‬‭directly‬ ‭related‬‭to‬‭the‬‭creativity,‬‭knowledge‬‭and‬‭identity‬‭of‬‭that‬‭collectivity‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭collectivity‬‭may‬‭be‬‭a‬‭legal‬‭person,‬‭such‬‭as‬‭a‬‭firm‬‭or‬‭a‬‭nation,‬‭or‬‭it‬‭may‬‭be‬‭a‬‭less‬ ‭well-defined‬‭group,‬‭such‬‭as‬‭a‬‭community‬‭(e.g.‬‭software‬‭communities)‬ I‭PM02:‬‭History‬‭and‬‭Main‬‭Types‬‭of‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬ ‭Rights‬ ‭Basics‬‭on‬‭Patents‬‭and‬‭Utility‬‭Patents‬ ‭ atents‬ P ‭Definition:‬ ‭A‬‭legal‬‭title‬‭which‬‭grants‬‭the‬‭holder‬‭the‬‭exclusive‬‭right‬‭(in‬‭countries‬‭for‬‭which‬‭the‬‭patent‬ ‭was‬‭granted)‬‭to‬‭prevent‬‭others‬‭from‬‭making,‬‭using‬‭or‬‭offering‬‭for‬‭sale,‬‭selling‬‭or‬ ‭importing‬‭a‬‭product‬‭that‬‭infringes‬‭his‬‭patent‬‭without‬‭his‬‭authorization‬ ‭ hat‬‭can‬‭be‬‭patented:‬ W ‭Patents‬‭protect‬‭inventions‬‭which‬‭solve‬‭technical‬‭problems‬‭:‬ ‭‬ ‭Products,‬‭devices,‬‭systems,‬‭processes,‬‭methods,‬‭uses,‬‭chemical‬‭substances,‬‭and‬ ‭pharmaceuticals‬ ‭ erm‬‭of‬‭rights:‬ T ‭20‬‭years‬‭from‬‭date‬‭of‬‭application‬‭(“filing”)‬ I‭ssuance:‬ ‭2-5‬‭years,‬‭usually‬ ‭Technology‬‭Description‬‭and‬‭Claims:‬ ‭‬ ‭Description‬‭must‬‭enable‬‭someone‬‭“skilled‬‭in‬‭the‬‭art”‬‭to‬‭practice‬‭the‬‭“best‬‭mode”‬‭of‬ ‭the‬‭invention‬ ‭‬ ‭Claims‬‭define‬‭rights‬‭to‬‭technology‬‭and‬‭the‬‭basis‬‭of‬‭prosecution‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭underlying‬‭idea‬‭is‬‭not‬‭protected‬ ‭Conditions‬‭for‬‭Patentability:‬ ‭‬ ‭Novelty‬‭(EU:‬‭prior‬‭to‬‭application‬‭invention‬‭may‬‭not‬‭be‬‭known‬‭or‬‭used‬‭by‬‭others,‬‭US:‬ ‭one-year‬‭grace‬‭period)‬ ‭‬ ‭Non-obviousness‬‭(not‬‭patentable‬‭if‬‭a‬‭person‬‭of‬‭“ordinary‬‭skill‬‭in‬‭the‬‭art”‬‭finds‬‭the‬ ‭invention‬‭obvious...this‬‭is‬‭the‬‭toughest‬‭requirement)‬ ‭‬ ‭Usefulness‬‭(susceptible‬‭of‬‭industrial‬‭application‬‭–‬‭easiest‬‭requirement‬‭to‬‭fulfill)‬ ‭‬ ‭Infringement‬ ‭The‬‭Space‬‭of‬‭Patent‬‭Protection‬‭–‬‭Three‬‭Dimensions‬ ‭ tility‬‭Patents‬ U ‭Overview:‬ ‭A‬‭utility‬‭model‬‭grants‬‭the‬‭holder‬‭the‬‭exclusive‬‭right‬‭to‬‭prevent‬‭third‬‭parties‬‭from‬‭exploiting‬ ‭an‬‭invention‬‭(e.g.‬‭making,‬‭using,‬‭offering‬‭for‬‭sale)‬‭without‬‭authorization‬‭in‬‭the‬‭country‬ ‭where‬‭the‬‭utility‬‭model‬‭was‬‭registered‬ ‭ hat‬‭can‬‭be‬‭protected:‬ W ‭Same‬‭types‬‭of‬‭inventions‬‭that‬‭can‬‭be‬‭protected‬‭by‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭except‬‭for‬‭processes‬ ‭(manufacturing‬‭and‬‭working‬‭processes,‬‭measuring‬‭processes,‬‭etc.)‬ I‭ssuance:‬ ‭The‬‭examination‬‭and‬‭grant‬‭of‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭usually‬‭takes‬‭several‬‭years.‬‭The‬‭utility‬‭model,‬‭in‬ ‭contrast,‬‭will‬‭be‬‭registered‬‭within‬‭a‬‭few‬‭weeks‬‭after‬‭filing‬‭the‬‭application‬ ‭ erm‬‭of‬‭rights:‬ T ‭3‬‭to‬‭10‬‭years‬‭from‬‭date‬‭of‬‭application‬‭(“filing”)‬ ‭Differences‬‭compared‬‭with‬‭patents:‬ ‭‬ ‭Available‬‭in‬‭a‬‭limited‬‭number‬‭of‬‭countries‬‭only‬ ‭‬ ‭Search‬‭reports‬‭only‬‭done‬‭in‬‭some‬‭countries‬ ‭‬ ‭Generally‬‭no‬‭substantive‬‭examination‬‭of‬‭novelty‬‭or‬‭inventiveness‬‭(it‬‭is‬‭an‬ ‭unexamined‬‭IP‬‭right)‬ ‭‬ ‭Registered‬‭and‬‭published‬‭after‬‭a‬‭few‬‭months‬ ‭‬ ‭Reviewed‬‭only‬‭in‬‭revocation‬‭or‬‭infringement‬‭proceedings‬ ‭→‬‭The‬‭applicant‬‭should‬‭conduct‬‭thorough‬‭searches‬‭to‬‭make‬‭sure‬‭that‬‭the‬‭application‬ ‭actually‬‭meets‬‭these‬‭requirements‬‭applying‬‭to‬‭effective‬‭IP‬‭rights.‬ ‭Otherwise‬‭he‬‭may‬‭not‬‭invoke‬‭any‬‭rights‬‭based‬‭on‬‭the‬‭utility‬‭model‬‭registration‬ ‭Basics‬‭on‬‭Copyrights,‬‭Trademarks‬‭and‬‭Design‬‭Patents‬ ‭ opyrights‬ C ‭Definition:‬ ‭A‬‭copyright‬‭gives‬‭to‬‭its‬‭creator‬‭economic‬‭exploitation‬‭rights‬‭(e.g.,‬‭rights‬‭of‬‭reproduction,‬ ‭communication‬‭to‬‭the‬‭public,‬‭translation,‬‭adaptation,‬‭distribution‬‭and‬‭resale)‬‭and‬‭moral‬ ‭rights‬‭(e.g.,‬‭rights‬‭of‬‭authorship,‬‭integrity‬‭and‬‭divulgation)‬‭to‬‭any‬‭production‬‭of‬‭the‬‭human‬ ‭mind‬‭,‬‭such‬‭as‬‭literary‬‭and‬‭artistic‬‭works‬ ‭‬ ‭This‬‭production‬‭must‬‭be‬‭an‬‭expression‬‭and‬‭not‬‭a‬‭mere‬‭idea‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭expression‬‭must‬‭be‬‭original‬ ‭ overage:‬ C ‭Examples‬‭include‬‭literary,‬‭dramatic,‬‭musical,‬‭artistic‬‭and‬‭photographic‬‭works,‬‭scientific‬ ‭articles‬‭and‬‭computer‬‭programs‬‭and‬‭databases‬ ‭Term‬‭of‬‭rights:‬ ‭‬ ‭Immediate‬‭protection‬‭upon‬‭creation‬ ‭‬ ‭For‬‭individuals,‬‭life‬‭+‬‭minimum‬‭50‬‭years‬ ‭‬ ‭For‬‭“works‬‭for‬‭hire”,‬‭minimum‬‭of‬‭95‬‭years‬‭from‬‭publication‬‭or‬‭120‬‭years‬‭from‬‭creation‬ ‭ esign‬‭Patent‬ D ‭Definition:‬ ‭Design‬‭rights‬‭are‬‭exclusive‬‭rights‬‭that‬‭can‬‭protect‬‭the‬‭outward‬‭appearance‬‭of‬‭the‬‭whole‬ ‭or‬‭parts‬‭of‬‭a‬‭product‬‭,‬‭resulting‬‭from‬‭the‬‭features‬‭of‬‭a‬‭product‬‭such‬‭as‬‭three-dimensional‬ ‭features‬‭(e.g.,‬‭the‬‭shape‬‭or‬‭surface‬‭of‬‭an‬‭article)‬‭or‬‭two-dimensional‬‭features‬‭(e.g.,‬‭patterns,‬ ‭lines‬‭or‬‭colors)‬ ‭Term‬‭of‬‭rights:‬ ‭‬ ‭Registered‬‭design‬‭rights:‬‭initial‬‭period‬‭of‬‭5‬‭years,‬‭maximum‬‭25‬‭years‬ ‭‬ ‭Unregistered‬‭design‬‭rights:‬‭3‬‭years‬ ‭ onditions:‬ C ‭A‬‭design‬‭right‬‭is‬‭primarily‬‭of‬‭an‬‭aesthetic‬‭nature,‬‭and‬‭does‬‭not‬‭protect‬‭any‬‭technical‬‭features‬ ‭of‬‭the‬‭article‬‭to‬‭which‬‭it‬‭is‬‭applied.‬‭As‬‭a‬‭general‬‭rule,‬‭to‬‭be‬‭registrable,‬‭the‬‭design‬‭must‬‭be‬ ‭"new"‬‭or‬‭"original"‬ ‭ overage:‬ C ‭Designs‬‭rights‬‭are‬‭applied‬‭to‬‭a‬‭wide‬‭variety‬‭of‬‭products‬‭of‬‭industry‬‭and‬‭handicraft:‬‭from‬ ‭technical‬‭products‬‭to‬‭consumer‬‭goods‬ ‭ rademarks‬ T ‭Definition:‬ ‭A‬‭trade‬‭mark‬‭is‬‭any‬‭sign‬‭,‬‭capable‬‭of‬‭being‬‭represented‬‭graphically,‬‭which‬‭distinguishes‬ ‭the‬‭goods‬‭and‬‭services‬‭of‬‭one‬‭undertaking‬‭(company‬‭or‬‭organization)‬‭from‬‭those‬‭of‬ ‭another‬ ‭ erm‬‭of‬‭rights:‬ T ‭EU‬‭Trademark‬‭protection‬‭lasts‬‭10‬‭years‬‭(renewable)‬‭as‬‭long‬‭as‬‭used‬‭within‬‭at‬‭least‬‭one‬ ‭country‬‭within‬‭5‬‭years.‬‭In‬‭US,‬‭no‬‭formal‬‭expiration‬‭date.‬‭In‬‭either‬‭area,‬‭a‬‭firm‬‭may‬‭lose‬‭its‬ ‭right‬‭if‬‭mark‬‭becomes‬‭generic‬‭rather‬‭than‬‭brand‬‭specific‬‭(e.g.‬‭Yo-yo,‬‭Trampoline,‬‭thermos...)‬ ‭Four‬‭General‬‭Functions‬‭for‬‭the‬‭consumer:‬ ‭1.‬ ‭Inform‬‭the‬‭customers‬‭and‬‭structure‬‭the‬‭offer‬ ‭2.‬ ‭Represent‬‭a‬‭guarantee‬‭of‬‭quality‬‭and‬‭continuity‬ ‭3.‬ ‭Have‬‭a‬‭signalling‬‭effect;‬‭and/or‬ ‭4.‬ ‭Guarantee‬‭the‬‭use‬‭of‬‭a‬‭particular‬‭recipe‬‭or‬‭procedure‬ ‭Signs‬‭include:‬ ‭‬ ‭word‬‭marks‬‭including‬‭letters,‬‭numbers‬‭or‬‭combination‬‭of‬‭letters,‬‭numbers‬‭and‬‭words‬ ‭‬ ‭figurative‬‭marks,‬‭whether‬‭or‬‭not‬‭including‬‭words‬ ‭‬ ‭figurative‬‭marks‬‭in‬‭color‬ ‭‬ ‭colors‬‭or‬‭combinations‬‭of‬‭colors;‬‭three-dimensional‬‭marks‬ ‭‬ ‭sound‬‭marks‬ ‭‬ ‭trademark‬‭for‬‭aroma‬ ‭ hich‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭signs‬‭may‬‭be‬‭registered‬‭as‬‭trademark?‬ W ‭Word,‬‭symbols,‬‭or‬‭other‬‭signs‬‭used‬‭to‬‭identify‬‭products‬‭can‬‭be‬‭trade-marked.‬ ‭But:‬‭A‬‭descriptive‬‭word‬‭or‬‭color‬‭cannot‬‭be‬‭trademarked‬ I‭PM03:‬‭Theory‬‭and‬‭Economics‬‭of‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬ ‭Protection‬ ‭Major‬‭Economic‬‭Functions‬‭and‬‭Risks‬‭of‬‭IPR‬ ‭Patents‬‭are‬‭Granted‬‭as‬‭a‬‭Temporary‬‭Monopoly‬‭Right‬‭with‬‭two‬‭Major‬‭Economic‬‭Functions:‬ (‭ 1)‬‭Incentives‬‭for‬‭Innovators‬‭:‬ ‭Intellectual‬‭property‬‭rights‬‭(IPR)‬‭provide‬‭incentives‬‭for‬‭innovators‬‭to‬‭invest‬‭in‬‭new‬ ‭products‬‭and‬‭processes‬‭by‬‭guaranteeing‬‭them‬‭a‬‭period‬‭where‬‭they‬‭can‬‭recoup‬‭a‬ ‭return‬‭from‬‭their‬‭investment‬‭unchallenged‬‭by‬‭competitors‬ (‭ 2)‬‭Diffusion‬‭of‬‭Technology‬‭:‬ ‭Patents‬‭help‬‭diffuse‬‭technology‬‭since‬‭they‬‭force‬‭innovators‬‭to‬‭disclose‬‭information‬ ‭regarding‬‭the‬‭underlying‬‭technology‬ ‭But‬‭IPR‬‭are‬‭not‬‭without‬‭social‬‭cost‬‭(risk‬‭of‬‭deadweight‬‭losses)...‬ ‭Why‬‭a‬‭system‬‭of‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬‭Protection?‬‭Incentives!‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭order‬‭for‬‭a‬‭capitalist‬‭economic‬‭system‬‭to‬‭operate‬‭properly,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭of‬‭decisive‬ ‭importance‬‭that‬‭markets‬‭for‬‭labour,‬‭capital,‬‭products‬‭etc.‬‭are‬‭functioning‬ ‭‬ ‭However,‬‭markets‬‭for‬‭ideas,‬‭knowledge,‬‭information‬‭and‬‭intellectual‬‭products‬‭in‬ ‭general‬‭have‬‭difficulties‬‭in‬‭functioning‬‭in‬‭principle‬ ‭‬ ‭E.g.,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭basically‬‭very‬‭difficult‬‭to‬‭sell‬‭an‬‭idea‬‭without‬‭disclosing‬‭it‬‭in‬‭such‬‭a‬‭way‬‭that‬ ‭others‬‭essentially‬‭can‬‭use‬‭it‬‭without‬‭paying‬‭properly‬‭(Arrow‬‭paradox)‬ ‭‬ ‭Society’s‬‭point‬‭of‬‭view:‬‭An‬‭underinvestment‬‭in‬‭creative‬‭work‬‭/‬‭knowledge‬‭production‬ ‭may‬‭result:‬‭The‬‭investment‬‭required‬‭for‬‭the‬‭creation‬‭of‬‭intellectual‬‭goods‬‭is‬‭often‬‭high‬ ‭relative‬‭to‬‭a‬‭very‬‭low‬‭marginal‬‭cost‬‭of‬‭using‬‭or‬‭making‬‭copies‬‭of‬‭them‬ ‭‬ ‭Therefore‬‭if‬‭use‬‭or‬‭copying‬‭were‬‭free‬‭to‬‭all,‬‭price‬‭would‬‭fall‬‭to‬‭marginal‬‭cost,‬‭but‬ ‭since‬‭marginal‬‭cost‬‭is‬‭lower‬‭than‬‭the‬‭average‬‭cost‬‭the‬‭original‬‭creator‬‭would‬‭not‬‭be‬ ‭able‬‭to‬‭recover‬‭her‬‭initial‬‭investment‬‭and‬‭refrain‬‭from‬‭making‬‭the‬‭investment‬ ‭‬ ‭By‬‭giving‬‭creators‬‭IPRs‬‭to‬‭exclude‬‭others‬‭from‬‭their‬‭work,‬‭they‬‭can‬‭create‬‭artificial‬ ‭scarcity‬‭of‬‭their‬‭intellectual‬‭goods,‬‭their‬‭price‬‭will‬‭rise‬‭and‬‭investment‬‭recouped‬ ‭→‬‭IPRs‬‭are‬‭legal‬‭instruments‬‭that‬‭create‬‭monopolies‬‭to‬‭solve‬‭a‬‭market‬‭failure‬ ‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬‭Protection‬‭and‬‭Social‬‭Cost‬ ‭‬ ‭IPRs‬‭are‬‭legal‬‭instruments‬‭that‬‭create‬‭monopolies‬‭and‬‭produce‬‭social‬‭costs‬ ‭‬ ‭Once‬‭intellectual‬‭goods‬‭have‬‭been‬‭created,‬‭the‬‭right‬‭to‬‭exclude‬‭limits‬‭access‬‭for‬ ‭users‬‭who‬‭are‬‭willing‬‭to‬‭pay‬‭to‬‭a‬‭price‬‭above‬‭marginal‬‭cost‬‭of‬‭copying‬‭or‬‭using‬‭that‬ ‭intellectual‬‭good‬‭but‬‭below‬‭the‬‭profit‬‭maximising‬‭price‬‭set‬‭by‬‭the‬‭holder‬ ‭→‬‭Excluding‬‭these‬‭users‬‭creates‬‭a‬‭deadweight‬‭loss‬‭(static‬‭inefficiency)‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭addition,‬‭since‬‭innovation‬‭is‬‭often‬‭cumulative,‬‭that‬‭is,‬‭the‬‭creation‬‭of‬‭new‬ ‭intellectual‬‭goods‬‭often‬‭relies‬‭on‬‭previous‬‭intellectual‬‭goods‬‭as‬‭inputs,‬‭increased‬‭IP‬ ‭protection‬‭inhibit‬‭innovation‬‭by‬‭limiting‬‭access‬‭to‬‭such‬‭inputs‬ ‭→‬‭Risk‬‭of‬‭dynamic‬‭inefficiency‬ I‭PRs‬‭Create‬‭a‬‭Trade-off‬‭between‬‭Incentive‬‭and‬‭Access‬ ‭IP‬‭laws‬‭try‬‭to‬‭calibrate‬‭this‬‭trade-off‬‭by‬ ‭1.‬ ‭limiting‬‭the‬‭length‬‭and‬‭scope‬‭of‬‭IPRs‬ ‭2.‬ ‭crafting‬‭exemptions‬‭to‬‭the‬‭IP‬‭holder’s‬‭exclusive‬‭rights‬ ‭3.‬ ‭enforcing‬‭the‬‭disclosure‬‭of‬‭the‬‭underlying‬‭knowledge‬ ‭Abusive‬‭/‬‭anticompetitive‬‭practices‬‭with‬‭IPRs‬ ‭ ctions‬‭based‬‭on‬‭IPRs‬‭are‬‭considered‬‭anticompetitive‬‭if‬‭they‬‭increase‬‭the‬‭likelihood‬‭that‬‭the‬ A ‭volume‬‭of‬‭value‬‭creation‬‭in‬‭a‬‭market‬‭decreases.‬‭The‬‭subsequent‬‭list‬‭of‬‭abusive‬‭practices‬‭is‬ ‭under‬‭surveillance‬‭by‬‭antitrust‬‭authorities:‬ ‭‬ ‭Mergers‬‭and‬‭acquisitions:‬ ‭○‬ ‭In‬‭appraising‬‭M&As,‬‭competition‬‭authorities‬‭evaluate‬‭whether‬‭markets‬‭are‬ ‭likely‬‭to‬‭be‬‭significantly‬‭less‬‭competitive‬‭after‬‭the‬‭new‬‭entity‬‭is‬‭formed.‬‭In‬ ‭markets,‬‭in‬‭which‬‭intellectual‬‭goods‬‭play‬‭a‬‭decisive‬‭role,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭necessary‬‭to‬ ‭assess‬‭the‬‭merging‬‭parties‘‬‭share‬‭of‬‭the‬‭existing‬‭stock‬‭of‬‭intellectual‬‭assets.‬ ‭M&As‬‭are‬‭critical‬‭in‬‭cases‬‭the‬‭parties‬‭involved‬‭hold‬‭significant‬‭IP‬‭portfolio‬ ‭‬ ‭Refusal‬‭to‬‭License‬‭is‬‭likely‬‭to‬‭be‬‭abusive‬‭in‬‭the‬‭following‬‭cases:‬ ‭○‬ ‭Refusal‬‭to‬‭License‬‭into‬‭downstream‬‭markets:‬‭Any‬‭refusal‬‭to‬‭grant‬‭access‬‭to‬ ‭the‬‭protected‬‭intellectual‬‭asset‬‭should‬‭be‬‭assessed‬‭in‬‭a‬‭manner‬‭consistent‬ ‭with‬‭the‬‭competition‬‭authority‬‭‘s‬‭policy‬‭on‬‭vertical‬‭restraints.‬‭A‬‭refusal‬‭to‬ ‭license‬‭the‬‭intellectual‬‭property‬‭to‬‭a‬‭(potential)‬‭downstream‬‭competitor‬‭would‬ ‭be‬‭deemed‬‭unlawful‬‭if‬‭the‬‭patent‬‭holder‬‭has‬‭significant‬‭market‬‭power‬‭in‬‭both‬ ‭the‬‭upstream‬‭and‬‭downstream‬‭markets.‬‭In‬‭other‬‭words,‬‭licensing‬‭could‬‭be‬ ‭made‬‭compulsory‬‭even‬‭if‬‭the‬‭patent‬‭is‬‭not‬‭absolutely‬‭essential‬‭to‬‭compete‬‭in‬ ‭the‬‭downstream‬‭market‬‭(Example:‬‭toner‬‭cartridges).‬ ‭○‬ ‭Refusal‬‭to‬‭license‬‭into‬‭new‬‭(horizontal)‬‭markets:‬‭If‬‭a‬‭firm‬‭comes‬‭up‬‭with‬‭an‬ ‭innovation‬‭for‬‭a‬‭new‬‭market‬‭that‬‭cannot‬‭be‬‭used‬‭without‬‭access‬‭to‬‭the‬‭original‬ ‭patent.‬‭The‬‭refusal‬‭to‬‭license‬‭blocks‬‭the‬‭development‬‭of‬‭the‬‭new‬‭market‬‭and‬ ‭places‬‭a‬‭disadvantage‬‭for‬‭the‬‭consumers.‬ ‭○‬ ‭Refusal‬‭to‬‭license‬‭without‬‭an‬‭objective‬‭and‬‭justified‬‭reason.‬ ‭‬ ‭Amicable‬‭Agreements‬‭in‬‭Patent‬‭Litigations‬ ‭‬ ‭Cross‬‭Licensing:‬ ‭○‬ ‭In‬‭assessing‬‭the‬‭antitrust‬‭implications‬‭of‬‭cross-licensing,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭vital‬‭to‬ ‭determine‬‭whether‬‭technologies‬‭involved‬‭are‬‭substitutes‬‭or‬‭complements.‬‭In‬ ‭cases‬‭where‬‭different‬‭parties‬‭hold‬‭‘blocking’‬‭patents‬‭on‬‭different‬‭aspects‬‭of‬‭a‬ ‭technology,‬‭cross-licensing‬‭might‬‭be‬‭the‬‭only‬‭way‬‭to‬‭ensure‬‭that‬‭the‬‭new‬ ‭technology‬‭is‬‭used‬‭at‬‭all.‬‭Because‬‭of‬‭this‬‭‘value‬‭increasing’‬‭or‬‭‘cost-‬ ‭decreasing’‬‭effect,‬‭cross-licensing‬‭of‬‭complementary‬‭technologies‬‭should‬‭be‬ ‭given‬‭the‬‭benefit‬‭of‬‭the‬‭doubt:‬‭in‬‭the‬‭absence‬‭of‬‭some‬‭specific,‬‭documented,‬ ‭competitive‬‭concern,‬‭they‬‭should‬‭escape‬‭antitrust‬‭scrutiny.‬‭The‬‭opposite‬ ‭principle‬‭applies‬‭to‬‭the‬‭case‬‭of‬‭substitute‬‭technologies:‬‭given‬‭the‬‭lack‬‭of‬‭any‬ ‭obvious‬‭benefit,‬‭they‬‭should‬‭generally‬‭be‬‭considered‬‭with‬‭suspicion.‬‭Cross‬ ‭licensing‬‭practices‬‭facilitate‬‭tacit‬‭collusion‬‭between‬‭rivals.‬  ‭‬ ‭Patent‬‭Pools:‬ ‭○‬ ‭Patent‬‭pools‬‭are‬‭very‬‭similar‬‭to‬‭cross-licensing.‬‭A‬‭number‬‭of‬‭firms‬‭gives‬‭each‬ ‭other‬‭access‬‭to‬‭a‬‭number‬‭of‬‭their‬‭patents.‬‭The‬‭payments‬‭schemes‬‭involved‬ ‭vary‬‭widely.‬‭Some‬‭pools‬‭grant‬‭free‬‭access‬‭to‬‭all‬‭members,‬‭others‬‭involve‬ ‭elaborate‬‭royalty‬‭schemes.‬‭Like‬‭cross-licensing,‬‭patent‬‭pools‬‭also‬‭facilitate‬ ‭tacit‬‭collusion.‬‭The‬‭number‬‭of‬‭patents‬‭involved‬‭also‬‭multiplies‬‭the‬‭potential‬‭for‬ ‭‘multi-market‬‭contact’‬‭between‬‭members‬‭pool‬‭member,‬‭making‬‭tacit‬ ‭agreements‬‭even‬‭easier‬‭to‬‭support.‬ ‭‬ ‭Grant-backs:‬ ‭○‬ ‭As‬‭part‬‭of‬‭the‬‭conditions‬‭for‬‭licensing‬‭their‬‭technology,‬‭many‬‭companies‬ ‭require‬‭their‬‭licensees‬‭to‬‭‘grant‬‭back’‬‭to‬‭them‬‭any‬‭improvements‬‭that‬‭they‬ ‭make.‬‭Without‬‭an‬‭appropriate‬‭quid-pro-quo‬‭the‬‭most‬‭obvious‬‭effect‬‭of‬ ‭grant-back‬‭clauses‬‭is‬‭that‬‭they‬‭tend‬‭to‬‭decrease‬‭the‬‭parties‘‬‭incentives‬‭to‬ ‭invest‬‭resources‬‭in‬‭seeking‬‭to‬‭improve‬‭the‬‭technology.‬ ‭‬ ‭Practices‬‭to‬‭extend‬‭the‬‭legal‬‭patent‬‭monopoly‬‭in‬‭terms‬‭of‬‭the‬‭original‬‭technical‬‭scope‬ ‭and/or‬‭lifetime‬‭of‬‭a‬‭patent:‬ ‭○‬ ‭Examples‬‭include‬‭licensing‬‭contracts‬‭that‬‭require‬‭grant-backs‬‭or‬‭payments‬ ‭even‬‭after‬‭the‬‭licensor‬‭legal‬‭protection‬‭has‬‭expired‬ ‭‬ ‭Umbrella‬‭branding:‬ ‭○‬ ‭A‬‭firm‬‭uses‬‭a‬‭trademark‬‭made‬‭famous‬‭by‬‭the‬‭sale‬‭of‬‭one‬‭product‬‭to‬‭enter‬‭into‬ ‭other‬‭markets.‬‭E.g.,‬‭Virgin‬‭is‬‭used‬‭to‬‭brand‬‭products‬‭as‬‭different‬‭as‬‭airlines,‬ ‭train‬‭services,‬‭electricity‬‭supply‬‭and‬‭cola‬‭drinks.‬‭Such‬‭brand‬‭extension‬ ‭strategies‬‭raise‬‭legitimate‬‭competition‬‭policy‬‭issues‬‭as‬‭a‬‭firm‬‭is‬‭essentially‬ ‭using‬‭an‬‭advantage‬‭acquired‬‭in‬‭one‬‭market‬‭to‬‭enhance‬‭its‬‭position‬‭in‬‭another.‬ ‭‬ ‭Compulsory‬‭trademark‬‭licensing‬ ‭‬ ‭IPRs‬‭and‬‭standard‬‭setting:‬ ‭○‬ ‭The‬‭interrelationships‬‭among‬‭IPR,‬‭standard‬‭setting,‬‭and‬‭licensing‬‭are‬ ‭complex.‬‭Standard-setting,‬‭often‬‭succeeded‬‭by‬‭IPR‬‭licensing,‬‭may‬‭enhance‬ ‭the‬‭value‬‭of‬‭IP;‬‭this‬‭tends‬‭to‬‭promote‬‭welfare‬‭by‬‭enhancing‬‭IPR‬‭holder’s‬ ‭incentive‬‭to‬‭innovate.‬‭At‬‭the‬‭same‬‭time,‬‭IPR‬‭holders‬‭may‬‭use‬‭anticompetitive‬ ‭means‬‭in‬‭standard-setting‬‭to‬‭obtain‬‭market‬‭power‬‭greater‬‭than‬‭the‬‭power‬‭that‬ ‭is‬‭inherent‬‭in‬‭the‬‭legitimate‬‭exercise‬‭of‬‭their‬‭IPRs‬‭[Abbott‬‭(2005),‬‭p.10,‬‭in:‬ ‭Schmidtchen‬‭(2006)]‬ ‭‬ ‭Interface‬‭protection‬‭and‬‭limits‬‭on‬‭interoperability:‬ ‭○‬ ‭The‬‭copyright‬‭protection‬‭of‬‭software‬‭raises‬‭additional‬‭issues.‬‭Foremost‬ ‭among‬‭them‬‭is‬‭the‬‭protection‬‭of‬‭interfaces,‬‭i.e.‬‭the‬‭parts‬‭of‬‭code‬‭that‬‭ensure‬ ‭the‬‭interoperability‬‭between‬‭a‬‭piece‬‭of‬‭software‬‭and‬‭other‬‭software‬‭packages‬ ‭or‬‭peripheral‬‭equipment.‬‭This‬‭has‬‭been‬‭a‬‭crucial‬‭aspect‬‭of‬‭the‬‭recent‬‭string‬‭of‬ ‭competition‬‭law‬‭cases‬‭involving‬‭Microsoft.‬‭The‬‭firm‬‭was‬‭accused‬‭to‬‭withhold‬ ‭information‬‭necessary‬‭to‬‭ensure‬‭that‬‭computer‬‭servers‬‭using‬‭non-Microsoft‬ ‭operating‬‭system‬‭would‬‭work‬‭well‬‭with‬‭personal‬‭computers,‬‭for‬‭which‬ ‭Microsoft‬‭‘s‬‭family‬‭of‬‭‘Windows’‬‭operating‬‭systems‬‭is‬‭dominant.‬ ‭ xcursus‬‭:‬‭Incompatibility‬‭is‬‭also‬‭likely‬‭to‬‭lead‬‭to‬‭market‬‭dominance‬‭as‬‭rivals‬‭might‬‭find‬‭an‬ E ‭early‬‭lead‬‭in‬‭network‬‭size‬‭to‬‭be‬‭an‬‭insurmountable‬‭advantage.‬‭Incompatibility‬‭also‬‭favors‬ ‭incumbents,‬‭not‬‭only‬‭because‬‭they‬‭might‬‭already‬‭have‬‭a‬‭significant‬‭installed‬‭base‬‭but‬‭also‬ ‭because‬‭consumers‬‭might‬‭simply‬‭expect‬‭that‬‭a‬‭big‬‭successful‬‭firm‬‭entering‬‭a‬‭new‬‭market‬‭is‬ ‭more‬‭likely‬‭to‬‭attract‬‭a‬‭large‬‭network‬‭of‬‭consumers.‬ I‭PM04b:‬‭A‬‭Strategic‬‭View‬‭of‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬ ‭Management‬‭-‬‭Strategy‬‭Concepts‬ ‭Defensive‬‭Motives‬ ‭Incentivize:‬‭Patent‬‭Reward‬‭Systems‬ ‭‬ ‭Patent‬‭reward‬‭systems‬‭are‬‭put‬‭in‬‭place‬‭by‬‭many‬‭firms‬‭to‬‭give‬‭employees‬‭an‬‭incentive‬ ‭to‬‭disclose‬‭their‬‭inventions‬‭and‬‭to‬‭go‬‭through‬‭the‬‭patent‬‭process‬ ‭‬ ‭Most‬‭employees‬‭disclose‬‭ideas‬‭and‬‭participate‬‭in‬‭patenting‬‭for‬‭the‬‭perceived‬‭prestige‬ ‭of‬‭having‬‭patents,‬‭not‬‭for‬‭the‬‭money‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭Germany‬‭(like‬‭elswere)‬‭the‬‭Act‬‭on‬‭Employees’‬‭Inventions‬‭provides‬‭strict‬‭rules‬ ‭concerning‬‭the‬‭transfer‬‭of‬‭rights‬‭to‬‭an‬‭invention‬‭to‬‭the‬‭employer,‬‭but...‬ ‭‬ ‭...the‬‭German‬‭law‬‭on‬‭employees'‬‭inventions‬‭also‬‭prescribes‬‭mandatory‬ ‭compensation‬‭of‬‭employees‬‭for‬‭inventions‬‭they‬‭make‬ ‭Protection‬‭function‬‭is‬‭a‬‭patent’s‬‭most‬‭original‬‭function‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭most‬‭cases‬‭of‬‭product‬‭innovations‬‭and‬‭many‬‭cases‬‭of‬‭process‬‭innovations‬‭trade‬ ‭secrets‬‭are‬‭not‬‭effective‬‭means‬‭of‬‭protection‬ ‭‬ ‭Firms‬‭file‬‭patents‬‭and‬‭other‬‭IPRs‬‭to‬‭defend‬‭their‬‭new‬‭technologies‬‭/‬‭products‬‭/‬ ‭processes‬‭against‬‭(legal)‬‭copying‬ ‭‬ ‭Patents,‬‭utility‬‭patents‬‭and‬‭design‬‭patents‬‭give‬‭firms‬‭a‬‭temporary‬‭monopoly‬‭position‬ ‭that‬‭(hopefully)‬‭allows‬‭them‬‭to‬‭recoup‬‭their‬‭investments‬‭in‬‭R&D‬ ‭‬ ‭Trademarks‬‭give‬‭firms‬‭a‬‭monopoly‬‭position‬‭that‬‭(hopefully)‬‭allows‬‭them‬‭to‬‭recoup‬ ‭their‬‭investments‬‭in‬‭product‬‭/‬‭process‬‭quality‬‭and‬‭marketing‬ ‭Protection‬‭is‬‭important‬‭–‬‭Non-disclosure‬‭has‬‭limits‬ ‭‬ ‭Innovations‬‭are‬‭not‬‭protected‬‭because‬‭firms‬‭fear‬‭that‬‭competition‬‭would‬‭profit‬‭from‬ ‭patent‬‭publication,‬‭without‬‭being‬‭able‬‭to‬‭prove‬‭an‬‭infringement‬‭later‬ ‭‬ ‭These‬‭reservations‬‭are‬‭regularly‬‭uttered‬‭in‬‭connection‬‭with‬‭process‬‭patents‬ ‭‬ ‭Wouldn’t‬‭it‬‭be‬‭sufficient‬‭in‬‭cases‬‭in‬‭which‬‭patents‬‭are‬‭characterized‬‭by‬‭a‬‭feature‬‭that‬ ‭cannot‬‭be‬‭traced‬‭easily‬‭(e.g.,‬‭a‬‭temperature‬‭or‬‭pH‬‭value)‬‭to‬‭abandon‬‭patent‬ ‭protection‬‭and‬‭rely‬‭on‬‭rights‬‭resulting‬‭from‬‭prior‬‭or‬‭continued‬‭use?‬ ‭‬ ‭Continued‬‭use:‬‭A‬‭firms’‬‭non-public‬‭but‬‭documented‬‭prior‬‭use‬‭secures‬‭continued‬‭use‬ ‭against‬‭a‬‭protected‬‭right‬‭of‬‭a‬‭third‬‭party‬‭that‬‭was‬‭granted‬‭later,‬‭BUT...‬ ‭‬ ‭...the‬‭facts‬‭are,‬‭however,‬‭attached‬‭to‬‭a‬‭number‬‭of‬‭conditions:‬ ‭○‬ ‭The‬‭right‬‭to‬‭continued‬‭use‬‭is‬‭territorially‬‭restricted,‬‭at‬‭least‬‭according‬‭to‬ ‭current‬‭legal‬‭practice.‬‭Prior‬‭use‬‭in‬‭Germany‬‭does‬‭not‬‭justify,‬‭e.g.,‬‭a‬‭right‬‭to‬ ‭continued‬‭use‬‭in‬‭France‬ ‭○‬ ‭The‬‭right‬‭to‬‭continued‬‭use‬‭cannot‬‭be‬‭easily‬‭exploited‬‭at‬‭any‬‭quantity.‬‭Prior‬ ‭use‬‭at‬‭laboratory‬‭scale‬‭will‬‭be‬‭difficult‬‭to‬‭evidence‬‭the‬‭right‬‭to‬‭continued‬‭use‬‭in‬ ‭a‬‭10.000‬‭ton‬‭production‬‭plant.‬‭Usually,‬‭factor‬‭10‬‭is‬‭acceptable‬‭in‬‭practice‬ ‭Filing‬‭patents‬‭to‬‭obtain‬‭room‬‭to‬‭manoeuvre‬ ‭‬ ‭Due‬‭to‬‭increased‬‭complexity‬‭of‬‭technologies‬‭and‬‭the‬‭innovation‬‭process‬‭patents‬ ‭have‬‭an‬‭option‬‭value‬‭for‬‭firms‬ ‭‬ ‭Firms‬‭want‬‭to‬‭maintain‬‭their‬‭room‬‭to‬‭manoeuvre‬‭and‬‭keep‬‭their‬‭options‬‭open‬‭for‬‭their‬ ‭own‬‭market‬‭activities‬‭and‬‭research‬ ‭Research‬‭Disclosure‬‭to‬‭Obtain‬‭Room‬‭to‬‭Manoeuvre‬ ‭‬ ‭A‬‭„Research‬‭Disclosure“‬‭is‬‭generally‬‭understood‬‭as‬‭a‬‭defensive,‬‭usually‬‭anonymous‬ ‭publication‬‭used‬‭to‬‭rather‬‭quickly‬‭generate‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art‬ ‭‬ ‭Although‬‭this‬‭goal‬‭could‬‭be‬‭achieved‬‭by‬‭putting‬‭an‬‭advert‬‭in‬‭the‬‭Beijing‬‭Times,‬‭R&D‬ ‭magazines‬‭have‬‭the‬‭advantage‬‭that‬‭publication‬‭is‬‭not‬‭costly‬‭and‬‭happens‬‭already‬ ‭within‬‭about‬‭six‬‭weeks‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭former‬‭times‬‭it‬‭was‬‭hoped‬‭to‬‭a‬‭certain‬‭extent‬‭to‬‭hide‬‭facts‬‭that,‬‭on‬‭the‬‭one‬‭side,‬‭we‬ ‭hesitated‬‭to‬‭present‬‭to‬‭a‬‭broad‬‭public‬‭but,‬‭on‬‭the‬‭other‬‭side,‬‭we‬‭did‬‭not‬‭want‬‭to‬‭keep‬ ‭secret‬ ‭‬ ‭Today,‬‭in‬‭the‬‭age‬‭of‬‭full‬‭text‬‭searches‬‭this‬‭cannot‬‭be‬‭expected‬‭any‬‭more‬ ‭‬ ‭Example‬‭for‬‭a‬‭research‬‭disclosure‬‭practice:‬‭IBM’s‬‭view‬‭is‬‭that,‬‭pure‬‭business‬ ‭methods‬‭without‬‭technical‬‭merit‬‭should‬‭not‬‭be‬‭patentable;‬‭they‬‭should‬‭still‬‭be‬ ‭published‬‭to‬‭prevent‬‭others‬‭from‬‭patenting‬‭the‬‭method‬ ‭Number‬‭of‬‭Patent‬‭Law‬‭Suits‬‭is‬‭Increasing,‬‭not‬‭only‬‭in‬‭IT‬ ‭‬ ‭Firms‬‭file‬‭patents‬‭to‬‭hedge‬‭against‬‭the‬‭risk‬‭being‬‭sued‬‭by‬‭competitors‬‭or‬‭patent‬‭trolls‬ ‭Offensive‬‭Motives‬ ‭Basic‬‭Question‬‭‘Why‬‭exchange‬‭patents’‬ ‭‬ ‭Royalty-Stacking‬‭(Geradin‬‭et‬‭al.‬‭2008)‬ ‭‬ ‭Hold-Up‬‭Problems‬‭(Hall‬‭and‬‭Ziedonis,‬‭2001)‬ ‭Exchange‬‭strategies‬ ‭‬ ‭Cross-licensing‬ ‭‬ ‭Patent‬‭pools‬‭and‬‭package‬‭licenses‬ ‭‬ ‭Cooperative‬‭standard‬‭setting‬ ‭Cross‬‭Licensing‬ ‭‬ ‭Agreement‬‭between‬‭firms‬‭that‬‭grant‬‭each‬‭the‬‭right‬‭to‬‭practice‬‭the‬‭other’s‬‭IPRs‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭exchange‬‭of‬‭licenses‬‭and,‬‭possibly,‬‭whole‬‭IPR‬‭portfolios‬‭is‬‭the‬‭strategy‬‭of‬‭strong‬ ‭partners‬‭who‬‭wish‬‭to‬‭exclude‬‭third‬‭parties‬ ‭‬ ‭Cross‬‭licenses‬‭require‬‭the‬‭existence‬‭of‬‭patent‬‭portfolios‬‭because‬‭it‬‭is‬‭extremely‬‭rare‬ ‭that‬‭licenses‬‭are‬‭successfully‬‭exchanged‬‭in‬‭completely‬‭different‬‭fields‬‭of‬‭work‬ ‭‬ ‭CL‬‭can‬‭solve‬‭the‬‭complements‬‭problem,‬‭at‬‭least‬‭among‬‭the‬‭two‬‭firms,‬‭and‬‭thus‬‭be‬ ‭highly‬‭pro-competitive‬ ‭‬ ‭Example:‬‭Bayer‬‭holds‬‭a‬‭basic‬‭patent‬‭on‬‭a‬‭pharmaceutical‬‭technology.‬‭A‬‭Japanese‬ ‭competitor‬‭has‬‭filed‬‭patents‬‭on‬‭a‬‭number‬‭of‬‭areas‬‭of‬‭application‬‭of‬‭this‬‭technology‬ ‭→‬‭In-house‬‭R&D‬‭to‬‭develop‬‭new‬‭applications‬‭would‬‭be‬‭much‬‭more‬‭expensive‬‭for‬ ‭Bayer‬‭than‬‭to‬‭engage‬‭in‬‭a‬‭cross-license‬‭deal‬‭with‬‭the‬‭Japanese‬‭rival‬ ‭‬ ‭Antitrust‬‭concern‬‭with‬‭cross-licenses‬‭among‬‭competitors:‬‭Running‬‭royalties‬‭will‬‭be‬ ‭used‬‭as‬‭a‬‭device‬‭to‬‭elevate‬‭prices‬‭and‬‭effectuate‬‭a‬‭cartel‬‭(Katz/Shapiro,‬‭1985)‬ ‭ atent‬‭Pooling‬ P ‭Conditions‬ ‭‬ ‭Two‬‭or‬‭more‬‭firms‬‭control‬‭patents‬‭necessary‬‭to‬‭make‬‭a‬‭given‬‭product‬ ‭‬ ‭At‬‭least‬‭some‬‭actual‬‭/‬‭potential‬‭manufacturers‬‭do‬‭not‬‭themselves‬‭hold‬‭any‬‭such‬ ‭patents‬ ‭‬ ‭Patent‬‭pool‬‭/‬‭package‬‭license‬‭can‬‭be‬‭the‬‭solution‬‭to‬‭the‬‭complements‬‭problem‬ ‭Definition‬ ‭‬ ‭Patent‬‭Pool‬‭=‬‭Group‬‭of‬‭patents‬‭licensed‬‭in‬‭a‬‭package‬‭,‬‭either‬‭by‬‭one‬‭of‬‭the‬‭patent‬ ‭holders‬‭or‬‭by‬‭a‬‭new‬‭entity‬‭established‬‭for‬‭this‬‭purpose‬ ‭‬ ‭Usually‬‭open‬‭to‬‭anyone‬‭willing‬‭to‬‭pay‬‭the‬‭royalties‬ ‭Advantages‬ ‭‬ ‭“One-stop-shopping”‬ ‭‬ ‭Little‬‭or‬‭no‬‭value‬‭of‬‭patent‬‭subsets‬‭by‬‭themselves‬ ‭‬ ‭Reduced‬‭risk‬‭from‬‭paying‬‭for‬‭patents‬‭that‬‭are‬‭useless‬‭without‬‭further‬‭complementary‬ ‭rights‬ ‭Antitrust‬‭Perspective‬ ‭‬ ‭Complementary‬‭i.e.‬‭blocking‬‭or‬‭essential‬‭patents‬‭in‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭pool‬‭may‬‭be‬ ‭pro-competitive‬ ‭‬ ‭Substitute‬‭or‬‭rival‬‭patents‬‭in‬‭a‬‭pool‬‭can‬‭eliminate‬‭competition‬‭or‬‭elevate‬‭licensing‬ ‭fees‬ ‭Standard‬‭Setting‬ ‭Patenting‬‭and‬‭Standard‬‭Setting‬ ‭‬ ‭A‬‭patent‬‭is‬‭called‬‭essential‬‭if‬‭it‬‭is‬‭necessarily‬‭infringed‬‭by‬‭any‬‭implementation‬‭of‬‭a‬ ‭standard‬‭(Baron‬‭et‬‭al.‬‭2012)‬ ‭‬ ‭Studies‬‭show‬‭that‬‭the‬‭inclusion‬‭of‬‭patented‬‭technology‬‭into‬‭a‬‭standard‬‭increases‬‭the‬ ‭value‬‭of‬‭the‬‭patent‬‭(Rysman/Simcoe‬‭2008)‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭increased‬‭value‬‭is‬‭an‬‭incentive‬‭for‬‭firms‬‭to‬‭adjust‬‭their‬‭patent‬‭filing‬‭strategies‬‭to‬ ‭ongoing‬‭standardization‬‭(Berger‬‭et‬‭al.‬‭2012)‬‭...‬  ‭‬.‭..‬‭and‬‭to‬‭participate‬‭in‬‭standardization‬‭committees‬‭and‬‭build‬‭up‬‭strategic‬‭alliances‬‭to‬ ‭influence‬‭the‬‭selection‬‭process‬‭in‬‭standardization‬‭(Leiponen‬‭2008)‬ ‭‬ ‭Positioning‬‭of‬‭firms‬‭has‬‭stronger‬‭impact‬‭on‬‭the‬‭inclusion‬‭of‬‭patented‬‭technologies‬ ‭into‬‭standards‬‭than‬‭the‬‭technological‬‭merits‬‭of‬‭the‬‭patents‬‭(Bekkers‬‭et‬‭al.‬‭2011)‬ ‭Essential‬‭patents:‬ ‭‬ ‭are‬‭these‬‭that‬‭someone‬‭would‬‭necessarily‬‭infringe‬‭when‬‭adopting‬‭the‬‭standard,‬ ‭‬ ‭only‬‭represent‬‭a‬‭very‬‭small‬‭share‬‭of‬‭patents‬‭that‬‭are‬‭technologically‬‭related‬‭to‬ ‭standards‬ ‭ hen‬‭included‬‭in‬‭standards...‬ W ‭...Essential‬‭patents‬‭have‬‭to‬‭be‬‭included‬‭according‬‭to‬‭(F)RAND‬‭terms‬ ‭‬ ‭Fair‬ ‭‬ ‭Reasonable‬ ‭‬ ‭Non-discriminatory‬ ‭Aggressive‬‭Motives‬ ‭ lock‬‭Competitors‬ B ‭Basic‬‭Patents‬‭/‬‭Patent‬‭Thickets‬‭are‬‭used‬‭as‬‭Market‬‭Entry‬‭Barriers‬‭to:‬ ‭‬ ‭Prevent‬‭competitors‬‭from‬‭entering‬‭the‬‭market‬ ‭‬ ‭Secure‬‭your‬‭room‬‭to‬‭manoeuvre‬ ‭‬ ‭Restricting‬‭a‬‭competitors‬‭room‬‭to‬‭manoeuvre‬ ‭Basic‬‭Patents‬‭as‬‭Market‬‭Entry‬‭Barriers:‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭scope‬‭of‬‭protection‬‭and‬‭thus‬‭the‬‭significance‬‭of‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭can‬‭be‬‭assessed‬‭by‬ ‭looking‬‭at‬‭the‬‭length‬‭of‬‭its‬‭text‬‭and‬‭the‬‭number‬‭of‬‭features‬‭in‬‭its‬‭main‬‭claim‬ ‭‬ ‭Basic‬‭patents‬‭refer‬‭to‬‭matter‬‭X,‬‭the‬‭combination‬‭of‬‭X+Y,‬‭or‬‭perhaps‬‭the‬‭use‬‭of‬‭X‬‭in‬ ‭the‬‭application‬‭of‬‭Z‬‭and‬‭do‬‭not‬‭show‬‭any‬‭further‬‭limitations‬ ‭‬ ‭Basic‬‭patents‬‭dominate‬‭and‬‭block‬‭all‬‭subsequent‬‭developments‬‭of‬‭third‬‭parties‬ ‭‬ ‭Businesses‬‭like‬‭chemistry‬‭are‬‭characterized‬‭by‬‭the‬‭fact‬‭that‬‭pioneering‬‭inventions‬‭are‬ ‭rare‬‭and‬‭happen‬‭in‬‭the‬‭beginning‬‭of‬‭the‬‭TLC‬‭/‬‭ILC,‬‭and‬‭incremental‬‭innovations‬‭are‬ ‭the‬‭rule‬‭and‬‭dominate‬‭the‬‭later‬‭stages‬ ‭‬ ‭Thus‬‭the‬‭actual‬‭determinant‬‭is‬‭the‬‭time‬‭factor‬‭that‬‭decides‬‭about‬‭success‬‭-‬‭who‬ ‭possesses‬‭the‬‭earlier‬‭date‬‭of‬‭application‬‭receives‬‭the‬‭basic‬‭patent‬ ‭‬ ‭Consequently,‬‭IP‬‭protection‬‭needs‬‭to‬‭start‬‭right‬‭at‬‭the‬‭beginning‬‭of‬‭a‬‭development‬ ‭and‬‭not‬‭at‬‭its‬‭end...‬ ‭ ppeal‬‭Strategy‬ A ‭Legally‬‭Challenge‬‭and‬‭Destroy‬‭other‬‭Firms’‬‭IPR‬ ‭‬ ‭According‬‭to‬‭a‬‭survey‬‭by‬‭Cohausz,‬‭every‬‭fourth‬‭granted‬‭patent‬‭is‬‭assumed‬‭not‬‭to‬‭be‬ ‭legally‬‭valid‬‭in‬‭case‬‭of‬‭doubt‬ ‭‬ ‭Consequently,‬‭it‬‭would‬‭be‬‭a‬‭sensible‬‭strategy‬‭to‬‭start‬‭worrying‬‭about‬‭patents‬‭only‬‭if‬ ‭they‬‭directly‬‭oppose‬‭a‬‭firm’s‬‭products‬  ‭‬ T ‭ hese‬‭considerations‬‭are‬‭supported‬‭by‬‭the‬‭fact‬‭that‬‭according‬‭to‬‭studies‬‭by‬‭Merck,‬ ‭about‬‭85‬‭%‬‭of‬‭the‬‭knowledge‬‭of‬‭humanity‬‭is‬‭currently‬‭searchable‬‭on-line‬‭with‬‭an‬ ‭increasing‬‭tendency‬ ‭‬ ‭Therefore‬‭the‬‭probability‬‭of‬‭destroying‬‭a‬‭protected‬‭right‬‭by‬‭obstructive‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art‬ ‭is‬‭connected‬‭more‬‭or‬‭less‬‭linearly‬‭to‬‭the‬‭temporal‬‭and‬‭financial‬‭expense‬‭invested‬‭in‬‭a‬ ‭search‬ ‭ atent‬‭Troll‬‭Strategy‬ P ‭What‬‭is‬‭a‬‭Patent‬‭Troll?‬ ‭‬ ‭Non-manufacturing‬‭entities‬‭who‬ ‭○‬ ‭do‬‭not‬‭actually‬‭make‬‭the‬‭product‬‭themselves‬ ‭○‬ ‭often‬‭have‬‭not‬‭been‬‭engaged‬‭in‬‭developing‬‭the‬‭technology‬ ‭‬ ‭No‬‭inventors‬‭who‬‭pursue‬‭their‬‭own‬‭line‬‭of‬‭research‬ ‭‬ ‭BUT‬‭–‬‭opportunistically‬‭or‬‭intentionally‬‭–‬‭profit‬‭from‬‭payments‬‭by‬‭companies‬‭that‬ ‭inadvertently‬‭infringe‬‭on‬‭the‬‭troll’s‬‭IP‬ ‭‬ ‭Focus‬‭primarily‬‭on‬‭essential‬‭standard‬‭technologies‬‭in‬‭the‬‭field‬‭of‬‭computing,‬ ‭telecommunications‬‭and‬‭mobile‬‭communications‬ ‭Strategies‬‭and‬‭Business‬‭Model‬‭of‬‭Patent‬‭Trolls‬ ‭1.‬ ‭Acquire‬‭patents‬‭(sometimes‬‭from‬‭bankrupt‬‭companies)‬ ‭2.‬ ‭Lay‬‭low‬‭until‬‭market‬‭develops‬‭and‬‭participants‬‭in‬‭the‬‭industry‬‭have‬‭made‬‭irreversible‬ ‭investments‬ ‭3.‬ ‭Turn‬‭patents‬‭against‬‭manufacturers‬ ‭4.‬ ‭Goal:‬‭Maximum‬‭royalty‬‭fees‬ ‭Basic‬‭Assumptions‬ ‭‬ ‭Information‬‭asymmetry‬‭between‬‭troll‬‭and‬‭company:‬ ‭○‬ ‭troll‬‭holds‬‭IP;‬‭companies‬‭do‬‭not‬‭know‬‭of‬‭its‬‭existence‬ ‭○‬ ‭Four‬‭action‬‭alternatives‬‭to‬‭respond‬‭to‬‭a‬‭troll‬‭attack:‬ ‭1.‬ ‭stop‬‭using‬‭infringed‬‭IP‬ ‭2.‬ ‭invent‬‭around‬ ‭3.‬ ‭pay‬‭royalties‬ ‭4.‬ ‭Revocation‬‭action‬‭against‬‭troll’s‬‭IP‬ ‭‬ A ‭ nalysis:‬‭Action‬‭alternatives‬‭of‬‭firms‬‭change‬‭in‬‭a‬‭time-cost‬‭analysis‬ ‭‬ ‭Conclusion:‬‭Costs‬‭of‬‭not‬‭using‬‭the‬‭infringed‬‭IP‬‭are‬‭crucial‬‭for‬‭the‬‭action‬‭alternatives‬ ‭of‬‭the‬‭firm‬ ‭IPM05:‬‭Basics‬‭in‬‭Filing‬‭Patents‬ ‭Criteria‬‭of‬‭Patentability‬ ‭ hree‬‭Things‬‭a‬‭Patent‬‭Needs‬ T ‭Novelty‬ ‭‬ ‭An‬‭invention‬‭shall‬‭be‬‭considered‬‭to‬‭be‬‭new‬‭if‬‭it‬‭does‬‭not‬‭form‬‭part‬‭of‬‭the‬‭state‬‭of‬ ‭the‬‭art‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art‬‭shall‬‭be‬‭held‬‭to‬‭comprise‬‭everything‬‭made‬‭available‬‭to‬‭the‬‭public‬ ‭by‬‭means‬‭of‬‭a‬‭written‬‭or‬‭oral‬‭description,‬‭by‬‭use,‬‭or‬‭in‬‭any‬‭other‬‭way,‬‭before‬‭the‬‭date‬ ‭of‬‭filing‬‭of‬‭the‬‭European‬‭patent‬‭application‬ ‭‬ ‭Previous‬‭filings:‬‭Also‬‭the‬‭content‬‭other‬‭patent‬‭applications‬‭that‬‭have‬‭been‬‭filed‬ ‭previously‬‭but‬‭only‬‭been‬‭published‬‭on‬‭or‬‭after‬‭the‬‭date‬‭of‬‭filing‬‭count‬‭as‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬ ‭art‬ ‭Inventive‬‭Step‬‭–‬‭Obviousness‬ ‭‬ ‭An‬‭invention‬‭shall‬‭be‬‭considered‬‭as‬‭involving‬‭an‬‭inventive‬‭step‬‭if,‬‭having‬‭regard‬‭to‬ ‭the‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭not‬‭obvious‬‭to‬‭a‬‭person‬‭skilled‬‭in‬‭the‬‭art‬‭(knows‬ ‭EVERYTHING,‬‭but‬‭has‬‭ZERO‬‭imagination)‬ ‭‬ ‭Previous‬‭Filings:‬‭In‬‭case‬‭the‬‭relevant‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art‬‭comprises‬‭documents,‬‭which‬ ‭have‬‭been‬‭filed‬‭prior‬‭to‬‭the‬‭filing‬‭date,‬‭however,‬‭have‬‭been‬‭published‬‭on‬‭the‬‭date‬‭or‬ ‭later‬‭(so‬‭called‬‭“54(3)‬‭documents”),‬‭such‬‭documents‬‭are‬‭excluded‬‭from‬‭the‬ ‭examination‬‭of‬‭inventiveness‬‭(but‬‭still‬‭count‬‭for‬‭the‬‭lack‬‭of‬‭novelty)‬ ‭‬ ‭Procedure:‬‭Regular‬‭examination‬‭on‬‭inventive‬‭step‬‭uses‬‭the‬‭so‬‭called‬ ‭“problem-solution-approach”‬ ‭○‬ ‭Steps‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Problem‬‭Solution‬‭Approach‬ ‭1.‬ ‭Identification‬‭of‬‭the‬‭technical‬‭field‬‭of‬‭the‬‭invention‬ ‭2.‬ ‭Identification‬‭of‬‭the‬‭closest‬‭prior‬‭art‬‭in‬‭this‬‭field,‬‭i.e.‬‭the‬‭most‬‭relevant‬ ‭prior‬‭art‬ ‭3.‬ ‭Determining,‬‭in‬‭the‬‭view‬‭of‬‭the‬‭closest‬‭prior‬‭art,‬‭the‬‭technical‬‭problem‬ ‭which‬‭the‬‭claimed‬‭invention‬‭addresses‬‭and‬‭successfully‬‭solves;‬‭and‬ ‭finally‬ ‭4.‬ ‭Examination‬‭whether‬‭or‬‭not‬‭the‬‭claimed‬‭solution‬‭to‬‭the‬‭objective‬ ‭technical‬‭problem‬‭is‬‭obvious‬‭for‬‭the‬‭ordinary‬‭skilled‬‭person‬‭in‬‭view‬‭of‬ ‭the‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art‬‭in‬‭general‬ ‭Industrial‬‭Applicability‬‭/‬‭Usefulness‬ ‭‬ ‭An‬‭invention‬‭shall‬‭be‬‭considered‬‭as‬‭susceptible‬‭of‬‭industrial‬‭application‬‭if‬‭it‬‭can‬‭be‬ ‭made‬‭or‬‭used‬‭in‬‭any‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭industry‬‭,‬‭including‬‭agriculture‬ ‭‬ ‭Usually,‬‭there‬‭are‬‭rather‬‭few‬‭inventions‬‭which‬‭do‬‭not‬‭satisfy‬‭Art.‬‭57‬‭EPC.‬ ‭‬ ‭Most‬‭of‬‭the‬‭“inventions”‬‭without‬‭industrial‬‭application‬‭are‬‭obviously‬‭not‬‭in‬‭accordance‬ ‭with‬‭essential‬‭physics,‬‭like‬‭so-called‬‭“Perpetuum‬‭mobile”‬‭cases‬ ‭‬ ‭Industrial‬‭Applicability‬‭is‬‭the‬‭easiest‬‭barrier‬‭to‬‭overcome,‬‭hardly‬‭any‬‭patent‬‭filing‬‭is‬ ‭rejected‬‭because‬‭of‬‭a‬‭lack‬‭in‬‭usefulness‬ ‭ verview:‬‭What‬‭is‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭claim,‬‭types‬‭of‬‭claiming‬‭systems‬‭and‬‭what‬‭types‬‭of‬ O ‭claims‬‭are‬‭given‬ ‭Patent‬‭claims‬ ‭‬ ‭Claims‬‭define,‬‭in‬‭technical‬‭terms,‬‭the‬‭extent‬‭of‬‭the‬‭protection‬‭conferred‬‭by‬‭a‬ ‭patent,‬‭or‬‭the‬‭protection‬‭sought‬‭in‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭application.‬ ‭‬ ‭Claims‬‭are‬‭of‬‭utmost‬‭importance‬‭both‬‭during‬‭prosecution‬‭and‬‭litigation‬ ‭‬ ‭Many‬‭problems‬‭caused‬‭by‬‭patents‬‭are‬‭because‬‭patents‬‭are‬‭poorly‬‭written‬‭in‬‭legalese‬ ‭[Juristensprache],‬‭to‬‭claim‬‭as‬‭much‬‭while‬‭disclosing‬‭as‬‭little‬‭as‬‭possible‬ ‭‬ ‭Use‬‭of‬‭standard‬‭terms‬‭and‬‭the‬‭omission‬‭[Auslassung]‬‭of‬‭legal‬‭jargon‬‭(whose‬‭only‬ ‭justification‬‭is‬‭a‬‭futile‬‭[sinnlos]‬‭reach‬‭for‬‭precision)‬‭may‬‭be‬‭very‬‭helpful‬ ‭‬ ‭Standardization‬‭of‬‭the‬‭basic‬‭syntax‬‭–‬‭claims‬‭usually‬‭include‬‭the‬‭following:‬ ‭○‬ ‭Preamble/Noun‬‭phrase:‬ ‭‬ ‭Recites‬‭class‬‭of‬‭the‬‭invention,‬‭and‬‭optionally‬‭its‬‭primary‬‭properties,‬ ‭purpose,‬‭or‬‭field:‬‭"An‬‭apparatus..."‬‭"A‬‭therapeutic‬‭method‬‭for‬‭treating‬ ‭cancer..."‬‭"A‬‭composition‬‭having‬‭an‬‭affinity‬‭for‬‭protein‬‭X...”.‬‭However,‬ ‭under‬‭the‬‭European‬‭Patent‬‭Convention,‬‭the‬‭preamble‬‭has‬‭a‬‭different‬ ‭meaning.‬ ‭○‬ ‭Transitional‬‭phrase:‬ ‭‬ ‭characterizes‬‭the‬‭elements‬‭that‬‭follow:‬‭"comprising”,‬‭"consisting‬‭of,"‬ ‭"consisting‬‭essentially‬‭of,"‬‭etc.‬ ‭○‬ ‭Set‬‭of‬‭"limitations"‬‭that‬‭together‬‭describe‬‭the‬‭invention:‬ ‭‬ ‭"an‬‭X,‬‭a‬‭Y,‬‭and‬‭a‬‭Z‬‭connected‬‭to‬‭the‬‭X‬‭and‬‭the‬‭Y.”‬ ‭○‬ ‭Optionally,‬‭a‬‭purpose‬‭clause:‬ ‭‬ ‭Further‬‭describes‬‭the‬‭overall‬‭operation‬‭of‬‭the‬‭invention,‬‭or‬‭the‬‭goal‬ ‭that‬‭the‬‭invention‬‭achieves‬ ‭Traditionally,‬‭two‬‭types‬‭of‬‭claiming‬‭system‬‭exist:‬ ‭1.‬ ‭Central‬‭Claiming‬‭System‬ ‭‬ ‭Claims‬‭identify‬‭the‬‭“centre“‬‭or‬‭“core”‬‭of‬‭the‬‭patented‬‭invention‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭exact‬‭scope‬‭of‬‭the‬‭protection‬‭depends‬‭on‬‭the‬‭actual‬‭nature‬‭of‬‭the‬ ‭inventor's‬‭contribution‬‭to‬‭the‬‭art‬‭in‬‭the‬‭concerned‬‭technology‬ ‭2.‬ ‭Peripheral‬‭claiming‬‭system‬ ‭‬ ‭Claims‬‭identify‬‭the‬‭exact‬‭periphery,‬‭or‬‭boundary,‬‭of‬‭the‬‭conferred‬‭protection‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭this‬‭system,‬‭the‬‭burden‬‭of‬‭drafting‬‭good‬‭claims‬‭is‬‭much‬‭higher‬‭on‬‭the‬ ‭patent‬‭applicant‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭applicant‬‭receives‬‭the‬‭protection‬‭he/she‬‭requested‬‭and‬‭almost‬‭nothing‬ ‭more‬ ‭‬ ‭Makes‬‭it‬‭easier‬‭for‬‭third‬‭parties‬‭to‬‭examine‬‭whether‬‭infringement‬‭may‬‭exist‬‭or‬ ‭not‬ ‭ omment:‬ C ‭No‬‭patent‬‭system‬‭today‬‭is‬‭a‬‭purely‬‭either‬‭central‬‭or‬‭peripheral,‬‭but‬‭the‬‭system‬‭used‬‭in‬ ‭Germany‬‭and‬‭most‬‭of‬‭the‬‭other‬‭countries‬‭of‬‭continental‬‭Europe‬‭is‬‭considered‬‭more‬‭central‬ ‭than‬‭the‬‭system‬‭currently‬‭used‬‭in‬‭the‬‭United‬‭Kingdom,‬‭the‬‭United‬‭States,‬‭and‬‭especially‬ ‭Japan,‬‭which‬‭are‬‭more‬‭peripheral.‬ ‭International‬‭patenting‬‭alternatives‬ ‭National‬‭patent‬‭offices‬‭(“direct‬‭filing”)‬ ‭‬ ‭National‬‭patent‬‭valid‬‭only‬‭in‬‭the‬‭country‬‭where‬‭it‬‭is‬‭granted‬ ‭‬ ‭Non-residents‬‭can‬‭also‬‭apply‬‭for‬‭a‬‭patent‬ ‭‬ ‭One‬‭year‬‭of‬‭"priority"‬‭for‬‭subsequent‬‭applications‬ ‭European‬‭Patent‬‭Office‬ ‭‬ ‭Just‬‭one‬‭application‬‭for‬‭up‬‭to‬‭45‬‭countries‬‭(39‬‭member‬‭states‬‭+‬‭1‬‭extension‬‭state‬‭+‬‭5‬ ‭validation‬‭states,‬‭as‬‭of‬‭October‬‭2024)‬ ‭‬ ‭An‬‭European‬‭patent‬‭is‬‭equivalent‬‭to‬‭national‬‭patents‬‭in‬‭the‬‭countries‬‭where‬‭it‬‭is‬ ‭granted‬‭(the‬‭applicant‬‭chooses‬‭the‬‭countries)‬ ‭Via‬‭the‬‭Patent‬‭Cooperation‬‭Treaty‬ ‭‬ ‭Just‬‭one‬‭application‬‭for‬‭up‬‭to‬‭153‬‭countries‬ ‭‬ ‭After‬‭the‬‭initial‬‭application‬‭phase,‬‭the‬‭international‬‭application‬‭leads‬‭to‬‭multiple‬ ‭national‬‭patent‬‭examination‬‭procedures‬ ‭‬ ‭Decisions‬‭with‬‭cost‬‭implications‬‭can‬‭be‬‭delayed‬‭until‬‭30-31‬‭months‬‭(depending‬‭on‬ ‭country)‬‭after‬‭filing‬‭(e.g.‬‭choice‬‭of‬‭countries‬‭to‬‭file‬‭in)‬ ‭There‬‭is‬‭no‬‭such‬‭thing‬‭as‬‭an‬‭international‬‭patent!‬ ‭Geographical‬‭Filing‬‭Hierarchy‬ ‭Priority‬‭Right‬‭–‬‭Definition‬‭and‬‭Time‬‭Limits‬ ‭ ational‬‭patent‬‭applications‬‭–‬‭Direct‬‭filing‬‭through‬‭the‬‭Paris‬‭Convention‬ N ‭Overview‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭applicant‬‭files‬‭a‬‭single‬‭application‬‭in‬‭the‬‭patent‬‭office‬‭of‬‭each‬‭country‬‭of‬‭interest,‬ ‭claiming‬‭priority‬‭back‬‭to‬‭the‬‭priority‬‭date‬ ‭Advantages‬ ‭‬ ‭Costs‬‭can‬‭be‬‭deferred‬‭for‬‭up‬‭to‬‭one‬‭year‬ ‭‬ ‭Faster‬‭allowance‬‭versus‬‭PCT‬‭filing,‬‭can‬‭be‬‭important‬‭for‬‭technologies‬‭with‬‭a‬‭short‬ ‭shelf‬‭life‬‭that‬‭need‬‭patent‬‭protection‬‭quickly‬ ‭Disadvantages‬ ‭‬ ‭Can‬‭be‬‭expensive‬‭if‬‭there‬‭are‬‭multiple‬‭countries‬‭where‬‭patent‬‭protection‬‭is‬‭sought‬ ‭(filing‬‭fees,‬‭translation‬‭fees,‬‭foreign‬‭associate‬‭fees,‬‭etc.‬‭for‬‭each‬‭country)‬ ‭‬ ‭Separate‬‭prosecutions‬‭in‬‭each‬‭foreign‬‭patent‬‭office‬ ‭Break-even‬‭point‬‭of‬‭direct‬‭filing‬‭in‬‭each‬‭country‬‭vs.‬‭PCT:‬‭three‬‭to‬‭four‬‭countries‬ ‭Process‬‭and‬‭costs‬‭of‬‭a‬‭national‬‭patent‬‭application‬‭in‬‭Germany‬ ‭ otal:‬‭EUR‬‭1.700‬‭-‬‭EUR‬‭5.100‬ T ‭(depending‬‭on‬‭complexity‬‭of‬ ‭patent‬‭and‬‭extent‬‭of‬‭applicant's‬ ‭preparation)‬ ‭ uropean‬‭patent‬‭applications‬ E ‭Overview‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭applicant‬‭files‬‭a‬‭single‬‭application‬‭at‬‭the‬‭EPO‬‭(can‬‭also‬‭be‬‭filed‬‭off‬‭of‬‭a‬‭PCT,‬‭the‬ ‭so‬‭called‬‭“Euro-PCT‬‭route”)‬ ‭Advantages‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭EPO‬‭not‬‭only‬‭searches‬‭the‬‭application‬‭but‬‭also‬‭conducts‬‭a‬‭single,‬‭binding‬ ‭prosecution‬‭of‬‭the‬‭application‬‭and‬‭either‬‭allows‬‭(grants)‬‭or‬‭rejects‬‭the‬‭application,‬‭i.e.‬ ‭no‬‭need‬‭for‬‭separate‬‭prosecutions‬‭in‬‭each‬‭country‬‭of‬‭interest‬ ‭Disadvantages‬ ‭‬ ‭Relatively‬‭high‬‭filing‬‭and‬‭examination‬‭fees‬ ‭‬ ‭Necessary‬‭for‬‭EPO‬‭application‬‭to‬‭be‬‭ratified‬‭in‬‭each‬‭country‬‭of‬‭interest,‬‭which‬ ‭involves‬‭additional‬‭fees‬‭and‬‭translation‬ ‭ reak-even‬‭point‬‭of‬‭EPO‬‭application‬‭vs.‬‭direct‬‭filing‬‭in‬‭each‬‭European‬‭country:‬‭three‬‭to‬‭four‬ B ‭countries‬ ‭The‬‭patent‬‭procedure‬‭at‬‭the‬‭EPO‬ ‭The‬‭European‬‭Patent‬‭with‬‭Unitary‬‭Effect‬ ‭ he‬‭“World-Wide‬‭Patent”‬‭–‬‭Patent‬‭Cooperation‬‭Treaty‬ T ‭Overview‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭Patent‬‭Cooperation‬‭Treaty‬‭(PCT)‬‭is‬‭an‬‭international‬‭patent‬‭law‬‭treaty,‬‭concluded‬ ‭in‬‭1970‬ ‭‬ ‭It‬‭provides‬‭a‬‭unified‬‭procedure‬‭for‬‭filing‬‭patent‬‭applications‬‭to‬‭protect‬‭inventions‬‭in‬ ‭each‬‭of‬‭its‬‭Contracting‬‭States‬ ‭Advantages‬ ‭‬ ‭More‬‭than‬‭153‬‭designations‬‭possible‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭case‬‭of‬‭huge‬‭patent‬‭families:‬‭advantage‬‭of‬‭saving‬‭interests‬ ‭‬ ‭Foreign‬‭filing‬‭costs‬‭can‬‭be‬‭deferred‬‭up‬‭to‬‭30/31‬‭months‬‭after‬‭the‬‭priority‬‭date‬ ‭‬ ‭30/31-month‬‭filing‬‭deadline‬‭allows‬‭the‬‭invention‬‭to‬‭be‬‭refined‬‭and‬‭its‬‭market‬ ‭acceptance‬‭researched‬ ‭‬ ‭A‬‭search‬‭report‬‭/‬‭non-binding‬‭opinion‬‭is‬‭issued;‬‭if‬‭an‬‭invention‬‭is‬‭clearly‬‭not‬ ‭patentable‬‭the‬‭applicant‬‭can‬‭abandon‬‭the‬‭application‬‭without‬‭paying‬‭for‬‭the‬‭foreign‬ ‭filings‬‭(as‬‭would‬‭be‬‭the‬‭case‬‭for‬‭direct‬‭filings)‬ ‭Disadvantages‬ ‭‬ ‭Process‬‭does‬‭not‬‭provide‬‭a‬‭patent,‬‭but‬‭only‬‭an‬‭option‬‭on‬‭a‬‭patent‬ ‭‬ ‭Strategic‬‭use‬‭of‬‭the‬‭process‬‭depends‬‭on‬‭the‬‭share‬‭of‬‭cases‬‭being‬‭transferred‬‭into‬ ‭national‬‭/‬‭regional‬‭phase‬ ‭‬ ‭High‬‭initial‬‭filing‬‭fee‬‭(~$3000)‬‭plus‬‭filing‬‭fees‬‭for‬‭each‬‭country‬ ‭‬ ‭Delay‬‭of‬‭the‬‭grant‬‭of‬‭national‬‭or‬‭EP‬‭patents‬ ‭‬ ‭May‬‭cause‬‭high‬‭costs,‬‭in‬‭case‬‭transfer‬‭into‬‭the‬‭national‬‭phase‬‭does‬‭not‬‭follow‬‭market‬ ‭attractiveness‬ ‭IPM6:‬‭Brand‬‭Management‬ ‭National‬‭versus‬‭International‬‭Protection‬‭of‬‭Trademarks‬ ‭1.‬‭National‬‭Filing‬ ‭2.‬‭Filing‬‭under‬‭the‬‭Madrid‬‭System‬‭for‬‭the‬‭International‬‭Registration‬‭of‬‭Marks‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭Madrid‬‭System‬‭comprises‬‭two‬‭treaties:‬‭Madrid‬‭Agreement‬‭(1891)‬‭and‬‭Madrid‬ ‭Protocol‬‭(1989)‬‭and‬‭is‬‭administered‬‭by‬‭WIPO‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭Madrid‬‭System‬‭offers‬‭a‬‭trademark‬‭owner‬‭the‬‭possibility‬‭to‬‭have‬‭his‬‭trademark‬ ‭protected‬‭in‬‭several‬‭countries‬‭by‬‭simply‬‭filing‬‭one‬‭application‬‭directly‬‭with‬‭his‬‭own‬ ‭national‬‭or‬‭regional‬‭trademark‬‭office‬‭(members‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Madrid‬‭Union)‬ ‭‬ ‭An‬‭international‬‭mark,‬‭if‬‭registered,‬‭is‬‭equivalent‬‭to‬‭an‬‭application‬‭or‬‭a‬‭registration‬‭of‬ ‭the‬‭same‬‭mark‬‭effected‬‭directly‬‭in‬‭each‬‭of‬‭the‬‭countries‬‭designated‬‭by‬‭the‬‭applicant‬ ‭3.‬‭European‬‭Union‬‭Trade‬‭Mark‬‭(EUTM)‬ ‭‬ ‭EU‬‭trade‬‭mark‬‭creates‬‭a‬‭unified‬‭trade‬‭mark‬‭registration‬‭system‬‭in‬‭Europe,‬‭whereby‬ ‭one‬‭registration‬‭provides‬‭protection‬‭in‬‭all‬‭member‬‭states‬‭of‬‭the‬‭EU‬ ‭‬ ‭EU‬‭trade‬‭mark‬‭system‬‭is‬‭administered‬‭by‬‭the‬‭European‬‭Union‬‭Intellectual‬‭Property‬ ‭Office‬‭(EUIPO),‬‭which‬‭is‬‭located‬‭in‬‭Alicante,‬‭Spain‬ ‭‬ ‭When‬‭registered,‬‭transferred‬‭or‬‭allowed‬‭to‬‭lapse‬‭[erlöschen],‬‭the‬‭effect‬‭of‬‭such‬‭action‬ ‭is‬‭EU-wide‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭EU‬‭Trade‬‭Mark‬‭is‬‭valid‬‭for‬‭a‬‭period‬‭of‬‭10‬‭years‬‭and‬‭may‬‭be‬‭renewed‬‭indefinitely‬ ‭‬ ‭Rules‬‭of‬‭law‬‭applicable‬‭to‬‭it‬‭are‬‭similar‬‭to‬‭those‬‭applied‬‭to‬‭national‬‭trade‬‭marks‬ ‭→‬‭Firms‬‭will‬‭therefore‬‭find‬‭themselves‬‭in‬‭a‬‭familiar‬‭environment,‬‭just‬‭on‬‭a‬‭larger‬ ‭scale‬ ‭‬ ‭EUTM‬‭is‬‭an‬‭alternative‬‭/‬‭complementary‬‭to‬‭national‬‭filings‬‭and‬‭the‬‭Madrid‬‭System‬ ‭‬ ‭Advantages‬ ‭○‬ ‭One‬‭filing‬‭process‬‭for‬‭the‬‭European‬‭Union‬ ‭○‬ ‭Lower‬‭costs‬‭/‬‭fees‬‭:‬‭Initial‬‭cost‬‭of‬‭filing‬‭an‬‭EUTM‬‭is‬‭much‬‭less‬‭than‬‭filing‬ ‭separate‬‭national‬‭applications‬‭in‬‭all‬‭EU‬‭member‬‭states‬‭(the‬‭economic‬ ‭advantage‬‭of‬‭using‬‭the‬‭EUTM‬‭system‬‭is‬‭given‬‭when‬‭a‬‭trade‬‭mark‬‭owner‬ ‭seeks‬‭registration‬‭in‬‭more‬‭than‬‭four‬‭member‬‭states)‬ ‭○‬ ‭Option‬‭of‬‭claiming‬‭the‬‭seniority‬‭of‬‭national‬‭trade‬‭marks‬ ‭○‬ ‭Similar‬‭legal‬‭preconditions‬‭as‬‭in‬‭national‬‭legal‬‭filing‬‭processes‬ ‭○‬ ‭Right‬‭of‬‭priority‬ ‭‬ ‭Disadvantages‬ ‭○‬ ‭Confusion‬‭about‬‭the‬‭dual‬‭filing‬‭systems‬‭in‬‭Europe‬‭(National‬‭versus‬‭EUTM‬ ‭filing)‬ ‭○‬ ‭Higher‬‭costs?‬‭If‬‭the‬‭EUTM-application‬‭is‬‭rejected‬‭on‬‭grounds‬‭which‬‭do‬‭not‬ ‭apply‬‭in‬‭all‬‭EU‬‭states‬‭(e.g.‬‭following‬‭opposition‬‭based‬‭on‬‭earlier‬‭conflicting‬ ‭national‬‭rights),‬‭then‬‭the‬‭cost‬‭for‬‭the‬‭filing‬‭cannot‬‭be‬‭recovered‬‭→‬‭the‬ ‭applicant‬‭must‬‭undergo‬‭national‬‭filing‬‭procedures‬‭with‬‭additional‬‭repayments‬ ‭in‬‭each‬‭country‬ ‭Corporate‬‭Brand‬‭(Portfolio)‬‭Strategies,‬‭Six‬‭Brand‬‭Architectures‬ ‭Basic‬‭Terms‬‭in‬‭Brand‬‭Portfolio‬‭Management‬ ‭‬ ‭Brand‬‭strategies‬‭determine‬‭the‬‭link‬‭between‬‭the‬‭brand‬‭and‬‭the‬‭firm’s‬‭products‬‭and‬ ‭services‬ ‭‬ ‭Most‬‭large‬‭firms‬‭with‬‭a‬‭multitude‬‭of‬‭products‬‭and‬‭services‬‭in‬‭their‬‭portfolio‬‭will‬‭own‬ ‭and‬‭market‬‭more‬‭than‬‭one‬‭brand‬ ‭→‬‭they‬‭have‬‭a‬‭trademark‬‭/‬‭brand‬‭portfolio‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭a‬‭brand‬‭portfolio‬‭brands‬‭will‬‭differ‬‭from‬‭each‬‭other‬‭because...‬ ‭○‬ ‭of‬‭different‬‭costumer‬‭needs/wishes‬ ‭○‬ ‭of‬‭different‬‭price/quality‬‭perceptions‬‭of‬‭customers‬ ‭○‬ ‭of‬‭competition‬‭within‬‭the‬‭target‬‭markets‬‭of‬‭the‬‭individual‬‭brands‬ ‭‬ ‭Brand‬‭(portfolio)‬‭strategies‬‭create‬‭coherence‬‭and‬‭structure‬‭in‬‭the‬‭portfolio‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭brand‬‭portfolio‬‭architecture‬‭refers‬‭to‬‭the‬‭generic‬‭structure‬‭of‬‭the‬‭portfolio‬ ‭Three‬‭main‬‭/‬‭classic‬‭brand‬‭portfolio‬‭strategies‬ ‭1.‬ ‭Umbrella‬‭Branding‬‭=‬‭Corporate‬‭Brand‬‭Strategy‬‭=‬‭Branded‬‭House‬‭=‬‭Mono-brand‬ ‭Portfolio‬ ‭‬ ‭One‬‭name‬‭and‬‭visual‬‭identity,‬‭usually‬‭with‬‭corporate‬‭brand‬‭names‬‭(e.g.‬ ‭Apple)‬ ‭2.‬ ‭Family‬‭Brand‬‭Strategy‬‭=‬‭House‬‭of‬‭Brand‬‭Families‬ ‭‬ ‭Coexistences‬‭of‬‭two‬‭or‬‭more‬‭brand‬‭families‬‭in‬‭which‬‭there‬‭is‬‭a‬‭great‬‭degree‬ ‭of‬‭coherence‬‭between‬‭the‬‭individual‬‭brands‬‭(e.g.‬‭Beiersdorf‬‭Nivea,‬‭Tesa‬‭etc.)‬ ‭3.‬ ‭Product‬‭Brand‬‭Strategy‬‭=‬‭House‬‭of‬‭Brand‬ ‭‬ ‭brands‬‭are‬‭created‬‭for‬‭different‬‭products‬‭with‬‭their‬‭own‬‭identity‬‭with‬‭or‬‭without‬ ‭disclosure‬‭of‬‭parent‬‭firm’s‬‭identity‬ ‭...and‬‭mixtures‬‭thereof...‬ ‭4.‬ ‭Hybrid‬‭or‬‭Mixed‬‭Brand‬‭Strategies‬ ‭‬ ‭including‬‭endorsed‬‭branding,‬‭sub-branding‬‭strategies‬ ‭Six‬‭Generic‬‭Brand‬‭Architectures‬ ‭.‬‭True‬‭Product‬‭Brands‬‭/‬‭House‬‭of‬‭Brands‬ 1 ‭One‬‭product,‬‭one‬‭brand‬‭and‬‭one‬‭promise‬‭(Examples:‬‭house‬‭of‬‭brands‬‭of‬‭P&G,‬‭Nestlé,‬ ‭LVMH‬‭etc.).‬‭Individual‬‭brands‬‭are‬‭created‬‭for‬‭different‬‭products‬‭or‬‭markets.‬‭Each‬‭brand‬‭has‬ ‭its‬‭individual‬‭positioning.‬‭Often‬‭the‬‭corporate‬‭identity‬‭is‬‭completely‬‭hidden.‬‭Some‬‭firms‬‭may‬ ‭disclose‬‭their‬‭parent‬‭company’s‬‭identity‬‭on‬‭their‬‭packs‬‭(e.g.‬‭address‬‭or‬‭small‬‭logo).‬‭Firms‬ ‭have‬‭a‬‭brand‬‭portfolio‬‭that‬‭corresponds‬‭to‬‭their‬‭product‬‭portfolio.‬ ‭.‬‭Maker’s‬‭Mark‬ 2 ‭Co-branding‬‭with‬‭the‬‭corporate‬‭and‬‭individual‬‭product‬‭brand‬‭(e.g.‬‭Vorwerk‬‭Thermomix‬‭/‬ ‭Kobold).‬‭Co-branding‬‭with‬‭the‬‭corporate‬‭brand‬‭is‬‭visible,‬‭but‬‭rather‬‭discreet,‬‭the‬‭product‬ ‭brand‬‭takes‬‭precedence.‬‭The‬‭corporate‬‭logo‬‭often‬‭remains‬‭a‬‭mystery‬‭in‬‭the‬‭eyes‬‭of‬‭the‬ ‭customers,‬‭if‬‭noticed‬‭at‬‭all,‬‭and‬‭nothing‬‭is‬‭done‬‭to‬‭explain‬‭the‬‭corp.‬‭brand.‬‭Function‬‭of‬‭this‬ ‭makers‬‭seal:‬‭recognition‬‭sign‬‭to‬‭identify‬‭the‬‭industrial‬‭group‬‭that‬‭made‬‭it.‬‭Of‬‭course‬ ‭co-branding‬‭is‬‭also‬‭feasible‬‭with‬‭a‬‭product‬‭family‬‭brand‬‭(Examples:‬‭Ferrero‬‭Kinder‬‭/‬‭Nutella)‬ ‭.‬‭True‬‭Umbrella‬‭Brand‬ 3 ‭This‬‭strategy‬‭involves‬‭just‬‭a‬‭single‬‭brand‬‭level‬‭–‬‭a‬‭well-known,‬‭overarching‬‭master‬‭brand‬‭is‬ ‭used‬‭to‬‭support‬‭two‬‭or‬‭more‬‭products‬‭in‬‭the‬‭portfolio.‬‭Umbrella‬‭branding‬‭was‬‭traditionally‬ ‭used‬‭in‬‭the‬‭B2B-sector‬‭(e.g.‬‭Bosch,‬‭Siemens).‬‭The‬‭innovation‬‭and‬‭quality‬‭reputation‬‭of‬‭the‬ ‭corporate‬‭brand‬‭is‬‭used‬‭to‬‭leverage‬‭the‬‭products.‬‭The‬‭individual‬‭products‬‭are‬‭without‬‭a‬ ‭specific‬‭sub-brand‬‭(but‬‭with‬‭a‬‭model‬‭designator,‬‭e.g.‬‭Bosch‬‭GSR205‬‭Professional‬ ‭Akkubohrschrauber).‬‭Disadvantage:‬‭the‬‭brand‬‭lacks‬‭in‬‭emotional‬‭content‬‭and‬‭is‬‭not‬‭a‬‭source‬ ‭of‬‭inspiration‬‭or‬‭affective‬‭spirit.‬ ‭.‬‭Endorsing‬‭Brand‬‭Strategy‬ 4 ‭The‬‭endorsing‬‭[unterstützend]‬‭master‬‭brand‬‭acts‬‭as‬‭a‬‭guarantee‬‭concerning‬‭innovation‬‭or‬ ‭quality.‬‭This‬‭strategy‬‭usually‬‭brings‬‭sentences,‬‭such‬‭as‬‭“brought‬‭to‬‭you‬‭by...”,“by‬‭the‬‭makers‬ ‭of....”‬‭or‬‭are‬‭marketed‬‭as‬‭“Brand‬‭X‬‭by‬‭(parent‬‭brand)”.‬‭Using‬‭a‬‭brand‬‭for‬‭endorsement‬‭does‬ ‭not‬‭expose‬‭firms‬‭to‬‭reputation‬‭risk‬‭and‬‭provides‬‭a‬‭greater‬‭variety‬‭of‬‭positioning‬‭the‬‭individual‬ ‭brands‬‭(e.g.:‬‭3M).‬ ‭.‬‭Master‬‭Brand‬‭Strategy‬ 5 ‭The‬‭master‬‭brand‬‭strategy‬‭is‬‭closely‬‭linked‬‭to‬‭the‬‭umbrella‬‭strategy‬‭(sometimes‬‭it‬‭is‬‭also‬ ‭referred‬‭to‬‭as‬‭aligning‬‭umbrella‬‭brand‬‭strategy)‬‭,‬‭however‬‭the‬‭degree‬‭of‬‭coherence‬‭between‬ ‭the‬‭master‬‭branded‬‭products‬‭is‬‭bigger.‬‭The‬‭master‬‭brand‬‭is‬‭used‬‭to‬‭leverage‬‭a‬‭variety‬‭of‬ ‭products‬‭within‬‭the‬‭same‬‭market‬‭/‬‭market‬‭segment‬‭(e.g.‬‭Sony‬‭in‬‭consumer‬‭electronics,‬‭IBM‬ ‭in‬‭computers).‬‭The‬‭master‬‭brand‬‭can‬‭be‬‭either‬‭a‬‭corporate‬‭brand‬‭or‬‭a‬‭product‬‭family‬‭brand‬ ‭(e.g.‬‭Nivea‬‭/‬‭Beiersdorf).‬‭The‬‭masterbrand‬‭enfolds‬‭not‬‭just‬‭a‬‭name,‬‭but‬‭a‬‭frame‬‭of‬‭reference‬ ‭with‬‭common‬‭values.‬ ‭.‬‭Source‬‭or‬‭Sub-Branding‬‭Strategy‬ 6 ‭This‬‭strategy‬‭features‬‭a‬‭two-tier‬‭brand‬‭structure/a‬‭dual-branding‬‭approach,‬‭that‬‭allows‬‭a‬ ‭deeper‬‭and‬‭more‬‭differentiated‬‭message.‬‭It‬‭happens‬‭when‬‭a‬‭firm‬‭pairs‬‭a‬‭corporate‬‭or‬‭range‬ ‭brand‬‭(parent‬‭brand)‬‭with‬‭a‬‭product‬‭brand‬‭(sub-brand),‬‭in‬‭a‬‭combined‬‭relationship‬‭(e.g.‬ ‭L’Oreal).‬‭The‬‭source‬‭brand‬‭itself‬‭is‬‭comparable‬‭to‬‭the‬‭master‬‭brand,‬‭but‬‭the‬‭products‬‭in‬ ‭contrast‬‭have‬‭a‬‭specific‬‭product‬‭brand‬‭name‬‭incl.‬‭the‬‭source‬‭brand.‬‭In‬‭practice‬‭endorsing‬ ‭and‬‭source‬‭branding‬‭strategies‬‭are‬‭difficult‬‭to‬‭distinguish‬ ‭Global‬‭vs.‬‭Local‬‭Brand‬‭Strategies‬ ‭1.‬‭Local‬‭brands‬ ‭‬ ‭A‬‭country‬‭specific‬‭brand‬‭is‬‭brand‬‭that‬‭is‬‭sold‬‭in‬‭only‬‭one‬‭country‬ ‭‬ ‭Not‬‭all‬‭companies,‬‭however,‬‭believe‬‭in‬‭a‬‭global‬‭approach‬‭is‬‭the‬‭best‬ ‭‬ ‭Multinationals‬‭such‬‭as‬‭Nestlé,‬‭Procter‬‭&‬‭Gamble‬‭or‬‭Unilever‬‭have‬‭some‬‭brands‬‭that‬ ‭are‬‭promoted‬‭world-wide‬‭and‬‭others‬‭that‬‭are‬‭country‬‭specific‬ ‭‬ ‭Companies‬‭that‬‭already‬‭have‬‭country-specific‬‭brands‬‭must‬‭balance‬‭the‬‭benefits‬‭of‬‭a‬ ‭global‬‭brand‬‭against‬‭the‬‭risk‬‭of‬‭losing‬‭the‬‭benefits‬‭of‬‭an‬‭established‬‭brand‬ ‭2.‬‭Global‬‭brands‬ ‭‬ ‭Using‬‭the‬‭same‬‭brand‬‭world-wide‬ ‭‬ ‭A‬‭global‬‭brand‬‭generally‬‭means‬‭substantial‬‭cost‬‭savings‬‭and‬‭gives‬‭a‬‭company‬‭a‬ ‭uniform‬‭worldwide‬‭image‬‭that‬‭enhances‬‭efficiency‬‭and‬‭cost‬‭savings‬‭when‬‭introducing‬ ‭other‬‭products‬‭associated‬‭with‬‭the‬‭brand‬‭name‬ ‭‬ ‭Examples:‬‭Philips,‬‭Kodak,‬‭Coca-Cola,‬‭Sony,‬‭Levi’s,‬‭Caterpillar‬ ‭‬ ‭Among‬‭companies‬‭that‬‭have‬‭faced‬‭the‬‭question‬‭of‬‭whether‬‭or‬‭not‬‭to‬‭make‬‭all‬‭their‬ ‭brands‬‭global,‬‭not‬‭all‬‭have‬‭followed‬‭the‬‭same‬‭path‬ ‭IPM7:‬‭IP‬‭Protection‬‭in‬‭Software‬‭incl.‬‭AI‬ ‭ roblems‬‭of‬‭Formal‬‭Protection‬‭of‬‭Software‬‭–‬‭Limits‬‭of‬‭Copyrights‬‭and‬ P ‭Trademarks‬‭(in‬‭Europe),‬‭Excursus:‬‭Copyright‬‭protection‬‭for‬‭AI‬‭generated‬ ‭content?‬ ‭3‬‭main‬‭formal‬‭legally‬‭established‬‭ways‬‭to‬‭protect‬‭software:‬ ‭‬ ‭These‬‭are,‬‭in‬‭increasing‬‭order‬‭of‬‭legal‬‭strength‬‭but‬‭also‬‭in‬‭terms‬‭of‬‭cost‬‭and‬ ‭complication:‬ ‭○‬ ‭copyrights‬ ‭○‬ ‭trade‬‭marks‬ ‭○‬ ‭patents‬ ‭‬ ‭Each‬‭of‬‭these‬‭forms‬‭of‬‭legal‬‭protection‬‭differs‬‭with‬‭regard‬‭to‬‭the‬‭type‬‭and‬‭strength‬‭of‬ ‭the‬‭protection‬‭it‬‭provides‬‭and‬‭also‬‭with‬‭regard‬‭to‬‭costs‬‭and‬‭any‬‭weaknesses‬ ‭‬ ‭Copyright‬‭is‬‭automatic,‬‭so‬‭it‬‭can‬‭easily‬‭be‬‭used‬ ‭‬ ‭Trademarks‬‭are‬‭relatively‬‭inexpensive‬‭and‬‭are‬‭widely‬‭seen‬‭as‬‭a‬‭highly‬‭effective‬‭form‬ ‭of‬‭software‬‭protection.‬‭They‬‭build‬‭on‬‭and‬‭complement‬‭copyright‬ ‭‬ ‭Patents‬‭can‬‭be‬‭expensive‬‭and‬‭complicated,‬‭but‬‭they‬‭similarly‬‭can‬‭work‬‭side‬‭by‬‭side‬ ‭with‬‭copyright‬‭and‬‭trade‬‭marks‬ ‭ ote:‬‭also‬‭trade‬‭secrets‬‭can‬‭be‬‭used‬‭as‬‭informal‬‭protection‬‭mechanism‬‭for‬‭software‬‭/‬‭the‬ N ‭underlying‬‭algorithm‬‭(think‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Google‘s‬‭secret‬‭search‬‭algorithm)‬ ‭Copyright‬‭is‬‭the‬‭legal‬‭protection‬‭automatically‬‭given‬‭to‬‭original...‬ ‭‬ ‭...literary,‬‭dramatic,‬‭musical‬‭or‬‭artistic‬‭works;‬‭sound‬‭recordings,‬‭films,‬‭and‬ ‭broadcasts;‬‭databases‬‭and‬‭computer‬‭programs‬ ‭‬ ‭Almost‬‭everywhere‬‭in‬‭the‬‭world,‬‭the‬‭act‬‭of‬‭recording‬‭a‬‭piece‬‭of‬‭software‬ ‭automatically‬‭gives‬‭you‬‭copyright‬‭as‬‭the‬‭writer‬‭of‬‭it‬ ‭‬ ‭Recording‬‭may‬‭take‬‭any‬‭form‬‭be‬‭it‬‭in‬‭writing‬‭or‬‭simply‬‭storing‬‭it‬‭electronically‬‭either‬ ‭on‬‭disk‬‭or‬‭incorporated‬‭into‬‭hardware‬ ‭‬ ‭This‬‭right‬‭applies‬‭to‬‭citizens‬‭of‬‭all‬‭of‬‭the‬‭nations‬‭that‬‭are‬‭members‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Berne‬ ‭Copyright‬‭Union‬‭(including‬‭the‬‭EU,‬‭the‬‭U.S.‬‭and‬‭Japan)‬ ‭‬ ‭It‬‭is‬‭advisable‬‭to‬‭include‬‭prominent‬‭copyright‬‭notices‬‭on‬‭the‬‭versions‬‭of‬‭the‬‭software‬ ‭that‬‭is‬‭sold‬‭to‬‭end‬‭users.‬‭It‬‭should‬‭say‬‭‘©‬‭[name]‬‭[year]‬‭all‬‭rights‬‭reserved’.‬‭[Not‬ ‭putting‬‭©‬‭[name]‬‭[year]‬‭will‬‭not‬‭diminish‬‭legal‬‭protection,‬‭but‬‭it‬‭is‬‭helpful‬‭to‬‭display‬‭the‬ ‭claim].‬ ‭‬ ‭Copyright‬‭protection‬‭is‬‭free,‬‭but....‬ ‭Weaknesses‬‭of‬‭Copyrights‬ ‭‬ ‭Copyright‬‭is‬‭free,‬‭but‬‭its‬‭weakness‬‭is‬‭that‬‭it‬‭only‬‭protects‬‭against‬‭having‬‭your‬ ‭software‬‭copied,‬‭translated,‬‭rearranged‬‭or‬‭otherwise‬‭altered‬‭and‬‭distributed‬ ‭‬ ‭You‬‭cannot‬‭sue‬‭for‬‭copyright‬‭infringement‬‭if‬‭another‬‭developer‬‭comes‬‭up‬‭with‬‭the‬ ‭same‬‭solution‬‭independently‬ ‭‬ ‭Copyright‬‭also‬‭does‬‭not‬‭prevent‬‭someone‬‭else‬‭developing‬‭and‬‭marketing‬‭a‬ ‭competing‬‭package‬‭by‬‭using‬‭your‬‭novel‬‭idea,‬‭as‬‭long‬‭as‬‭they‬‭do‬‭not‬‭directly‬‭copy‬‭(or‬ ‭do‬‭any‬‭of‬‭the‬‭other‬‭acts‬‭listed‬‭above)‬‭any‬‭aspects‬‭of‬‭your‬‭software‬  ‭‬ T ‭ hey‬‭can‬‭do‬‭this‬‭so‬‭long‬‭as‬‭their‬‭product‬‭does‬‭the‬‭same‬‭job‬‭as‬‭yours‬‭without‬‭copying‬ ‭the‬‭source‬‭codes‬‭or‬‭object‬‭codes‬‭of‬‭your‬‭software‬ ‭‬ ‭If‬‭you‬‭have‬‭spent‬‭a‬‭large‬‭amount‬‭of‬‭money‬‭developing‬‭a‬‭package,‬‭and‬‭there‬‭is‬‭a‬ ‭danger‬‭of‬‭this‬‭happening,‬‭you‬‭need‬‭to‬‭look‬‭at‬‭patent‬‭protection‬ ‭→‬‭Basic‬‭algorithms‬‭that‬‭underlie‬‭the‬‭software‬‭are‬‭not‬‭copyright‬‭protected!‬ ‭Generative‬‭AI‬‭makes‬‭creations‬‭as‬‭the‬‭human‬‭mind‬‭does...‬ ‭‬ ‭Generative‬‭AI‬‭can‬‭paint‬‭pictures,‬‭compose‬‭music,‬‭make‬‭videos,‬‭write‬‭texts‬‭etc.‬ ‭‬ ‭AI‬‭can‬‭write‬‭computer‬‭programs‬‭and‬‭create‬‭designs‬ ‭Are‬‭AI-generated‬‭creations‬‭copyright‬‭protected?‬ ‭‬ ‭No,‬‭copyright‬‭only‬‭protects‬‭creations‬‭of‬‭the‬‭human‬‭mind‬‭–‬‭It‘s‬‭a‬‭personality‬‭right‬‭!‬ ‭○‬ ‭Copyrighted‬‭works‬‭must‬‭be‬‭created‬‭by‬‭humans‬‭or‬‭with‬‭their‬‭substantial‬ ‭involvement‬ ‭○‬ ‭If‬‭only‬‭artificial‬‭intelligence‬‭was‬‭at‬‭work,‬‭there‬‭is‬‭no‬‭copyright‬‭protection‬ ‭(neither‬‭in‬‭the‬‭USA‬‭nor‬‭in‬‭Europe)‬ ‭Trade‬‭marks‬‭normally‬‭consist‬‭of‬‭a‬‭...‬ ‭‬ ‭distinctive‬‭name‬‭or‬‭a‬‭logo‬‭under‬‭which‬‭software‬‭programs‬‭are‬‭sold‬ ‭‬ ‭Similar‬‭to‬‭copyright,‬‭trade‬‭marks‬‭are‬‭both‬‭relatively‬‭cheap‬‭&‬‭widely‬‭recognized‬ ‭‬ ‭A‬‭good‬‭software‬‭program‬‭gets‬‭known‬‭by‬‭its‬‭name‬‭–‬‭In‬‭most‬‭countries,‬‭you‬‭can‬ ‭simply‬‭declare‬‭that‬‭this‬‭name‬‭is‬‭your‬‭product’s‬‭trade‬‭mark‬ ‭‬ ‭Registering‬‭a‬‭trade‬‭mark‬‭is‬‭usually‬‭straightforward‬‭and‬‭inexpensive‬ ‭‬ ‭If‬‭the‬‭TM‬‭is‬‭not‬‭registered,‬‭pirates‬‭still‬‭can‬‭be‬‭pursued‬ ‭‬ ‭This‬‭process‬‭is,‬‭however,‬‭more‬‭complicated‬‭and‬‭expensive‬‭to‬‭enforce‬‭than‬‭that‬‭of‬‭a‬ ‭registered‬‭trademark‬ ‭‬ ‭Infringement‬‭of‬‭a‬‭TM‬‭is‬‭usually‬‭easier‬‭to‬‭detect‬‭than‬‭infringement‬‭of‬‭copyright,‬ ‭especially‬‭in‬‭the‬‭case‬‭of‬‭software‬ ‭‬ ‭TM‬‭infringement‬‭is‬‭immediately‬‭visible‬‭to‬‭the‬‭eye,‬‭whereas‬‭copyright‬‭infringement‬ ‭requires‬‭comparing‬‭each‬‭part‬‭of‬‭the‬‭software‬‭for‬‭unauthorised‬‭copying‬ ‭Software‬‭Patentability‬‭in‬‭Europe‬‭vs.‬‭US,‬‭especially‬‭the‬‭issue‬‭of‬‭technicality‬ ‭ hat‬‭is‬‭patentable?‬‭The‬‭current‬‭situation‬‭in‬‭Europe‬ W ‭Legal‬‭situation‬‭concerning‬‭the‬‭possibility‬‭of‬‭filing‬‭software‬‭patents‬‭in‬‭the‬‭EU‬‭is‬‭diffuse‬ ‭‬ ‭Although‬‭the‬‭national‬‭EU‬‭patent‬‭offices‬‭and‬‭EPO‬‭are‬‭subject‬‭to‬‭the‬‭identical‬‭/similar‬ ‭legal‬‭framework,‬‭national‬‭practices‬‭in‬‭interpreting‬‭software‬‭patent‬‭laws‬‭deviate‬ ‭considerably‬‭!‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭origin‬‭for‬‭the‬‭different‬‭interpretations‬‭are‬‭some‬‭key‬‭wordings‬‭and‬‭criteria‬‭that‬‭are‬ ‭used‬‭by‬‭patent‬‭offices‬‭which‬‭offer‬‭freedom‬‭when‬‭examining‬‭a‬‭filing‬‭for‬‭a‬‭software‬ ‭patent‬ ‭‬ ‭Basically,‬‭software‬‭is,‬‭according‬‭to‬‭article‬‭52‬‭(2)‬‭of‬‭the‬‭European‬‭Patent‬‭Convention,‬ ‭not‬‭an‬‭invention‬‭as‬‭such‬‭and‬‭is‬‭thus‬‭not‬‭patentable:‬  ‭Under‬‭Art.‬‭52(2)‬‭EPC‬‭the‬‭following‬‭are‬‭not‬‭regarded‬‭as‬‭inventions:‬ ‭a.‬ ‭discoveries,‬‭scientific‬‭theories‬‭and‬‭mathematical‬‭methods‬ ‭b.‬ ‭aesthetic‬‭creations‬ ‭c.‬ ‭schemes,‬‭rules‬‭and‬‭methods‬‭for‬‭performing‬‭mental‬‭acts,‬‭playing‬‭games‬‭or‬ ‭doing‬‭business,‬‭and‬‭programs‬‭for‬‭computers‬ ‭Though,‬‭there‬‭are‬‭exceptions‬‭from‬‭this‬‭general‬‭rule‬‭articulated‬‭in‬‭Art.‬‭52(2):‬ ‭‬ ‭As‬‭a‬‭basic‬‭criterion‬‭the‬‭invention‬‭must‬‭exhibit‬‭a‬‭so‬‭called‬‭“technical‬‭character”‬ ‭(“technicality”).....(this‬‭criterion‬‭must‬‭be‬‭fulfilled‬‭by‬‭all‬‭filings,‬‭by‬‭the‬‭way)‬ ‭‬ ‭With‬‭regard‬‭to‬‭software,‬‭“technicality”‬‭cannot‬‭be‬‭basically‬‭denied‬‭(in‬‭contrast‬‭to‬ ‭article‬‭52(2)‬‭EPC,‬‭which‬‭suggests‬‭a‬‭general‬‭opposition‬‭and‬‭prohibition)‬ ‭‬ ‭However,‬‭the‬‭test‬‭for‬‭“technicality”‬‭offers‬‭a‬‭broad‬‭room‬‭of‬‭interpretation‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭EPO‬‭board‬‭of‬‭appeals‬‭[Beschwerdekammer]‬‭and‬‭patent‬‭courts‬‭in‬‭the‬‭member‬ ‭countries‬‭consider‬‭software‬‭as‬‭patentable,‬‭when‬‭it‬‭offers‬‭a‬‭technical‬‭character,‬‭i.e.,‬‭if‬ ‭the‬‭software‬‭can‬‭be‬‭classified‬‭into‬‭one‬‭or‬‭more‬‭technological‬‭fields‬‭–‬‭in‬‭such‬‭a‬‭case‬ ‭paragraph‬‭52(2)‬‭EPC‬‭may‬‭not‬‭be‬‭applied‬ ‭But,‬‭what‬‭does‬‭“technicality”‬‭exactly‬‭mean?‬ ‭What‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭software‬‭exhibits‬‭a‬‭„technical‬‭character“?‬ ‭‬ ‭Firstly,‬‭all‬‭kinds‬‭of‬‭software‬‭programs‬‭that‬‭can‬‭be‬‭run‬‭on‬‭a‬‭computer‬‭are,‬‭by‬ ‭definition,‬‭„technical“‬‭in‬‭nature‬‭(since‬‭a‬‭computer‬‭is‬‭a‬‭machine)‬ ‭‬ ‭Moreover,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭important‬‭that‬‭the‬‭invention‬‭provides‬‭/‬‭performs‬‭a‬‭technical‬‭effect‬ ‭‬ ‭An‬‭isolated‬‭software‬‭program,‬‭stored‬‭on‬‭any‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭storage‬‭medium,‬‭should‬‭be‬ ‭patentable,‬‭if‬‭it‬‭produces‬‭a‬‭technical‬‭effect‬‭when‬‭operated‬‭and‬‭run‬‭on‬‭a‬‭computer‬ ‭‬ ‭In‬‭contrast,‬‭software‬‭patents‬‭on‬‭business‬‭methods,‬‭that‬‭do‬‭not‬‭deliver‬‭a‬‭contribution‬ ‭to‬‭the‬‭technical‬‭state‬‭of‬‭the‬‭art‬‭and‬‭do‬‭not‬‭perform‬‭a‬‭technical‬‭effect,‬‭are‬‭not‬ ‭patentable‬ ‭‬ ‭However,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭highly‬‭controversial,‬‭what‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭technical‬‭effect‬‭a‬‭software‬‭program‬ ‭must‬‭deliver:‬‭Is‬‭a‬‭virtual‬‭/‬‭digital‬‭effect‬‭sufficient‬‭or‬‭is‬‭a‬‭physical‬‭/‬‭mechanistic‬‭effect‬ ‭required?‬ ‭‬ ‭So‬‭far,‬‭software‬‭is‬‭only‬‭patentable‬‭if‬‭it‬‭also‬‭inhibits‬‭physical-technical‬‭features,‬‭i.e.,‬‭if‬ ‭it‬‭is‬‭coupled‬‭to‬‭some‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭hardware‬‭(beyond‬‭hardware‬‭in‬‭the‬‭sense‬‭of‬‭storage‬ ‭media)‬ ‭‬ ‭E.g.,‬‭controlling‬‭software‬‭for‬‭antilock‬‭brake‬‭systems‬‭(ABS)‬‭in‬‭combination‬‭with‬ ‭physical‬‭components‬‭like‬‭sensors‬‭and‬‭braking‬‭disks‬‭is‬‭patentable,‬‭since‬‭it‬‭performs‬‭a‬ ‭physical-mechanical‬‭effect‬ ‭‬ ‭Consequently,‬‭in‬‭all‬‭cases‬‭when‬‭a‬‭software‬‭causes‬‭a‬‭technical-mechanical‬‭effect‬ ‭beyond‬‭its‬‭interaction‬‭with‬‭a‬‭computer,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭basically‬‭patentable‬ ‭‬ ‭Such‬‭kind‬‭of‬‭software‬‭are‬‭called‬‭–‬‭in‬‭contrast‬‭to‬‭other‬‭kinds‬‭of‬‭software‬‭–‬ ‭“‬‭computer-implemented‬‭inventions‬‭”‬ ‭Diffuse‬‭Legal‬‭Situation‬‭in‬‭Europe‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭current‬‭construction‬‭[Auslegung]‬‭and‬‭application‬‭of‬‭European‬‭law‬‭on‬‭software‬ ‭patents‬‭differs‬‭considerably‬‭within‬‭the‬‭European‬‭Union‬‭and‬‭its‬‭national‬‭patent‬‭offices‬ ‭‬ ‭The‬‭key‬‭criterion‬‭concerning‬‭„technicality“‬‭is‬‭perceived‬‭and‬‭interpreted‬‭in‬‭various‬ ‭forms‬‭in‬‭individual‬‭member‬‭states:‬‭Consequently,‬‭in‬‭the‬‭course‬‭of‬‭a‬‭revocation‬ ‭proceeding‬‭[Patentnichtigkeitsverfahren]‬‭a‬‭patent‬‭office‬‭in‬‭country‬‭A‬‭may‬‭come‬‭to‬‭the‬ ‭conclusion‬‭to‬‭confirm‬‭the‬‭„technical‬‭character“‬‭of‬‭a‬‭software‬‭patent‬‭whereas‬‭in‬ ‭country‬‭B‬‭the‬‭same‬‭software‬‭may‬‭not‬‭considered‬‭to‬‭be‬‭patentable‬ ‭‬ ‭Especially‬‭for‬‭SMEs‬‭the‬‭confusing‬‭legal‬‭position‬‭in‬‭the‬‭EU‬‭leads‬‭to‬‭legal‬‭uncertainty‬ ‭‬ ‭SME‬‭usually‬‭do‬‭not‬‭have‬‭the‬‭legal‬‭know-how,‬‭resources‬‭and‬‭experiences,‬‭to‬‭protect‬ ‭their‬‭software‬‭products‬‭with‬‭patents‬‭and‬‭therefore‬‭tend‬‭to‬‭rely‬‭simply‬‭on‬‭copyrights‬ ‭‬ ‭Although‬‭the‬‭legal‬‭situation‬‭in‬‭Europe‬‭is‬‭highly‬‭unclear‬‭and‬‭obscure,‬‭the‬‭importance‬ ‭of‬‭software‬‭has‬‭been‬‭rising‬‭steadily‬‭in‬‭the‬‭EU‬ ‭‬ ‭EPO‬‭and‬‭national‬‭patent‬‭offices‬‭have‬‭granted‬‭several‬‭thousands‬‭of‬‭software‬‭patents‬ ‭over‬‭the‬‭last‬‭two‬‭decades‬ ‭‬ ‭Since‬?