Summary

This document discusses philosophical viewpoints on morality, focusing on the concept of supererogatory actions. It details arguments related to moral theories and discusses how they classify actions based on their moral worth. The document provides summaries of various philosophers viewpoints and examples.

Full Transcript

MID-SEMESTER FEEDBACK: WE’D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU! MORAL S AINTS J. O. URMSON “SAINTS AND HEROES” OUTLINE A. Urmson’s View 1. The challenge 2. Why it is a good challenge 3. What we should do about it B. Possible responses A. URMSON’S VIEW 1. THE CHALLENGE Let’s put the chall...

MID-SEMESTER FEEDBACK: WE’D LOVE TO HEAR FROM YOU! MORAL S AINTS J. O. URMSON “SAINTS AND HEROES” OUTLINE A. Urmson’s View 1. The challenge 2. Why it is a good challenge 3. What we should do about it B. Possible responses A. URMSON’S VIEW 1. THE CHALLENGE Let’s put the challenge in the form of an argument: P1: If a moral theory fails to categorise the moral worth of actions correctly it is a bad theory and should be revised, or rejected (if it can’t be appropriately revised) P2: The standard versions of moral theories only recognize three types of actions P3: A fourth type exists and has moral worth – supererogatory actions P4: Standard moral theories miscategorise supererogatory actions. C: The standard version of moral theories should be revised, or rejected THE CHALLENGE Is this a good argument? Does the conclusion follow from the premises? Yes, seems plausible that it does. Are the premises true? P1: If a moral theory fails to categorise the moral worth of actions correctly it is a bad theory and should be revised, or rejected (if it can’t be appropriately revised) Seems plausible. Remember the first of the two aims of a moral theory. Tell us which actions (etc) are morally right and wrong etc.. [i.e. Get the answers right] We need to think carefully about whether and why P2, P3, and P4 are true. 2. WHY THIS IS A GOOD CHALLENGE P2: The standard versions of moral theories only recognize three types of actions Right Permissib Wrong what you le Ought not to ought to do Ok to do do Not ruled out WHY THIS IS A GOOD CHALLENGE P3: Supererogatory actions exist and have moral worth How does Urmson defend this claim? By appeal to examples, chiefly but not just, of saints and heroes Seems that there are many examples of actions that are not morally required, not plausibly duties but that go beyond what duty requires SAINTS AND HEROES At least sometimes we use ‘saint’ and ‘hero’ for moral evaluation Use them in three types of situation 1. When people do their duty by exercising abnormal self-control [when most people would e.g. be overcome by desire, self-interest (saint) or fear, drive for self-preservation (hero)] 2. When people do their duty without effort [when most others would be overcome by temptation or fear] Examples: child who stays at home to look after ill parent, Dr who stays to look after others in a plague- ridden city SAINTS AND HEROES 3. When people do things that are far beyond what duty requires (with or without abnormal self- control/no effort) = supererogatory actions = the saintly or heroic action par excellence Examples: A doctor who volunteers to go to a plague-ridden/war torn city The soldier who sacrifices their life to protect his comrades in the grenade case In general, actions with high moral worth but that are not, intuitively, morally required. GOING BEYOND WHAT DUTY REQUIRES Might go a long way beyond – e.g. personal self-sacrifice Might go just beyond ( ‘going the extra mile’ – Urmson) e.g. some cases of forgiveness, generosity, helpfulness, doing of favours Or somewhere in between the extra mile and hero/saint Such actions are good, praiseworthy, have moral worth But are not strictly speaking duties – we wouldn’t think we were justified in blaming or punishing if the person didn’t perform them. GOING BEYOND WHAT DUTY REQUIRES Such actions are praiseworthy, have high moral worth/value But are not duties – ask more of people than we think morality should ask Categorising them as right and required is a mistake Right Wrong Permissible actions are actions not ruled out by morality, OK to do, won’t be doing wrong but less good/worthy than doing right Permissible Categorising them as permissible is a mistake Such actions have high moral worth and are not ruled out by morality Categorising them as wrong is a mistake EXAMPLES? 5 MINUTE EXERCISE [Aka don’t rely on AI to do philosophy for you] WHY THIS IS A GOOD CHALLENGE P4: Standard moral theories miscategorize supererogatory actions (including actions that go beyond duty but aren’t quite saintly/heroic) MAU: an action is right (required, obligatory) if it maximizes the good An action is wrong if it fails to maximize the good An action is permissible if it is one of two or more actions which generate equal amounts of good and no action would generate more good. = no category for supererogatory actions (cf. demandingness objection) WHY THIS IS A GOOD CHALLENGE Kant: conceives of duty as the only expression of moral value in human action. Universalizability of the maxim of action and acting from the motive of duty (or respect for the law) are two constitutive hallmarks of moral action. But supererogatory action is optional and personal, not motivated by universal moral law Kant: going ‘above and beyond’ may reflect moral self-indulgence and vanity unbound by the moral law or even be a violation of one’s duties to oneself WHY THIS IS A GOOD CHALLENGE Aristotle: focus on being a good person, being fully virtuous, and living the best, Eudaimon, life Not focused on actions directly, doesn’t use notions like ought, right, wrong, permissible BUT common to interpret Aristotle’s view as committed to the claim that what you ought to do in any case is the virtuous action, how you ought to live is as the virtuous person would live In that case, no room for supererogatory actions in his view i.e., actions that are good but not required Aristotle would have to classify these actions either as wrong (not what the VP would do) or as required (what the VP would do). SUMMARY P1: If a moral theory fails to categorise the moral worth of actions correctly it is a bad theory and should be revised, or rejected (if it can’t be appropriately revised) P2: The standard versions of moral theories only recognize three types of actions P3: A fourth type exists and has moral worth – supererogatory actions P4: Standard moral theories miscategorise supererogatory actions. C: The standard version of moral theories should be revised, or rejected B. POSSIBLE RESPONSES How might one reply to this argument? Accept P1. P2 also seems plausible. So, if P3 is plausible then P4 will be too. And C will follow. P3: A fourth type exists and has moral worth – supererogatory actions P4: Standard moral theories miscategorise supererogatory actions. C: The standard version of moral theories should be revised, or rejected The most important premise seems to be P3 On the face of it, three options: a, Deny P3 or respond by accepting the conclusion and arguing either that b. the moral theory in question can be revised to accommodate supererogation or that c. we need a new moral theory 1. DENY THE EXISTENCE OF SUPEREROGATION Deny P3 Different ways to do this. Deny that supererogatory acts go beyond what duty requires – what is best ought to be done Human beings are limited and flawed and often fail to live up to the standards of ideal behaviour Which of the three views we have discussed would be likely to say this? MAU? Aristotle? Kant? Deny that supererogatory actions have high moral worth/are good E.g. Kant: great personal self-sacrifice may reflect moral self-indulgence and vanity unbound by the moral law or even be a violation of one’s duties to oneself 2. REVISE OR REJECT Denying the existence and value of supererogatory actions goes against common sense intuitions Remember: not just saintly and heroic actions, but other less extremely good actions that go beyond duty Seems plausible that types of morally worthy and unworthy actions might be more complicated than what traditional theories allow; moral life isn’t as neat as they imply Might the standard theories be revised to accommodate the supererogatory? Or is the problem deeper than this, do we need a new moral theory? [See online Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy entry on Supererogation] REVISE OR REJECT What must we accommodate? Urmson’s suggestion: Line between what we can expect and demand on the one hand and what we can hope for and receive with gratitude on the other 1. Duties concern minimum requirements, what it’s not acceptable for people to go below, ‘compliance is indispensable’ 2. Such duties must be within the capabilities of ordinary people. 3. Duties must be formulable in rules of manageable complexity 4. We have a right to demand compliance, you’re blameworthy if you don’t do your duty REVISE OR REJECT 5. Some actions are morally good and praiseworthy but don’t meet conditions 1-4. It’s okay to pressure someone to do their duty, censure them if they don’t. Would be morally wrong to pressure someone to do something saintly or heroic and censure them if they didn’t. TH E EN D

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