Incident Planning PDF

Incident Planning Fig. 7-0. The incident command post at a multi-alarm incident in Los Angeles (CA) *Source.* Photo courtesy of Mike Meadows Introduction The incident commander (IC) is responsible for establishing the incident action plan (IAP) (fig. 7-0). This begins with a size-up and then es...

Incident Planning Fig. 7-0. The incident command post at a multi-alarm incident in Los Angeles (CA) *Source.* Photo courtesy of Mike Meadows Introduction The incident commander (IC) is responsible for establishing the incident action plan (IAP) (fig. 7-0). This begins with a size-up and then establishing the incident priority, strategy, and tactical objectives to get the troops off on the right foot. As the incident moves forward, the IC must bridge the tactical gap by assigning tactical supervisors in key positions and roles around the incident. Fortunately, much of this can be pre-planned and trained upon with proven tools and techniques to rapidly remain ahead of the incident while ensuring safe, effective, and effi­ cient operations that remain in alignment. Incident Priorities, Strategy, and Alignment  Command decision-making goes in a top-down order. The IC must*first* determine the incident priority. Regardless of the incident (fire, hazmat, MCI, etc.), there is only one of three priorities: lifesaving, incident stabilization, or protection of property/environment. *Second,* this drives the strategy of offensive, combination, or defensive. Then, the tactical objectives are established which drive the tasks. This top-down order of decision-making is crucial to success. Unfortu­ nately, it is counterintuitive to most firefighters, like swimming upstream. One of our greatest strengths as firefighters is that we are action-oriented, ready to jump into the fray. This is also our Achilles' heel and downfall. We sometimes act first, then think second. This can cause a push-pull between the firefighters and the IC. The primary role of the IC is developing and executing the IAP to ensure the appropriate priority and strategy are communicated and that the tactics are in alignment with that strat­ egy. When completed (early in the incident), your tactical supervisors will be better positioned to execute and lead the battle, allowing the IC to step back and think ahead. As discussed in chapter 4, while the tactical supervisors are thinking in the "next" mindset, you are thinking further ahead in the "then/what if" mindset. This *is* aggressive command, which allows you to stay ahead of the incident power curve and support your tactical supervisors and task-level crews. Examples of being in the "then/what if' mindset include, but are not limited to: "Then.. Checking exposures and floors above for extension and evacuation of occupants. Calling additional companies, alarms, or specialty resources like light/air units, law, hazmat, Red Cross, investigator, utility companies, board up crews, and so on with staging areas. Requesting additional tactical channels/frequencies from dispatch. Considering salvage and overhaul needs after the fire is contained and secondary searches are complete and all clear is declared. Adding companies for rotation of crews due to excessive heat or cold. "What if.. There is vertical or horizontal extension that is unseen, or into exposures? A Mayday is declared? An unknown victim(s) is found? Weather changes affect fire conditions? This goes beyond our control objectives? The troops need critical incident stress debriefing? While the IC arrives to find firefighters jumping into action, they must look at the big pic­ ture and determine if what they are doing is right. As a young firefighter, I have often jumped into action, eyes rolled back, knowing subconsciously that I will just keep going until someone orders me to stop. I didn't really think of the tactical implications of what I was doing, I just wanted to get some. One commercial fire, I stepped off the truck and started breaking win­ dows. I thought I was helping, venting. Why wouldn't I want to get smoke out of the building? Turns out it was cold smoke and all my window-breaking did was more damage. Once on a house fire, I was assigned division A, and my boundaries were the whole house and my resources were all the crews working inside. As I performed my lap, I found a young firefighter on the C side pounding away at a window and about to jump in. No captain in sight. As he masked up, the window was getting ready to flash. I stopped him. There was no indica­ tion of a victim in the house, crews were already performing a primary search inside, and he was only doing it for the fun of it. He had just learned VEIS and could not wait to try it out. The problem was this was not the right place or time. Crews were already searching inside, of which he was not aware, and the window was clearly about to flash, which he didn't see. I love aggres­ sive firefighters---not foolish firefighters. Crews on the roof of a commercial fire were all heads down, cutting for vertical ventilation. This included the captain, who was *not* in the tactical "in the next" mindset. Conditions dete­ riorated and the officer was not aware as he was head-down, with a trash hook, attempting to create a louver out of the hole. The roof then collapsed, and the three members narrowly escaped tragedy. Lack of tactical awareness and task saturation that causes tunnel vision is all too common. You must expect this as the IC. A crew can cut a great vent hole, right before the roof comes down. An engine can stretch a line very effectively under a mansard that is about to crush them. The IC must insert tactical supervisors to see what the task-level companies do not see. As the IC, I've had to switch from offensive to defensive strategies. Crews didn't see the bigger picture. That's normal. I've also remained in an offensive strategy when one of my division supervisors wanted to get everyone off the roof. He didn't realize the construction was older, dimensional lumber, and a rain roof built over an older roof. The roof division saw things he didn't see. From his perspective, it may have looked sketchier. But the roof division saw it from a different perspective. I was the one to tip the balance and decided to remain offensive. This was an outside-in fire. The fire had started outside, went up the C side wall, and was traveling the space between old and new roofs. The inside was clear. IC stands for incident commander. *IC also stands for incident chiropractor.* The IC must main­ tain alignment between the strategic, tactical, and task levels. This is critical. Division and group supervisors help maintain this alignment by carrying out the IC's strategy. Their job is to get crews back into alignment, so everyone is working on the same page. This is a combination of keeping the NIOSH 5 from coming into alignment while maintaining alignment with the incident prior­ ity, strategy, tactical objectives, and tasks of the operation, both laterally and vertically. Most firefighters know that an offensive strategy is an aggressive or internal posture. Defen­ sive is a regressive or external posture. This applies to all incidents, regardless of the nature of the operation. Incidents that get out of alignment can lead to potential problems. For exam­ ple, a strip mall fire may be a combination strategy, with the center unit defensive and expo­ sures offensive. Yet, Engine 10 is working in the defensive space under a roof that may come down quickly. The division or group supervisor should see this and fix it right away. I've been on several fires where crews had to be redirected out of the building or to the offensive area of operations. When the incident is out of alignment, bad things usually happen. Similar to how the human body suffers numbness and tingling, an incident will start to have issues with risk assessment, accountability, and communications (fig. 7-1). As the alignment gets worse, the human body experiences pain. An incident will then have a sentinel event like a collapse or a Mayday. Finally, the human body could experience paralysis. So too an incident could have firefighter injuries or death. Offensive versus Defensive Strategies The *offensive strategy* is the primary forward-moving posture firefighters want to take when responding to an incident, especially a structure fire. As the IC, you must be disciplined to think before you act. Do not allow yourself (and the rest of the alarm) to react and simply jump into the fray before you perform an adequate size-up. Remember, you are leading a team of very aggressive human beings whose natural inclination is to run into battle unless someone restrains them. And restraint is much easier said than done. As the IC and division supervisor, I have had to withstand the onslaught of criticism, frus­ tration, and outright anger at the declaration of a defensive strategy. You must remove your emotions from the situation or you will become part of the problem. I have even had two cap­ tains almost go to blows at the command post and had to remind them that we had bigger fish to fry, like a multi-alarm commercial fire, and they had to put their egos in a box until we could get the fire under control. In the midst of chaos, the IC must have command maturity. *Command maturity* is the ability to detach from the emotions of the situations and be calm, rational, focused, thoughtful, systematic, and professional. *Command presence* is the ability to  exude confidence that inspires your troops to follow you. You must have command maturity to have command presence. An offensive strategy is indicated in the following situations: Victim profile can be low, moderate, high, or confirmed. The higher the profile, the more risk can be taken (we know what we have to gain and how much risk we are willing to take). Conditions allow interior/forward moving operations that will be *sustained long enough* to accomplish the tactical objectives, without injury or death to the troops (we can stay in the fight long enough to close the deal). Human and physical resources match the current and anticipated needs/conditions (we will or already do have enough troops, trucks, and tools to get the job done). Conversely, a *defensive strategy* is one of retreat to a safer area whereby crews are in an inci­ dent stabilization or property/environment priority (fig. 7-2). A defensive strategy is indicated in the following situations: » Low victim profile/vacant No fire breaks, walls, partitions Fire involvement outstrips the available resources Heavy, violent smoke conditions There is not enough time to complete the objectives of an offensive strategy before conditions may deteriorate. Remember, it takes time to order resources, have them gain access, and then support them long enough to make a difference or complete objectives. This is not a simulation where things happen instantaneously. Lightweight construction Out of business One business without partitioning Excess fire load Heavy, hazardous materials Flammable liquids Combination Strategy Many do not know what a *combination* strategy entails. A *combination strategy* has both offen­ sive *and* defensive operations/spaces in the same incident. The incident priority and strategy must be clearly known by all, and they may change during an incident. You can have a lifesav­ ing priority with a combination strategy. For example, you have a commercial building with one section defensive due to collapse, with another area offensive with interior fire attack and search based on a fire wall separating the two. The combination strategy is the most challenging for commander's intent because there are both offensive and defensive spaces on the same building(s). Here, more strategic direction is required to outline the specific parameters and objectives that are to be employed at the tac­ tical level. As the IC of a large car wash fire at night, I was ready to go defensive as a portion of the roof was about to collapse (fig. 7-3). This was 2:30 in the morning and an all clear had been declared. We were clearly in an inci­ dent stabilization priority. As I notified the division supervisors of my intent to switch to a defensive strategy, one called on the radio, "Chief, we have a fire wall in here. I am about 50 feet in from the D side with a 216\" line, inside at the mouth of the hallway. I think we can save half the building. We are having a positive effect and we will not go past this point." This was critical information from a heads-up experienced captain who was in a tactical mindset. His actions and tactical leadership made it possible to save the mechanical end of the carwash, the adjacent smog shop, and the upstairs office with all the business records. He went in and out of the car wash to ensure that his plan was working and conditions on the outside matched the inside (figs. 7-4a, 7-4b, and 7-4c). The delineation between the offensive and defensive spaces was the fire wall he discovered. We continued an offensive strategy on one side with him supervising that operation. Toward the B side, we utilized elevated master streams and 216\" defensive lines in the defensive space. The job of the tactical supervisors was to keep the task-level companies from migrating and informed of the combination strategy. We struck a line at the fire wall (fig. 7-5). The same could apply to a vegetation fire with direct attack and structure defense happen­ ing simultaneously. This was the case on a fast-moving vegetation fire in light, flashy fuels on a hot, windy day. The fire involved a large older two-and-a-half-story Victorian home with bal­ loon frame construction. Initially, we attempted to contain the fire in the home while crews also were fighting the grass fire and performing structure defense to protect a neighborhood nearby. As the winds grew and water supply became more challenging, I ordered that the house be defensive. Meanwhile, direct attack and structure defense continued in other parts of the fire. A combination strategy can also occur during an active shooter MCI where the threat is confined by law enforcement in the gym (defensive), and several patients are in the quad area (offensive).   A hazmat combination strategy would be the hot/exclusion zone where isolation and denial of entry is the tactic, and the cold/support zone where occupants are evacuating the exposure. Conversely, you can have an incident stabilization priority after an all clear is declared, yet still be in an offensive strategy during salvage and overhaul inside. Combination Considerations Moderate to high victim profile Fire breaks, walls, and partitions can be leveraged for tactical advantage Fire involvement versus resources There is time to complete objectives in the offensive space before conditions deteriorate Heavy timber construction or greater Business/building can be easily isolated/segmented The Incident Power Curve 77?e *incident power curve* is the common sequence of events that occurs in most emergency incidents and fires in which the demand upon the IC and tactical supervisors is increased and the potential to become overwhelmed is greater (fig. 7-6). Initially, the activities on a structure fire begin chaotically as companies go to work initiating fire attack, search, forcible entry, and many other tactics. This causes the curve to go up steeply at first. This leads to the first pla­ teau and is often a false plateau (first peak). As the impact of these efforts continues, condi­ tions often improve; the IC will get reports of a primary search completed or fire knocked down, for example. This leads to a lull and the IC may believe that the incident is going according to plan and that it will not escalate (first valley). Then, an unforeseen event happens that drives activity up again to a second plateau (second peak). This can be something relatively benign like a burst hoseline or a hydrant out of service. It can also be more significant like fire in the attic space that was undetected, an unknown victim found, or a Mayday. An *incident within an incident* (IWI) is a secondary event that happens during emergency operations that escalates demand significant enough to warrant additional resources and inci­ dent action planning. Examples would be a firefighter Mayday, roof collapse, or vehicle acci­ dent involving a fire department (FD) apparatus or vehicle. An IWI often requires adding tactical division/group supervisors, ordering additional resources, or rapidly switching prior­ ities and strategy. One goal of the IC is to stay ahead of the incident power curve (fig. 7-6). By decentralizing command to division and group supervisors, the IC can remain in the "then" and "what if?" mindset. The IWI is always looming. If the IC gets sucked into the tasks, the IC is not doing their job and will fall behind. *Command lag is* the difference between an IWI occurring and the IC responding to it. Fig. 7-6. A predictable sequence to assist you in staying ahead of the incident is the incident power curve. *Note.* X axis is time; Y axis is bad stuff; Red line is reactive, behind the incident---a bad place to be; Black line is real time---the present; Green line is ahead of the incident---where you want to be For example: You forecast (through your division/group supervisors) that the roof will col­ lapse, so you go defensive (on the green line). Then the roof comes in on the black line. This kept you off the red line. The Tactical As mentioned previously, the tactical space and tactical gap is where the battle is won or lost. Regardless of the IC's plan or leader's intent, no IC can ever truly see what is really going on at all levels and in all places of an incident (fig. 7-7). The right tactic, at the right time, in the right place is vital. Conversely, the wrong tactic at the wrong time and place can be catastrophic. A task-level crew can cut a great hole in a roof, but if that was not the right tactic, not coordinated, or the roof comes in, things can get worse. During a rescue, you may have a victim who needs to be removed using a window. If the crews initiate search from the front door, the victim may not survive if the search takes too long or the victim is brought out through the immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) environ­ ment. An effectively stretched 1%\" line may be too small a caliber where a 216" was needed. A transitional attack may take too long and unknown victims may suffer. No IC can see the entire incident and ensure that all these things are happening effectively, let alone account for all the crews. Task-level crews do not see what other companies are doing due to tunnel vision, and this can result in redundant or conflicting efforts. At the very least, time and resources will be wasted. At the worst, firefighter or civilian lives will be lost. Tactics for specific incidents and structure types vary greatly. The vast body of knowledge regarding tactical decision-making fills many volumes of outstanding works by experienced and wise authors like John Norman and Anthony Avillo, to name just two. East coast and west coast tactics are a derivative of common construction features, eras of construction, layout, use, access through city streets, topography, tradition, and a host of countless other factors. San Francisco and New York City have incredible differences in topography alone that require alternative methods of access, laddering, and fire attack. Topography and vegetation cause significant variances in tactics within the same state. San Francisco and Los Angeles will have  vastly different operations. While San Francisco has very little vegetation, brush, or wildland, Los Angeles County has thousands of areas and communities that are threatened in the wild­ land urban interface (WUI), where heavier fuels along with the steep hills and mountainsides are commonplace. The older parts of the United States will have legacy and balloon construction and likely will have dimensional lumber, while the newer cities and communities will likely have more light­ weight, modern construction. Communities at elevation will have construction features to accom­ modate snow and mountain terrain, while parts of the country along the south and eastern seaboard that are susceptible to hurricanes will have unique fortification features of their own. Each community will have unique construction specific to that area. Row houses like brown­ stones are common in larger, older cities, while tilt-up construction is more likely found in post-1960s areas. There may also be extremely specific construction based upon the builder, like a McKuen Fourplex, or an Eliot Tri-Level. The point is to know the specific construction features common to *your* area, and the spe­ cific target hazards in your city, battalion, or first-due area. This knowledge and your resource levels drive associated tactics, and pre-planning is priceless. Every fire department has different staffing levels, standard operating guidelines, response matrices, construction types from different eras, occupancy loads, terrain, weather, conges­ tions, access/egress issues, and a host of other factors. We ask that you consider what is pre­ sented with an open mind. You may find that something new can be employed, what you have been doing is verified, or that you are presented with something you have not considered before. The goal is learning, not preaching. One thing is certain: change is a constant, and we must always challenge our assumptions, try new things, and realize that the enemy and the battlefield are always in flux. The key is to balance experience with academia. Both are important. UL FSRI studies continually give us new data to make more educated tactical decisions. In addition, Project Mayday and FRS have given us priceless data to ensure that our crews go home in one piece, while saving as many civilians as possible. That said, there are some uni­ versal tactical considerations that should be discussed regarding each type of structure fire or other incident. For the IC, the tactics employed by your FD must be well understood so that you can anticipate, choose, support, command, and coordinate them. This includes knowing the kind, type, size, and number of resources available to you. All fire departments, districts, and authorities have specific resources. At the same time, the IC does not need to keep up on the latest chains used on the chain­ saws, or the latest pump pressure cards on the engines, nor does the IC need technical certifi­ cation in every possible area to be effective. The IC should know the amount of water in your engine water tanks, pump capacity, amount of hose, and reach of the ladders on your truck companies. If your agency does have dedicated truck companies, being assigned to a truck as a company officer prior to promotion to chief officer is certainly advantageous, if not crucial. The IC straddles the strategic/tactical spaces. *A chief officer IC should not dip into the task* *level.* This can border on micromanaging and take the IC off the ball for the bigger picture. This will create more radio traffic and slow down the time-to-task interval of getting the work done. The result will be an IC who is behind the curve and the incident will outpace them. If an IWI occurs, the IC is instantly overwhelmed. Once that happens, there is no turning back. You will not catch an incident that has outpaced you. *Time-to-task* (TTT) (also known as time-to-completion) is the time it takes to accomplish a task once it is identified as necessary to the incident tactical objectives. This includes commu­ nication from the IC to the tactical supervisors and vice versa. For example, crews arrived to a confirmed victim profile on the El Camino Fire. The victim was on the gurney at 4:32 from arrival. This TTT of 4:32 was within the 6-8-minute window to get a surviving fire victim out and to EMS, based upon FRS statistics of over 3000 rescues. As stated previously, *modern incident command starts well before an incident and is a team* *sport\\* The time and training required to build trust is vital if you are to outpace an incident and save civilian lives. Trust allows the IC to decentralize, thereby minimizing radio traffic, while the tactical supervisors and company officers act with the IC's intent by choosing the appropriate tactics at the right time in the right place. This minimizes radio traffic and TTT, allowing the officer closest to the problem to act quickly. One way to get all officers on the same page is to train on shared recognition of construc­ tion features and tactics, so the intent of the IC is carried out in the field. *Tactical points of* *opportunity* (TPOs) are building construction, access, layout, and other physical features that can be leveraged to increase the impact of resources to accomplish tactical objectives. Figure 7-8 shows a common lightweight two-story home. Note that over the garage are two-bedroom windows and on the D side is a garage access door, a bedroom window, and a bathroom window. The door and bedroom window are TPOs. Examples include fire walls, breezeways, partitions, stairwells, windows, side doors, roll-up doors, and so on. Reinforcing a fire wall can keep a fire contained with much less water and resources, for example. Attacking the fire that is close to a commercial roll-up door with large caliber hose­ lines, instead of attacking from the front and pulling two or three hundred feet, can quickly knock down a commercial fire while minimizing exposure and TTT of companies. Some firefighters hate acronyms. The fact is that they are a great training tool to build muscle memory. Tactical worksheets are also a useful resource. Checklist firefighting is a derogatory term implying that there is no thinking when using an acronym or checklist. This can happen. Some aspiring (and incumbent) officers will regurgitate the same things no matter what is in front of them. For example, they will set up two-out on a known rescue or have the second engine secure a water supply with a small travel trailer on fire. I have heard IC's direct the second truck to secure utilities on a house fire with a *confirmed* victim profile because that is what the SOG says. Not good. Standard operating guidelines are just that: *guidelines.* They are not standard operating *laws.* That would make them SOLs and then we *would* be SOL! Having said all this, consider the military and aviation models of checklists and redundancies. The *Checklist Manifesto* by Atul Gawande is based upon the principle that "\... highly trained, experienced, and capable people regularly make avoidable mistakes." The acronym RECEO-VS has been around since the 1950s, when Lloyd Layman created it. He also created FPODP. Both are still very useful today and are timeless. SAW-CSS-RECEO-VSS  The IC and tactical supervisors must ensure the proper tactics are being employed. We have added front and back-end components to the RECEO-VS algorithm to include additional com­ mand considerations to give you a system that encompasses more of all the tactical consider­ ations for structure fires in the context of the IC. Each has universal key points that must be considered. These are benchmarks that the IC and tactical supervisors should share and com­ municate. The SAW-CSS-RECEO-VSS system has been used nationwide for years. You will notice that italicized words correspond with key points on the tactical worksheet that follows. Size-Up All incidents start with size-up. Size-up is so crucial that we have dedicated an entire chapter to it (Chapter 5). *Remember, size-up is a mental, ongoing process.* Start with your *FPODP or FIRST* algorithm. Consider 7 *parts of the structure* (four sides, top, bottom, inside). The *construction features* are extremely critical to assess early. Aside from the construc­ When you first look at the building, try to ignore the fire and smoke and truly focus on If possible, it is critical to get a *360°, or lap* around the structure. This may be easier said The *reporting party* (RP) is the individual who has reported the incident, typically by * Assess the victim profile (VP) as soon as possible and report it to all units.* The VP may Jfe Your *initial size-up* will conclude with an arrival report to incoming units; however, remember that size-up is continuous. As you talk to the RP, bystanders, occupants, employees, and attempt a lap (chiefs should delegate the physical lap to a company officer/tactical supervisors), you will garner more critical information. The *IOCAN* (identify, objects, contents, actions, needs; see chapter 5 for more information) system is designed to give a quick arrival report. Your arrival report is likely dictated by your SOGs. Your agency may require additional details like building height, size, construc- tion/occupancy type, VP, exposures, and many other factors. Apparatus Placement Apparatus placement should be considered early, as you typically do not get a second chance. The size and lack of maneuverability, combined with other units arriving, makes staging your apparatus in the right place the first time a daunting task. As supply lines are laid and attack lines stretched, the available real estate around a building can rapidly deteriorate. Plan ahead based upon your type of apparatus, mission, SOGs, order of arrival, and conditions, including how conditions may change. A first-arriving engine will likely attempt to see *three sides* of a smaller stand-alone structure, allowing the officer to have a tactical advantage before stepping off the rig. Exposures, access, fire location, and tactical points of opportunity can be identified early. A larger building, such as a commercial structure, row houses, strip malls, big boxes, high-rises, or industrial facilities will require a more methodical approach. This can include driving around the structure if subsequent units are delayed, having other units approach from other directions, or directing a unit to stage in the rear and give report on conditions from the C side of the building. The old adage that the truck always gets the address is based upon several factors. First, ladders have limited reach and do not have as much flexibility as hoselines that can be extended. An aerial master stream is only as good as the reach, and that cannot happen from two blocks away. Second, truck companies carry specialized equipment that may need to be readily available. And many agencies only have one truck company and want it close, to have a prime location before multiple engines and hoselines eliminate options. The *hot zone* is any area that will cause damage to apparatus, including, but not limited to, collapse, thermal insult, excessive smoke, hazardous materials, power lines, and so on. Ensure that apparatus are staged out of the hot zone, including potential changes in conditions. Many aerial master streams have been shut down and moved after condi­ tions changed to a defensive strategy and collapse potential increased. As discussed in chapter 4, there are three *staging* levels: Level 1, Level 2 and forward staging. Identify a location for Level 2 staging if you call additional alarms/resources. Water Supply Water supply must be considered as soon as possible to take advantage of any hydrants while responding into the scene. A secondary supply must be considered in case the initial hydrant is out of service. Before you race to a fire without a water supply, ensure that the second-due company is close by and multiple hydrants are within reach of one engine. Many over-zealous company officers have bypassed hydrants to beat other companies into the fire, only to find themselves out of water quickly. * What* is the required fire flow? You can refer to chapter 6 for the NFPA 1710 recommen­ dations by occupancy type, or some organizations still utilize the National Fire Academy formula: (building length x width)/3 = GPM. * Who* is securing the water supply? This will be dictated by your SOGs. Is this being accomplished with one or more companies? Will this require a relay pumping operation and the establishment of a water supply group supervisor (often in rural communities)? * Where* is the water supply? Is it reachable by one engine, or is this an extensive lay? Will water tenders be required? * What* is the supply? A dry or wet forward lay by the first-due engine from the hydrant to the fire? A wet forward lay by the second-due engine? A driveway/split lay? A reverse lay by the second engine from the first, out to the hydrant? A tank transfer? A water shuttle from a distant hydrant, or drafting operation? Once a patent water supply is established, it should be announced on the tactical channel. If an *FDC* is present, consider having a separate engine pump the FDC with a separate supply. Command Command must be established and announced. *There can only be one IC at a time, and the IC* *must be on scene to assume command.* While your SOGs will determine specific parameters, some fundamental best practices exist. When the first-arriving officer is a chief or staff officer with no tactical capability, assuming command is the most likely option. Developing an IAP and calling additional resources will typically be the best decision. Get the VP and announce it. * Command option/mode* determines one of three postures that the first arriving *company* officer is taking regarding incident command: assuming command, passing command (often called fast attack or rescue mode), and investigating. Each has specific consider­ ations and potential triggers. The determination is made by the first-arriving officer based upon whether or not their company can make a significant difference in the incident that will save/protect civilian lives or gain a tactical advantage to prevent significant injury or loss. **♦ Assuming Command** is indicated for the company officer if the incident is so large and complex that developing an IAP, calling additional resources, and directing subsequent units will be more impactful and likely to remain ahead of the incident power curve than performing initial tasks with a single unit. **♦ Passing Command** is the act of notifying subsequent responding units that the initial company officer plans to relinquish command as soon as the next officer arrives and assumes command. This is indicated when the incident demands imme­ diate action, and an appreciable difference can be made to save lives and prevent injury or significant loss. A key point is that the officer passing command is *still in* *command* until it has been passed to the next officer who has arrived on scene. **♦ Working or Mobile Command** is a term utilized by the initial IC to indicate that they are performing tasks while in command and not in a fixed location. This indi­ cates that incoming radio transmissions should be limited to key information (arriv­ als, water supplies, etc.) so the IC can give updates and direction to arriving units and perform the transfer of command via radio. **♦ Investigation Mode** is the term utilized to indicate that the first company has no indication of fire or smoke (other than a possible audible alarm) and has chosen to engage in further investigation. Reconnaissance may be indicated with more than one company to further ascertain the situation (see chapter 5). Investigative mode may be accompanied by either retaining command or passing command to the next officer, based upon the situation. If you are a company officer arriving first on the scene, *you are in command.* Whether you like it or not, that's a fact. You may choose to *pass command* upon arrival; however, *you* *are still in command,* and command has not been passed to another officer until *they are* *on scene and has assumed command from you.* Once a chief officer or permanent IC has arrived, the incident *name* and the *ICP location* should be announced. This allows all members to find the IC and sets the template for the incident. For example, "Chief 1 on scene, assuming Main Street Command from Engine 10. The command post is located across the street from the A/B corner\... " The IC should then announce the incident priority, strategy, and tactical objectives... This is a lifesaving priority, offensive strategy with the objectives of fire attack, search, and vertical ventilation." If an adequate description of the scene was given by the first-arriving company officer, then the chief does not need to repeat those conditions, thus saving valuable radio traffic. If, however, the first-arriving company officer did *not* give an adequate arrival report, the chief can clean up the description as part of the subsequent arrival report. For example, companies are dispatched to a house fire. Engine 1 arrives, stating, "El on scene. We have heavy fire. Initiating fire attack. Need a water supply. Passing command." Upon arrival of the chief, a subsequent arrival would be, "Chief 1 on scene, assuming Main Street Command from Engine 1. Command post is located across the street from the A side. This is a large 3-story, balloon frame house with heavy fire on the third floor. High victim profile. This is a lifesaving priority, offensive strategy. Objectives are fire attack and search." Call *additional resources alarms* early and confirm the staging location. Set up your *ICS* early. Do you have adequate channels for *communications?* Strategy Confirm your priority, strategy and *VP,* apparatus placement, water supply, and your command mode. Priority: *lifesaving, incident stabilization, orproperty/environment*; and strategy: *offen­* *sive, combination, or defensive.* Keep it simple. Remember, they may change as conditions change. Safety Safety is listed sixth in this list because you will not know what your safety issues are until you have performed/decided upon the previous five factors. You cannot possibly know what the safety challenges are until you have sized up the incident and determined your priority/strat- egy. Offensive and defensive strategies have very different considerations, as noted previously. * RIC and two-out:* Offensive and combination strategies will likely necessitate *rapid* *intervention and/or two-out* protection for your members. Known rescue situations eliminate the need for such measures. Fire departments across America fulfill the two-out mandate in countless ways. Your FD SOGs will determine the appropriate level of rapid intervention readiness and/or two-out implementation. That said, consider backup teams at all entry points where fire attack is initiated on a structure fire. These teams are separate from the rapid intervention crew (RIC). Rapid intervention is *not* the same as the minimum two-out. RIC was developed out of the Code of Federal Regulations 1910.134 Two-In, Two-Out standard. Stay ahead of the curve and ensure the proper protection for your crews. Your FD has SOGs on rapid intervention, Maydays, two-out, and so on. More on RIC in chapter 12. The old adage that safety is everyone's responsibility may be true, yet it creates potential for no one to truly be watching for safety if all members are task-oriented/saturated. One tragic case in point was a double drowning of two two-year-old children. They were at a backyard BBQ and everyone thought someone else was watching them. They managed to ascend a locked ladder to an above ground pool. By the time anyone realized the children were missing, both toddlers were floating face down in the pool. A *personnel accountability report* (PAR) is conducted on the radio periodically to ensure crews are safe and in their designated assignments. This can easily be decentralized to tactical supervisors for ongoing accountability. *Active accountability is* the act of tactical division and group supervisors being constantly aware of their crews' locations and assignments. This is done through visual, face-to-face, and radio communication. * Utilities* should be secured, and often this can be assigned to a RIC. Considerations for structure fire safety include, but are not limited to, the following: ♦ Excessive fire load from contents inside the structure ♦ Presence of hazardous materials and accelerants ♦ High rack storage systems ♦ Industrial processing systems ♦ Void spaces, holes, open hatches, and compromised flooring ♦ Construction type, including multiple re-models (especially against fire codes) ♦ Conversion of commercial occupancies into living spaces against code ♦ Heavy occupancy due to COVID-19 and economic pressures ♦ Collapse potential of facades, unsupported mansards, parapets, and walls ♦ Roof collapse of lightweight gusset truss systems, bowstring trusses, open web bar trusses, oriented strand board (OSB) I-beams, and other lightweight construction ♦ Overhead power lines, including energized metal fencing ♦ Fire above and beneath firefighters working inside the structure ♦ Vent point ignition, flashover, backdraft, and smoke explosion ♦ Rapid change in fire conditions ♦ Increased collapse potential from deteriorated/unstable building construction during salvage and overhaul ♦ Propane tanks, stored gasoline, or natural gas supplies exposed ♦ Excess load on roofs including HVAC systems, concrete tile, and large signs or antennas ♦ Apparatus in the hot zone (see apparatus placement mentioned previously) ♦ Extreme weather conditions and dehydrated or overheated firefighters ♦ Extremely inexperienced firefighters or officers ♦ Highly emotional scene due to firefighter Mayday or excess victims Rescue Remember, the victim profile drives *everything.* Lifesaving is the first priority and rescue the first tactical consideration. That said, you may have to get attack lines in place to save the most people, based upon the building construction, layout, and fire location. For example, controlling the fire in an interior stair or hall tends to do the most good for the most people inside. All sit­ uations, incidents, and fires are different. Some key points are: A low victim profile does *not* mean an all clear. Only *we* determine all clear after searches. Use separate companies for *primary* and *secondary* searches. A fresh set of eyes will always see things differently and tend to notice different nuances of a search. Primary complete is not the same as a secondary complete all clear declaration. Ensure *all* areas are searched *twice* by different crews before declaring an all clear on the fire. * Medical* is part of rescue. Ensure you have advanced life support and transport capability on scene at all times. Always have one transporting ambulance available on scene at working fires for firefighters or unknown victims. Typically, fire victims require an ambulance for each patient due to the critical nature of burn victims. *A* *good rule of thumb is one ambulance per fire victim, plus one.* Most local EMS delivery models do not have the capacity that may be needed to sustain this level of coverage. Many are not part of the fire department. The key is to train together and ensure you have a communications plan *before* a fire. A working structure fire with civilian victims or firefighters down is *not* the time to find out that you cannot communicate with your EMS provider. Forward stage the ambulance crew with gear and gurney at the ICP so you can have face-to-face communications at all times. Their apparatus should be accessible quickly, and not blocked in by fire apparatus. Again, training is crucial *before* a fire. Exposures Typically, *interior* exposures are a higher priority than *exterior* exposures. While you may con­ sider this as *confinement,* it is common to see fire departments attack exterior exposures when there is still a significant amount to be protected in the building of origin. Areas closest to the fire, adjacent rooms, halls, stairs, and floors above are typically of greater priority and victims have less time than those in separate buildings. Exterior exposures downwind or with the greatest loss potential are usually your priority. For example, if you have a fire in a single unit of a strip mall with a common attic, the preven­ tion of lateral spread to the side with more units to lose is generally your priority. Row houses are a particular challenge. Confinement Confinement is often much easier and faster than extinguishment, and can be accom­ plished with less water and fewer firefighters. We have seen fires allowed to spread to uninvolved areas because firefighters attempted to extinguish head on, and like taking a knife to a gun fight, the fire beat them. Confine first in the area to keep the fire off victims and away from uninvolved areas, interior exposures, paths of egress, hallways, and stair­ wells, *then* extinguish. Utilizing TPOs is a huge tactical advantage for confining a fire. Consider the *location of hoselines and flow path.* Both are critical to confining the fire quickly. Extinguishment What is your required fire *flow?* Unlike supply, extinguishment is about the *size and number* of attack lines. One common pitfail is to utilize commonly pulled 1%\" lines in fires that require 2^1^/6\" lines to open. A general rule of thumb is it takes two to three firefighters to stretch a *1^3^A\"* attack line, and three to four firefighters to stretch a 216\" attack line. These are minimums. Distance matters. Generally speaking, it is more critical to get one well-stretched line in place before trying to get two lines simultaneously. This may not be an issue for resource-rich sys­ tems. However, most regions would be served well by this rule. Overhaul Do *not* rely on the thermal imaging camera (TIC) alone. Otherwise, you are asking for a rekin­ dle. The one time in 13 years as a battalion chief that I had a rekindle was when I allowed crews to rely on the TIC and didn't look in the attic myself. The TIC is infrared spectrum, not x-ray. Open areas and look for smoke. Cellulose insulation, in particular, can conceal smoldering hot spots. Confirm *who* is doing the overhaul and *where* it is needed. Ventilation What is the *purpose* of the ventilation? Support fire attack, confine the fire, or rescue? This *must be coordinated* with fire attack, regardless of the type of *vent tactic,* otherwise the fire can worsen. Water on the fire is a prerequisite to ventilation. That said, old school vertical venti­ lation often was ahead of the fire and allowed lift to create visibility. Whatever the tactic, coor­ dinate through your tactical supervisors. Your options are vertical, horizontal, positive pressure (PPV), HVAC, and hydraulic. Salvage *Who* is performing salvage and *what* is the priority? Talk to the owner/occupant/AT^3^ about pic­ tures, pills, and pets. Opportunities to salvage may take place at any time, based upon condi­ tions and priorities. Treat the occupants belongings like your own and teach your troops to do the same. Support Here, we consider what is needed to support the IAP. Several agency-specific resources are cer­ tainly available. As a minimum, consider the following: Law enforcement (LE) Investigator Public information officer (PIO) Safety officer (SO) Red Cross Utility companies (gas, electricity, and water) Board up/fencing company Rehab Air/light unit Hazmat team Tactical Worksheet---Structure Fire +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | s | Size-Up | □ FPODP | □ 360° | □ VP | | | | | | | | | | □ Seven | □ RP | □ I0CAN | | | | Sides | | | | | | | | | | | | □ | | | | | | Constructio | | | | | | n | | | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | A | Apparatus | □ Three | □ Hot Zone | □ Staging | | | | Sides | | | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | W | Water | □ Who | □ What | □ FDC | | | Supply | | | | | | | □ Where | | | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | C | Command | □ Name | □ | □ Comms | | | | | Additional | | | | | □ ICP | Alarms | | | | | | | | | | | | □ ICS | | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | S | Strategy | □ Confirm | □ | □ Defensive | | | | VP | Combination | | | | | | | | | | | □ Offensive | | | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | S | Safety | □ RIT | □ Two-Out | □ PAR | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | R | Rescue | □ 1st | □ All clear | □ Utilities | | | | | | | | | | □ 2nd | □ Medical | | | | | | T/T | | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ --- ---------------- --------------------- ------------- --- ----------------- E Exposures □ Interior □ Exterior C Confinement □ Location of lines □ Flow Path E Extinguishment □ Flow Required □ Size □ Number of Lines 0 Overhaul □ Who □ Where V Ventilation □ Purpose □ Type □ Coordination S Salvage □ Who □ Where □ RP S Support □ Law □ Red Cross □ Rehab □ Invest □ Utility □ Air □ PIO □ Board Up □ Hazmat □ Safety --- ---------------- --------------------- ------------- --- ----------------- The Tactical Supervisor The tactical division/group supervisor is critical to the success of an incident. *The primary* *purpose of a tactical supervisor is to bridge the tactical gap between the IC and the crews work­* *ing.* This is accomplished by the IC trusting the supervisor to be their eyes and ears in the tac­ tical space. The decentralized authority given to the supervisor by the IC requires solemn trust that can only be accomplished through training and time (fig. 7-9). To be an effective officer in the division/group supervisor role, tactical expertise is required. As with any officer, knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) are paramount to success. KSAs to be an effective division/group supervisor include knowledge of FD SOGs, tactics, fire behavior, building construction, and signs of deteriorating conditions; ability to size up a changing sit­ uation, multi-task, exude command presence, and be decisive; and communication, account­ ability, and risk management skills. With training, any good company officer can become an effective tactical supervisor. In addition, clear leaders intent (without micromanaging) from the IC will ensure that the IC and tactical supervisors are on the same page, and can maintain alignment. As discussed in chapter 4, the tactical supervisor must remain in the "then" mindset, ahead of the current situation. Task-level crews are working and their officers are in the "now" while executing the work. Simultaneously, the tactical supervisor is ahead, thinking in the future. What will be the CAN in the next 3-10 minutes and beyond? Examples of being in the "next" mindset include, but are not limited to: Anticipating and seeing changing/deteriorating fire conditions increase in pressurized smoke during attack, vent-point ignition, flashover, backdraft, and so on Looking for collapse potential and fire in the overhead or under firefighters Considering retreating crews Getting additional attack lines in place Ensuring primary and secondary searches are being completed by different crews Coordinating ventilation and fire attack Seeing if conditions inside match what is seen outside. Are conditions improving? Rotation of crews Setting up salvage during the fire attack on an attic fire, for example Vital information must be shared between the IC and tactical supervisors to ensure align­ ment, reduce radio traffic, minimize TTT, maximize effectiveness, and ensure tactical bench­ marks are completed. The IC must become accustomed to less radio traffic by relying upon the tactical supervisor to keep the IC abreast of incident tactical benchmarks, rather than unnecessary chatter about tasks. In turn, the tactical supervisor must not overwhelm the IC with unnecessary task-level transmissions yet give the IC critical tactical benchmarks and CAN reports as needed. Examples of *appropriate* radio *transmissions/benchmarks* from a tactical supervisor to an IC include, but are not limited to: Primary clear of a floor or building---"Command, Division A, primary search clear of the house." Secondary *all clear* of a floor or building---"Command, Division 3, secondary search complete, all clear on floor 3." Water on the fire/knockdown---"Command, Fire Attack Group, we have knockdown of the fire, checking for extension." Fire contained---"Command, Division C, fire is contained to two rooms on the Charlie side, first floor." Switching to salvage and overhaul---"Command, Division Sub 1, secondary search complete, all clear in the basement. Switching to salvage and overhaul." Need additional companies by type (engine, truck, squad, rescue)---"Command, Division B, negative fire extension on the B-l exposure. Need one truck company for positive pressure ventilation." Objective completed---"Command, Roof Division, ventilation complete. Exiting the roof. Will be available for an assignment in 5 minutes." Examples of *inappropriate* radio transmissions from a tactical supervisor to an IC include, but are not limited to: "Command, Division A, Truck 1 is searching the kitchen." "Command, Fire Attack Group, we are deploying another 1%\" line." "Command, Rescue Group, Truck 3 is performing VES." While traditional command without tactical supervisors may require these transmissions, the benefit of utilizing division/group supervisors is that many previous transmissions become unnecessary, thus reducing radio traffic. *Benchmarks and needs are the vital transmissions.* BRO-HAM and TACOS When assigning a group or division supervisor role to an officer, give the following: n **Boundaries---**What is the division/group area? (Whole house, A side of commercial, all fire attack functions, search of all units in the complex?) ** Resources---**Who is working for them? (E101, E103, TR106) ** Objectives---**What is their job? (Fire attack and search, just fire attack, prevent lateral spread and evacuate) Division and group supervisors must be *highly.* ** Hostile---**Strong command presence. Don't let companies go around you to the IC via radio or otherwise. Make sure they know that you are *their supervisor* (fig. 7-10). ** Agile---**Seeing the bigger picture while being eyes and ears for IC. *Simultaneously,* being the guardian angel for the companies while seeing hazards and looming problems. Thinking in the "next" (secondary search, roof/attic conditions, coordinate vent, crew air and accountability), with a 6-50-foot sphere of awareness. Seeing what the crews and IC do not see in the tactical space. ** Mobile---**In, out, and around the tactical area. Do not remain stationary. It requires a lot of movement to have the situational awareness and accountability needed to be safe and effective. *That said, do not put yourself in jeopardy too far into the hazard area.* Remain close or in physical contact with firefighters in your tactical area for short periods to communicate, size-up, and account for members. This requires the division/group supervisor to be in full PPE, including SCBA (fig. 7-11).  The Tactical Supervisor CHIEF DAN COTRELL, BILLINGS (MT) FIRE DEPARTMENT In late October 20201 was an incumbent captain and aspiring to be promoted to bat­ talion chief. I was assigned to the rescue company with the Billings Fire Department. As part of my BC development training, I was required to attend the "Calm the Chaos- Mastering Fire Ground Command" course that my department had brought in. As a twenty-plus-year veteran of the career fire service, I had seen several new trends come and go. I had little hope that this course was any different. My skepticism was fueled by a long career with a very traditional fire department, where the incident commander had total control of the incident. In my old system, all of the personnel working for the IC were working at a task level. I refer to this as a "mother, may I?" system of command. This system of command and control had always worked well for us, and we had seen and expected success on incidents. However, in the words of Dr. David Griffin "you don't know what you don't know." On day four of the class, we reported to the training grounds for a hands-on applica­ tion of the course. I was still apprehensive of an approach where the IC had to relin­ quish a portion of his authority, but I decided that I was going to give the system a chance to prove itself. On scenario number one, I was the first-in captain on an engine company. My company arrived at a simulated single-family residential home with a working fire. Upon arrival, I gave my normal report, put my crew to work at a task level, made a lap, and then started to apply the ideology I had learned the past three days in the classroom. Instead of passing command and initiating fire attack, I retained com­ mand and started thinking at a tactical level. What is the incident priority? (In this case, lifesaving.) In order to meet the priority, what do I need next? I assigned my crew to pull two lines to the front door and re-set the fire from the outside. I assigned the second engine the objective of fire attack and gave my firefighter to the captain of the second engine so we would have both a fire attack crew and a two-out line. The battalion chief arrived and I transferred command to the BC with the recommen­ dation that I assume a division supervisor roll. I was assigned Division A with the objec­ tives of fire attack and search. Engines 2,1, and the truck were all working for me upon arrival. I was able to make quick assignments to the companies assigned to me, coor­ dinate their efforts, and meet my objectives with little to no radio traffic and zero dupli­ cation of efforts or freelancing. The way I felt after that first scenario concluded is hard to describe. For the first time in my career as a company officer, I felt that I was permitted to fully do my job. The previous three days of training clicked, and I was able to feel how empowering it is to allow the people on the ground, the people who first feel the heat, who first detect the change in conditions, to address those issues at a tactical level, without tying up the radio asking command permission to make adjustments. Fast forward to July 26,2022.1 had been promoted to BC exactly seven months prior. My department had embraced assigning division and group supervisors to multi-company incidents, and we experienced a great deal of success with the system. In the early morning hours of the shift, we were dispatched to a possible structure fire in an area that is mixed-use, residential, commercial, and agricultural. The fire was located just outside the city limits but within the department's response area. A normal residential structure response was assigned, which consists of four engines, one truck, and one BC. Because the address is outside the city, a recommendation for a water tender is made as well. The first engine (Engine 2) arrives and reports a large auto shop with light smoke show­ ing from the alpha side. Because of the residential nature of the area, there is a reason­ able likelihood of living quarters in the structure, and a moderate victim profile was assigned. After completing his 360°, E2 Captain suspected a vent-limited fire located in what he thought was a room located on the Delta side with an exterior-walk door for access. He had his crews deploy handlines to that door and initiated fire attack from the exterior at a task level. I arrived and parked on the Alpha side and made contact with E2, who reported that they believed they had knocked the fire down through the Delta side door. I assumed command, confirmed an offensive strategy, and ordered additional resources. Condi­ tions from the command post consisted of light smoke from the gable and eaves. I had a false sense that we could make an aggressive attack and extinguish the fire. Upon arrival of the next engine, I assigned the captain, a 33-year veteran of the fire service, as Division Alpha, with objectives of fire attack and search. He was assigned El (his unit), E2, and was told that he would also need the next engine on scene to complete his objectives. When working as a division or group supervisor, you are expected to use the acronym BRO-HAM. You must know your *boundaries,* in this case the entire structure (for now); *resources,* in this case Captain Christensen had three engines (is this enough?); and *objectives,* or what tactics are in play and how do I as the supervisor assign the task-level crews to achieve the objectives? These are all action items. The HAM is the attitude you must have. You must be *hostile.* Seek out the crews that are assigned to you and physically grab them, tell them who you are, that they are now working for you, and what their task is. You must be *agile,* not only physically, but more importantly *mentally agile.* You must know fireground tactics and the tasks needed to make them successful. You must be thinking about not only what do I need to do now, but what needs to be done next to meet the assigned objectives? Last but most certainly not least is being *mobile.* In order to be an effective supervisor, you must stay mobile. This means making contact with your task-level crews (seek them out for updates), commit to frequent laps looking for expected changes, and be prepared to report to command early if the tactics you have assigned aren't producing those expected results. Keeping the BRO-HAM attitude in mind, remember that from the command post I was seeing light smoke, and had received a report from the first-due crew that they believed they had reset the fire. Division Alpha supervisor made a lap and observed that there was heavy smoke and heat in the Charlie-Delta corner of the building. Furthermore, when he came back to the Alpha side, he observed the fire attack crew opening the overhead door and attempt­ ing to make entry. What happened here? What's wrong with this picture? How was it fixed? It turns out that the incident was out of alignment without me, the IC, knowing it. The task-level fire attack crew thought that they had reset the fire but realized the room they initiated fire attack on was isolated from the rest of the building, so they were attempting to re-engage through the Alpha side overhead door. They were unaware that they had never really applied water to the seat of the fire, and they had now intro­ duced a flow path when they opened the overhead door. The vent-limited fire was now in a free burning state at the opposite end of the structure. Thankfully, the division supervisor followed BRO-HAM to a tee. He made his lap, observed conditions within his boundaries, considered how he could meet his assigned objectives with the units assigned to him, made a point to find those resources, and let them know that they were now working for him and gave them their assignment. In this instance, when the division supervisor checked in with the fire attack crew, they were so task saturated they had not heard any of the radio communications and did not know that they had been assigned to Division Alpha. He was able to inform them of the rapid fire growth and re-directed them to engage from the exterior until more recon could be conducted. As the incident progressed and intel was gathered, we found out from the owners that there were no people in the structure and that there was a second-story mezzanine on the entire Delta side of the building, the exact area that the fire attack crew was attempting to access. Due to the limited water supply, we were unable to make prog­ ress extinguishing the fire, and a defensive strategy was called. I am so grateful that I had a competent and experienced company officer on the ground assigned as a division supervisor that morning. He was able to fill the tactical gap that existed between me and the fire attack crew. With his supervision, we were able to re-align the incident, and most importantly his application of BRO-HAM kept that task-level fire attack crew from entering a structure that was in no way worth the risk. The job of the tactical supervisor is: ** Tactical decision-making:** Crew assignments to complete the objectives, including (but not limited to) size, number, and placement of attack lines; search tactic of choice and area of priority; coordination of fire attack and ventilation; priority for salvage and overhaul, and so on. ** Active accountability:** The process of accounting for crews by being in close physical proximity, including, hands-on, eyes-on accounting of companies, members, location of entry, air levels, rotation of crews. FATS tags on turnouts help (fig. 7-12). ** Communications between companies and command:** CAN reports; face-to-face with crews assigned preferred to reduce radio traffic yet increase efficiency of communica­ tions; radio transmissions when needed to companies further into the hot zone. ** Ongoing size-up and risk/gain assessment:** Victim profiling and SIGNAL: reading smoke and fire conditions to anticipate fire behavior, location, and spread (roll-over, flashover, vent-point ignition, backdraft, smoke explosion); reading building conditions for potential failure and collapse. ** Safety officer:** Ensure adherence to all safety policies and SOGs and watch out for deteriorating conditions. Being an effective tactical division/group supervisor takes training, including realistic hands-on training (fig. 7-13).  Bridging the Tactical Gap Chief and/or company officers can be assigned as division/group tactical supervisors. If your system has a lot of chiefs, then you may have the luxury of only assigning chief officers into tactical positions, thus allowing the company officers to be solely focused on task-level super­ vision of their companies. Most jurisdictions, however, do not have enough 24-hour coverage of chief officers to have them on scene in a timely or abundant fashion. Therefore, company officers can make great tactical supervisors as they are often on-scene prior to any chief offi­ cers, and likely multiple company officers may be on-scene before the second chief officer. When a company officer is assigned as a tactical supervisor, they have several options from which to assign the crew. First, the crew may be assigned to another company officer to aug­ ment that crew and ensure proper supervision. This is a good option when the crew is inexpe­ rienced. Second, the company officer may assign the crew to a non-IDLH assignment like a water supply, exposure line, or EMS. Third, the crew may be assigned an interior IDLH posi­ tion if the crew is senior and/or a senior member of the crew is capable of proper supervision. This happens regularly on senior truck and rescue companies. Finally, the crew may assist the company officer in the tasks of tactical supervision, such as pulling a second backup line, per­ forming door control, accounting for crews, or changing bottles, for example. The first-arriving company officer will be in command until the arrival of a second com­ pany officer or chief. Whether command is passed to the second company officer or retained by the first, the first-arriving chief may choose to assign the company officer in command as a tactical supervisor upon arrival. This quickly bridges the tactical gap by leveraging the tac­ tical advantage of the prior IC's knowledge of the building layout, fire location, tactical plan, and accounting of crews. This helps keep the alarm ahead of the incident power curve. Rather than assign the company officer/IC back to their crew at the task level, the previous IC can bump up to a tactical position rapidly without a lot of delay in command transfer. The new IC (chief) can rapidly get into the "then/what if" strategic mindset while the newly appointed tac­ tical supervisor remains in the "next" mindset. This bridging of the tactical gap from the *bottom-up* invests one company officer to maintain manageable span of control, maximize accountability, minimize TTT, continue risk assessment, and minimize radio traffic and delays in command transfer. *Task-saturation* is the phenomenon in which an individual performing tasks is overwhelmed, unable to think tactically, hear radio traffic, multi-task, or see the bigger picture. *Tunnel vision* is the condition in which an individual is extremely focused visually and misses their surround­ ings. *Auditory exclusion* is the condition in which an individual is focused on a particular sound or voice and does not hear other background sound. Examples would be missing an exposure building because you are focused on the flames of a house fire, or talking face-to-face with someone and not hearing your portable radio, respectively. In general, the second company officer to an area is a better choice to become the tactical supervisor because the first com­ pany officer is task-saturated, focused on stretching an attack line, forcing entry, donning an SCBA, initiating a search, and so on (fig. 7-14). Ideally, the tactical supervisor should be mobile, yet posted up at the threshold of the entry point to the hot zone in their division. This would be the front door of a house on division A, or the back door of a commercial building on division C. The tactical supervisor must be able to see the bigger picture and not get too far into the weeds. If they are in the hot zone with heavy smoke, they can no longer account for crews or step back and see conditions. They can go in briefly for face-to-face communication and accountability, but they must not remain in the hot zone or they will lose situational awareness. For this reason, even on a two-story house with fire on the second floor, the tactical supervisor will likely be division A if the attack is from the front door (fig. 7-15).  In some cases, most or all of the company officers may be required to initiate tasks on a larger incident. Multiple lines may need to be stretched while supply lines are established and rescues initiated. Here, the chief arriving and assuming command may choose a *top-down* method of bridging the tactical gap by taking on more centralized tactical decision-making until the arrival of the second chief. This was the case on a large multi-story center hall apart­ ment fire. We needed multiple attack lines from different locations with separate water sup­ plies, search from two different stairwells, vertical ventilation, and medical all simultaneously. This required all the company officers working on the fire floor to remain task-oriented, as it took at least two companies on each of the two different stairwells to get attack lines in place on the same floor. This necessitated that I, as the IC, direct crews with more tactical details on stairwell and hydrant locations and on what side to position apparatus. By the time the second chief arrived, the majority of the first alarm was assigned and he went in behind them as the division supervisor of the fire floor. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND Mayday and Mugging Division supervisors help decentralize command, breaking up the "opinion brigade," as Anthony Avillo would say, putting your chiefs and officers in forward command positions to increase your influence and span of control. When assigning a division, the individual at a minimum should be assigned a radio designation, area of respon­ sibility, and crews reporting to them. And in complicated incidents, their tactical objec­ tives should be included. At a structure fire, when assigning a division to a competent chief, the objective can be as simple as put out the fire. How this sounds on the radio: "Car 81 is Basement Division, Truck 4, Rescue 1, and Engine 6 are reporting to car 81." If command or operations fails to put this over the radio after a face-to-face assign­ ment, the division officer should make the announcement and/or follow up face-to- face with their crews.. On a stubborn fire that went to a second alarm, calling me in from home as a member of the command staff, I was assigned to the training division. Command assigned me the basement division. Prior to my arrival, crews were pulled out and defensive oper­ ations were attempting to reset and make a final push on the fire. Division Supervisors It is critical to understand that whether you are supervising one or multiple compa­ nies, you *are not a member of the company.* You are, in fact, operating alone while coor­ dinating companies in a forward position. These officers are not responsible for your accountability. You are responsible for theirs. When resources come available in a divi­ sion, supervisors should be assigned an aid or interior safety officer. Initially, I was assigned one company with five members and the simple objective of putting out the fire in the basement. I had ordered three members (including their boss) to advance the line and told two others to push the line in. I ordered that as soon as the first firefighter comes out to change his bottle, the backup firefighters should follow the line in. I waited outside, checking the conditions of the advance. I could see that they were hitting fire and making good progress. This staggered my time of entry a few minutes behind the hose crew. I knew this would help me maintain continuity of command. While that first crew had to exit for air, the next crew would meet up with me to extinguish the fire. I made entry crawling in with zero visibility. There was low heat, with about six inches of water on the floor and a loud constant noise of water flowing. I met up with the offi­ cer who thought they were at the far side of the basement. I directed him that they had about 10 feet more to go to reach the Alpha side. Then, one member's air pack alarmed for low air. I figured two would go out and the other two would come in, allowing us to extinguish the fire. I failed to communicate my expectations of having one of the firefighters with air remain to staff the nozzle. The firefighter handed me the nozzle, and I was going to pass it to the other firefighter. "MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY." Instead, the entire crew of three went out as a team, and before they got to the hatch way door, things went bad and conditions deteriorated rapidly. They made it up the stairs, but the two other firefighters were ordered by the chief not to descend the stairs. I found myself operating alone. At first, I had the pipe. As a chief, this never happens and I figured this was kind of cool. Afterall, the other members will be here in a minute. I could tell that I needed to advance the line another ten feet towards the Bravo side, down a little hall, to hit the base of the fire. The line was significantly caught up and I knew it would take another crew to make the final push, but no one came. The condi­ tion in my location was still favorable. Now, I knew my radio transmissions were not getting out and I could hear the chief call a Mayday for me. I tried to radio back to no avail. Still with low heat, I started to back out with the pipe in my hand. Pulling the line back over itself, due to debris and water, I could not find the hose but had the pipe in my hand. I radioed that I needed another line and a crew, but there was still no answer. As I crawled about half way back, intermittently stopping to hit the fire in front and behind me, I fell forward from a crawling position into the water. I lost the nozzle and looked up only to see an orange glow all around me. I calmly, but deliberately scurried to find the nozzle. Finding it allowed me to chase back a signifi­ cant fire situation now clearly defined in front of me and behind me. I later learned that my transmissions were not getting out due to a microphone short (this was confirmed after manufacturing testing). I knew I was close to the Charlie side, but not sure of the location of the stairs. I figured that once I hit the wall, I will go ten feet in one direction and if I didn't find the stairs, I would go ten feet in the other. I remember laughing to myself, because if I run out of air I might drown with all the water on the floor. At this point, Firefighter Matt Thomas located me in zero visibility as I was in a kneeling position, flowing water while keeping the fire in check. He was pulling me towards him and I kept asking if he knew where the door was. I was adamant not to go with him until I confirmed he knew where the door was. At the Fire Department Instructors Conference, FDNY Lt. Eddie Cancro told a RIT story in which a downed firefighter was located, but the RIT lost their orientation and couldn't find the stairs to escape. Firefighter Thomas confirmed that the stairs were straight ahead. I started to follow him when the fire came back. I opened the line to chase it back. A few second later, he grabbed me and pulled me to the stairs. I kept saying that I was fine. As I hit the stairs, others started to grab and pull me up the stairs. They were pulling my shoulder straps. As they pulled, my bottle kept catching the cement stairs. While this was done with the best of intentions, this was not a fun event for me. Due to having two previous surgeries on my shoulder, it felt more like a mugging than a rescue. Those firefighters all played a significant role to ensure I made it out, and I am extremely grateful. The moral of the story is that you cannot be left alone in a structure fire when you are a division or group supervisor. It's one thing to step in and check conditions or quickly account for your crews. You should *not,* however, be operating alone. Be sure to remain with other crews or notify a backup team, two-out team, or RIT that you are going in and to expect you to be out within two minutes or less. This will ensure your safety, accountability, and prevent an unnecessary RIT deployment. Remember to put this great book into practice. Checkbox command, where we check off that we have a company or two dedicated for RIT, doesn't mean anything if you don't ensure you get out of the firehouse and train with crews. This way you will be confident that they can competently fulfill the task at hand. The ICS Formula and Templating  ICS never put a fire out, but it organizes the people and resources that do. There seems to be a lot of confusion around America about when and why to use a division versus a group. First, they *are* the same level of authority, as both bosses are called supervisors, so they work with\' each other laterally. For example, a ventilation group may assist with PPV on divisions 4, 5, and 6. Or a rescue group may assist division 3 with multiple VEIS rescues. Another example would be a rescue group handing victims over to medical group for treat­ ment and transport. So, a group does not work for a division, nor a division for a group. They work *with* each other. So, when might we choose a group as a better means to tactically organize an incident? There are few easy situations. Functions like RIC and medical are almost always groups, as they are functionally organized. Several crews focused solely on search and rescue could work under a rescue group. Conversely, divisions A, B, C, or 1, 2, 3 are geographically organized. A roof division is usually a more appropriate choice for vertical ventilation than a ventilation group. One of the misconceptions of ICS is that it is not suited for fast-moving Type 4/5 incidents like structure fires. This is not a flaw in the system, but a flaw in traditional training. Most ICS training is relegated to defining the difference between a division, group, or branch, and fill­ ing out an organizational chart. Classes like 1-100,1-200,1-300 and beyond are excellent as a foundation; however, the nature of daily single and multi-alarm fires and other incidents requires a different type of training and application of ICS. It is a fallacy to consider any modern-day incident routine or bread-and-butter, as the nature and complexity of daily Type 4 and Type 5 incidents has changed dramatically since 2001. Another common misconception is that the use of divisions A, B, C, and/or D is only for defen­ sive operations. In fact, the use of geographic division is highly effective for interior, offensive operations. The portal and side of entry determines the division designation when using A-D. However, many other factors come into play for determining an effective and efficient ICS plan. Figure 7-16 shows a house fire to illustrate the strategic, tactical, and task levels working together. The span of control for the IC is currently 3:1, with division A, roof division, and medical all working directly for the IC. In addition to reducing the span of control, additional benefits include more face-to-face communication and active eyes-on accountability, embed­ ded safety officers, and division of labor for objectives and resource allocation. This house fire diagram is a foundation for the following section on how to apply ICS rapidly. *ICS templating* is the process used to rapidly apply ICS to an incident and remain ahead of the incident power curve. *The ICS formula* is composed of the building/situation + conditions \+ resources which determine your ICS template. All three factors should be considered in deter­ mining if, when, where, and how a group or division should be established (see fig. 7-17). The ICS formula (B+C+R=ICS) is composed of the following three factors/inputs: ** Building (B):** Large/small, residential/commercial, high/wide, big box, strip mall, center hall, garden-style, rowhouse, taxpayer, etc. ** Conditions (C):** Food on stove, heavy fire, victim trapped, exposures, high winds, lateral extension, vertical extension [Standard Conditions] [Standard Actions] Building (Fixed Factor) Problem (variable) Single Family Dwelling Apartments [Hhhhk]{.smallcaps} 4 Engines 1 Ladder Command - IC2 Safety-ISO 5 Engines 1 Ladder Command - IC2 Safety - ISO Stand Alone Commercial 5 Engines 1 Ladder Command - 1C2 Safety - ISO Stripmall 5 Engines 1 Ladder Command - IC2 Safety - ISO +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | fpjBDjOiyWjy | AildWtln-U | | | | | | AdalBumanb | | | | | | JC-2 | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Fire Attack** | Vent | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Primary Search** | On Deck | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Backup** | RIT | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | **Water Supply** | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Fire Attack | Exposure Resources | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Primary Search | Vent | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | CHECK EXPOSURE | On Deck | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Back Up | RIT | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Water Supply | 2ndry Water | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Fire Attack | Exposure Resources | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Roof Report | Vent | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Back Up | On Deck | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Water Supply | RIT | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | | Building System | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Fire Attack | Exposure Resources | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Roof Report | Vent | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | CHECK EXPOSURE | On Deck | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Back Up | RIT | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Water Supply | Building System | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ Standard Conditions Standard Actions Building (Fixed Factor) Problem (variable) Single Family Dwelling *[Working Fire]* Apartments *[Light Smoke]* 4 Engines 1 Ladder Command - IC2 Safety - ISO 5 Engines 1 Ladder Command - IC2 Safety - ISO [v] \_ [jc]{.smallcaps} - 2 El Fire Attack Ll- Primary Search E2-BackUp E 3 - Water Supply imei [Ll - Vent] [E3-On Deck] [E4 ---Lvll] Stand Alone Commercial *[Nothing Showing]* 5 Engines 1 Ladder Command - IC2 Safety - ISO Stripmall *[Working Fire]* 5 Engines 1 Ladder Command-IC2 Safety - ISO El-Fire Unit LI-Check Exposures E2 - Spot hydrant El - Investigating Ll-Complete 360 and roof Report El - Fire Attack Ll - Roof E2 - EXPOSURE E3-Water Supply Second Line All other Lvl -1 All other Lvl -1 **Safety Off - Exp Supervisor** E4 Crew- Back Up E4 Off --- **Fire Atk Supervisor** E5 - RIT Building System Fig. 7-17. Examples of ICS formula and templating from the Midwest City (OK) Fire Department ** Resources (R):** How many engines, trucks, medics, and chiefs are responding? What is the staffing? What is the response time? Arrival order? You cannot have a very extrava­ gant ICS with two-person engines arriving 20 minutes apart from each other. Template examples: ** Commercial/big box:** Divisions A, B, C, and D based upon entry point. Can be used for offensive, combination, or defensive strategies.  ** Strip malls:** Division A and C initially. May include divisions B and D if necessary to contain lateral extension. ** Regional mall:** May use divisions A, B, C, and D based upon the need to contain. ** Garden-style apartment:** If smaller, divisions A and C can get the front and back quickly organized. ** Center hall multi-floor:** Divisions 1,2, 3, 4, and so on. ** Townhome:** Divisions A, B, C, and D. ** Smaller house:** Division A. This includes two-story houses. ** Larger house:** Division A and C, or others as needed. Portal of entry is the division. If crews enter the C side and go to the second floor, they still work for C. ** Known Rescue:** In house, duplex, fourplex, condo, garden apartment---fire attack group, rescue group, medical group, roof division, or vent group. If operations are on the roof, a roof division clarifies to everyone on scene that roof operations are in progress. Incident templating also applies to other incidents: **o Vegetation fires:** Typically, division B (left flank), division 0 (head), and division X (right flank). This literally puts a BOX around the fire quickly. If needed, fill in the gaps with additional divisions as more resources arrive. ** MCI:** A medical group can have the objectives of triage, treatment, and transport. If a larger MCI, then medical branch could have triage, treatment, and transport units. Other groups and/or branches like fire/rescue, law, evacuation, and others may be required. ** Hazmat:** A hazmat group can have the objectives of entry, identification, decontamina­ tion, and so on. Others may be medical group, evacuation group, and so on. Again, size and complexity may drive the need for branches. Fire Attack and Rescue Groups When faced with a fire wih confirmed victims trapped, either notified en route by dispatch, or upon arrival from bystanders, things change. Firefighters will experience an adrenaline dump and have more tunnel vision and auditory exclusion. In addition, every firefighter leans toward rescue *or* fire attack as the *first* priority in a known victim situation. You are thinking of one or the other as you read this. That's normal. Relegating multiple known victims *and* fire attack to a lone division supervisor can be over­ whelming to that division supervisor. To overcome these predictable obstacles, splitting the load between a fire attack group and rescue group can easily organize an otherwise chaotic scene. I learned this the hard way on Morse Avenue with the three fatalities and had a chance to do it differently with El Camino. Again, the other factors matter. The building and resources are still part of the ICS formula. So, they must be taken into consideration. If your FD has few resources, you may stick with a single division. If the building is huge, like a Home Depot, or a high-rise, a single fire attack group supervisor cannot possibly manage all fire attack opera­ tions, so divisions are the way to go. However, you may augment with a rescue group. For example, I had a three-alarm fire in a center hall apartment building with multiple victims confirmed upon arrival. The main fire was on the top/third floor, which became division 3. Because of the number of potential victims, I set up a rescue group to work *laterally* with division 3 to augment the search and rescue operations by utilizing VEIS from the exterior, while crews searched from the inte­ rior hallway. A fire attack group and rescue group template is good for known victims in houses, duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, condominiums, and garden apartments. Beyond those, known victims in larger buildings or with few resources responding will need a division template. *Again, this* *is not one-size-fits-all. Train, train, and then train some more.* Branching Out  Typically, divisions, groups, or a combination of the two will work very effectively for the vast majority of structure fires and other incidents in the Type 5 and 4 arena. Occasionally, how­ ever, the size or type of incident may dictate the use of branches. *Branches* can be either geo­ graphic or functional and are comprised of multiple groups/divisions. They are very effective for larger, more complex incidents like a massive MCI, hazmat incident, or extremely large building fires like regional malls, massive apartment complexes, high-rises, or fires that involve multiple buildings or large areas. When a division or group supervisor becomes too saturated and the span of control too great, they and the IC can either create a new tactical level (split one division into two) or branch out (create a new layer). The new branch can then oversee the previous units in the division/ group by splitting them into new tactical units under the new branch. This keeps the IC's span of control the same, yet reduces the previous division/group supervisor's span of control back into a manageable size. For example, a division supervisor has too many units on the tenth floor of a high-rise fire. They may notify command of the need to branch out by turning division 10 into *branch* 10 with division A composed of companies accessing floor ten from the north stairwell, and division C composed of companies accessing floor ten from the south stairwell. If five companies were coming from each stairwell, division 10's span of control was 10:1. By branching out, an officer from each stairwell could be identified as the new division supervisor, bringing branch 10's span of control from 10:1 down to 2:1. A second way to reduce the span of control is to create a new division. For example, I assumed command at a structure fire in a large home that was over 10,000 square feet. This was clearly beyond the scope of the first division A supervisor working at the front of the structure. We created a second division D for crews entering from the right side of the home. While my span-of-control went up by one, it was still manageable. Early one foggy morning, I responded to a 30-vehicle pileup on Highway 5 in central Cali­ fornia. There was fire, hazardous materials leaking, occupants trapped, and countless people injured. We set up a fire/rescue branch, a hazmat branch, and a medical branch. Over 30 resources responded, yet the IC's span of control was 6:1 (PIO, safety, liaison officers included). Unified command was established with the California Highway Patrol. More about this in chapter 16. ICS = B + C + R The Safety Officer Many agencies assign the second-arriving chief officer as safety officer. This can be very effec­ tive and get a fresh set of eyes on the incident to identify the safety issues listed earlier. Haz­ ardous materials incidents and other technical incidents may require that the safety officer have technical qualifications and the position may even be mandated by law, depending on the jurisdiction or nature of the incident. For example, an assistant safety officer is often required on hazardous materials incidents and the officer must have the same qualifications as the hazardous material team making entry. For structure fires, an alternative methodology is to have the second chief officer arriving assume the division supervisor role of the hot division. If a company officer is already filling the role of the primary division supervisor, the second chief can either take over the primary division or assume a new division supervisor position if the incident is expanding. Remember, one of the primary responsibilities of any division/group supervisor is to be the safety officer for their tactical space. Therefore, if a house fire has division A, roof division, RIC group and medical group, there are actually *four* safety officers embedded in the incident. Rather than one safety officer who cannot be in more than one place at a time, multiple safety officers can constantly monitor their respective areas and crews working. This includes accountability as well. As discussed in chapter 2, decentralized incident command or *mission command* allows for tactical supervision to be placed in a forward position in the tactical space. Rather than a single safety officer and/or accountability officer, each division/group supervisor fulfills these roles around the incident. In addition, a safety officer increases, not decreases, the span of control for the IC. Typically, the safety officer has no tactical authority and can only stop or identify safety issues. WISDOM FROM THE MASTERS Do Incident Safety Officers Really Help? CHIEF DAVE DODSON (RET), EAGLE RIVER (CO) Way back in 19981 wrote the first book dedicated to the specific duties and responsi­ bilities of an incident safety officer (o), and in 1999 it was published by Delmar Publi­ cations. My motivation to write the text came from an increasing trend of firefighters being caught in flashovers and collapses, but also from a misuse of safety officers---a shallow expectation that they were merely bunker-cops. In the book, I professed that the ISO must bridge any disconnect between the incident commander, changing con­ ditions, and crew exposure, and better predict potentials such as flashover and build­ ing collapse. I also stated that the ultimate goal of any safety officer is to *eliminate the* *need for safety officers.* Since then, the book has gone through three revisions, a new publisher, and become the study reference for over ten thousand fire officers seeking Pro-Board certification as an incident safety officer. I share this history not as a cele­ bration, but a preface to some discoveries I've made and some realities that all fire offi­ cers must embrace. Twelve years as a duty safety officer and over twenty years networking with members of the Fire Department Safety Officer Association has led me to the belief that one of the first---and most important---contributions an assigned safety officer (now labeled SOF) at a building fire incident can make is to evaluate (read) the building and com­ municate fire spread and collapse/failure