Anatomy and Physiology of an Incident PDF

Jill Anatomy and Physiology of an Incident Fig. 4-0. Every incident has three primary levels of operation: strategic, tactical, and task. Introduction Regardless of the size, type, or nature of the incident, all have a common anatomy and physi­ ology. Viewing it this way helps us approach any...

Jill Anatomy and Physiology of an Incident Fig. 4-0. Every incident has three primary levels of operation: strategic, tactical, and task. Introduction Regardless of the size, type, or nature of the incident, all have a common anatomy and physi­ ology. Viewing it this way helps us approach any type of response with a consistent methodol­ ogy and nomenclature to organize, manage, and mitigate the event. While no two incidents are ever the same, we can anticipate common characteristics in each, so we are equipped to apply a standard decision-making model, speak the same language, and operate consistently over time. As the variables specific to the incident at hand unfold, we plug them into the system to minimize chaos, keeping the troops calm while allowing the maximum ability to anticipate variables and adjust to unforeseen circumstances. This chapter gives an overview and context to the anatomy, terminology, and physiological characteristics of incidents. Subsequent chap­ ters in the book are referenced and go into much greater detail. Consider this an introduction. Incident Types There are five incident types: Types 1-5. *Type 1 incidents* involve large, federal-level events like 9/11 (fig. 4-1), large wildfires, and massive hurricanes, for example. *Type 2 incidents* are typi­ cally state-level incidents like smaller fires, floods, and events that are located or impacting resources within that state. Examples would be smaller hurricanes or earthquakes, and flood­ ing that impacts multiple counties. Type 1 and 2 incident management teams (IMTs) are com­ posed of overhead personnel who -will typically take over the management of larger incidents as they escalate. *Type 3 incidents* are county or operational area incidents that last more than a day (opera­ tional period) and involve more than one agency (fig. 4-2). *Operational areas* are typically syn­ onymous with county jurisdiction. Type 3 IMTs have become extremely common throughout the United States since 9/11. Incidents like local flooding, or multiple incidents operating con­ currently like floods, fires, or human-made acts, would likely be managed by a Type 3 IMT until relieved by a higher-level team if escalating. More on IMTs in Chapter 16: Unified Command. *Type 4 incidents* can be considered multi-alarm/multi-agency events (multi-alarm structure fire) that last up to 24 hours (fig. 4-3). A larger fire department will likely mitigate these inci­ dents without any automatic/mutual aid, while smaller agencies may have automatic/mutual aid agreements in place that are required to mitigate the same-size incident. *Type 5 incidents* are single alarm, initial response events that happen every day, from med­ ical aids to house fires, and can be mitigated in a few hours or less (fig. 4-4). The scope of the majority of this text is on Type 4 and 5 incidents. Chapter 16 does discuss Type 1-3 incidents. Pre-Incident Considerations Modern incidents demand that we think more globally to ensure success. Rather than only considering the period between dispatch and close of the incident, pre- and post-incident con­ siderations will set up the fire department for greater success. Therefore, they should be fac­ tored into the overall incident anatomy and physiology. Pre-incident preparation includes pre-planning target hazards, high life-threat occupan­ cies, and multi-family dwellings. Training and the capabilities of your team are critical. This includes considering who is staffing companies during the shift and considering their   training and experience. You may need to move personnel to set up the team for optimal performance. The deployment model should be factored into your command philosophy and preparation. Countless communities and cities have endless permutations of deployment models, staffing, resource levels, automatic and mutual aid arrangements, volunteer/combination/career depart­ ments, and dispatch centers. On any given day, you may have staffing shortages, company clo­ sures, or units out of service for training, maintenance, special events, and so on. Consider traffic patterns, weather conditions, run volume, and special events. A good incident com­ mander knows what companies are out of service or out of position throughout the shift. Sit­ uational awareness and preparation before the dispatch will keep you from being surprised when the bell rings. Incident Anatomy and Physiology  Upon dispatch, the actual incident has 12 components, each with specific characteristics: 1. Dispatch/Response 2. Arrival/Size-Up 3. Priority/Strategy 4. Tactics 5. Tasks 6. Resources 7. ICS/Organization 8. Communications 9. Re-evaluation 10. Support 11. Transfer/Close 12. On-Scene After-Action Review (AAR) Dispatch and Response Upon dispatch, you will consider the type, size, and nature of the incident. Your first priority is to get to the incident safely. If you are a chief or a staff officer and do not have a driver, inci­ dent technician, or a company you can follow out of your station, you must take the time to map yourself into the incident before you respond code 3. Fortunately, most systems have an automatic mapping function. As a company officer, you have the luxury of a driver, engineer, or apparatus operator. Many would-be first-due companies miss a turn and get delayed because of over-zealous officers who do not route their driver into the scene or look up the pre-plan. Consider who will be first-in and if the correct number and type of resources are responding. Is the normal first-due com­ pany delayed? Is the weather a factor and will there be additional delays due to traffic? What is the potential? Should any special resources be added to the incident response? Cues like multiple calls to dispatch, a column of smoke, a report of visible flames, and a report of a fire across from a particular address likely lead to a working fire. If you have a pre-plan of the loca­ tion, only open it if you have a driver. Otherwise get to the scene safely and open the pre-plan later. This includes satellite mapping systems. If you know the occupancy or location and have important information, share it. Otherwise, keep the radio quiet. Standard operating guide­ lines (SOGs) for communications are extremely varied. Ensure all units are on the proper chan­ nel and that you have clear communication with dispatch. Additional considerations for response are listed in sections 2 and 3, where specific incident types are discussed. Arrival and Size-Up This is often the most critical step in the incident because we start on the right foot, or not. A systematic, institutionalized method of size-up must be adopted and trained upon by your organization if you expect to have maximum effectiveness and consistency day-in and day-out. Size-up is an ongoing mental process, from pre-planning, SOGs, and training to after-action review, more training, and SOG revision. As related to arrival of an incident, *size-up* is the mental process of rapidly gathering information, assessing risk, gain, available resources, stra­ tegic and tactical options, and developing an initial incident action plan. This process is con­ tinuous throughout the incident (fig. 4-5). One misconception is that size-up and arrival reports are synonymous. This is not true. Size-up is a mental process that precedes the verbal process of giving an arrival report on the radio. An *arrival report* happens *after* a mental size-up and is the first-due company or chief officer's initial radio report to incoming units to communicate arrival, conditions, actions, and needs, including the assumption or passing of command for subsequent resources responding. We delve much further into both size-ups and arrival reports in chapter 5: Size-Up, Risk Management, and Communications. Priority/Strategy The *incident commander* (IC) determines the incident priority and strategy, develops the incident action plan, and orders resources to mitigate the problem. The *strategic level* of the incident is where the IC resides who is typically furthest away (over 50 feet) from the incident and thinking furthest ahead of the incident (fig. 4-6). The mindset of the IC is in the "then/what-if" level of thinking. The IC must think downstream (then) regarding next stages and resource needs like additional alarms, special resource needs, transitioning into a salvage and overhaul, or investi­ gation. The IC must think ahead of the current situation regarding potential risks and plan for and anticipate unknown and unplanned (what-if) events such as a Mayday, an unknown victim, exposures involved, or rapid fire progression. The strategic level is the furthest away from the incident and the IC must be ahead of the incident in the "then/what-if" mindset.  The *incident action plan* (IAP) is the amalgamation of the priority, strategy, tactical objec­ tives, communication, resource allocation, and organization of the incident. Type 1-3 incidents have the luxury of a planning section that produces a written plan for a given operational period. A Type 4 (multi-alarm) or Type 5 (single alarm) response such as a structure fire does not have the discretionary time or resources to develop such an IAP. The *starting point* for an IAP at these common, daily incidents is a consolidation of your agency SOGs/SOPs, policy, response levels, pre-plans, dispatch protocols, radio frequencies, training, and so on. These pre-established factors give us the opportunity to rapidly respond to, organize, and mitigate a Type 4 or 5 incident where discretionary time is minimal. Unlike Type 1-3 incidents, the true LAP on a structure fire or any other single or multi-alarm incident is verbalized and recorded as the incident unfolds. The *incident command post* (ICP) is where the IC and other aids or overhead personnel reside. The location of the ICP has been open to debate for decades. Generally speaking, the front of a building is a good location; however, this is not always possible due to apparatus, conditions, hoselines, and so on. Also, a corner of a building gives the IC two sides of the building to see. Two overall philosophies exist regarding the location and positioning of the ICP: inside the command vehicle or outside. There are benefits to each. Inside the command vehicle has the benefits of a quieter working environment. Fireground noise like apparatus, saws, radio traf­ fic, sirens, horns, and inclement weather make it difficult to hear the radio, think, and not be distracted with bystanders and side conversations. Subtle nuances like the sound of a vibra-alert system, the sound of low-air self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and the tone of voice of the crews give the IC insight. The benefits of being outside the vehicle are that the IC can see and hear conditions more readily and support staff can easily access the IC. The *incident priority* is the most overarching urgency that determines the incident strategy, objectives, resources needs, and level of gain or risk to be considered. It is the first and biggest decision made by the incident commander. The three options for incident priorities, *regardless* *of the type of incident,* are life saving, incident stabilization, and property/environment. All incidents, regardless of type, nature, and size, will be in one of these three priorities. A *life saving priority* indicates that there is civilian human life at risk and savable. Therefore, a higher amount of risk may be taken by responders. This would drive incident objectives like search and rescue operations, interior attack, or evacuation of civilians from hazardous areas where injury or death is imminent. The term Life "Safety" has been commonly used in the past. This creates confusion on what lives are the priority: the civilians or the firefighters? Safety is always part of our mindset as firefighters and we do not want to take unnecessary risk. That said, a life *saving* priority is for the civilians. An *incident stabilization priority* indicates that all civilian life loss risk has been mitigated and the operations are focused on preventing further escalation, property loss, and bringing the situation under control. A moderate to low level of risk is allowed in this situation. This would drive incident objectives like exposure protection, confinement and preventing exten­ sion, extinguishment, and containing or stopping a leak. Finally, a*property/environmentpriority* indicates that all civilian life is free of risk, the inci­ dent is controlled and stabilized, and now the focus of the response is on preventing further damage to property and the environment. Minimal risk is allowed in this situation. This would drive incident objectives like salvage and overhaul, mopping up a vegetation fire, preventing runoff from reaching a storm drain, or calling in special resources to clean up hazardous material. The *incident strategy* determines the position from which resources will engage the prob­ lem. Every incident, *regardless of type,* will have one of three strategies: offensive, defensive, or combination. An *offensive strategy* indicates that personnel are engaged in a forward moving posture to engage in more aggressive operations to accomplish incident objectives. Structural fire­ ground examples would be interior fire attack, search, vertical ventilation, or salvage and overhaul. Vegetation fire examples would be direct attack operations (remove the fire from the fuel) that extinguish the fire with hoselines. An MCI example would include triage, treat­ ment, and transportation. Hazardous material incident examples would include a team entering a hazardous area to contain a leak or rescue an exposed civilian or entering a build­ ing to evacuate. A *defensive strategy* indicates that personnel are engaged in a backward-moving posture to engage in less aggressive and lower-risk operations to accomplish incident objectives and pre­ vent further loss or damage. Structural fireground examples would be exterior fire attack for a prolonged period with large caliber streams or elevated master streams. Vegetation fire exam­ ples would be indirect attack operations (remove fuel from the fire) such as back-burning, firing out, cutting handlines, cutting in dozer lines, and performing structure defense. An MCI exam­ ple would include remaining outside an area threatened by a hazardous material or active threats prior to performing triage, treatment, and transportation. Hazardous material incident examples would include restricting access to the area around the hazard, denying entry, and gross decontamination. A *combination strategy* indicates that the incident has both an area where an offensive strat­ egy is being employed *and* a defensive strategy is being employed simultaneously. An example would be a strip mall with collapse of the center unit (defensive space); however, units are able to enter the B and D exposures to contain the fire and evacuate (offensive space). A vegetation/ wildland fire example of a combination strategy would be in the wildland urban interface (WUI), where direct attack is being utilized on the flanks of the fire while structure defense is utilized in front of the fire to protect residences. An MCI example would be an active shooter confined by law enforcement to a building in an office complex (defensive), while fire and EMS personnel triage, treat, and transport victims outside the building (offensive). A hazardous material incident example of a combination strategy would be an engine and truck company evacuating a commercial building (offensive) from the A side, while the leak on the C side of the structure is isolated and entry is denied until the arrival of a technically qualified hazard­ ous material team (defensive). Incident priorities and strategies can change throughout the event. For example, a struc­ ture fire may begin offensive, then deteriorating conditions warrant a retreat to defensive. Once an all clear is declared for the involved building, the priority will change to incident stabiliza­ tion. It is certainly common for a fire to be in a stabilization priority with an offensive strategy. For example, the fire is knocked down, secondary search is all clear, yet crews remain inside to perform salvage and overhaul. The risk threshold is less, so if conditions deteriorate, the IC can easily switch to a combination or defensive strategy more quickly without regard for poten­ tial civilian life. Tactical The *tactical level* of the incident is between the strategic-level IC and the task-level crews work­ ing. *Tactical officers* make operational decisions, assign crews to specific tasks, account for their personnel, and assess safety issues to accomplish the incident tactical objectives. Deci­ sions are made in the field by tactical officers closer to the work and hot zone (6-50 feet away) than the IC. The mindset of the tactical officer is in the next level of thinking. The tactical offi­ cer must think ahead of the current situation they are seeing and order resources in anticipa­ tion of needs to accomplish incident tactical objectives. Since they are closer to the hot zone than the IC, yet further away from the work than the task-level companies, they can recognize and anticipate changing conditions more quickly regarding collapse, vent-point ignition, flash- over, and fire beneath or above companies working, for example. Their primary means to com­ municate with their crews is face-to-face, which reduces radio traffic but enhances communication quality and maintains accountability (fig. 4-7). While a company officer will supervise a single crew, they are often too task-saturated to supervise multiple crews or companies while standing back from the anticipated work in a manner to truly fulfill the functions required of a tactical supervisor. Limited staffing and response levels force most company officers to perform tasks alongside their crews and pre­ vent them from being very effective tactical officers. Division and group supervisors will most effectively fill the role of tactical supervisor. *Divi­* *sion supervisors* focus on a geographic area, such as the front of a building, third floor, roof, or flank of a fire. *Group supervisors* focus on functional components of an incident, such as fire attack, search, ventilation, medical, or rapid intervention crew (RIC). *Consolidating multiple* *companies under one division or group supervisor is a critical factor in creating safe, effective,* *and efficient emergency scene operations.* Examples of tactical officer actions for varying incidents include, but are not limited to: ** Structure fire:** Ordering additional hoselines, ensuring primary and secondary searches are complete, coordinating fire attack and ventilation, checking for fire extension, recognizing collapse potential, anticipating/preventing hostile fire events, preventing access or evacuating crews, and prioritizing areas for salvage and overhaul. ** Vegetation fire:** Ordering additional resources for their division, sending companies to get more water, coordinating with other divisions, prioritizing structures to be defended, and recognizing downed power lines, watch out situations, and changing wind direction. ** Hazardous materials incidents:** Defining the exclusion zone, ordering additional resources, tracking entry and egress, supervising evacuations, and setting up gross decontamination. ** MCI:** Setting up triage, treatment, and transport areas, establishing traffic patterns for ground ambulances, and identifying an area for a landing zone/helispot. Tactics are employed under the priority and strategy established by the IC. *Tactical objec­* *tives* are the incident's operational and functional goals to be accomplished. Examples for structure fires are rescue, exposure control, confinement, extinguishment, ventilation, salvage, overhaul, RIC, rehab, medical treatment/transport, and support. Examples of vegetation fire tactical objectives are perimeter control, structure defense, establishing handlines or dozer lines, air attack, mop up, and so on. Examples for hazardous material incidents are identify hazard, deny entry, stop a leak, contain a spill, backup, decontamination, and so on. Examples for MCI are triage, treatment, transport, and so on. *Control objectives* are based upon operational/geographic boundaries for the incident. A structure fire may have a control objective of containing the fire to the room or unit of origin. For larger fires, it may be to the wing, floor, or building of origin. For vegetation fires it is common to put a box around the fire so all units know the control objectives/boundaries for the fire. Boundaries are likely based upon geographical landmarks where the fire can be stopped (something like, "south of Elder Creek Rd, west of Excelsior Rd, north of Florin Road, east of Bradshaw Rd") (fig. 4-8). The *tactical gap* is the space between the strategic-level IC and the task-level crews working where risk assessment, communications, accountability, and situational awareness become distorted. *This is the tenderloin or sweet spot of the incident, where the battle is truly won or lost.* The view, conditions, and sense of situation/resource status is very different between the strategic and task levels. The IC is too far away and the crews are too close/inside the hazard area. Therefore, the need to assign tactical division/group supervisors is paramount. While the crews are up close, inside the environment working, they are subjected to smoke, noise, thermal insult, auditory exclusion, tunnel vision, increased cardiovascular stress, SCBA, nfl\* i. \>Q J ? 9 Fig. 4-8. Control objectives can be physical boundaries, like roads for a vegetation fire. cumbersome PPE, confined spaces, and a host of other bad things. They are trying to survive a potentially lethal environment that wants to kill them. Meanwhile, out at the command post, the IC is far away from the work and only seeing one side or corner of a building. The only tether to any situational awareness or accountability to those whose lives the IC is responsible for inside the building is through a radio. The IC is talking to a bunch of workers who really don't want to chat, are hard to understand if they do answer the radio, and don't hear most of the radio traffic in the first place. Their reality is very different than the IC's. This is centralized command. Unfortunately, the fire service has been in the habit of this type of command structure for decades, where everyone reports to the IC. The IC's span of con­ trol is blown out, the IC gets overwhelmed and behind the incident power curve, and the com­ munications get sloppier and harder to understand. And accountability is out the window. Sound familiar? I was once in my battalion office, listening to a commercial structure fire across town in another jurisdiction. The engine officer transmitted some incomprehensible message through a SCBA to the IC from inside the fire. The IC responded with the usual, "Repeat?" The engine officer transmitted again, this time louder and slower. Still unable to understand the trans­ mission, the IC said, "Engine X, I can't understand you, but you are talking which means you're alive, and that's good enough for now." At least the IC was honest instead of responding with the usual "copy" from the ICP when the IC has no clue what was just said. Good luck continues to breed bad habits into the next generation. Many new chiefs are just trying to learn to drive code 3 while talking on multiple radios, navigating the route to the scene, getting updates from dispatch on the Mobile Data Computer/Terminal (MDT) and some­ how trying to account for a bunch of adrenaline-filled firefighters who are running into a building that might kill them. The tactical gap is usually overlooked, it's the space where you can really see what is going on in that area of the incident. It's the front or back of a building, 6-50 feet away. It's seeing fire in the overhead, or underneath your firefighters. It's the lap of the structure, when possible. It's the stairwell outside the 7th floor landing. It's seeing vent-point ignition, potential collapse, or a lack of coordination between the attack crews and vertical vent team. It's where you get a victim profile from occupants. *We must bridge the tactical gap ASAP with division/group super­* *visors. This is mission command and decentralization* (fig. 4-9). It's also where the NIOSH 5 live (see chapter 5). It's where you can really see the risk and conduct active eyes-on and hands-on accountability. It's where you can talk to the crews face-to- face instead of on the radio and form a tactical plan while checking air status, company tags, and names on turnout coats. It's where the battle is won or lost. I have been the division supervisor countless times and I *always* had a better level of situa­ tional awareness than the IC at the ICP. Not because I was smarter than anyone, but because I was standing in the tactical gap. Task The *task level* is where the work gets done. *Company officers* directly supervise the tasks of their crews and account for their personnel. Decisions are carried out by task-level officers and their crews directly within the hot zone (0-6 of situational awareness). Tunnel vision and auditory exclusion are maximized in the task level, causing common challenges with situational aware­ ness, accountability, and communications (See chapter 5). The mindset of the tactical officer is in the "now" level of thinking. Examples of tasks include but are not limited to stretching hoselines, forcing a door, searching, cutting a hole, pumping an engine, donning an SCBA, throwing a ladder, treating a patient, entering a hazardous mate­ rial area, and cutting a handline. As an IC, you must remember that time moves much slower at the command post than at the task level, where the work is getting done. Your tactical supervisors will see, in real time, progress being made, where crews are, and how conditions are changing for the crews work­ ing. With tactical supervisors in place, the need to request updates directly from crews is min­ imized. This will keep radio traffic minimized, and the crews won't feel harassed by the IC when they are just trying to do the work in a violent environment. Resources Resources must be called early. As a general rule, it is much better to have the resources and not need them than need them and not have them. The second priority upon response to a dis­ patch (after arriving safely) is ensuring the right type and number of resources are dispatched. This is accomplished by updates from dispatch, knowledge of the building and location, pre-plans, and other signs like a large column of smoke, heavy winds, or power outages. One critical question to ask dispatch when responding to a structure fire is if everyone is reported out of the structure or not. While we still perform a search and only *we* will declare an all clear for a building, an update that three confirmed victims are trapped is critical information that must be shared immediately. Unfortunately, sometimes this information is not relayed to responding units. There are three types of staging areas: level 1, level 2, and forward staging. *Level 1 staging* occurs when resources stand by in the direction of travel, within a block of the incident (fig. 4-10). This usually occurs with a first alarm unless assignments are given. *Level 2 staging* occurs when a separate and specific location has been established away from the main inci­ dent, usually when greater alarms are called (fig. 4-11). Finally, *forward staging* occurs when personnel who are fully equipped with PPE and SCBA come with tools and equipment to a forward area to be imminently assigned (fig. 4-12). The location is usually the ICP or a division/group area. The benefit of forward staging is that it greatly reduces reflex time to get additional or replacement crews into service. Forward-staged crews can be used for anything the IC deems appropriate. For example, a crew can stand by to relieve another crew, deploy an additional hoseline, perform a secondary search, or set up RIC. ICS/Organization The incident must be organized as soon as possible to ensure accurate accountability of per­ sonnel and resources. This will prevent the IC from getting behind the curve and overwhelmed with an unmanageable span of control. When this happens, there is no longer an IC, just an OW (overwhelmed), chasing the incident on the radio and asking for a lot of updates.  ICS is the national standard and primary means of organizing incidents, whether small or large, simple or complex. Setting up divisions and groups proactively will bridge the tactical gap. All too often, incident commanders resist the use of ICS or setting up of divisions and groups. As discussed in chapter 2, this phenomenon is usually a result of a lack of training, or developing complacency on smaller, more manageable fires. *ICS is like a parachute: Don't wait* *until you hit the ground to pull the chord.* We will delve much further into ICS throughout the rest of this book. For the Type 5 (single alarm) and Type 4 (multi-alarm) arena, ICS must be swift, simple, and quickly adaptable. Unfortunately, ICS is often applied in a wildland mindset to a structure fire, or the inappropriate level of ICS is applied. For example, the first level of ICS that is typically utilized would be a division or group. Many times, a fire department or IC will set up an oper­ ations chief (OSC). This is a much higher level than necessary and has virtually no benefits. Utilizing an OSC essentially passes the buck from the IC and dumps all the problems and chal­ lenges onto the OSC. The only one who benefits is the IC who now has very little to do. This is NOT the intent of ICS. Notice the specific hierarchy in the operations section in figure 4-13. The bottom of the totem pole is the single resource (engine, truck, etc). Next is a *strike team* that is comprised of  if the plan is working or not. Perhaps an all clear was made by companies inside the structure and you switch to an incident stabilization priority while maintaining an offensive strategy. Tactical objectives would include salvage and overhaul. Conversely, you may see or be told of deteriorating conditions and concern for structural stability and switch from an offensive to a defensive strategy. You may decide to call additional resources, add overhead personnel, or call special support units. Tactical objectives would include exposure protection with the tasks of establishing elevated master streams and water supplies. This in turn would drive the resource request for two engines and two trucks. Support Once the IAP is verified, the incident must be supported properly to execute the plan. Support functions may take on many forms, including but not limited to the following: Additional units/alarms Overhead personnel (safety and public information officers) Specialty units Lighting and air Food/water and rehab Utility companies Red Cross (for displaced occupants) Law enforcement EMS Building management Board up crews Investigator Citizen support is vital to excellent service. You may have displaced renters with a landlord who is out of town. You may have an apartment complex with dozens of occupants out in the cold of night with an apathetic manager and no spare units. Perhaps the fire was confined to a specific area and the owner wants to continue to occupy their home and you have shut off the power. Heaven forbid, you have a child whose parents are not capable of caring for them. Whatever the case, you are only limited by your imagination and empathy. Be sure to go the extra mile and ask yourself, "What if this was my home and my family?" Transfer/Close As the IC, you will either command the incident until the end and turn the property back over to management/owner/occupant, or you may transfer command to another officer. Transfer of command requires specific information to be relayed to the newIC regarding the IAP. This includes current priority, strategy, tactical/control objectives, benchmarks accomplished, ICS (resource assignments), communications plan, and resource needs. Many tools are utilized to accomplish the command transfer effectively and efficiently. More on this will be discussed in chapter 5. On-Scene After-Action Review An excellent learning opportunity is conducting a brief, tailboard after-action review with companies prior to them clearing the scene (fig. 4-14). If the fire has not been completely over­ hauled, ensure that one company is keeping an eye out for flareups with a hoseline in place, especially in the attic or cockloft. Then, after the review, companies can be released back into service until overhaul and investigation is completed and the property is turned back over the owner/occupant/manager. We will study after-action reviews, reports and the full cycle to maximize learning for the future.  Summary groups; maintaining clear communications; and constantly re-evaluating to properly support the incident or switch directions all come from knowing incident anatomy and physiology. Only then can you drive the incident, command, coordinate, and lead others to lead in the battle. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Describe the five incident types. 2. Explain the difference between size-up and an arrival report. 3. Explain a combination strategy. 4. Describe tactical objectives and control objectives. 5. Explain the tactical gap. 6. What are the three levels of staging? FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The two course objectives for CO279 Strategy and Tactics are to create a strategy and imple­ ment appropriate tactics through a working knowledge and execution of IMS/NIMS at the incident. This chapter establishes the foundations of strategy selection and tactical support for an incident both operationally and through command functions. Course outcome \#2 is an expectation that students understand the importance pre-fire planning and associated phases. Through this chapter, incident types and order are broken down by section providing a detailed review of opportunity for pre-incident preparation and planning. Course outcome \#4 is the expectation that the student can describe the steps during size-up. This chapter details size-up as a prearrival, arrival and ongoing process providing the student with guidance at each step. Course outcome \#5 is the expectation that the student understands the significance of fire­ ground communications. This chapter contains a section on fireground communications through formal systems such as dispatch, command, and tactical channels as well as the dif­ ferences between communication as interactions on the fireground with regard to face-to-face communication, environmental and mental stressors, span of control, and situational aware­ ness. Course outcome \#6 is the expectation that the students identify the roles of NIMS and IMS as it relates to strategy and tactics, and course outcome \#7 is the expectation that the stu­ dent can demonstrate knowledge of the various roles and responsibilities in ICS/NIMS. This chapter takes ICS/NIMS and begins to associate roles and responsibilities with their strategic or tactical location and role. NFPA1021 Job Performance Requirements The content in this chapter covers incident typing and, incident structure and incident time­ lines. This information can be utilized to support training and educational programs associ­ ated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, Fire Officer II JPR 5.6 and Fire Officer III JPR 6.6.