Command Philosophy for Modern Incidents PDF

Command Philosophy Modern Incidents Fig. 2-0. Military doctrine must be part of modern incident command. Introduction *Every battle is won or lost before it is ever fought.* This ancient quote from *The Art of Warfare* by Sun Tzu applies to the modern fireground and emergency environment.^1^ W...

Command Philosophy Modern Incidents Fig. 2-0. Military doctrine must be part of modern incident command. Introduction *Every battle is won or lost before it is ever fought.* This ancient quote from *The Art of Warfare* by Sun Tzu applies to the modern fireground and emergency environment.^1^ We must be able to see the battle in our minds, train, forecast, extrap­ olate all permutations, and be ready for unknowns. The effort put into knowledge of building construction in your area, fire behavior, tactical decision-making, hands-on training, pre-planning, teambuilding, and drilling in realistic, stressful environments is what drives a winning battle. These are all elements that are factored in before the bell ever rings (before the battle is ever fought). This means everyone! Not just the incident commander (IC), but all offi­ cers and crew members. Modern incident command and management is a team sport requiring exponential think­ ing, multi-dimensional preparation, and decentralized decision-making. Rather than linear thinking, where we expect an incident to follow our algorithms and play nice in the sandbox, modern incident command must prepare for simultaneous actions, exponential growth, vio­ lent events, ambushes, and unprecedented challenges. Decentralized Command versus Centralized Command The *Span of Control* is the number of resources a commander can effectively manage. Histor­ ically, the optimal span of control is 5:1. Modern incident commanders are not just engaging with companies working, they are also engaging with dispatch, bystanders, traffic, mapping, and pre-plans while also managing radios. In reality, 3:1 is more realistic. *Centralized Command* means that all resources report directly to the IC and all tactical decisions are made by the IC. The result is often a central point of contact (the IC) for all resources, who is tethered to multiple companies *only* by an overloaded radio frequency, and who is likely operating outside a manageable span of control. This results in an IC who is redlin­ ing and unable to get or think ahead of the incident in the "what-if" mindset. If another alarm is called, an unknown victim is found, a Mayday is declared, or if any number of other unknown situations unfold, the IC who is taxed by normal operations becomes overwhelmed and is no longer in command or control. A centralized command ethos slows down the response and allows the fire (or any incident) to *outpace* the fire department operations. We cannot stop the clock, put the fire in staging, or call another alarm of time. We must decentralize! Effective incident command, coordination, and management cannot be accomplished by a centralized command philosophy with a single incident commander at the command post who has not trained and prepared the *entire alarm to work as a team,* nor given out tactical super­ vision (decision-making authority) to multiple officers who are in the tactical gap. In short, no IC, no matter how experienced or well-trained, can keep up with, let alone stay ahead of, an incident like a team of officers working together and sharing the division of labor and decision-making authority can. No IC (even with an incident technician or aide at the incident command post \[ICP\]) can be everywhere at once assessing the risk. Nor can they account for all the crews and resources on scene, rotating out and coming in. Other processes that tap the IC's mental bandwidth include forecasting changing building and fire conditions that could lead to tragedy; maintaining clear communication on multiple channels with dispatch and multiple resources; processing bystander inputs; and reconning valuable information regarding victim profile, additional hazards, and construction features. If this sounds like a lot, it is! And that's without a victim trapped, a Mayday, or exposures burning. Often, the answer to these challenges is more technology or tools used by the IC at the ICP. The Fireground Accountability and Tracking System (FATS) tags and passports, global posi­ tioning system (GPS), drones, Google Maps, and countless other tools flood our industry in an attempt to help bridge the tactical gap and keep the IC from drowning. While there are some excellent tools, nothing replaces the use of ICS and a decentralized command philosophy whereby tactical supervisors are trained and empowered to help the IC drive the incident. Some fire agencies have the luxury of a large overhead support system of chief officers, both operational and staff, who can respond. The challenge is often that these officers are out of position, on other alarms, or not available after business hours. Some systems have enough companies to assign an engine company to the ICP to assist the IC. Most agencies do not have either of these luxuries. There is a new normal in emergency response that is redefined daily. Modern incidents have become immensely complex from factors including, but not limited to: Increased response levels due to rapid intervention team, EMS, and other requirements Decreased response levels due to closures and staffing Building construction Low-mass synthetics Wildland urban interface (WUI) Drought Weather events Terrorism Civil unrest, rioting, and mass arson Political and socioeconomic divide More complex hazardous materials Violence against first responders COVID-19 Population increase More families co-living Social media Inexperienced firefighters Hoarding Commercial buildings over-filled with flammables Commercial buildings used as dwellings Excess fire loading, inventory, and high-piled stock Arson due to poor economic conditions At Sacramento Metro Fire, the span of control was 15:1 for a battalion chief (BC) respond­ ing to a house fire from the time of dispatch: 4 engines, 2 trucks (that routinely split into 2 teams each), a medic unit, and another BC. In addition, the BC had no driver and was navigat­ ing code 3 driving in city traffic, talking on a command channel to dispatch, a tactical chan­ nel to responding companies, using the mobile data computer (MDC) to track resources and updates, and referencing the map to get to the scene. Meanwhile, the tactical channel is crackling with companies arriving, going to work, and giving updates on conditions, while the command channel is buzzing with other units, inci­ dents, and dispatch calling the BC with updates. This is all before arriving! The notion of 5:1 is *not* just the resources you are managing, it includes anything that is demanding your atten­ tion (even driving), requiring your brain to process information. 5:1 gets blown out very quickly. ---Carl von Clausewitz can only be developed through training *and* time. *Mission command is based on the Army's view that war is a human endeavor and* *inherently dynamic and uncertain. No plan can accountfor every possibility, and most* *plans must change rapidly during execution if they are to succeed. The principles of* *mission command are:* * Competence* * Shared understanding* * Mutual trust* * Mission orders* * Commander's intent* * Disciplined initiative* * Risk acceptance* *Mission command requires an environment of trust and shared understanding among* *commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires building effective teams and a command* *climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative* *to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander's intent. Through mission* *orders, commandersfocus leaders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details* *of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control and allows* *subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks. Finally, when* *delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success* *by allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.^4^* *The Commander's Intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation* *and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the* *staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's* *desired results withoutfurther orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.^3^* For fire department IC's, *Commander's Intent (Leader'sIntent)* is the Incident Priority/Strategy declaration upon the assumption of command. When an IC states, "We are in life priority, offensive strategy\... " that sets the left and right boundaries for the incident. Tactical division or group supervisors then execute the mission objectives of search, fire attack, ventilation, forcible entry, and so on. When an incident stabilization/defensive strategy is declared, the same holds true. The supervisors keep everyone out of the building (parameters), then focus the battle on protect­ ing exposures and preventing further growth (objectives). Developing Your Officers for Mission Command The *mission command mindset* means command through controlling standards, expectations, and performance. This is a 24-hour-a-day enterprise consisting of training, drilling, pre-planning, coaching, empowering, communicating, analyzing, operating, debriefing, reviewing, and revising. Rather than waiting for the alarm to go off, we must develop our team issues privately. *Commanders develop a basic level of control within their organizations when they create* *a culture that embraces mission command at every level. The time spent inculcating* *mission command into training, education, and problem solving prior to operations saves* *time and simplifies command and control during operations. Commanders cannot expect* *subordinates to respond effectively to a mission command approach once operations* *commence if they have not developed subordinates comfortable in its use beforehand.* *Effective mission command requires well-developed subordinates capable of decentralized* *execution of missions and tasks. Training must create common, repetitive, shared* *experiences that build trust and allow commands to acquire competence in shared* *understanding. Trained teams are able to communicate explicitly and implicitly, conduct* *decentralized operations, and achieve unity of effort in uncertain situations.^7^* The tenets of mission command are competence, shared understanding, mutual trust, mis­ sion orders, commander s intent, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance. From a fire service standpoint, these may seem either overly simplistic or extremely esoteric. They can be both. On the one hand, these tenets are simple to understand and self-defining. On the other hand, they may be a collection of obscure military terms and the furthest thing from what is hap­ pening in a fire department. *Competence* should be self-explanatory. It is the expectation that all members are skilled in their jobs and can act at the task level with the utmost skill and professionalism. If the com­ pany officer, or a chief officer, must intervene to assist with additional training or a perfor­ mance improvement plan, then this should be done as soon as possible. One captain was struggling with the notion of having more autonomy in decision-making at the tactical level. He had always worked in battalions with a more centralized approach, and he was not trained nor accustomed to what was being asked of him. We set up one-on-one meet­ ings, simulations, and reviewed fires together. As the company drills ensued, he became more comfortable in the multi-company environment. When he was placed in a division role on a duplex fire, he did a fine job and often asked for more training and opportunities to grow. The key was that the training was not punitive, and he had a supportive learning environment. *Shared understanding* means that the IC, tactical division or group supervisors, and task-level companies are all on the same page regarding the incident priority and strategy, tactical and control objectives, and the situation and resource status. In simple terms, they knew the inci­ dent action plan (IAP) for every incident. Shared understanding also meant that we did after-action reviews as an entire alarm. Whether a brief tailboard hotwash or a formal train­ ing session with video and audio, all members attended. This provided a shared understand­ ing of the process and areas for improvement. This was also an excellent succession planning process for aspiring officers. *Mutual trust* is the glue that holds the team and operation together. It does not happen over­ night. Only through *training and time* does trust emerge. It is tested on the fireground. The officers must trust that the IC will keep the incident in the correct priority and strategy, call for resources when asked, and not steal back authority once it has been delegated to the tac­ tical level. The IC must trust that their company officers can handle the burden of division or group supervision, will lean into the opportunity to lead, and will execute tactics in a similar fashion that the pre-planning and training has provided. The El Camino Fire had minimal radio traffic, yet crews performed vent, enter, isolate, search (VEIS) and deployed multiple hoselines to varying locations without notifying me (the IC) of these tactics. They saved a 456-year-old boy without having to ask for permission. Tactical group supervisors led the operations and were entrusted to execute without asking  Rather than think of an incident as beginning upon dispatch and ending when command is terminated, we must consider many pre-incident factors that will set our team up for suc­ cess prior to the incident, and afterwards, many others that will set us up for success in the next incident. Building this mission command culture is a full-time job and success is truly developed between the dispatches. Mission Command for the Incident Command System Fortunately, the Incident Command System (ICS) is designed to manage any type of incident, from the simplest public assist single-resource response to a Type 1 national-level historic event. Unfortunately, ICS is often relegated to Type 1-3 incidents and not utilized and prac­ ticed on more frequent Type 4-5 incidents, where it can be easily applied to mitigate the common issues that plague these daily incidents. Often, ICS ends at the Type 3 Incident Man­ agement Team (IMT) or incident. This lack of usage of ICS at the more common Type 4 (multi-alarm) and Type 5 (single alarm) incidents has created an extremely disparate philos­ ophy toward incident command and management, especially regarding structure fires. Proper application of ICS can affect and improve common struggles associated with Type 4 and 5 incidents, including communications, accountability, risk management, span of con­ trol, safety, fog of war, and many other challenges. *A decentralized philosophy treats all the officers on a single or multi-alarm response as a Type* *5 or Type 4 IMT, respectively.* This requires a tremendous amount of training and time to build that team where the IC has enough trust in their officers to bridge the tactical gap and make decisions on behalf of the IC. This means trusting that a quiet radio frequency is a good thing because there are less task-level companies talking on the radio and instead talking face-to- face to their division or group supervisors. One reason for the inconsistency in ICS application for structure fires is that ICS was devel­ oped in the wildland arena to manage massive fires. Since ICS was born out of necessity in the 1970's from large-scale wildland fires, one of the stigmas is that it is only good for large-scale incidents. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Soberanes Fire in California burned 132,127 acres, 57 homes, killed a dozer operator named Robert Reagan III---a husband and father of two precious little girls---and had over 5,000 personnel assigned (fig. 2-2). No one would argue whether ICS is needed to manage this immense incident. However, the use of ICS for structure fires is still a bit of a challenge for some. The common theme in those who struggle with ICS is simply a lack of proper training. These are smart, thoughtful, experi­ enced, genuinely concerned firefighters who were never taught how to effectively apply ICS to structure fires. Most ICS training is relegated to defining the difference between groups, divisions, and branches. Even then, many officers struggle. As we all know, applying a tool on an actual emer­ gency scene requires vastly more training than simply reciting definitions. As we mentioned previously, no one argues the benefits of ICS on large-scale incidents. One of the problems with training is the failure to recognize the critical differences between wildland fires and struc­ ture fires and that applying ICS in a wildland method to a structure fire is doomed to fail. Fig. 2-2. The Soberanes Fire on the second day. The fire started July 22, 2016 in Garrapata State Park. Table 2-1. Differences Between Wildland Fires and Structure Fires +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Factor | Wildland Fires | Structure Fires | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Work Period | 12-24 hours | 12-24 minutes | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Personal Protective | Lightweight | Cumbersome | | Equipment | | | | | NoSCBA | SCBA | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Communications | Multiple | One frequency | | | frequencies | | | | | Hindered by SCBA | | | Not hindered by | | | | SCBA | Feedback due to | | | | confined | | | Relatively open | | | | workspace allows | workspace | | | | | | | clearer | | | | communications | | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Situational Awareness | Supported by field | Hindered by smoke | | | observers | and heat | | | | | | | Visibility | Visibility | | | typically good | typically bad | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Conditions | Relatively more | Relatively less | | | predictable | predictable | | | | | | | Low thermal insult | High thermal insult | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Incident Progression | Relatively slower | Relatively rapid | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Life Loss | Less | More | | Historically | | | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Duration of Incident | Days to weeks | Minutes to hours | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | Overhead Support | Plentiful | Minimal | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ greatest loss of civilians and firefighter lives year in and year out. Therefore, we should be using ICS on house fires, but we often do not because of our view of them as easy, routine events. Let's Look at Some Facts *In 2021, localfire departments responded to an estimated 1.35 million fires in the United* *States. These fires caused 3,800 civilian fire deaths and 14,700 reported civilian fire* *injuries. The property damage caused by these fires was estimated at \$15.9 billion. On* *average, a fire department responded to a fire somewhere in the US every 23 seconds in* *2021. A home structure fire was reported every 93 seconds, a home fire death occurred* *every three hours and eight minutes, and a home fire injury occurred every 47 minutes.* *More than one-third of the fires (486,500, or 36%) occurred in or on structures. Most of the* *fire losses were caused by these fires, including 3,010 civilian fire deaths (79%); 12,600* *civilian fire injuries (86%); and \$12.7 billion in direct property damage (80%). Majorfires* *in the Colorado wildland urban interface (WUI) caused \$648 billion in direct property* *damage (4%). Unfortunately, losses from WUIfires were not broken out by incident type.* *A substantial portion of the loss was undoubtedly due to structurefires. Only one-quarter* *of the fires (25%) occurred in home properties, including one- or two-family homes and* *apartments or other multifamily housing. However, these fires caused three-quarters of* *the civilian fire deaths (75%) and injuries (76%). One of every five fires (20%) occurred in* *one- or two-family homes, yet thesefires caused nearly two-thirds of the civilianfire deaths* *(64%\>) and over half of the civilian fire injuries (54%\>). The 6%\> of fires that occurred in* *apartments caused 11% of the civilian fire deaths and 21%\> of the injuries. Vehicle fires* *accountedfor 15% of the fires, 18% of the civilian fire deaths, and 10% of the civilian fire* *injuries. Neither structures nor vehicles were involved in half of the fires (49%) reported* *in 2021. These fires, not including structures nor vehicles, were brush, grass, or wildland* *fires---excluding crops, timber, and other properties of value (20%); outside rubbish fires* *(17%); outside fires involving property of value (6%); and otherfires (6%). The 2021 overall* *estimate for total fire incidents was 55% lower than in 1980. Additionally, property loss,* *adjustedfor inflation, was 20% lower in 2021 than in 1980. The 2021 estimate of totalfire* *deaths was 42% lower than in 1980, home fire deaths were 50% lower, deaths in one- or* *two-family home fires were 47% lower, and apartmentfire deaths were 66% lower. Because* *the U.S. population has grown since 1980, population-based rates have dropped even more* *than the estimates have. Less progress has been made in preventing the deaths and injuries* *associated with reportedfires. **For overall home fires, the 2021 rate of 7.9 deaths per*** ***1,000 reported home fires was higher than the rate of 7.1 in 1980. The rate for one-*** ***or two-family home fires was 35% higher than in 1980, while the rate for apartment*** *fires was 31% lower. Most of the reduction in the number of reportedfires andfire losses* *occurred more than a decade ago. There is still more work to do, particularly around* *home fires.^9^* House fires are the greatest fire threat to civilian life and the most common structure fire for firefighters. These high risk and high frequency events are a perfect opportunity to utilize ICS on a regular basis. This develops officers at all levels with repetitions on the more com­ monly occurring fires (that claim the most lives). Then, when a larger fire comes along in an apartment or commercial building, your officers are experienced and ready to jump into tac­ tical division/group supervisor positions. The Operations Triangle and Core Values The *Operational Triangle* is composed of the elements critical to successful operations: strat­ egy & tactics, ICS, and standard operating guidelines (SOGs, also referred to as standard oper­ ating procedures \[SOPs\]) (see fig. 2-3). All three are required and work together in a symbiotic interwoven fashion. Rather than look at operations from a silo, with engine, truck, rescue, med­ ical, and command all working independently, we must realize that all must work in concert for the best possible outcome. Strategy & Tactics are at the bottom of the triangle and repre­ sent the foundation and the most critical element. This is where incident priorities, strategy, and tactics like search, fire attack, vent, and forcible entry all happen. Depth of understanding in tactics, fire behavior, building construction, the latest Underwriters Laboratories/National Institute of Standards and Technology research, case studies, and experience come into play (fig-2-3). ICS is the national standard for commanding incidents, and it works very effectively in the hands of a well-trained IC and responding officers. ICS can fluctuate to fit your incident, whether food on the stove of a stand-alone 1200-square-foot home, an apartment building with multiple units, a commercial structure fire with Mayday, or a conflagration that burns down thousands of structures. SOGs are your playbook. Many varying philosophies exist regarding SOGs. Some believe that they are a necessary evil and occupy computer space, that they have no real value, and check the box. Others believe that a fire department (FD) cannot have enough SOGs and want one for every possible permutation that could exist. This is usually followed by a stringent phi­ losophy where the SOGs *must be* followed at all times. In addition, some believe that utilizing SOGs for resource pre-assignments for a structure fire is negligent and that the IC must orches­ trate every move each company makes (centralized). Conversely, many FDs have SOGs that list pre-assignments and considerations for companies based upon the incident type and arrival order. Mission command and decentralized \\ both dictate that pre-assignments are a fundamen­ tal aspect of the success of outpacing the enemy (fire). Pre-assignments or SOGs are simply a playbook. Similar to how each team in the National Football League (NFL) has a playbook for different teams and circumstances, so too must an FD have a playbook (SOGs) that lays out the plan, including pre-assignments. Pre-assignments allow all responding officers to know the gameplan going into battle. Then, as inevitable variables unfold, adjustments can be made. Consider an NFL head coach who has studied the opposing team, trained, and prepared his team, and develops a game plan with scripted plays. Everyone knows the plan and has  practiced and watched game film. Then, the quarterback steps up under center and sees a blitz coming, or another unexpected variable and calls an audible to the offense. They adjust. Then, split-second decisions are made by all the players to carry out the play. This same process is applied to the modern fire department that recognizes how fast a fire grows and how quickly the window of time to save a civilian shuts. Therefore, pre-assignments play a *vital* role in staying ahead of the incident and in deploying mission command. Just as the NFL coach prepared his team for a game, a chief prepares their battalion or fire depart­ ment for battle. The whistle blows on the field just as the alarm goes off in the firehouse. The play is called by the coach on the sidelines just as the chief declares a life priority/defensive strategy with the tactical objectives of fire attack, vent, search, and medical. Then, just as the quarterback calls "Omaha" to signal an audible for a blitz, the IC gets information back from their tactical supervisors that they must switch to a defensive strategy. In this analogy, the IC is the head coach and the quarterback is a division supervisor. We need a plan that is flexible and can be adapted in the field by skilled officers who are empow­ ered and trained to carry out the mission. Otherwise, we have everyone stage and ask for direc­ tion from the IC. This centralized process will not keep up with the fire, let alone outpace it. The IC still has the latitude to override an operation for safety reasons. This is not the same as undermining the tactical supervisor, it's simply due diligence. As the IC on a large apart­ ment fire, I was asked by Division 3 on the fire floor for blowers. From his vantage point, the Division 3 supervisor didn't see what I saw from the ICP: fire still blowing out of two apartment windows that were being fed by a gas leak. I simply replied, "Negative Division 3, you have heavy fire on the alpha/delta corner. Once you get that contained and we get the leak stopped, you can have all the blowers you want." The outputs, or results of the operations triangle, are the operational core values: safe, effec­ tive, efficient and consistent operations. The priority is in that order, top to bottom: * Safe---*Is the operation done without unnecessary risk? This job is dangerous. There is risk. Make sure there is no *unnecessary* risk. There is not a lot that is safe about going into a burning building. Perhaps the saying should be, "be smart," or "don't be danger­ ous," or "don't take unnecessary risk." * Effective---*Is the operation making a positive difference? If not, why? Either adjust or back out. * Efficient---Is* the operation done with as little wasted time and resources as possible? More resources, more radio traffic, and faster actions do not always mean more effi­ ciency. High speed/low drag is the key to efficiency on the fireground. * Consistent---*Are our operations as an organization/region consistent across all shifts and companies? This is one of the most common challenges in the fire service; however, it is not insurmountable. High-impact, realistic training, as a battalion or full alarm assign­ ment, over time, will result in more consistency. The Operations Triangle was utilized in the consolidation of the two 20-station fire districts that created the new 40-station Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District. One agency was very loose and didn't have much in the way of SOGs. The other was the opposite and had more SOGs than anyone could count. In the wake of the merger, there was operational confusion and con­ flict as these two converging and opposing philosophies came to bear on fires. As we devel­ oped SOGs, one side wanted none, and the other wanted more. So, to meet in the middle, the operational core values were developed. They were the leader's intent for the new fire district. The operational core values were also the means from which to call an audible on the SOGs. Does deviating from the SOG (calling an audible) make the operation more safe, effective, or efficient? If so, do it. Unacceptable Reasons to Call an Audible on an SOG I didn't know the SOG I don't like/agree with the SOG I don't like SOGs in general I don't like the people who wrote the SOG SOGs were still developed with pre-assignments; however, the core values provided a succinct leader's intent. The Ten Commandments of Incident Command As we begin to delve into greater detail regarding incident command, an overview will set the tone for the rest of this book. "The 10 Commandments of Incident Command" is a list of fun­ damental rules of engagement that can be applied to any incident. 1. Know the Enemy The enemy is a structure fire, a vegetation fire, a hazardous material, an active shooter, a technical rescue, an earthquake, a flood, etc. We must know our enemy, respect our enemy, and outsmart our enemy. Each has unique challenges that we will explore in sections 2 and 3. 2. Know the Battlefield The battlefield can be a legacy home, a lightweight modern home, a multi-family fourplex, a center hall apartment, a multi-use taxpayer, a big box warehouse, a high-rise, a field full of light flashy fuel, a forest, a river, an industrial complex, a mountainside, a collapsed building, or any other possible location that humans occupy. We must know these different theaters and how they are built and designed, and how they evolved, function, and behave. 3. Know the Weapons and Tactics of War Each incident type and kind has specific tactics associated with it. We must know the tac­ tics and resources available for each and every incident that we could encounter in our jurisdictions, and often beyond. Tactics evolve. VEIS was once VES. VEIS was once only for one room, now it has evolved into window initiated search. As an IC, you do not have to be a technician on each and every piece of equipment and apparatus in your battalion. You must know the capabilities and tactics, the resources, and the needs to support them. 4. Perform a Thorough, Ongoing Size-up As you will see in chapter 5, size-up is a critical, continuous, mental process to access risk versus gain and forecast how the incident will behave. Mission command is vital to a thor­ ough, ongoing size-up. 5. Stay ahead of the Incident Power Curve The IC must remain ahead of the incident in the "then/what-if" mindset. Here forecasting, contingency planning, and preparing for an incident within the incident (IWI) occur. Do *not* get caught behind the curve! Again, mission command is vital to remaining ahead of the curve. 6. Communicate in a Calm, Clear, Confident Fashion The \#1 problem in all incidents is communication. Learn and train others how to commu­ nicate effectively. "As the first line goes, so goes the fire" is a common saying. "If the IC panics, so will everyone else" is also true. Do not make it worse. Your incidents should all sound the same. Whether a smoldering cigarette butt in the middle of the Nevada dessert or a 5-alarm apartment fire on a windy day with a busload of hemophiliacs in a glass truck, you should sound calm. 7. Give Clear Objectives Do not assume that all responders have clear leader's intent. Focus the troops on the most important tactical and control objectives and then support them to accomplish those objectives. 8. Establish ICS Divisions and Groups Early Proactive use of ICS will fulfill a mission command ethos and prevent you from getting behind the incident power curve. Do not wait until you are overwhelmed and beyond your span of control before assigning division and group supervisors. We will go into this in much more detail throughout the book. 9. Have a Plan B and a Plan C Contingency and emergency plans are crucial to have established in your back pocket before you need them. A contingency plan would be switching to a defensive strategy. An emer­ gency plan would be a building collapse or a Mayday. 10. Have the Guts to Say No The IC is the least popular person to the troops on the fireground when they say no to con­ tinuing the firefight due to possible collapse, severe winds, lack of resources, deteriorating conditions, etc. As the Division C supervisor on a strip mall fire, I was told by command that we were switching to a combination strategy. I concurred, as the building was all clear and several units were untenable. We retreated to an offensive space and wrote off the areas involved. The crews were not happy about it, but it was the right thing to do. I just told them to yell at the IC. Summary The command philosophy of the 2020s and beyond represents a paradigm shift away from the centralized processes of the past. The military evolved decades ago into a decentralized ethos, and the fire service is well overdue to follow. Several key components will provide the founda­ tion from which to move forward: mission command, ICS, and operational core values. Mission command is the primary command philosophy of the modern military and is required of today's fire service. The key principles of mission command are competence, shared understanding, mutual trust, mission orders, commander's intent, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance. Command and tactical decision-making authority are decentralized to offi­ cers in the field of battle who are charged with leading smaller groups of warriors. Those offi­ cers are trained, equipped, empowered, and entrusted to carry out the leader's intent. This gives left and right boundaries to these field officers and the latitude to fulfill the objectives in any matter they see fit, within the leader's intent. This reduces lag time, confusion, and com­ munication overload, and encourages empowerment, ingenuity, and initiative to outpace the enemy, rather than be bogged down by a process-driven, centralized, and antiquated model. ICS is built to apply mission command to the fire service. Decentralization, modular orga­ nization, and flexibility are all characteristics of ICS; however, some agencies either apply a wildland mindset to ICS or have not trained enough to apply it in the structure fire arena with success. Therefore, ICS has been relegated by some to larger, less common incidents due to the misconception that it is too large and cumbersome to be used expeditiously on structure fires, especially house fires, our most common and lethal foe. This book aims to solve these challenges. Operational core values are also vital to mission command in that they give a condensed, standing order list of leader's intent: be safe, effective, and efficient. This empowers field offi­ cers to have disciplined initiative while accepting risk, both of which are vital to mission command. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Define span of control. 2. Define and compare centralized and decentralized command. 3. Explain what the commander's intent would include on the fireground. 4. What are the tenets of mission command? 5. Describe the operational core values of the Operations Triangle. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content Course outcome \#6 is the expectation that the student will be able to identify roles in IMS/ NIMS as it relates to strategy and tactics, and \#7 is that they can demonstrate knowledge of the various roles and responsibilities in ICS/NIMS. The content in this chapter introduces the purpose of utilizing the IMS and how the structure translates to delegation of tasks and decen­ tralization of decision making and action. Understanding the mission (the why) behind the organizational charts is the keystone to comprehension and appropriate utilization. Endnotes 1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War.* 2. *ADP-06 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2019), ARN34403-ADP\_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf 3. *ADP-06 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.* 4. *FM 5-0 Planning and Orders Production,* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of the Army, 2022), 5. *FM 5-0 Planning and Orders Production,* (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of the Army, 2022), 6. *ADP-06 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.* 7. *ADP-06 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.* 8. *ADP-06 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.* 9. Shelby Hall and Ben Evarts, "US Fire Loss in 2021," *NFPA Journal,* December 7,2022.