Hazardous Materials Incidents PDF

14 Hazardous Materials Introduction Hazardous materials (hazmat) incidents have more potential than ever. Secondary devices, lithium-ion batteries, dirty bombs, white powder substances, vehicle accidents, and uninten­ tional leaks/releases all have the potential for a lot of chaos. Today's stru...

14 Hazardous Materials Introduction Hazardous materials (hazmat) incidents have more potential than ever. Secondary devices, lithium-ion batteries, dirty bombs, white powder substances, vehicle accidents, and uninten­ tional leaks/releases all have the potential for a lot of chaos. Today's structure fires are wrought with hazardous materials. Even if you do not have a formal hazmat response, your structure fires can be laden with hazmat. Look at the average home garage and you need look no further. Gasoline, oils, solvents, pesticides, paints, canisters, and countless other hazmat are common­ place. Refer to the Boyd Street case study in chapter 10. See also Appendix B, Boyd Street Inci­ dent. Below is an excerpt from the Boyd Street Incident green sheet: *The Boyd event was an extremely violent, hot, and rapidly expanding fire due to the* *abundant fuel supply in the form of smoke (carbon monoxide/CO), plastics, butane, and* *nitrous oxide (N~2~0). Of particular concern was the extremely large quantity of the Nf).* *Although Nf) is a non-combustible gas, N~2~0, when heated, will decompose, creating an* *exothermic reaction. During the decomposition phase, its compounds split, releasing* *oxygen (Of, and nitrogen (Nf. IfNf) is mixed with afuel source, it will also create a rapidly* *expanding pressure wave of carbon dioxide (COf and water vapor (Hf)).* *The small N20 cylindersfound on scene of the Boyd Incident contained approximately 8* *grams each of net product and have been known to release their contents in temperatures* *as low as 106° Fahrenheit. As the fire intensity and pre-heating increased, the release of* *the Nf) increased. The temperature around the Nf) storage was approximately 400° to* *over 900° Fahrenheit early into the event.* *According to industry experts, when large quantities of product contained in the cylinders* *are stacked in quantity and exposed to heat, they can release or explode from the outer* *edges of the storage configuration, working inward until a critical temperature is reached.* *This can cause a simultaneous release of a large portion of the product to occur, with* *violent results.* Fortunately, we have taught you to use the same process for all incidents: Size-up (includ­ ing victim profile), priority, strategy, tactics\... Your ICS will flow from there and help with your incident action plan, resource ordering, and so on. Hazmat is no different. That said, there are specific objectives and considerations to make you more safe, effective, and efficient as the incident commander of a hazmat event. Reference 29 CFR 1910.120 for the Code of Federal Reg­ ulations regarding hazmat operations and response for further information. Again, like an MCI, a hazmat must first be recognized to be properly commanded and resolved. Once the incident goes beyond the capability of the first company on scene, the inci­ dent commander must think big. When in doubt, make calls. You may have a department or county hazmat team that will advise you prior to their arrival. Making proper notifications early is crucial to resolving the issue in a timely manner. In addition to the hazmat response team (HMRT), county hazmat, the county office of emergency services (OES), National Guard Civil Support Teams (fig. 14-1), and law enforcement may all be required to be notified. If a restaurant, cafeteria, grocery store, or any food processing facil­ ity is involved, county health must be notified.  The North County Fire District in Monterey County is responsible for providing fire protection and emergency services to several communities, including the typically peaceful Moss Landing, California. Moss Landing is a small coastal community located in the northern part of Monterey County, known for its picturesque harbor, diverse wildlife, and agricultural activities. At 01:00 on September 20, 2022, Fire Station No. 1 received an alarm indicating an unknown fire at the intersection of CA-Highway 1 and Dolan Rd. Initially perceived as a nuisance incident, it was quickly escalated as the dispatcher upgraded the response to a structure fire at the Elkhorn Battery Energy Storage Facility. On that day, I served as the on-duty chief officer, having previously held the same role during a battery incident in September of the previous year at a neighboring facility. The Elkhorn Battery Energy Storage Facility was commissioned in April of 2022. The facility is owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). Situated next to the federally protected Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary, this facility plays a cru­ cial role in storing and releasing excess electricity. The facility supports the integra­ tion of renewable energy sources while ensuring a reliable power supply. With a capacity of 182.5 megawatts (MW), the Elkhorn Battery Energy Storage Facility houses 256 Tesla Megapack battery packs. These lithium-ion battery arrays are specifically designed to store the surplus renewable energy that solar installations generate. During periods of low demand, the facility stores this energy and releases it during peak-demand periods. Upon the arrival of the first fire engine at the scene, the company officer reported wit­ nessing a glow from within the secured premises of the PG&E facility. When I reached the facility, I met up with the company officer, who had been on the scene for approx­ imately five minutes. The company officer confirmed what we had heard on the radio: a Megapack was engulfed in flames. At that moment, I realized we were facing a chal­ lenging incident due to our knowledge of lithium-ion battery fires. Lithium-ion batteries pose a significant threat to firefighters when they go into ther­ mal runaway and ignite. The combustion of these batteries can release intense heat and toxic fumes, putting firefighters at risk of severe burns and injuries. Extinguish­ ing such fires can be challenging and sometimes impossible. In particular, the Mega­ pack cannot be extinguished once it goes into thermal runaway, and it may take anywhere from four to six hours to burn down. After confirming the safety of all plant personnel, my immediate priority was to con­ sult the site's emergency pre-plan (pre-plan) to guide my actions. As I opened it, mem­ ories of the planning process flooded back. The fire district and PG&E had worked together diligently to create the pre-plan, meticulously outlining necessary actions to safeguard the well-being of first responders during an emergency event. I then assigned two engine companies to set up two portable water monitors to safe­ guard adjacent Megapacks not involved in the fire, as stipulated by the pre-plan. The on-site water system provided ample water volume and pressure, allowing us to avoid deploying fire engines into the hot zone. Once the monitors were in place, we relocated the engine companies to the warm zone, away from toxic fumes or smoke. We knew that as the fire evolved into a hazmat incident, we needed to assume the necessary roles and establish a unified incident command structure. To do so, I requested assis­ tance from law enforcement for evacuation or shelter-in-place orders. When the rep­ resentatives from the Monterey County Environmental Health Department (EH) and the Monterey County Office of Emergency Services (OES) arrived, they became tech­ nical advisors, providing valuable information and guidance throughout the incident. In anticipation of the event generating significant publicity, I called Cal OES to inform them about the burning Megapack emitting toxic fumes and gases into the atmosphere. As the fire continued to burn and the winds picked up, the safety of the surrounding community became an even greater concern. Command made the decision to issue shelter-in-place orders for the immediate area surrounding the facility, which also included the closure of a small section of California's CA-1 Highway. These measures were taken to ensure the well-being of residents, commuters, and others in the vicin­ ity of the facility. The Megapack continued to burn for approximately six hours, caus­ ing the shelter-in-place order to remain in effect for most of the day. The safety of the public was our utmost priority, and we wanted to ensure that there was no further threat to their well-being. To confirm the absence of any lingering hazards, proper air sampling was conducted. Once the results verified that there was no longer a threat to the public, the shelter-in-place order was lifted, allowing residents and commuters to resume their normal activities with peace of mind. Collaboration between the incident commanders and PG&E was pivotal in mitigating the incident. Working closely with PG&E, our team coordinated efforts to prevent addi­ tional Megapacks from being affected. PG&E's extensive knowledge of the facility's layout and operational intricacies proved invaluable in strategizing containment mea­ sures. Together, we devised a comprehensive plan that included targeted suppression efforts and protective measures to safeguard non-involved critical equipment. Through close collaboration with environmental agencies, we documented potential ecological harm and implemented effective measures to prevent the spread of harm­ ful substances within the facility. Equipped with a fire suppression water system, onsite water monitors, and several holding ponds for fire suppression water, the facility ensured safety and actively safeguarded the surrounding ecosystem. The preparedness and knowledge gained through the pre-planning process proved crucial during the actual emergency. By understanding the risks associated with lithium-ion battery fires and implementing appropriate safety measures, we were able to protect lives, property, and the environment. It cannot be overstated how import­ ant it is to work with developers early on and provide ongoing training. The importance of these measures became evident in the successful outcome of the incident. In conclusion, it is essential to raise awareness about the risks associated with lithium-ion battery fires and ensure the implementation of proper safety measures to protect firefighters, the public, and the environment. Extensive planning with the facil­ ity, onsite training, and close collaboration with PG&E management ensured that the incident resulted in no injuries to site employees, the public, or firefighters. This inci­ dent highlights the dedication and professionalism of the individuals involved in emer­ gency response, who fulfill their duties as part of their commitment to the communities they serve. Glossary **Assistant safety officer (ASO):** Separate from the incident safety officer, the ASO must have the same training as the entry team and focuses solely on hazmat operations safety. **Backup team:** The technical hazmat team that is standing by if the entry team requires assis­ tance or extrication. **Contamination reduction zone (CRZ):** The area between the exclusion zone and the support zone in which decontamination occurs (fig. 14-2). **Entry team:** The technical hazmat team that enters the exclusion zone to mitigate a spill or leak. **Exclusion zone:** The area immediately around a hazardous material leak or spill in which spe­ cialized PPE must be utilized by technical-level responders. **Gross decontamination:** The act of decontaminating large numbers of people who may be exposed to hazardous materials. This may be done with water alone by firefighters and hoselines. **Hazardous materials group supervisor/branch director:** The individual in charge of the tactical and technical hazmat operations on a scene. **Site access control:** The act of preventing persons from going into and out of the exclusion zone to prevent cross contamination. **Support zone:** The area furthest away from the exclusion zone in which support functions such as command and medical are staged and working. **Technical decontamination:** The act of decontaminating the entry and backup team mem­ bers with multiple steps and solutions appropriate to the hazardous material. If an entry is required, a backup team must be ready. This will also require technical decontamina­ tion for the team as they exit the area. **Technical reference specialist:** The individual charged with identifying the characteristics, dangers, operating procedures, mitigation measures, and overall safe and effective han­ dling of the hazardous material product. Tactical Considerations for Hazardous Materials Response Identify, Isolate, and Deny Entry For an active incident, the first tactical objective is to identify the material, isolate, and deny entry to the area to prevent further exposure. This could be anything from simply keeping people back with tape, to mass evacuations, closing rail lines, or freeways. Do not be afraid to think big. Wind and weather are a major consideration. Refer to your SOGs and the U.S. Depart­ ment of Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) for details, including removing those in immediate danger (fig. 14-3). The Safety Data Sheet (SDS) lists the hazardous ingredients of a product, its physical and chemical characteristics (e.g., flammability, explosive properties), its effect on human health, the chemicals with which it can adversely react, handling precautions, the types of measures that can be used to control exposure, emergency and first aid procedures, and methods to con­ tain a spill. This will contain critical information regarding the material you are dealing with,  including but not limited to hazard classification, flammability, toxicity, health hazards, and potential medical response information. Refer to your agency and county hazmat response policy. Your HMRT will provide the expertise for the actual tactical considerations and proce­ dures regarding entry, mitigation, and decontamination. Your job is to support and organize the incident. Entry and Mitigation As with all incidents, determine the VP ASAP. This may be a worker or bystander incapacitated in the immediate area, employees exposed, or civilians evacuating the building or area. An MCI may be generated as well. Your VP drives your priority, strategy, tactics, tasks, and resource needs. This will also help you determine if you have discretionary time or not to mitigate the hazard Remember, the first priority is to identify, isolate the hazmat, and deny entry. That said, refer to your ERG, hazmat team, SOGs, MSDS, policy, and on-scene experts if you are faced with a confirmed VP with a person down in the immediate area of a spill or release. The hazmat group supervisor (HMGS), or branch director with multiple hazmat groups is responsible for the tactical and technical operations. This includes technical reference, site access, entry, back up, and decontamination. The entry team must have a backup team place along with an ASO to approve the entry. Decontamination and Medical Once mitigated, all personnel that entered must go through technical decontamination through the CRZ (fig. 14-4). This includes all equipment. Non-technical companies can assist and sup­ port this under the direction of the HMGS.  If gross decontamination is indicated, engine companies can perform this task early in the incident prior to the arrival of a hazmat team. Refer to your SOGs. Another primary objective for the incident commander is medical. Whether just one ambu­ lance, or a medical group/branch due to the size and complexity, you must have medical stand­ ing by. The minimum is a standard for your hazmat team to be monitored and provide potential treatment. In addition, depending upon the victim profile, you will have additional medics for treatment and transport of civilians. Decontamination must be considered prior to treatment and transport so you do not transmit contaminants from the scene to local hospitals. Also, consider the weather and duration of the incident. Your hazmat teams will likely need rehab and shelter, so two teams will likely be required any time an entry is planned. WISDOM FROM THE MASTERS Technical Rescue Command Considerations CHIEF GREGG AVERY, LOS ANGELES CITY (CA) FIRE DEPARTMENT *Technical rescue incidents can have a component of hazmat. For example, a confined* *space entry may have a leak, or a rescue may involve a spill. To that point, we have added* *this contribution from Chief Avery.* When faced with a technical rescue incident, your role as the incident commander is challenging, due to the complex and specialized nature of the incident. More impor­ tantly, your workforce will/should possess unique skill sets and certifications and will challenge you to build an appropriate strategy that meets the needs of the incident and satisfies all legal requirements. As incident commanders, we must consider *NFPA Stan­* *dard 1710: Standard for Organization and Deployment for Suppression, EMS, and Special* *Operations* as well as *NFPA 1670:* (now bundled into 2500), *Standard on Operations and* *Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents)* I always utilize a subject matter expert, generally the US&R Task Force commander, to assist with this vital function. When commanding technical rescue incidents, the standards of command always apply and are essential for an organized, efficient, and safe operation. As with any inci­ dent, the commander should implement and utilize the following: ** Assume command:** In my organization we assume command by announcing to the current IC (captain) and providing Metro Fire Communications (MFC) a comprehensive size-up. I operate under the assumption that I have incomplete situational awareness when I assume command and as I gain further clarity I give updated size-ups. ** Gain situational awareness:** This is accomplished by combining the informa­ tion you have obtained while en route and with your personal observations as well as information from your assigned officers. I always say that situational awareness is ever-changing and ever-growing and I am fully committed to pivoting/changing my strategy and tactics accordingly. ** Communications:** My command style utilizes a conversational style with my officers and division and group supervisors. It is incumbent on the IC to ensure that everyone on the scene is briefed on the communication plan. ** Develop objectives and strategy:** This is done in a rapid fashion based on situational awareness, utilizing standard operating procedures, and always with the mindset that your strategy should and will be adjusted as needed. Your strategy and tactics should be driven by your department s operational risk management policy. ** Resource deployment:** Initial deployment will be single resources and driven by standard operating procedure. ** Incident organization:** Building out your organizational chart utilizing divi­ sions and groups. I always consider carefully my leadership choices, and I try to match skillsets to assignments. In a technical rescue this is an absolute must. Allied agencies will be a part of your organization, so consider them early. ** Evaluate and revise:** Looking at your plan continuously is essential so that revisions occur as needed and in a timely fashion. ** Transition of command:** I always anticipate transitioning my incidents, and w^r^e routinely utilize the first battalion chief in the operations role. I have a background in US&R operations and have had the opportunity to command several incidents. One of those incidents was a confined space/trench incident at a construction site in the Hollywood Hills. A worker had stepped into a recently drilled 15-foot-deep caisson hole. When the first-arriving engine company determined the type of incident, they called for a full technical rescue dispatch. I was assigned and responded, arriving after most of the resources were on scene. What I discovered was a chaotic scene with several officers attempting to implement their own plans. After assuming command, I placed the Captain II from the US&R Task Force (TFC) in charge of the rescue group and directed him to develop a plan for the rescue. I simultaneously ordered all personnel away from the hole. This simple act had the effect I was looking for: the scene immediately became calm and orderly. I gathered the officers together and briefed them on the site safety plan and on the plan to extricate the victim in con­ junction with the TFC from the US&R TF. **[Technical Rescue (Trench)]** □ Approach from head of trench □ Ladders □ Spoils pile 2\* from lip \ 3. Describe victim profiling for hazardous materials incidents. 4. What are the medical considerations for a hazardous materials incident with regard to victims and technicians? 5. Discuss the distinct safety concerns, roles, and requirements for hazardous materials incidents. 6. Explain some of the expanded communication demands of a hazardous materials incident. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in chapter 14 provides detailed information specific to hazardous mate­ rials incidents. While the FESHE CO279 course does not specifically reference hazardous mate­ rials incidents, they involve the same processes and principles of structural firefighting requiring size-up, determination of incident priorities, selection of appropriate strategy, and coordination of tactics and resources. The chapter format supports the CO279 course outline by detailing information on hazardous materials incident operations, communications, and coordination of these events and ICS/NIMS roles and responsibilities to support and manage them. Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C\#7: Spill on Freeway and C\#8: Sick Building for objectives-based scenario exercises. NFPA 1021 Job Performance Requirements The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, Fire Offi­ cer II JPR 5.6,5.6.1, and Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1. For larger-scale incidents and pre-planning, the content in this chapter also supports training and education for Fire Officer III 6.6.3 Develop a plan for the organization given an unmet need for resources that exceed what is available in the organization. Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C\#7: Spill on Freeway and C\#8: Sick Building for 1021 Job Performance Requirement-based scenario exercises for Fire Officer I, II, and III. Endnotes 1\. "List of Codes and Standards," National Fire Protection Association,