Vegetation Fires PDF

13 Vegetation Fires Introduction Units responded to a reported grass fire endangering structures and livestock. This was a fast-moving fire in light, flashy fuels on a red-flag day. This fire was in Battalion 5, adjacent and directly north of Battalion 7.1 was assigned the hot division, ahead o...

13 Vegetation Fires Introduction Units responded to a reported grass fire endangering structures and livestock. This was a fast-moving fire in light, flashy fuels on a red-flag day. This fire was in Battalion 5, adjacent and directly north of Battalion 7.1 was assigned the hot division, ahead of the fire where the head was going. Multiple resource requests were being made by command and the column of smoke from the head could be seen from several miles away. The fire jumped across several roads and was moving north. As I drove to get ahead of the fire, recon the values at risk, and account for the companies assigned to my division, I found a Type 1 Engine (typical structure engine) at the end of a driveway. The captain and his crew were in full structural turnouts. The captain had decided to deploy a 1%\" attack line into the green, unburned fuel. He unknowingly dropped his portable radio on the ground at the engine when he got out. We had no communications. The head of the fire was rapidly moving toward the captain and his firefighter. I used the PA system on my BC buggy to hail him and ordered him to evacuate. They were approximately 200 feet away. He began to take up hose with his firefighter. I told him to drop the hose and run to me. As they did, the fire front swept over the area and they narrowly escaped. This was an example of the NIOSH 5 coming into alignment on a grass fire. The fire was large enough to require units from far away that were not accustomed to this type of firefight­ ing. This can be an added risk to your operations if personnel are not trained, equipped, or experienced in these types of fires. Like all incidents in this textbook, we will focus on the Type 4 and 5 scope of vegetation fires, also known as initial attack. These can easily grow to include larger vegetation fires from first to greater alarm, known as reinforced response, and sometimes extended attack where the fire may transition to a Type 3 (operational area/county-level). Type 3 would be indicated by a size that encompasses multiple jurisdictions and/or multiple operational periods wherein a Type 3IMT would respond for additional operational, logistical, and planning support. Like most fires, vegetation fires start small, and most are caught before they reach devas­ tating levels. That said, trends have shown that these fires have reached unprecedented levels of death, destruction, and frequency compared to decades past. The Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District (Metro Fire) is located directly north of the San Joaquin Valley of Central California. Metro Fire has vegetation fires throughout the summer that are affected by high heat, Delta breezes, and low humidities. Battalion 7 is directly adja­ cent to all the battalions at Metro Fire. This means a lot of fires in the summers with neigh­ boring battalions. Some are roadside grass fires, some are thousands of acres and burned structures within our jurisdiction, and many are everywhere in between, from one to hundreds of acres on any given summer day. Typical tactics consist of pump-and-roll mobile attack, pro­ gressive hose lays, use of hand tools, dozers, and support of helicopter operations (fig. 13-1). On the north and east ends of the Metro Fire District boundaries are state and mutual threat zones that cause automatic and mutual aid responses with CAL FIRE on a regular basis throughout the summer fire season. Simultaneously, Metro Fire crews respond to statewide wildfires as part of the California State Master Mutual Aid system. This program, managed through the California Office of Emergency Services (CAL OES) has been in place for decades and is the means by which hun­ dreds of resources and thousands of firefighters respond all over the state to support each other in the cities and communities throughout California. In addition, like many agencies, several Metro Fire members respond as part of IMTs and/or part of the mutual aid system to fill individual overhead positions as needed.  Definitions Terminology in the vegetation/wildland fire arena is relatively universal. That said, there are several authorities that have similar definitions and we have referenced several different sources to expose you to various entities. We hope this expands your awareness. *Vegetation Fires* involve dry grasses, shrubs, and light flashy organic fuels. These can range from roadside grass fires to large vegetation fires that engulf thousands of acres and structures with lives threatened. *Wildfires* are typically in larger, forested areas and can involve national/ state parks, national forests, private land, logging areas, and may also encroach on populated areas. In recent years, wildfires have devastated entire communities with catastrophic life loss. The WUI is the area in which communities, neighborhoods, homes, and other buildings exist in regions of heavy vegetation growth and more mountainous topography. Vegetation fires, wild­ fires, and those in the WUI are more lethal than ever. The potential for these fires to grow rapidly and exponentially has caused unprecedented death and destruction. That said, WUI can happen on smaller Type 5 and Type 4 fires in communities and neighborhoods requiring access through properties, fences, yards, and driveways (fig. 13-2). Glossary **Anchor point:** The location from which a fire attack is initiated. **Black:** Fuel already burned. **Control objectives:** Geographic boundaries from which to stop the fire. **Direct attack:** Also known as an offensive strategy, this occurs when firefighters remove the flames from the fuel by directly extinguishing the fire with water, usually with a mobile attack or progressive hose lay. **Escape routes:** A path that firefighters utilize to get to a safety zone or away from the fire. **Extended attack:** That phase of wildland fire management when initial attack resources are no longer capable of achieving the objectives (usually control) set for the incident, and  additional resources and overhead are committed, generally extending incident activities into another operational period.^1^ **Firing operations:** A defensive tactic whereby fire is placed on the ground by qualified fire­ fighters to remove fuel ahead of the fire. **Flanks:** Outer left and right edges of the fire line. **Fuel:** Any material that burns (grass, brush, trees, or manmade materials). **Green:** Fuel not yet burned. **Head:** Leading fire edge. **Heel:** Area of fire origin, where the base of the fire is located. **Indirect attack:** Also known as a defensive strategy, this occurs when the fuel is removed from the fire. Examples would be cutting lines or firing operations. **Initial response/attack:** Resources initially committed to an incident.^2^ **Kind:** A classification of resources in the incident command system which refers to function; e.g., hand crew, helicopter, engine, dozer.^3^ **LCES:** Lookouts, communications, escape routes, safety zones **Mobile attack:** Also known as pump-and-roll, this occurs when apparatus is capable of driv­ ing and pumping water simultaneously. **Progressive hose lay:** A wildland firefighting tactic whereby hose is deployed and extended continuously in successive sections, from the nozzle, for as long as necessary to contain the fire (fig. 13-3). **Rate of spread (ROS):** The speed in which a fire grows away from the area of origin. The rate is usually measured in chains per hour. One chain equals 66 feet. There are several means to measure ROS. In the field, one simple method from the Southwest Fire Science Consor­ tium is to estimate by an average person walking or running. A slow ROS would be slower than a walk. A moderate ROS would the average person walking. A rapid ROS would be a fast walk. A critical ROS would be an average person running, also characterized by spotting. **Red-flag conditions:** Weather conditions in which there is a greater potential for vegetation fires igniting and growing rapidly due to high heat, low humidity, and high winds. **Reinforced response:** Those resources requested in addition to the initial response/ **Safety zones: A** location to which firefighters can escape if conditions worsen rapidly. **Spotting:** Embers casting out ahead of the fire, creating new fires, causing rapid fire growth. **Strike team: A** team of five of the same kind and type of resource with a leader that acts as one resource. **Tanker: A** fixed-wing aircraft designed to drop water on wildland fires. **Task force:** A team of different kinds and types of resources with a leader, assembled for a spe­ cific task/mission/objective that acts as one resource. **Type:** A classification of resources in the incident command system which refers to capability. Type 1 is generally considered to be more capable than Types 2,3, or 4, respectively, due to size, power, capacity, or in the case of incident management teams, experience, and qualifications.^5^ **Values at risk:** Any item of value that could be threatened by a fire, including but not limited to structures, outbuildings, vehicles, utility infrastructure, fencing, stored materials, live­ stock, and so on. **Water tender:** A mobile ground apparatus comprised of a large tank of water with the objec­ tive of providing remote water supply to other resources. CASE STUDIES IN COMMAND The Sand Fire CHIEF MARK BRUNTON, CAL FIRE The Sand Fire started in late July 2016 in the area of Sand Ridge Road and Hwy 49 in El Dorado County, California at 17:10 hours. The weather at the time of the dispatch was 101 degrees Fahrenheit, 12% relative humidity, with winds from the South at 7 mph. The response to this area from CAL FIRE called for six Type 3 engines, four Type 1 fire hand crews, two Type 2 dozers, two battalion chiefs, one air tactical group supervisor (ATGS), two Type 1 air tankers, and one Type 2 helicopter with crew. Additionally, four local government engine companies, three water tenders, a medic unit, and a chief officer were part of the initial response. In California, CAL FIRE has the jurisdictional responsibility for vegetation fires on State Responsibility Area (SRA) land. This is essen­ tially any non-federal land. Upon arrival of the first engine company, they reported a fire of approximately 10 acres in grass/oak-woodland fuels moving uphill at a moderate-to-rapid rate of spread (fig. 13-4). At this point, there were no structures threatened. The engine company officer took IC and personnel started a progressive hose lay. The engine company officer kept the IC role until the first-in CAL FIRE chief officer arrived a few minutes later. The update  from the chief officer after a transfer of command was that the fire was at approxi­ mately 20 acres, continuing to move uphill with the same rate of spread. I was dispatched as the second CAL FIRE chief officer. Additionally, more CAL FIRE battalion chiefs as well as a CAL FIRE assistant chief responded. Due to the location of this fire, fuel, and weather conditions, it was anticipated that this fire would grow significantly and go beyond initial attack and into the next burning period. Upon arrival I was assigned as operations. An augmented resource request of ground resources was ordered by the IC. Additional air resources were ordered by the ATGS upon seeing the view from over 20 air miles away of a significant growing column (fig. 13-5). A unified command structure was established between CAL FIRE, the local govern­ ment fire district in which the fire was burning, and the El Dorado County Sheriff's Office (EDSO), who is responsible for evacuations and coordination of road closures with the California Highway Patrol (CHP). At approximately 17:30 hours the fire had jumped the Consumnes River, which is the county line between El Dorado and Amador Counties. This prompted the involvement of additional resources from Amador County, as well as the Amador County Sheriffs Office (ASO). The observed fire behavior was erratic and increased in intensity and rate of spread as it moved from the original fuel type into brush and light timber. Significant long-range spotting, as well as group torching of timber, attributed to the spread (fig-13-6). The IC and I established the initial incident organization, which started as 3 Divisions and then grew eventually to a two-branch, eight-division organization. Control and management objectives were established. Evacuation and road closures were decided upon and initiated by the law enforcement agencies. Due to the difficult and limited access points along with the fast-moving fire, assign­ ment of resources resulted in long distances that needed to be traveled in order to get to their assigned areas. At approximately 18:45 hours the first report from the ATGS  was that a structure was now involved. The area initially that was rural and had no WUI now moved into an area dotted by residential structures as well as various out­ buildings, and eventually threatened numerous wineries in the Amador County side of the fire. At approximately 19:30 hours, the blaze was being battled by 6 air tankers, 100 engines, and more than 10 hand crews, as well as 5 dozers (fig. 13-7). From 19:00 hours until 19:30 hours, the fire went from 600 acres to 1,300 acres, more than doubling in size in 29 minutes. Plans were being set for the fire to burn into the next operational period. Additional resource and logistical requests were made for that next day. Suppression continued to take place throughout the evening. An update of acreage and containment at 23:00 hours was at approximately 2000 acres, 20% contained, and 2 structures destroyed. The fire at that point was in a large river canyon and still in two counties. Weather conditions improved only slightly, and active fire was observed throughout the nighttime and early morning hours. Ground resources continued to battle the fire and air resources had ceased operation due to nighttime restrictions at approximately 20:00 hours (fig. 13-8).  July 27 initially saw limited growth of the fire in the overnight. Predicted weather on that day was calling for high temperatures with rising humidity, and thunderstorms east of the fire, which were predicted to cause erratic winds. As the fire started into the second operational period that day, fire intensity increased, which challenged the control lines. By midafternoon the fire had taken off again. Air resources continued to fly and reinforce lines and attempted to catch multiple spot fires. Reports of additional structures involved were reported and ground resources were sent from staging areas or as soon as they checked in to the incident. By midday, it was decided to request a CAL FIRE Type 1IMT. It would take approxi­ mately 24 hours for the team to arrive and be briefed. In the meantime, the local regional Type 3 IMT integrated with the CAL FIRE unit incident structure to manage the fire. With the fire progression, a firing plan was devised to take advantage of the change in topography and fuel type to slow the forward progression of the fire. A deputy opera­ tions chief was given a CAL FIRE Type 3 engine strike team, a dozer, crew, and sup­ ported by aircraft to conduct the operation as the fire advanced towards County Road 16\. The plan was approved by me as the operations section chief and resources briefed and the operation conducted. The firing operation was successful and greatly reduced the forward progress of the fire before it breached the control objective of crossing County Road 16. On July 28, a transition was completed with the CAL FIRE Type 1IMT. Most active fire progression had been stopped, yet greater planning and logistical support was required to fully contain the fire. On July 28, the fire was contained at 75%. It had burned 3800 acres and destroyed 13 structures and 38 outbuildings. No lives were lost. Some challenges of this fire from the initial attack were a fire that had prime burning conditions in terms of weather, fuel, and topographical alignment. Poor access, as well as natural barriers such as a river where the fire jumped, made it difficult to effectively deploy resources. The fire, which also burned in two separate counties, created a need for a larger unified command structure. Rapid fire growth over two operational peri­ ods with limited resources to staff the incident caused many initial attack resources to be double-shifted and therefore reduced the effectiveness of those resources. Successes of the incident can be attributed to experienced company officers who were aggressive and tactically proficient. Experience within the chief officers assigned to the incident accounted for the development of a quickly designed and executed strat­ egy and deployment of resources at critical points of the incident, and allowed for the ability to re-adjust objectives as needed. Fundamentals of Vegetation Fires Like any incident, the key is to stay ahead of the incident power curve. Fuel (light/flashy, medium, heavy), weather (relative humidity, temperature, and wind), and topography are the three factors that drive the size and complexity of a vegetation fire (fig. 13-9). Preplanning, including access points and weather predictions, are vital to being prepared on any given shift. Depending upon the AHJ, a red flag warning may be in place, which could  enhance your response levels. All these should be part of the incident commander's mindset and situational awareness at the beginning of each shift. Initial attack response resources to vegetation fires in local jurisdictions are varied. You may have many of the kind and type of resources you need, or you may have to make structural resources work (Type 1 engines, trucks, squads, medics) (fig. 13-10). The response can be lim­ ited or mixed, with many resources from mutual/automatic aid agencies. This requires you, the incident commander, to order the appropriate resources ASAP, by specific kind and type. Calls from reporting parties can be specific (at the corner of A and Z Streets), general (smoke seen from miles away), or come from a combination of the two. You may have homeowners calling because they see smoke, others who have direct flame impingement, and still others who got a call from a loved one across town. Like a structure fire, a working vegetation fire will likely produce a visible column of smoke that could be obscured by wind; however, unlike a structure fire, a vegetation fire may have grown to several acres before you arrive. This creates a challenging situation to size up the fire and determine the size, rate and direction of spread, and values at risk. Consider units respond­ ing from different directions to give you a report from their vantage point. The fire may be better anchored and fought from a different location than which you arrived on scene or were dispatched to. Vegetation fires in local jurisdictions usually start as Type 5 or 4 (initial attack/reinforced response) before getting to a Type 3 or larger status and are described in terms of size, rate of spread, fuel type, potential, and values at risk. Some considerations for each include, but are not limited to the following: ** Size:** Can be described by acreage. For rough estimates, a football field is roughly 1.32 acres. Other descriptions can include "roadside grass fire" or "100 x 100-foot grass fire," and so on. ** ROS:** Slow, moderate, or rapid. If you have spotting (embers igniting ahead of the fire), then consider the fire moving at a critical ROS. ** Fuel type:** There are thirteen fuel models in four fuel groups (grasslands, shrublands, timber, and slash) for more sophisticated fuel modeling and fire behavior predicting. These are typically for larger Type 1-3 incidents. Type 4 or 5 incidents can be described as light/flashy, medium, or heavy fuels. ♦ Light/flashy fuel (dry grass) is considered the most dangerous to first responders, as the fuels burn very rapidly and can create enough heat to cause major injuries, death, and damage to equipment. ♦ Medium fuel would be 14\" to 3\" diameter and more densely spaced. Examples would be Manzanita and heavy brush. ♦ Heavy fuel would be timber with laddering fuels from the ground to the crown, for example. ** Potential:** Potential is your estimate as to the ultimate size that the fire can grow before it is contained. ** Values at risk:** Homes, other structures, livestock, vehicles, power distribution, and any other assets that the fire could engulf or damage. Do not forget, with the right condi­ tions, modern fires can consume entire communities and kill scores of civilians. While performing your FPODP size-up, ask yourself, "Where is the fire going, and what am I saving?" The primary overarching objective for any vegetation fire is to put a box around the fire by containing it as soon as possible before it gets into values at risk like homes. Putting a box around the fire means identifying the perimeter of the fire and establishing control objec­ tives as soon as possible. For example, a fire may start at the intersection of Gerber and Waterman Roads and move into a vacant field with light/flashy fuel, moving at a rapid ROS (fig. 13-11). By the time the first units arrive on scene, the fire may be threatening the next road to the north (Rondeau Way), heading directly toward homes. The box would be the four sides of the fire from which crews will contain it: Keep the fire north of Gerber, south of Rondeau, west of Waterman and east of Souffle. This can be accomplished by anchoring the fire at the heel and beginning a direct attack upon the flames, by either mobile attack or progressive hose lay. There will be a left flank, a right flank, and the head of the fire. One of the two flanks will be moving faster and  considered the hot flank that is downwind of the black and moving in the direction of the wind. The head (front) of the fire is often obscured by smoke on larger fires and difficult to see. *Tandem attack* is composed of two mobile attack engines working in line, one behind the other, usually beginning on the hot flank. This allows the first engine to move rapidly toward the head of the fire, while the second back-up engine ensures complete containment and that no flare-ups occur. This is just like a primary fire attack line being followed up with a back up line in a structure fire. The next two engines would initiate attack on the cold flank that is upwind of the black. Another option is to split the head of the fire when the fire is moving at a rapid ROS and about to involve homes or other significant values at risk. In this situation, the first two mobile pumping units would drive through the black directly to the head of the fire, anchor off each other, split the head, and work their way back the left and right flanks toward the heel. This would be supported by other units performing structure defense from the street side of the homes Vegetation fires commanded in the urban arena will often follow best practices from the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG). Other state-specific resources like FIRESCOPE provide excellent field operations guides (FOGs) and direction, such as the ICS-420-1 FOG. Once a fire goes to a Type 3 or above, more specific *wildfire* terminology, tactics, and resources are utilized. However, many of these components can and are utilized by urban fire departments that have this threat when fires are in the initial attack (Type 5) or reinforced response (Type 4) phase of growth. Safety General safety for vegetation/wildland fires includes the acronym LCES (Lookouts, Commu­ nications, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones). The incident commander and responding troops must be cognizant of LCES at all times, even in seemingly benign fires. Whereas a lookout on a large wildland fire would be a more formal assignment, a lookout on an initial attack vegetation fire can be the incident commander, division supervisor, safety officer, airborne resources, company officer, or all of the above. The key is to expect the unex­ pected and respect these initial attack fires. That is why communications are so critical to get established early. An escape route to a safety zone on an initial attack fire may be a dirt road, or simply get­ ting back into the black (burned area) during a mobile attack. When the fire is extending into a more complex incident, the incident commander should ensure that the division/group super­ visors on the fire have identified escape routes and safety zones within their respective areas of operation. The NWCG has developed fire orders and watch-out situations for vegetation and/or wild­ fires. These are not just for large Type 1-3 incidents. These are for Type 4 and 5 initial attack, reinforced response, and extended attack fires as well. Ensure your troops are well trained in the following areas. 10 Standard Fire Orders 1. Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts. 2. Know what your fire is doing at all times. 3. Base all actions on the current and expected behavior of the fire. 4. Identify escape routes and safety zones and make them known. 5. Post lookouts when there is possible danger. 6. Be alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act decisively. 7. Maintain prompt communications with your forces, your supervisor, and adjoining forces. 8. Give clear instructions and be sure they are understood. 9. Maintain control of your forces at all times. 10. Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first. 18 Watch Out Situations 1. Fire not scouted and sized-up 2. In country, not seen in daylight 3. Safety zones and escape routes not identified 4. Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior 5. Uninformed regarding strategy, tactics, and hazards 6. Instructions and assignments are not clear 7. No communication with your company or supervisor 8. Constructing line without a safe anchor point 9. Building fire line downhill with fire below 10. Attempting a frontal assault on the fire 11. Unburned fuel between you and the fire 12. Cannot see the main fire and not in communication with someone who can 13. On a hillside where rolling material can ignite material below 14. Weather is getting hotter and drier 15. Wind increasing or changing direction 16. Getting frequent spot fires across the fire line 17. Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zone difficult 18. Taking a nap near the fire line Structure Defense Watch-Out Situations Often, structures will be at risk in the WUI where metropolitan fire departments work. These require a distinct set of safety and tactical considerations. The WUI has a separate and dis­ tinct set of watch-out situations to augment the 18 WUI watch-out situations: Poor access and narrow, one-way roads Bridge load limits Wooden construction and wood shake roofs Power lines, propane tanks, and hazmat threats Inadequate water supply Natural fuels 30 feet or closer to structures Structures in chimneys, box canyons, narrow canyons, or on steep slopes (grade 30% or more) Extreme fire behavior Strong winds Evacuation of public (panic) Underground utilities threat Structural collapse zone when structures are exposed to fire Smoke byproducts often laced with chemical compounds not found in pure wild­ land fires According to the FIRESCOPE Field Operations Guide (ICS 420-1, 2022 ed.), the following structure defense tactics are options for consideration as structures become threatened: ** Tactical evacuation---**in areas and situations with imminent life threats. As a result, fire personnel will switch from suppression to evacuation and assist law enforcement. ** Check and go---**a rapid evaluation to check for occupants requiring removal or rescue: ♦ Structure triage category---threatened non-defensible. ♦ This tactic is most appropriate when there is no safety zone or temporary refuge area (TRA) present and the forecasted fire spread, intensity, and the projected impact time of the fire front prohibit resources from taking preparation action to protect the structure. ♦ Complete a rapid evaluation to check for occupants at a structure, evaluate life threat, and to assist in evacuation. ♦ Used when fire spread, intensity, lack of time, or inadequate defensible space prohibit firefighting resources from safely taking action to protect the home when the fire front arrives. ♦ Evaluate the structure for follow-up action when additional resources become available, the fire front passes, or fire behavior intensity is reduced. ** Prep and go---**implies that some preparation of the structure may be safely completed prior to resources leaving the area: ♦ Structure triage category---threatened non-defensible. ♦ A tactic used when a safety zone and TRA are not present and when fire spread and intensity are too dangerous to stay in the area when the fire front arrives, but there is adequate time to prepare a structure for defense ahead of the fire front. ♦ Utilized for structures where potential fire intensity makes it too dangerous for fire resources to stay when the fire front arrives. ♦ There is some time to prepare a structure ahead of the fire; resources should engage in rapid, prioritized fire protection preparations and foam the structure prior to leaving. ♦ Resources should leave with adequate time to avoid the loss of escape routes. ♦ Advise residents to leave and notify supervisors of any residents who choose to stay so that you can follow up on their welfare after the fire front passes. ♦ As with check and go, prep and go is well suited for engine strike teams and task forces. ** Prep and defend---**a tactic used when a safety zone and TRA are present and adequate time exists to safely prepare a structure for defense prior to the arrival of the fire front: ♦ Structure triage category---threatened defensible. ♦ An ideal multiple-resource tactic, especially in common neighborhoods where efforts may be coordinated over a wide area. A tactic used when it is possible for fire resources to stay when the fire front arrives. Fire behavior *must* be such that it is safe for firefighters to remain and engage the fire. ♦ Adequate escape routes to a safety zone must be identified. A safety zone or TRA must exist on site. ♦ Firefighters must be vigilant to sudden changes in fire intensity and be prepared to move to the TRA or withdraw along the escape route to the safety zone. ♦ Adequate time must exist to safely prepare the structure for defense prior to the arrival of the fire front. ** Fire front following---**a follow-up tactic employed when check and go, prep and go, or bump and run tactics are initially used: ♦ A tactic used to come in behind the fire front. ♦ This action is taken when there is insufficient time to safely set up ahead of the fire or the intensity of the fire would likely cause injury to personnel located in front of the fire. ♦ The goal of fire front following is to search for victims, effect perimeter control, extinguish spot fires around structures, control hot spots, and reduce ember production. ** Bump and run---**a tactic where resources typically move ahead of the fire front in the spotting zone to extinguish spot fires and hot spots, and to defend as many structures as possible: ♦ Bump and run may be effective in the early stages of an incident when the resource commitment is light and structure defense is the priority. ♦ Bump and run may also be used on fast-moving incidents when there are adequate resources available, but where an effort must be made to control or steer the head and shoulders of the fire to a desired end point. ♦ Perimeter control and structure defense preparation are secondary considerations with the bump and run tactic. ♦ Resources must remain mobile during bump and run and must constantly identify escape routes to safety zones and TRAs as they move with the fire front. ♦ Bump and run is a defensive tactic when fire front impact in the WUI is imminent and there are not enough resources to effectively take perimeter control action. It is an offensive tactic when resources are steering the head of the fire to a desirable end point. ♦ The tactic is useful when terrain and fuels are suitable for mobile attack. ♦ Fire line supervisors and strike team/task force leaders must realize that bump and run places resources in front of the advancing fire front and that extreme caution should be exercised. ♦ Control lines in front of the fire should be identified and prepared with dozers and fire crews, enabling the bump and run resources to direct the fire to a logical end point. This is a frontal attack strategy and a watch-out situation. Control lines in front of the main fire must be reinforced with retardant drops, coordinated firing operations, and engine support. ** Anchor and hold---**anchor and hold is a tactic utilizing control lines and large water streams from fixed water supplies in an attempt to stop fire spread. The goal is to extinguish structure fires, protect exposures, and reduce ember production. ♦ Anchor and hold can be referred to as taking a stand to stop the progression of the fire. ♦ Anchor and hold tactics are more effective in urban neighborhoods where the fire is spreading from house to house. ♦ Establishing an anchor and hold line requires considerable planning and effort and utilizes both fixed and mobile resources: --- Fixed engines should be spotted in safe areas where they can safely withstand any --- Mobile engines or task forces can engage in individual structure defense actions --- Mobile engines should be prepared to redeploy to other areas should the fire --- Ground resources, such as engine crews and fire crews, should staff hoselines and --- Hand-crew strike teams should be deployed to construct fire control lines wher­ ** Tactical patrol---**a tactic where the key element is mobility and continuous monitoring of an assigned area: ♦ Tactical patrol can be initiated --- After the main fire front has passed and flames have subsided, but when the --- In areas where the fire has passed but the risk to structures remains from fire brands smoldering in void spaces, on roofs, and in rain gutters and stored mate­ rial near buildings; or, --- In neighborhoods away from the interface where there is predicted to be signifi­ cant ember wash and accumulated ornamental vegetation. ♦ The goal is to patrol areas downwind of potential ember showers. ♦ This tactic should be used to extinguish hot spots or secondary structure ignitions and address safety issues such as power lines, weakened trees, and other hazards. ♦ Vigilance, situational awareness, and active suppression actions are a must.^5^ SAW-CSS-RECEO-VSS for Vegetation Fires  The SAW-CSS-RECEO-VSS system has been used nationwide for years. You will notice that *italicized words correspond with key points on the tactical worksheet* that follows. Size-Up Vegetation fires have unique size-up considerations that are very different from structure fires. The good news is that you can still use your FPODP system for mental size-up when you arrive on scene. At the beginning of your shift, look at weather patterns and expected wind events that could create red flag conditions. Remain vigilant about weather changes. * Facts* identify the size of the fire, type of fuel, rate of spread, and direction the fire is moving. (Three-acre grass fire in light flashy fuels, moving at a rapid rate of spread to the north.) * Probabilities* identifies the potential size to which you estimate the fire could grow, and any potential values at risk, such as structures, livestock, electrical distribution, vehicles, and so on. (Potential for 30 acres, houses threatened to the north off Main Street.) * Own situation* determines the number, kind, and type of resources you have on scene and responding. (Two Type 3 engines on scene, one Type 1 engine, and one water tender responding.) * Decision* determines your priority and strategy, just like any other incident (life saving, incident stabilization, or property/environment priority; offensive, combination, or defensive strategy). See section on strategy for more information below. * Plan,* as with all incidents, determines your tactical and control objectives. (Initiate direct attack on the left and right flanks. Keep the fire south of Main Street, east of 1st Street, and west of 2nd Street.) * Four sides* refers to knowing the left, right flanks, base, and head of the fire. The *box* is the 4 sides or control objectives in which you intend to confine the fire. * Values at risk,* as described above, must be identified early so that subsequent resources can position ahead of the fire to defense. * Fuel* is either light (dry grasses), moderate (brush and heavier vegetation), or heavy (densely spaced fuels including heavy brush, ladder fuels, and trees). * Weather* has three key factors that drive a vegetation fire: relative humidity (RH), tem­ perature, and wind. RH, temperature, and sustained wind speed and direction should be identified at the beginning of shift and monitored throughout the day, so you will know it upon dispatch. * Topography* is the amount of grade, or level of incline and steepness of the land. The steeper the topography, the faster the fire will travel. End your mental size-up with an *IOCAN* arrival report. For example, "E303 is on scene at the corner of 1st and Pearl Streets. Three-acre grass fire in light flashy fuels, rapid rate of spread to the north. Potential for 30 acres, houses threatened to the north off Main Street. E303 is initiating direct attack on the right flank. E303 has Pearl Command. Command is mobile. E305 come behind E303 for tandem attack to catch the head of the fire. E106 go to Main Street for structure defense." Notice that we didn't say "moving with the wind" because that gives the rest of the alarm no frame of reference from where you are. Announce the direction in terms of the compass: "Moving to the north\... " Order additional resources as soon as possible. With this arrival report, how many additional resources would you order and what type? Would you have any go directly to Main Street for structure defense? Apparatus Placement Unlike a structure fire at a single address, a vegetation fire can be spread over several miles. Once the fire is anchored by first-in crews, subsequent resources may arrive and be assigned to initiate attack from several different locations, based upon the size of the fire, values at risk, and conditions. The hot zone on a vegetation fire is different than on a structure fire. Resources working on the fire must be cognizant of being in the fuel, wind shifts, and falling trees and powerlines. Remain in the black or burned-out area as much as possible. On a grass fire as a captain, my firefighter (on overtime) and I were attacking the fire with a hoseline, and the wind shifted. The smoke enveloped us, blinding us for several seconds. The sound of the flames intensified. He started to panic and yell for me. I told him that we were safe because we were in the black and to "stay calm and stay put!" Then the wind shifted and we were okay. Keep apparatus and your attack position upwind when possible. Consider law enforcement early to assist with traffic coming into the scene. If needed, identify a *staging* area for additional apparatus. This may not be needed, as resources will likely go right to work during initial attack (fig. 13-12). Water Supply Water supply will likely be a water tender, but it could be a nearby hydrant(s), or even a body of water that you must draft. Tank transfers from large Type 1 engines are also an excellent resource if you have Type 3 or smaller engines that can nurse from them. Who is securing the water supply? Where is/are it/they located? What is it (hydrant, water tender, etc.)? Once a patent water supply is established, it should be announced on all channels. Consider a water supply group supervisor if you have a complicated water supply plan and, depending upon the amount of radio traffic, you may consider giving them a sepa­ rate tactical channel. Command Command must be established and announced ASAP. *There can only be one IC at a time, and* *the IC must be on scene to assume command and must name the incident.* While your SOGs will determine specific parameters, some fundamental considerations exist. Command may be passed to the next company officer, or first chief officer, depending upon your SOGs and the size and scope of the fire. The benefit of the first-arriving company officer establishing and retaining command (until the first chief arrives) is that they can develop an IAP since it may be easier to see more of the fire and what values are at risk early. And, subsequent units can be assigned to different locations, if needed. Also, additional resources can be called ASAP. As with any incident, the first-due company officer will contend with tasks. This could include initiating a progressive hose lay, mobile attack, or structure defense. Once a chief officer or permanent IC has arrived, the *ICP location* should be announced; however, it may be mobile or move during the incident. Call *additional alarms/resources* early and confirm staging, or response locations that may be different from the original location. Set up your *ICS* early. Unlike interior structural firefighting, the first officer to an area can assume the division supervisor. The visibility and situational awareness regarding the best tactics and assignments must be made early and the front of a flank typically has the best view of where the fire is going and what is threatened. Develop a *communications plan* to prevent overtaxing a single tactical or command channel. Add additional command and tactical frequencies ahead of the incident. Strategy On a vegetation fire, you still have the same three choices for priority and strategy: life saving, incident stabilization, property/environment priority; and *offensive, combination, or defensive* *strategy.* An offensive strategy would be indicated when crews are performing direct attack on the fire with water. The objective is perimeter control by extinguishing the flames (removing the fire from the fuel). A defensive strategy would be indicated when crews are performing an indirect attack with containment lines (removing the fuel from the fire---back-burning, firing out, dozer lines, hand-crews, air drops) as seen in figure 13-13. Or the primary tactic is structure defense, as described above in the FIRESCOPE Structure Defense Guide for the WUI. A combination strategy would utilize both offensive and defensive tactics simultane­ ously. I have utilized a combination strategy many times due to threatened structures, rapid rate of spread, and resource types. For example, we had a fast-moving grass fire in light, flashy fuels with structures threatened in front of the head. While mobile attack units performed direct attack on the flanks, structural units, including truck companies, performed structure defense ahead of the fire. In an urban setting with limited wildland engines, this can be a very effective combination. Air support is a major tactical advan­ tage (fig. 13-14).  Safety Risks for vegetation fires in the wildland and WUI are unique and must be trained upon and taught to all firefighters who may respond to such incidents. * LCES:* lookouts, communications, escape routes, and safety zones. As described above, LCES is the minimum and usually the initial set of safety considerations. The 10 Standard Fire Orders are universal and should be applied to any incident. Addi­ tional safety considerations like the 18 Watch Out Situations or WUI Watch-Out Situa­ tions will be incident-specific and change as the incident grows and becomes for complex. * Power lines* are a common hazard. Often, power poles, lines, and other distribution components become involved. In addition, lines can fall and remain energized. Smoke can also cause arcing of power lines. * Snags* are burned-out trees that can fall suddenly. Remain vigilant with head up watching out for lines, snags, smoke, and wind shifts, and *spotting* ahead of the fire. Spotting indicates the fire is growing rapidly ahead of you and may not be caught with a direct initial attack. Consider structure defense or contain­ ment lines ahead of the fire. Rescue Remember, the victim profile drives *everything.* This is still true of vegetation fires; however, you will likely have more discretionary time during the early stages of initial attack, and rein­ forced response phases to evacuate and perform structure defense. As stated previously, large wildfires (Type 1 and 2 incidents) can claim many lives. For the scope of this book, the Type 4 and 5 incident level, the victim profile on a vegeta­ tion fire is usually low to moderate; however, you may have occupied dwellings ahead in the path of the fire during initial attack, especially at night. * Evacuation* of entire communities is an excellent tactic that can be assigned to law enforcement, when available, during a fast-moving fire. Structure defense automatically implies that evacuation of the defended dwellings is occurring; however, do not take this for granted. Crews may overlook evacuation if the home seems abandoned, or the occupant may refuse to leave. * Medical treatment and transport* functions should be established early under the direc­ tion of a medical group supervisor (MGS). Ensure you have advanced life support and transport capability on scene at all times, including ALS treatment in staging. Firefighters can get heat exhaustion during prolonged vegetation fires in extreme heat. Ensure your crews begin hydrating early in the day. I had an engineer who routinely "hydrated" with soda or coffee in the morning. He went down on two separate fires. Not a coincidence. Exposures Exposures on a vegetation fire can be any values at risk. Values can come in all shapes, sizes, and quantities that may or may not seem valuable to you. Some of these items can be extremely valuable to the owners, including, but not limited to: Structures, including homes, outbuildings, sheds, barns, and businesses. This can include vehicles, trailers, campers, and semi-trucks and trailers. Livestock, including cows, horses, sheep, goats, and any combination of farm animals. Infrastructure, including power poles/lines, transformers, distribution stations, phone, cable, water tanks, pump stations, propane tanks, gas lines, fencing, rail trussells, and bridges. Other values can include pallets, baled haystacks, agricultural/farm equipment, old, rusted vehicles, and junkyards. Roadways which may be impacted by fire or smoke conditions must also be considered as exposures and requests for traffic control should be made early. Confinement Unlike a structure fire, containing a vegetation fire takes more specific planning, communi­ cation, coordination, and support. Even Type 4 and 5 vegetation fires can be hundreds of acres in size or more. *Control objectives* must be identified by the IC in conjunction with the division and group supervisors to put a box around the fire. Roadways, rivers, creek beds, dozer lines, and handlines can all be utilized for control objective locations. Extinguishment The fire may be contained; however, it may not be extinguished. Smoldering fuels along the perimeter can easily re-ignite, or wind can change, causing rekindle and spotting. Extinguishment means the perimeter is cold. One rule of thumb to prevent rekindle is to have the fire cold with no smoking fuels (smokers) *100feet in from the perimeter.* If winds are erratic or expected, this distance should be increased. Overhaul Overhaul is dependent upon the weather conditions and surrounding values at risk. * Mopping up* a vegetation fire is the act of overhaul and extinguishing additional hot spots and smoking fuels inside the burned area, or black (fig. 13-15). If weather conditions are not favorable, with erratic wind behavior, the fire may need to be made cold with overhaul throughout the entire burned area to prevent rekindle or spotting. The IC has the sole responsibility to declare the fire contained, and then extinguished before leaving the incident. Do *not* take this responsibility lightly. I would always drive the entire perimeter of every grass fire I ever commanded. Depending upon the weather, I would either drive the center or assign crews to patrol, especially at night, for flare ups. Ventilation While fuel, weather, and topography all influence fire behavior, weather is the most influential and most dynamic. At beginning of shift, you should already know the fuel types and topog­ raphy in your area. Weather predictions can change. Temperature, RH, and wind all contrib­ ute to fire behavior, with the most influential being wind. Always watch for weather changes, especially wind.  Salvage Salvage may happen on a vegetation fire, although it is not common. You may have a building or storage unit that could have contents to be salvaged. Support Vegetation fires will require an immense amount of support. As a minimum, consider the following: Law enforcement (LE) Public information Officer (PIO) Incident safety officer (ISO) Public information officer (PIO) Liaison officer (LO) Red Cross Utility company Rehab and medical unit for members Air operations (fig. 13-16) Bulldozers Hand crews Investigator Tactical Worksheet---Vegetation Fire +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | s | Size-up | □ FPODP □ Fuel □ | | | | Topography | | | | | | | | □ 4 Sides □ Weather | | | | (RH, Temp, □ IOCAN | | | | | | | | □ Values at Risk | | | | Wind) | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | A | Apparatus Placement | □ 3-Sides □ Hot Zone | | | | (in the □ Staging | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | W | Water Supply | □ Who □ Where □ What | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | C | Command | □ Name □ Add Res □ | | | | Comms | | | | | | | | □ ICP □ ICS | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ --- ---------------- --- -------------------------------------------------------- --- ------------- --- ---------------- s Strategy □ 0 □ C □ D s Safety □ LCES □ Lines □ Spotting □ 18/10 □ Snags R Rescue □ Evacuation □ Medical T/T E Exposures □ Structure Defense □ Livestock □ Infrastructure C Confinement □ Control Objectives/Box (roads, riverbeds, dozer lines) E Extinguishment □ Perimeter control (100 feet in) 0 Overhaul □ Mop-up V Ventilation □ Weather changes S Salvage □ Who □ Where □ RP s Support □ Law □ Red Cross □ Dozers □ PIO □ Util □ Crews □ Safety □ Rehab □ Invest □ Liaison □ Air Ops --- ---------------- --- -------------------------------------------------------- --- ------------- --- ---------------- ICS and Communications for Vegetation Fires o® The potential of even Type 4 and 5 fires to grow in complexity with structures threatened necessitates that the IC remain ahead of the incident power curve from the onset. This means resource ordering, decentralized command with ICS, and potential for multiple radio channels from which to communicate and coordinate. This does not mean you have to order the world and five extra frequencies for every roadside or vacant lot fire. This means you must think ahead at all times. Communication en route while responding to the scene amongst the responding units is paramount to an adequate size-up. I have arrived on countless vegetation fires to the dispatched area, only to find the fire had long since moved well away into another area entirely. The smoke visible was vast enough that it was often difficult to assess the best means of access. Air sup­ port helps tremendously in these circumstances and Metro Copter 1 and 2 saved our hides more than a few times. **An example of an FPODP for a 10-acre vegetation fire in dry grass:** Facts: 10-acre vegetation fire in light flashy fuel, moving at a rapid rate of spread -with spotting to the north. Probabilities: Potential for 150 acres and structures threatened ahead of the fire. Own situation: I am the first-arriving Type 3 engine with two more Type 3 engines, a water tender, and a chief responding. Decision: Life saving priority, combination strategy. Plan: Anchor the right (hot flank). Have E32 tandem behind me to attempt to catch the head. Have E33 anchor the left flank. Call five Type 1 engines for structure defense, four more Type 3 engines for mobile attack, a second chief, three more water tenders, and air attack. Retaining command until the chief arrives.  **An example of an IOCAN arrival report:** "E31 on scene at the corner of This and That Roads. 10-acre vegetation fire in light flashy fuels, moving at a rapid rate of spread to the north toward homes. E31 is assuming Veg Command, anchoring the right flank. Next Type 3 engine tandem behind me. Third Type 3 engine anchor and attack the left flank. Calling an additional five Type 1 engines, four Type 3 engines, three water tenders, air attack and a second chief." Unlike structure fires, calling a second alarm may or may *not* get you what you need. Be sure to refer to your response matrix. When ordering engines, you may not have the exact *type and kind* in your area, so requesting pump-and-roll capability may cast a wider net to get what you need sooner from a closer firehouse. Fortunately, ICS for Type 4 and 5 vegetation fires is relatively easy and consistent, compared to structure fires. The primary objectives for each division are perimeter control and defend values at risk/structure protection. Essentially, "put out the fire and protect any buildings or other stuff you can." Divisions quickly and easily organize a vegetation fire, even if it grows into a more significant incident involving structures. In the past, a structure protection group would be established for structure defense. The challenge was that a fire could be so large (hundreds/thousands of acres), with multiple com­ munities or groupings of structures threatened, that a single structure protection group super­ visor could not properly manage all the areas. And what about cars, fencing, utilities, and all the other values we described above? This does not mean that a structure protection group or branch is wrong. You may find it useful for a concentrated area of a fire. A branch may also be appropriate with divisions within it. If a particular division has structures threatened, they must call resources commensurate with that situation. This could be structural Type 1 engines, trucks, or a combination of smaller-type engines. The trucks primarily evacuate and provide staffing to assist the engines with hoselines, and can utilize hand tools, or prep the building. This would include removing fences, excess fuel, and debris. One way to organize your fire is to anchor the fire on the left and right flanks at the heel. The left flank would become Division B, the right flank would become Division X. This allows both divisions to grow if necessary to the left and right and create Divisions A and Y, respec­ tively. Division O would be the head of the fire and you may assign structure fire resources there ahead of the fire. This way, you literally put a box around the fire (fig. 13-18). Summary Vegetation fires in the Type 5 and Type 4 arena will most often be contained quickly to under an acre in size. That said, red-flag conditions can easily create a fire that quickly overwhelms resources. In recent years, catastrophic fires with multiple fatalities have become more frequent. Like all fires, training, pre-planning, size-up, and many of the other factors you have learned in this book apply. Remain ahead of the incident power curve. Prevent the NIOSH 5 from coming into alignment and decentralize early to bridge the tactical gap and organize the incident with ICS. Bedrock safety principles like the 10 Standard Fire Orders, 18 Watch Out Situations, and LCES can apply to a fire of any size. In addition, SAW-CSS-RECEO-VSS can be applied to this arena very effectively. Nomenclature and tactics for vegetation fires are significantly different, as are the risks involved in these incidents. Mobile attack, progressive hose lays, hand tools, dozers, and air resources may be utilized in these fires, in addition to firing operations. Depending upon the threat to populated areas, evacuations may be required with support from law enforcement. The key tactical objectives are perimeter control, known as putting a box around the fire, and structure defense. Several structure defense tactics are available. As with any fire or tactic, do not get in over your head. Only attempt tactics in which you are proficiently trained and have been approved and properly supported by the incident commander. Use of ICS was founded in large-scale wildfires and works extremely effectively in smaller Type 5 and 4 vegetation fires. Anchoring and attacking the left and right flanks can be supported by setting up divisions while moving toward the head and achieving full containment. Chapter Review Review Questions 1. Describe vegetation fires, wildland fires, and the wildland urban interface. 2. What are the three factors that drive the size and complexity of a vegetation fire? 3. Describe LCES. 4. What are the 10 Standard Fire Orders? 5. Explain three of the tactical options for structure defense. 6. Explain why initial establishment of divisions on a vegetation fire would not follow traditional alphabetical order. FESHE Strategy and Tactics (C0279) Related Content The content contained in chapter 13 provides detailed information specific to vegetation fires. While the FESHE CO279 course does not specifically reference vegetation fires, they involve the same processes and principles of structural firefighting requiring size-up, determination of incident priorities, selection of appropriate strategy, and coordination of tactics and resources. The FPODP method is applied to vegitation fires in the ICS and Communications section of this chapter. The chapter format supports the CO279 course outline by detailing information on fireground operation, communications, and coordination of these events and ICS/NIMS roles and responsibilities to support and manage them. Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C\#6 Vegetation Fire---Terrain with Structures Threatened for an objectives-based scenario exercise. NFPA1021 Job Performance Requirements The information in this chapter can be utilized to support training and educational programs associated with the Emergency Services Delivery Fire Officer IJPR 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, Fire Offi­ cer IIJPR 5.6,5.6.1, and Fire Officer III 6.6 and 6.6.1. For larger-scale incidents and pre-planning wildland urban interface responses, the content in this chapter also supports training and education for Fire Officer III 6.6.3 \"Develop a plan for the organization given an unmet need for resources that exceed what is available in the organization.\" Access the Tactical Review Guide Appendix C\#6: Vegetation Fire---Terrain with Structures Threatened for a 1021 Job Performance Requirement-based scenario exercise for Fire Officer I, II, and III. Endnotes 1. National Interagency Fire Center, *Chapter 2: Wildland Fire Management Terminology,* 2004, pdf\_files/ch2.pdf. 2. FIRESCOPE, *Field Operations Guide---ICS 420-1,* ICS Publication, 2022. 3. National Interagency Fire Center, *Chapter 2.* 4. FIRESCOPE, *Field Operations Guide.* 5. National Interagency Fire Center, *Chapter 2.* 6. FIRESCOPE California, *Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Structure Defense,* October 21,2013,.