Melchert & Morrow - Chapter 19: David Hume - PDF

CHAPTER 19 DAV I D HUME Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason T he eighteenth century is often called the age says, but not impossible—as had been clearly of enlightenment. Those who lived through shown in...

CHAPTER 19 DAV I D HUME Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason T he eighteenth century is often called the age says, but not impossible—as had been clearly of enlightenment. Those who lived through shown in the triumphs of the scientific revolution this period in Europe and some of its colo- from Copernicus to that most admired of think- nies felt they were making rapid progress toward ers, Isaac Newton (1642–1727). Newton’s unified overthrowing superstition and arbitrary authority, explanatory scheme for understanding both ter- replacing ignorance with knowledge and blind obe- restrial and celestial movements symbolized what dience with freedom. It is an age of optimism. One human efforts could achieve—if only they could be of the clearest expressions of this attitude is found freed from the dead hand of the past. And thinkers in a brief essay by Immanuel Kant (the subject of throughout the eighteenth century busy themselves our next chapter). Writing in 1784, Kant defines applying Newton’s methods to other subjects: to what the age understands by “enlightenment.” the mind, to ethics, to religion, and to the state Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed of society. immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s Yet none of them would claim to have arrived understanding without guidance from another. This at the goal. Here again is Kant: immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and If it is now asked, “Do we presently live in an en- courage to use it without guidance from another. lightened age?” the answer is, “No, but we do live in Sapere Aude! “Have courage to use your own under- an age of enlightenment.”2 standing!”—that is the motto of enlightenment.1 The key word is “progress.” Newton showed that This call to think for oneself, to have the cour- progress is really possible. And the conviction spreads age to rely on one’s own abilities, is quite charac- that this progress can be extended indefinitely if only teristic of European thinkers of the age. For Kant, we can muster the courage to do what Newton had the lack of courage is “self-imposed.” Working done in physics and astronomy. We were not yet oneself out of this immaturity is difficult, Kant mature, but we were becoming mature. 438 mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 438 07/09/18 03:57 PM  How Newton Did It 439 How Newton Did It maxim. The fact that white light is not a simple phenomenon (as it seems to naive sight) is disclosed It is almost impossible to exaggerate Newton’s only by an immensely detailed series of investiga- impact on the imagination of the eighteenth cen- tions, which reveal its composition out of the many tury. As a towering symbol of scientific achieve- simpler hues of the rainbow. ment, he can be compared only to Einstein in the The explanations of his experiments are to be twentieth century. The astonished admiration his “deduced from the phenomena.” This emphasis work evoked is expressed in a couplet by Alexan- on paying attention to the facts of experience is der Pope. Aristotelian in character, but in the modern era, Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night; we can trace it back through John Locke to Fran- God said, Let Newton be, and all was light.* cis Bacon. In Newton its fruitfulness pays off in a way that had never been seen before. Newton Everyone has some idea of Newton’s accom- expresses a deep suspicion of principles not de- plishment, of how his theory of universal gravi- rived from a close experimental examination of tation provides a mathematically accurate and the sensible facts. We cannot begin with what powerful tool for understanding not only the seems right to us. Hypotheses not arrived at by motions of heavenly bodies but also such puz- way of careful analysis of the sensible facts are zling phenomena as the tides. We don’t go into arbitrary—no matter how intuitively convincing the details of this theory here, but every science they may seem. And Newton’s success is, to the is developed on the basis of certain methods and eighteenth-century thinker, proof that his meth- presuppositions that may properly be called philo- ods are sound. sophical. It is these philosophical underpinnings Note how different this is from the rationalism that we must take note of, for they are crucially of Descartes. Always the mathematician, Descartes important to the development of thought in the seeks to find starting points for science and philos- eighteenth century—not least to the philosophy ophy that are intuitively certain, axioms that are of David Hume. “so clear and distinct” that they cannot possibly be How had Newton been able to pull it off? doubted. He is confident that reason, the “light of His methods are not greatly different from those nature,” will certify some principles as both know- of Galileo and Hobbes. There are two stages (like able and known. So the structure of wisdom, for Hobbes’ resolution and composition), which he Descartes, is the structure of an axiomatic, geo- calls analysis and synthesis. But there is a par- metrical system. Intuitive insight and deduction ticular insistence in some of his pronouncements from first principles will get you where you want that strikes a new note. to go. I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced But for eighteenth-century thinkers inspired from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; by Newton, this smells too much of arbitrariness. and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, One man’s intuitive certainty, they suspect, is an- whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no other man’s absurdity.* The only cure is to stick place in experimental philosophy.3 closely to the facts. The rationalism of Descartes is The key to doing science, he believes, is to supplanted by the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, stay close to the phenomena rather than to frame and David Hume. hypotheses. Newton’s long and persistent series of experiments with the prism exemplifies this * They feel confirmed in this suspicion by the example of rationalist philosophy after Descartes. First-rate intel- * Epitaph intended for Sir Isaac Newton. John lects such as Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz developed Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, 14th ed. (Boston: Little, remarkably different philosophical systems on the basis of Brown, 1968). supposedly “self-evident” truths. mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 439 07/09/18 03:57 PM 440 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason ÉMILIE DU CHÂTELET B orn into an aristocratic French family, Émilie du Châtelet (1706–1749) juggled many identities during her short life: She was a learned the largest prime number, are in fact impossible on careful consideration and that many philoso- phers have blundered into mistakes by suppos- natural philosopher, a courtier in the palace of ing that they have a clear idea of something that King Louis XV, a member of Parisian high soci- turns out to be impossible. The second principle ety, and the wife of an ambitious nobleman. She is Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, which was also an active participant in the Republic of says that there must be a sufficient reason to Letters, early modern Europe’s intellectual elite, explain why things are as they are.* According who shared and debated their ideas through corre- to du Châtelet, the principle of noncontradiction spondence and publications. Despite the demands explains all necessary truths, because denying them her social role placed on her, she embodied the leads to contradiction, but if we want to estab- advice she set forth in her Discourse on Happiness “to lish some contingent truth, we need to identify be resolute about what one wants to be and about a sufficient reason that enables us to understand what one wants to do” (DH, 355).4 After studying why things are as they are and not some other philosophy, physics, analytic geometry, and the way. Furthermore, these reasons must actually newly invented calculus, she published a number improve our understanding of the phenomenon. of philosophical treatises and translated Newton’s Otherwise, it is just a meaningless way of claim- Principia Mathematica into French. Her Foundations ing that there is some reason. of Physics synthesizes Newtonian mechanics with Acquiring knowledge of contingent facts, du the ideas of the great German philosopher Leibniz Châtelet argues, often requires framing hypotheses. to set Newtonian science on firmer metaphysical When certain things are used to explain what has foundations. been observed, and though the truth of what has Du Châtelet grounds all human knowledge been supposed is impossible to demonstrate, one on two basic principles. The first is Aristotle’s is making a hypothesis. (FP, 148) principle of noncontradiction, which says that something cannot be both true and false at the Especially at the beginning of an inquiry, same time. Something is impossible, du Châtelet there is often no way to proceed except by fram- says, just in case it implies a contradiction. She ing hypotheses. Doing science well, du Châtelet warns that many things that seem possible, such as says, involves testing those hypotheses against observations and accepting hypotheses as prob- able only when they have been confirmed repeat- edly and explain a wide range of observations. This is how astronomy advanced from a primitive understanding of the skies to Ptolemy’s system to Copernicus and Kepler’s. Since it is on the basis of Kepler’s system that Newton showed that the laws of motion apply to the heavens, du Châtelet argues, even Newton himself depended on others’ framing and testing of hypotheses. She objects that whereas natural philosophers in Descartes’ day had embraced unfounded hypotheses without test- ing them, building whole systems on “fables” or “fictions,” thinkers in her own time had swung too mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 440 07/30/18 01:37 PM  To Be the Newton of Human Nature 441 ÉMILIE DU CHÂTELET far in the other direction by trying to do with- to be content with probable reasons to ex- out hypotheses altogether. Those who refuse to plain them. Thus, probabilities are not to be entertain hypotheses at all, she cautions, will sel- rejected in the sciences, not only because dom reach the truth. they are often of great practical use, but also because they clear the path that leads to the The true causes of natural effects and of the truth. (FP, 147) phenomena we observe are often so far from the principles on which we can rely and the experiments we can make that one is obliged * On Leibniz, see p. 478. To Be the Newton from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every un- of Human Nature guarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest David Hume (1711–1776) aspires to do for human antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is op- nature what Isaac Newton did for nonhuman pressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, nature: to provide principles of explanation both open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive simple and comprehensive.5 There seem to be two them with reverence and submission, as their legal motivations. First, Hume shares with many other sovereigns. Enlightenment intellectuals the project of debunk- But is this a sufficient reason, why philoso- ing what they call “popular superstition.” By this phers should desist from such researches, and they usually mean the deliverances of religious leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? enthusiasm, together with the conviction of cer- Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclu- tainty that typically accompanies them.* (The era sion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? of religious wars based on such certainties is still (HU, 91–92)6 fresh in their memory.) But they also mean what- ever cannot be demonstrated on a basis of reason The basic strategy in this war is to show what and experience common to human beings. Hume’s the human understanding is (and is not) capable of. prose betrays his passion on this score. Remarking And this is what a science of human nature should on the obscurity, uncertainty, and error in most give us. If we can show that “superstition” claims philosophies, he pinpoints the cause: to know what no one can possibly know, then we They are not properly a science; but arise either undermine it in the most radical way. from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular “Superstition is the religion of feeble minds.” superstitions, which, being unable to defend them- selves on fair ground, raise these entangling bram- Edmund Burke (1729–1797) bles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased Hume’s second motivation is his conviction * “Enthusiasm” is the word eighteenth-century thinkers that a science of human nature is, in a certain way, use to describe ecstatic forms of religion involving the claim fundamental. Because all our intellectual endeavors that one is receiving revelations, visions, or “words” directly are products of human understanding, an examina- from God. This form of religion is far from dead. tion of that understanding should illumine them mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 441 07/09/18 03:57 PM 442 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason all, even mathematics, natural philosophy, and re- ligion. Such an inquiry will reveal how the mind works, what materials it has to operate on, and how knowledge in any area at all can be constructed. Hume is aware that others before him have formulated theories of the mind (or human under- standing), but they have not satisfactorily settled matters. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions.... Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was cer- tain. (T, Intro. p. 3) Consider the wide disagreement between Descartes and Hobbes, for instance. Descartes, as we have seen, believes that the freedom and rationality of our minds exempts them from the kind of causal explanation provided for material bodies. A mind, he concludes, is a thing completely distinct from a “As the science of man is the only solid foundation for body. Hobbes, however, includes the mind and all the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can its ideas and activities within the scope of a material- give to this science itself must be laid on experience and istic and deterministic science. “Mind,” for Hobbes, observation.” is just a name for certain ways a human body oper- –DAVID HUME ates. Who is right here? From Hume’s point of view, neither one pre- vails. Hobbes simply assumes that our thoughts rep- only by sticking close to the experimental facts; we resent objects independent of our minds and that can hope to progress in understanding the mind whatever principles explain these objects will also only if we do the same. explain the mind. But surely Descartes has shown us For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the that this is something we should not assume. What- mind being equally unknown to us with that of ex- ever our experience “tells” us about reality, things ternal bodies, it must be equally impossible to form could actually be different. That is the lesson of any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise Descartes’ doubt. Hobbes’ assumption that sensa- than from careful and exact experiments, and the tions and thoughts generally represent realities ac- observation of those particular effects, which result curately is nothing but a “hypothesis.” And, Hume from its different circumstances and situations. And says (following Newton), we must avoid framing tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles hypotheses. Similarly, Descartes’ positive doctrine as universal as possible, by tracing up our experi- of a separate mind-substance is just as “hypotheti- ments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from cal” as that of Hobbes. It is derived from principles the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that may seem intuitively obvious but have not been that pretends to discover the ultimate original quali- “deduced from the phenomena.” ties of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as We do not have, Hume thinks, any insight into presumptuous and chimerical. (T, Intro, p. 5) the “essence” of either material bodies or minds, as Hobbes and Descartes seem to assume. We have The Newtonian tone is unmistakable. What, made progress in understanding the physical world then, are the data that scientists of human nature mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 442 07/30/18 01:37 PM  The Theory of Ideas 443 must “observe” and from which they may draw Hume thinks that we are all familiar with this principles “as universal as possible”? Hume calls difference. There may be borderline cases such as a them “perceptions,” by which he means all the terrifying dream, in which the ideas are very nearly contents of our minds when we are awake and as lively as the actual impressions would be. But alert.* Among perceptions are all the ideas of the on the whole, the distinction is familiar and clear. sciences, as well as ideas arbitrary and supersti- One other important distinction must be observed: tious. Hume aims to draw a line between legiti- that between simple and complex perceptions. The mate ideas and ideas that are confused, unfounded, impression you have when you slap the table is and nonsensical. The first thing to do is to inquire simple; the impression you have when you hear about the origin of our ideas. a melody is complex. Complex impressions and ideas are built up from simple ones. The next thing Hume notices is “the great re- The Theory of Ideas semblance betwixt our impressions and ideas” A science of human nature must concentrate on (T, I, 1, 1, p. 8). It seems as though “all the per- what is peculiarly human. A person’s height, ceptions of the mind are double, and appear both weight, and shape are characteristics of a human as impressions and ideas” (T, I, 1, 1, p. 8). No, he being, but these are properties shared with the non- adds, this is not quite correct. For you have the human objects Newtonian science explains so well. idea of a unicorn, but you have never experienced It is human ideas, feelings, and actions that require a unicorn impression. (Ah, you say; but I have special treatment. Ideas are particularly important seen a picture of a unicorn! True enough, but your because they are involved in nearly all the activities experience on that occasion did not constitute an that are characteristically human. What are ideas, impression of a unicorn, but that of a unicorn pic- and how do we come to have them? ture. Your idea of a unicorn is not the idea of a Perceptions, Hume claims, can be divided into picture.) So you do have an idea that does not cor- two major classes: impressions and ideas. respond to any impression; so not all our percep- The difference betwixt these consists in the de- tions are “double.” grees of force and liveliness with which they But a closer look, Hume thinks, will convince us strike upon the mind, and make their way into that although this principle does not hold for com- our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, plex ideas, it does hold for all simple ideas. We which enter with most force and violence, we may need not analyze the idea of a unicorn very far to name impressions; and under this name I comprehend notice that it is made up of two simpler ideas: that all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they of a horse and that of a single horn. Impressions do make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas correspond to these simpler ideas, for we have all I mean the faint images of these in thinking and seen horses and horns. So the revised principle is reasoning. (T, I, 1, 1 p. 7) that to every simple idea corresponds a simple impres- You can get a vivid illustration of the difference be- sion that resembles it. tween the two classes if you slap the table smartly If impressions and simple ideas come in pairs with your hand (the sound you hear is an impres- like this, so that there is a “constant conjunction” sion) and then, a few seconds later, recall that between them, the next question is, Which comes sound (the content of your memory is an idea). first? Hume again notes that in his experience, it is always the impression that appears first; the idea comes later. *Here Hume shows that he, like Descartes (and Locke and Berkeley, too), is committed to the basic principle of the To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet representational theory (pp. 372–373)—that what we know or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, first and best are our ideas. Unlike Descartes, as we will see, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not Hume believes there are no legitimate inferences from ideas so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impres- to things. sions by exciting the ideas.... We cannot form mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 443 07/09/18 03:57 PM 444 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, If you try and fail, then all you have are meaning- without having actually tasted it. (T, I, 1, 1, p. 9) less noises or nonsensical marks on paper. This suggests that there is a relation of dependence Hume has here a powerful critical tool. It seems between them; Hume concludes that every simple innocent enough, but Hume makes radical use of idea has some simple impression as a causal ante- it. The rule is a corollary to Hume’s Newtonian cedent. Every simple idea, in fact, is a copy of a pre- analysis of phenomena. It is a result of the theory ceding impression.* What is the origin of all our of ideas. ideas? The impressions of experience. The rule is this: no impression, no idea. The Association of Ideas This is an apparently simple principle, but The results so far constitute the stage of analy- Hume warns us that taking it seriously will have sis. What we find, on paying close attention to far-reaching consequences. It is, in fact, a rule of the contents of the human mind, are impressions procedure that Hume makes devastating use of. and ideas, the latter in complete dependence on All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally the former. Hume now proceeds to the stage of faint and obscure: The mind has but a slender hold synthesis: What are the principles that bind these of them: They are apt to be confounded with other elements together to produce the rich mental life resembling ideas; and when we have often em- characteristic of humans? Like Newton, he finds ployed any term, though without a distinct mean- that the great variety of phenomena can be ex- ing, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea, plained by a few principles, surprisingly simple in annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, nature. These are principles of association, and that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: The limits between them are they correspond in the science of human nature to more exactly determined: Nor is it easy to fall into universal gravitation in the purely physical realm. any error or mistake with regard to them. When It is evident that there is a principle of connexion we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philo- between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, sophical term is employed without any meaning or and that, in their appearance to the memory or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, imagination, they introduce each other with a cer- from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And tain degree of method and regularity.... Were the if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, confirm our suspicion. (HU, 99) there would immediately be observed something, Every meaningful term (word), Hume tells us, which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person, who broke the thread of is associated with an idea. Some terms, however, discourse, might still inform you, that there had se- have no clear idea connected with them. We get cretly resolved in his mind a succession of thought, used to them and think they mean something, but which had gradually led him from the subject of we are deceived. Hume in fact thinks this happens conversation. (HU, 101) all too frequently! How can we discover whether a term really means something? Try to trace the You should be able to test whether this observation associated idea back to an impression. If you can, it is correct by observing your own trains of thought is a meaningful word that expresses a real idea. or noting how one topic follows another in a con- versation you are party to. If Hume is right here, the next question is, *Compare Hobbes, p. 406, and Locke, p. 417. Hume’s What are these principles of association? theory of the origin of ideas is similar, but without Hobbes’ mechanistic explanation and without the assumption that To me, there appear to be only three principles of external objects are the cause of our impressions. Hume connexion among ideas, namely Resemblance, Conti- considers both these claims merely “hypotheses.” The per- guity in time or place, and Cause or Effect. ceptions of the mind are our data; beyond them we may not That these principles serve to connect ideas will safely go. not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 444 07/09/18 03:57 PM  Causation: The Very Idea 445 leads our thoughts to the original [Resemblance]: One more distinction will set the stage. The mention of one apartment in a building natu- rally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning All the objects of human reason or enquiry may nat- the others [Contiguity]: And if we think of a wound, urally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are follows it [Cause and Effect]. (HU, 101–102) the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either in- There is some question about whether this list tuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of three principles is complete; Hume thinks it of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, probably is and invites you to try to find more if is a proposition, which expresses a relation between you think otherwise. The world of ideas, then, is these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of governed by the “gentle force” of association. He thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the likens it to “a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mere operation of thought, without dependence on mental world will be found to have as extraordi- what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though nary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the many and as various forms” (T, I, 1, 4, pp. 12, 14). truths, demonstrated by Euclid, would forever It is important to note that this “gentle force” retain their certainty and evidence. operates entirely without our consent, will, or Matters of fact, which are the second objects even consciousness of it. It is not something in our of human reason, are not ascertained in the same control, any more than we can control the force of manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however gravity. If Hume is right, it just happens that this is great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The con- how the mind works. He does not think it possible trary of every matter of fact is still possible; because to go on to explain why the mind works the way it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived it does; explanation has to stop somewhere, and, by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will like Newton, he does not “frame hypotheses.” But not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposi- these principles, he thinks, can be “deduced from tion, and implies no more contradiction, than the the phenomena.” affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a 1. Using the quotation from Immanuel Kant as a cue, contradiction, and could never be distinctly con- explain the notion of enlightenment. ceived by the mind. (HU, 108) 2. Contrast rationalism, materialism, and empiricism and relate each to Newton’s rule about not framing The contrast drawn in these paragraphs is hypotheses. an important one. Let’s be sure we understand 3. How does Hume explain the origin of our ideas? it. Suppose that yesterday you had uttered two (Distinguish complex from simple ideas.) statements: 4. What principles govern transitions from one idea or impression to another? A: Two plus three is not five. B: The sun will not rise tomorrow. The sun did rise this morning.* Thus, both Causation: The Very Idea statements are false. But what Hume draws our at- tention to is that they are false in different ways. A is We now have the fundamental principles of false simply because of the way in which the ideas Hume’s science of human nature: an analysis into “two,” “plus,” “three,” “five,” and “equals” are re- the elements of the mind (impressions and ideas), lated to each other. To put them together as A does the relation between them (dependence), and the principles that explain how ideas interact (asso- ciation). We are now ready for the exciting part: *We feel safe saying this because if the sun had not risen What happens when this science is applied? this morning, you almost certainly would not be reading this. mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 445 07/09/18 03:57 PM 446 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason is not just to make a false statement; it is to utter a We don’t usually think so. We talk confidently contradiction, to say something that cannot even be of things beyond the reach of our senses and clearly conceived. As Hume puts it, we can know memory—of what’s going on in the next room or it is false “by the mere operation of thought.” We on the moon, of what happened long before we do not have to make any experiments or look to were born, of a whole world of objects that exist our experience. The opposite of A can in turn be (we think) quite independent of our minds, and known to be true, no matter what is “anywhere ex- many of us think it sensible to talk of God and the istent in the universe.” soul. All this is common sense, and yet it goes far However, we can clearly conceive B even beyond the narrow bounds of Hume’s data. What though it turned out to be false. It is not false be- can we make of this? Or rather, what can Hume cause the ideas in it are related the way they are; make of it? He considers some examples: given the way they are related, it might have been A man believes that his friend is in France. Why? true. We can clearly conceive what that would Because he has received a letter from his friend. have been like: You woke up to total and continu- You find a watch on a desert island and con- ing darkness. Whether B is true or false depends clude that some human being had been there on the facts, on what actually happened in nature. before you. And to determine its truth or falsity you needed to You hear a voice in the dark and conclude there do more than just think about it. You needed to is another person in the room. consult your experience. The falsity of B, Hume In each of these cases, where someone claims says, cannot be demonstrated. Reason alone will not to know something not present in his perceptions, suffice to convince us of matters of fact; here only you will find that a connection is being made by the experience will do. relation of cause and effect. In each case a present And he suggests one further difference between impression (reading the letter, seeing the watch, them: About relations of ideas like A we can be cer- hearing the voice) is associated with an idea (of the tain, but with respect to propositions stating mat- friend’s being in France, of a person’s dropping the ters of fact, our evidence is never great enough to watch, of someone speaking). The way we get be- amount to certainty.* liefs about matters of fact beyond the present tes- We need to remind ourselves once again that timony of our senses and memory is by relying on Hume is committed to sticking to the phenomena: our sense of causal relations. The letter is an effect of the perceptions of the mind, its impressions, and our friend’s having sent it; the watch was caused to its ideas. These are the data that need explaining be there on the beach by another person; and voices in a science of human nature. But now it is obvious are produced by human beings. Or so we believe. It that a question forces itself on us. Is that all we can is causation that allows us to reach out beyond the know about? limits of present sensation and memories. *Hume is here suggesting a revolutionary understanding All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to of the kind of knowledge we have in mathematics. A contrast be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By with Plato will be instructive. For Plato (see pp. 152–153), means of that relation alone we can go beyond the mathematics is the clearest case of knowledge we have. Not evidence of our memory and senses. (HU, 109) only is it certain and enduring, but also it is also the best avenue into acquaintance with absolute reality, for its objects This seems like progress, though it is hardly are independent of the world of sensory experience—eternal very new. Descartes, you will recall, escapes so- and unchanging Forms. Hume, however, suggests that math- lipsism by a causal argument for the existence of ematics is certain not because it introduces us to such reali- God. But Hume now presses these investigations ties, but simply because of how it relates ideas to one another. Mathematics has no objects. This suggestion undermines the in a novel direction. How, he asks, do we arrive at entire Platonic picture of reality. It is further developed in the knowledge of cause and effect? the twentieth century by Ludwig Wittgenstein and the logical The first part of his answer to this question is positivists. See pp. 626–627 and 634–635. a purely negative point. We do not, and cannot, mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 446 07/09/18 03:57 PM  Causation: The Very Idea 447 arrive at such knowledge independent of experi- Hume is searching for what, if anything, makes this ence, or a priori: Our knowledge of causality is a rational thing to believe. Because this time could not a matter of the relations of ideas. be very different from all those past times, the ar- Consider two events that are related as cause gument is invalid and does not give us a good reason and effect. To use a typical eighteenth-century ex- to believe that the second ball will move. Can we ample, think about two balls on a billiard table: the patch up the argument? cue ball strikes the eight ball, causing the eight ball Suppose we add a premise to the argument. to move. Suppose we know all about the cue ball— 1a. The future will (in the relevant respect) be like its weight, its direction, its momentum—but have the past. never had any experience whatsoever of one thing striking another. Could we predict what would Now the argument looks valid. Propositions happen when the two balls meet? Not at all. For 1a, 1, and 2 do indeed entail proposition 3. If we all we would know, the cue ball might simply stop, know that 1a is true, then, in the light of our ex- reverse its direction, pop straight up in the air, go perience summed up in 1 and 2, it is rational to straight through, or turn into a chicken. Our belief believe that the second billiard ball will move when that the effect will be a movement of the second ball struck by the first one. We could call proposition is completely dependent on our having observed 1a the principle of the uniformity of nature. that sort of thing on prior occasions. Without that But how do you know that proposition 1a is experience, we would be at a total loss. true? Think about that a minute. How do you know that the future will be like the past? It is surely not No object ever discovers, by the qualities which contradictory to suppose that the way events hang appear to the senses, either the causes which pro- together might suddenly change; putting the kettle duced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor on the fire after today could produce ice. So 1a is can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter not true because of the relation of the ideas in it.* of fact.... causes and effects are discoverable, not by Whether 1a is true or false must surely be a matter reason, but by experience. (HU, 110) of fact. So if we know it, we must know it on the basis of experience. What experience? If we look My expectation that the second ball will move back, we can see that the futures we were (at vari- when struck is based entirely on past experience. ous points) looking forward to always resembled I have seen that sort of thing happen before. This the pasts we were (at those points) recalling. This seems entirely reasonable: I make a prediction on suggests an argument to support 1a. the basis of past experience. But if that prediction 1b. I have experienced many pairs of events that is reasonable, we ought to be able to set out the have been constantly conjoined in the past. reason for it. Reasons can be given in arguments. 1c. Each time I found that similar pairs of events Let us try to make the argument explicit. were conjoined in the future. Therefore, 1a. The future will (in these respects) be like the 1. I have seen one ball strike another many times. past. 2. Each time, the ball that was struck has moved. Therefore, But it is clear that this argument is no better 3. The struck ball will move this time. than the first one; we are trying to justify our gen- eral principle 1a in exactly the same way as we tried If we look at the matter this way, however, it is to justify the expectation that the struck billiard easy to see that proposition 3 does not follow from ball would move (proposition 3). If it didn’t work propositions 1 and 2. It seems possible that this time, the first time, it surely won’t work now. The fact something else could happen. To be sure, none of us believes that anything else will happen, but it is precisely this belief, the belief that the first one *You should review the discussion of the distinction causes the second to move, that needs explanation. between relations of ideas and matters of fact, pp. 445–446. mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 447 07/09/18 03:57 PM 448 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason that past futures resembled past pasts is simply no be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, good reason to think that future futures will resem- at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea ble their relevant pasts. of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by Yet we all think that is so, don’t we? Our prac- which all natural operations are performed, never tical behavior surely testifies to that belief; we appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to con- clude, merely because one event, in one instance simply have no hesitation in walking about on the precedes another, that therefore the one is the third floor of a building, believing that it will sup- cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may port us now just as it always has in the past. We all be arbitrary and casual.... believe in the uniformity of nature. But why? For Suppose again, that he has acquired more expe- what reason? rience, and has lived so long in the world as to have Let us review. Hume is inquiring into the foun- observed similar objects or events to be constantly dation of ideas about things that go beyond the conjoined together; what is the consequence of this contents of our present consciousness. These ideas experience? He immediately infers the existence all depend on relations of cause and effect: They of one object from the appearance of the other. are effects caused in us by impressions of some (HU, 120–121) kind. But what is the foundation of these causal in- This seems plausible. But what is the difference ferences? It can only be experience. But now we between the first and the second supposition? The see that neither experience nor the relations of idea can only difference is that in the first case the man lacks supply a good reason for believing that my friend is in sufficient experience to notice which events are France, for that belief rests on the assumption that “constantly conjoined” with each other. But what the future will resemble the past, which cannot difference does this difference make? What allows itself be justified by appealing to experience or to him in the second case to make inferences and have the relations of ideas. expectations, when he cannot do that in the first And so we have the first part of Hume’s answer case? If it is not a matter of reasoning, then there to the question about what justifies us in believing must be in so many things independent of our present ex- perience: not any reason! some other principle, which determines him to We must be careful here. Hume is not advising form such a conclusion. This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. (HU, 121) us to give up such beliefs; he thinks we could not, even if we wanted to. “Nature will always maintain Note carefully what Hume is saying. Our her rights,” he says, “and prevail in the end over belief that events are related by cause and effect is any abstract reasoning whatsoever” (HU, 120). The a completely nonrational belief. We have no good fact that these beliefs do not rest on any rational reason to think this. We cannot help but believe foundation is an important result in his science of in causation, but we believe in it by a kind of in- human nature, and, as we’ll see, its philosophical stinct built into human nature: When we experi- consequences are dramatic. But he acknowledges ence the constant conjunction of events, we that we cannot really do without these beliefs. Our form a habit of expecting the second when we survival depends on them. observe the first, and we believe the first causes If we allow that these beliefs about the world the second.* are not rationally based, the next obvious question Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. is this: What is their foundation? Hume suggests a It is that principle alone, which renders our expe- thought experiment. rience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the Suppose a person, though endowed with the stron- future, a similar train of events with those which gest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, im- mediately observe a continual succession of objects, *Compare this to al-Ghazālī theory about causation and one event following another; but he would not (pp. 307–308). mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 448 07/09/18 03:57 PM  Causation: The Very Idea 449 have appeared in the past. Without the influence between event A and event B, the more probable of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every we think it that a new experience of A will be fol- matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present lowed by B. Again, note that for Hume this is not to the memory and senses. (HU, 122) the result of a rational calculation. We do not decide Hume is here turning upside down the major to believe with a particular degree of assurance. theme of nearly all philosophy before him. Almost It just happens. That is how we are made.* everyone in the philosophical tradition has agreed This might seem unsatisfactory, for the idea of that a person has a right to believe something only constant conjunction does not seem to exhaust the if a good reason can be given for it. This goes back notion of causality. When we say that X causes Y, at least to Plato.* The major arguments among the we don’t just mean that whenever X occurs Y also philosophers concern what can (and what cannot) occurs. We mean that if X occurs, Y must occur, be adequately supported by reason. This commit- that X produces Y, that X has a certain power to bring ment to the rationality of belief is most prominent, Y into being. In short, we think that in some sense of course, in a rationalist such as Descartes, who the connection between X and Y is a necessary determines to doubt everything that cannot be connection. This is part of what we mean by the certified by the “light of reason.” The skeptics, on idea of a cause. We could express this idea in a these same grounds, argue that virtually no belief formula: in matters of fact can be known because virtually CAUSE = CONSTANT CONJUNCTION + NE- nothing can be shown to be reasonable. Hume CESSARY CONNECTION seems to agree that virtually no belief in mat- Hume now owes us an account of this latter aspect ters of fact can be shown to be reasonable; is he, of the idea. then, a skeptic? We return to this question later in How can he proceed? The idea of cause is one this chapter. of those metaphysical ideas we are all familiar with, For now, let us note his conclusion that almost but whose exact meaning is obscure. Hume has al- none of our most important beliefs (all of which ready given us a rule to deal with these cases: Try depend on the relation between cause and effect) to trace the idea back to an impression. What hap- can be shown to be rational. We hold them simply pens if we try to do that? out of habit. Our tendency to form beliefs about Think again about the billiard balls on the table. the external world is just a fact about us; this is the Try to describe with great care your exact expe- way human nature works. Hume does not try to rience when seeing the one strike the other. Isn’t explain why human nature functions this way—it it your impression that the cue ball moves across just does. We should not frame hypotheses! the table, it touches the eight ball, and the eight There is a corollary, which Hume is quick to ball moves? Is there anything else you observe? draw. Sometimes a certain event is always con- In particular, do you observe the force that makes joined with another event. But in other cases, one the second ball move? Do you observe the necessary event follows another only in some or most cases. connection between the two events? Hume is con- Water always boils when put on a hot fire, but it vinced that you do not. only sometimes rains when it is cloudy. These facts are the foundation of probabilistic expectations. Our degree of belief corresponds to the degree of *A qualification needs to be made here. While our connection that our experience reveals between degree of confidence in our beliefs is usually governed by this the two events. The more constant the conjunction principle, there are exceptions. We can be misled by think- ing that certain ideas have meaning when they do not. Or we can generalize too soon on the basis of limited informa- tion. These mistakes lead to what Hume calls “superstition.” *Review Plato’s distinction of knowledge from opin- Most superstitions are erroneous beliefs about causes and ion in terms of the former being “backed up by reasons” effects. Think about the bad luck supposedly associated with (pp. 150–151). breaking a mirror or walking under a ladder. mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 449 07/09/18 03:57 PM 450 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason We are never able, in a single instance, to discover This puzzle, Hume thinks, can be solved. any power or necessary connexion; any quality To solve it, we have to go back to the fact that which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the exposure to constant conjunctions builds up an one an infallible consequence of the other. We only associationistic habit of expecting one event on the find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the appearance of the other. This habit is the key to other.... Consequently, there is not, in any single, understanding the full concept of a cause. particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary After a repetition of similar instances, the mind is connexion. (HU, 136) carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it Mental phenomena are no different. If you will will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel to move your hand, your hand moves. If you try in the mind, this customary transition of the imagi- to picture your best friend’s face, you can do it. nation from one object to its usual attendant, is the But no matter how closely you inspect these op- sentiment or impression, from which we form the erations, all you can observe is one thing being fol- idea of power or necessary connexion. (HU, 145) lowed by another. You never get an impression of As we have seen, there are two things that go the connection between them. All relations of cause into the concept of a cause. One component is a and effect must be learned from experience; and constant conjunction of events. Of that we have experience can show us only “the frequent CON- experience, and on that basis Hume offers the fol- JUNCTION of objects, without being ever able lowing definition of a cause: to comprehend any thing like CONNEXION be- tween them” (HU, 141). an object, followed by another, and where all the Where then do we get this second part of our objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects idea of cause? Is it one of those ideas that is simply similar to the second. (HU, 146) meaningless? Should we discard it or try to do Notice that this is a reduced, cautious definition of without it? That seems hardly possible. Yet a close “cause.” It is not a definition of the full notion of inspection of all the data seems to confirm Hume’s cause, which includes the idea of a necessary con- conclusion: nection between events. We cannot, Hume says, Upon the whole, there appears not, throughout “point out that circumstance in the cause, which all nature, any one instance of connexion, which is gives it a connexion with its effect. We have no conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose idea of this connection” (HU, 146). and separate. One event follows another; but we But we do experience something relevant can never observe any tie between them. They to our belief in necessary connection. We cannot seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can help but feel that there is a connection. It is on the have no idea of any thing, which never appeared to basis of this kind of subjective experience that our outward sense or inward sentiment, the neces- we project a necessary connection into the relation sary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of between objective events. And Hume gives us a connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed second definition of cause: either in philosophical reasonings, or common life. an object followed by another, and whose appear- (HU, 144) ance always conveys the thought to that other. (HU, 146) “All events seem entirely loose and separate.” And the conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of Hume has done two things. (1) He has provided cause at all—because there is no corresponding an account of the basis on which we have the idea impression of necessary connections. But then it is of cause at all—the observed constant conjunc- really puzzling why this idea should be so natural, tions between kinds of events. (2) He has given an so pervasive, and so useful. It is an idea we all have, explanation of why we attribute a necessary con- and one we can hardly do without. nection to those pairs of events—even though such mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 450 07/09/18 03:57 PM  The Disappearing Self 451 necessary connections are never experienced. The The Brahmanical philosophers in India identify the full concept of a cause is a kind of fiction.* Nec- self with ātman. Avicenna imagines that his Flying essary connections do not appear anywhere in Man could recognize the existence of his self.* our experience, but we cannot help applying that In modern times, Descartes follows Plato’s lead, notion to observed events. maintaining that the soul or mind is an immaterial Remembering that we rely on cause and effect and immortal substance, Locke posits spiritual sub- for all our inferences to realities beyond present stances, and Berkeley argues that spirits and their consciousness, we now see that all such beliefs are ideas make up the whole of reality. simply based on habit. We have no reason for belief Hume can hardly avoid dealing with this ques- in an external world, in the reality of other per- tion, since he claims to be constructing a science sons, or even in past events. If knowledge is based of human nature. The first thing we need to do, on reason, as the philosophical tradition has held, to the extent possible, is to clarify the meaning there is precious little we can claim to know! of the central term. What Plato called “soul” and Descartes the “mind,” Hume names the “self.” A self is supposedly a substance or thing, simple 1. Contrast relations of ideas with matters of fact. (not composed of parts), and invariably the same Give some examples of your own. through time. It is the “home” for all our mental 2. What is Hume’s argument for the conclusion that states and activities, the “place” where these char- causes and effects are discoverable not by reason but by experience? acteristics are “located.” (The terms in quotes are 3. If our beliefs about causation are dependent on used metaphorically.) Your self is what is supposed experience, what experiences are of the relevant to account for the fact that you are one and the kind? same person today as you were at the age of four, 4. How does Hume explain our judgments of even though nearly all your characteristics have probability? changed over the years. You are larger, stronger, 5. Granted that the idea of necessary connection is an and smarter; you have different hopes and fears, important part of our idea of a cause, how does different thoughts and memories; your interests Hume account for that? and activities are remarkably different. Yet you are 6. What part of our idea of causation is a fiction, the same self. Or so the story goes.† according to Hume? What part is not? It is clear what Hume will ask here. Remember his rule: If a term is in any way obscure, or a sub- ject of much controversy, try to trace it back to an The Disappearing Self impression. Most philosophers in the Western tradition, along From what impression cou’d this idea be derived? with many in the Indian tradition, have taken human This question ’tis impossible to answer without a beings to have an enduring self that is somehow dis- manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet ’tis tinct from the body. Plato argues that a person is a question, which must necessarily be answer’d, if really a soul. Aristotle holds (with qualifications) we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear and that the soul is a functional aspect of a living body. intelligible. It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is *Hume does not apply the term “fiction” to his account of causality; but he does use it when talking of (1) the iden- *For Plato’s views, see p. pp. 168–170. For Aristotle’s, tity of objects through time, (2) the existence of objects see pp. 203–206. On ātman, see pp. 36–37. For Avicenna’s independent of experience, and (3) personal identity in a views, see pp. 304–305. continuing self. Since the pattern of analysis is similar in †It would be helpful at this point to review what Locke all these cases, we think it is justified to use the term here. says about personal identity (pp. 419–420). Note that We are indebted to Matthew McKeon for additional clarity he argues that my identity cannot consist in sameness of soul on this topic. or self, though he doesn’t find those terms meaningless. mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 451 07/09/18 03:57 PM 452 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason not any one impression, but that to which our sev- or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never eral impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a can catch myself at any time without a perception, reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of and never can observe any thing but the perception. self, that impression must continue invariably the When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self by a sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my no impression constant and invariable. (T, I, 4, 6, perceptions remov’d by death, and cou’d I neither p. 164) think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou’d be entirely an- Let us be clear about the argument here. The nihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite term “self” is supposed to represent an idea of to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one upon something that continues unchanged throughout serious and unprejudic’d reflexion, thinks he has a person’s life. Since the idea is supposed to be a a different notion of himself, I must confess I can simple one, there must be a simple impression that reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, is its “double.” But there is no such impression, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we Hume claims, “constant and invariable” through are essentially different in this particular. (T, I, 4, life. It follows, according to Hume’s rule, that we 6, p. 165) have no such idea! The term is one of those meaning- Again, Hume tries to pay close attention to the less noises that we wrongly suppose to mean some- phenomena and tries not to frame hypotheses. If we thing, when it really doesn’t. look inside ourselves, do we find an impression of This is a most radical way of undermining belief something simple, unchanging, and continuing? He in the soul or self. Some philosophers claim to confesses that he can find no such impression, and have such an idea and to be able to prove the self his suggestion that maybe you can, that maybe you really exists. Others claim to be able to prove that are “essentially different” in this regard, is surely it doesn’t exist. But Hume undercuts both sides; ironic. His claim is that none of us ever finds more they are just arguing about words, he holds, be- in ourselves than fleeting perceptions—ideas, sen- cause neither side really knows what it is talking sations, feelings, and emotions. about. Literally! There simply is no such idea as the (supposed) idea of the self, so it doesn’t make sense to affirm it or to deny it. This claim, of course, rests on the theory of “Since our inner experiences consist of ideas. It is only as strong as that theory is good. Is reproductions and combinations of sensory that a good theory? This is an important question; impressions, the concept of a soul without a in later chapters, we meet other philosophers who body seems to me to be empty and devoid of investigate this question.* But for now, let us ex- meaning.” plore in a bit more depth why Hume thinks there is Albert Einstein (1879–1955) no impression that corresponds to the (supposed) idea of the self. In a much-quoted passage, Hume says, So we have no reason to suppose that we are selves, or minds, or souls, if we understand those For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some par- terms to refer to some simple substance that un- ticular perception or other, of heat or cold, light derlies all our particular perceptions. But what, then, are we? *Kant, for instance, denies a key premise of the theory I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that of ideas: that all our ideas (Kant calls them “concepts”) arise they are nothing but a bundle or collection of differ- from impressions. Some of our concepts, Kant claims, do ent perceptions, which succeed each other with an not arise out of experience, though they may apply to experi- inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux ence. See pp. 473–474. and movement.... The mind is a kind of theatre, mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 452 07/09/18 03:57 PM  Rescuing Human Freedom 453 where several perceptions successively make their thinking is to frame a hypothesis, to go beyond the appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in evidence available.7 If this criticism is correct, it an infinite variety of postures and situations. There undermines Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics; we is properly no simplicity in it at any one time, nor cannot know that the mind is a substance distinct identity in different; whatever natural propensity we from the body because we cannot know it is a sub- may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. stance at all! All we have is acquaintance with that The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that bundle of perceptions. constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are repre- sented, or of the materials, of which it is compos’d. Rescuing Human Freedom (T, I, 4, 6, p. 165) A science of human nature must also address whether human actions are in some sense free. Like the idea of cause, the idea of the self is a The mechanistic physical theories of Galileo and fiction. As selves or minds, we are nothing but a Newton give this question new urgency. As long as “bundle” of perceptions. Anything further is sheer, the entire world is conceived in Aristotelian terms, unsupported hypothesis. We have not only no where a key mode of explanation is teleological,* reason to believe in a world of “external” things the question of freedom is not pressing. If everything independent of our minds, but also no reason to acts for the sake of some end, pursuing its good believe in mind as a thing.* in whatever way its nature allows, human actions In thinking of ourselves, Hume suggests, the would fit the general pattern neatly. Humans have analogy of a theater is appropriate. In this theater, more alternatives available than do petunias and an amazingly intricate play is being performed. The snails, and they make choices among the available players are just all those varied perceptions that goods. But the pattern of explanation would be succeed each other, as Hume says, with “incon- common to all things. ceivable rapidity.” But if we are to understand the Early modern science, however, has banished analogy correctly, we must think away the walls of explanation in terms of ends or goals; explanation the theater, think away the stage, think away the by prior causes is “in.” The model of the universe seats and even the audience. What is left is just the is mechanical; the world is compared to a gigantic performance of the play. Such a performance each clock. Stones do not fall in order to reach a goal, and of us is. oak trees do not grow because of a striving to realize How does this bundle theory of the self bear the potentiality in them. Everything happens as it on Descartes’ cogito, “I think, therefore I am”? Des- must happen, according to laws that make no refer- cartes takes this as something each of us knows with ence to any end, goal, or good. certainty. And in answer to the question, “What, Are human actions like this, as strictly deter- then, am I?” he says, “I am a thing (a substance) mined by law and circumstance as the fall of the that thinks.” Hume is in effect saying that Des- stone? The view that human actions constitute cartes is going beyond what the phenomena reveal. no exception to the universal rule of causal law is A twentieth-century Humean, Bertrand Russell, known as determinism. The successes of modern puts it this way: The most that Descartes is entitled science give it plausibility. But it seems to clash to claim is that there is thinking going on. To claim with a deeply held conviction that sometimes we that there is a mind or self—a thing—doing the are free to choose, will, and act. *Compare the Buddhist doctrine of anātman or non- self (pp. 41–45). The psychologist and philosopher Alison Gopnik speculates that Hume might have learned about *An explanation is teleological if it makes essential ref- Buddhist philosophy through the Jesuit missionary Charles erence to the realization of a goal or end state. Aristotle’s Francois Dolu while both were living in La Flèche, France, discussion of “final causes” provides a good case study (see in the 1730s. pp. 195–197). mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 453 07/09/18 03:57 PM 454 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason Descartes shows us one way to deal with this all must admit that there are. He gives some ex- problem: Make an exception for human beings! amples (HU, 150, 151): Mechanical principles might govern material Motives are regularly conjoined to actions: bodies, but they can have no leverage on a non- Greed regularly leads to stealing, ambition to material mind. The will, Descartes says, is com- the quest for power. pletely free. And by “free” he means “not governed If a foreigner acts in unexpected ways, there is by causal laws.” always a cause—some condition (education, But Hume cannot take this way, for he is con- perhaps) that regularly produces this behavior. vinced we have no idea of a substantial self, so we Where we are surprised by someone’s action, can have no reason to think such a nonmaterial a careful examination always turns up some mind or soul exists. Hume’s solution to this puzzle unknown condition that allows it to be fit again is quite different from Descartes’, and it is justly into a regular pattern. famous. Its basic pattern is defended by numerous If all that we can possibly mean by “caused” is philosophers (but not all) even today. that events are regularly connected, we should all He begins by asserting that “all mankind” is of agree that human behavior is caused. Why do some the same opinion about this matter. Any contro- of us resist this conclusion? Because, Hume says, versy is simply due to “ambiguous expressions” used to frame the problem. In other words, if we men still entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of can get our terms straight, we should be able to nature, and perceive something like a necessary settle the matter to everyone’s satisfaction. What connexion between the cause and the effect. When we need is a set of definitions for what Hume calls again they turn their reflections towards the opera- “necessity” on the one hand and “liberty” on the tions of their own minds, and feel no such connex- other. ion of the motive and the action; they are thence I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men apt to suppose, that there is a difference between have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity the effects, which result from material force, and and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, those which arise from thought and intelligence. which can be put on these terms; and that the (HU, 156, 157) whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon But this is just a confusion! Causality on the side of words. (HU, 149) the objects observed is just regularity, and on the We already know what Hume says about ne- side of the observer it is the generation of a habit cessity. The idea of necessity is part of our idea of based on regularities. In neither case, material or a cause but is a kind of fiction. It arises not from intelligent, is there any necessity observed. Human impressions, but from that habit our minds de- actions are “caused” in exactly the same sense as velop when confronted with regular conjunctions events in the material world. between events. All we ever observe, when we be- What then of freedom or liberty? lieve that one event causes another, is the constant It will not require many words to prove, that all conjunction of events of the first kind with events mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty of the second. as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole Are human actions caused? If we understand dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto this in what Hume thinks is the only possible way, merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when we are simply asking whether there are regularities applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely detectable in human behavior.* And he thinks we mean, that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference *Look again at Hume’s two definitions of “cause” on by which we can conclude the existence of the p. 450. other.... By liberty, then, we can only mean a mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 454 07/09/18 03:57 PM  Is It Reasonable to Believe in God? 455 power of acting or not acting, according to the determina- tions of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at 1. What does Hume fail to find when—as he says—he rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. enters most intimately into what he calls himself? Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed 2. What conclusions does Hume draw about the to belong to everyone, who is not a prisoner and in nature of a “self”? chains. (HU, 158–159) 3. Explain how Hume thinks the necessity of actions (i.e., that they have causes) is compatible with the fact of Perhaps the most accessible way to understand liberty in actions (i.e., that sometimes we act freely). Hume’s point is to think of cases where a person is said to be unfree. Hume’s example is that of a man in chains. Isn’t such a man unfree precisely because he cannot do what he wants to do? Even if he yearns to Is It Reasonable to Believe in God? walk away, wills to walk away, tries to walk away, he After doubting everything doubtable, Descartes will be unable to walk away. He is unfree because his finds himself locked into solipsism—unless he actions are constrained—against his will, as we say. can demonstrate that he is not the only thing that Suppose we remove his chains. Then he is free, exists. The way he does this, you recall, is to try at liberty to do what he wants. And isn’t this the to demonstrate the existence of God. He looks, very essence of freedom: to be able to do whatever in other words, for a good reason to believe that it is that you want or choose to do? We could put something other than his own mind exists. If he can this more formally in the following way: prove that God exists, he knows he is not alone; and, God being what God is, he will have good A person P is free when the following condition is reason to trust at least what is clear and distinct satisfied: If P chooses to do action A, then P does A. about other things as well. Thus everything hangs, If this condition were not satisfied (if P should for Descartes, on whether it is reasonable to be- choose to do A but be unable to do it), then P would lieve that there is a God.* not be at liberty with respect to A. What does Hume say about this quest to show Hume wants to reconcile our belief in causal- that belief in God is more reasonable than disbelief? ity with our belief in human freedom. We do not We review briefly two of the arguments Descartes have to choose between them. We can have both presents, together with a Humean response to modern science and human freedom. Newtonian each, and then we look at a rather different argu- science and freedom would clash only if freedom ment that was proving very popular in the atmo- entailed exemption from causality. But causes are sphere after Newton. simply regularities; and freedom is not an absence Descartes first argues that we can infer God’s of regularity, but the “hypothetical” power to do existence from the mere fact that we have an idea something if we choose to do it. It is, in fact, a cer- of an infinite and perfect being. Claiming that tain kind of regularity. It is the regularity of having he himself cannot be the source of such an idea, the actions we choose to do follow regularly upon Descartes concludes that God himself must be its our choosing to do them. cause.† Hume counters that There is no reason, then, in human liberty, to deny that a science of human nature—a causal sci- ence of a Newtonian kind—is possible. And New- *Earlier thinkers, too, from Aristotle on, think they tonian, mechanistic science is no reason to deny or can give good reasons for concluding that some ultimate per- doubt human freedom or to postulate a Cartesian fection exists and is in one way or another responsible for all mind that eludes the basic laws of the universe. other things. Review the proofs given by Augustine (p. 269), Hume’s compatibilism, as it is sometimes called, Anselm (pp. 312–314), Avicenna (p. 323), and Aquinas (pp. 302–304). The arguments of Descartes are in Meditations is an important part of a kind of naturalism, a III and V. view that takes the human being to be a natural †See Descartes’ argument in Meditations III, fact, without remainder. pp. 378–379. mel70610_ch19_438-464.indd 455 07/09/18 03:57 PM 456 CHAPTER 19 David Hume: Unmasking the Pretensions of Reason the idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, Look round the world: Contemplate the whole wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing operations of our own mind, and augmenting, with- but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite out limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. number of lesser machines, which again admit of (HU, 97–98) subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these vari- By extrapolating from our internal impressions ous machines, and even their most minute parts, of intelligence, goodness, and wisdom, we can get are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which the idea of a being that is perfectly intelligent and ravishes into admiration all men who have ever completely good. And this is the idea of God.* This contemplated them. The curious adapting of means undercuts Descartes’ argument. to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, Descartes’ third argument is, roughly, that be- though it much exceeds, the productions of human cause the idea of God as nonexistent is as absurd contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, as the idea of a mountain without a valley or a tri- and intelligence. Since therefore the effects re- angle with more than three sides, the mere fact that semble each other, we are led to infer, by all the we have the idea of God means that God exists.† rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to But this, Hume objects, is to illegitimately infer a the mind of man, though possessed of much larger matter of fact from a mere relation of ideas. Perhaps faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work thinking of God entails thinking that he exists; but which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, that concerns only how those ideas are related to and by this argument alone, do we prove at once each other, not whether God in fact exists. That is the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human a question that can only be settled by reference to mind and intelligence. (D, II, 45) experience. Let us note several points about this argument. The most popular argument for God during It is an argument, Hume says, a posteriori; that the Enlightenment, among common folk and intel- is, it depends in an essential way on experience. lectuals alike, does begin from experience. It can Our experience of the world as an ordered and be called the argument from design.‡ Newton harmonious whole provides one crucial premise; set the idea that the universe is a magnificently or- our experience of how machines come into being dered arrangement on a firm scientific footing. The provides another. Note also that it is an argument image of a great machine, or clockwork, domi- by analogy. Its structure looks like this (M = a ma- nates eighteenth-century thought about the nature chine; I = intelligence; W = the world): of the world. And it suggests a powerful analogy. Just as machines are the effects of intelligent design 1. M is the effect of I. and workmanship, so the universe is the work of a 2. W is like M. Therefore, master craftsman, supremely intelligent and won- 3. W is the effect of something like I. derfully skilled. Machines don’t just happen and Finally, you should recognize that this, like Des- neither does the world. cartes’ first two arguments, is a causal argument. In a set of dialogues that Hume did not venture Both the first premise and the conclusion deal with to publish during his lifetime, one of the partici-