lesson 3.pdf

A. Importance of the Study.-The legal system of a country is said to tell vividly in its own peculiar way the life story of a people. In the same manner, the country's legal philosophy lucidly mirrors the national souL The reason for this may be gleaned from what one law professor has writt...

A. Importance of the Study.-The legal system of a country is said to tell vividly in its own peculiar way the life story of a people. In the same manner, the country's legal philosophy lucidly mirrors the national souL The reason for this may be gleaned from what one law professor has written. Tho~e who would tell of life as mankind lives it must give an account of law somewhere in the story, for a prime function of law is telling ffi'3n how to live. In this, it is a good deal like custom and religion, which regulate the business of living by means of more or less dogmatic com- mands in the interest of certain ends thought to be desirable. In n:lture and effect, the prescriptions in our codes and statutes are not to be dis- tinguished from the ordinances of the holy books or of tribal feeling, or from the exhortations of priests or moral philosophers. Their subject matter is human conduct and their concern is its control through the technique of dogma. Indeed, the distinction between law on the one hand and custom and morals on the other, is quite modern. Ancient law, com· pounded of tribal customs and sacred commandments, proceeded from a lawgiver who was at once the conserver of ancient traditions and the spokesman of the gods'! I subscribe to the theory that the juristic thought of a country in- variably embodies the passing and shifting problems of its generations, and the law, therefore, becomes the repository of a people's growth and fulfillment - to the end that the legal aphorisms and doctrines found useful today, though they may be discarded tomorrow, may nevertheless be signposts along the legal highway, giving us a sense of direction and incentive in the solution of our social, political and economic problems." * This paper was written in connection with the Fellowship in Jurisprudence granted to the writer under the NEC·ICA U.P. Faculty Development Program. The writer expresses his gratitude to Dean Vicente Abad Santos for the latter's inspira- tion and guidance in the preparation of this work. The extensive use of direct quotes was intentional. The quotes are intended to reflect, with no possible risk of distortion from the writer, the ideas of those quoted. """ A.B., LL.B., LL.M. (UP); LL.M. (Harvard). 1 Fernandez, Perfecto V., Sixty Years of Philippine Law, 35 PHIL.L.J. 1389 (19060). 2 Paredes, Quintin, Speech on the occasion of the Commencement Exercises of the Francisco Law School, 15 L.J. 146 (1950).  Crude though it was, the attempt of the Filipinos at legal ordering started rather early.3 This development suffered a substantial modifica- tion, if not a serious setback, with the coming of foreign domination in the 16th century. For more than three centuries, the Filipinos were not free to fashion their own legal thinking. Such phenomenon resulted in the emergence of a legal system which is a hybrid of Roman Civil Law and Anglo-American Common Law. Ironically, the legal system evolved 4 was, as it still is, neither civil nor common law. Much less is it typically Filipino. The situation has not fundamentally changed even after more than a decade and a half of political independence.5 It is refreshing to note, however, that even during the long period of stagnation, there were voices raised by some Filipino thinkers calling for a revision of the country's legal concepts. Inaudible those voices might have seemed at the time, the clearer and louder they resound throughout the length and breadth of the land with the passing of the years.6 Recent years have witnessed a healthy realization of an imperative urgency to revamp the country's legal system along the line of the people's customs, traditions and temperament, and to make it responsive to the nation's needs.7 To make this change possible as well as effective, there is the necessity to effect a comparable turn in the legal thinking of the people. A youthful and outstanding leader has stressed that -... If we are to live and flourish an independent nation, we've got to find the roots, the firm roots, of our cultural heritage. The question it seems, is what is to be included and what to be excluded from this heritage.8 Behind all this need for reform lies the precarious, if not altogether confused, politico-socio-economic situation which has plagued the country since its political emancipation in 1946, to say the least.9 3 As early as the 15th century, the Philippines could boast of two legal codes, namely, the Code of Sumakwel or Maragtas (1250 A.D.) and the Code of Kalantiao (1433 A.D.). Also (ORENDAIN,TEN DATUSOF MADIAAS88-89, 139-142 1963). 4 Balbastro, Arturo E., The Legal Philosophy of Jose P. Laurel, 37 Phil. L.J. 728- 729 09,62). 5 "Now, rather well-advanced in years and about to complete a half century in the public service of our country, rendered in all departments of government, ll~gis- lative, executive, judicial, and therefore continuously exposed during the pa~t five decades to the searing issues of national and international life that those decades have seen, I may say that I find no necessity to revise or modify my faith in the paramount need of national integration under the inspiration and guidance of a vigorous nationalism such as Rizal, Mabini and Bonifacio bequeathed to our people as a priceless legacy." - LAUREL,OURECONOMY- WHAT CAN BE DONE88-89 (Hf56). (956) 6 See supra note 4 at 728. 7 Id. at 729. 8 MANGLAPUS,FREEDOM,NATIONHOOD ANDCULTURE2-3 (1959). 9 LAUREL,OUR ECONOMY- WHAT CANBE DONExi (195'6).  With the current resurgence of nationalistic movement calculated to make secure to the Filipinos the nation's patrimony10 should go hand in hand a fundamental change in the people's legal thinking. As tersely put by Dean Vicente Abad Santos, now that we are substantially a poli- tically independent nation and are at present striving toward economic emancipation, it seems but proper that we should fashion our own legal philosophy and nationalize our legal outlook in accordance with our cul- ture.n In this connection, Dean Abad Santos made the following observ- ation: 1.2 A cursory glance at the diet offered to Filipino law students reveals that it is sadly deficient in respect of the wisdom of illustrious Filipino lawyers. True, we have courses in legal philosophy offered in both under- graduate and graduate levels. But the philosophy that is taught and learn- ed is not indigenous but alien. It is a sad commentary on our legal edu- cation that our students can in some instances readily expound the views of alien writers but they are at a loss in providing themselves with native props. This is not to say that we should denigrate foreign legal philosophy. It has its utility. But if we are to be true to the spirit of datus Sumakwel and Kalantiao, then we must evolve something that is peculiarly ours. Ultimately, the change should bring about a transformation of the Philippine legal system from its present posture which is suitable to a semi-feudal society into one which can adequately provide an effective underpinning for a progressive country's agro-industrial economy.u This is aside from having a legal system based on the mores and tempera- ment, and in accordance with the culture and traditions of the Filipinos. B. Purpose and Scope.-A proper and adequate understanding of Philippine legal philosophy, or more accurately Filipino legal thinking, presupposes a familiarity with the principles and concepts underlying it. 10 "The topic of the day is a 'FilipinO-First' policy, the Filipinization of every- thing from our national resources to our labor force, from education to religion, from the retail business to the exploration of oil. "The tide is running full at present. The newspapers are black with headlines about the new reawakening of the national consciousness. In the halls of some insti- tutions resound fervid discourses advocating fantastic measures and are heard end- less discussions that generate more heat than light, and political speeches on na- tionalism that may divert the attention of the people to, or to sidetrack the issue of, graft and corruption in the November elections."'-Francisco, Vicente J., Ultra- Nationalism, 24 L.J. 111 (1959). 11 Abad Santos Vicente, Education in Law for Philippine Culture, Law Register, Vol. V, p. 1 (November, 1959). 12 Id. 13 "That the economic status quo in our country is both a colonial and semi-feu- dal one and since many of our present social and economic problems are inherent in and inevitable from that dual character of status quo, then we need to have fun- damental reform in our society and in our economic life if we are to overcome and resolve the problems and dilemmas that have been harassing us all these years." - See supra note 9. Especially at this stage of our national existence and development as a people, when nationalism has been rekindled and is about to flower with its maturity in the land, it is but fitting and proper that attention be focused on the basic ideas underlying our legal system. Although it may be said that we cannot divorce our legal system from foreign influence for the simple reason that it has been largely a product of two leading legal systems of the world, it cannot be doubted that an intimate under- standing of the fundamental principles underlying our laws is imperative in order to obtain a proper perspective of our legal institutions.14 For this purpose, Dean Abad Santos makes the following suggestion :15 This then is my humble suggestion for ~ducation in law for Philippine culture: a research on the works and lives of illustrious Filipino lawyers. A study of their views will give breadth to the legal education of the practitioners and judges of tomorrow; more, it will instill in them native wisdom so necessary to our identity as a nation. Their lives - noble, patriotic and characterized by integrity - will serve as worthy examples to those to whom has been entrusted the greatest temporal power, the administration of justice. Their works and lives will be a mirror of our past and a projection of our aspiration. It is the purpose of this work to help focus attention on the necessity of revising the Filipino legal thinking as well as the country's legal sys- tem. To this end a survey is made of the notions on law and justice as expressed and expounded by Filipino thinkers within and without the law profession. Ideas expressed by Filipino thinkers, whether lawyers, jurists or mere laymen, as far as they are pertinent to the subject, are availed of and analyzed in the proper appreciation of their impact upon the trend or development of Philippine law and legal institutions, as well as upon the political, social and economic life of the people as a whole. As Dean Abad Santos has noted - The Philippines has its scholarly and learned lawyers. There are not many of them of course but their views in matters legal deserve more than passing consideration. By their views we mean not only those ex- pressed in judicial opinions but more especially given in other forms. Un- fortunately, and this explains partly the deficiency we have noted above, their writings (except possibly in the case of Dr. Jose P. Laurel) have not been collected in a convenient and systematized form. Parenthetically, even the collected writings of Dr. Jose Laurel have yet to be published.16 11 " This is intended to give him an understanding and insight of the in- tellectual foundations of law as a social phenomenon and force in human society. It is believed that such insight will promote his understanding of any concrete law with which he will be confronted." - Sinco, Vicente G., Objectives of the New Cur· riculum of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, 29 PHIL. L.J. 307, 309 (1954). 15 See supra note 11. 16 rd.  Of course, this does not preclude a cursory inquiry into the subject of whether there exists as a system a particular legal philosophy in this country. Philosophy is generally defined asa body of principles or gen- eral concepts underlying a given branch of learning or major disciplineY From this, it may be deduced that legal philosophy refers to the body of principles or concepts underlying law as a branch of knowledge or discipline.1s In short, the subject of this work may be said to deal with a body of principles or concepts underlying Philippine law as a discipline or branch of learning. One fundamental question to be answered in this regard, however, is whether or not there is such a thing as Philippine legal philosophy. It is one of the primary objectives of this work to find an answer to that question. A. Pre-Spanish Period.-As early as the 15th century, the Philip- pines could boast of two legal "codes". These are the Code of Sumakwel or Maragtas (1250 A.D.) and the Code of Kalantiaw (1433 A.D.) which were named after the rulers of Panay who respectively promulgated them. Even if only to get an inkling of the legal thinking at that time, these "codes" deserve consideration.19 1. Code Maragtas.-Consisting of four parts, the Code Maragtas deals with the social aspect of labor, the offense of robbery and theft, marriage and family relations.20 Laziness or idleness was seriously penalized. Since the main source of livelihood at that time was farming or agriculture, an individual caught not devoting himself to this occupation was sold to slavery in order to train him to work on the soil. If later on he was found out to be trained 17 WEBSTER'SNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY1842 (Second Edition). is "A philosophY of law may be defined as an integral system of legal control in terms of its final cause. It is integral because it is, as a matter of psychological necessity, supposed to exhibit a certain kind of internal consistency and also, as a matter of social necessity, to afford a comfortable margin of predictability. It is a system of legal control because it attempts to realize its mandates and objectiveB through socially binding measures promulgated by the legal authority. It is con- ceived in terms of its final cause because it is always taken· in relation to the achieve- ment of a predetermined end... " - Espinosa, Jose F., Observations on Justices Holmes' and Cardozo's Philosophy of Law, (22 PHIL. L.J. 87 (1947) 19 "There were both oral and written laws in ancient Philippines. The oral laws were the customs and traditions called ugali, which were handed down orally from generation to generation. According to Filipino mythology, these oral laws were first given by Lubluban, the great granddaughter of the first man and woman in the world. This made her the legendary lawgiver of the ancient Filipino." - ZAIDE, GREGORIO F., THE PHILIPPINESSINCEPRE-SPANISHTIMES 70 (1949). 20 MONTECLARO, PEDROA., MARAGTAS 40-42 (1957). (In Visayan - Hiligaynon dialect) in and dedicated to farming, he was repurchased from his buyer and set free. However, on his second offense, that is, if he still proved to be lazy after he had been set free, he was banished to the mountains and the wilderness, and ostracized by society.21 Theft, in general, and stealing from the farm of others, in particu- lar, were severely punished by the cutting of the fingers of the culpriU2 The reliance of the people on agriculture at the time can explain this severity on thefts involving agricultural crops. During the early times when the population was still sparse, a man was allowed to have three wives at a time. However, only those who could afford it were allowed to have many wives and children. The poor were limited to not more than two children. This encouraged the poor to work hard to improve their livelihood for fear that their children in excess of the two allowed by law would be killed and thrown into the river if the parents did not have sufficient means to support the chil- dren.23 If an unmarried woman became pregnant by a man who abandoned her in order to avoid marriage, and the man could not be located or found, the child was killed for the reason that it would· be difficult for the woman to have a child without a father to support it. The woman was also ostracized by her family. The authorities took the responsi- bility to look for the man who, if caught and would not marry the woman by whom he had a child, was killed first and then the child was killed next, and both the man and the child were buried in the same grave.24 Justice was administered by the datu whose position was heredibry. In deciding cases, the datu was aided by four elders in the tribe, the latter in their capacity as witnesses to the authority of the former. Of- fenses which were punishable by hanging, being buried alive, or by drown- ing in the sea, were robbery, theft, rape, adultery, and concuhinage. Killing due to a duel, conducted for the display of bravery and skill in the use of arms, was not punishable. In fact, the victor was praised and was placed in a position to marry a girl of beauty and coming from a respectable family. However, if the killing was attended by treachery, it was made punishable by death.25 As a result of all this, the people were respectful of each other, es- pecially the authorities and the elders. They were afraid to rob or steal 21 rd. at 41. 22 rd. 23 See supra note 20 at 41. 24 rd. at 41-42. 25 rd. at 8. the property of others and to trespass into another's farm. They were helpful to one another, especially to those who were in need of food. The young men were afraid to dishonor the maidens because of the heavy penalty imposed for such offense. However, those who could afford it were permitted to have two wives. But in this case, the authorities were strict with respect to the qualification of the man. Moreover, there was the rule that the man should treat the wives equally, and that all the wives should live with the man under one roof.26 2. Code of Kalantiaw.-The Code of Kalantiaw consists of eighteen orders or "sugo". The English translation was made by Dr. Jorge C. Bocobo from the Spanish version which was a copy of the original that belonged to Don Marcelino Orfila of Zaragoza, Spain.27 As may be gathered from its provisions, the Code of Kalantiaw deals primarily with certain injunctions against specific acts tending to dis- turb order and peaceful relations in the community, giving prominence at times to the religious beliefs and the social stratification of the people during the period. In the Province of Aklan which comprises the terri- tory within the jurisdiction of Datu Kalantiaw, there are still traces of the old custom of gathering the elders or the "ponu-an" in the barrios to conduct and promulgate rules and regulations which were announced by a publlc crier, for the "sakup" to obey.28 In addition to this, there are still the arrangement of marriage suits and celebrations by the old folks. Respect for the dead, the aged, the women, and the duly consti- tuted authorities, is still noticeable among the inhabitants of the Island of Panay, although the observance of injunctions with respect to certain beliefs and superstitions are no longer in vogue. It can be generally said that the effect of the rather strict provisions of the two codes still pre- dominates ill the more conservative communities in the island.29 B. Spanish Period.-With the control of the government in the hands of the Spanish authorities, the views expressed by the Filipino thinkers, if they were expressed at all, during the period did not find much outlet in public affairs. This must be the natural consequence of an abnormal relationship between the conqueror and the conquered as Dr. Jose Rizal himself observed. 26 Id. at 5-6. 27ALBA, DIGNO, PAGING DATU KALANTIAW IN THE NEW PROVINCE OF AKLAN 7 (19 56). 1 28 Id. at 15. 29 "The ancient Filipino laws may appear barbaric in severity of their penaltioo, but compared with the cruel laws of Draco in ancient Hellas and the severe penal laws of the other ancient European nations, they were really quite humane and fair." - ZAIDE, GREGORIOF., THE PHILIPPINES SINCE PRE-SPANISH TIMES 71 (1949).  The existence of a foreign body within another endowed with strength and activity is contrary to all natural and ethical laws. Science teaches us that it is either assimilated, destroys the organism, is eliminated or becomes encysted.3a Complaining against the suppression of the Filipino thought ann freedom at the time, Dr. Rizal wrote :31 No, the valves must not be closed; the human conscience, the people's cry, must not be stifled. Air is a very weak substance, very compressible, yet still it expands and explodes when compressed too much. The laws that govern the material world are the same in the moral and political world. And we say this in loyalty to the Spanish government; we say what we think even though many be offended; we wish to be loyal to the mother country and its exalted rulers. As a felt need of the time, Dr. Rizal saw the desirability of the expression of the Filipino thought and feeling. To this end, he advocated the Philippine representation in the Spanish legislative body. And so long as it is not asserted that the Spanish parliament is an assemblage of Adonises, Autinouses, pretty boys, and other like paragons; so long as the purpose of resorting thither is to legislate and not to philo- sophize or to wander through imaginary spheres, we maintain that the government ought not to pause at these objections. Law has no skin nor reason nostrils. So we see no serious reason why the Philippines may not have repre- sentatives. By their institution many malcontents would be silenced, and instead of blaming its troubles upon the government, as now happens, the country would bear them better, for it could at least complain and with its sons among its legislators would in a way become responsible for their actions.32 It may be said that the ideas that were born of Filipino minds at the time were held in a suspended state until such propitious moment when reforms could be had and opportunity for expression presented it- self. Undoubtedly, the writings of Rizal and other Filipino reformists are saturated with fertile ideas which could have given some bases for legal development during their lifetime. Unfortunately, these ideas had to remain dormant for years. C. American Period.-The capture of the Spanish Fleet by Com- modore Dewey in the famous battle of Manila Bay ushered in the Amer- 30 RIZAL'SPOLITICALWRITINGS149 (Craig, 1933). 1933). 31 RIZAL'SPOLITICAL WRITINGS267 (Craig, 1933). Sll See supra note 30 at 142. ican occupation of the Philippines. With the downfall of the Spanish colonial power and with the establishment of the American regime, a new era came to dawn in the islands. The coming of the Americans marked a new life in the history of our jurisprudence. Already, the times were characterized with many problems in the social, economic, and political life of the people. Spanish influence was still fresh, and the inertia of Spanish jurisprudence was still a factor, as it still is, in the legal growth of the new era. The problems confronting the newly acquired territory were peculiar and novel, and while the Con- gress of the United States was studying the advisability of extending into the archipelago the principles and doctrines well established in the Amer- ican jurisdiction, our own government agencies -and instrumentalities were busy reconciling our laws with the then current problems, towards the end of fostering their early and satisfactory solution.ss The early part of the American regime witnessed an abrupt trans- formation from the Spanish colonial administration into the American concept of government. After the establishment of the First and Second Philippine Commissions, the Filipino thinkers focused their attention primarily on the possible systems of government as well as the relation to be adopted with America. The ideas expressed by them slowly found their mark on legislative measures, increasing proportionately with the increase of Filipino participation in the new administration. At any rate, it may be noted that the germ of nationalism had merely lain dor- mant and slowly but steadily found itself in active form as the American authorities conceded more powers to the Filipinos. As the legislative and judicial branches of the government came under the control of the Filipinos, their native talent which was first given impetus in the Malolos Constitution again gained momentum. Although the main concern at the time was the attainment of political independence, there were worthwhile developments in legal institutions necessary and suitable for the needs of the time and also useful for the future. D. Commonwealth Period.-As an anti-climax to the political eman- cipation of the country, the Commonwealth Government was inaugurated in 1935. This has been more properly called the transition period and it could have been fittingly so if it were not for some drastic development in world events, namely, the outbreak of World War II. ss Paredes, Quintin, Speech on the occasion of the Commencement Exercises of the Francisco Law School, 15 L.J. 146 (1950).  After the establishment of the Commonwealth Government, with the Filipinos at the head of the three branches of the government, subject only to certain checks and supervision from the United States author- ities, for the first time did the Filipino thinkers find the necessary vehi- cles for expression of their ideas. It was at this period when a number of doctrines and concepts found adequate expression and came to influ- ence the development of the Philippine legal system. However, what could have been a continuous and progressive devel- opment of the Philippine legal institutions and concepts suffered a major setback when the Japanese Imperial Forces occupied the country for more than three years. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, there were ideas expressed during the period which have provided a link in the continuity of the legal development of the country, that is, from the Filipino point of view. After the liberation of the Philippines, the Filipinos picked up where they had left off before the holocaust. The period of reconstruction and rehabilitation began. Efforts were also made at continuing the program which constituted a part of the transition preparatory to complete in- dependence from the United States of America. E. Period of the Republic.-In fulfillment of her promise to grant Philippine independence, the United States proclaimed the Philippines a sovereign state on the historic morning of July 4, 1946. With this came new responsibilities for the Filipinos.34 The first decade since the proclamation of Philippine independence saw three Presidents with varied temperaments. President Manuel A. Roxas, who had the honor of being the last President of the Common- wealth and the first President of the Republic, dedicated his administra- tion to the task of laying the foundations of the republican institutions and the independent existence of the country. The program of rehabili- tation and reconstruction did not becloud the concern for social and eco- nomic reforms, and even legal development. When President Elpidio Quirino succeeded President Roxas, after the latter's untimely death, the former continued the program of his predecessor. 34 "That no foreign nation or individual can possibly love the Filipinos and the Philippines more than they can love themselves and their own country, and there- fore the only ones best qualified to decide on what is, or should be best for the Philippines and the Filipinos are the enlightened and patriotic Filipinos themselves; the corollary of this proposition is the simple truth that 'we cannot depend upon other peoples to solve our own problems; in the end, and when all is said and done, it can only be we ourselves who will have to solve them'. I put these last clauses in quotation marks because I am aware that many other Filipinos, in recent days, and myself, many years before this time, have stated that simple truth in writing or verbally in various speeches." - See supra note 9.  A radical change came about with the election of President Ramon Magsaysay. Great emphasis was given to the rights of the common "tao" to the effect that "he who has less in life should have more in law." Except for the sudden resurgence of nationalism,a5 especially during the administration of President Carlos P. Garcia, the second decade of the Republic has been merely a continuation of the basic programs of the previous administrations. It is, however, significant to note that under the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal, there was an attempt to revise some aspects of our semi-feudal legal system in order to fit the program of agro-ipdustrial development for the country. Eco- nomic and social developments were also brought about with the ideas expressed by Filipino thinkers as basis.36 With the inauguration of Pres- ident, Ferdinand E. Marcos, there has been a focus on national greatness, drawing inspiration from the monumental grandeur of the nation's he- roic p.ast. By accident of history, there took place in the Philippines the blend- ing of two great systems of law, namely, the Civil Law and the Common Law.37 As noted by an elder jurist and statesman, this development started with the coming of the Americans to the islands. The coming of the Americans marked a new life in the history of our jurisprudence. Already, the times were characterized with many problems in the social, economic, and political life of the people. Spanish influence was still fresh, and the inertia of Spanish jurisprudence was still a factor, as it still is, in the legal growth of the new era. The problems confronting the newly acquired territory were peculiar and novel, and while the Con- gress of the United States was studying the advisability of extending into the archipelago the principles and doctrines well established in the Amer- ican jurisdiction, our own government agencies and instrumentalities were busy reconciling our laws with the then current problems towards the end of fostering their early and satisfactory solution.38 This happening did not escape some pessimism on the possible out- come of the meeting of the two world legal systems in the Philippines. The implantation of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands marked the genesis of a unique legal system in which the two streams of 35 Francisco, Vicente J., Ultra-Nationalism, 24 L.J. 111 (19159). 36 The most revolutionary of these measures is Republic Act No. 3844, approved on August 8, 1963, otherwise and more commonly known as the. Agricultural Land Reform Code. 37 See supra note 4 at 728. 38 See supra note 2.  the law - the civil, the legacy of Rome to Spain, coming from the West, and the common, the inheritance of the United States from Great Britain, coming from the East, after circumnavigating the world have met on common ground. This consortium of the world's two great legal systems, "originating from different sources, flourishing in different countries, among different peoples, and diverse institutions, surroundings, and conditions," which in this time may form an amalgam to produce a peculiar national system, has wrought lamentable confusion in the existing substantive law.39 At any rate, there can be no doubt that the Philippines is an heir to both systems of law.40 We have seen the origin and development of the Philippine jurispru- dence from its Roman prototype on one side and from Anglo-American system on the other; we have seen that the Roman Law was brought to these Islands through the agency of Spain; we have also seen that the common law in its modified form is being extended to us through the medium of the United States. We then may conclude that we han the world's two great legal systems contending for supremacy in these Islands.41 As a consequence, there has been a tendency to amalgamate into one body the laws of the conquerors and the laws of the conquered.42 We quote Dr. Laurel's own words: The blending of the two great systems of law has already taken place in the Philippine Islands. We can not now evade the tendency to amalga- mate into one body the laws of the conquerors and the laws of the con- quered. But much more, in the matter of the development and perfection of our unique legal system, remains to be achieved. As in the present State of Louisiana, the Anglo-American law has to mould our criminal and commercial laws as well as the law of evidence. The development of the law of corporations, damages, and procedure must largely be influenced by the Anglo-American law; while the law of persons and domestic rela- tions, of property, succession, obligations, and in general the private law, or the law governing private persons, their inter-relations, property, and obligations must remain based upon the civil law. But every principle of law has to be chosen and adopted with care.43 But as predicted earlier, such development was not without any problem. Basically, Dr. Laurel saw this problem when he said:44 39 David, Gonzalo D., Are Sociedades Anonimas Corporations? 17 PHIL. L.J. 151 (1937). 40 Laurel, Jose P., Looking Forward: The Golden Age of Procedure, 20 PHIL. L.J. 17 (1940). 41 Cuyugan, Antonio E., Origin and Development of Philippine Jurisprudence, 3 PHIL.L.J. 212-213 (1917). 42 LAUREL,ASSERTIVE NATIONALISM 80 (1931). 43 Id. at 80-81. 44 Id. at 69.  Our system of jurisprudence, while it may appear satisfactorily to some persons, is not a credit to us. If we trace the historical development of our jurisprudence, we shall find that, from the time of Spanish domination to the present, we have always been governed by foreign laws; that is, by laws which were imposed upon us by our conquerors. More directly, Dr. Laurel pointed out that there resulted a confusion from the blending of the two systems. Here in the Philippines two divergent systems of law, the Roman- Spanish civil law and the Anglo-American common law, have met and blended. While the blending of these two great systems has given our laws elasticity and progressiveness, yet it has engendered also great con- fusion. The crux of the situation lies in the restatement of common law principles which has been grafted bodily into our jurisprudence, and in those field where we cannot as yet avail of the restatement of the American law, we are faced with a task of great magnitude. Hence, ?/hile the need for codification of our laws is both immediate and impevative, we realize with Justice Cardozo that "only powers superhuman could compass that achievement." All we can hope to achieve is to erect a modest struc- ture sufficient to harmonize our legal requirements with our present-day needs in so far as it is compatible with the architectonic wisdom of our people.45 For example, we find that the Spanish Civil Code is still the governing law in this country, notwithstanding the fact that such a body of law was drafted by Spanish jurists having in view the conditions and needs of the Spanish people and without regard to the customs, traditions, and history of the Filipinos. While the Spanish Civil Code is a good system of law from the point of view of logical arrangement and symmetry, yet I know that many of its provisions are not only obsolete now, but are entirely inapplicable to local conditions in the Philippines. What is true of the Civil Law is also true of the Commercial, Penal, and other laws. When the United States took possession of the Islands, they naturally brought 45 Laurel, Jose P., Integration of Philippine Laws, 21 PHIL. L.J. 96 (1941). 46 See supra note 44. "The Philippines is the only civil law country in the world today that has no civil code of its own, that is the genuine exwession of her people. This is because the civil code which governs the Philippines today is the civil code of Spain, which has been enforced by the decree of Queen Maria Cristina, not by the will of our people. The proclamation, therefore, of his Excellency, President Manuel L. Quezon, for the codification of the substantive laws of the country, particularly the Civil Law, which is the law that governs the private relations and life of our people, constitutes a landmark in our national history. Not only should the codification systematize the substantive laws to make its provisions clear and definite for ready reference by lawyers and judges, but it should be written for the people. It should be imbued by the principles of democracy, social justice, real equality, human dignity and social solidarity, which inspire the social philosophy of our Constitution." Florendo, Gerardo, Bases of a New Civil Code, 8 L.J. 905 (1940).  with them their system of jurisprudence and promulgated laws, with the intention of improving upon the legal system prevailing in the Islands at the time. They passed, among other laws, the Code of Civil Procedure based upon the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. The result, as has been said by a Filipino judge, is that we have a blended or mestizo system of jurisprudence in the Philippines. Who knows but that the cross- breeding of the Castilian lion and the American eagle had resulted in the evil birth of a phenomenal creature! There can be no question that Philippine jurisprudence has remained basically civil law. On the other hand, it cannot also be doubted that. the common law has gained foothold in this country. In these few cases just cited, although there is a seeming conflict of opinion, the majority seem to be inclined to hold that the common law of England, or at least its modified form as imbedded in the American jurisprudence, has taken a permanent foothold in this Archipelago, and exerted its influence over the existing jurisprudence, in time to form an amalgam with the other system now in vogue and produce a new species which would be neither Roman nor Anglo-American.H According to Dr. Booobo, the Code Commission, in working out the rules to be embodied in the Civil Code, drew principally from two sources: (1) the Anglo-American equity jurisprudence and (2) the general prin- ciples of natural justice.48 After all is said and done, there is something which the Filipinos can be happy about the meeting of the two legal systems in this country. Dean Abad Santos has noted thus :49 One of the chief prides in which a Filipino lawyer may very well indulge is the fact that he can feel more or less at ease in either the Civil law or the Common Law. The Philippines, because of its relations with Spain for almost four centuries, is the rightful beneficiary of the Roman Law which is the common heritage of civilization. Then too our country's almost half a century of contact with Anglo-American law has afforded it the opportunity of enriching its legal institutions and techniques. Thus it is said and with much truth that in the Philippines there is a happy blending of the best of the two aforementioned systems of law. One of the leading advocates and statesmen of the country made the following observation: The jurisprudence of our country has followed the general pattern of our culture, and is a unique hybrid of the European and the Anglo- H See supra note 41 at 213. 48 Bocobo, Jorge. Equity in the New Civil Code, 14 L.J. 230 (1949). ~ Abad Santos, Vicente, Trusts: A Fertile Field for Philippine Jurisprudence, 25 PHIL. L.J. 519 (1950).  Saxon disciplines and traditions. Despite recent reforms and revisions, our civil and commercial law is predominantly Spanish in substance, and our political and constitutional law profoundly American in inspiration. The body of our statutes derives from the European school; but our procedure, except for such unimportant features as the jury system, has been pat- terned on American practices and rules.50 As a natural consequence of the fundamentally civil law influence in Philippine jurisprudence, there has predominated in this jurisdiction a positivistic approach to legal questions with statutory provisions as the primary authority over and above precedents and customs. In fact, an allegedly abusive resort to positivism has caused a cry of protest from some quarters. "We do not know where we are going, but we are on the way." The statement practically summarizes the present way of legal and official thinking in the Philippines. There has been a sudden increase of law schools, but a meagre few have ever attempted seriously what legal philosophy they should stress to students. What is still more unfortunate is that the problems of national life have arisen directly from an ultra materialistic and positivist attitude toward law and life. We are approach- ing, we fear, a stage when ethical and moral content of our philosophy will be abandoned, when citizens and even public officials will feel free to assert, without restraint, their personal and class selfishness and avarice. The sole aim of many is profit, the affairs of government left to amateurs or self-seeking politicians who barter principles for self-aggrandizement. It is true that the Philippines has been the meeting place of the best world legal systems, but that at the same time, it has also sadly succumbed to the influence of extreme pragmatism, positivism, voluntarism and utili- tarianism.51 Worthy of note is the fact that there has been of late a slight but significant tendency to depart from the purely positivistic pattern. Touching on two decisions of the Supreme Court,5'2 a V.P. law profes- sor made the following observation: There is now a noticeable trend back to natural law thinking after almost two centuries of neglect. While one might say that it is quite an old idea yet it has certain charms that excite revisit. It has always been a concept of considerable significance for both ethical and legal philo- sophers, and, in the connection last put, has influenced the major juristic 50 Francisco, Vicente J., The Hybrid Pattern of Philippine Jurisprudence, 16 L.J. 206 (1951). 51 Coquia, Jorge R., For a Revival of Natural Law Doctrine in Philippine Juris- prudence, 16 L.J. 2 (1951). 52 Rutter v. Esteban, G.R. No. 3708 (1953) and De la Cruz v. Sosing, G.R. No. 4875 (1953).  schools of thought and, thereby, the legal ordering. The new-found in- terest then in the natural law theory is not merely historical but juristic, especially in the light of two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in which the natural law theory played an important role: Rutter v. Esteban and de z.a Cruz v. Sosing.53 It is generally known that there are as many definitions of law as there are schools of jurisprudence or legal thought. Of interest in this work are the different definitions of the term attempted at by Filipino thinkers. One writer defines law as universally accepted rules for the guid- ance of human action, prescribed and enforced by a sovereign political authority.54 Another looks at law as that system of norms of conduct which, in practice, is recognized by the judicial authority in a given jurisdiction as binding on all.persons within such jurisdiction.55 A pro- fessor of law makes the following broad definition :56 The same word "law" is used to indicate a broad generic sense when it is simply referred to as "law" without a definite article "the", e. g., the law. As a generic term Dean Roscoe Pound has stated that it is used to mean the legal order or the regime of adjusting relations and ordering conduct through the systematic and orderly application of the force of a politically organized society. In this sense, the word "law" is used with reference to derecho, jus, droit, diritto, recht, or kautusan. The grand central idea of the law is thus not ley but derecho, not lex but jus, not batas but kautusan. As the legal order, or the entire system of ordered liberty, or the total process of lawness, it is made up of a body of legal precepts and a body of received or traditional ideals of the end of the law. If the law is to be truly workable and effective then it must always have ideals or "anticipatory constructs." Law is primarily custom and morality codified. It is also public policy expressed. But custom, morality and public policy change with the change of the times, and so does law. As new ideas evolve and new thoughts arise which to the lawmaker reflect the best and the ideal, and as these ideas and thoughts gain ascendancy in the life of a people, new laws 5a Pascual, Crisolito, Natural Law Revisited 30 PHIL. L.J. 330 (195'5). 54 ZAFRA,THE STATUSOF THE PHILIPPINESUNDERTHE COMMONWEALTH, preface (1937). 55 Francisco, Vicente J., The Rule of Law and the Judiciary in the Philippines, 24 L.J. 42 (1959). 56 Pascual, Crisolito, The Policy Function of the Law; Value Creation, Clarifica- tion and Realization, 29 PHIL. L.J. 431, 432-433 (1954).  are enacted to suit the resulting change. This is but inevitable, for such is the law of progress; and law is at all times progressive. Sometimes the lawmaker may be far advanced of the times, and at occasions behind it; but in the main, it can well be said, that the laws of the land reflect the customs and morality of its people and reveal the public policy of its government.51 Sociological thought is represented as follows in the language of the law, science and policy approach: To repeat, legal education is concerned with the training for leadership in democracy. Law cannot be regarded at present solely as legal doctrines or as a peculiar set of technical symbols useful in predicting judicial be- havior, but rather as the whole of a community's institutions of govern- ment, the sum of all the power decisions of the community. It has more than the primitive functions of maintaining order. It is a positive instru- ment for promoting and securing all the other basic values of the com- munity like welfare, respect, wealth, skill, and enlightenment. The court is not therefore the only principal and proper instrument of legal control. Other institutions and practices which are already in being but can stand improvement, or which may be created for assuring a wider sharing of such values likewise serve the same purpose.58 The following is one of the practitioners' viewpoint with the shade of sociological jurisprudence: The law, my friends, is not like any other profession, the study of which is confined during the years of college. The law is an ever-changing coefficient of our social life, and, therefore, as a corollary, the legal pro- fession, if it hopes to be responsive to social fluctuations, must itself be constantly informed. This means continuous study and research - a pro- cess which is tedious and burdensome. but fruitful and necessary, if the law were to remain the "soul of our existence" and the "foundation of our social life."59 Law today is no longer the eternal, immutable truth of the Natural School, nor the spirit of the people, but is the product of infinitive forces variable with time and place. The legal method of today is no longer that of logical deduction from unchangeable standards but is the finding of a Just Decision to be aimed at consciously from the beginning.60 57 Cabatuando, Jose R., Should Impossible Crimes be Punished? 13 PHIL. L.J. 18 (1933). 58 Fernando, Enrique M., Education for the Law: Training for Leadership in a Democratic Society, 2'5 PHIL. L.J. 441, 441-442 (1950). 59 See supra note 2. 60 Diokno, Ramon Jr., What are "Los Principios Generales del Derecho" in Article Six of the Spanish Civil Code," 10 PHIL. L.J. 1, 23 (1930).  It has been said that knowledge of law is a mastery of legal prin- ciples, but this statement is not only partly true nowadays. Law is all inclusive. We do not turn to a body of isoteric legal doctrines, at least not invariably, to find the key to some novel problem of constitutional limitation, the bounds of permissible encroachment on liberty or property. We turn at times to physiology or embryology or chemistry or medicine - to Jennes or Pasteur or Virchon or Lister as freely and submissively to a Blackstone or a Coke. Of course, even then we try to know our place and exhibit the humility that becomes the amateur. We do not assume to sit in judgment between conflicting schools of thought. Enough it is for us that the view embodied in a contested statute has at least respectable support - its sponsors, if perchance its critics - in the true abodes of science. Philosophically, the concept of legal control may be divided into two classes: the a priori and the a posteriori. The a priori concept of legal control starts off from an ideal postulate, usually assumed as axiomatic, and proceeds deductively in the enunciation of particular legal canons which are held to apply to any legal complexus. It is evident that this method altogether prescinds from the empirical environment of any given legal situation. The leading and the inferred premises are regarded as definitive formulas of legal conduct and are for that reason independent of the vicissitudes of time and space. The outstanding example of the a priori concept of legal control is the metaphysical theory of law which is usually associated with Hegel.... The a posteriori concept of legal control, on the other hand, pro- pounds a method and a doctrine which is inverse to that of the a priori concept. In methodology, it proposes induction, or more appropriately, ex- periment. In doctrine, it advocates social utilitarianism. As stated by Jeremy Bentham, social utilitarianism is the interest of the greatest number.... At this point, it may be noted that, as one writer has called at- tention to, law is not only the definition but also the limitation of power.63 It has also been observed that, by force of habit, there has been the thinking that the end of law is logic and not experience contrary to what Justice Holmes believed. 61 LAUREL, PROCEDURAL REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES 39 (1940). 62 See supra note 18 at 87-88. 63 Ledesma, Carlos, The Proper Place of Administrative Law in our System of Government, 20 PHIL. L.J. 403, 411 (1941).  In a large measure, much of our present confusion is due to our habits of mind acquired for more than half a century. We still believe as did our forbears in the nineteenth century across the seas, that the end of the law is logic and analysis, and nothing more. We think, if we may borrow a stock illustration of Roscoe Pound that the judicial proces is to be a "sort of slot machine proceeding in which the facts were put in, the court pulled a logical lever, and pulled out the predetermined result." If the law were so certain, there would be no reason calling it a jealous mistress, nor do we believe there would be so many worshipping at her shrine. We hazard a statement that this cast of mind has been largely moulded by our reverential adherence to Spanish commentators whose end of analysis now belongs to a passing age. Those who have sat in many a courtroom and observed the everyday working ideal of the lawyer are familiar with this mode of thought. How vain must this ideal be to those growing number who believe with Holmes that the life of law has not been logic but experience?64 A theological point of view connects law with liberty in the sense that liberty has for its assumption the rule of law. This view defines law as that which makes the good manifest, liberty being the spon- taneous obedience to law.65 The relation between law and morality has been enunciated by Dr. Laurel. According to him, if there is a moral world, there must be a moral order, and where there is order, there must be law. He added that from this point of view, moral order is divine and righteousness, as an essential attribute, is the primal law and guiding principle.66 But Dr. Laurel was not content with the ethical exposition of the law. He went further in finding the explanation in the biological sphere. But the explanation may perhaps be drawn from the early biological teaching that many forms of life have developed from the protoplasmic to the more complex and higher and more efficient forms and that, so- ciologically, human society has emerged from a state of barbarism to better forms of organization and higher degree of compactness. We have reached the present state of development and now occupy the vantage ground from 64 Navarro, Emiliano R., A Word More on Moncado vs. People's Court et al., 16 L.J. 154 Og'51). 65 De la Costa, H., On Peace and Liberty, (An introductory note to ARANETA'S CHRISTIANDEMOCRACY FOR THE PHILIPHINES59 (19'58). 66 Laurel, Jose P., The Foundation of Human Relationship, 14 L.J. 57 (1949). According to Dr. Laurel, unlike the physical world which encompasses only the phenomenal and sensual, morality rests in the supersensuous sphere of the spirit where the inner verities are apperceived above the accident of time and space and virtue is rendered _secure against the constant provocation of the senses. From this point of view moral order is divine, the righteousness as an essential attribute, is its primal law and guiding principle. - LAUREL,MORALANDPOLITICALORIENTATION 28 (1949).  which to gain a varying perspective. The immensity of the panorama indicating the length of what has been traveled and the difficulties met in the travail should not detain us but should serve to enable us to visual- ize the future with confidence. The goal is not yet reached, but it is within sight.61 It is known that there are three sources of the law: (1) positive law, emanating from the legislature; (2) customary law, emanating from the people; and (3) judge-made law, emanating from the courts. Judicial decisions are by far the best and most desirable source of law, because the principles evolved by the judiciary grow out of actual controversies, and in each case the sense of justice deeply felt by the judge when he is faced by a real conflict between the claims of the parties is a solid guaranty of a just solution. The spark of conflicting interests kindles the conscience of the judge. On the other hand, customs formed by the lapse of time become obsolete because of changing social conditions. Be- sides, custom is insignificant in the Philippines as a source of law, because the Civil Code states that custom is followed only when there is no law applicable. Legislation is often a mere abstraction or speculative process in the mind of the drafters of the law; and too often laws are not care- fully pondered upon in the midst of popular excitement, or because of the compelling pressure of legislative business. Supplementing this view is that calling attention to the significance of dissenting opinions as the voice of the minority.... Sometimes also dissenting opinions are more stimulating and thought provoking than the opinions of the majority. The student in such cases is advised not to ignore this minority voice. He should know not only what the law is now but what it may be in the future. For the law is a progressive science. It is ever changing. What may be an ac- cepted dogma today may have to be repudiated tomorrow in the interests of progress.69 I subscribe to the theory that the juristic thought of a country in- variably embodies the passing and shifting problems of its generations, and the law, therefore, becomes the repository of a people's growth and ful- fillment - to the end that the legal aphorisms and doctrines found useful today, though they may be discarded tomorrow, may nevertheless be sign- posts along the legal highway, giving us a sense of direction and incentive in the solution of our social, political and economic problems. 67 See supra note 61 at x-xi. 68 Bocobo, Jorge, Unfettering the Judiciary, 17, PHIL. L.J. 139, 140 (1947). 69 Lichauco, Marcial P., Studying Law Thru Cases, 11 PHIL. L.J. 48 (1931). 10 See supra note 59.  It is not surprising then, that from the start, the sociological school of jurisprudence came into prominence - starting of course with the desire of our early jurists to reconcile American and Spanish Institutions, and to solve the new problems posed by the new era of American domi- nation. One writer believes that while law is primarily customs and morality codified, it is also public policy expressed, and that while it changes with the changing of the times, law is always fundamentally the ex- pression of the people's desire. It is the view of the same writer that so long as a law corresponds with the actual feelings and demands of the community whose conduct it seeks to regulate, however archaic and ancient it may be, however unwise or unliberal its provisions are, it is the rule that should be adopted, the regulations that should exist/1 It is said that every legal system has two goals, namely, social order and justice. Every system of law aspires to do two things: to establish social order and to render justice. Of the first end arises the need of stability; and of the second, the need of change. Hence the truth of Dean Pound's statement: "Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still.7'2 But what is justice? As in the case of law, there are as many definitions of justice as there are schools of jurisprudence. In a coun- try which is predominantly civil law like the Philippines, it is natural to expect a positivistic approach to law and justice. But possibly as a consequence of the common law influence, it may be interesting to con- sider the varied and various views on this subj ect as expressed by Fili- pino thinkers. In his article entitled "There can be no justice without truth, no liberty without justice, and no democracy without liberty," Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion said :13 And what is justice? In common parlance, justice is to give each his due. As Justinian had put it: "Justice is the constant desire and effort to render to every man his due." What is due to each, however, cannot be determined, much less given, without accurate information about the pertinent facts. Hence, the wisdom in the words of Disraeli: "Justice is 11 See supra note 54 at 27-28. 12 See supra note 60. 13 Concepcion, Roberto, There can be no justice without truth, no liberty with· out justice, and no democracy without liberty, 23 L.J. 113 (1958).  truth in action." Indeed, possession of the truth is indispensable to the administration of justice. But, Judges have no personal knowledge of the conditions surrounding the litigations. Judges ascertain the factual back- ground of each controversy by sifting the evidence introduced by the litigants, through their respective counsel. Judges cannot possibly do jus- tice - in its objective sense - to the parties, if the facts proven by them do not dovetail with the truth. What is worse, the decision of a court of justice, if predicated upon distortion of the truth, is bound to sanction and perpetuate the wrong complained of, instead of righting it. In short, rather than a bulwark of the rights of the weak, such judicial award may come to be regarded as an instrument of oppression. According to Dr. Laurel, justice is the rectitude of mind which enables one to estimate correctly what is due to every man, and give this to him conscientiously, regardless of any other consideration. He went further to state that it is not enough that a man endeavor to do justice always; he must be willing to suffer rather than do anybody an injustice.74 To him, "what is unjust is immoral and what is immoral is stupid,75 In a commencement address entitled "A Call for Moral Regenera- tion," the late President Manuel A. Roxas said :76 The concept of justice as we understand it - justice based on moral principles and revealed by the conscience of every man - is the only secure foundation for civilized society. And justice requires that indi- viduals and nations perform the promises they have made. Many genera- tions before Christ, the Jewish prophet Ezra said that rigorous observ- ance of the law was the sole rule for righteous living. If he meant not only the written law but also the moral law which is likewise written in the hearts of men, he must be regarded as having enunciated a prin- ciple which is of inestimable value to mankind. It was left for Christ to clearly establish this principle. In His priceless philosophy He enjoined mankind to obey the laws of Caesar; and as for Mosaic Law, He was most persuasive when He taught the duty to obey not so much the letter of that law, as the spirit of it, which is no other than the moral law, written upon the tablets of conscience at a summit higher than Mount Sinai - the pinnacle of the human spirit. Thus, He taught the observance of the fundamental virtues of justice, kindness, and mercy, and the respect for the rights of others. 74 LAUREL, FORCES THAT MAKE A NATION GREAT 5,1 (1944). Dr. Laurel further observed thus: "A just man invariably appraises men and things on the basis solely of their intrinsic worth and value, and guides his action with reference to them accordingly. Justice is a noble virtue and among the hardest for imperfect man to practice faithfully. 'Man is unjust but God is just' has been the common lament since the beginning of humanity. All the more honor therefore to the man who acts justly in all circumstances. - Id. 75 See supra note 66 at 58. 76 Papers, Addresses and Other Writings of Manuel Roxas, pp. 690-691 (1954).  According to the thinking of President Roxas, justice is something more than the moral intangible concept of giving to everyone his due and punishing those that are guilty of violating the law. Justice must be pure. It must be practical. It must be fair. It must be prompt. It must be fierce. A mere lip service to justice does not establish justice in the land. Justice must take form; it must take substance. Justice must affect the life of every individual.77 Reviewing Dean Roscoe Pound's book entitled "Justice According to Law," one writer posed the following question which goes to the core of the relationship between law and justice :78 If justice, then, is not the abstraction that it has been made out to be, but a reality which is alive with social implications, then law must be of such nature as to serve the ends of justice. But what is law?... To the thinking of Dr. Laurel, the aim and purpose of law is justice and justice is administered through knowledge and ascertainment of truth.79 However, he pointed out the difficulty encountered in the process.... To gain this lofty objective a method must be prescribed, a path indicated, a procedure ordained. The difficulty is that law is frequently but a vague expression of a general principle, and courts have virtually to "legislate between gaps." Not infrequently, also, the indicated path is or leads to a winding zigzag with the result that the destination is reached with difficulty, expense and perchance, peril.80 This is especially so because one of the main functions of law is to distinguish between the good and the bad. Dr. Laurel stressed this point thus: 81 Law is that which differentiates between good and evil - between just and unjust. If law should be taken away or abolished, all things fall into confusion. Every man will become law to himself, a fact which, 77 Id. at 502. On this point, the late President Manuel Roxas stated further thus: "I made this principle the lamp for my footsteps throughout my life. I commend it to all of you. I found it an excellent touchstone to determine the wisdom or justice of all my actions. It conforms strictly to the requirements of the moral law which underlies our social order and our legal institutions. It could be made the moral creed of all our citizens." - Id. at 687. 78 Soliongco, 1.P., Book Review of Roscoe Pound's Justice According to Law, 27 Phil. L.J. 604 (1952). 79 LAUREL, PERIODICAL REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES ix (1940). 80 Id. at ix-x. 81 See supra note 42 at 1'54-155.  in depraved condition of human nature, must needs produce many great enormities. Lust and envy, covetousness and ambition will become laws. The law has power to prevent, to restrain, to repair evils; without this power, all kinds of mischiefs and distempers will break in upon a state. It is the law that entitles the people to the protection and justice of the government. All things subsist in a mutual dependence and relation. It is the labor of the people that supports and maintains the government; if you take away the protection of the government, the vigor and cheer- fulness of allegiance will be taken away, though the obligation remains. Even during the Spanish times, Dr. Jose Rizal had occasion to make this observation, to wit :82 When the laws and the acts of officials are kept under surveillance, the word justice may cease to be a colonial jest. The thing that makes the English most respected in their possession is their strict and speedy justice, so that the inhabitants repose entire confidence in the judges. Justice is the foremost virtue of the civilizing races. It subdues the barbarous nations, while injustice arouses the weakest. Considering that the Philippine legal system is basically Civil or Roman Law, we may find the following significant :83 The Roman Law was based on the sound and abstract principles of justice. As justice is the same in every country and at all times so the Roman Law has invaded the domains of all countries of the world and per- meated in all their laws. Along this line is the thinking of Dr. Jorge Bocobo, especial- ly with reference to the reform introduced into the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit.84 One of the principal reforms in the new Civil Code is the emphasis laid upon equity and justice as against strict legalism or form. The proj- ect recognizes that more significant and more far-reaching than the formu- lation of legal rules, justice and equity should prevail in any legislation. In working out the rules to be embodied in the proposed Civil Code, the Code Commission drew principally from two sources: (1) the Anglo- American equity jurisprudence and (2) the general principles of natural justice. Dr. Bocobo has expressed the hope that with the above an idea is given how the new Civil Code strives to temper the rigor of legal- ism in order that justice may triumph. After all, to his thinking, 82 See supra note 30 at 144. 83 Ramos, Aurelio C., The Roman Law in the Philippines, 9 PHIL. L.J. 185 (1929). 84 See supra note 48. the paramount aim of the courts is to do justice, which should not be defeated by any technicality, or by the letter of the law.85 Dr. Laurel pointed out the responsibility of the courts in this regard. We quote the words of Dr. Laurel as follows: 86 The courts have a definite responsibility to perform; therefore, they must have the necessary power to meet this responsibility. Experience has demonstrated that the legislature cannot with full realization of the needs of the administration of justice, act to any greater advantage than the courts in the work of systematization and improvement in this allocated field. In the first place, it must be admitted that the judges are in a better position to know the needs that should be met to improve the administra- tion of justice. In the second place, the legislature with its casual informa- tion and intermittent and periodical sessions, cannot be fully apprised of the needs and problems of the courts. And, in the third place, the formu- lation of any specific remedy in the form of rules and other measures not only requires familiarity with actual conditions but expert and systematic advice and while there may be found capable and qualified men in the legislative branch, these are likely to be few and have no time materially to devote their attention personally to the work of the kind that should be undertaken. The result of the time-honored usurpation, borrowing the lan- guage of Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States, is that the legislature "patches the fabric here and there, and mars often where it should mend.... " With the realization that "no method of administering justice will work well without a competent judiciary to operate it,"87 Dr. Laurel also took cognizance of the fact that "uprightness and fear- less impartiality are not exclusively a judge's virtue" and that "every- one needs to be just and render unto others what is theirs by right."88 The necessity, if not indispensability, of the courts as the instrumentality of administering justice is thus stressed further.89 Experience has taught us that until men become angels, and until a better order comes about, it will be foolhardy for us to turn our backs to the courts and judges and seek justice in what Dean Pound, in a master- piece of understatement call "substitute agencies." What a situation it would be if, say, the Supreme Court were abolished and we had only Congress or the Executive Department to dispense justice! It has been noted that the vital functions of popular govern- ment, from Plato's day to ours, have generally been grouped under 85 Id. at 231. 86 See supra note 79 at 37-38. 87 See supra note 87; also 8 L. J. 366 (940). 88 See supra note 74 at 52. 89 See supra note 78 at 605. fours headings for purposes of easier classification and organization. These four headings are health, justice, education and opportunity.90 Justice, the ,second vital function." is important because even if the citizens should be healthy and fairly well-clothed and well-housed, but did not enjoy equality before the law, no material and moral rewards commen- surate with their toil and service or with their contribution to the social good, they would still be far from happy and contented; the government under which they live cannot be rated as good and efficient... There is no adequate justice when too few of the people have too much while too many have too little not only of the world's material goods but also of the moral intangible satisfactions that come from enjoying the equal protection of the law and from the non-discriminatory dispensation of rewards for labor and service,..... If a small man is victim of a grievous wrong but cannot get redress in the courts either because he cannot afford the expense or the courts are biased against him, there also is no regime of justice. He and common people such as he, will not have trust and faith in the government.91 Writing with a rich background of labor cases and problems, former Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court of Industrial Relation said92 I made mention of democracy. What is democracy? The Filipino people established this Government to achieve peace and order, because without a government there can be no peace and order; because the ob- jective of the government is justice, but there can be no justice when there is no liberty, and there can be no liberty without protection. The govern- ment may give the working men all of the rights, but if they are weak, without freedom and are under subjugation, of what use are those rights? That is what I meant when I said: the end of our courts is justice, and there is no justice when there is no liberty, and there is no liberty without pro- tection. From the point of view of the courts, the late Justice Jose Abad Santos made the following observation: 93 There are people who seem to think that in some cases they see the courts subordinating justice itself to legal technicalities. Thus they seem to think that there is now a sort of break between law and justice, be- tween common sense of common men and law enforcement. Preferring plain justice and common sense as all men would sooner or later prefer, 90 LAUREL, BREAD AND FREEDOM 15 (1953). 91 Id. at 15-16. 92 Bautista, Jose S., Unions and the Working-Man, 22 L.J. 396, 430 (1957). 93 Abad Santos, Jose, Common Sense in the Administration of Justice, 15 L.J. 98 (1950).  they would subvert law and the institutions supporting it because they seem to feel their incompatibility with plain justice and common sense. The law as it is written is a dead and lifeless thing. Indivi- dual initiative is necessary in order to give it meaning and purpose. Individual action is essential in order that we may inject fire into its spirit and breathe the breath of life into its skeleton.94 Such a recognition brings us into the realm of legal interpreta- tion as a means of finding the meaning of the law and giving life to the purpose or intention of the legislature. In the process, there are guidelines which should be borne in mind if faith be kept with the determined goal. The truth is that law cannot be interpreted to the letter "which killeth" in derogation of its spirit "which giveth life." Laws, and political laws speciallY, should be interpreted with a broad vision, with statesmanship; and that interpretation should be given which is intended to subserve na- tional interests, having in view the history, the trend of events, nay, the aspirations of the people..... It is utterly unncessary to make any distinction between what is "legally right" and what is "politically wrong." In the interpretation of our laws, we should incline the balance in favor of that which is designed to give us greater powers in the administration of our affairs, legally and politically, such being the declared and avowed purpose of the Government of the United States as expressed in the Jones Law.95 For this purpose, there has been established in this country a judicial system. During the early days of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the late President Manuel L. Quezon spoke on the subject thus: 96 Our Constitution establishes an independent judiciary by providing for security of tenure and compensation of our judges. But independence is 94 LAUREL, POLITICO-SOCIAL PROBLEMS 14 (1936). 95 See supra note 42 at 113. "... For law, whether administrative or otherwise, is not only the defini- tion but it is also the limitation of power." - See supra note 63. 96 QUEZON IN HIS SPEECHES, pp. 86-87 (1937). "It is for all of us, therefore, rulers and governed, to so nourish and guard the Constitution that it may forever yield for our people and posterity a bountIful harvest of liberty. No man and no group of men made this Constitution. It was the work of the Filipino people, who ordained and proclaimed it, and it is now and will always be the work of the Filipino people to make it real and true and lasting that the great purpose anunciated in its preamble may be fully achieved under the unfailing guidance of Divine Providence." - Recto, Claro M., Constitution Day Speech, 15 L.J. 51 (1950).  not the only objective of a good judiciary. Equally, if not more important, is its integrity which will depend upon the judicious selection of its mem- bers. The administration of justice cannot be expected to rise higher than the moral and intellectual standards of the men who dispense it. To bulwark the fortification of an orderly and just government, it shall be my task to appoint to the bench only men of proven honesty, character, learning, and ability, so that everyone may feel when he appears before the courts of justice that he will be protected in his rights, and that no man in this country from the Chief Executive to the last citizen is above the law. As early as the Spanish regime in this country, Dr. Jose Rizal made known the following thoughts during an interview in his death cell :97 I desire for the Philippine Islands such a system of legalized liberty as the Basque provinces of Spain have. I persist in condemning the re- bellion. The sentence which deprives me of life is just if it has wished to punish in me the work of the revolution, but not if it takes into account my intentions. Such was his longing for a regime of justice as to be confirmed in his own experience of want of it during the trial which preceded his execution. Even long before his own trial, he made the fol- lowing observation :98 True it is that the Penal Code has come like a drop of balm to such bitterness. But of what use are all the codes in the world, if by means of confidential reports, if for trifling reasons, if through anonymous traitors any honest citizen may be exiled or banished without a hearing, without a trial? Of what use is that Penal Code, of what use is life, if there is no security in the home, no faith in justice and confidence in tranquility of conscience? Of what use is all that array of terms, all that collection of articles, when the cowardly accusation of a traitor has more influence in the timorous ears of the supreme autocrat than all the cries for justice? Along the same line of thinking, President Manuel A. Roxas said half a century later as follows: 99 97 See supra note 30 at 369. In his plea for justice, Dr. Rizal made the following statement: "Even the greatest criminals are not punished without being heard first, and then having an advocate allowed them: in main instances the law, in spite of its strictness, humanely provides the assistance of an official defender. In every case the accused, retaining his rights, awaits, not always in prison, the sentence which shall proclaim his inno· cence; or deprive him of his rights by the imposition of corporal punishment. But even then he knows the time fixed for its duration." - Id. at 3'54. "At least put me on trial. If I am adjudged guilty, visit upon me the law's pe- nalty - not punishments without limit which kill the social being and its activities. But if I am innocent, give me liberty." - Id. at 3,55. 98 Id. at 130. 99 See supra note 76 at 279.  · My conception, our conception, of a regime of law is one which goes beyond that. It means that the people will have confidence in the pub- lic officials whose duty it is to execute the law; more particularly, they must have confidence in our courts of justice. They must be able to look upon the courts as the bulwark of their liberties, as the ever watchful sentinel that stands guard over their rights, their rights guaranteed by our Con- stitution and by our laws. These courts must function in such a way that they will create in the minds and in the hearts of our people absolute faith in their fairness and the impression that they really are the fountain source of justice and that they are the expression of the combined con- science of their fellow countrymen. It is well settled that the administartion of justice cannot be left to Congress or the Executive Department of the government. As one writer has said, "experience has taught us that until men become angels, and until a better order comes about, it will be foolhardy for us to turn our backs to the courts... 100 On his part, Pres- ident Manuel L. Quezon had this to say101 An independent judiciary administering justice without fear or favor promptly and impartially to rich and poor alike is the strongest bulwark of individual rights and the best guaranty against oppression and usurpa- tion from any source. Equally important is the maintenance of the con- fidence of the people in the courts. I will appoint no man to the bench without having satisfied myself, after a thorough investigation, of his char- acter and ability. To strengthen the faith of the common people in our courts, it is necessary that the utmost care be exerted in the selection of justices of the peace. These courts are often the only tribunals accessible to the larger portion of our population and it is essential that they be maintained worthy of their confidence. If the disinherited cannot obtain redress of their grievances or vindication of their rights in these courts, they have no further recourse, for the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Court are often beyond their reach. By the impartiality and integrity of the justices of the peace, therefore, the judiciary of the Philippines is judged by the millions of our countrymen who live in the barrios and distant places. I pledge myself to do everything in my power to main- tain these courts free from political or other extraneous influence and to appoint thereto only men of proven ability and integrity and of the broadest human sympathies. Quoting the words of Disraeli to the effect that "justice is truth in action," Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion has pointed 100 See supra note 78 at 605. 101See supra note 96 51-52. As noted by Dr. Rizal, the thing that makes the English most respected in their possession is their strict and speedy justice, so that the inhabitants repose entire con· fidence in the judges. - See supra note 30 at 144. out that the "possession of the truth is indispensable to the admin· istration of justice."l02 However, he also noted that.. But, Judges have no personal knowledge of the conditions sur- rounding the litigations. Judges ascertain the factual background of each controversy by sifting the evidence introduced by the litigants, through their respective counsel. Judges cannot possibly do justice - in its ob- jective sense - to the parties, if the facts proven by them do not dovetail with the truth. What is worse, the decision of a court is bound to sanction and perpetuate the wrong complained of, instead of righting it. In short, rather than a bulwark of the rights of the weak, such judicial award may come to be regarded as an instrument of oppression.loa Such a situation has led some people to think that the courts are subordinating justice itself to legal technicalities and the same peo- ple, preferring plain justice and common sense as all men would sooner or later prefer, would subvert law and the institution supporting it be- cause they seem to feel their incompatibility with plain justice and com- mon sense.l05 Ramon Diokno, Jr. has outlined the process of deciding a case as follows:1Oli In deciding a case there are two moments: First, the ascertainment of the proper and just juridical norm; second, its application by means of syllogism to the case on hand. Obviously before a just norm can be ap- plied syllogistically it must first be found. De Diego would find it by two methods: first, by the generalization of the provisions of the positive law; and second, by deduction from the superior principles of justice. The first mode may be called technical, in accordance with codal provisions; and the second, the theoretical investigation of derecho in ac- cordance with what is considered just. Juridical construction having given and classified our legal materials, it then becomes necessary to determine the social end, or the juridical idealism of the period. The idea of derecho gives us the means of finding it in actual life, but it does not give us its content, which we must seek in human conduct, and in social phenomena. The idealism of a period is a state of fact, a condition which is deemed preferable to another because it is better. Juridical idealism being the preference of juridical conditions the next problem is how to ascertain it in a scientific manner... We can only say, 102 See supra note 73. 103 Id. 104 See supra note 93. 105 See supra note 60 at 17-18.  that Ithe judge should use all the means that legal science can give him. 106 According to Ramon Diokno, Jr., the legal method of today is no longer that of logical deduction from unchangeable standards but is the finding of a just decision to be aimed at consciously from the beginning.'07 There can be no "Derecho" except that which is Just. The law, cus- toms, scientific law, etc., are but materials, data for arriving at a Just Conclusion. The law should first be sought as it has the prima facie presumption of being just, and the Civil Code is right according to what is Just which is to be found by all the means that legal science can give him.lOB To the mind of the same writer, the legislative solution of how to fill the "gaps in the law" is but part of the larger problem with which it is inextricably connected of how the law may at the same time be ad- ministered and made to grow and adapt itself to the realities of life.109 Although the courts have usually disclaimed any right to legislate, according to Dr. Bocobo, they have, however, in fact made law. This is especially true in England, the United States, the Philippines and other English-speaking countries.110 This has arisen out of necessity in the process of making a decision in certain cases. There are cases where the law is confronted by a situation where so- lution hinges crucially upon the insight of the judge rather upon mere subscription to stale legal formulas. In this difficulty, the judge becomes a law-maker, albeit interstitially. His role is to reconcile the dynamic in- terests of society with the static. Of course, he can choose between the two. But to preserve both in their respective spheres - that is the su- preme task of law - and it is the recognition of this fact and some solid contribution to it wherein consist the enduring significance of Holmes and Cardozo in Constitution law.111 106 Id. at 18. 107 Id. at 23. l08Id. "Common law doctrines should not be in force as law in the Philippine Islands. They may be applied in the appropriate case like other data for the Just Decision." -Id. l09Id. at 2. "... The problem dates from antiquity. It has existed since we outgrow the primitive modes of obtaining redress by reprisals, private wars, and blood feuds until this day when the doctrine of the supremacy of the law is thoroughly established.. " - Id. 110 Bocobo, Jorge, The Cult of Legalism, 17 PHIL.. L.J. 253, 255-256 (1937). 111 See supra note 18 at 92.  Such necessity is further elucidated as follows: 112 The necessity of what is called judge-made law and the possibility of its existence arise from the power of the courts, which admittedly exists, to determine what the law is, if unwritten, or what it means if written. Another justification for judge-made law was gven by Dr. Bo- cobo thus: The votaries of formalism worship the letter of the law with undim- inished function. They have raised their faith on the pedestal of strict interpretation. Denying the right and the duty of the judge to declare new principles, or to adapt old rules to the changing needs of modern life, many lawyers in the Philippines put their absolute faith in legisla- tive formulation as more than sufficient tv unfold any policy of the State. Therefore, they say, the court should never usurp legislative functions by transcending the words of the statutes.l13 In conclusion, it is the duty of the judiciary to unfold and develop the law by liberal interpretation. It is imperative that this far-reaching task of the judge should ever be upheld because no matter how well drawn up our statutory laws might be, lawyers usually demand that the letter of the law be adhered to if it suits the interest of their clients and the courts must choose which pathway to take -the formal or the substantial, the strict or the liberal. The noble purposes of the law have been lost in narrow and labyrinthical technicalities, whereas a broad and humane in- terpretation has opened the wide highways that lead to the common wel- fare. The experience of mankind shows that legalism has ever been the forbidding bulwark of the dominant caste, whether social or economic. A reflective contemplation of what the poet has called "the eternal landscape of the past" would make this sinister fact of history loom large in our minds, and impel us boldly to storm this fortress of special privilege.114 Professor Enrique M. Fernando's comments on Ehrlich's philo- , sophy of law are worthwhile considering in connection with the sub- ject of legal interpretation. We quote the same thusy5 With all the adverse criticism though to which Ehrlich's philosophy of law may justly be subjected, still the fact remains that it represents a great advance in juristic thought. Judged as of the date in which he first gave it concrete expression, it was an achievement of the first magni- tude. It rescued jurisprudence from the ossification which might have been its fate had no new light and insight from the related social sciences been 112 Cruz, Alberto V., Judge-Made Law, 19 PHIL. L.J. 98 (1939). 113 See supra note 110 at 2'53. 114 See supra note 110 at 263. 115 Fernando, Enrique M., Ehreich's Philosophy of Law, 24 PHIL., L.J. 849, 860 (1949).  admitted. Time had not dimmed the recognition of its power and its force. Scientific advances may suggest a change in the method. The growth of state control may suggest a re-examination of its content. But its aims and objective remain as timely today as it was when first enun- ciated. No science of law can afford to by-pass the "living law" - except on the pain of being condemned as barren and sterile. Dr. Bocobo also observed that in another field of legal develop- ment, the courts of the Philippines have need of the philosophical, the far-flung view of positive law - in the questions that will be raised, in increasing number and eagerness, with respect to the Con- stitution of the Philippines. According to him, a judiciary that is bereft of a broad outlook of social and economic conditions, that turns a deaf ear to the voice of history, that does not look far into the future, would be unfit to grapple with these tremendous problems. He recognized the imperative need of encouraging a conse- cration of the eternal principles of justice and a devout cultivation of the "socialization of the law."116 Moreover, he believed that not only must the courts reconcile the Spanish law and the American law, but the rules of each system must be adapted to Philippine conditions. To his mind, this duty can not be undertaken by the judiciary if it is shackled by the chains forged in technical reasoning.ll7 More and more, jurists, judges and legislators all over the world are striving for what is called "the socialization of the law." This movement stands for the principle that the whole legal structure - statutory and judge-made - must be reconstructed on the bases of the changed and changing social and economic conditions of modern life. The breath of the new life of society must be breathed into the traditional concepts of the law. This "socialization of the law" would be hard of attainment if our courts did not feel the throb of present-day society - its tremendous strug- gles for readjustment and the restless longings of the masses for a decent living. And the experience of the past shows that the courts have been a tremendous factor in working our social justices.ll8 An elder stateman and practitioner has observed that the application of realist doctrines in the legal practice in the Philippines is still in its infancy, although in some isolated instances, there have been undertones of realism in our Supreme Court. According to him, how far our judges 116Bocobo, Jorge, Unfettering the Judiciary, 17 PHIL. L.J. 139, 145 (1937). 117Id. "The foregoing brief exposition, I hope, will give an idea of how the new Civil Code strives to temper the rigor of legalism in order that justice may triumph. After all, the paramount aim of the courts is to do justice, which should not be defeated by any technicality, or by the letter of the law." - See supra note 48 at 231. 118 See supra note 116 at 142. will turn to be realists, and how advisable this transformation should be, is not for us to answer. To him it is sufficient for us to recognize that government is a practical activity which must necessarily bring the judges as well as the members of the bar into the domain of juristic realism.11~ As a result of the habit of thinking for more than half a century, there is still the belief that the end of law is logic and analysis in the same manner as a "slot-machine" jurisprudence would approach a legal situation. This cast of mind has been largely moulded by the reverential adherence to Spanish commentators whose end of analysis now belongs to a passing age.12O Recently, there has been a realization that law cannot be regarded solely as legal doctrines or as a peculiar set of technical symbols useful in predicting judicial behavior, but rather as the whole of a community's institutions of government, the sum of all the power decisions of the community. Having more than the primitive functions of maintaining order, the law is a positive instrument for promoting and securing all the other basic values of the community like welfare, respect, wealth, skill, and enlightenment. Under this set-up, the court is not therefore the only principal and proper instrument of legal control, but other institu- tions and practices which are already in being but can stand improvement, or which may be created for assuring a wider sharing of such values likewise serve the same purpose.121 There has also been the tendency toward natural justice. This was noted by Dr. Bocobo in Insular Government v. Bingham, 13 Phil. 558 (1909), where, speaking for the Supreme Court, he said that "justice is about the same under whatever law" and "civilized nations everywhere have adopted about the same rules of justice and law when they relate to fundamental principles affecting rights of man.122 In Alba v. Acuna, 53 Phil. 380 (1929), he observed that the provisions of law on the sub- ject were doubtful, but the Supreme Court chose to adopt the construc- tion whi