Lecture 4.pdf

Common Course Introduction to International Relations BAES 2023/2024 Lecture 4 Liberalism 20 November 2023 Dr Clara della Valle 1 Core concepts v Freedom (in primis, individual’s freedom) v Progress v Peace v Wellbeing v Cooperation v Law (domestic / international) v Institutions v Pluralism v...

Common Course Introduction to International Relations BAES 2023/2024 Lecture 4 Liberalism 20 November 2023 Dr Clara della Valle 1 Core concepts v Freedom (in primis, individual’s freedom) v Progress v Peace v Wellbeing v Cooperation v Law (domestic / international) v Institutions v Pluralism v Interdependence v Collective security 2 A very long tradition… Ø Intellectual roots: Classical Liberalism (1600-1800) Ø Pre WWII: Idealism / Utopian Liberalism (1919-39) Ø Post WWII: Neo-liberalism (’60s-’90s) a) Sociological Liberalism b) Republican Liberalism Level of the nation-state (Waltz’s second image) c) Institutional Liberalism d) Interdependence Liberalism 3 Systemic level (Waltz’s third image) Intellectual roots – Classical Liberalism J. Locke (1632-1704) § § § Progress = individual freedom + capitalism Enabled by modernisation (human and technical) = intellectual revolution + scientific revolution Liberal and constitutional state: Rechtsstaat (vs. realist state as concentration of power: Machtstaat) as a necessary condition for progress. It establishes and enforces the rule of law that respects the rights of citizens J. Bentham (1748-1832) § § § I. § § 4 Builds on Locke Belief in progress: ‘The greatest happiness of the greatest numbers’ Emphasis on international law, whose respect is a rational interest of states Kant (1724-1894) Anarchy and the constant possibility of war suggest the goal of getting rid of war by overcoming anarchy A world of constitutional states (republics) is precondition for establishing ‘perpetual peace’ Idealism / Utopian Liberalism W. Wilson (1856-1924) ‘Make the world safe for democracy’ 14 points: new international order based on liberal principles Key ideas: democracy, rule of law and self-determination as preconditions for peace Ø Ø dismantle empires encourage the spread of liberal democracy IR must be governed by shared norms of international law Ø Ø transparent and honest diplomacy LoN as guarantor of political independence and territorial integrity N. Angell (1872-1967) § § 5 War of conquest is too costly (economically and politically); it also loses importance Due to modernisation and interdependence (de-territorialised capitalism), as well as the increasing weight of international law Sociological Liberalism [John Burton, Karl Deutsch, James Rosenau, Moisés Naim, Phil Cerny] v IR = inter-national + trans-national relations, i.e., relations between people, groups, and organizations belonging to different countries v Increasing relevance of transnational relations à need to look at actors other than states à Pluralism Transnationalism: ‘The processes whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and societies that can, and do, have important consequences on the course of the events’ (Rosenau, 1980:1) v Relations between individuals are usually more peaceful and cooperative than those between governments 6 Karl Deutsch (Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 1957) Dense transnational ties à more peaceful relations à security communities (SC) a) Pluralistic SC: if they achieve (i) compatibility with fundamental values deriving from common institutions; (ii) ‘mutual responsiveness’ (mutual loyalty, identity, common sense of ‘us’); (iii) mutual expectations of peaceful change. E.g. NATO b) Amalgamated SC: if there has been a formal merger of previously independent units, with the creation of a single form of government. E.g. EU * * Conditions for an amalgamated SC 7 • similar values (political ideologies but also economic and religious values) • the formation of a common sense of ‘us’ • similar lifestyles • a group of leading actors (to avoid the logic of the balance of power to prevail) • high economic growth • positive expectations with respect to the advantages of integration • intensive transactions and communications • widening of the leading elites • stable links among the elites of different states • high geographical mobility of the population John Burton (World Society, 1972) ‘Cobweb model’ (vs. ‘billiard ball model’) of transnational relations: each state consists of several groups (religious, professional, etc.), which have their own interests and external ties à the communication of a state with the outside world is not unique and homogeneous In the presence of several groups, which intersect each other, the possibility of cooperation increases and the risk of conflict decreases James Rosenau (Turbulence in Word Politics, 1990) Fundamental role of individuals in international politics (dispersion of state power; globalization; communication; the emergence of ‘global’ issues; technological revolution; increasing of citizens’ global mobility) à multi-centric world, autonomous from the state-centric one, which however continues to exist. The first, reticular, will be more peaceful and stable Moisés Naim (The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What it Used to Be, 2013) Diffusion of political power at the micro level: ‘micro-powers’ (protest groups, hackers, activists, parties with radical orientations) à rejection of traditional values and authority, challenge to central powers 8 Interdependence Liberalism à Integration theories + Interdependence theories [Richard Rosecrance, David Mitrany, Erns Haas, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye] v Interdependence (mutual dependence) = people and governments are affected by what happens elsewhere v Modernization à greater socio-economic interactions (transnational) interdependence between states and societies à greater cooperation in IR à greater Richard Rosecrance (1986; 1995 ; 1999) § The costs of using force have increased § Modernization: makes possession of a territory and its resources (thus, territorial expansion) less profitable § Key to success in today’s world: highly qualified labour force, access to information, and financial capital High division of labour in the international economy increases interdependence between states, and that discourages and reduces violent conflict between states § § 9 Frédéric Bastiat: ‘When goods don’t cross borders, the soldiers will’ à it is in the less developed countries that war now occurs Integration theories Post WWII (’50s-’60s)à IOs & EEC, then EU Functionalism (general theory of integration) David Mitrany Cooperation arranged by technical experts to provide solutions to common problems in various functional areas (transport, communication, finance etc.) § “Ramification”: technical and economic collaboration expands when participants discover mutual benefits § Tangible benefits from IOs à transfers of citizens’ loyalty from the state to IOs § > Economic interdependence > political integration > peace E.g. EEC § Neo-functionalism (regional theory of integration) Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter § Fundamental role of political elites § “Spill-over”: increased cooperation in one area leads to increased cooperation in other areas § Externalization of domestic policies to IOs > political integration > peace E.g. EU 10 “Simple Interdependence”, Keohane & Nye (1971) à strong liberalism Influenced by sociological liberalism: very similar to Rosenau’s theory It is not true that states are the most important, independent and autonomous actors Transnational actors can greatly influence the behaviour of states Importance of transnational, multinational and trans-governmental relations, alongside intergovernmental ones § Cooper notes how the growing economic interdependence between US, UK and Japan has influenced their foreign policies § § § § Very popular view in the early ’60s, BUT from the mid-’60s: long phase of stagnation and even backsliding in West European cooperation; ‘70s: US political and economic distress (war in Vietnam + end of dollar’s convertibility into gold) Neo-realist reaction: a) it is not given that more interdependence leads to more cooperation; b) ‘vulnerability’: dependence is always asymmetrical (power-related) Revisitation of Keohane & Nye 1971 theory à first movement towards realism • Power and interests still fundamental • ‘Asymmetry of vulnerabilities’ • Economic interdependence creates both constraints and opportunities for states, which vary according to the degree of vulnerability • ‘Issue-areas’ (# vulnerability; # fungibility of power; # actors, etc. according to area) • Many forms of power (as many as the interdependent relations - e.g. oil crisis, 1973/9) 11 “Complex Interdependence”, Keohane & Nye (1977) à weak liberalism Main argument: complex post-WWII interdependence (between advanced/liberal countries) is qualitatively different from that of the past. Today, not all problems are ‘life or death’ issues; IR are and will be more peaceful Causes: no longer clear distinction and hierarchy between high politics and low politics § § § relations between states no longer managed by rulers (political elites) alone: there are many different levels of relations increasing number of inter-/trans-national relations carried out by technicians, individuals, groups decreasing usefulness/importance of military force Consequences: IR more and more similar to domestic politics § § § § § 12 IR = inter-national, inter-governmental, trans-national relations, etc. actors (states, NGOs, individuals, etc.) simultaneously pursue multiple objectives increasing usefulness/importance of economic and institutional instruments power resources will most often be specific to issue areas: no fungibility of power different issues create different coalitions, with varying degrees of conflict; the international hierarchy varies with the domain considered: increasing relevance of IOs Institutional Liberalism [Robert Keohane, Arthur Stein, John Ikenberry, Duncan Snidal, Michael Zürn] v Liberal institutions are not mere ‘scraps of papers’ (as realists have it): they are independent actors that can make cooperation easier and far more likely v But powerful states will not easily be constrained à less idealistic view than Utopian liberals What is an international institution? International Organizations (IOs): NATO, EU Set of rules which governs state action in particular areas, such as aviation or shipping: ‘regimes’ Regime + IO: WTO [NB: The English School also considers institutions sovereignty, war, diplomacy, BoP, and great powers. Liberalism does not] 13 Development of studies on international regimes, ’70s-’80s “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice” (Krasner, 1983: 2) Regimes: institutionalised norms of international cooperation Core idea: self-interested states create international regimes to solve collective problems. If well crafted, regimes have the advantage of solving commitment problems and creating ‘repeated games’, that is, bargaining under the expectation that the parties will need to cooperate again in the future Assumptions [NB: similar to neorealist ones; behaviouralist approach] à ‘weak liberalism’: Ø states main actors Ø power and interests still fundamental Ø international anarchy: no natural harmony, as with earlier liberals, BUT cooperation possible thanks to institutions that mitigate conflict 14 Why do institutions mitigate anarchy? Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984 Efficient IIs have important functions for cooperation: § Provide a flow of information that reduces member states’ fear of each other (e.g. cheating) § Reduce transaction costs by providing opportunities for negotiation § make commitments more credible (by ensuring monitoring and control systems and facilitating the implementation of commitments made) § stabilize expectations about other states’ behaviour and the effectiveness of international standards “virtuous circle of cooperation” à IIs challenge the implications of anarchy 15 Neo-realist critique Cheating is not the major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation: Keohane as well as several other liberal institutionalists overlook one crucial item: relative gains* ‘Gains’ are benefits that accrue to participants that cooperate. The main problem is relative gains. States must worry that other states gain more from cooperation than they do themselves Keohane, 1993: qualification which further moderated his liberal position: the single most important condition for cooperation is the existence of common interests between states (Keohane 1993: 277). If states have interests in common, they will not worry about relative gains. In such situations, institutions can help advance cooperation. In the absence of common interests, states will be competitive, apprehensive, and even fearful. In those circumstances, institutions will not be of much help Liberalism closer and closer to neorealism à ‘neo-neo-synthesis’ (Waever 1996); liberal institutionalism is merely neo-realism ‘by another name’ (Mearsheimer 1995: 85). Keohane recognizes this but the end of the CW gave a new impulse to strong liberalism *Absolute gains: As long as we do well it doesn’t matter if others do even better Relative gains: We will do our best, but number one priority is that the others don't get ahead of us 16 Republican Liberalism [Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett] v Strong normative connotation: democracy is a necessary precondition for peace; it is therefore a moral duty to promote democracy in the world à ‘strong liberalism’ Theory of Democratic Peace Roots in Kant (For Perpetual Peace, 1795) – later revived and updated by Doyle (1983, 1986) Variations: A. general: democracies are more peaceful B. ‘dyadic’: democracies do not make war on each other à ‘separate peace’ = correlation between the spread of democracies and the proliferation of security communities / global peace (Russett, 2023) Why are democracies at peace with one another? Ø Domestic political culture based on peaceful conflict resolution Ø Common moral values which led to the formation of Kant’s ‘pacific union’ Ø Economic cooperation and interdependence: Kant’s ‘spirit of commerce’ 17 …But is this true? v End of CW: new wave of democratization à growing liberal optimism on the future of democracy BUT recent democratic transformations in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa do not support such optimism v No democratic culture in many new democracies + setbacks (Russia 2000) + ‘de-consolidation’ of Western democracies (UK, US, France, Greece 2000) v Peaceful relations have developed between the consolidated democracies of the West, but this is not guaranteed with Eastern Europe or ‘Global South’ new democracies à division and mistrust between old and new democracies v Economic cooperation and interdependence highly developed among consolidated democracies of the West, but this is not true with new democracies in Eastern Europe (difficult negotiations on 2004, 2007 and 2013 EU enlargement) and in the ‘Global South’ (one-sided economic dependence on the North) v Neo-realist critique: there is always the possibility that a liberal or democratic state will revert to authoritarianism or another form of non-democracy. Furthermore, today’s friend might very well turn out to be tomorrow’s enemy, whether or not they are a democracy (Walt) v But Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ is today questioned by republican liberals as well: § § § expansion of a democratic ‘zone of peace’ beyond Western Europe, North America and Japan far from assured rising populism, economic inequality, frustration and fear within established democracies the ‘dark side’ of the relationship between peace and democracy: risk of external warfare/civil war in democratization and partial democracies (Mann 2005, Richmond 2020) 18 To sum-up and conclude Neo-liberalism vs. neo-realism: disagreement no longer on human nature, which is difficult to interpret. Behaviourist turn brings the two strands together: analysis of observable facts and measurable data in the outside world Main critiques moved by neorealists to liberals: v Economic Interdependence: has always been there, yet war has been waged v Institutions: no ability to act independently; if they do it is in ‘low politics’. Interests matter really v Democracy: possibility of regression to authoritarianism; moreover, today’s friends may be my enemies tomorrow Strong liberals (Rosenau, Slaughter, Ikenberry etc.) Weak liberals (Keohane’s parable) Accept several realist claims, including the persistence of anarchy Primary importance of the state Power of states still highly significant Interests in common Systemic and domestic analysis The world is changing in some fundamental ways in line with liberal expectations From states to transnational political system Different view on anarchy: does not mean complete absence of legitimate and effective authority in international politics Today: crisis of the liberal order? 19 Thank you for your attention! Any question? Dr. Clara della Valle 20