Jurado Oblicon Chapter 1 PDF

BOOK IV OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.1 Conce...

BOOK IV OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.1 Concept of Obligations. — Evidently, the above definition of an obligation is adopted from Sanchez Roman’s classic definition of an obligation as “the juridical necessity to comply with a prestation.”2 Manresa, on the other hand, defines it as a “legal relation established between one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to the fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of him.’’3 It must be observed, however, that obligations may be either civil or natural.4 A civil obligation is one which has a binding force in law, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing it against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the obligation which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation, on the other hand, is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to 1 New provision. 2 4 Sanchez Roman 53. 3 8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 21. 4 Art. 1423, Civil Code. 1 Art. 1156 OBLIGATIONS the natural law.5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordance with the statute of limitations, a natural obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished. This may be illustrated by the following example: If A has a right of action, evidenced by a promissory note, to collect one thousand pesos from B, and such promissory note prescribes after the expiration of ten years from the time it accrues,6 although the latter is no longer bound to pay the obligation in accordance with the statute of limitations, he is still bound to pay in accordance with equity and natural law.7 It is, therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a natural obligation may be distinguished from each other as follows: (1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a natural obligation is based on equity and natural law; and (2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while the latter is not.8 Requisites of Obligations. — An obligation has four essential requisites. They are: (1) A juridical or legal tie, which binds the parties to the obligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or unilateral acts of persons; (2) An active subject known as the obligee or creditor, who can demand the fulfillment of the obligation; (3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor, against whom the obligation is juridically demandable; and (4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object of the obligation.9 The form in which the obligation is manifested is sometimes added as a fifth requisite. As a general rule, however, it cannot be considered as essential. Obligations arising from law, quasi-con- tracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do not require any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question regard- 5 3 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2394-2395. 6 Art. 1144, Civil Code. 7 Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 40. 8 Art. 1423, Civil Code. 9 Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Vol. 1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p. 20. 2  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156 ing their validity or binding force. It is only in obligations arising from certain contracts that it becomes essential. Thus, in a con- tract involving a donation of personal property whose value exceeds P5,000.00, the law requires that the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing;10 in a contract of sale of a piece of land or any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that the authority of the latter shall be in writing;11 in a contract of simple loan or mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with respect to interest shall be expressly stipulated in writing;12 in a contract of antichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing;13 in a contract involving a donation of immovable property, the law requires that the dona- tion shall be made in a public document, while the acceptance shall be made either in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document;14 in a contract of partnership where immovable property or real rights are contributed to the common fund, the law requires that the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an inven- tory of the property or real rights, signed by the partners, must be attached;15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law requires that the personal property which is the subject matter of the contract shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a security for the performance of an obligation;16 and in a contract involving the sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale or transfer shall be registered.17 Non-compliance with such formalities would have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void or inexistent. Classification of Obligations. — The following is the primary classification of obligations under the Civil Code: (1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192). (2) With a period (Arts. 1193-1198). (3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206). 10 Art. 748, Civil Code. 11 Art. 1874, Civil Code. 12 Art. 1956, Civil Code. 13 Art. 2134, Civil Code. 14 Art. 749, Civil Code. 15 Arts. 1771, 1773, Civil Code. 16 Art. 2140, Civil Code. 17 Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art. 1581, Civil Code. 3 Art. 1156 OBLIGATIONS (4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222). (5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225). (6) With a penal clause (Arts. 1226-1230). There are, however, other classifications of a secondary char- acter which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the Civil Code, such as: (1) Legal, conventional and penal;18 (2) Real and personal;19 (3) Determinate and generic;20 (4) Positive and negative;21 (5) Unilateral and bilateral;22 (6) Individual and collective;23 (7) Accessory and principal.24 The following, on the other hand, is the classification of obligations according to Sanchez Roman:25 (1) As to juridical quality: (a) Natural — when the obligation is in accordance with natural law. (b) Civil — when the obligation is in accordance with positive law. (c) Mixed — when the obligation is in accordance with both natural and positive law. 18 Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code. 19 Arts. 1163-1168, Civil Code. 20 Arts. 1163-1166, Civil Code. 21 Arts. 1167-1168, Civil Code. 22 Arts. 1169-1191, Civil Code. 23 Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code. 24 Arts. 1166, 1226, et seq., Civil Code. 25 8 Sanchez Roman 20-40. 4  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156 2. As to parties: (a) Unilateral and bilateral — unilateral, where only one party is bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mu- tually or reciprocally bound. (b) Individual and collective — individual, where there is only one obligor, and collective, where there are several ob- ligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable only for his proportionate share of the obligation, or solidary, when each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation. 3. As to object: (a) Determinate and generic — determinate, when the object is specific; generic, when the object is designated by its class or genus. (b) Simple and multiple — simple, when there is only one undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertak- ings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of the undertakings are demandable at the same time, or distribu- tive, when only one undertaking out of several is demandable. Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alterna- tive, when the obligor is allowed to choose one out of several obligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative, when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation for one which is due and demandable. (c) Positive and negative — positive, when the obligor is obliged to give or do something; negative, when the obligor must refrain from giving or doing something. (d) Real and personal — real, when the obligation con- sists in giving something; personal, when the obligation con- sists in doing or not doing something. (e) Possible and impossible — possible, when the ob- ligation is capable of fulfillment in nature as well as in law; impossible, when the obligation is not capable of fulfillment either in nature or in law. (f) Divisible and indivisible — divisible, when the obli- gation is susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, when the obligation is not susceptible of partial performance. 5 Art. 1157 OBLIGATIONS (g) Principal and accessory — principal, when it is the main undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an undertaking to guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation. 4. As to perfection and extinguishment: (a) Pure — when the obligation is not subject to any condition or term and is immediately demandable. (b) Conditional — when the obligation is subject to a condition which may be suspensive, in which case the happen- ing or fulfillment of the condition results in the birth of the obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or ful- fillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of the obligation. (c) With a term or period (a plazo) — when the obligation is subject to a term or period which may be suspensive or from a day certain, in which case the obligation is demandable only upon the expiration of the term, or resolutory or to a day certain, in which case the obligation terminates upon the expiration of the term. Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: 1. Law; 2. Contracts; 3. Quasi-contracts; 4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and 5. Quasi-delicts.26 Sources of Obligations. — In Roman law, the sources of obligations are: (1) contractu; (2) quasi-contractu; (3) maleficio; and (4) quasi-maleficio.27 These sources are preserved in the Civil Code with the addition of law or lege.28 The addition of lege as an independent source of obligations, however, has been criticized as theoretically erroneous. Thus, according to the Supreme Court: 26 Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form. 27 8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 35. 28 Art. 1157, Civil Code. 6  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1158 “This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes that the quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed by law are of different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi, criticizes this assumption and says that the classification embodied in the Code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one or the other of these categories should have been suppressed and merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9) The validity of the criticism is, we think, self-evident and it is of interest to note that the common law makes no distinction between the two sources of liability. The obligations which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those arising ex lege, are in the common law system merged into the category of obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated implied contracts.’’29 Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not pre- sumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.30 Obligations Arising from Law. — Unlike other obligations, those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently, only those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws are demandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them, and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.31 How can we determine whether an obligation arises from law or from some other source, such as a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted that in the birth or generation of an obligation, there is always a concurrence between the law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or condition upon which the obligation is based or predicated. According to Manresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act or condition upon which it is based is nothing more than a factor for determining the moment when it becomes demandable, then the law 29 Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182. 30 Art. 1090, Spanish Civil Code. 31 Art. 1158, Civil Code. 7 Art. 1159 OBLIGATIONS itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law merely recognizes or acknowledges the existence of an obligation generated by an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate such obligation, then the act itself is the source of the obligation and not the law.32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount to B in a game of chance, according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the former may recover his loss from the latter, with legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the source of the obligation of B to refund to A the amount which he had won from the latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi- delict, but the law itself.33 The same can also be said with regard to the obligation of the spouses to support each other,34 the obligations of employers under the Labor Code,35 the obligations of the owners of the dominant and servient estates in legal easements,36 and others scattered in the Civil Code and in special laws. Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.37 Obligations Arising from Contracts. — A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.38 As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all of the consequences which according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.39 These contracts are commonly called consensual contracts. Once the contract is perfected, the valid contract has the force of law binding the parties to comply therewith in good faith, where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of the other. (Tiu Peck vs. CA 221 SCRA 618 ) There are certain 32 8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48. 33 Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182. 34 Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs. Lauron, 12 Phil. 453. 35 Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119. 36 Arts. 634, 687, Civil Code. 37 Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form. 38 Art. 1305, Civil Code. 39 Art. 1315, Civil Code. 8  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1160 contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge and commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the object of the obligation.40 Whether the contract is consensual or real, the rule is that from the moment it is perfected, obligations which may be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations are those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged to do or to give something; unilateral obligations, on the other hand, are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged to do or to give something. Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from contracts are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting parties. This is clearly deducible not only from the nature of contracts, but also from Art. 1169 of the Code which declares that such obligations have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. “Compliance in good faith’’ means performance in accordance with the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code recognizes the right of such contracting parties to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.41 Good faith must, therefore, be observed to prevent one party from taking unfair advantage over the other party. In the case of Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 608 (1986), it was ruled that evasion by a party of legitimate obligations after receiving the benefits under the contract would constitute unjust enrichment on his part. However, in default of an agreement, the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such obligations are applicable.42 Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.43 Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. — Quasi- contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary 40 Art. 1316, Civil Code. 41 Art. 1306, Civil Code. 42 Art. 1305, et seq., Civil Code. 43 New provision. 9 Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS and unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become bound to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.44 The most important of these juridical relations which are recognized and regulated by the Civil Code are negotiorum gestio45 and solutio indebiti.46 Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever a person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another without any power or authority from the latter.47 In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or officious manager has assumed the agency or management of the business or property, he shall be obliged to continue such agency or management until the termination of the affair and its incidents,48 exercising such rights and complying with such obligations as provided for in the Code.49 Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the juridical relation which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through mistake to another who has no right to demand it.50 In this type of quasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the person to whom the delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to return the property delivered or the money paid.51 The Civil Code provides other instances of quasi-contract. Examples are those found in Articles 2159, 2164 to 2175. In the case of Perez vs. Palomar, 2 Phil. 682, it was significantly noted that in a quasi contract where no express consent is given by the other party, the consent needed in a contract is provided by law through presumption (presumptive consent). Presumptive consent gives rise to multiple juridical relations resulting in obligations for delivery of the thing and rendering of service. Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, 44 Art. 2142, Civil Code. 45 Art. 2144, Civil Code. 46 Art. 2154, Civil Code. 47 Art. 2144, Civil Code. 48 Ibid. 49 Arts. 2144-2152, Civil Code. 50 Art. 2154, Civil Code. 51 Ibid. 10  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161 Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.52 Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. — As a rule, every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable.53 This principle is based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect — the criminal aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects are separate and distinct from each other in the sense that one affects the social order and the other, private rights, so that the purpose of the first is to punish or correct the offender, while the purpose of the second is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liability itself. Please note, however, that there are offenses and special crimes without civil liability. Examples are crimes of treason, rebellion, illegal possession of firearm and gambling. But a person who is not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. — In general and prior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the following rules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil liability arising from criminal offenses: (1) Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party (i) expressly waives the civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it separately, or (iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. (2) Independent civil action. — In the cases provided in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 52 Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form. 53 Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is subject to the rules stated in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code. 11 Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS (3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding rules, the following rules are observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; (b) If the civil action has been filed ahead of the criminal action, and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in criminal action has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence prevented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall be tried and decided jointly; (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, however, it is stated that except for civil actions provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The action contemplated, as pointed out by Justice Oscar Herrera in his Treatise on Criminal Procedure, is a civil action arising from a crime if reserved or filed separately and a criminal case is filed if it has to be suspended to await final judgment in the criminal action. The rule clarifies that, “During the pendency of the criminal action, the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot 12  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161 be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall not run.’’ Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of the civil actions under Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall not be suspended because they can be instituted separately. This refers to civil actions arising from the offense charged which have not been reserved or civil actions that have been filed ahead of the criminal action but have been suspended. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Historical Development and Highlights of Amendment of Rules on Criminal Procedure, February 2001). (4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action. (5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000 provides for the elements of a prejudicial question. They are: (a) the previously instituted civil action which involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Section 7 limits a prejudicial question to a “previously insti- tuted civil action’’ in order to minimize possible abuses by the sub- sequent filing of a civil action as an after thought for the purpose of suspending the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure, February 2001) At a glance, therefore, the following are the salient changes brought about by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, as more specifically discussed hereunder by Justice Herrera in his Treatise on Criminal Procedure: a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988. Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from crime including the civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising 13 Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. b. Under the former rule, a waiver of any of three civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the res- ervation of the right to file any of said civil actions separately waives the others. This is no longer provided for. The reserva- tion and waiver refers only to the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even with- out a reservation. c. The rulings in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, 167 SCRA 376, allowing a third-party complaint, and the ruling in Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 376, as well as Cabaero vs. Cantos allowing a counterclaim are no longer in force. Under the 2000 Rules, these pleadings are no longer allowed. Any claim which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the filing of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of the check involved. In other cases, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages. Idem; Id. — Effect of acquittal. — If the accused in a criminal action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil action for damages based on the same act or omission still be instituted? This question requires a qualified answer. If the acquittal of the accused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages based 14  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161 on the same act or omission may still be instituted.54 In such case, mere preponderance of evidence shall be sufficient in order that the plaintiff will be able to recover from the defendant.55 On the other hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground that he did not commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing, if the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as a general rule, no longer possible.56 Idem; id. — Effect of independent civil actions. — As a rule, the civil action to recover damages from the person criminally liable is not independent from the criminal action. This is true even where it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the injured party from the criminal proceedings either by reserving his right to file a separate civil action or by commencing the action to recover damages ahead of the criminal action. In the first, the right to file a civil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal action, while in the second, once the criminal action is instituted, the action to recover damages shall be suspended.57 There are, however, certain exceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the civil action to recover damages is entirely separate and independent from the criminal action, although the act or omission which is the basis thereof may be a criminal offense. They are: first, where the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a criminal offense or felony;58 and second, where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.59 As a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that these cases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule that if the accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground that he did not commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution of a civil action is no longer possible. 54 Art. 29, Civil Code. 55 Ibid. 56 Sec. 3(c), Rule 111, New Rules of Court. 57 Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of Court. 58 Arts. 31, 177, Civil Code. 59 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code. 15 Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS With regard to the first, it must be noted that where the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action may proceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter.60 It is evident that in such case the basis of the civil action may be an obligation arising from the law, contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict. Thus, a postmaster, who has been charged criminally for malversation of government funds under his custody, may still be made a defendant in a civil case for the recovery of the funds, not on the ground of malversation, but on the ground that under Sec. 633 of the Revised Administrative Code, he can be held accountable therefor.61 The basis of the civil action in such case is not the obligation arising from the criminal offense of malversation, but the obligation arising from the law. Similarly, if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to recover damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries sustained in an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the criminal prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may, therefore, be continued regardless of the result of the latter. Consequently, he can still recover damages even if the driver is acquitted in the criminal action, because it is clear that the action in such case is based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission of the driver complained of as felony.62 The same principle is also applicable if the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under the Civil Code.63 In such case, the injured party can always institute a civil action to recover damages independently of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter. This is so even granting that the accused is acquitted in the criminal action either on the ground of reasonable doubt or on the ground that he did not commit the offense charged. The reason for this is that the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal liability of the defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort.64 60 Art. 31, Civil Code. 61 Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 121. 62 San Pedro Bus Line vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 840; Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Trans. Co., 7 SCRA 276. 63 Art. 2176, et seq., Civil Code. 64 Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112; Stanvac vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109. 16  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1161 With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are five exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which is stated in Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expressly grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. They are: (1) interferences by public officers or employees or by private individuals with civil rights and liberties,65 (2) defamation,66 (3) fraud,67 (4) physical injuries,68 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city or municipal police officer to render aid or protection in case of danger to life or property.69 In all of these cases or instances, although the act or omission may constitute a criminal offense in accordance with our penal laws, the injured party may institute a civil action to recover damages which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Once the action is instituted, then it may proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.70 Idem; id.; id. — Effect of failure to make reservation. — Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: “In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided that the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.’’ The insertion in the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section, resulted in a debate among academicians which lasted for more than twenty years. Finally, interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court, in Garcia vs. Florido,71 declared: “As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. 65 Art. 32, Civil Code. 66 Art. 33, Civil Code. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Art. 34, Civil Code. 70 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code. 71 52 SCRA 420. This case was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113. 17 Art. 1161 OBLIGATIONS The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law.’ x x x’’ Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe,72 the Supreme Court declared: “The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only result in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional doubt. Article 33 is quite clear: ‘In case of x x x physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only preponderance of evidence.’ That is a substantive right not to be frittered away by a construction that would render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this Court both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.’’ Thus, in Elcano vs. Hill,73 where the first defendant had been previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide and subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act is not criminal, 72 57 SCRA 106. 73 77 SCRA 98. 18  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the Supreme Court held, despite the fact that the plaintiffs (who are the parents of the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their right to institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, that acquittal is not a bar to the civil action against him. The same ruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta.74 In effect, the procedural requirement provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court is not mandatory. Removal of Reservation Requirement For Independent Civil Actions Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court was likewise amended to read as: “SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.’’ (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000). Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only be allowed if there is a reservation, or were filed ahead of the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure, February 2001). Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of the Book, and by special laws.75 Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. — As it is used in this part of the Civil Code, the term “quasi-delicts”76 refers to all of those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi- 74 91 SCRA 113. 75 Art. 1093, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form. 76 In Spanish law, “cuasi-delitos’’ is sometimes known as “culpa aquiliana’’ or “culpa extra-contractual.’’ 19 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS contracts, or criminal offenses.77 Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil Code and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connected or unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation, causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the equivalent of the term “tort” in Anglo-American law.78 Idem; Persons liable. — Obligations arising from quasi- delicts are demandable not only from the person directly responsible for the damage incurred,79 but also against the following: (1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, with respect to damages caused by the minor children who live in their company; (2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who live in their company; (3) The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise, with respect to damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions; (4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry; (5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains; and (6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades, with respect to damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.80 It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above persons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they have 77 Report of the Code Commission, p. 161. 78 See Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98. 79 Art. 2176, Civil Code. 80 Art. 2180, Civil Code. 20  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.81 Idem; Requisites of liability. — In actions based on quasi- delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from the defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following facts: (1) The fault or negligence of the defendant; (2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and (3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.82 Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. — Quasi-delicts and crimi- nal offenses are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other. However, they may be distinguished from each other in the follow- ing ways: (1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are only of private concern; (2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damages incurred; (3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal and civil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and (4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them, while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.83 Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. — In Elcano vs. Hill (G.R. No. L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that quasi-delicts include acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the exact language of the Court, “it is ‘more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress,’ to hold, as 81 Ibid. 82 Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8. 83 Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607. 21 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.’’ The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is startling. It expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond what was originally contemplated by the lawmaker. Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the scope of obligations arising from the law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and acts or omissions punished by law is well-defined. Their boundaries are clearly delineated and drawn with precision. It is only with respect to obligations arising from quasi-delicts that there is a problem and this is natural because of the very nature of such obligations. Under our system of liabilities, quasi-delicts must necessarily be a sort of “dumping ground’’ or “garbage can’’ for all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the purview of the four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the original plan envisaged by the lawmaker is as follows: The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap with crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and which we can very well call the general rule) are: first, negligent acts or omissions not punishable as criminal offenses; second, intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those regulated by Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code; and third, the so-called strict liability torts where there is neither negligence nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in the case contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the case of actionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705 of the Civil Code. The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with acts or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (and which we can very well call the exceptions) are: first, criminal negligence; and second, acts or omissions punishable as crimes under the Revised Penal Code but the Civil Code expressly declares that the civil action arising therefrom is separate and independent from the criminal action. (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code) We believe that the above arrangement was deliberately planned. Thus, according to the Code Commission in its Report: “The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting the word ‘tort’ from Anglo-American law. But ‘tort’ under that system is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. ‘Tort’ in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but 22  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the Project.’’ (Report, pp. 161-162) Idem; Character of remedy. — In Padua vs. Robles,84 in his concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: “It is by now beyond all cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act, such as that committed in this case, gives rise to at least two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he had already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case.’’ The above opinion was confirmed in Elcano vs. Hill.85 Thus, according to the Supreme Court: “Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of the civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered 84 66 SCRA 485. 85 77 SCRA 98. 23 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.” However, in Mendoza vs. Arrieta,86 a more recent case, there was a return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this case, the Supreme Court categorically held that since the offended or injured party had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised Penal Code by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the criminal action, and since the court had expressly declared that the fact from which the civil liability did not exist, therefore, the civil action for damages subsequently commenced by said injured party against the defendant has already been extinguished in consonance with Sec. 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if plaintiff’s cause of action against defendant is not ex-delicto, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that defendant’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt. Thus, the problem is still very much with us. The debate rages on. Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario 73 Phil. 607 This case come up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed 86 91 SCRA 113. 24  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla’s negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo’s responsibility, the Court of Appeals found: “* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla’s employer. There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. (See p. 22, appellant’s brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violations which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.’’ The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The petitioner’s brief states on page 10: “* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter 11, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book lV of the Civil Code, in precise words of Article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to “those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law.’ ’’ The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus: 25 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS “* * * We cannot agree to the defendant’s contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in Article.1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.” Speaking through Justice Bocobo, the Supreme Court held: “The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible under Article 1903 (now Art. 2180, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now Arts. 2176 to 2194, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code. “Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or “culpa aquiliana’’ is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored. xxx “It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article.1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions “not punishable by law.’’ But inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the “confusion worse confounded.’’ However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos 26  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. xxx The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault of negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code. The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations. “Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 366 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law according to the literal import of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. 27 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS “Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. “Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make de- fendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy un- der our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defen- dant under Article. 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that profes- sional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. “At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personal and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, “they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.” And according to Manresa, “It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director.” (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also 28  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee “vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza” (“become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.”) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles. “Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual. “In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.’’ Elcano vs. Hill 77 SCRA 98 This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of occurrence, and his father, defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, of which when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake. According to the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Barredo: “As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are: 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the 29 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reserved? 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married? “The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. “Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of x x x Garcia — that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts — deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations which are derived from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)’’ And it is precisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable by law,’’ that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that “killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life’’ hence, the ruling that “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.’’ And so, because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, 30  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, “not punishable by law,’’ thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Thus, the corresponding provision to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, “Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book (on quasi-delicts), and by special laws.’’ More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides: “ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.’’ According to the Code Commission: “The foregoing provi- sion (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of an- cient origin, having always had its own foundation and indi- viduality separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cu- asi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.” (Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.) Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds “the spirit that giveth life’’ rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles.29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule III, contemplate also the same separability, it is “more 31 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress,’’ to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to “fault or negligence,’’ covers not only acts “not punishable by law’’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed, by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi- delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor (child),” it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.’’ 32  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 Now, under Article 2180, “The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.’’ In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. “It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) “Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son. “WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.’’ Mendoza vs. Arrieta 91 SCRA 113 The records show that a three-way vehicular accident occurred involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by Rodolfo Salazar and a sand-and-gravel truck owned by Felipino Timbol 33 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of the mishap, two separate criminal actions for damage to property through reckless imprudence were instituted. The first was instituted by Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was instituted by Salazar against Montoya. There was no reservation made by both complainants of their right to institute a civil action separately. After hearing the two cases jointly, the court rendered judgment acquitting Salazar on the ground that his jeep was bumped from behind by the truck causing it to collide with the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on the other hand, was convicted on the ground that his guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to Salazar the amount of P972.50 for actual damages to the latter’s jeep. After the termination of the criminal cases, Mendoza filed a civil case. against both Salazar and Timbol, either in the alternative or in solidum, for indemnification for damages. Upon motions of both defendants, the respondent court dismissed the case. The plaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the Supreme Court by means of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of the orders of dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the Supreme Court held: “We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner’s Complaint against truck-owner Timbol. “In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car. “Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action. “It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is 34  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM- 227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228.’’ And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.: “The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer, in this case the defendant-petitioner, is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.” “The petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the Civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner’s) lane and collided with his car; that the sudden swerving of Salazar’s jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel-and- sand truck in the same direction as Salazar’s jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner’s car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff’s primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz; and (2) defendants’ delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner 35 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS Salazar or of Timbol’s employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar’s jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner’s car, were alleged in the Complaint. “Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. “Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obliga- tion not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.” “But it is truck-owner Timbol’s submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner’s failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says: “Section 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section, Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.’’ “Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florido, said: “As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding from criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit 36  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 of the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.’ x x x” “In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, “it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.” “We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict. “The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether. “At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. “The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana, as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter’s civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, 37 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228. “Neither would an independent civil action lie. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the Trial Court in this wise: “In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held liable for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar. “Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court believes that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza’s car.” “Crystal clear is the trial court’s pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner’s car. In other words, “the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.’’ Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides: “Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. x x x’’ “And even if petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep- owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted hereunder: 38  GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1162 “Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. x x x “If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.’’ ‘’In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge’s Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds. “WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felipino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.’’ As discussed by Justice Herrera in his Treatise on Criminal Procedure: The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 2000 is a virtual return to the 1940 Rules of Court which deemed as instituted with the criminal action only the civil liability arising from the offense charged. The civil liability is deemed instituted — not merely “impliedly” instituted with the institution of the criminal action. The amendment modified the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court to deem as impliedly instituted only the civil liability of the accused from all sources of obligation arising from the same act or omission. The purpose of the Committee was to limit the civil liability to be instituted with the criminal action to that of the accused and not the employer. The court, however, went further by limiting the civil action that is deemed instituted with the criminal only to the civil liability arising from the offense charged. ALL decisions to the contrary are no longer controlling. The independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 are no longer deemed or impliedly instituted with the criminal action or considered as waived even if there is no reservation. The reservation applies 39 Art. 1162 OBLIGATIONS only to the civil liability arising from the offense charged. The employer may no longer be held civilly liable for quasi-delict in the criminal action as ruled in Maniago (infra.); San Ildefonso Lines (infra.) and the pro hac vice decision in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation (infra.), and all other similar cases, since quasi delict is not deemed instituted with the criminal. If at all, the only civil liability of the employer in the criminal action would be his subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code. The rule has also done away with third-party complaints and counterclaims in criminal actions. These claims must have to be ventilated in a separate civil ac