Anarchy Is What States Make of It: International Organization Spring 1992 PDF

Cambridge University Press International Organization Foundation Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics Author(s): Alexander Wendt Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www....

Cambridge University Press International Organization Foundation Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics Author(s): Alexander Wendt Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858 Accessed: 12/08/2010 15:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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University of Wisconsin Press, The MIT Press, Cambridge University Press, International Organization Foundation are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization. http://www.jstor.org Anarchyis whatstatesmake ofit: the ofpowerpolitics social construction AlexanderWendt The debatebetweenrealistsand liberalshas reemergedas an axisofcontention in internationalrelationstheory.1Revolvingin the past around competing theoriesof humannature,the debate is moreconcernedtodaywiththe extent to whichstateactionis influencedby"structure"(anarchyand the distribution of power) versus"process" (interactionand learning)and institutions. Does the absence of centralizedpoliticalauthorityforcestatesto play competitive powerpolitics?Can international regimesovercomethislogic,and underwhat conditions?What in anarchyis givenand immutable,and whatis amenableto change? The debate between "neorealists"and "neoliberals" has been based on a sharedcommitment to "rationalism."2Like all social theories,rationalchoice directsus to ask some questions and not others,treatingthe identitiesand interestsof agentsas exogenouslygivenand focusingon how the behaviorof This articlewas negotiatedwithmanyindividuals.If myrecordsare complete(and apologiesif theyare not), thanksare due particularlyto JohnAldrich,Mike Barnett,Lea Brilmayer,David Campbell,JimCaporaso, Simon Dalby, David Dessler, Bud Duvall, Jean Elshtain,KarynErtel, Lloyd Etheridge,ErnstHaas, MartinHollis, Naeem Inayatullah,StewartJohnson,FrankKlink, Steve Krasner,FriedrichKratochwil,David Lumsdaine,M. J. Peterson,Spike Peterson,Thomas Risse-Kappen,JohnRuggie,Bruce Russett,JimScott,RogersSmith,David Sylvan,JanThomson, MarkWarren,and JuttaWeldes. The articlealso benefitedfrompresentations and seminarsat the AmericanUniversity,the Universityof Chicago, the Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst, SyracuseUniversity, of Washingtonat Seattle,the University the University of Californiaat Los Angeles,and Yale University. 1. See, forexample,JosephGrieco,"Anarchyand theLimitsofCooperation:A RealistCritique oftheNewestLiberalInstitutionalism," 42 (Summer1988),pp. 485-507; IntemationalOrganization JosephNye,"Neorealismand Neoliberalism,"WorldPolitics40 (January1988),pp. 235-51; Robert A Perspectiveon WorldPolitics,"in hiscollectionofessays Keohane, "NeoliberalInstitutionalism: entitledIntemational and StatePower(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1989),pp. 1-20; Institutions JohnMearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instability in Europe Afterthe Cold War,"Intemational Security13 (Summer1990), pp. 5-56, along withsubsequentpublishedcorrespondenceregarding Mearsheimer'sarticle;and EmersonNiou and Peter Ordeshook,"Realism Versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation," AmericanJoumalofPoliticalScience35 (May 1991),pp. 481-511. 2. See Robert Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions:Two Approaches," IntemationalStudies Quarterly32 (December 1988),pp. 379-96. 46, 2, Spring1992 IntemationalOrganization ? 1992bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology 392 InternationalOrganization agents generates outcomes. As such, rationalismoffersa fundamentally behavioralconceptionof both process and institutions: theychange behavior but not identitiesand interests.3In additionto thisway of framingresearch problems,neorealists and neoliberals share generally similar assumptions about agents: states are the dominantactorsin the system,and theydefine securityin "self-interested" terms.Neorealistsand neoliberalsmay disagree abouttheextentto whichstatesare motivatedbyrelativeversusabsolutegains, butbothgroupstakethe self-interested stateas thestartingpointfortheory. This startingpointmakessubstantivesense forneorealists,sincetheybelieve anarchiesare necessarily"self-help"systems,systemsin whichboth central authority and collectivesecurityare absent.The self-helpcorollaryto anarchy does enormouswork in neorealism,generatingthe inherentlycompetitive dynamicsof the securitydilemmaand collectiveaction problem.Self-helpis not seen as an "institution"and as suchoccupies a privilegedexplanatoryrole vis-a-visprocess,settingthe termsfor,and unaffectedby,interaction.Since statesfailingto conformto thelogicofself-helpwillbe drivenfromthesystem, onlysimplelearningor behavioraladaptationis possible;thecomplexlearning involvedin redefinitionsof identityand interestis not.' Questions about identity-and interest-formation are thereforenot importantto studentsof internationalrelations.A rationalistproblematique,whichreducesprocessto dynamicsof behavioral interactionamong exogenouslyconstitutedactors, definesthescope ofsystemictheory. By adopting such reasoning,liberals concede to neorealists the causal powersof anarchicstructure, but theygain therhetoricallypowerfulargument thatprocesscan generatecooperativebehavior,even in an exogenouslygiven, self-helpsystem.Some liberals may believe that anarchy does, in fact, constitutestates with self-interested identitiesexogenous to practice. Such "weak" liberalsconcede the causal powers of anarchyboth rhetorically and substantively and accept rationalism'slimited,behavioralconceptionof the causal powersof institutions. They are realistsbeforeliberals(we mightcall them "weak realists"), since only if internationalinstitutionscan change powersand interestsdo theygo beyondthe"limits"ofrealism.5 3. Behavioral and rationalistmodels of man and institutionsshare a common intellectual heritagein the materialistindividualismof Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham. On the relationship betweenthe two models,see JonathanTurner,A Theoryof Social Interaction(Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity Press, 1988), pp. 24-31; and George Homans, "Rational Choice Theoryand Behavioral Psychology,"in Craig Calhoun et al., eds., Structuresof Power and Constraint (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1991),pp. 77-89. 4. On neorealistconceptionsof learning,see Philip Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet ForeignPolicy,"in George Breslauerand PhilipTetlock,eds.,Leamingin U.S. and SovietForeign Policy(Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1991), pp. 24-27. On the.difference betweenbehavioral and cognitivelearning,see ibid., pp. 20-61; Joseph Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet SecurityRegimes,"IntemationalOrganization41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402; and ErnstHaas, WhenKnowledgeIs Power(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,1990),pp. 17-49. 5. See Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables,"in StephenKrasner,ed., Intemational Regimes(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 1983),pp. 355-68.  Anarchy 393 Yet some liberals want more. When Joseph Nye speaks of "complex learning,"or RobertJervisof "changingconceptionsof selfand interest,"or RobertKeohane of "sociological"conceptionsof interest,each is assertingan importantrole for transformations of identityand interestin the liberal researchprogramand,byextension,a potentially muchstrongerconceptionof processand institutions in worldpolitics.6"Strong"liberalsshouldbe troubled bythedichotomousprivileging ofstructure overprocess,sincetransformations of identityand interestthroughprocess are transformations of structure. Rationalismhas littleto offersuch an argument,7 whichis in partwhy,in an importantarticle, FriedrichKratochwiland John Ruggie argued that its ontologycontradictedtheintersubjectivist individualist epistemologynecessary forregimetheoryto realize itsfullpromise.8Regimescannotchangeidentities and interestsifthe latterare takenas given.Because of thisrationalistlegacy, despiteincreasingly numerousand richstudiesof complexlearningin foreign policy,neoliberalslack a systematictheoryof howsuchchangesoccurand thus must privilegerealist insightsabout structurewhile advancing their own insightsaboutprocess. The ironyis thatsocial theorieswhichseek to explainidentitiesand interests do exist.Keohane has called them"reflectivist";9because I wantto emphasize theirfocuson the social construction and minimizetheirimage of subjectivity problem,followingNicholas Onuf I will call them "constructivist."" Despite importantdifferences, cognitivists, standpointand postmod- poststructuralists, ern feminists,rule theorists,and structurationists share a concernwiththe basic "sociological" issue bracketed by rationalists-namely,the issue of identity-and interest-formation. Constructivism's potentialcontribution to a strongliberalismhas been obscured, however,by recent epistemological debates betweenmodernistsand postmodernists, in whichScience disciplines Dissent for not defininga conventionalresearch program,and Dissent celebratesitsliberationfromScience.1"Real issues animatethisdebate,which 6. See Nye, "Nuclear Learningand U.S.-Soviet SecurityRegimes"; Robert Jervis,"Realism, Game Theory,and Cooperation,"WorldPolitics40 (April 1988),pp. 340-44; and RobertKeohane, "InternationalLiberalismReconsidered,"in JohnDunn, ed., The Economic Limitsto Modem Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1990),p. 183. 7. Rationalistshave givensome attentionto the problemof preference-formation,althoughin so doingtheyhave gone beyondwhatI understandas the characteristicparametersof rationalism. See, forexample,JonElster,"Sour Grapes: Utilitarianism and theGenesis ofWants,"in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams,eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1982),pp. 219-38; and Michael Cohen and RobertAxelrod,"CopingwithComplexity: The AdaptiveValue ofChangingUtility,"American EconomicReview74 (March 1984),pp. 30-42. 8. FriedrichKratochwiland JohnRuggie,"InternationalOrganization:A StateoftheArton an ArtoftheState,"IntemationalOrganization 40 (Autumn1986),pp. 753-75. 9. Keohane, "InternationalInstitutions." 10. See Nicholas Onuf,Worldof Our Making(Columbia: Universityof South Carolina Press, 1989). 11. On Science,see Keohane,"InternationalInstitutions";and RobertKeohane, "International Relations Theory:Contributionsof a FeministStandpoint,"Millennium18 (Summer 1989), pp. 245-53. On Dissent, see R. B. J. Walker,"Historyand Structurein the Theoryof International Relations,"Millennium18 (Summer1989), pp. 163-83; and RichardAshleyand R. B. J.Walker, 394 InternationalOrganization With respect to the substance of international also divides constructivists. relations,however,bothmodernand postmodernconstructivists are interested in how knowledgeablepracticesconstitutesubjects,whichis not farfromthe strongliberal interestin how institutionstransform interests.They share a cognitive,intersubjectiveconceptionof process in whichidentitiesand inter- ests are endogenousto interaction, ratherthana rationalist-behavioral one in whichtheyare exogenous. My objectivein thisarticleis to build a bridgebetweenthese twotraditions (and, by extension,between the realist-liberaland rationalist-reflectivist debates) bydevelopinga constructivist argument,drawnfromstructurationist and symbolicinteractionistsociology,on behalf of the liberal claim that internationalinstitutionscan transformstate identitiesand interests.12 In contrastto the "economic" theorizingthat dominatesmainstreamsystemic international relations scholarship, this involves a "sociological social psychological"formof systemictheoryin whichidentitiesand interestsare the dependentvariable.13 Whethera "communitarian liberalism"is stillliberalism does not interestme here. What does is thatconstructivism mightcontribute to the strongliberal interestin identity-and interest-formation significantly and therebyperhapsitselfbe enrichedwithliberalinsightsabout learningand cognitionwhichithas neglected. My strategyforbuildingthisbridgewill be to argue againstthe neorealist claim that self-helpis given by anarchic structureexogenouslyto process. Constructivistshavenotdone a goodjob oftakingthecausal powersofanarchy seriously.This is unfortunate,since in the realist view anarchyjustifies disinterestin the institutionaltransformation of identitiesand interestsand thus buildingsystemic theories in exclusively rationalistterms;its putative causal powers must be challenged if process and institutionsare not to be subordinatedto structure.I argue that self-helpand power politicsdo not follow either logicallyor causally fromanarchyand that if today we find ourselvesin a self-helpworld,thisis due to process,not structure. There is no "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in Interna- tionalStudies,"IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 34 (September1990),pp. 367-416. For an excellent criticalassessmentof these debates, see Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospectsof InternationalTheoryin a Post-PositivistEra," IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 33 (September1989), pp. 235-54. 12. The factthat I draw on these approaches aligns me withmodernistconstructivists, even thoughI also drawfreelyon thesubstantive workofpostmodernists, especiallyRichardAshleyand Rob Walker.For a defenseof thispracticeand a discussionof its epistemologicalbasis, see my earlier article,"The Agent-Structure Problemin InternationalRelations Theory,"Intemational Organization41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-70; and Ian Shapiro and Alexander Wendt, "The DifferenceThat Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Consent," forthcoming in Politicsand Society.Amongmodernistconstructivists, myargumentis particularly indebtedto the published work of Emanuel Adler, FriedrichKratochwil,and John Ruggie, as well as to an unpublishedpaper by Naeem Inayatullahand David Levine entitled"Politics and Economics in Contemporary InternationalRelationsTheory,"SyracuseUniversity, Syracuse,N.Y., 1990. 13. See ViktorGecas, "Rekindlingthe SociologicalImaginationin Social Psychology," Joumal fortheTheory ofSocial Behavior19 (March 1989),pp. 97-115.  Anarchy 395 "logic" of anarchyapart fromthe practicesthat create and instantiateone structureof identitiesand interestsratherthan another; structurehas no existenceor causal powersapartfromprocess.Self-helpand powerpoliticsare not essentialfeaturesof anarchy.Anarchyis whatstatesmakeofit. institutions, examinethe claimsand In the subsequentsectionsof thisarticle,I critically assumptionsof neorealism,develop a positiveargumentabout how self-help and power politicsare sociallyconstructedunder anarchy,and then explore threewaysin whichidentitiesand interestsare transformed underanarchy:by the institutionof sovereignty,by an evolutionof cooperation,and by inten- tionaleffortsto transformegoisticidentitiesintocollectiveidentities. Anarchyand powerpolitics Classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthauattributedegoismand powerpoliticsprimarily to humannature, whereas structuralrealistsor neorealistsemphasize anarchy.The difference stems in part from differentinterpretationsof anarchy's causal powers. KennethWaltz's workis importantforboth. In Man, theState,and War,he definesanarchyas a conditionof possibilityforor "permissive"cause of war, arguingthat"wars occurbecause thereis nothingto preventthem."14 It is the humannatureor domesticpoliticsofpredatorstates,however,thatprovidethe initialimpetusor "efficient"cause of conflictwhich forces other states to respond in kind.15Waltz is not entirelyconsistentabout this,since he slips withoutjustificationfromthe permissivecausal claim that in anarchywar is always possible to the active causal claim that "war may at any moment occur."'16But despite Waltz's concludingcall for third-imagetheory,the efficientcauses thatinitializeanarchicsystemsare fromthe firstand second images.This is reversedin Waltz's Theory Politics,inwhichfirst- ofInternational and second-imagetheoriesare spurned as "reductionist,"and the logic of anarchyseems by itselfto constituteself-helpand powerpoliticsas necessary featuresofworldpolitics.17 This is unfortunate,sincewhateverone maythinkoffirst- and second-image theories, they have the virtue of implyingthat practices determinethe characterof anarchy.In thepermissiveview,onlyifhumanor domesticfactors cause A to attack B will B have to defend itself.Anarchies may contain dynamicsthatlead to competitive powerpolitics,buttheyalso maynot,and we can argueaboutwhenparticularstructures ofidentityand interestwillemerge. 14. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State,and War (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1959), p. 232. 15. Ibid.,pp. 169-70. 16. Ibid., p. 232. This pointis made byHidemi Suganamiin "BringingOrder to the Causes of War Debates," Millennium19 (Spring1990),p. 34, fn.11. 17. KennethWaltz,Theory Politics(Boston: Addison-Wesley,1979). ofIntemational 396 InternationalOrganization In neorealism,however,therole ofpracticein shapingthecharacterofanarchy is substantiallyreduced,and so thereis less aboutwhichto argue:self-helpand competitive powerpoliticsare simplygivenexogenouslybythestructure ofthe statesystem. I willnot here contestthe neorealistdescriptionof the contemporary state systemas a competitive, I willonlydisputeits explanation.I self-helpworld;18 develop my argumentin three stages. First,I disentanglethe concepts of self-helpand anarchyby showingthatself-interested conceptionsof security are not a constitutive propertyof anarchy.Second, I show how self-helpand competitivepowerpoliticsmaybe producedcausallyby processesof interac- tionbetweenstatesin whichanarchyplaysonlya permissiverole. In both of these stagesof myargument,I self-consciously bracketthe first-and second- image determinants not because theyare unimportant of state identity, (they are indeed important), butbecause likeWaltz's objective,mineis to clarify the "logic" of anarchy.Third,I reintroducefirst-and second-imagedeterminants to assess theireffectson identity-formation in different kindsof anarchies. Anarchy,self-help,and intersubjectiveknowledge Waltz definespoliticalstructure on threedimensions:orderingprinciples(in thiscase, anarchy),principlesof differentiation (whichhere dropout), and the distributionof capabilities.19 By itself,thisdefinitionpredictslittleabout state behavior.It does not predictwhethertwo stateswill be friendsor foes,will recognizeeach other'ssovereignty, willhave dynasticties,willbe revisionistor status quo powers, and so on. These factors,which are fundamentally intersubjective,affectstates' securityinterestsand thusthe characterof their interactionunderanarchy.In an importantrevisionofWaltz's theory,Stephen Waltimpliesas muchwhenhe arguesthatthe"balance ofthreats,"ratherthan the balance of power, determinesstate action, threatsbeing socially con- structed.20Put more generally,withoutassumptionsabout the structureof identitiesand interestsin the system,Waltz's definitionof structurecannot predictthe contentor dynamicsof anarchy.Self-helpis one such intersubjec- tivestructureand, as such,does the decisiveexplanatoryworkin the theory. The questionis whetherself-helpis a logicalor contingentfeatureof anarchy. In thissection,I develop the conceptof a "structureof identityand interest" and showthatno particularone followslogicallyfromanarchy. A fundamentalprincipleof constructivist social theoryis that people act towardobjects,includingotheractors,on the basis of the meaningsthatthe 18. The neorealist descriptionis not unproblematic.For a powerfulcritique, see David Lumsdaine,Ideals and Interests:The ForeignAid Regime,1949-1989 (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress,forthcoming). 19. Waltz,Theory ofIntemationalPolitics,pp. 79-101. Press,1987). 20. StephenWalt,TheOriginsofAlliances(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity  Anarchy 397 objects have for them.21States act differently towardenemies than theydo towardfriendsbecause enemiesare threateningand friendsare not.Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us whichis which.U.S. military power has a differentsignificance forCanada than forCuba, despite theirsimilar"structural"positions,just as Britishmissileshave a different significanceforthe United States thando Sovietmissiles.The distribution of powermayalwaysaffectstates'calculations,buthowit does so dependson the intersubjectiveunderstandingsand expectations,on the "distributionof knowledge,"that constitutetheirconceptionsof self and other.22If society "forgets"what a universityis, the powers and practices of professorand studentcease to exist;if the United States and SovietUnion decide thatthey are no longerenemies,"the cold war is over." It is collectivemeaningsthat constitutethestructures whichorganizeour actions. Actorsacquireidentities-relatively stable,role-specific understandingsand expectationsabout self-by participating in suchcollectivemeanings.23 Identi- ties are inherentlyrelational:"Identity,withits appropriateattachmentsof psychologicalreality,is alwaysidentitywithina specific,sociallyconstructed 21. See, forexample,HerbertBlumer,"The MethodologicalPositionofSymbolicInteractionism," in hisSymbolic Interactionism:Perspectiveand Method(EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1969), p. 2. Throughoutthisarticle,I assumethata theoretically productiveanalogycan be made between individualsand states.There are at least twojustifications forthisanthropomorphism. Rhetori- cally,theanalogyis an acceptedpracticein mainstreaminternational relationsdiscourse,and since thisarticleis an immanentratherthan externalcritique,it should followthe practice.Substan- tively,statesare collectivitiesof individualsthatthroughtheirpracticesconstituteeach otheras "persons"havinginterests, fears,and so on. A fulltheoryof stateidentity- and interest-formation would neverthelessneed to drawinsightsfromthe social psychology of groupsand organizational theory,and forthatreasonmyanthropomorphism is merelysuggestive. 22. The phrase "distributionof knowledge"is BarryBarnes's, as discussed in his work The NatureofPower(Cambridge:PolityPress,1988); see also PeterBergerand ThomasLuckmann,The Social Construction of Reality(New York: Anchor Books, 1966). The concernof recentinterna- tionalrelationsscholarshipon "epistemiccommunities"withthe cause-and-effect understandings of the world held by scientists,experts,and policymakersis an importantaspect of the role of knowledgein worldpolitics;see Peter Haas, "Do Regimes Matter?EpistemicCommunitiesand MediterraneanPollutionControl,"IntemationalOrganization 43 (Summer1989),pp. 377-404; and ErnstHaas, WhenKnowledgeIs Power.My constructivist approach would merelyadd to thisan equal emphasison howsuchknowledgealso constitutes thestructures and subjectsof social life. 23. For an excellentshortstatementof how collectivemeaningsconstituteidentities,see Peter Berger,"Identityas a Problemin the Sociologyof Knowledge,"EuropeanJoumalofSociology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1966,pp. 32-40. See also David Morganand Michael Schwalbe,"Mind and Selfin Society: LinkingSocial Structureand Social Cognition,"Social Psychology Quarterly 53 (June 1990), pp. 148-64.In mydiscussion,I drawon thefollowing texts:GeorgeHerbertMead, Mind, interactionist Self and Society(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Bergerand Luckmann,The Social Construction ofReality;SheldonStryker, Symbolic Interactionism:A Version(Menlo Social Structural Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1980); R. S. Perinbanayagam,Signifying Acts: Structure and Meaningin Everyday Life(Carbondale: SouthernIllinoisUniversity Press,1985); JohnHewitt,Self and Society:A SymbolicInteractionist Social Psychology(Boston: Allyn& Bacon, 1988); and Turner, A Theoryof Social Interaction.Despite some differences, much the same points are made by structurationists such as Bhaskar and Giddens. See Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism (AtlanticHighlands,N.J.: HumanitiesPress, 1979); and AnthonyGiddens, CentralProblemsin Social Theory(Berkeley:University ofCaliforniaPress,1979). 398 InternationalOrganization world," Peter Berger argues.24Each person has many identitieslinked to institutionalroles,such as brother,son, teacher,and citizen.Similarly, a state may have multiple identitiesas "sovereign,""leader of the free world," "imperial power," and so on.25The commitmentto and the salience of particularidentitiesvary,but each identityis an inherently social definitionof the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectivelyhold about themselvesand one anotherand whichconstitutethe structureof the social world. Identitiesare the basis of interests.Actors do not have a "portfolio"of intereststhat theycarryaround independentof social context;instead,they definetheirinterestsin the process of definingsituations.26 As Nelson Foote puts it: "Motivation... refer[s]to the degree to whicha humanbeing,as a participantin the ongoingsocial processin whichhe necessarilyfindshimself, definesa problematicsituationas callingforthe performanceof a particular act, with more or less anticipatedconsummationsand consequences, and therebyhis organismreleases the energyappropriateto performingit."27 Sometimessituationsare unprecedentedin our experience,and in thesecases we have to constructtheirmeaning,and thusour interests, byanalogyor invent them de novo. More oftenthey have routinequalities in which we assign meaningson the basis of institutionally defined roles. When we say that professorshave an "interest"in teaching,research,or goingon leave, we are sayingthatto functionin the role identityof "professor,"theyhave to define certainsituationsas callingforcertainactions.This does not mean thatthey will necessarilydo so (expectationsand competence do not equal perfor- mance),but iftheydo not,theywillnot get tenure.The absence or failureof roles makes definingsituationsand interestsmore difficult, and identity 24. Berger,"Identityas a Problemin theSociologyofKnowledge,"p. 111. 25. While not normallycast in such terms, foreignpolicy scholarship on national role conceptions could be adapted to such identitylanguage. See Kal Holsti, "National Role Conceptionsin the Studyof ForeignPolicy,"IntemationalStudiesQuarterly 14 (September1970), pp. 233-309; and Stephen Walker,ed., Role Theoryand ForeignPolicyAnalysis(Durham, N.C.: Duke UniversityPress, 1987). For an importanteffortto do so, see Stephen Walker,"Symbolic Interactionism and International Politics: Role Theory's Contribution to International Organization,"in C. Shih and Martha Cottam,eds., Contending Dramas: A Cognitive Approachto Post-WarIntemationalOrganizationalProcesses(New York: Praeger,forthcoming). 26. On the "portfolio"conceptionof interests,see BarryHindess,PoliticalChoice and Social Structure(Aldershot,U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 2-3. The "definitionof the situation"is a centralconceptin interactionist theory. 27. Nelson Foote, "Identificationas the Basis for a Theory of Motivation,"American SociologicalReview16 (February1951), p. 15. Such stronglysociologicalconceptionsof interest have been criticized,with some justice, for being "oversocialized"; see Dennis Wrong,"The OversocializedConceptionof Man in Modern Sociology,"AmericanSociologicalReview26 (April 1961), pp. 183-93. For useful correctives,which focus on the activationof presocial but nondetermining humanneeds withinsocial contexts,see Turner,A Theory ofSocial Interaction, pp. 23-69; and ViktorGecas, "The Self-Conceptas a Basis fora Theoryof Motivation,"in Judith Howard and Peter Callero, eds., The Self-SocietyDynamic (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1991),pp. 171-87.  Anarchy399 confusionmayresult.Thisseemsto be happening todayin theUnitedStates and theformer SovietUnion:without thecoldwar'smutualattributions of threatand hostility todefinetheiridentities,thesestatesseemunsureofwhat their"interests"shouldbe. An institution is a relativelystableset or "structure" of identitiesand interests. Such structures are oftencodifiedin formalrulesand norms,but thesehave motivational forceonlyin virtueof actors'socialization to and participationincollective knowledge. Institutions arefundamentally cognitive entities thatdo notexistapartfromactors'ideasabouthowtheworldworks.28 Thisdoes notmeanthatinstitutions are notreal or objective, thattheyare "nothingbut"beliefs.As collective knowledge, theyareexperienced as having an existence"overand abovetheindividuals whohappento embodythemat themoment."29 In thisway,institutionscometoconfront individuals as moreor lesscoercivesocialfacts,buttheyarestilla function ofwhatactorscollectively "know."Identities andsuchcollective cognitionsdo notexistapartfromeach other;theyare "mutually constitutive."30 On thisview,institutionalization is a processofinternalizing newidentities and interests, notsomething occurring outsidethemand affecting onlybehavior;socializationis a cognitiveprocess, notjusta behavioral one.Conceivedin thisway,institutions maybe coopera- tiveor conflictual, a pointsometimeslost in scholarship on international regimes, which tendsto equate institutions withcooperation.There are important differences betweenconflictual and cooperative institutionsto be sure,butall relatively stableself-otherrelations-eventhoseof"enemies"- aredefined intersubjectively. Self-helpis an institution,one ofvariousstructures ofidentity and interest thatmayexistunderanarchy. Processesofidentity-formation underanarchy are concerned firstand foremost withpreservation or "security" oftheself. Conceptsofsecurity therefore intheextenttowhichandthemannerin differ whichtheselfis identified withtheother,31 cognitively and,I wanttosuggest, it 28. In neo-Durkheimianparlance,institutions are "social representations."See Serge Moscov- ici, "The Phenomenonof Social Representations,"in Rob Farr and Serge Moscovici,eds., Social Representations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984), pp. 3-69. See also Barnes, The Natureof Power.Note thatthisis a considerablymore socialized cognitivism than thatfoundin muchof therecentscholarshipon theroleof"ideas" inworldpolitics,whichtendsto treatideas as commoditiesthat are held by individualsand intervenebetween the distribution of power and outcomes.For a formofcognitivism closerto myown,see Emanuel Adler,"CognitiveEvolution:A DynamicApproach for the Studyof InternationalRelations and Their Progress,"in Emanuel Adler and BeverlyCrawford, eds.,Progress inPostwarInternational Relations(New York: Columbia University Press,1991),pp. 43-88. 29. Bergerand Luckmann,TheSocial Construction ofReality,p. 58. 30. See Giddens,CentralProblemsinSocial Theory;and AlexanderWendtand RaymondDuvall, "Institutionsand InternationalOrder,"in Ernst-OttoCzempiel and JamesRosenau, eds., Global Changesand Theoretical Challenges(Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1989),pp. 51-74. 31. Proponentsof choice theorymightput this in termsof "interdependentutilities."For a usefuloverviewof relevantchoice-theoretic discourse,mostof whichhas focusedon the specific case of altruism,see Harold Hochman and Shmuel Nitzan,"Concepts of ExtendedPreference," 400 InternationalOrganization is upon thiscognitivevariationthatthemeaningofanarchyand thedistribution of power depends. Let me illustratewith a standardcontinuumof security systems." At one end is the "competitive"securitysystem,in whichstates identify negativelywitheach other'ssecurityso thatego's gain is seen as alter'sloss. Negativeidentification under anarchyconstitutessystemsof "realist" power politics:risk-averseactors that inferintentionsfromcapabilitiesand worry about relativegains and losses. At the limit-in the Hobbesian war of all againstall-collective actionis nearlyimpossiblein sucha systembecause each actormustconstantly fearbeingstabbedin theback. In the middle is the "individualistic"securitysystem,in which states are indifferent to the relationshipbetween theirown and others' security.This constitutes"neoliberal" systems:states are still self-regarding about their securitybut are concernedprimarily withabsolute gains ratherthan relative gains. One's position in the distributionof power is less important,and collectiveaction is more possible (thoughstillsubjectto free ridingbecause statescontinueto be "egoists"). Competitiveand individualisticsystemsare both "self-help" formsof anarchyin the sense that statesdo not positivelyidentifythe securityof self withthatof othersbut insteadtreatsecurityas the individualresponsibility of each. Giventhe lack of a positivecognitiveidentification on thebasis ofwhich to build securityregimes,power politicswithinsuch systemswill necessarily consistofefforts to manipulateothersto satisfyself-regarding interests. Thiscontrastswiththe"cooperative"security system,inwhichstatesidentify positivelywithone anotherso that the securityof each is perceivedas the responsibilityof all. This is not self-helpin any interestingsense, since the "self" in termsof which interestsare defined is the community;national interestsare internationalinterests.33In practice,ofcourse,theextentto which JoumalofEconomicBehaviorand Organization 6 (June1985),pp. 161-76.The literatureon choice theoryusuallydoes not linkbehaviorto issues of identity.For an exception,see AmartyaSen, "Goals, Commitment, and Identity,"JoumalofLaw, Economics,and Organization1 (Fall 1985), pp. 341-55; and Robert Higgs, "Identityand Cooperation: A Commenton Sen's Alternative Program,"JoumalofLaw, Economics,and Organization 3 (Spring1987),pp. 140-42. 32. Securitysystemsmightalso varyin theextentto whichthereis a functionaldifferentiation or a hierarchicalrelationshipbetweenpatronand client,withthe patronplayinga hegemonicrole withinits sphereof influencein definingthe securityinterestsof itsclients.I do not examinethis dimensionhere;forpreliminary discussion,see AlexanderWendt,"The StatesSystemand Global Militarization,"Ph.D. diss.,Universityof Minnesota,Minneapolis,1989; and AlexanderWendt and Michael Barnett,"The InternationalSystemand Third World Militarization,"unpublished manuscript, 1991. 33. This amountsto an "internationalizationof the state." For a discussionof thissubject,see RaymondDuvall and AlexanderWendt,"The InternationalCapital Regimeand the Internation- alization of the State," unpublishedmanuscript,1987. See also R. B. J. Walker,"Sovereignty, Identity,Community: Reflectionson theHorizonsof Contemporary PoliticalPractice,"in R. B. J. Walkerand Saul Mendlovitz,eds., Contending Sovereignties(Boulder,Colo.: LynneRienner,1990), pp. 159-85.  Anarchy 401 withthecommunity states'identification varies,fromthelimitedformfoundin "concerts"to thefull-blown formseen in "collectivesecurity"arrangements.34 Dependingon howwell developedthe collectiveselfis, itwillproducesecurity practices that are in varyingdegrees altruisticor prosocial. This makes collectiveaction less dependent on the presence of active threatsand less prone to free riding.35 Moreover, it restructureseffortsto advance one's objectives,or "power politics,"in termsof shared normsratherthan relative power.36 On this view, the tendencyin internationalrelationsscholarshipto view power and institutionsas two opposing explanationsof foreignpolicy is thereforemisleading,since anarchyand the distribution of power onlyhave meaningforstateactionin virtueof the understandings and expectationsthat constituteinstitutionalidentitiesand interests.Self-helpis one suchinstitution, constituting one kind of anarchybut not the only kind. Waltz's three-part definitionof structurethereforeseems underspecified.In order to go from structureto action,we need to add a fourth:the intersubjectively constituted structure ofidentitiesand interestsin thesystem. This has an importantimplicationforthewayinwhichwe conceiveof states in the state of naturebeforetheirfirstencounterwitheach other.Because statesdo not have conceptionsof self and other,and thus securityinterests, apart fromor priorto interaction,we assume too much about the state of nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy,"international political systems,like economic markets,are formedby the coaction of self-regardingunits."37We also assume too muchifwe argue that,in virtueof 34. On the spectrumof cooperativesecurityarrangements, see Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, "Concerts,CollectiveSecurity,and the Future of Europe," International Security16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61; and Richard Smoke, "A Theoryof Mutual Security,"in Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov,eds., Mutual Security(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 59-111. These maybe usefullyset alongsideChristopherJencks'"Varietiesof Altruism,"in Jane Mansbridge,ed.,BeyondSelf-Interest (Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress,1990),pp. 53-67. 35. On the role of collectiveidentityin reducingcollectiveactionproblems,see Bruce Fireman and WilliamGamson,"UtilitarianLogic in theResourceMobilizationPerspective,"in MayerZald and JohnMcCarthy,eds., TheDynamicsofSocial Movements (Cambridge,Mass.: Winthrop,1979), pp. 8-44; RobynDawes et al., "CooperationfortheBenefitofUs-Not Me, or MyConscience,"in Mansbridge,BeyondSelf-Interest, pp. 97-110; and Craig Calhoun, "The Problemof Identityin CollectiveAction," in Joan Huber, ed., Macro-MicroLinkagesin Sociology(BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage, 1991),pp. 51-75. 36. See Thomas Risse-Kappen,"Are DemocraticAlliancesSpecial?" unpublishedmanuscript, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 1991. This line of argumentcould be expanded usefullyin feministterms.For a usefuloverviewof the relationalnatureof feministconceptionsof self,see Paula England and Barbara Stanek Kilbourne,"FeministCritiquesof the SeparativeModel of Self: ImplicationsforRational Choice Theory,"Rationality and Society2 (April 1990),pp. 156-71. On feministconceptualizationsof power,see Ann Tickner,"Hans Morgenthau'sPrinciplesof Political Realism: A FeministReformulation,"Millennium17 (Winter 1988), pp. 429-40; and ThomasWartenberg,"The ConceptofPowerin FeministTheory,"PraxisInternational 8 (October 1988),pp. 301-16. 37. Waltz,Theory ofInternationalPolitics,p. 91. 402 InternationalOrganization anarchy,statesin thestateofnaturenecessarilyface a "staghunt"or "security dilemma."38 These claimspresupposea historyof interactionin whichactors have acquired"selfish"identitiesand interests;beforeinteraction(and stillin abstractionfromfirst-and second-imagefactors)theywould have no experi- ence upon which to base such definitionsof self and other. To assume otherwiseis to attributeto statesin the stateof naturequalitiesthattheycan onlypossess in society.39 nota constitutive Self-helpis an institution, featureof anarchy. What,then,is a constitutive featureofthestateofnaturebeforeinteraction? Two thingsare left if we strip away those propertiesof the self which presuppose interactionwith others. The firstis the material substrateof agency,includingits intrinsiccapabilities.For humanbeings,thisis the body; for states, it is an organizationalapparatus of governance.In effect,I am suggesting forrhetoricalpurposesthattherawmaterialout ofwhichmembers of the statesystemare constitutedis createdbydomesticsocietybeforestates enterthe constitutive althoughthisprocess process of internationalsociety,40 impliesneitherstable territoriality nor sovereignty, whichare internationally negotiatedtermsof individuality (as discussedfurther below). The second is a desire to preservethis material substrate,to survive.This does not entail "self-regardingness," however, since actors do not have a self prior to interaction withan other;howtheyviewthemeaningand requirements ofthis survivalthereforedepends on the processes by which conceptionsof self evolve. This mayall seem veryarcane,but thereis an importantissue at stake: are theforeignpolicyidentitiesand interestsofstatesexogenousor endogenousto thestatesystem?The formeris the answerof an individualistic or undersocial- ized systemictheoryfor which rationalismis appropriate;the latteris the answerof a fullysocializedsystemictheory.Waltz seemsto offerthelatterand 38. See Waltz,Man, theState,and War; and Robert Jervis,"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," WorldPolitics30 (January1978),pp. 167-214. 39. My argumenthere parallels Rousseau's critiqueof Hobbes. For an excellentcritiqueof realistappropriationsof Rousseau, see Michael Williams,"Rousseau, Realism,and Realpolitik," Millennium18 (Summer1989), pp. 188-204. Williamsargues thatfarfrombeing a fundamental startingpointin the stateof nature,forRousseau the staghuntrepresenteda stage in man's fall. On p. 190,WilliamscitesRousseau's descriptionofman priorto leavingthestateof nature:"Man onlyknowshimself;he does not see his own well-beingto be identifiedwithor contraryto thatof anyoneelse; he neitherhates anythingnor loves anything; but limitedto no more than physical he is no one, he is an animal."For anothercritiqueof Hobbes on the stateof naturethat instinct, parallelsmyconstructivist readingof anarchy,see Charles Landesman,"Reflectionson Hobbes: Anarchyand Human Nature,"in Peter Caws, ed., The Causes of Quarrel(Boston: Beacon, 1989), pp. 139-48. 40. Empirically,this suggestionis problematic,since the process of decolonizationand the subsequentsupportofmanyThirdWorldstatesbyinternational societypointto waysinwhicheven the raw materialof "empiricalstatehood" is constitutedby the societyof states. See Robert Jacksonand Carl Rosberg,"WhyAfrica'sWeak StatesPersist:The Empiricaland theJuridicalin Statehood,"WorldPolitics35 (October 1982),pp. 1-24.  Anarchy 403 proposes two mechanisms,competitionand socialization,by whichstructure conditionsstateaction.4' The contentof his argumentabout thisconditioning, however,presupposesa self-helpsystemthatis not itselfa constitutive feature of anarchy.As JamesMorrowpointsout, Waltz's two mechanismscondition behavior,notidentityand interest.42 This explainshowWaltzcan be accused of both "individualism"and "structuralism."4' He is the formerwithrespectto systemicconstitutionsof identityand interest,the latter with respect to systemicdeterminations ofbehavior. Anarchy and the social constructionofpower politics If self-helpis not a constitutive featureof anarchy,it mustemergecausally fromprocessesin whichanarchyplaysonlya permissiverole.' This reflectsa second principleof constructivism: thatthe meaningsin termsofwhichaction is organizedarise out of interaction.45This being said, however,the situation facingstatesas theyencounterone anotherforthe firsttimemaybe such that only self-regarding conceptionsof identitycan survive;if so, even if these conceptions are socially constructed,neorealists may be rightin holding identitiesand interestsconstantand thusin privileging one particularmeaning of anarchicstructureover process. In thiscase, rationalistswould be rightto argue for a weak, behavioral conceptionof the differencethat institutions make, and realistswould be rightto argue thatany internationalinstitutions which are created will be inherentlyunstable,since withoutthe power to 41. Waltz,Theory ofInternational Politics,pp. 74-77. 42. See JamesMorrow,"Social Choice and SystemStructurein WorldPolitics,"WorldPolitics 41 (October 1988), p. 89. Waltz's behavioraltreatmentof socializationmaybe usefullycontrasted withthemorecognitiveapproachtakenbyIkenberry and theKupchansin thefollowingarticles:G. John Ikenberryand Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization 44 (Summer1989), pp. 283-316; and Kupchan and Kupchan,"Concerts,Collective Security,and the Future of Europe." Their approach is close to my own, but they define socializationas an elite strategyto induce value change in others,ratherthan as a ubiquitous featureofinteractionin termsofwhichall identitiesand interestsgetproducedand reproduced. 43. Regardingindividualism, see RichardAshley,"The Povertyof Neorealism,"International Organization 38 (Spring1984),pp. 225-86; Wendt,"The Agent-Structure Problemin International RelationsTheory";and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" Inter- nationalOrganization 43 (Summer1989),pp. 441-74. Regardingstructuralism, see R. B. J.Walker, "Realism, Change, and InternationalPoliticalTheory,"International StudiesQuarterly 31 (March 1987), pp. 65-86; and MartinHollis and StevenSmith,Explainingand Understanding International Relations(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1989). The behavioralismevidentin neorealisttheoryalso explainshow neorealistscan reconciletheirstructuralism withthe individualism ofrationalchoice theory.On the behavioral-structural characterof the latter,see Spiro Latsis, "SituationalDeter- minismin Economics,"British Journalfor thePhilosophy ofScience23 (August1972),pp. 207-45. 44. The importanceof the distinctionbetween constitutiveand causal explanationsis not sufficientlyappreciatedin constructivistdiscourse.See Wendt,"The Agent-Structure Problemin International RelationsTheory,"pp. 362-65;Wendt,"The StatesSystemand Global Militarization," pp. 110-13; and Wendt, "Bridgingthe Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in InternationalRelations," ReviewofInternational Studies17 (October 1991),p. 390. 45. See Blumer,"The MethodologicalPositionofSymbolicInteractionism," pp. 2-4. 404 InternationalOrganization transform identitiesand intereststheywillbe "continuingobjectsofchoice" by exogenouslyconstitutedactors constrainedonly by the transactioncosts of behavioralchange.46 Even in a permissivecausal role,in otherwords,anarchy may decisivelyrestrictinteractionand thereforerestrictviable formsof systemictheory.I address these causal issues firstby showinghow self- regardingideas about securitymightdevelop and then by examiningthe conditionsunderwhicha keyefficient cause-predation-may disposestatesin thisdirectionratherthanothers. Conceptionsof selfand interesttendto "mirror"thepracticesof significant others over time. This principleof identity-formation is captured by the symbolicinteractionist notionofthe"looking-glassself,"whichassertsthatthe selfis a reflectionof an actor'ssocialization. Considertwo actors-ego and alter-encounteringeach otherforthe first time.47 Each wantsto surviveand has certainmaterialcapabilities,but neither actorhas biologicalor domesticimperativesforpower,glory,or conquest(still bracketed),and thereis no historyof securityor insecurity betweenthe two. What should theydo? Realistswould probablyargue thateach should act on thebasis ofworst-caseassumptionsabouttheother'sintentions, justifying such an attitudeas prudentinviewofthepossibility ofdeathfrommakinga mistake. Such a possibility alwaysexists,even in civilsociety;however,societywouldbe impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case possibilities.Instead,most decisionsare and should be made on the basis of probabilities, and theseare producedbyinteraction, bywhatactorsdo. In the beginningis ego's gesture,which may consist,for example,of an advance,a retreat,a brandishing of arms,a layingdownof arms,or an attack.48 For ego, thisgesturerepresentsthebasis on whichit is preparedto respondto alter.Thisbasis is unknownto alter,however,and so itmustmake an inference or "attribution"about ego's intentionsand, in particular,given that this is anarchy,about whetherego is a threat.49 The contentof this inferencewill largelydepend on two considerations.The firstis the gesture's and ego's 46. See RobertGrafstein,"Rational Choice: Theoryand Institutions," in KristenMonroe,ed., TheEconomicApproachtoPolitics(New York: Harper Collins,1991),pp. 263-64. A good example of the promiseand limitsof transactioncost approaches to institutionalanalysisis offeredby RobertKeohane in hisAfter Hegemony(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Press,1984). 47. This situationis not entirelymetaphoricalin worldpolitics,since throughout historystates have "discovered"each other,generatingan instantanarchyas it were. A systematicempirical studyoffirstcontactswouldbe interesting. 48. Mead's analysisof gesturesremainsdefinitive. See Mead's Mind,Self and Society.See also the discussionof the role of signalingin the "mechanicsof interaction"in Turner'sA Theoryof pp. 74-79 and 92-115. Social Interaction, 49. On the role of attribution processesin the interactionist accountof identity-formation,see Sheldon Strykerand Avi Gottlieb,"AttributionTheoryand SymbolicInteractionism," in John Harvey et al., eds., New Directionsin Attribution Research,vol. 3 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), pp. 425-58; and Kathleen Crittenden,"Sociological Aspects of Attribution," Annual Reviewof Sociology,vol. 9, 1983, pp. 425-46. On attributionalprocesses in international relations,see Shawn Rosenbergand GaryWolfsfeld,"InternationalConflictand the Problemof Attribution,"JournalofConflict Resolution21 (March 1977),pp. 75-103.  Anarchy 405 physicalqualities,whichare in part contrivedby ego and whichinclude the directionof movement,noise, numbers,and immediateconsequences of the gesture.50The second considerationconcernswhatalterwould intendbysuch qualitieswere it to make such a gestureitself.Altermaymake an attributional "error"in itsinferenceabout ego's intent,but thereis also no reason forit to assume a priori-before the gesture-that ego is threatening, since it is only througha processof signalingand interpreting thatthecostsand probabilities ofbeingwrongcan be determined.5" Social threatsare constructed, notnatural. Consideran example.Would we assume,a priori,thatwe were about to be attackedifwe are ever contactedby membersof an alien civilization?I think not. We would be highlyalert,of course,but whetherwe placed our military forceson alertor launchedan attackwoulddepend on howwe interpreted the importof their firstgesture for our security-if only to avoid makingan immediateenemyout ofwhatmaybe a dangerousadversary.The possibility of error,in otherwords,does notforceus to act on theassumptionthatthealiens are threatening: actiondependson theprobabilitieswe assign,and theseare in keypart a functionof what the aliens do; priorto theirgesture,we have no systemic basis forassigningprobabilities.Iftheirfirstgestureis to appearwitha thousandspaceships and destroyNew York, we will definethe situationas threateningand respondaccordingly.But if theyappear withone spaceship, sayingwhatseems to be "we come in peace," we willfeel"reassured"and will probablyrespondwitha gestureintendedto reassurethem,evenifthisgesture is notnecessarilyinterpreted bythemas such.52 This process of signaling,interpreting,and respondingcompletesa "social act" and beginsthe process of creatingintersubjective meanings.It advances thesame way.The firstsocial act createsexpectationson bothsides about each other's futurebehavior: potentiallymistakenand certainlytentative,but expectationsnonetheless.Based on thistentativeknowledge,ego makesa new gesture,again signifying the basis on whichit will respondto alter,and again alterresponds,addingto thepool ofknowledgeeach has about the other,and so on over time.The mechanismhere is reinforcement; interactionrewards actorsforholdingcertainideas about each otherand discouragesthemfrom holdingothers.If repeated long enough,these "reciprocaltypifications" will createrelatively stableconceptsofselfand otherregardingtheissue at stakein theinteraction.53 50. On the "stagecraft"involvedin "presentationsof self,"see ErvingGoffman,ThePresenta- tionofSelfin EverydayLife(New York: Doubleday,1959). On therole ofappearance in definitions of the situation,see GregoryStone, "Appearance and the Self," in Arnold Rose, ed., Human Behaviorand Social Processes(Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1962),pp. 86-118. 51. This discussionof the role of possibilitiesand probabilitiesin threatperceptionowes much to StewartJohnson'scommentson an earlierdraftofmyarticle. 52. On therole of "reassurance"in threatsituations,see RichardNed Lebow and JaniceGross Stein,"BeyondDeterrence,"JournalofSocialIssues, vol. 43, no. 4, 1987,pp. 5-72. 53. On "reciprocaltypifications," see Bergerand Luckmann,TheSocial Construction ofReality, pp. 54-58. 406 InternationalOrganization INSTITUTIONS PROCESS State A with identities.(1) Stimulus requiring and interests \action of (2) StatesA's definition | l the situationl Intersubjective and understandings (3) StateA's action expectations possessed { ofA andB byandconstitutive \ ~~~(4) State B's interpretation \ ~~~of A's action and it of B's owndefinition \/ the situation StateB withidentities \l andinterests (5) StateB's action FIGURE 1. ofinstitutions Thecodetermination andprocess It is throughreciprocalinteraction,in other words, that we create and instantiatetherelatively in termsofwhichwe define enduringsocial structures our identitiesand interests. Jeff Coultersumsup theontologicaldependenceof structureon process thisway: "The parametersof social organizationthem- selves are reproducedonly in and throughthe orientationsand practicesof membersengagedin social interactions overtime.... Social configurationsare not 'objective'like mountainsor forests,but neitherare they'subjective'like dreams or flightsof speculativefancy.They are, as most social scientists constructions."54 concede at thetheoreticallevel,intersubjective The simple overall model of identity-and interest-formation proposed in no less than to cooperativeones. Figure 1 applies to competitiveinstitutions Self-helpsecuritysystemsevolvefromcyclesof interactionin whicheach party acts in ways that the other feels are threateningto the self, creating expectationsthat the other is not to be trusted.Competitiveor egoistic ifthe otheris threatening, identitiesare caused by such insecurity; the selfis forcedto "mirror"such behaviorin itsconceptionof the selfs relationshipto 54. JeffCoulter,"Remarks on the Conceptualizationof Social Structure,"Philosophyof the Social Sciences12 (March 1982),pp. 42-43.  Anarchy 407 thatother.55 Being treatedas an objectforthegratification of othersprecludes the positiveidentificationwith othersnecessaryfor collectivesecurity;con- versely,beingtreatedbyothersin waysthatare empathicwithrespectto the securityofthe selfpermitssuchidentification.56 Competitivesystemsof interactionare prone to security"dilemmas," in whichthe efforts of actorsto enhance theirsecurityunilaterallythreatensthe securityof the others,perpetuatingdistrustand alienation. The formsof identityand interestthatconstitutesuch dilemmas,however,are themselves ongoingeffectsof,notexogenousto,theinteraction;identitiesare producedin and through"situated activity."57 We do not beginour relationshipwiththe aliens in a securitydilemma;securitydilemmasare not givenby anarchyor nature. Of course, once institutionalizedsuch a dilemma may be hard to change(I returnto thisbelow), but the pointremains:identitiesand interests are constitutedby collectivemeaningsthatare alwaysin process.As Sheldon Stryker emphasizes,"The social processis one ofconstructingand reconstruct- ing self and social relationships."58If states findthemselvesin a self-help system,thisis because theirpracticesmade it thatway.Changingthepractices willchangetheintersubjective knowledgethatconstitutesthesystem. Predator states and anarchy as permissivecause The mirrortheoryof identity-formation is a crude account of how the process of creatingidentitiesand interestsmightwork,but it does not tell us whya systemofstates-such as, arguably,our own-would have ended up with self-regarding and not collective identities.In this section, I examine an efficient cause, predation,which,in conjunctionwithanarchyas a permissive cause, maygeneratea self-helpsystem.In so doing,however,I show the key role thatthe structureof identitiesand interestsplaysin mediatinganarchy's explanatory role. The predatorargumentis straightforward and compelling.For whatever reasons-biology, domestic politics,or systemicvictimization-some states 55. The followingarticlesby Noel Kaplowitz have made an importantcontributionto such thinkingin internationalrelations:"PsychopoliticalDimensionsof InternationalRelations: The ReciprocalEffectsof ConflictStrategies,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly 28 (December 1984), pp. 373-406; and "National Self-Images,PerceptionofEnemies,and ConflictStrategies:Psychopoliti- cal Dimensionsof InternationalRelations,"PoliticalPsychology11 (March 1990),pp. 39-82. 56. These argumentsare commonin theoriesof narcissismand altruism.See Heinz Kohut, Self-Psychology and theHumanities(New York: Norton,1985); and MartinHoffmann, "Empathy, Its Limitations,and Its Role in a ComprehensiveMoral Theory,"in WilliamKurtinesand Jacob Gewirtz,eds., Morality,Moral Behavior,and Moral Development(New York: Wiley, 1984), pp. 283-302. 57. See C. Norman Alexander and Mary Glenn Wiley, "Situated Activityand Identity Formation," in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph Turner, eds., Social Psychology:Sociological Perspectives (New York: Basic Books, 1981),pp. 269-89. 58. Sheldon Stryker, "The Vitalizationof SymbolicInteractionism," Social Psychology Quarterly 50 (March 1987),p. 93. 408 InternationalOrganization maybecome predisposedtowardaggression.The aggressivebehaviorof these predatorsor "bad apples" forcesotherstatesto engage in competitivepower politics,to meet firewithfire,since failureto do so may degrade or destroy them.One predatorwillbest a hundredpacifistsbecause anarchyprovidesno guarantees.This argumentis powerfulin partbecause itis so weak: ratherthan makingthe strongassumptionthatall statesare inherently power-seeking(a purely reductionisttheoryof power politics), it assumes that just one is power-seeking and thatthe othershave to followsuitbecause anarchypermits theone to exploitthem. In makingthisargument,it is importantto reiteratethatthe possibilityof predationdoes notin itselfforcestatesto anticipateit a prioriwithcompetitive power politicsof theirown. The possibilityof predationdoes not mean that "war mayat anymomentoccur"; it mayin factbe extremely unlikely.Once a predatoremerges,however,it mayconditionidentity- and interest-formation in thefollowingmanner. In an anarchyof two,ifego is predatory,altermusteitherdefineitssecurity in self-helptermsor pay the price. This follows directlyfromthe above argument,in whichconceptionsof self mirrortreatmentby the other.In an anarchyof many,however,the effectof predationalso depends on thelevelof collectiveidentity alreadyattainedin thesystem.If predationoccursrightafter thefirstencounterin thestateofnature,itwillforceotherswithwhomitcomes in contactto defendthemselves,firstindividually and thencollectively ifthey come to perceivea commonthreat.The emergenceof sucha defensivealliance willbe seriouslyinhibitedifthestructure ofidentitiesand interestshas already evolvedinto a Hobbesian worldof maximuminsecurity, since potentialallies will stronglydistrusteach otherand face intensecollectiveaction problems; suchinsecureallies are also morelikelyto fallout amongstthemselvesonce the predator is removed. If collective securityidentityis high, however,the emergenceof a predatormaydo muchless damage.If thepredatorattacksany memberof the collective,the latterwill come to the victim'sdefenseon the principleof "all forone, one forall," even if the predatoris not presentlya threatto othermembersof the collective.If the predatoris not strongenough towithstandthecollective,itwillbe defeatedand collectivesecurity willobtain. But if it is strongenough,the logic of the two-actorcase (now predatorand collective)willactivate,and balance-of-power politicswillreestablishitself. The timingof the emergence of predation relative to the historyof identity-formation in the community is thereforecrucialto anarchy'sexplana- toryrole as a permissivecause. Predationwill alwayslead victimsto defend themselves, butwhetherdefensewillbe collectiveor notdependson thehistory ofinteraction withinthepotentialcollectiveas muchas on theambitionsofthe predator.Will the disappearance of the Soviet threatrenew old insecurities amongthe membersof the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization?Perhaps,but notiftheyhave reasonsindependentofthatthreatforidentifying theirsecurity withone another.Identitiesand interestsare relationship-specific, notintrinsic  Anarchy 409 attributes of a "portfolio";statesmaybe competitivein some relationshipsand solidaryin others."Mature" anarchiesare less likelythan"immature"ones to be reduced by predationto a Hobbesian condition,and maturity, whichis a proxyforstructures ofidentityand interest,is a functionof process.59 The sourceof predationalso matters.If it stemsfromunit-levelcauses that are immuneto systemicimpacts(causes such as human natureor domestic politics taken in isolation), then it functionsin a manner analogous to a "genetictrait"in theconstructedworldof the statesystem.Even ifsuccessful, thistraitdoes notselectforotherpredatorsin an evolutionary sense so muchas it teachesotherstatesto respondin kind,but sincetraitscannotbe unlearned, the otherstateswillcontinuecompetitivebehavioruntilthe predatoris either destroyedor transformed fromwithin.However,in the morelikelyeventthat predationstemsat least in partfrompriorsystemicinteraction-perhapsas a resultof beingvictimizedin the past (one thinkshere of Nazi Germanyor the SovietUnion)-then it is more a responseto a learned identityand, as such, mightbe transformed byfuturesocial interactionin theformof appeasement, reassurancesthat securityneeds will be met, systemiceffectson domestic politics,and so on. In thiscase, in otherwords,thereis morehope thatprocess can transform a bad apple intoa good one. The role of predationin generatinga self-helpsystem,then,is consistent witha systematic focuson process.Even if the source of predationis entirely exogenousto thesystem,itis whatstatesdo thatdeterminesthequalityoftheir interactions underanarchy.In thisrespect,itis notsurprising thatit is classical realistsratherthanstructural realistswho emphasizethissortofargument.The former'semphasison unit-levelcauses of powerpoliticsleads moreeasilyto a permissiveview of anarchy'sexplanatoryrole (and thereforeto a processual viewof international relations)thandoes thelatter'semphasison anarchyas a "structuralcause";60 neorealistsdo not need predationbecause the systemis givenas self-help. This raises anew the question of exactlyhow much and what kind of role human nature and domesticpoliticsplay in world politics.The greaterand more destructivethisrole, the moresignificant predationwillbe, and the less amenableanarchywillbe to formation ofcollectiveidentities.Classical realists, of course,assumed thathumannaturewas possessed by an inherentlust for poweror glory.My argumentsuggeststhatassumptionssuchas thisweremade fora reason: an unchangingHobbesian man providesthe powerfulefficient cause necessaryfora relentlesspessimismabout worldpoliticsthat anarchic structurealone, or even structureplus intermittent predation,cannotsupply. One can be skepticalof such an essentialistassumption,as I am, but it does 59. On the "maturity"of anarchies,see BarryBuzan, People, States,and Fear (Chapel Hill: University ofNorthCarolinaPress,1983). 60. A similarintuitionmaylie behindAshley'seffort to reappropriateclassicalrealistdiscourse for criticalinternationalrelationstheory.See Richard Ashley,"Political Realism and Human Interests,"International StudiesQuarterly38 (June1981),pp. 204-36. 410 InternationalOrganization producedeterminateresultsat the expenseof systemictheory.A concernwith systemicprocess over structuresuggeststhatperhaps it is time to revisitthe debate overtherelativeimportanceoffirst-, second-,and third-image theories ofstateidentity-formation.6" Assumingfor now that systemictheories of identity-formation in world politicsare worthpursuing,let me conclude by suggestingthat the realist- rationalistalliance "reifies"self-helpin the sense of treatingit as something separatefromthepracticesbywhichitis producedand sustained.PeterBerger and Thomas Luckmanndefinereificationas follows:"[It] is the apprehension of the productsof humanactivityas iftheywere somethingelse than human products-such as factsof nature,resultsof cosmiclaws,or manifestations of divine will. Reificationimplies that man is capable of forgettinghis own authorshipof the humanworld,and further, thatthe dialecticbetweenman, theproducer,and his productsis lostto consciousness.The reifiedworldis... experiencedbyman as a strangefacticity, an opusalienumoverwhichhe has no controlratherthan as the opuspropriumof his own productiveactivity."62 By denyingor bracketingstates' collective authorshipof their identitiesand interests,in otherwords,the realist-rationalistalliance denies or bracketsthe factthatcompetitivepower politicshelp create the very"problemof order" theyare supposed to solve-that realismis a self-fulfillingprophecy.Far from beingexogenously given,theintersubjective knowledgethatconstitutes compet- itiveidentitiesand interestsis constructedeverydaybyprocessesof"social will formation."63 It is whatstateshave made of themselves. Institutionaltransformations ofpowerpolitics Let us assumethatprocessesof identity- and interest-formationhave createda worldinwhichstatesdo notrecognizerightsto territory or existence-a warof all againstall. In thisworld,anarchyhas a "realist"meaningforstateaction:be insecureand concernedwithrelativepower.Anarchyhas thismeaningonlyin virtueof collective,insecurity-producing practices,but if those practicesare 61. Waltz has himselfhelped open up such a debate withhis recognitionthatsystemicfactors conditionbut do not determinestate actions. See Kenneth Waltz, "Reflectionson Theoryof International Politics:A Response to MyCritics,"in RobertKeohane, ed.,Neorealismand Its Critics (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 322-45. The growingliteratureon the observationthat"democraciesdo notfighteach other"is relevantto thisquestion,as are twoother studies that break importantground towarda "reductionist"theoryof state identity:William Bloom's PersonalIdentity, National Identityand IntemationalRelations(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1990) and Lumsdaine'sIdeals and Interests. 62. See Berger and Luckmann,The Social Construction of Reality,p. 89. See also Douglas Maynardand Thomas Wilson,"On the Reificationof Social Structure,"in ScottMcNall and Gary Howe, eds., Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 1 (Greenwich,Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), pp. 287-322. 63. See Richard Ashley, "Social Will and InternationalAnarchy,"in Hayward Alker and Richard Ashley,eds., AfterRealism,work in progress,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology, Cambridge,and ArizonaStateUniversity, Tempe, 1992.  Anarchy 411 relativelystable,theydo constitutea systemthatmayresistchange.The fact thatworldsof powerpoliticsare sociallyconstructed, in otherwords,does not guaranteetheyare malleable,forat least tworeasons. The firstreasonis thatonce constituted, anysocial systemconfronts each of its membersas an objectivesocial factthat reinforcescertainbehaviorsand discouragesothers.Self-helpsystems, forexample,tendto rewardcompetition and punish altruism.The possibilityof change depends on whetherthe exigenciesof such competitionleave room foractions that deviate fromthe prescribedscript.If theydo not, the systemwill be reproducedand deviant actorswillnot.64 The second reason is thatsystemicchange mayalso be inhibitedby actors' interestsin maintainingrelativelystable role identities.Such interestsare rootednotonlyin thedesireto minimizeuncertainty and anxiety, manifestedin effortsto confirmexistingbeliefsabout the social world,but also in the desire to avoid the expectedcostsof breakingcommitments made to others-notably domesticconstituenciesand foreignallies in thecase of states-as partof past practices.The level of resistancethatthese commitments inducewill depend on the "salience" of particularrole identitiesto the actor.65 The UnitedStates, for example, is more likely to resist threatsto its identityas "leader of anticommunist crusades" than to its identityas "promoterof humanrights." But foralmostanyrole identity, practicesand information thatchallengeit are likelyto createcognitivedissonanceand even perceptionsof threat,and these maycause resistanceto transformations of the selfand thusto social change.66 For bothsystemicand "psychological"reasons,then,intersubjective under- standingsand expectationsmayhave a self-perpetuating quality,constituting path-dependenciesthatnew ideas about selfand othermusttranscend.This does not change the fact that throughpractice agents are continuously producingand reproducingidentitiesand interests,continuously"choosing nowthepreferences[they]willhave later."67 But itdoes mean thatchoicesmay not be experiencedwith meaningfuldegrees of freedom.This could be a constructivist forthe realistpositionthatonlysimplelearningis justification 64. See Ralph Turner,"Role-Taking:Process Versus Conformity," in Rose, Human Behavior and Social Processes,pp. 20-40; and JudithHoward, "From ChangingSelves Toward Changing Society,"in Howard and Callero,TheSelf-Society Dynamic,pp. 209-37. 65. On the relationshipbetweencommitmentand identity,see Foote, "Identificationas the Basis for a Theoryof Motivation";Howard Becker, "Notes on the Concept of Commitment," AmericanJoumalof Sociology66 (July1960), pp. 32-40; and Stryker, SymbolicInteractionism.On role salience,see Stryker,ibid. 66. On threatsto identity and thetypesofresistancethattheymaycreate,see GlynisBreakwell, CopingwithThreatened Identities (London: Methuen,1986); and TerrellNorthrup,"The Dynamic of Identityin Personaland Social Conflict,"in Louis Kreisberget al., eds.,Intractable Conflicts and TheirTransfornation (Syracuse,N.Y.: SyracuseUniversityPress, 1989), pp. 55-82. For a broad overviewofresistanceto change,see TimurKuran,"The Tenacious Past: TheoriesofPersonaland CollectiveConservatism," JournalofEconomicBehaviorand Organization 10 (September1988),pp. 143-71. 67. James March, "Bounded Rationality,Ambiguity,and the Engineeringof Choice," Bell JournalofEconomics9 (Autumn1978),p. 600. 412 International Organization possiblein self-help systems. The realistmightconcedethatsuchsystems are sociallyconstructedandstillarguethatafterthecorresponding identities and interestshavebecomeinstitutionalized, theyare almostimpossible to trans- form. In theremainder ofthisarticle,I examinethreeinstitutional transformations ofidentityandsecurityinterest through whichstatesmight escapea Hobbesian worldoftheirownmaking. In so doing,I seekto clarify whatitmeansto say that"institutions transform identities andinterests,"emphasizingthatthekey tosuchtransformations is relativelystablepractice. Sovereignty,recognition,and security In a Hobbesianstateof nature,statesare individuated by the domestic processesthatconstitutethemas statesandbytheirmaterial capacity to deter threatsfromotherstates.In thisworld,eveniffreemomentarily fromthe predations ofothers,statesecuritydoes nothaveanybasisin socialrecogni- tion-in intersubjective understandings ornormsthata statehas a right to its existence,territory,and subjects.Securityis a matterof nationalpower, nothingmore. The principle ofsovereignty transforms thissituationbyproviding a social basisfortheindividuality and securityofstates.Sovereignty is an institution, and so it existsonlyin virtueof certainintersubjective understandings and expectations;thereis no sovereigntywithout an other.Theseunderstandings andexpectations notonlyconstitutea particular kindofstate-the"sovereign" state-butalso constitute a particular formofcommunity, sinceidentitiesare relational.The essenceof thiscommunity is a mutualrecognition of one another'srightto exerciseexclusive politicalauthoritywithin territoriallimits. Thesereciprocal "permissions"68constitutea spatially ratherthanfunctionally differentiatedworld-a worldin whichfieldsof practiceconstitute and are organizedaround"domestic"and "international" spacesratherthanaround the performance of particularactivities.69 The locationof the boundaries betweenthesespacesis ofcoursesometimes contested,warbeingonepractice through whichstatesnegotiatethetermsoftheirindividuality. Butthisdoes notchangethefactthatitisonlyinvirtue ofmutualrecognition thatstateshave 68. Haskell Fain, NormativePoliticsand the Community of Nations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,1987). 69. This is the intersubjectivebasis for the principleof functionalnondifferentiation among states,which "drops out" of Waltz's definitionof structurebecause the latterhas no explicit intersubjective basis. In internationalrelationsscholarship,the social productionof territorial space has been emphasizedprimarily bypoststructuralists.See, forexample,RichardAshley,"The Geopoliticsof Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theoryof InternationalPolitics," Alternatives12 (October 1987), pp. 403-34; and Simon Dalby, Creatingthe Second Cold War (London: Pinter,1990). But the idea of space as both productand constituentof practiceis also prominent in structurationist discourse.See Giddens,CentralProblemsinSocial Theory;and Derek Gregoryand JohnUrry,eds.,Social Relationsand SpatialStructures (London: Macmillan,1985).  Anarchy 413 This recognitionfunctionsas a formof "social "territorialpropertyrights."70 closure" thatdisempowersnonstateactorsand empowersand helps stabilize interactionamongstates.71 Sovereignty normsare now so takenforgranted,so natural,thatit is easyto overlooktheextentto whichtheyare bothpresupposedbyand an ongoingarti- factof practice.When statestax "their""citizens"and not others,when they "protect"theirmarketsagainstforeign"imports,"whentheykillthousandsof Iraqis in one kindofwar and thenrefuseto "intervene"to killevenone person in anotherkind,a "civil"war,and whentheyfighta globalwar againsta regime that soughtto destroythe institutionof sovereignty and then give Germany back to the Germans,theyare actingagainstthe backgroundof,and thereby reproducing, sharednormsaboutwhatitmeansto be a sovereignstate. If statesstoppedactingon thosenorms,theiridentityas "sovereigns"(ifnot necessarilyas "states") would disappear. The sovereignstate is an ongoing accomplishmentof practice,not a once-and-for-allcreation of normsthat somehow exist apart frompractice.72Thus, sayingthat "the institutionof sovereignty transformsidentities"is shorthandforsayingthat"regularprac- tices produce mutuallyconstitutingsovereignidentities(agents) and their associatedinstitutionalnorms(structures)."Practiceis thecore ofconstructiv- istresolutionsoftheagent-structure problem.This ongoingprocessmaynotbe politicallyproblematicin particularhistoricalcontextsand, indeed, once a communityof mutual recognitionis constituted,its members-even the disadvantagedones73 mayhave a vestedinterestin reproducingit.In fact,this is part of what havingan identitymeans. But this identityand institution remaindependenton what actors do: removingthose practiceswill remove theirintersubjectiveconditionsofexistence. 70. See JohnRuggie,"Continuityand Transformation in theWorldPolity:Towarda Neorealist Synthesis,"WorldPolitics35 (January1983), pp. 261-85. In Mind,Self,and Society,p. 161,Mead offersthefollowing argument:"Ifwe say'thisis myproperty, I shallcontrolit,'thataffirmationcalls out a certainset ofresponseswhichmustbe thesame in anycommunity in whichpropertyexists.It involvesan organizedattitudewithreferenceto property whichis commonto all membersof the community. One musthave a definiteattitudeof controlof his own propertyand respectforthe property ofothers.Those attitudes(as organizedsetsofresponses)mustbe thereon thepartofall, so thatwhenone sayssuch a thinghe calls out in himselfthe responseof the others.That which makessocietypossibleis suchcommonresponses." 71. For a definitionand discussionof "social closure," see RaymondMurphy,Social Closure (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1988). 72. See Richard Ashley,"Untyingthe SovereignState: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique,"Millennium17 (Summer1988), pp. 227-62. Those withmoremodernistsensibili- ties will findan equally practice-centric view of institutionsin Blumer'sobservationon p. 19 of "The MethodologicalPosition of SymbolicInteractionism":"A gratuitousacceptance of the conceptsof norms,values,social rulesand the like should notblindthe social scientistto the fact thatanyone ofthemis subtendedbya processofsocial interaction-a processthatis necessarynot onlyfortheirchangebut equallywell fortheirretentionin a fixedform.It is the social processin grouplifethatcreatesand upholdstherules,nottherulesthatcreateand upholdgrouplife." 73. See, forexample,MohammedAyoob, "The Third World in the Systemof States: Acute Schizophreniaor GrowingPains?" International StudiesQuarterly 33 (March 1989),pp. 67-80. 414 InternationalOrganization This may tell us somethingabout how institutions of sovereignstates are reproduced throughsocial interaction,but it does not tell us why such a structureof identityand interestwould arise in thefirstplace. Two conditions would seem necessaryfor this to happen: (1) the densityand regularityof interactionsmustbe sufficiently highand (2) actorsmustbe dissatisfiedwith preexisting formsofidentity and interaction.Giventheseconditions,a normof mutualrecognitionis relativelyundemandingin termsof social trust,having the form of an assurance game in which a player will acknowledge the sovereignty of the othersas long as theywillin turnacknowledgethatplayer's own sovereignty.Articulatinginternationallegal principlessuch as those embodiedin thePeace ofAugsburg(1555) and thePeace ofWestphalia(1648) mayalso help byestablishingexplicitcriteriafordetermining violationsof the nascent social consensus.74 But whethersuch a consensusholds depends on whatstatesdo. If theytreateach otheras iftheyweresovereign,thenovertime theywill institutionalize that mode of subjectivity; if theydo not, then that mode willnotbecome thenorm. Practicesof sovereignty willtransformunderstandings of securityand power politicsin at least threeways.First,stateswill come to definetheir(and our) securityin termsof preservingtheir"propertyrights"over particularterrito- ries.We now see thisas natural,but the preservationof territorial frontiersis not,in fact,equivalentto the survivalof the stateor itspeople. Indeed, some states would probably be more secure if they would relinquish certain territories-the"Soviet Union" of some minority republics,"Yugoslavia" of Croatia and Slovenia, Israel of the West Bank, and so on. The fact that sovereignty practiceshave historicallybeen orientedtowardproducingdistinct spaces, in otherwords,affectsstates'conceptualizationofwhatthey territorial must"secure" to functionin thatidentity, a processthatmayhelp accountfor the"hardening"ofterritorial boundariesoverthecenturies.75 Second, to the extentthatstatessuccessfully internalizesovereignty norms, theywill be more respectfultoward the territorialrightsof others.76This restraintis not primarily because of the costs of violatingsovereignty norms, althoughwhen violatorsdo get punished (as in the Gulf War) it reminds everyoneofwhatthesecostscan be, butbecause partofwhatit means to be a 74. See WilliamCoplin,"InternationalLaw and AssumptionsAbout the State System,"World Politics17 (July1965),pp. 615-34. 75. See AnthonySmith,"States and Homelands: The Social and GeopoliticalImplicationsof NationalTerritory," Millennium10 (Autumn1981),pp. 187-202. 76. This assumesthatthereare no other,competing,principlesthatorganizepoliticalspace and identityin the internationalsystemand coexistwithtraditionalnotionsof sovereignty;in fact,of course, there are. On "spheres of influence"and "informalempires," see Jan Triska, ed., DominantPowersand Subordinate States(Durham,N.C.: Duke University Press,1986); and Ronald Robinson,"The ExcentricIdea ofImperialism,Withor WithoutEmpire,"in WolfgangMommsen and JurgenOsterhammel,eds., Imperialismand After:Continuities and Discontinuities(London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 267-89. On Arab conceptionsof sovereignty, see Michael Barnett, "Sovereignty, and Identity:From Pan-Arabismto the Arab State System,"unpub- Institutions, lishedmanuscript, UniversityofWisconsin,Madison,1991.  Anarchy 415 ''sovereign''state is that one does not violate the territorialrightsof others without"just cause." A clear exampleof such an institutional effect,convinc- inglyargued by David Strang,is the markedlydifferent treatmentthatweak states receivewithinand outside communitiesof mutualrecognition.77 What keeps theUnitedStatesfromconqueringtheBahamas,or Nigeriafromseizing Togo, or AustraliafromoccupyingVanuatu? Clearly,power is not the issue, and in thesecases eventhecostofsanctionswouldprobablybe negligible.One mightargue thatgreatpowerssimplyhave no "interest"in these conquests, and thismightbe so, butthislack ofinterestcan onlybe understoodin termsof theirrecognition ofweak states'sovereignty. I haveno interestin exploitingmy friends, notbecause oftherelativecostsand benefitsofsuchactionbutbecause theyare myfriends.The absence of recognition,in turn,helps explain the Westernstates' practicesof territorialconquest,enslavement,and genocide against Native American and Africanpeoples. It is in thatworld that only powermatters,nottheworldof today. Finally,to theextentthattheirongoingsocializationteachesstatesthattheir sovereignty dependson recognition byotherstates,theycan affordto relymore on the institutionalfabric of internationalsociety and less on individual national means-especially militarypower-to protect their security.The intersubjective understandings embodied in the institution of sovereignty,in otherwords,mayredefinethemeaningof others'powerforthe securityof the self.In policyterms,thismeansthatstatescan be less worriedaboutshort-term survivaland relativepower and can thus shifttheir resources accordingly. Ironically,it is the greatpowers,the stateswiththe greatestnationalmeans, thatmayhave the hardesttimelearningthislesson; smallpowersdo not have the luxuryof relyingon nationalmeans and maythereforelearn fasterthat collectiverecognitionis a cornerstoneofsecurity. None of this is to say that power becomes irrelevantin a communityof sovereignstates. Sometimes states are threatenedby others that do not recognize their existence or particularterritorialclaims, that resent the externalitiesfromtheireconomic policies, and so on. But most of the time, thesethreatsare playedoutwithinthetermsofthesovereignty game.The fates of Napoleon and Hitlershowwhathappenswhentheyare not. Cooperation among egoists and transformationsof identity We began this sectionwitha Hobbesian state of nature.Cooperationfor joint gain is extremelydifficultin this context,since trustis lacking,time horizonsare short,and relativepowerconcernsare high.Lifeis "nasty,brutish, and short." Sovereigntytransformsthis systeminto a Lockean world of (mostly)mutuallyrecognizedpropertyrightsand (mostly)egoisticratherthan 77. David Strang,"Anomalyand Commonplacein European Expansion: Realist and Institu- tionalAccounts,"IntemationalOrganization 45 (Spring1991),pp. 143-62. 416 InternationalOrganization competitiveconceptionsof security, reducingthe fearthatwhatstatesalready have willbe seized at anymomentbypotentialcollaborators,therebyenabling themto contemplatemoredirectformsof cooperation.A necessarycondition forsuchcooperationis thatoutcomesbe positively interdependentin thesense thatpotentialgains existwhichcannotbe realized byunilateralaction.States such as Brazil and Botswanamayrecognizeeach other'ssovereignty, but they need furtherincentivesto engage in joint action. One importantsource of incentivesis the growing"dynamicdensity"of interactionamong statesin a world with new communicationstechnology,nuclear weapons, externalities fromindustrialdevelopment,and so on.78Unfortunately, growingdynamic densitydoes not ensurethatstateswill in factrealizejoint gains; interdepen- dence also entailsvulnerability and the riskof being "the sucker,"whichif exploitedwillbecome a sourceofconflictratherthancooperation. This is therationaleforthefamiliarassumptionthategoisticstateswilloften findthemselvesfacingprisoners'dilemma,a game in which the dominant strategy,if played only once, is to defect. As Michael Taylor and Robert Axelrodhave shown,however,giveniterationand a sufficient shadow of the future,egoists using a tit-for-tat strategycan escape this result and build cooperativeinstitutions.79 The storytheytell about thisprocesson the surface seems quite similar to George Herbert Mead's constructivist analysis of interaction, partof whichis also told in termsof "games."8"Cooperationis a gestureindicatingego's willingnessto cooperate; if alter defects,ego does likewise,signalingits unwillingnessto be exploited;over time and through reciprocalplay,each learns to formrelativelystable expectationsabout the other'sbehavior,and throughthese,habitsofcooperation(or defection)form. Despite similarconcernswithcommunication, learning,and habit-formation, however,there is an importantdifferencebetween the game-theoreticand constructivist analysisof interactionthatbears on how we conceptualizethe causal powersofinstitutions. In the traditionalgame-theoretic analysisof cooperation,even an iterated one, the structureof the game-of identitiesand interests-is exogenousto interactionand, as such, does not change.8'A "black box" is put around identity- and interest-formation, and analysisfocusesinsteadon the relation- 78. On "dynamicdensity,"see Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation in the World Polity"; and Waltz, "Reflectionson Theoryof IntemationalPolitics." The role of interdependencein conditioningthe speed and depthof social learningis muchgreaterthanthe attentionto whichI have paid it. On the consequences of interdependenceunder anarchy,see Helen Milner,"The Assumptionof Anarchyin InternationalRelations Theory:A Critique,"Reviewof Intemational Studies17 (January1991),pp. 67-85. 79. See Michael Taylor,Anarchyand Cooperation(New York: Wiley, 1976); and Robert Axelrod,TheEvolutionofCooperation(New York: Basic Books, 1984). 80. Mead, Mind,Self and Society. 81. Strictlyspeaking,thisis not true,since in iteratedgames the additionof futurebenefitsto currentones changesthepayoff ofthegame at Ti, in thiscase fromprisoners'dilemmato structure an assurancegame. This transformation of interesttakesplace entirelywithinthe actor,however, and as such is nota functionof interaction withtheother.  Anarchy 417 ship betweenexpectationsand behavior.The normsthatevolvefrominterac- tion are treatedas rules and behavioralregularitieswhichare externalto the actorsand whichresistchangebecause of thetransactioncostsofcreatingnew ones. The game-theoreticanalysisof cooperation among egoists is at base behavioral. A constructivistanalysisof cooperation,in contrast,would concentrateon howthe expectationsproducedbybehavioraffectidentitiesand interests.The process of creatinginstitutions is one of internalizingnew understandings of self and other,of acquiringnew role identities,not just of creatingexternal constraintson the behaviorof exogenouslyconstitutedactors.82Even if not intended as such, in other words, the process by which egoists learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing theirinterestsin termsof shared commitments to social norms.Over time,this will tend to transform a positiveinterdependenceof outcomesinto a positiveinterdepen- dence ofutilitiesor collectiveinterestorganizedaroundthe normsin question. These normswillresistchangebecause theyare tiedto actors'commitments to their identitiesand interests,not merelybecause of transactioncosts. A constructivistanalysisof "the cooperationproblem,"in otherwords,is at base cognitiveratherthanbehavioral,since it treatsthe intersubjective knowledge that defines the structureof identitiesand interests,of the "game," as endogenousto and instantiated byinteractionitself. The debate over the futureof collectivesecurityin WesternEurope may illustratethe significanceof this difference.A weak liberal or rationalist analysiswould assume thatthe European states' "portfolio"of interestshas notfundamentally changedand thatthe emergenceof newfactors,such as the collapse of the Soviet threat and the rise of Germany,would alter their cost-benefit ratiosforpursuingcurrentarrangements, therebycausingexisting institutionsto break down.The European statesformedcollaborativeinstitu- tionsforgood, exogenouslyconstitutedegoisticreasons,and the same reasons maylead themto rejectthoseinstitutions; thegameofEuropean powerpolitics has not changed. A strongliberal or constructivist analysisof this problem would suggestthat four decades of cooperation may have transformeda positiveinterdependenceof outcomesintoa collective"European identity"in termsofwhichstatesincreasingly Even ifegoistic definetheir"self"-interests.83 reasons were its startingpoint,the process of cooperatingtends to redefine those reasons by reconstituting identitiesand interestsin terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments. Changes in the distribution ofpowerduringthelate twentieth centuryare undoubtedlya challengeto these new understandings, but it is not as if West European states have some ofnormsis a real possibility 82. In fairnessto Axelrod,he does pointout thatinternalization that mayincreasethe resilienceof institutions.My pointis thatthisimportantidea cannotbe derived froman approachto theorythattakesidentitiesand interestsas exogenouslygiven. 83. On "European identity,"see BarryBuzan et al., eds., The EuropeanSecurityOrderRecast (London: Pinter,1990),pp. 45-63. 418 InternationalOrganization inherent,exogenouslygiveninterestin abandoningcollectivesecurityif the priceis right.Theiridentitiesand securityinterestsare continuously in process, and if collectiveidentitiesbecome "embedded," theywill be as resistantto change as egoistic ones.84Through participationin new formsof social knowledge,in otherwords,theEuropean statesof 1990mightno longerbe the statesof 1950. Critical strategictheoryand collective security The transformation of identityand interestthroughan "evolution of cooperation"faces two importantconstraints.The firstis thatthe process is incrementaland slow. Actors' objectivesin such a process are typicallyto realize joint gainswithinwhat theytake to be a relativelystable context,and theyare thereforeunlikelyto engage in substantialreflectionabout how to changetheparametersofthatcontext(includingthestructure ofidentitiesand interests)and unlikelyto pursue policies specifically designedto bringabout such changes. Learningto cooperate may change those parameters,but this occurs as an unintendedconsequence of policies pursued for other reasons ratherthanas a resultofintentionalefforts to transcendexistinginstitutions. A second,morefundamental, constraintis thatthe evolutionofcooperation storypresupposes that actors do not identifynegativelywith one another. Actors mustbe concernedprimarilywithabsolute gains; to the extentthat antipathyand distrustlead themto definetheirsecurityin relativistic terms,it will be hard to accept the vulnerabilitiesthat attend cooperation.85 This is importantbecause it is preciselythe "centralbalance" in the statesystemthat seems to be so oftenafflicted withsuch competitivethinking, and realistscan thereforeargue that the possibilityof cooperationwithinone "pole" (for example,theWest) is parasiticon thedominanceofcompetitionbetweenpoles (the East-West conflict).Relations between the poles may be amenable to some positivereciprocity in areas such as armscontrol,but the atmosphereof distrustleaves littleroom forsuch cooperationand its transformative conse- quences.86The conditionsof