Policy and Operational Procedures for the Lawful and Effective Use of Covert Techniques within the Sovereign Base Areas Cyprus (PDF)

**Policy and Operational Procedures for the Lawful and** **Effective Use of Covert Techniques within the Sovereign** **Base Areas Cyprus.** **TABLE OF DOCUMENT DETAILS** +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Title | Policy and Ope...

**Policy and Operational Procedures for the Lawful and** **Effective Use of Covert Techniques within the Sovereign** **Base Areas Cyprus.** **TABLE OF DOCUMENT DETAILS** +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Title | Policy and Operational Procedures | | | for the Lawful and | | | | | | Effective Use of Covert | | | Techniques within the Sovereign | | | | | | Base Areas Cyprus. | +===================================+===================================+ | Reference No | S.O INT 2 | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relevant Department | Crime & Intel Steering Group | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Ownership | Chief Supt. D. Purvis | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Document Author | DI 187 V. Varnava | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Approved by | Deputy Chief Constable | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Approval Date | Jun 20 | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Implementation Date | Jun 20 | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | To be Reviewed Date | Jun 23 | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Last Revised Date | 21/10/2019 | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Quality Assured by | Policy Department HQ | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Protective Marking | Not Protectively marked | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Linked to other | NO | | | | | Standing Order | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relevant Legislation | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Pages (including this page) | Twenty-eight (28) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ **TABLE OF CONTENTS** **I[ntroduction](#s1)** [**Page 4**](#s1) [**Section 1**](#s1) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- ------------------------ [**Guidance and Minimum Standards**](#s2) [**Page 5**](#s2) [**Section 2**](#s2) [**Access to and use of Guidance**](#s3) **[Page 5-6](#s3)[on page 5]** [**Section 3**](#s3) [**Oversight and inspection**](#s4) [**Page 6**](#s4) [**Section 4**](#s4) [**Information Management**](#s5) [**Page 7**](#s5) [**Section 5**](#s5) [**Primary Information Source Register (PISR)**](#s6) [**Page 7**](#s6) [**Section 6**](#s6) [**Intelligence Source Register (ISR)**](#s7) [**Page 7**](#s7) [**Section 7**](#s7) [**Status Drift**](#s8) [**Page 8**](#s8) [**Section 8**](#s8) [**The Use of Community Leaders as sources of information**](#s9) [**Page 9**](#s9) [**Section 9**](#s9) [**Persons in custody**](#s10) [**Page 9**](#s10) [**Section 10**](#s10) [**Intelligence Approaches within ongoing operations**](#s11) [**Page 10**](#s11) [**Section 11**](#s11) [**Tasking and Coordination**](#s12) [**Page 10-11**](#s12) [**Section 12**](#s12) [**Covert Structures and Assets**](#s13) [**Page 11**](#s13) [**Section 13**](#s13) [**Application and Authorisation**](#s14) [**Page 11**](#s14) [**Section 14**](#s14) [**Operational Personnel**](#s15) [**Page 11**](#s15) [**Section 15**](#s15) [**CHIS**](#s16) [**Page 12**](#s16) [**Section 16**](#s16) [**Using the internet to gather intelligence and evidence**](#s17) **[Page 13]** [**Section 17**](#s17) [**What is Open Source Research?**](#s18) **[Page 13]** [**Section 18**](#s18) [**When there is a need for an authorisation**](#s19) [**Page 13**](#s19) [**Section 19**](#s19) [**Is it unlawful for any OIU Officer to set up and use a social networking account with a false identity?**](#s20) [**Page 13**](#s20) [**Section 20**](#s20) [**Equipment and Vehicles**](#s21) [**Page 14**](#s21) [**Section 21**](#s21) [**Vehicles**](#s22) [**Page 15**](#s22) [**Section 22**](#s22) [**Information Technology**](#s23) [**Page 15**](#s23) [**Section 23**](#s23) [**Physical and Operational Security**](#s24) [**Page 15**](#s24) [**Section 24**](#s24) [**Vetting**](#s25) [**Page 15**](#s25) [**Section 25**](#s25) [**Office Security**](#s26) [**Page 16**](#s26) [**Section 26**](#s26) [**Personal Security**](#s27) [**Page 17**](#s27) [**Section 27**](#s27) [**Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) involving OIU vehicles**](#s28) [**Page 17**](#s28) [**Section 28**](#s28) [**Mobile telephones**](#s29) [**Page 17**](#s29) [**Section 29**](#s29) [**Pseudonyms and false identities**](#s30) [**Page 18**](#s30) [**Section 30**](#s30) [**Payment of rewards**](#s31) [**Page 18**](#s31) [**Section 31**](#s31) [**Application and Authorisation**](#s32) [**Page 19**](#s32) [**Section 32**](#s32) [**Covert Surveillance Process**](#s33) **[Page 20]** [**Section 33**](#s33) [**Entry onto Land Process**](#s34) [**Page 21**](#s34) [**Section 34**](#s34) [**Urgent Authorisation**](#s35) **[Page 21]** [**Section 35**](#s35) [**Reviews, Renewals and Cancellations**](#s36) [**Page 22**](#s36) [**Section 36**](#s36) [**Renewals**](#s37) [**Page 22**](#s37) [**Section 37**](#s37) [**Cancellations**](#s38) [**Page 22**](#s38) [**Section 38**](#s38) [**CHIS Process**](#s39) **[Page 24]** [**Section 39**](#s39) [**CHIS Authorisations, Reviews, Renewals & Cancellations**](#s40) [**Page 25**](#s40) [**Section 40**](#s40) [**Reviews**](#s41) [**Page 25**](#s41) [**Section 41**](#s41) [**Renewals**](#s42) [**Page 25**](#s42) [**Section 42**](#s42) [**Cancellations**](#s43) [**Page 25**](#s43) [**Section 43**](#s43) [**Other CHIS Management records**](#s44) [**Page 26**](#s44) [**Section 44**](#s44) [**Security of Information transferred by CD**](#s45) [**Page 26**](#s45) [**Section 45**](#s45) [**Recording Information**](#s46) [**Page 26**](#s46) [**Section 46**](#s46) [**Inter- Agency Protocols**](#s47) [**Page 27**](#s47) [**Section 47**](#s47) [**De-confliction process**](#s48) **[Page 28]** [**Section 48**](#s48) 1. []{#s1.anchor}**Introduction** 1. The use of covert policing techniques is a key tool in the investigation of a wide range of crimes and offences relating to public order. The very nature of covert policing often impacts on an individual's rights to respect for a private and family life or may interfere with their peaceful possession of property. 2. Where the police wish to use covert policing techniques in the investigation of crime or for a specific operation and there is a likelihood of interfering with such rights, the covert policing activity must be necessary, proportional, properly authorised and regulated. 3. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Ordinance 2012 (RIPO) regulates the police use of Covert Surveillance, Covert Entry onto Land, interference with property and the use and conduct of Covert Human Intelligence Sources. It does not allow the use of intrusive surveillance techniques or interception with communications. 4. To ensure the lawful and effective use of covert techniques, only those officers who have received specialist training in their use will be able to operate, manage or authorise covert policing operations. 5. This document defines specific policy and procedures relating to the SBA Police, when using and managing covert techniques as regulated by RIPO and the associated Codes of Practice on Covert Surveillance and Entry onto Land and the Code of Practice on Covert Human Intelligence Sources. 6. It does not seek to repeat practice and standards already published in guidance documents but seeks to define policy and practice which is specific to the SBA or which derogates from those minimum standards. 2. []{#s2.anchor}**Guidance and Minimum Standards** 1. In order to achieve standardisation and to maintain the high levels of professionalism and security required when deploying and managing covert techniques, the SBA Police and Customs and Immigration, will comply, **where applicable**, with the guidance and minimum standards defined in the following UK ACPO restricted documents and any subsequent revisions. - **ACPO (2006) Guidance on The National Intelligence Model.** - **ACPO (2010) Guidance on The Management of Police Information.** - **ACPO (2008) (Revised) Guidance on The Lawful and Effective Use of Covert Techniques -- The Legal Framework and Covert Operational Management.** - **ACPO (2009) Guidance on The Lawful and Effective Use of Covert Techniques -- Local Volume Crime and Disorder.** - **ACPO (2010) (Revised) Guidance on The Management of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS).** - **ACPO (2010) Guidance on The Use and Management of Specialist Surveillance Techniques -- Section 7 Surveillance Logs and Records.** - **ACPO (2018) Guidance on The Management of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) - Revised Code of Practice.** - **ACPO (2018) Guidance on The Use of Covert Surveillance and Property Interference - Revised Code of Practice.** 3. []{#s3.anchor}**Access to and use of Guidance.** 1. In addition to copies of RIPO and accompanying Codes being available at Force HQ and WSBA and ESBA Divisions, the above OFFICIAL SENSITIVE Guidance documents will also be held by the Central Authorities Bureau Force HQ (CAB) and the Divisional Operational Intelligence Units (OIUs). No persons other than those officers appointed to the CAB, OIUs or who are appointed Authorising Officers for the purpose of RIPO, will be allowed access to these documents, without the express permission of the Chief Constable or Deputy. 2. The contents of the documents will not be disclosed outside of law enforcement agencies. 3. Prosecuting agencies who wish to have sight of the guidance documents for judicial proceedings, will agree processes with the Chief Constable or Deputy that will protect sensitive content, such as techniques, methodology and technical capability, through Public Interest Immunity proceedings (PII). 4. []{#s4.anchor}**Oversight and Inspection** 1. **Senior Responsible Officer** 2. RIPO stipulates that a person of ACPO rank be appointed as the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO), for the maintenance of standards, compliance with the Ordinance and the setting of strategies and policies. For the SBAs, this role will be carried out by the Chief Constable or Deputy Chief Constable SBA Police. The SRO must be aware of his role and responsibilities and have a regular process in place to carry it out. The SRO will appoint an officer of Superintendent rank, whose responsibility will be to chair a standing Covert Policing Working Group (CPWG), consisting of relevant practitioners from OIUs, CAB and force IT. This group will examine and make recommendations to the SRO on such matters as, covert policing strategies, covert equipment, IT, policy changes, training and staff development, resources and funding. 3. **Internal Inspection** 1. A general internal inspection of the processes, procedures and operational application of RIPO, will be conducted on an annual basis. Thematic inspections of specific operational areas, for example CHIS, can be conducted at any time as authorised by the CC / DCC. 2. Such inspections will be carried out by the Professional Standards Unit, in conjunction with CAB and under the direction of the Deputy Chief Constable. 4. **External Inspection** 3. External inspection will be carried out by the Investigatory Powers Commissioners (IPCO), as defined in RIPO, at time scales agreed with the CC / DCC. IPCO replace IPC. (Investigatory Powers Commissioners Office) 4. Additional external inspection may be conducted by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) during their normal inspection process. 5. []{#s5.anchor}**Information Management** 5. **Effective use of the 5x5x5 process** 6. All information received by the SBA Police, that has not been recorded on other force systems, such as incident records or custody records, will be submitted using the recognised 5x5x5 process. 7. With the exception of registered CHIS, and unless the source of the information is unknown, for example an anonymous telephone call, the true identity of the source will initially be recorded. Effective use of the 5x5x5 (which will change to the 3x5x2 process) information reports should include its requirement in each and every application as it is the intelligence value that the SAO / AO relies on for each decision making. Referred in the extant OSC Procedures and Guidance document. 6. []{#s6.anchor}***Primary Information Source Register (PISR)*** 8. All information received by way of a 5x5x5 report will be recorded and retained in a Primary Information Source Register (PISR), held by the relevant OIU. It is then the responsibility of the OIU Inspector to conduct a risk assessment based on all the facts, including the true identity of the source, the nature of the information and its intelligence value, before further dissemination and action. OIU Inspectors and CAB will have quarterly meetings to compare records in order to ensure a more corporate approach and to identify persons who may be giving information to both Divisions (source de-confliction). 7. []{#s7.anchor}***Intelligence Source Register (ISR)*** 9. Where an initial 5x5x5 report is deemed to be of intelligence value, it will be recorded in an Intelligence Source Register (ISR), given a unique reference number, which will cross refer to the PISR. The 5x5x5 will then be appropriately sanitised, including where necessary, the removal of the source's true identity, prior to any further dissemination or action. Any further reference to the source of the information will then be by the ISR unique reference number only. Information received through the use of covert techniques, will be sanitised from the outset and recorded using the ISR process. The primary information source record for such information will be the force Covert Surveillance or Source Management System. 8. []{#s8.anchor}***Status Drift*** 10. The OIU Inspector will continually monitor sources of information to satisfy himself or herself that such sources should not be considered for assessment as a CHIS. 11. Where the same source has given information on three or more occasions, the OIU Inspector will speak to the reporting officer to again ensure that source's status has not 'drifted' into a role that should be considered for CHIS authorisation. 12. All police officers not employed in the OIU have a mandatory requirement to notify the OIU Inspector of any human source of information who repeatedly passes information or who is believed to be acting in the capacity of a CHIS. [definition of CHIS]; 13. OIU staff with day to day responsibility for managing CHIS, are referred to as Source Handlers. Handlers are reminded that CHIS or other persons providing intelligence do not belong to individual employees. They are assets utilised by the OIU for the benefit of the SBA Police. Oversight and management of CHIS activity is the responsibility of the OIU Inspector, also known as the Controller. He or she has the discretion to direct officers to pass over access to a source of information or change the handler(s) of a CHIS, where operationally required. 14. Only where the above course of action has been undertaken, can the force seek to effectively protect the identity of sources that are at risk or other covert methodology, through PII, during judicial proceedings. 9. []{#s9.anchor}***The Use of Community Leaders as sources of information*** 15. There are a number of individuals, who due to their position in the community (Mayors, Community leaders etc) are able to provide information regarding issues that make impact on public order or crime. These individuals normally engage with the Deputy Divisional Commanders. 16. There are a number of individuals, who due to their position in the community (Mayors, Community leaders etc) are able to provide information regarding issues that may impact on public order or crime. These individuals are sources of information and regularly engage with the Deputy Divisional Commanders and Divisional community units. In the majority of cases these individuals will not be classed as CHIS as a "relationship has not been developed for a covert purpose" Many of these "sources" merely volunteer or provide information that is within their personal knowledge without being induced, asked or tasked by a police officer. This means that the source is not a CHIS for the purposes of RIPO. However the status of these individuals should be kept under regular review by the controller to establish at any given stage whether they should be authorised as a CHIS (I.e. tasked or induced to seek out information by way of establishing or maintain a relationship for the purpose of obtaining, providing access to, or disclosing information) 17. They will be handled by the Deputy Divisional Commanders. These officers will be required to maintain a full record of meetings, tasking and information given. Appropriate information will be submitted using a sanitised 5x5x5 report. 18. This way the contact among the source and the handler remains at high levels indicating the significance of the process. 19. A thorough and detailed Risk Assessment should be contacted and reviewed regularly thus minimizing the risk and maximizing their safety in accordance with the duty of care owed to the CHIS. 10. []{#s10.anchor}**Persons in custody** 20. Persons in custody can be a rich source of information; especially those in custody for a series of crimes, serious crime, Divisional Intelligence Requirement (DIR) crime or otherwise identified as being of interest. All investigating officers should seek to ascertain if any such individual is willing to provide information that is not related to the offence for which they are in custody or suspected of committing. If a person is in custody expresses a willingness to provide information, the investigator will immediately inform the OIU Inspector. Handlers looking to conduct intelligence approaches / intelligence interviews within the custody suite must be aware of the inherent risk this tactic poses. The potential of compromise to the handlers and the individual being spoken to is considered high. No handler will conduct such an approach without consultation with and approval by the Controller. Handlers must consider alternative tactical options to facilitate an approach to a potential source before a custody visit will be sanctioned. The exposure of handlers in this process should be recorded in each risk assessment they compose accordingly. The OIU manager should monitor the process of handler's exposure to possible risks and possible consequences of these risks. OIU Manager carries the overall responsibility and corporate risks in relation to the exposure of handlers to risk. If such contact is approved and contacted, then relevant cell intervention form should be completed. The form should be then forwarded to the Controller (OIU Inspector) for review and further direction. In the event that such person is registered as CHIS then the form will be included in the application file. If not, then the form will be kept at the respective Divisional OIU. 11. []{#s11.anchor}**Intelligence Approaches within ongoing operations** 21. It is anticipated that through analysis of network charts and other analytical products potential sources may be identified who feature in on-going proactive investigations. The OIU will not orchestrate an approach to such an individual without prior consultation with the Controller, who will often liaise directly with the SIO of the said operation. This will ensure OIU activity does not have a detrimental impact on the operation and all the risks are considered and documented. OIU handlers will then be tasked to devise and implement a tradecraft plan to facilitate the recruitment of the source. The investigative SIO will not be made aware of the progress of the recruitment process. 12. []{#s12.anchor}**Tasking and Coordination** 22. OIU Inspectors will participate in quarterly meetings with DSMT for the purpose of reviewing the tasking procedure; ensure effective profiling and tasking according to NIM model and to discuss quality control and effectiveness. 23. All use of covert surveillance or entry onto land, except in the case of urgency, will be approved through recognised Tasking and Co-ordination (T&CG) processes. At no time however, will the use of covert surveillance or the existence of a CHIS be mentioned in a general T&CG meeting. 24. Where consideration has been given to the use of covert surveillance, a separate meeting will be held, with only those persons who need to know being present. This will normally only include the Divisional Commander or Deputy, the OIU Inspector or Deputy and the investigating officer or operational plan owner. 25. CHIS tasking will be carried out by the OIU, based on the use and conduct authorisation given by the force Senior Authorising Officer (SAO), the CC/DCC. 13. []{#s13.anchor}**Covert Structures and Assets.** 26. Where practicable and feasible, the standards for covert structures and assets, such as physical and personal security; personnel and training; welfare and vetting; information technology and the use of dedicated roles, will comply with the minimum standards defined in the relevant guidance documents. It is recognised however, that due to the specific and unique policing situation in the SBA, it may be necessary to derogate from some of those standards. 14. []{#s14.anchor}**Application and Authorisation** 27. The application and authorisation of all covert techniques will be overseen by the CAB, on behalf of the CC / DCC. In addition, the CC / DCC, will be responsible for authorising all applications for entry onto land and CHIS. The full role of the SAO and CAB is defined in the relevant Codes of Practice and appropriate guidance manuals. 28. All covert operations will be conducted through the divisional OIUs. OIU Inspectors will be responsible for advising on the appropriate technique to be used and for the management of local surveillance and CHIS records and operational security. Divisional Commanders or their Deputies, should not be directly involved in the covert operations taking place within their respective division. 15. []{#s15.anchor}**Operational Personnel** 29. ***Covert Surveillance and Entry onto Land*** 30. Only those officers who have undergone a specialist surveillance training programme should be used to carry out a covert surveillance or entry onto land role. These officers have been specifically trained in covert surveillance techniques, including visual imagery, the maintenance of surveillance management records and log keeping. Where operational necessity dictates, it may be possible for an untrained officer to work alongside a trained individual, for example an observation post. This should be the exception rather than a regular occurrence. 31. For longer term surveillance deployment, Divisional Commanders should seek to provide resources from those officers trained in surveillance techniques, who are not employed in the OIU. This will not only enable OIU to conduct effective surveillance operations, but it will also help to reduce 'skills fade' and maintain levels of competency of those trained resources not employed in OIU. 32. It is also vitally important that unless totally unavoidable, OIU officers should not be used on high visibility overt deployments such as public order incidents, uniform patrol or public events. If no other option is available, then OIU Inspectors should carry out a risk assessment in the relevant Divisional risk register (Annex 1). 16. []{#s16.anchor}***CHIS*** 33. Only those officers who have undergone a specialist CHIS training programme, will be permitted to handle or control authorised CHIS. 34. The OIU Inspector or his deputy will be the CHIS Controller. All CHIS handling will be conducted by trained officers who are permanent staff in the OIU. 35. As the SBA has insufficient resources to form a dedicated source unit, it has been necessary to implement a 'multi-functional role' approach to Intelligence and CHIS handling in the OIUs. This obviously requires careful management to ensure that officers are not carrying out intelligence field roles and CHIS handling on the same operation. OIU officers who engaged in handling a CHIS, should not be deployed in any other role in the matter under investigation or likely to be linked with the investigation. The multifunction use of the handlers should be part of each risk assessment and relevant detailed information should be given in the particular risk assessment to this respect. This should be carefully managed by the OIU Inspector. 36. Divisional Commanders should seek to provide trained resources from other units where the OIU has insufficient staff available to effectively manage CHIS or where handlers with specific skills are required, for example due to gender or ethnicity. 17. []{#s17.anchor}**Using the internet to gather intelligence and evidence** 37. The Internet can provide a wide range of useful information to intelligence and investigating officers. 38. Offenders may be using electronic auction sites (e.g., eBay) to sell stolen goods, or may be using social networking sites to communicate about planned offences. 18. []{#s18.anchor}**What is Open Source Research?** 39. Open source research is the collection, evaluation and analysis of material from online sources available to the public, whether on payment or otherwise, to use as intelligence or evidence within a criminal investigation. 19. []{#s19.anchor}**When there is a need for an authorisation** 40. If open source material is re-visited with some regularity, usually to build a profile, covert surveillance authorisation for the investigation will be required. 41. If privacy controls are in operation and are breached covertly (for example by the use of an officer who does not disclose his identity as such or uses a false identity) then at least directed surveillance authorisation for the investigation will be required. 42. If a relationship is established between the investigator and the operator/owner of the site a CHIS authorisation for the investigator will be required 20. []{#s20.anchor}**Is it unlawful for any OIU Officer to set up and use a social networking account with a false identity?** 43. It is not unlawful to set up a false identity however it is not advisable to do so for a covert purpose without authorisation as using photographs of other persons without their permission to support the false identity interfere with other laws. 44. **[Best practice and guidance to field officers to avoid the inappropriate use of social network sites in investigations and operations;]** - Do not create a false identity in order to 'be friend' with individuals on social networks without an authorisation under RIPO; - When viewing an individual's public profile on a social network, do so only to the minimum degree necessary and proportionate in order to obtain evidence to support or refute an investigation; - Repeated viewing of open profiles on social networks to gather evidence or to monitor an individual's status, must only take place under a RIPO authorisation; - The authorised False Personas / Pseudonyms should be recorded on a central record kept by CAB for deconfliction purposes. 45. Be aware that it may not be possible to verify the accuracy of information on social networks and if such information is to be used as evidence, take reasonable steps to ensure its validity. 21. []{#s21.anchor}**Equipment and Vehicles** 46. ***Technical surveillance equipment*** 47. All technical surveillance equipment will be held by the respective OIU and operated by officers who have undergone specific training in its deployment and use. A member of the OIU will be appointed as Technical Field Intelligence Officer (TFIO) and will be responsible for all Technical Surveillance equipment including registration, monitoring of use, maintenance of records, monitoring repair and service schedules and inhouse training. 48. Technical equipment capable of being used for 'Directed Surveillance' will be centrally managed by the Clothing and Supply Officer of the SBA Police and a record will be kept by this officer to this respect. This record and the Technical Equipment Issuing Registers will be inspected regularly in order to ensure correct usage. 22. []{#s22.anchor}***Vehicles*** 49. The SBA has limited capability for covert vehicles. Regular rotation of unmarked vehicles between Divisions, access to SBA fleet vehicles and the use of temporary on loan vehicles should be considered in order to provide the best possible operational capability. 23. []{#s23.anchor}**Information Technology** 50. All applications and authorisations for Covert Surveillance and Entry onto Land, will be made through SBAPS Application, known as the Covert Surveillance System (CSS). The CAB will be responsible for oversight of all force application and authorisation processes, while each Divisional OIU will maintain and monitor its own records. Application, authorisations and management records for CHIS will be carried out on standalone secure computers held by each Divisional OIU and CAB. All records containing the true identity of a CHIS will be stored and kept at a secure location under the responsibility of CAB. The Source Management System (SMS) will be controlled and managed under strict security principles. 24. []{#s24.anchor}**Physical and Operational Security** 51. ***Security Protocols*** 52. The objective of security measures introduced within the OIU is to prevent the unauthorised access to, or disclosure of, sensitive information held within the unit. "Sensitive information" is any information that, if compromised, could place at risk the safety of any individual, and/or lead to the compromise of any Police or other law enforcement operation. 53. The overriding principle under which sensitive information should be handled will be on the principal of "NEED TO KNOW". This is based on the premise that the fewer individuals granted access to a piece of sensitive information, the less likely that a compromise will occur, and the easier to trace any unauthorised disclosure 25. []{#s25.anchor}***Vetting*** 54. All staff engaged on covert operations will be cleared to a minimum 'Security Clearance' (SC) level. 55. Vetting clearance will be reviewed annually. However, any change in personal circumstances which may affect clearance, for example changes of marital status; criminal convictions; disciplinary findings; association with persons involved in crime; matters which could make an individual susceptible to pressure or improper influence to disclose information or financial difficulties, should be brought to the attention of an OIU supervisor or the Force Professional Standards Unit. 26. []{#s26.anchor}***Office Security*** 56. Recognised minimum standards for office security have been adopted where possible, however it is recognised that this must be achieved within the confines of the current estate and office layout. 57. WSBA OIU occupies two offices on the ground floor of Akrotiri Police Station. The access corridors are shared with all other police staff at WSBA. OIU staff must be aware of the potential for non-security vetted, non-police personnel being present in the immediate vicinity of their working environment. Doors must be kept closed when the office is unattended and only OIU staff will have access to the combination numbers for the locks. A multi-combination security cabinet is situated in the OIU Inspectors office for the storage of covertly obtained material, sensitive documentation and CHIS records. 58. ESBA OIU occupies a single level building, which is separate to the main police station at Dhekelia. This building is shared with the Tasking and Coordination Unit, which comes under the supervision of the OIU Inspector. The OIU have two offices and a small annex. Both internal offices will be fitted with digital door locks and a further digital lock will be fitted to the external access door. Doors must be kept closed when the office is unattended and only OIU staff will have access to the combination numbers for the locks. A multi-combination security cabinet for storage of covertly obtained material and CHIS records, will be situated in the OIU Inspectors office. 59. CAB is situated in a secure environment at SBA HQ. Again, the door to the CAB office will be accessed by digital lock and a multi-combination security cabinet for storage of covertly obtained material and CHIS records will be used. 60. The CAB and OIUs will operate a 'clear desk policy' at the end of each working day or when the office is to be left unattended for any lengthy period. 27. []{#s27.anchor}***Personal Security*** 61. Officers are responsible for the safety of themselves and their colleagues whilst conducting meetings with sources. Each meeting must be risk assessed prior to its commencement. 62. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be available in the OIU. Each officer will have access to the equipment, so that if the risk dictates, it can be carried in their vehicle during source meetings. The use of PPE is at the discretion of the individual handler and is dependent on the source's risk assessment and the cover story being employed. 28. []{#s28.anchor}***Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) involving OIU vehicles*** 63. In the event that an OIU vehicle conveying a source is involved in a road traffic collision, the objective of the handlers will be to protect the identity of the source. For minor collisions, this might be achieved by one of the handlers escorting the source away from the scene. For more serious collisions, the option to remove the source from the scene might not be possible in which case a cover story will be provided for the source\'s presence in the vehicle. 64. Should a police vehicle collision occur when a source is onboard, the handlers will contact the Controller immediately. 65. All collisions involving OIU vehicles must be investigated as per Force Policy. Should the investigating officer consider it necessary to interview the source, the Controller must be informed. The Controller will then request approval from the SAO. 29. []{#s29.anchor}***Mobile telephones*** 66. Each OIU will be equipped with two prepaid mobile telephones and a stock of prepaid SIM cards, with different numbers. Source Handlers will be issued with one of these telephones in order to carry out their role with a CHIS. All CHIS will be provided with a number from one of these telephones. Officers will not issue a source with their own mobile numbers due to the fact that this practice may expose the handlers and their families to possible dangers. 67. The OIU Sergeant will be responsible for maintaining records of issue, details of numbers used and any other use of the telephones. 68. Under no circumstances will positive police action be instigated upon information being received by a handler via a text message. Text messages will only be treated as a prompt for the handler to contact the source. Only when the intelligence is obtained verbally from the source can it be risk assessed and consideration be given for dissemination. 69. Officers will not use their own mobile or land line phone at home to contact a source in any circumstance. 30. []{#s30.anchor}***Pseudonyms and false identities*** 70. Officers engaged in covert operations, particularly those handling sources, will not routinely use pseudonyms or false identities or documents, save that which is necessary to maintain a cover story. The use of any pseudonym or false identity or document by the field officers should be centrally managed and be on a central record that can be inspected on a regular basis by CAB in order to ensure the correct usage. All officers who are to be engaged in covert operations have been trained in the use of cover stories. A five-digit pin number will replace the collar number of operatives in all logs used during directed surveillance. That will minimize the risk of exposing any of the operatives in the event of any of such logs goes public or seeing by unauthorised personnel. 31. []{#s31.anchor}***Payment of rewards*** 71. The SBA will adopt the recognised Source Rewards process and payment matrix. This matrix will be adapted to suit the range of crimes committed within the SBA and rewards will reflect the economic value of these crimes. 72. With the exception of incentive payments, the OIU Inspector will be present and supervise all payments of rewards to CHIS. 73. Incentive payments, which should be limited to 10 euro, without prior approval, will be notified to the Controller at the earliest opportunity. 32. []{#s32.anchor}**Application and Authorisation** 74. RIPO and the Codes of Practice define specific roles for the application and authorisation of covert techniques. Additional management and oversight roles have been identified through effective practice. 75. All applications and authorisations for Directed Surveillance and Entry onto Land will be made using the force CSS Application on SBAPS. All applications will be made by OIU staff or other personnel who have received specialist RIPO training. 76. Applications and authorisations for CHIS will be made using the SMS system and a manual transfer of CD and hard copy records. Only officers in the OIU who have received specialist CHIS training will make such applications. 33. []{#s33.anchor}**Covert Surveillance Process** 34. **Entry onto Land Process** 35. []{#s35.anchor}**Urgent Authorisation** 77. Authorisation for Covert Surveillance, Entry onto Land and CHIS can be given in circumstances which amount to urgency. 78. Urgency criteria must not be applied as a matter of convenience and should only be used where life is at risk or delay would cause serious detriment to an investigation. 79. Urgent authorisations can be given orally by a LAO or SAO, as applicable or in writing by their Deputy during their temporary unavailability. Such authorisations last for 72 hours. 80. In practice, where urgent authorisation is required, applicants must seek to obtain oral authorisation from either Divisional Commander at WSBA or ESBA, prior to obtaining written urgent authorisation from a Deputy. 81. Where urgent oral authorisation is required, the following action will be taken. - The Applicant will record the time and date that they spoke to the Authorising Officer. - The Applicant and Authorising Officer will record the intelligence case and information provided and the grounds on which the authorisation is to be given. - The Applicant and Authorising Officer will record the time and date the authorisation is given and the time and date the authorisation ceases. - The Applicant will commence the appropriate record on CSS or SMS. - At the end of 72 hours the application will be cancelled or if there are grounds to continue, the application will be renewed accordingly. 36. []{#s36.anchor}***Reviews, Renewals and Cancellations*** 82. ***Reviews*** 83. The Authorising officer can delegate reviews to another officer. In practise however, in the SBA, circumstances dictate otherwise, the Authorising officer will conduct all reviews, using the appropriate section in SBAPs CSS application. The Authorising Officer cannot delegate all or part of his/her responsibilities to another officer. A deputy should only be used in the absence of the Authorising Officer and the reasons for absence should be stated. 37. []{#s37.anchor}***Renewals*** 84. All renewals will be treated as if they were a new application and the above processes will be followed, using the appropriate renewal section in CSS Application. 38. []{#s38.anchor}***Cancellations*** 85. Authorisations must be cancelled as soon as the requirement for covert surveillance or entry onto land has ceased. Cancellation will be recorded on CSS using the appropriate cancellation section. CAB will be responsible for the product management and he/she will deal with this in accordance with the destruction of official records standing order (SO A9) in the force at the time. 39. []{#s39.anchor}**CHIS Process** 40. []{#s40.anchor}**CHIS Authorisations, Reviews, Renewals and Cancellations** 86. ***Authorisations*** 87. The CHIS process diagram describes in full the authorisation process. It must be noted however that where a person meets all of the criteria to be regarded as a CHIS, but declines to sign terms and Conditions of conduct, this does not prevent them being authorised as a CHIS, providing the risk assessment reflects this issue and the Force's Authorising Officer (FAO) is content to tolerate the risk and give authorisation. 41. []{#s41.anchor}***Reviews*** 88. The Authorising officer can delegate reviews of CHIS to another officer. In the SBA, the Controller will conduct the reviews, using the appropriate review form on CSS. The SAO must be notified of any significant changes to circumstances or risk that may affect the original authorisation. On review all existing records for the CHIS in question, will be copied to CD and transferred by secure courier to CAB, in order to update the central registry. The Authorising Officer cannot delegate all or part of his/her responsibilities to another officer. Therefore, a deputy should only be used in the absence of the Authorising Officer for the reviews of CHIS and the reasons for absence should be stated. 42. []{#s42.anchor}***Renewals*** 89. All renewals will be treated as if they were a new application and the above process will be repeated. 43. []{#s43.anchor}***Cancellations*** 90. Authorisations must be cancelled as soon as it is decided that use and conduct of the CHIS is no longer required. A cancellation form will be recorded on SMS and submitted to CAB for action by the SAO and central registry. 44. []{#s44.anchor}**Other CHIS Management records** 91. All other CHIS management records will be maintained by the OIU on the local SMS and where necessary submitted in hard copy format to CAB for authorisation by the SAO. Applications for, and records of rewards and benefits. 92. CAB will be responsible for updating all central records. 45. []{#s45.anchor}***Security of information transferred by CD.*** 93. CDs containing CHIS information will be transferred from the Division to HQ. When information is transferred by CD and all records on the OIU SMS and CAB Central Registry have been appropriately updated, the CD will be destroyed. 94. Divisional OIUs and CAB will be responsible for maintaining a record of CDs issued, received and destroyed. 46. []{#s46.anchor}**Recording Information** 95. All information obtained through the use of covert techniques will be treated as sensitive and recorded, disseminated or used in one of the following ways: 96. CHIS contact sheet recorded on SMS and retained by OIU. Subsequent dissemination intelligence, if appropriate by way of a sanitised 5x5x5; 97. Surveillance logs retained by the OIU and subsequent dissemination of intelligence by way of a sanitised 5x5x5; 98. Surveillance Management Records (SMR) retained by OIU; 99. Sensitive policy files retained by OIU; and 100. Other briefing notes and contemporaneous notes of CHIS meetings, etc retained by OIU. 101. Such records may be revealed to the prosecution by way of sensitive schedules, however PII processes should be sought to protect the identity of CHIS, observation post locations, methodology used and technical assets. 102. Requirements under R v Johnson, relating to the use of observation posts will be recorded in the SMR or Sensitive Policy file. 103. In order to maintain the integrity of such operations, the OIU Inspector will fulfil the requirements for the second visit to the property owner as stated in this case, instead of a Chief Inspector. 47. []{#s47.anchor}**Inter-Agency Protocols** 104. Memorandums of understanding will be drawn up and agreed between the SBA Police, Customs and Immigration and the Military, who are governed by similar UK legislation, as to the inter-agency management of CHIS and sharing of information obtained through covert means. 105. The Republic of Cyprus Police does not have legislation relating to the use of covert techniques and therefore existing arrangements for information sharing will remain. It should always be borne in mind that the duty of care to protect any person assisting the SBA from unnecessary disclosure is paramount. 48. []{#s48.anchor}**De-confliction process** 106. A de-confliction process has been put in place in order to avoid duplication of effort or potential compromise of an operation. 107. De-confliction requests will be made by the Divisional OIU to the CAB and it will be the CABs responsibility to ensure that either the CC or DCC are provided with the relevant details enabling them to make the de-confliction request at the earliest opportunity. The CAB will notify the Division of the outcome. - **For all CHIS authorisations**, the SBAP Chief Constable or Deputy will telephone DSA and provide the subject's name, date of birth and intended date of authorisation before authorisation is given. - DSA will then check to ensure that the subject is not currently registered as a CHIS by any other organisation operating within BFC/SBAA. - If the check is negative, DSA should be able to inform the CC either immediately or shortly after. If the check is positive i.e suspect is currently registered to another organisation, DSA will request a conference as soon as possible with the Chief Constable or the Deputy Chief Constable and/or any other interested parties as appropriate to decide the way forward. - DSA will record on a spreadsheet all CHIS authorisations and deauthorisations contacted by SBAP which will be available for inspection if required by the Surveillance Commissioners. - **For all Covert Surveillance (CS) authorisations**, the SBAP Chief Constable or Deputy will telephone DSA and provide details of the venue of the intended CS operation before authorisation is given. - DSA will then check to ensure that the venue is not subject to any other surveillance operation being contacted by any other organisation operating within BFC/SBAA. - If the check is negative DSA should be able to inform the CC shortly after the request has been made. If the check is positive i.e reveals that the intended venue is the subject of another operation, DSA will request a conference as soon as possible with the Chief Constable or the Deputy Chief Constable and/or any other interested parties as appropriate to decide the way forward. - DSA will record on a spreadsheet all applications for CS contacted by SBAP which will be available for inspection if required by the Surveillance Commissioners. 108. Clearly the use of CHIS and Covered Surveillance operations are new to us in the SBAP and will take some getting used to by all concerned. The protocols described above are designed to assist in that process. If however, practice reveals a better way of operating, the protocols will be evolved accordingly to ensure the most effective and efficient use of all BFC/SBAA resources.