The Birth of Bangladesh PDF

# 19 The Birth of Bangladesh Late on the evening of 25 March 1971, Mujibur Rahman’ voice came faintly on a wavelength close to that of the official Pakistan Radio. In what must have been a pre-recorded message, Mujib proclaimed East Pakistan to be the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The full text...

# 19 The Birth of Bangladesh Late on the evening of 25 March 1971, Mujibur Rahman’ voice came faintly on a wavelength close to that of the official Pakistan Radio. In what must have been a pre-recorded message, Mujib proclaimed East Pakistan to be the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The full text of the proclamation has been published in the Bangladesh documents released by the Indian Foreign Ministry. It said, ‘This may be my last message. From today, Bangladesh is independent. I call upon the people of Bangladesh, wherever you are and with what you have, to resist the army of occupation to the last. Your fight must go on until the last soldier of the Pakistan occupation army is expelled from the soil of Bangladesh and final victory is achieved.’¹ ## Military Action in East Pakistan With the final and irreversible breakdown of political negotiations on 25 March 1971, Yahya ordered military action to suppress the revolt of the Awami League. Political activity was prohibited throughout the country and Awami League was banned as a political party. Censorship was clamped on the press. Yahya said, ‘Let me assure you that my main aim remains the same, namely, transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. As soon as the situation permits, I will take fresh steps towards the achievement of this objective’.2 In Dhaka, the headquarters of the rebellion, fighting was soon over. Attempts had been made to isolate the forces in the cantonment from the city by the erection of numerous barricades. No fewer than fifty barricades had been erected between the Inter-continental Hotel in the centre of the residential quarter and Dhaka airport. These barricades presented little difficulty to the highly-trained troops, whose main object was to remove them with minimum loss of life. Accurate gun fire soon drove off those who manned barricades, and snipers’ nests in surrounding huts were cleared by the use of tracer bullets which set fire to inflammable materials and obliged the occupants to escape to safety. The main streets were thus quickly cleared. The only serious resistance which the army encountered was from the well-armed men of the East Bengal Regiment and the police, who manned a number of strong points. These were systematically reduced. The army never opened fire until it was first fired upon. When this happened, it reacted sharply. In an operation of this kind, some civilian casualties are inevitable as innocent people are caught in the cross-fire, but the army never fired upon civilians as such, only upon those who resisted it with arms. Many people of the middle and upper class families had already left the city to escape violence at the hands of the Awami League operatives; college and university students had gone home, partly because of the approaching vacation and partly because of the closure of educational institutions by Mujib’s decree. Iqbal Hall and Jagannath Hall of Dhaka University which had been turned into an arsenal and strong-point manned by members of the students’ branch of the Awami League, were razed to the ground during the military action. Iqbal Hall was hit by two rockets and Jagannath Hall by four. The rooms were mostly charred but intact. A few dozen half-burnt rifles and stray papers were still smouldering. The damage was grave. There were mass graves in the university with three pits of five to fifteen metres diameter each. The foreign press alleged several thousand deaths (in the university area) while army officers placed the figure at around a hundred. Officially, only forty deaths were admitted. 3 Mujib was arrested at 1:30 a.m. on the morning of 26 March, but a number of his lieutenants fled from Dhaka to those parts of East Pakistan which were under Awami League control. Mujib was kept overnight at the Adamjee School. Next day, he was shifted to Flag Staff House from where he was flown to Karachi three days later. Kamal Hossain surrendered the following day. Except for these two, the entire Awami League leadership left for India, either from fear or by design. It was a major failure of the military action that the elected leaders, students, and political activists went over to India. It would have been different if the elected leadership had remained available and not lost their political freedom of action by escaping to India. Within a few weeks, overt resistance had been overcome by the army. However, the fleeing members of the National Assembly from Awami League were successful in announcing a government in exile for Bangladesh in India. There are serious allegations against officers and men in the Pakistan Army that they indulged in atrocities against the population in East Pakistan. The alleged excesses fall into the following categories:4 - excessive use of force and fire power in Dacca during the night of 25 and 26 of March 1971 when the military operation was launched; - senseless and wanton arson and killings in the countryside during the course of ‘sweep operation’ following the military action; - killing of intellectuals and professionals like doctors, engineers, etc. and burying them in mass graves not only during the early phases of the military action but also during the critical days of the war in December 1971; - killing of Bengali officers and men of the units of the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, and East Pakistan police force in the process of disarming them, or on the pretence of quelling their rebellion; - killing of East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, or their mysterious disappearance from their homes by or at the instance of army officers performing Martial Law duties; - raping of a large number of East Pakistani women by the officers and men of the Pakistan army as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture; - wanton destruction of bridges, rail and road communications and other vital installations; and - deliberate killing of members of Hindu minority community. Nevertheless, it appears that, as long as General Tikka Khan was in command, the troops were kept under control and they did what was strictly necessary in the military sense. There might have been some instances of excesses but that was not the policy. General Tikka had strictly advised the army contingent to stay away from the local population and only to interfere when there was a serious breach of law and order or a threat to human life and property. When he was replaced by Lieutenant-General Niazi, things changed for the worse. The new General was known to be a debauch who indulged in wine and women. What was worse, he encouraged men under his command to indulge in excesses such as the rape of women and the theft of valuables. It was under him that certain shameful excesses took place which were magnified manifold by the Indian and other foreign media. These also brought a bad name to the Pakistan Army and its morale suffered. It made the army look like an occupation force and became the target of hatred by even those who otherwise did not support the Awami League. Meanwhile, a large number of people crossed over to India, first due to the atrocities of the Awami League operatives and later as a result of the military action. Estimates of the number of refugees vary widely. The Indian propaganda machine gave a figure as high as 10 million but a more moderate estimate put it at 3 million. The refugee problem provided India with a pretext to intervene in East Pakistan, an excuse they had been looking for all the time. They were already training and arming the rebels who called themselves Mukti Bahini. ## Reaction in West Pakistan Unfortunately, political parties in West Pakistan actively or tacitly supported the military action in East Pakistan. The press in West Pakistan was jingoistic and supported statements of Yahya that aggravated the sad situation in East Pakistan. His bellicose statements directed against India and other foreign powers did not help matters. The politicians and the press in West Pakistan tried to create war hysteria and certain impudent zealots tried to launch what was called the ‘Crush India’ campaign. It was indeed a major failure on the part of political parties in West Pakistan because they failed to understand and appreciate the gravity of the situation and the consequences that were likely to follow. They meekly and willingly submitted to the short-sighted military solution being offered by the military government and made little effort to put their weight on the side of a political solution to solve the crises. Only a handful of journalists and politicians in West Pakistan raised their voice against the military action. The daily Azad from Lahore persuaded about fifty prominent citizens of Lahore to sign a public statement opposing military operations in East Pakistan and called for a political settlement. No other newspaper except Azad dared to carry this statement. A public meeting was held at the premises owned by former Air Force Chief and former Punjab Governor, Air Marshal Nur Khan, where military operations were denounced. Abdullah Malik, one of the editors of Azad, had used the expression ‘Bangladesh’ in his speech at the Engineering University and had expressed sympathy for the people of East Pakistan. He was tried by a military court and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment.? ## Attempts at Reconciliation It was plain that after the pre-emptive military action on 25 and 26 March, contemporaneously with the neutralization of insurgents and the pacification of the countryside, Yahya’s immediate tasks were to: - win back the confidence of East Pakistan; - revitalize belief in the prospect of an acceptable Constitution; - counter Indian propaganda and restore Pakistan’s world image; - repair the damaged economy. To embark on these tasks implied, of course, that the old Pakistan could hold together, a belief flowing from the decision to pre-empt secession. Moreover, the doctrine that the Awami League (as distinguished from the people of East Pakistan) and India were in complicity was based on the idea that the people of East Pakistan desired unity despite all that had happened and was still happening. Criticism of India as a base for insurgents and rebels justified the doctrine that once these marauders had been killed or captured, tranquillity would return. Some people considered the pre-emptive strike unwise and the coup a failure which had left the two wings irretrievably sundered. It is doubtful whether East and West Pakistan were indeed irretrievably sundered, but the difficulty was to resolve the visible contradictions. Was it possible to win back East Pakistan’s confidence when the army was roving the countryside seeking to destroy the self-proclaimed liberation forces, challenging the loyalty of any person it suspected, and making use of courts organized in terms of Martial Law Regulation No. 88? Was not the very scope of these military operations a measure of the prevailing disaffection? Could confidence be restored among a people, a million of who lived in exile in India with scarcely a family where a death or destruction had not been recorded? Had not Mujib, East Pakistan’s hero, been removed to West Pakistan, there to stand trial in secret for being a traitor and rebel by the same president who was now appealing for faith and goodwill? Judged by any standards, the task of reconciliation was formidable, but Yahya believed it could be accomplished. On 28 June, Yahya addressed the nation and - reaffirmed his aim to restore democratic government; - declared that East Pakistan had voted for provincial autonomy and not for secession; - accused Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League of defiance, obduracy, and of seeking secession; - declared his conclusion that the framing of a Constitution by an assembly was not feasible; - considered that there was no alternative but to have a Constitution prepared by a ‘group of experts’ (afterwards spoken of as the ‘Constitution Committee’) whom he had, as it appeared, already selected; - the ‘martial law cover’ would remain ‘for some time’; - political parties must be ‘national’ and he had already recommended to the Constitution Committee that ‘it would be a good thing if we ban any party which is not national in the practical sense’ and that ‘we must eschew the habit of sub-parties’; - his proposed Constitution could be amended by the National Assembly by means of machinery to be provided by the Constitution itself; - the Legal Framework Order would be amended to suit the new arrangements; and - by-elections would be held to fill vacant seats in the assemblies. 8 In September, Yahya made it known that the National Assembly would have ninety days after receiving the draft Constitution, in which to propose amendments. These amendments would, however, require his assent. Moreover, before the Assembly could meet, by-elections would be necessary. In August, a list of eighty-eight East Pakistan Assembly members was issued stating that they were clear of all adverse allegations and that they retained their seats. This left seventy-nine East Pakistani members who were called upon to answer charges, failing which they would have to vacate their seats in the Assembly. In particular, the seats held by Mujib and Dr Kamal Hossain were declared vacant although, so far as anyone knew, Mujib’s trial, which began in August, had not yet concluded and his guilt or innocence was still unpronounced. Shortly afterwards, the public was informed that by-elections would be held during the period 25 November-9 December 1971. It was said that the miniature general election in East Pakistan would afford excellent opportunities to create a National Assembly which would fit in well with the policies that Yahya and his group desired to promote, and evidence of a plan to that end soon emerged. As early as 15 October, out of seventy-nine seats declared vacant in East Pakistan, fifteen had already acquired National Assembly representation because the candidates were declared to have been elected unopposed, although elections were not due until the fortnight 25 November-9 December. The political complexion of these successful members was unmistakable, comprising, as they did:9 - Pakistan Democratic Front - 5 - Jamaat-i-Islami - 5 - (Convention) Muslim League - 2 - Qayyum Muslim League - 1 - Nizam-i-Islam Party - 2 These unopposed results disclosed several things. First of all, that there would again be a confusing multiplicity of parties in the House, creating plenty of room for contention although with a general drift as to outlook. Much more important was the fact that this number of unopposed returns so early in the day spoke of an indifference in East Pakistan to the by-elections. It was said in Dhaka that some intending candidates were being warned by District Magistrates, acting on the instructions of the martial law authorities, not to oppose certain candidates already nominated in some constituencies. 10 It was further reported that others were being dissuaded from standing for election either by physical force at the hands of the military or by the threat of it, and it was significant that the Governor of East Pakistan, Dr A.M. Malik, made reference to ‘not entirely satisfactory elections’. This was a bold statement for Dr Malik to make seeing that he was the appointee of the martial law administration. His appointment was clearly intended to placate sentiment in East Pakistan by giving to that province a civilian Governor born on its own soil, but the idea was a nullity at the outset. Not only was the purpose as transparent as it was disingenuous, but Dr Malik’s past associations with the central government over the years robbed him of whatever credibility he might otherwise have had. Moreover, a martial law administrator remained, the only change being that General Tikka Khan returned to military duty and was replaced by Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi. The proposed elections were never held as they were overtaken by war with India. ## The Draft Constitution It has been mentioned above that the elections in December 1970 were held to elect a Constituent Assembly which was required to frame a Constitution for Pakistan within 120 days. After having framed such a Constitution, the Assembly would have become the central legislature and would have transferred power to the elected Prime Minister and the Cabinet amongst them and would have acted as Parliament in a parliamentary form of government. Unfortunately, all this did not come about. While East Pakistan was in turmoil and under military action, Yahya promised a Constitution in his address to the nation on 28 June 1971. A draft Constitution was already prepared and circulated. The draft Constitution gave a presidential form of government. It was based on the 1962 Constitution with the following departures: - The office of Vice-President for Pakistan was provided for. - There was to be a bicameral legislative at the Centre, two Houses to be called the Senate and the National Assembly. - The Senate was to be the Upper House with 15 members (out of a total membership of 65) to be nominated by the President. The Senate was to be a permanent House not subject to dissolution. Half of its membership was to change every two years. - The number of seats in the National Assembly was to be 313, with 264 as general seats, 13 seats reserved for women, 17 for the scheduled castes, 15 for caste Hindus, 1 for Buddhists, and 3 for Christians and others. East Pakistan was allocated 169 seats out of which 130 were to be general seats, the remaining seats being allocated to women and minorities. - There were provisions for the joint sitting of the two Houses of the Parliament to iron out differences between the two Houses on legislation. - The power of taxation and the subjects for taxation by the central legislature were specifically spelled out in the main body of the draft Constitution. - A chapter of the draft Constitution was devoted to political parties. The aims and purposes that a political party could have were clearly laid down which included, amongst others, true faith and allegiance to Pakistan to preserve its integrity and sovereignty as an Islamic Republic; to observe the principles of democracy within its own organization; not to be a foreign aided party; and to adopt exclusively constitutional methods to bring about a change in the Constitution or the law of Pakistan. There were also provisions for the registration of the political parties. These provisions were apparently necessitated by the experience with the Awami League. - There was a provision for the imposition of martial law in whole or any part of Pakistan but only in compelling circumstances which were defined as attack or invasion by a foreign power or its imminent danger; law and order within the country being in grave jeopardy; and a serious problem affecting the whole, or any substantial part of the country or any province. Martial law was to be declared by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army at the request of the President or of his own motion. The declaration of martial law could only be revoked by the Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the President. Except for these features and some other minor ones, the draft Constitution was a reproduction of the 1962 Constitution. This draft Constitution was never promulgated. Nevertheless, it appears to have been used as a working paper for the interim Constitution of 1972 and, later, the permanent 1973 Constitution, particularly the provision regarding the Senate an the joint sittings of the two Houses of Parliament. 11 ## International Responses On 19 July, Yahya declared that Mujib would be tried by a military court in camera and the allegations were such that he could be awarded the death sentence. On 3 September, Dr A.M. Malik and General Niazi were appointed Governor and Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan, respectively. The first step taken by Dr A.M. Malik’s government was to announce general amnesty for those alleged to have committed crimes in East Pakistan since March. This decision resulted in the release of a large number of prisoners. Meanwhile, Dr Malik had established contact with the Awami League leaders in exile and had come to the conclusion that they were frustrated with the Indian government because it did not support their movement out of sympathy for the Bengali Muslims, but was motivated by the desire to dismember Pakistan. He, therefore, made repeated appeals to the refugees to come back home, but it did not have any impact because the Awami League leaders were kept under constant vigilance by the Indian authorities¹2 and it was no longer possible for them to return even if they so desired. The guerrilla activities and sabotage campaign of the Mukti Bahini had assumed alarming proportions and, by October, East Pakistan seemed to be in the midst of civil war. As for international developments, the Indian government tried to put diplomatic pressure on Islamabad for an immediate political solution, but the government of Pakistan resisted it on the plea that it was an internal matter. Pakistan insisted on her sovereignty and refused to accept the representatives of international agencies. By the middle of April, Pakistan was able to secure general approval of the international community regarding the political position. Some countries, including China, extended complete support to Pakistan in the campaign to convince the international community that what had happened in East Pakistan was purely an internal problem. By the beginning of May, normalcy had returned to East Pakistan to a great extent and the general situation permitted Islamabad to allow the United Nations to begin relief and rehabilitation activities. Meanwhile, India began to undermine Pakistan’s position by exploiting the refugees who were called freedom fighters and, with the help of an organized propaganda machinery, insisted on becoming a party to the East Pakistan situation. The Indian government refused to return the refugees and turned down the United Nations’ offers for providing assistance at the borders. India was supported by the exiled Bengali leaders in her campaign to condemn the UN efforts. In June, India launched a monsoon offensive against Pakistan, which was aimed at disrupting communications by blasting bridges and terrorising the public. Yahya made half-hearted attempts to win over moderate Bengalis by promising the restoration of political life. Since he had no organized campaign or clear programme and also suffered from a credibility gap, these efforts were doomed to failure. In July, U Thant proposed the appointment of UN representatives on both sides of the East Pakistan border to facilitate the return of refugees and placed this suggestion before the Security Council. Yahya immediately accepted the proposal but the Indian government rejected it. By then, a significant change in Sino-American relations was taking place as a result of Kissinger’s visit to Peking, with the announcement by President Nixon in July to visit China the following year. This development led India to realize the difficulty of supporting the Bangladesh liberation movement without the support of a superpower. During this period, the USSR had decided, for various reasons, to establish closer relations with India. After the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971, the government of the USSR adopted a hostile attitude towards Pakistan and made it clear that it would frustrate every attempt to involve the US in the East Pakistan crisis. Soviet commitment also encouraged India to intensify the activities of the Mukti Bahini. During September and October, the Soviet Union tried, for the last time, for a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis and pressurized India to limit her commitment to the Bangladesh movement. However, Yahya’s broadcast on 12 October convinced the Soviet Union that Pakistan was not yet prepared for any such settlement by accepting confederation between the two wings of Pakistan. After October, Soviet military assistance to India assumed larger proportions and war seemed imminent. Pakistan depended too much on the UN and the world powers for intervention in the prospective war. It was, perhaps, because of this that Pakistan decided to widen the circle of war by opening a front on the western border on 3 December. By then, it was too late. By November 1971, the Pakistani nation had been shaken and demoralized due to regional polarization. A majority of East Pakistanis had turned hostile towards the army because of the military action and the subsequent failure of the military authorities to restore the people’s confidence in the government. The army’s morale had also been affected because the jawans had been in the trenches for several months without rest and proper food. Even otherwise, the army was not as disciplined as it was in 1965. Yahya had concentrated his attention more on promotions in the higher cadres than on its equipment and training. Moreover, Yahya’s position was unstable as compared to Ayub because the junta on which he depended was itself a divided house. Conditions within East Pakistan were depressing. The economic fabric had been shattered because of the virtual closure of industry since March. The monsoon offensive of the Mukti Bahini had not only done great damage to the communication system, roads, and bridges but had also created uncertainty and terror. The Indian propaganda presenting events in Bangladesh as a liberation movement and Pakistan as a colonial country had moulded international public opinion against the latter. Circumstances were thus favourable for an Indian offensive against Pakistan. ## Indo-Pak War and the Fall of Dhaka Having realized that the Mukti Bahini could not achieve the objective, India decided to launch an attack on the eastern front. Although full-scale war started on 22 November, yet ‘unimpeachable Indian military sources said that, in spite of official denials, Indian troops had crossed the borders into East Pakistan’ in the first week of November. 13 This was the ‘first confirmation that Indian soldiers had operated inside East Pakistan in the current crisis’. 14 The New York Times also carried a similar report on 13 November 1971. As soon as Dr Malik came to know about the Indian attack, he left for Islamabad on 26 November to advise the President to avert the war, either by seeking UN intervention or by making political settlement with the Awami League leaders. He knew that in case of an all-out war, East Pakistan would be lost. He returned to Dhaka on 1 December and expressed dissatisfaction about his talks with Yahya. Although Jessore had been captured by the Indian Army on 6 December, Yahya was not conveyed this news till 8 December. Moreover, the unrealistic attitude adopted by Pakistan’s representative at the Security Council was an indication to Dr Malik that the correct military position of East Pakistan was not being communicated to Yahya. He, therefore, addressed a letter to Yahya appreciating the valour of the Pakistan Army and painting a discouraging but realistic picture of the lack of military and civil supplies, breakdown of law and order, large-scale murders of Pakistan supporters, and requested for physical intervention within forty-eight hours. He made it clear that if no help came, the problem should be solved through negotiations so that power was transferred peacefully and millions of human lives were not put at stake. It is obvious that help from foreign friends was assured by Islamabad to Dr Malik and General Niazi. As the situation became critical, both Niazi and Dr Malik badgered Islamabad for the promised help. General Niazi even went to the US Consul-General in Dhaka to ask ‘if US military assistance was to be provided’. 15 Yahya’s response to Dr Malik’s letter was precise and self-explanatory. He replied: ‘We are praying for you’. It is difficult to say if the problem could have been settled politically at this stage as proposed by Dr Malik when the Indian Army was racing towards Dhaka. However, there is no doubt that Yahya did not make any serious effort for political settlement before the war although he knew that Pakistan’s position was weaker and India had made preparations for inflicting a military defeat on Pakistan. On 9 and 10 December, General Niazi sent messages to the Chief of General Staff informing him that a regrouping of troops and the re-adjustment of battle positions was not possible due to intense enemy air activity and the hostility of the local population. He stated that airfields, bridges, and heavy weapons had been seriously damaged. He requested for reinforcement by airborne troops to protect Dhaka. General Niazi’s message clearly stated that the situation was critical and the resistance of the Pakistan Army was likely to last only a few more days. On 10 December, Dr Malik sent another message to Yahya requesting him to arrange an immediate cease-fire and negotiate a political settlement. In response, Yahya authorized the Governor of East Pakistan to take suitable decisions as required by the circumstances because the East-West Pakistan link had been severed. He said that he would approve all measures taken by him. At the same time, Yahya directed General Niazi to follow the decisions taken by the Governor. After the receipt of this message, Dr Malik contacted the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, and delivered a message demanding a peaceful transfer of power to the people’s representatives through the United Nations after the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Indian Army. Facilities for the repatriation of the Pakistan Army and protection of the non-Bengali population were also demanded. The message made it clear that there was no question of surrender. Yahya buried the message as soon as he came to know of it and an official spokesman denied its dispatch. On 11 December, Pakistan invoked its understanding with friendly powers to come to its assistance. Dhaka was told that help was expected from friends, which never arrived, and the war continued. By 15 December, Indian forces had reached the outskirts of Dhaka. On 14 December, the Governor’s House was rocked by Indian planes as a result of which the Governor and his Cabinet resigned and sought protection from the Red Cross. General Niazi again met the American Consul-General and requested him to arrange for an immediate cease-fire. On 16 December, the instrument of surrender was signed by General Niazi and General Jagjit Singh Aurora, Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, and Dhaka fell. ## Role of the United Nations Several attempts, most of them half-hearted, were made in the United Nations to stop the war between Pakistan and India. Full-fledged war started on the eastern front on 22 November and spread to West Pakistan on 3 December, yet the United Nations remained unperturbed till 4 December 1971 when Argentina, supported by seven other members of the Security Council, requested an emergency session of the Security Council. At this session, the United States sponsored a draft resolution calling for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of troops. The resolution also proposed posting UN observers on the borders. It was vetoed by the USSR. 16 On 4 December, the USSR sponsored a draft resolution calling for ‘political settlement in East Pakistan which would inevitably result in cessation of hostilities’. 17 The resolution was supported by Poland but the other twelve members of the Security Council abstained from voting. If accepted by Pakistan, this resolution would have led to a cease-fire and political settlement in East Pakistan, which Pakistan needed desperately. After October 1971, Pakistan also favoured a political settlement or, at least, paid lip service to the idea under American pressure. Negotiations through American diplomats had started with the Bangladesh government in exile, so there was nothing objectionable from Pakistan’s point of view and the resolution, if accepted, would have saved Pakistan from unprecedented humiliation. But the resolution was vetoed by China, with of course, the prior approval of Islamabad. Pakistan, therefore, missed a good opportunity to achieve peace which was the greatest need of the hour. One fails to understand why Pakistan did not approach the United Nations. It should be recalled that Bhutto had advised Pakistan not to approach the Security Council in case of war with India. 18 He did not spell out the logic behind this advice. Later on, opposition parties in Pakistan criticized Bhutto’s statement and held him responsible for delayed action in the United Nations. After Bhutto’s removal from the prime ministership in 1977, Yahya also alleged that Bhutto acted against the advice of the government, but the question is who stopped Yahya from accepting the Russian resolution when he knew about Pakistan’s military position in East Pakistan better than anyone else. China had also sponsored a resolution which was subsequently withdrawn. Another resolution sponsored by Argentina and supported by seven other countries on the same day was vetoed by the USSR. The resolution contained proposals similar to the American one. Yet another resolution was submitted by the USSR calling ‘for cease-fire and effective action by the Pakistan government towards a political settlement giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the December 1970 elections’. 19 This presented a way of extricating the Pakistan Army but Pakistan did not show interest in it and consequently it was not voted upon. If Pakistan had pressed for its acceptance, there were chances that the resolution would have been passed and implemented under Soviet pressure. The matter was then transferred to the General Assembly under ‘The Uniting for Peace Procedure’. A thirty-four member revised resolution on which debate began on 7 December, demanded a cease-fire immediately and ‘withdrawal of forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the border 20 The resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority of 104. Only eleven countries voted against it. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but India kept it pending for three days. Then India laid down Pakistan’s withdrawal of forces from East Pakistan as a pre-condition for the acceptance. This was in fact a tactic to gain time. Yet another resolution was sponsored by the United States in the Security Council calling ‘upon the government of India forthwith to accept a cease-fire and withdrawal of armed forces as set forth in the General Assembly Resolution’. 21 The resolution was again vetoed by the USSR. The second resolution, otherwise the eighth, was sponsored by Poland on 15 December, after the arrival of Z.A. Bhutto in the United Nations. The resolution called for the transfer of power ‘to the lawfully elected representatives of the people and with the beginning of this process ‘military action in all the areas will be ceased and an initial cease-fire will start for a period of 72 hours’. 22 The resolution also demanded the evacuation of armed forces, West Pakistani civilians, and other persons ‘from the eastern theatre of conflict’. Although Indian forces were threatening to enter Dhaka, Pakistan did not show any interest in the draft resolution and preferred to negotiate for surrender with India. The resolution was never voted upon, but if Pakistan had shown any interest in having it passed, it could have been discussed and passed. 23 Bhutto, who knew that the war had been lost, made a lengthy speech in the Security Council on 15 December. He said; ‘I find it disgraceful to my country and to my person to remain here...legalize aggression, legalize occupation...I will not be a party to...we will go back and fight. The object of the UN had been to permit the fall of Dhaka.... Why should I waste my time here? I will go back to my country and fight’. But he remained in New York until 18 December, when he was asked by Yahya to return to Pakistan to take over. 23 It is obvious that the Security Council had been dragging its feet till the fall of Dhaka. It is also true that Pakistan neither evinced interest in the proceedings of the United Nations nor made serious efforts for a cease-fire. In fact, Pakistan missed quite a few opportunities, without any cogent reason, of achieving peace and saving herself from humiliation. An impression is gained that the junta’s plan was to surrender East and to continue army rule in West Pakistan. Perhaps, they did not fully visualize the consequences of surrender. ## Break-up of Pakistan: A Constitutional Analysis ### Introduction The Muslims in Bengal were in the forefront of the movement for a separate Muslim nation in the Indian subcontinent. It was in Dhaka, in 1906 that, All India Muslim League was formed. It was a Bengali, Fazlul Haq, who tabled the Lahore Resolution (later known as ‘Pakistan Resolution’) on 23 March 1940 in Lahore. Again, when Jinnah called for direct action in 1946, Bengali Muslims were first to respond, which, unfortunately, led to large-scale communal killings in Calcutta and other parts of Bengal. It cannot be denied that the freedom movement for Pakistan had many ardent supporters in Bengal who made the most sacrifices to accomplish this end. At the time of Independence, West Pakistan consisted of four Provinces: Balochistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab and Sindh. Balochistan and the NWFP were largely tribal societies while Punjab and Sindh were feudal societies. Big landlords held sway over the economy and politics of these provinces. East Pakistan, on the other hand, consisted of one province, East Bengal. This was part of Bengal partitioned into its eastern part consisting predominantly of Muslims (more than 80 per cent) and the western part comprised largely the non-Muslim population. Land ownership patterns in East Pakistan were different as it consisted of small landholders. Hindus had owned large tracts of land holdings in eastern Bengal but they had either left East Pakistan or their land holdings had been reduced due to the land reforms made soon after 1947. Thus, the two wings of Pakistan were not only divided by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory, they were actually composed of two very different societies politically, economically, ethnically and linguistically-with Islam being the only bond holding them together as one country. The factors that were to have a divisive impact were: - The provinces in West Pakistan comprised 85 per cent of the land area of Pakistan but only 45 per cent of its population, while East Pakistan covered only 15 per cent of the land area of Pakistan but 55 per cent of its total population. - West Pakistan had four regional languages. Very few people in East Pakistan understood any of these regional languages. - East Pakistan had only one language: Bengali which was not understood in West Pakistan. - For a variety of reasons, the people of West Pakistan were ready to accept Urdu (not one of its regional languages) as their national language. - The people of East Pakistan took enormous pride in their language, which was rich in literature and cultural heritage, and wanted Bengali to be the national language as well. These serious issues of communication gave rise to misgivings. At the expense of democratic dispensation, an autocratic establishment started forming in West Pakistan, which represented feudal, bureaucratic and military interests. This alliance between the bureaucracy and the feudal aristocracy in West Pakistan became increasingly powerful and dominated the political power of the State. Later, military establishment joined hands with this alliance and a new axis of military-bureaucratic-feudal interests came into being, with the military soon emerging as the dominant partner, depriving the people of Pakistan of their democratic rights. ### The Language Issue What became the first serious contention between the two wings was the announcement by Jinnah in March 1948 that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan. There was widespread agitation in East Pakistan in support of the Bengali language and against the imposition of Urdu as a national language. This agitation continued spasmodically till 1954, when the Constituent Assembly accepted that both Urdu and Bengali would be the national languages of Pakistan. Although this issue was resolved belatedly, it had created a lot of bitterness between the people of the two wings of Pakistan. In the East, the resistance was seen as a struggle against the West Pakistan establishment which was determined to dominate the eastern wing and impose its own language on its people. In West Pakistan, this struggle was viewed as an attempt by the Hindus in East Bengal, who had a strong presence there and were known to be rich and politically powerful, to foment trouble. Although Urdu was not indigenous to any of the regions comprising West Pakistan, West Pakistanis could not see any reason why Urdu should not be acceptable to East Pakistanis since it was accepted as the language of the