Heywood Global Politics Chapter 8 PDF

CHAPTER 8 Identity, Culture and Challenges to the West ‘Identity is the theft of the self.’ E S T E E M A RT I N PREVIEW The end of the Cold War, and particularly developments such as September 11 and the ‘war on ter...

CHAPTER 8 Identity, Culture and Challenges to the West ‘Identity is the theft of the self.’ E S T E E M A RT I N PREVIEW The end of the Cold War, and particularly developments such as September 11 and the ‘war on terror’, has altered thinking about global order and the balance between conflict and cooperation in world affairs in an important way. In addition to – and, some would argue, in place of – a concern with shifting power balances between and among states, global order appears to be increasingly shaped by new forces, especially those related to identity and culture. Some even argue that culture has replaced ideology as the key organizing principle of global politics, reflected in the growing significance in world affairs of factors such as ethnicity, history, values and religion. How can this trend towards so-called ‘identity politics’ best be explained, and what have been its implications? Most importantly, does the increasing impor- tance of culture mean that conflict, perhaps conflict between different civilizations, is more likely, or even inevitable? The growing salience of culture as a factor affect- ing world affairs has been particularly evident in relation to religion. Not only has there been, in some cases, a revival in religious belief, but more radical or ‘funda- mentalist’ religious movements have emerged, preaching that politics, in effect, is religion. To what extent has religious revivalism, and especially the trend towards religious fundamentalism, affected global politics? Finally, issues of identity, culture and religion have played a particularly prominent role in attempts to challenge and displace the politico-cultural hegemony of the West. The process through which former colonies have tried to establish non-western and sometimes anti-western political identities has affected Asia, but it has been especially crucial in the Muslim world, encouraging some to talk in terms of a civilizational clash between Islam and the West. What is the basis for conflict between Islam and the West, and can this conflict be overcome? KEY ISSUES ! Why has identity politics become a prominent feature of world affairs? ! Has culture displaced ideology as the organizing principle of global politics? ! Is there an emerging ‘clash of civilizations’? ! How important is religion in modern global politics? ! Is conflict between Islam and the West unavoidable? ! How has the West sought to deal with the ‘Muslim question’? 185  186 GLOBAL POLITICS CONCEPT RISE OF IDENTITY POLITICS Colonialism Westernization as modernization Colonialism is the theory Modernization has traditionally worn a western face. Western societies have or practice of establishing control over foreign conventionally been portrayed as ’developed’ or ‘advanced’ societies, implying territory and turning it that they offer a model that will, over time, be accepted by all other societies. This into a colony. Colonialism view was fostered by the economic, political and military ascendancy that is thus a particular form European states established from the sixteenth century onwards, underpinned of imperialism (see p. 28). by the expansion of trade, leading to the industrial revolution, and the spread of Colonialism is usually distinguished by colonialism. From the nineteenth century onwards, European ascendancy devel- settlement and economic oped into the ascendancy of the West (see p. 26) generally, through the growing domination. As typically importance of former colonies, most notably the USA. By the end of the nine- practised in Africa and teenth century, some nine-tenths of the entire land surface of the globe was South-east Asia, colonial controlled by European, or European-derived, powers. government was exercised by a settler The philosophical and intellectual roots of western civilization lie in Judeo- community from the Christian religion and the rediscovery in early modern Europe of the learning of mother country who classical Greece and Rome, which provided the foundation for the scientific were ethnically distinct revolution of the seventeenth century and subsequent technological advances. from the native During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political, economic and cultural population. In French colonialism, colonies life in Europe was deeply permeated by liberal ideas, so much so that liberalism were thought of as part has sometimes appeared to be indistinguishable from western civilization in of the mother country, general. Influenced by the Enlightenment, liberal thinkers preached the values meaning that colonial of individualism, reason, freedom and toleration. This form of liberalism was peoples were granted boldly universalist: it implied that human history would be marked by the formal rights of citizenship. In contrast, gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal principles and institutions. Progress, in neo-colonialism involves short, was understood in strictly liberal terms. economic domination What were the features of this western model of modernization? without direct political Westernization had significant economic, political and cultural implications. In control, as, for example, economic terms, it meant the growth of a market or capitalist society. in so-called US ‘dollar imperialism’ in Latin Capitalism, based as it was on private property and competition, stimulated an America. unprecedented level of economic dynamism, underpinned by an ethic of indi- vidual self-striving. This gave rise to industrialization and urbanization, as well as new patterns of social stratification, based on a rising middle class, brought about through the expansion of business and the professions, and an increas- ingly factory-based working class. From a western perspective, market capitalism is the only reliable mechanism for generating wealth and widespread prosperity. The political face of westernization took the form of the advance of liberal l The Enlightenment: An democracy. The key feature of such a system is that the right to rule is gained intellectual movement that through success in regular and competitive elections. In this way, a competitive reached its height in the and market-based economic system was complemented by an open and plural- eighteenth century and istic political system. Such economic and political arrangements have very challenged traditional beliefs in religion, politics and learning in particular implications for the culture (see p. 194) of western societies, however. general in the name of reason As liberal societies tend to espouse universal values and emphasize the and progress. importance of personal autonomy and freedom of choice, they are often seen to weaken cultural bonds and identities. This can be seen in the changing nature of l Individualism: The belief in social relationships in liberal societies. Ferdinand Tönnies noted the decline of the supreme importance of the individual over any social group Gemeinschaft, or ‘community’, typically found in traditional societies and char- or collective body (see p. 154). acterized by natural affection and a mutual respect, and the rise of Gesellschaft,  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 187 or ‘association’, the looser, artificial and contractual relationships that are typi- cally found in urban and industrialized societies. Gesellschaft relationships tend to liberate people from their cultural inheritance, allowing them to adopt beliefs, values and norms more in line with individual tastes and personal preferences. Liberal societies have therefore tended to ‘privatize’ culture, in that issues such as religious belief, moral principles and sexual conduct have been increasingly thought of as matters to be decided by the individual rather than the larger society. This has been reflected, particularly since the 1960s, in the spread of so- called ‘permissive’ values and social norms. Such a trend has been associated with a general decline in deference and the weakening authority of traditional values and traditional hierarchies (not least those linked to gender roles). The notion that westernization provided the only viable model for modern- ization gained its greatest impetus during the final decades of the twentieth century. Globalization (see p. 8) appeared to be bringing about the universaliza- tion of the western economic model together with the spread of the values and appetites of consumer capitalism. And, as Fukuyama (see p. 539) and other ‘end of history’ theorists gleefully proclaimed, the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War appeared to herald the universalization of western-style liberal democracy. However, the same period also witnessed early signs that universalist liberalism was under pressure, both in its western homeland and beyond. In western society itself, there were signs of a backlash against the spread of liberal values and of atomistic individualism. In the USA and else- where, this took the form of growing support for social conservatism, articu- lating hostility towards the ‘permissive 1960s’ and calling for a strengthening of traditional values, often rooted in religion (see p. 197). Liberalism also came under pressure from communitarian theorists who argued that, in conceiving of the individual as logically prior to and ‘outside’ the community, liberalism had legitimized selfish and egotistical behaviour and downgraded the importance of collective identity. They argued that social fragmentation and breakdown had l Permissiveness: The become a feature of western society largely as a result of individuals’ obsession willingness to allow people to make their own moral choices; with rights and their refusal to acknowledge reciprocal duties and moral respon- permissiveness suggests that sibilities. This was demonstrated by the so-called ‘parenting deficit’; that is, the there are no authoritative abandonment of the burdens of parenthood by fathers and mothers who are values. more concerned about their own lifestyles and careers. However, powerful forces were also emerging beyond western societies that sought to challenge, and over- l Deference: Willing compliance with the wishes or turn, the hegemony of universalist liberalism, and with it the notion that west- expectations of others. ernization represented the only legitimate model of modernization. These forces have been associated with the emergence of a new politics of identity, in which l Social conservatism: The identity is linked to ‘particularisms’, such as culture, ethnicity, locality and reli- belief that societies should be gion. based on a bedrock of shared values and a common cultures, providing a necessary social ‘cement’. Politics of collective identity Whereas politics during the ‘short’ twentieth century, and especially during the l Identity: A relatively stable Cold War era, was dominated by ideological rivalry, politics since appears to have and enduring sense of selfhood; identity may be personal been structured increasingly by issues of cultural difference. The East–West (unique to an individual), social rivalry between communism and capitalism was based on a clash between (shared with a group) or human contrasting models of industrial society, each offering a supposedly universal (shared with all people). solution to economic and social ills. They each practised the politics of owner- 188 GLOBAL POLITICS A P P ROAC H E S TO... IDENTITY Realist view identity (linked to nationality, religion, ethnicity (see p. Realists have given relatively little attention to the issue 193) and so on) being written off simply as ‘false of identity. Their primary focus is on the interests and consciousness’ (deluded and manipulated thinking). behaviour of the state, seen as the dominant global Class identities, nevertheless, were provisional, not actor, rather than on the make-up of its constituent fundamental. They were essentially a manifestation of population. Nevertheless, since states are viewed as the inequalities of the capitalist system, and would be unified and cohesive entities, this reflects assumptions swept away once a classless, communist society had about political allegiance and social belonging. Notably, been established. Social constructivists, for their part, as most states are nation-states (see p. 168), realists have emphasized the extent to which the interests and tend to assume that identity is forged through the over- actions of global actors, be they states or individuals, lapping ties of nationality and citizenship. National are fashioned by their sense of identity, which is in turn identity, indeed, may be ‘natural’, in that it reflects an conditioned by non-material factors. As Wendt (see p. irresistible psychological disposition for people to iden- 77) put it, ‘identities are the basis of interests’. Such a tify with others who are similar to themselves. position rejects any fixed or unchanging notion of identity, as it does the idea that actors encounter each Liberal view other with pre-determined sets of preferences. Liberals generally understand identity in strictly Individuals can thus adopt different identities in differ- personal terms. Human beings are first and foremost ent cultural and ideational circumstances, including, individuals, possessed of a unique identity. However, potentially, cosmopolitan identities. emphasizing the importance of the individual has two Since the 1970s, however, critical theorists from contrasting implications. Individuals are defined by various traditions have increasingly understood iden- ‘inner’ qualities and attributes that are specific to tity in terms of ‘difference’. This reflects both the themselves, but such thinking is also universalist, in decline of the politics of social class and a growing that it implies that, as individuals, all human beings awareness of other sources of social injustice, linked, share the same status and so are entitled to the same for example, to gender (see p. 423), race, ethnicity and rights and opportunities. This is reflected in liberal sexual orientation. Conventional models of identity support for the doctrine of human rights (see p. 311). came to be seen as forms of cultural control and subor- For liberals, then, identity is both unique and universal. dination, in that they are constructed on the basis of The liberal commitment to individualism has impor- the norms and characteristics of dominant groups. The tant implications for any theory of social or collective emphasis on difference, by contrast, allowed marginal- identity. In particular, it suggests that factors such as ized and subordinated groups to embrace, even cele- race, religion, culture, gender and social class are at best brate, their distinctive, and therefore more ‘authentic’, of secondary importance: they are not ‘core’ to human identity. Identity formation thus became a vehicle for identity. Nevertheless, liberals have adopted a wide political self-assertion, as in the ideas of ‘black libera- range of views on such issues, and have also recognized tion’, ‘women’s liberation’, ‘gay liberation’ and so on. the social dimension of personal identity. This is Such thinking has been particularly embraced by femi- evident in the ideas of liberal communitarianism nist theorists, for whom identity is linked to gender. (Taylor 1994) and liberal nationalism (Miller 2007). However, while egalitarian feminists have been concerned to reduce or remove gender differences (on the grounds that gender serves to divide otherwise Critical views identical human beings), so-called difference feminists A variety of critical approaches to identity have been have argued that gender is the very root of identity. developed. Theorists in the Marxist tradition have The theory of gender identity suggests that women conventionally understood identity in terms of social should be ‘woman-identified’, thinking of themselves in class. They believe that people tend to identify with terms of the distinctive capacities, needs and interests those who have the same economic position, and of women. therefore class interests, as themselves, other forms of  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 189 ship, capitalism standing for private property and market competition, while CONCEPT communism stood for collective ownership and central planning. Although the Liberal former clearly vanquished the latter, its worldwide victory has been thrown into democracy doubt, particularly since the 1980s, by the growing importance of identity politics (see p. 190). What all forms of identity politics have in common is, first, that they A liberal democracy is a political regime in which view liberal universalism as a source of oppression, even a form of cultural impe- a ‘liberal’ commitment to rialism, that marginalizes and demoralizes subordinate groups and peoples. It limited government is does this because, behind the façade of universalism, the culture of liberal soci- blended with a eties is constructed in line with the interests of its dominant groups – men, ‘democratic’ belief in whites, the wealthy and so forth. Subordinate groups and peoples are either popular rule. Its key features are: (1) the right assigned an inferior or demeaning stereotype or they are encouraged to identify to rule is gained through with the values and interests of dominant groups, their oppressors. success in regular and However, identity politics is also a source of liberation and empowerment. It competitive elections, promises that social and political advancement can be achieved through a based on universal adult process of cultural self-assertion aimed at cultivating a ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ sense suffrage; (2) constraints on government imposed of identity. In many ways, the archetypal model for identity politics was the black by a constitution, consciousness movement that first emerged in the early twentieth century, institutional checks and inspired by activists such as Marcus Garvey, who preached a ‘back to Africa’ balances, and protections message. Black nationalism gained greater prominence in the 1960s with an for individual rights; and upsurge in both the reformist and revolutionary wings of the movement. In its (3) a vigorous civil society including a reformist guise, the movement took the form of a struggle for civil rights that private enterprise reached national prominence in the USA under the leadership of Martin Luther economy, independent King (1929–68) and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured trade unions and a free People (NAACP). The strategy of protest and non-violent civil disobedience was press. While some view nevertheless rejected by the emerging Black Power movement, which supported liberal democracy as the political expression of black separatism and, under the leadership of the Black Panthers, founded in western values and 1966, promoted the use of physical force and armed confrontation. Of more economic structures, enduring significance in US politics, however, have been the Black Muslims, others argue that it is founded in 1929, who advocate a separatist creed based on the idea that black universally applicable, as Americans are descended from an ancient Muslim tribe. The underlying strategy it allows for the expression of the widest of black nationalism was, however, to confront a dominant white culture possible range of views through a process of consciousness-raising that has subsequently been adopted and beliefs. by other forms of identity politics. Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) Jamaican political thinker and activist, and an early advocate of black nationalism. Garvey was the founder in 1914 of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). In 1916, he left Jamaica for New York, where his message of black pride and economic self-sufficiency gained him a growing following, particularly in ghettos such as Harlem. Although his black business enterprises failed, and his call for a return to Africa was largely ignored, Garvey’s emphasis on establishing black pride and his vision of Africa as a ‘homeland’ provided the basis for the later Black Power move- ment. Rastafarianism is also based largely on his ideas. Garvey was imprisoned for mail fraud in 1923, and was later deported, eventually dying in obscurity in London. 190 GLOBAL POLITICS Focus on... Identity politics: who are we? Identity politics is an orientation towards social theo- fore inculcate a sense of inferiority, even shame, rizing and political practice, rather than a coherent helping to entrench marginalized groups in their subor- body of ideas with a settled political character. Its dination. central feature is that it seeks to challenge and over- Second, subordination can be challenged by reshap- throw oppression by reshaping a group’s identity ing identity to give the group concerned a sense of through what amounts to a process of politico-cultural (usually publicly proclaimed) pride and self-respect, for self-assertion. Manifestations of identity politics are example, ‘black is beautiful’, ‘gay pride’ and so on. varied and diverse, ranging from second-wave feminism Embracing and proclaiming a positive social identity and the gay and lesbian movement to ethnic national- thus serves as an act of defiance (liberating people ism, multiculturalism (see p. 192) and religious funda- from others’ power to determine their identity) and as mentalism (see p. 199). Identity can be reshaped an assertion of group solidarity (encouraging people to around many principles – gender, sexuality, culture, identify with those who share the same identity as ethnicity, religion and so on. All forms of identity poli- themselves). Critics of identity politics have argued tics nevertheless exhibit two characteristic beliefs. First, that it ‘miniaturizes’ humanity, by seeing people only in group marginalization is understood not merely as a terms of group belonging; that it fosters division, often legal, political or social phenomenon, but is, rather, a because it embraces exclusive and quasi-absolutist cultural phenomenon. It operates through stereotypes notions of identity; and that it embodies tensions and and values developed by dominant groups that struc- contradictions (for example, between the women’s ture how marginalized groups see themselves and are liberation movement and patriarchal religious funda- seen by others. Conventional notions of identity there- mentalists). Why has there been an upsurge in identity politics since the final decades of the twentieth century? As discussed later in the chapter, the phenomenon is often associated with postcolonialism (see p. 200), and attempts in former European colonies to give political independence a cultural dimension by developing a non-western, and sometimes anti-western, sense of identity. A second factor was the failure of socialism and, ultimately, the collapse of communism. Until the 1970s, there had been a clear tendency for socially disadvantaged groups and peoples to articulate their political aspirations through socialism in one of its various forms. By providing a critique of exploitation and oppression, and by standing for social development and equality, socialism exerted a powerful appeal for oppressed peoples in many parts of the world, often, but not always, linked to the wider influence of the Soviet Union. Anticolonial nationalism in the developing world was typically orientated around socialist values and goals and sometimes embraced Marxist-Leninist doctrines. However, the failure of developing-world socialist regimes, particularly those with Soviet-style central planning systems, to eradicate poverty and deliver pros- perity meant that postcolonial nationalism was increasingly remodelled in line with values and identities that were more deeply rooted in developing-world soci- eties. This was evident in the growing importance of ethnic nationalism and the rise of religious fundamentalism. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 191 added powerfully to such tendencies. Communist rule had merely fossilized ethnic and national loyalties by driving them underground, meaning that ethnic and religious nationalism became the most natural vehicles for expressing anti- communism or anti-Sovietism. In addition, the political instability and economic uncertainty precipitated by the collapse of communism were a perfect breeding ground for a form of politics that offered an ‘organic’ sense of collective identity. This was most clearly demonstrated by the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s through a growing stress on the politics of national and ethnic identity, which resulted in a series of wars and, for example, left the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia divided into ‘ethnically pure’ Muslim, Serb and Croat areas. A third factor explaining the growth of identity politics was globalization. In a sense, identity politics can be seen as a form of resistance against the cultural impact of globalization. As discussed in Chapter 6, globalization has been asso- ciated with a process of homogenization, through which a relatively narrow common culture has tended to be adopted the world over. The features of this include growing urbanization, the use of common technology (televisions, computers, mobile phones and so on), so-called ‘global goods’, the growth of consumerism and materialism, and an increasing cultural mixing through the ‘multiculturalization’ of national cultural traditions. Globalization has therefore been seen in many parts of the world as a threat to their national culture, and so to traditionally-based forms of identity. However, resistance to what Benjamin Barber (2003) called ‘McWorld’, a complex of western, and often specifically US, influences, appetites and values, has rarely taken the form of simple traditional- ism. Whereas traditional conceptions of social belonging were ‘given’, in the sense that they stemmed largely from unquestioned (and perhaps unquestion- able) bonds and loyalties, those generated by identity politics are ‘modern’ in that they are shaped by a process of individualization and so involve, to a greater or lesser extent, a process of self-definition. It is the intersection of individual cogni- tive processes with broader cultural, political and economic forces that gives identity, in this sense, its political potency and emotional power. This also helps to explain why identity politics tends to take root not in traditional societies but either in modern societies or in societies in which a traditional sense of belong- ing is being disrupted by modern influences. Multiculturalism and hybridity One of the most significant manifestations of identity politics in modern societies is multiculturalism (see p. 192). This emerged as, thanks to increased interna- tional migration since the 1970s (examined in Chapter 7), more and more coun- tries came to accept and even (although with different degrees of enthusiasm) embrace their multicultural characters, abandoning the politics of assimilation or strategies of voluntary repatriation. Multiculturalism proclaims the idea of ‘togetherness in difference’ (Young 1995), taking particular account of cultural differentiation that is based on race, ethnicity or language. Multiculturalism not only recognizes the fact of cultural diversity, but also holds that such differences l Traditionalism: A belief in the value of tradition and should be respected and publicly affirmed. Although the USA, an immigrant continuity, providing society society, has long been a multicultural society, the cause of multiculturalism in this with a historically-rooted sense sense was not taken up until the rise of the black consciousness movement in the of identity. 1960s. Australia has been officially committed to multiculturalism since the 192 GLOBAL POLITICS 1970s, in recognition of its increasing ‘Asianization’. In New Zealand, it is linked CONCEPT to a recognition of the role of Maori culture in forging a distinctive national iden- Multiculturalism tity. In Canada, it is associated with attempts to achieve reconciliation between Multiculturalism is used French-speaking Quebec and the English-speaking majority population, and an as both a descriptive and acknowledgement of the rights of the indigenous Inuit peoples. a normative term. As a Multiculturalism, however, is a broad term that encompasses a range of descriptive term, it refers ambiguities as well as different approaches to the challenge of diversity. The to cultural diversity ambiguity that lies at the heart of multiculturalism is reflected in the tension arising from the existence within a society between, on the one hand, the idea of ethnic belonging and the embrace, even of two or more groups celebration, of diversity on the other. Multicultural theorists highlight the whose beliefs and importance of ethnicity as a basis for identity. Multiculturalism can be seen as a practices generate a form of communitarianism, in that it focuses on the group and not the individ- distinctive sense of ual, seeing an individual’s self-worth as being inextricably linked to respect and collective identity, usually linked to racial, ethnic or recognition for the beliefs, values and practices of his or her ethnic community. language differences. As a The advance of multiculturalism has therefore gone hand in hand with normative term, campaigns for minority rights, sometimes called ‘special’ or ‘polyethnic’ rights. multiculturalism implies These are rights that acknowledge and seek to protect a community’s ethnic a positive endorsement distinctiveness, and affect matters such as dress, language, schooling and public of communal diversity, based either on the right holidays. In states such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, they extend to of different cultural special representation or territorial rights for indigenous peoples. However, at groups to respect and the same time, multiculturalism proclaims the supposed benefits of cultural recognition, or on the mixing and hybridity, the value each community derives from living within a alleged benefits to the society characterized by cultural difference. Cultures can thus learn from and larger society of moral and cultural diversity. enrich each other, widening cultural opportunities and strengthening inter- Multiculturalism, in this cultural understanding. The result is a kind of ‘mix-and-match’ multiculturalism sense, acknowledges the that operates in tandem with cultural globalization to create deeper levels of importance of beliefs, social and cultural mixing in modern societies, blurring national distinctiveness values and ways of life in in the process. establishing self- understanding and a There are, moreover, competing models of multiculturalism, offering differ- sense of self-worth for ent approaches to how diversity and togetherness can be reconciled, and individuals and groups providing rival views on the complex relationship between multiculturalism alike. and nationalism. Liberal multiculturalists tend to stress the importance of civic unity, arguing that diversity can and should be confined to the private sphere, leaving the public sphere as a realm of integration. Moral, cultural and lifestyle choices can thus largely be left to the individual, while common political or civic allegiance help to bind people together. In this view, multiculturalism and nationalism are compatible, even creating a new, possibly twenty-first century model of national identity in the form of multicultural nationalism, which balances cultural diversity against a common citizenship. Insofar as this destroys the link between nationality and ethnicity, it is very clearly based on a form of civic nationalism. However, conservatives, who argue that stable and successful societies must be based on shared values and a common culture, argue that nationalism and multiculturalism are fundamentally incompatible. In this view, human beings are limited and dependent creatures, who are natu- rally drawn to others similar to themselves but, by the same token, fear or distrust people who are in some way different. Multicultural societies are there- fore inherently fractured and conflict-ridden: suspicion, hostility and even violence between different ethnic communities are not products of intolerance, ignorance or social inequality, but are a simple fact of social psychology. Ethnic  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 193 and cultural diversity are therefore the implacable enemy of national unity and CONCEPT political stability. Ethnicity The record of multicultural societies nevertheless suggests that there is Ethnicity is the sentiment nothing natural or inevitable about inter-ethnic conflict or hostility. This can be of loyalty towards a seen in relation to the revival of ethnic nationalism in the late twentieth century distinctive population, (discussed later in the chapter), but it is also evident in the close relationship cultural group or between ethnic conflict and socio-economic divisions. In a sense, communal territorial area. The term tensions have always been as much about social class as they have been about is complex because it has both racial and cultural ethnicity: different ethnic groups tend to occupy differing positions within the overtones. The members economy and enjoy different levels of economic and social security. In some of ethnic groups are respects, these economically based ethnic tensions have become more acute in an often seen, correctly or age of globalization. This has happened in at least two ways. First, as Amy Chua incorrectly, to have (2003) argued, in many developing countries, the increased concentration of descended from common ancestors, meaning that wealth in the hands of those in a position to exploit the benefit of global markets they tend to be thought has often allowed small ethnic minorities to acquire hugely disproportional of as extended kinship economic power. Examples of such ‘market dominant’ economic minorities groups, united by blood. include the Chinese in much of southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa and, More commonly, though in a less extreme form, the Ipos in West Africa. In such circumstances, however, ethnicity is understood as a form of widening economic divisions have provoked growing hostility and racial preju- cultural identity, albeit dice on the part of ethnic majorities, which are increasingly expressed in one that operates at a violence, creating what Chua called a ‘world on fire’. The second way in which deep and emotional level. economic and ethnic tensions intermingle is in developed countries, where An ‘ethnic’ culture ethnic minorities are usually confined to marginal, low-status and low-income encompasses values, traditions and practices occupations. Such circumstances are usually linked to discrimination and other but, crucially, it also gives forms of structural disadvantage, and have led to civil unrest and even rioting people a common amongst ethnic minority youths. Examples of this occurred in various parts of identity and sense of the UK in 1981, in Los Angeles in 1992, in Queensland, Australia in 2004 and distinctiveness, usually by across much of France in 2005. focusing on their origins and descent. Is cultural conflict inevitable? The rise of identity politics is often seen as part and parcel of a broader phenom- enon: the growing salience of culture as a factor affecting international relations and world affairs. Some, indeed, believe that since the end of the Cold War culture has effectively displaced ideology as the organizing principle of global politics. One of the most widely discussed and controversial attempts to high- light the importance of culture in contemporary global politics has been Samuel Huntington’s (see p. 540) ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. Although the thesis was very much born in the context of the end of the Cold War (Huntington 1993, 1996), the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ attracted growing attention during the 1990s as early, optimistic expectations of the establishment of a liberal ‘new world order’ were shaken by an upsurge in ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and elsewhere. However, the thesis had its greatest impact after September 11 (see p. 20), when it was widely used as an explanation of the l Clash of civilizations changing nature of world order as global terrorism was seen as a symptom of an thesis: The theory that, in the emerging clash between Islam and the West. Nevertheless, the extent to which it post-Cold War world, conflict would not primarily be informed the Bush administration’s approach to the ‘war on terror’ (see p. 230) ideological or economic but, should not be exaggerated, as it certainly would not have encouraged the adop- rather, cultural in character. tion of strategies of democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan. 194 GLOBAL POLITICS Huntington’s basic assertion was that a new era in global politics was emerging CONCEPT in which civilization would be the primary force, a civilization being ‘culture writ Culture large’. As such, the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis contrasted sharply with the neolib- Culture, in its broadest eral image of world affairs, which stresses the growth of interdependence (see p. sense, is the way of life of 7), particularly in the light of globalization. Huntington’s relationship to realism a people; their beliefs, is more complex, however. Insofar as he accepted that traditional, power-driven values and practices. states remain the key actors on the world stage, he was a realist, but his realism Sociologists and was modified by the insistence that the struggle for power now took place within anthropologists tend to distinguish between a larger framework of civilizational, rather than ideological, conflict. In ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, the Huntington’s view, cultural conflict is likely to occur at a ‘micro’ level and a former encompassing ‘macro’ level. ‘Micro-level’ conflict will occur at the ‘fault-lines’ between civiliza- that which is passed on tions, where one ‘human tribe’ clashes with another, possibly resulting in commu- from one generation to nal wars. In that sense, civilizations operate rather like tectonic plates that rub up the next by learning, rather than through against one another at vulnerable points. At the ‘macro-level’, conflict may break biological inheritance. out between the civilizations themselves, in all likelihood precipitated by clashes Culture therefore between their ‘core’ states. Huntington particularly warned about the likelihood embodies language, of conflict between China (wedded to distinctive Sinic cultural values despite religion, traditions, social rapid economic growth) and the West, and between the West and Islam. He also norms and moral principles. A distinction is identified the potential for conflict between the West and ‘the Rest’, possibly spear- sometimes drawn headed by an anti-western alliance of Confucian and Islamic states. between ‘high’ culture, This account of emerging and seemingly irresistible cultural conflict has been represented especially by severely criticized, however. For example, Huntington’s ‘tectonic’ notion of civi- the arts and literature, lizations presents them as being much more homogeneous, and therefore which is supposedly the source of intellectual and distinct from one another, than is in fact the case. In practice, civilizations have personal development, always interpenetrated one another, giving rise to blurred or hybrid cultural and ‘low’ or ‘popular’ identities. Furthermore, just as orthodox Marxists made the mistake of culture, which is ‘economism’, by overstating the importance of economic and class factors in orientated around mass determining identity, Huntington made the mistake of culturalism, in that he consumption and populist instincts, and failed to recognize the extent to which cultural identities are shaped by political may even have a and social circumstances. This, indeed, may be a defect of all forms of identity debasing impact on politics. What appears to be a cultural conflict may therefore have a quite differ- society. ent, and more complex, explanation. For instance, the ethnic conflicts that broke out in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were not so much a product of natural hatreds and tensions rising to the surface but were, rather, a consequence of the growth of nationalist and racialist doctrines in the power vacuum that had been created by the collapse of communism. Similarly, conflict between civilizations may be more an expression of perceived economic and political injustice than of cultural rivalry. The rise of militant Islam (discussed later in the chapter) may thus be better explained by tensions and crises in the Middle East in general and in the Arab world in particular, linked to the inheritance of colonialism, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the survival of unpopular but often oil-rich autocratic regimes, and urban poverty and unemployment, rather than by cultural incom- patibility between western and Islamic value systems. However, though partial in its account of the emerging twenty-first century global order, the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ has been effective in drawing attention to important tendencies in global politics. These include the growing political importance of culture in an apparently de-ideologized world and the power of the backlash against globalization in particular and against western global hegemony in general. As such, it provides a context that helps to explain  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 195 the rising importance of religious movements in the post-Cold War world. In addition, Huntington helpfully underlines the capacity of cultural difference to generate political conflict, even though this may too often be portrayed as a natural, rather than political, process. Nevertheless, Huntington’s theories are often more flexible and sophisticated than his critics allow. He recognized, for example, that a global war involving the ‘core’ states of the world’s major civiliza- tions is highly improbable (but not impossible), and he acknowledged that the prospects of a global inter-civilizational conflict are linked to the shifting balance of power amongst civilizations and their ‘core’ states, especially the rise of China as the ‘biggest player in the history of man’. He also recognized that civilizational conflict can be managed by political intervention. For example, he warned against the West pursuing democracy promotion (see p. 212) on the grounds that this would merely inflame non-western cultures and encourage them to form anti-western alliances. RELIGIOUS REVIVALISM Religion and politics The most prominent aspect of the growing political importance of culture has undoubtedly been religious revivalism and the rise of religious movements. In Huntington’s (1996) view, religion is the ‘central defining characteristic’ of civi- lizations, in which case the ‘clash of civilizations’ effectively implies a clash of religions. Such a view is difficult to sustain, however. Not only are there consid- erable parallels and overlaps amongst the world’s religions: for example, Buddhism developed out of Hinduism, and Christianity, Islam and Judaism, the ‘religions of the book’, are rooted in a common belief in the Old Testament of the Bible – but the role of religion in different societies and cultures varies consider- ably. For instance, although Judeo-Christian beliefs are clearly a component of western civilization (one that is, nevertheless, shared with Orthodox and Latin American civilizations), it is not necessarily its defining feature, Greco-Roman influences and the related tradition of Enlightenment rationalism being at least equally important. Ideas such as social equality, toleration, critical rationality and democracy are thus key elements in western culture, but none of these can be traced directly to Christianity. Indeed, one of the features of western, and particularly European societies is their secularism, the USA, where about one- quarter of voters define themselves as ‘born-again Christians’, being an excep- tion. Such developments are based on the so-called ‘secularization thesis’. The advance of secularism, nevertheless, does not necessarily imply the decline of l Secularism: The belief that religion. Rather, it is concerned to establish a ‘proper’ sphere and role for reli- religion should not intrude into gion, in line with the liberal belief in a so-called ‘public/private divide’. Its aim is secular (worldly) affairs, usually reflected in the desire to to fence religion into a private arena, in which people are free to do as they like, separate church from state. leaving public life to be organized on a strictly secular basis. Freedom of religious belief therefore developed into a key liberal-democratic principle. However, l Secularization thesis: The other forces, such as the advance of rationalism and scientific doctrines and the theory that modernization is growth of materialistic and consumerist values, have strengthened ‘this-worldly’ invariably accompanied by the victory of reason over religion concerns in many societies. and the displacement of However, advocates of the secularization thesis have been confounded by spiritual values by secular ones. developments from the late twentieth century onwards. Religion has become 196 GLOBAL POLITICS Debating... Is there an emerging ‘clash of civilizations’? The ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis suggests that twenty-first century global order will be characterized by growing tension and conflict, but that this conflict will be cultural in character, rather than ideological, political or economic. But how compelling is the thesis? YES NO The rise of culture. Culture is destined to be the primary Complex and fragmented civilizations. Huntington’s force in twenty-first century global politics because, as notion of culture and civilization can be dismissed as Huntington put it, ‘If not civilization, what?’ Since the simplistic at best. In the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, end of the Cold War, ideology has faded in significance cultures are portrayed as rigid and ‘hermetically sealed’, and globalization has weakened the state’s ability to giving rise to a narrow association between civilizations generate a sense of civic belonging, while there is little and seemingly unchanging sets of traditions, values and evidence of global or cosmopolitan identities becoming a understandings. The idea of ‘fault-line’ conflict between reality. In such a context, peoples and nations are civilizations is based on a homogeneous or ‘tectonic’ confronted by the most basic of human questions: who model of civilizations. In practice, civilizations are not are we? This forces them to define themselves increas- homogeneous and unified blocs, but are, rather, complex, ingly in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, fragmented and often open to external influence. For values and customs; in short, in terms of culture. States instance, the notions of an ‘Islamic civilization’ or a and groups from the same civilization will therefore rally ‘western civilization’ fail to take account of either the to the support of their ‘kin countries’, and political creeds extent of political, cultural and social division within such as socialism and nationalism will give way to each ‘civilization’, or the extent to which Islam and the ‘Islamization’, ‘Hinduization’, ‘Russianization’ and so on. West have influenced, and continue to influence, one another. Cultural conflict. A stronger sense of cultural belonging cannot but lead to tension and conflict. This is, first, Cultural harmony and peaceful coexistence. The idea that because different cultures and civilizations are incom- cultural difference is always and inevitably linked to mensurate: they establish quite different sets of values political antagonism is highly questionable. Cultural and meanings; in effect, different understandings of the similarity is, for example, no guarantee of peace and world. However desirable cross-cultural understanding stability: most wars take place between states from the may be, it is impossible to bring about. Second, there is same, not different, civilizations. Moreover, there is an irresistible tendency for people’s sense of who they are considerable evidence that people from different cultures, to be sharpened by an awareness of the ‘other’: the people religions or ethnic origins have been able to live together they are not; those they are against. This divides people in relative peace and harmony as, for instance, applied in into ‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘our civilization’ versus ‘those the Balkans during the Ottoman era. Finally, when barbarians’. cultures or cultural groups clash this is less a reflection of ‘natural’ antipathies or rivalries, and more a manifesta- Civilizational tensions. Certain trends to which tion of deeper political and social factors, linked to the Huntington drew attention have undoubtedly generated distribution of power or wealth. tension, giving the world an increasingly problematical multipolar and ‘multicivilizational’ character. These Trends towards cultural homogenization. The ‘clash of include the long-term decline of the West, and, more civilizations’ thesis offers, at best, a one-sided account of specifically, the fading of US hegemony; the so-called contemporary cultural trends. In particular, it ignores the ‘Asian affirmation’, the economic rise of Asia and espe- extent to which globalization and other forces have cially the rise of China; and the resurgence of Islam, already blurred cultural differences in many parts of the driven by a population explosion in a still unstable world. Although the ‘one world’ image advanced by so- Muslim world. Tensions between China and the USA and called ‘hyperglobalizers’ and liberal internationalists may between Islam and the West thus have an inescapable be naive, there are nevertheless strong tendencies towards civilizational dimension. economic interdependence and integration which at least counter-balance, and perhaps contain, any centrifugal tendencies that civilizational rivalry may generate.  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 197 more important, not less important. This has been evident in the emergence of CONCEPT new, and often more assertive forms of religiosity, in the increasing impact of Religion religious movements and, most importantly, in a closer relationship between Religion, in its most religion and politics, through both the religionization of politics and politiciza- general sense, is an tion of religion. This became evident in the 1970s within Islam, and was most organized community of dramatically demonstrated by the 1979 ‘Islamic Revolution’ in Iran, which people bound together by brought the Ayatollah Khomeini (see p. 198) to power as the leader of the world’s a shared body of beliefs first Islamic state. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that this was not an exclu- concerning some kind of transcendent reality. sively Islamic development, as so-called ‘fundamentalist’ movements emerged However, ‘transcendent’ within Christianity, particularly in the form of the ‘new Christian Right’ in the in this context may refer USA, and within Hinduism and Sikhism in India. Other manifestations of this to anything from a belief include the spread of US-style Pentecostalism in Latin America, Africa and East in a distinctly ‘other- Asia; the growth in China of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that has been worldly’ supreme being or creator God, to a more taken by the authorities to express anti-communism and is reportedly supported ‘this-worldly’ experience by 70 million people; the regeneration of Orthodox Christianity in post- of personal liberation, as communist Russia; the emergence of the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult in in the Buddhist concept Japan; and growing interest across western societies in myriad forms of Eastern of nirvana. There are mysticism and spiritual and therapeutic systems (yoga, meditation, Pilates, major differences between monotheistic Shiatsu and so forth). religions (Christianity, Although religious revivalism can be seen as a consequence of the larger Islam and Judaism), upsurge in identity politics, religion has proved to be a particularly potent means which have a single, or of regenerating personal and social identity in modern circumstances. As limited number of, sacred modern societies are increasingly atomistic, diffuse and pluralized, there is, texts and a clear authority system, and arguably, a greater thirst for the sense of meaning, purpose and certainty that pantheistic, non-theistic religious consciousness appears to offer. This applies because religion provides and nature religions believers with a world-view and moral vision that has higher, or indeed supreme, (Hinduism, Buddhism, authority, because it stems from a supposedly divine source. Religion thus Jainism, Taoism and so defines the very grounds of people’s being; it gives them an ultimate frame of on), which tend to have looser, more reference as well as a moral orientation in a world increasingly marked by moral decentralized and more relativism. In addition, religion generates a powerful sense of social solidarity, pluralized structures. connecting people to one another at a ‘thick’ or deep level, as opposed to the ‘thin’ connectedness that is conventional in modern societies. Religious revivalism has nevertheless served a variety of political purposes. Three of these have been particularly prominent. The first is that religion has been an increasingly important component of social conservatism, offering to strengthen the moral fabric of society through a return to religious values and practices. Such a religiously-orientated moral conservatism has been particularly evident in the USA since the 1970s, as the new Christian Right sought to fuse religion and politics in attempting to ‘turn America back to Christ’. Through its influence on the Republican Party, and particularly on presidents such as Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, the new Christian Right has made moral and cultural issues, such as anti-abortion, ‘creationism’ and opposition to gun control, gay rights and stem cell research, as prominent in US politics as tradi- tional ones such as the economy and foreign policy. Second, religion has been an increasingly significant component, even the defining feature, of forms of ethnic l Moral relativism: The belief that there are no absolute nationalism. The attraction of religion rather than the nation as the principal values, or a condition in which source of political identity is that it provides a supposedly primordial and seem- there is deep and widespread ingly unchangeable basis for the establishment of group membership. India has disagreement over moral issues. witnessed an upsurge in both Hindu nationalism and Sikh nationalism. Hindu  198 GLOBAL POLITICS Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–89) Iranian cleric and political leader. The son and grandson of Shi’a clergy, Khomeini was one of the foremost scholars in the major theological centre in Qom until being expelled from Iran in 1964. His return from exile in 1979 sparked the ‘Islamic Revolution’, leaving the Ayatollah (literally, ‘gift of Allah’) as the supreme leader of the world’s first Islamic state until his death. Breaking decisively with the Shi’a tradition that the clergy remain outside politics, Khomeini’s world-view was rooted in a clear division between the oppressed, understood largely as the poor and excluded of the developing world, and the oppressors, seen as the twin Satans: the USA and the Soviet Union, capitalism and communism. Islam thus became a theo-political project aimed at regenerating the Islamic world by ridding it of occupation and corruption from outside. nationalists in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the more radical World Hindu Council and its parent body, the RSS, have sought to make Hinduism the basis of national identity and called for the ‘Hinduization’ of Muslim, Sikh, Jain and other communities. Sikh nationalists have looked to establish ‘Khalistan’, located in present-day Punjab, with Sikhism as the state religion and its government obliged to ensure its unhindered flourishing. In Israel, a collection of small ultra- orthodox Jewish parties and groups have become more prominent in transform- ing Zionism into a defence of the ‘Greater Land of Israel’. This has often been expressed in a campaign to build Jewish settlements in territory occupied in the Six-Day War of 1967 and then formally incorporated into Israel. Third, religion has gained its greatest political influence through providing the basis for militant politico-cultural regeneration, based on the belief that, in Khomeini’s words, ‘Politics is religion’. This notion of religion as a theo-political project is usually referred to as ‘religious fundamentalism’. The fundamentalist upsurge The term ‘fundamentalism’ was first used in debates within American Protestantism in the early twentieth century. Between 1910 and 1915, evangel- ical Protestants published a series of pamphlets entitled The Fundamentals, upholding the inerrancy, or literal truth, of the Bible in the face of modern interpretations of Christianity. However, the term is highly controversial, being l Fundamentalism: A style of commonly associated with inflexibility, dogmatism and authoritarianism. As a thought in which certain result, many of those who are classified as fundamentalists reject the term as principles are recognized as simplistic or demeaning, preferring instead to describe themselves as ‘tradi- essential truths that have unchallengeable and overriding tionalists’, ‘conservatives’, ‘evangelicals’, ‘revivalists’ and so forth. However, authority, often associated with unlike alternative terms, fundamentalism has the advantage of conveying the fierce, and sometimes fanatical, idea of a religio-political movement or project, rather than simply the asser- commitment. tion of scriptural literalism (although this remains a feature of certain forms of fundamentalism). Religious fundamentalism is thus characterized by a l Scriptural literalism: A belief in the literal truth of rejection of the distinction between religion and politics. Politics, in effect, is sacred texts, which as the religion. This implies that religious principles are not restricted to personal or revealed word of God have private life, but are seen as the organizing principles of public existence, unquestionable authority. including law, social conduct and the economy as well as politics. Although  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 199 some claim that fundamentalist tendencies can be identified in all the world’s CONCEPT major religions – Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism and Religious Sikhism – others argue that they tend to be confined to Islam and Protestant fundamentalism Christianity, as only these religious traditions have the capacity to throw up comprehensive programmes of political renewal, albeit with very different The word ‘fundamentalism’ derives characters and ambitions. from the Latin It is difficult to generalize about the causes of the fundamentalist upsurge fundamentum, meaning that has occurred since the late twentieth century because, in different parts of ‘base’. The core idea of the world, it has taken different doctrinal forms and displayed contrasting ideo- religious fundamentalism logical features. What is clear, nevertheless, is that fundamentalism arises in is that religion cannot and should not be deeply troubled societies, particularly societies afflicted by an actual or perceived confined to the private crisis of identity. Ruthven (2005) thus emphasized that fundamentalism is driven sphere, but finds its by a ‘search for meaning’ in a world of growing doubt and uncertainty. A variety highest and proper of developments have helped to generate such doubt and uncertainty. Three expression in the politics factors in particular have strengthened the fundamentalist impulse in religion by of popular mobilization and social regeneration. contributing to such crises: secularization, globalization and postcolonialism. Although often related, Secularization has contributed to a decline of traditional religion and a weaken- religious fundamentalism ing of established morality. In that sense, fundamentalism represents a moral should not be equated protest against decadence and hypocrisy; it aims to restore ‘rightful’ order and with scriptural literalism, re-establish the link between the human world and the divine. Fundamentalism as the ‘fundamentals’ are often extracted through a can therefore be seen as the antidote to moral relativism. process of ‘dynamic’ Religious fundamentalism may also be intrinsically linked to the advance of interpretation by a globalization. As traditional societies are disrupted by increased global flows of charismatic leader. people, goods, ideas and images, religious fundamentalism may emerge as a Religious fundamentalism counter-revolutionary force, a source of resistance to the advance of amorality also differs from ultra- orthodoxy, in that it and corruption. This helps to explain why fundamentalists generally possess a advances a programme Manichaean world-view, one that emphasizes conflict between ‘light’ and ‘dark- for the moral and ness’, or good and evil. If ‘we’ are a chosen people acting according to the will of political regeneration of God, ‘they’ are not merely people with whom we disagree, but a body actively society in line with subverting God’s purpose on Earth; they represent nothing less than the ‘forces religious principles, as opposed to a retreat of darkness’. Political conflict, for fundamentalists, is therefore a battle or war, from corrupt secular and ultimately either the believers or the infidels must prevail. Finally, the impact society into the purity of of postcolonialism helps to explain why, although fundamentalism can be found faith-based communal across the globe, its most potent and influential manifestations have been found living. in the developing world in general and the Muslim world in particular. Postcolonial societies inherited a weakened sense of identity, compounded by a debilitating attachment to western values and institutions, particularly among elite groups. In such circumstances, religious fundamentalism has been attrac- tive both because it offers the prospect of a non-western, and often specifically anti-western, political identity, and because, particularly since the decline of revolutionary socialism in the 1970s, it articulates the aspirations of the urban poor and the lower middle classes. CHALLENGES TO THE WEST The issues of identity, culture and religion have acquired particular prominence through their association with attempts to challenge and displace the politico- cultural hegemony of the West. This marks a recognition of two things. The first is that the material and political domination of the West had an important  200 GLOBAL POLITICS cultural dimension, reflected in the advance of so-called ‘western’ values, such as CONCEPT individualism, formal equality, secularism and materialism. The second was that, Postcolonialism if this culture bore the imprint of western domination, a non-western, or Postcolonialism perhaps anti-western, culture had to be established in its place. This can be seen originated as a trend in in the development of the broad phenomenon of postcolonialism, as well as in literary and cultural attempts in Asia to develop a distinctive system of values. However, it has been studies that sought to expressed most significantly in the rise of political Islam, and in the idea that address the cultural Islam represents a morally superior alternative to western liberalism. conditions characteristic of newly-independent societies. Its purpose has Postcolonialism primarily been to expose and overturn the cultural The structures of western political domination over the rest of the world were and psychological challenged many years before its cultural and ideological domination was called dimensions of colonial rule, recognizing that into question. Anti-colonialism emerged in the inter-war period, but it reached its ‘inner’ subjugation can high point of influence in the post-1945 period, as the British, French, Dutch and persist long after the other European empires collapsed in the face of the growing strength of inde- political structures of pendence movements. In a sense, the colonizing Europeans had taken with them colonialism have been the seeds of their own destruction, the doctrine of nationalism. Anti-colonialism removed. A major thrust of postcolonialism has was therefore based on the same principle of national self-determination that had been to establish the inspired European nation-building in the nineteenth century, and which had legitimacy of non- provided the basis for the reconstruction of Europe after WWI. Although liberal western and sometimes ideas about self-government and constitutionalism were sometimes influential, anti-western political most anti-colonial movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America were attracted to ideas and traditions. Postcolonialism has some form of socialism, and most commonly, revolutionary Marxism. Drawing nevertheless taken a inspiration from the same Enlightenment principles as liberalism, Marxism’s variety of forms. These strength was both that its theory of class struggle provided an explanation for range from Gandhi’s (see imperialism in terms of capitalism’s quest for profit, and that its commitment to p. 268) attempt to fuse revolution provided colonized peoples with a means of emancipation in the form Indian nationalism with an ethic of non-violence of the armed struggle. However, as discussed earlier, the influence of socialism to forms of religious and particularly Marxism in the developing world steadily declined from the fundamentalism, most 1970s onwards, as the emergence of postcolonialism was reflected in the quest for significantly Islamic non-western and sometimes anti-western political philosophies. A major contrib- fundamentalism. utory factor to this was growing resentment against ex-imperial powers that, in many cases, continued to exercise economic and cultural domination over those countries that they had formerly ruled as colonies. Postcolonialism and neo- colonialism were therefore often linked processes. The characteristic feature of postcolonialism is that it sought to give the developing world a distinctive political voice separate from the universalist pretensions of liberalism and socialism. An early but highly influential attempt to do this was undertaken at the Bandung Conference of 1955, when 29 mostly newly-independent African and Asian countries, including Egypt, Ghana, India l Non-Aligned Movement: and Indonesia, initiated what later became known as the Non-Aligned An organization of countries, Movement. They saw themselves as an independent power bloc, offering a founded in 1961, that avoided ‘Third World’ (see p. 36) perspective on global political, economic and cultural formal political and economic priorities. This ‘third-worldism’ defined itself in contradistinction to both affiliation to either of the Cold western and Soviet models of development. A more militant form of third world War power blocs and committed itself to values such politics nevertheless emerged from the Tricontinental Conference held in as peaceful coexistence and Havana in 1966. For the first time, this brought Latin America (including the mutual non-interference. Caribbean) together with Africa and Asia – hence the name ‘tricontinental’.  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 201 Frantz Fanon (1925–61) A Martinique-born French revolutionary theorist, Fanon is best known for his views on the anti-colonial struggle. In Black Skin, White Masks (1952), he mixed personal reflection with social analysis to explore the psychological damage done to black people in a ‘whitened’ world. In his classic work, The Wretched of the Earth (1961), he drew on psychiatry, politics, sociology and the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre in arguing that only total revolution and absolute violence can help black or colonized people liberate themselves from the social and psychological scars of imperialism. Fanon died after contracting leukaemia, and, at his request, his body was returned to Algeria and buried with honours by the Algerian National Army of Liberation. His other works include Towards the African Revolution (1964). However, as it is a form of identity politics that draws inspiration from indige- nous religions, cultures and traditions, postcolonial theory tends to be highly disparate. It has been reflected in Gandhi’s political philosophy, which was based on a religious ethic of non-violence and self-sacrifice that was ultimately rooted in Hinduism. In this view, violence, ‘the doctrine of the sword’, is a western impo- sition upon India. By contrast, Frantz Fanon emphasized the link between anti- colonialism and violence. He argued that decolonization requires, in effect, a new species of man to be created, and that this is largely achieved as the psychological burden of colonial subjugation is rejected through the cathartic experience of violence. Edward Said (see p. 204), perhaps the most influential postcolonial theorist, examined how Eurocentric values and theories served to establish western cultural and political hegemony over the rest of the world, especially through the device of Orientalism. However, critics of postcolonialism have argued that, in turning its back on the western intellectual tradition, it has aban- doned progressive politics and been used, too often, as a justification for tradi- tional values and authority structures. This issue has been particularly controversial in relation to the tension between cultural rights and women’s rights (see p. 203). Asian values l Orientalism: Stereotypical The idea that Asian culture and beliefs may constitute an alternative to western depictions of ‘the Orient’ or ones gained momentum during the 1980s and 1990s, fuelled by the emergence Eastern culture generally which of Japan as an economic superpower and the success of the so-called Asian are based on distorted and invariably demeaning western ‘tiger’ economies – Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore. This assumptions. position was outlined most clearly by the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, when Asian state representatives from Iran to Mongolia, meeting in preparation for l Asian values: Values that the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, issued a bold statement in supposedly reflect the history, favour of what they called ‘Asian values’. While not rejecting the idea of univer- culture and religious backgrounds of Asian societies; sal human rights, Asian values drew attention to supposed differences between examples include social western and Asian value systems as part of an argument in favour of taking harmony, respect for authority culture difference into account in formulating human rights. Particularly keen and a belief in the family. advocates of this view included Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, at that  202 GLOBAL POLITICS time the prime ministers, respectively, of Malaysia and Singapore. From this CONCEPT perspective, human rights had traditionally been constructed on the basis of Confucianism culturally-biased western assumptions. Individualism had been emphasized Confucianism is a system over the interests of the community; rights had been given preference over of ethics formulated by duties; and civic and political freedoms had been extolled above socio- Confucius (551–479 BCE) economic well-being. The recognition of Asian values sought to rectify this. At and his disciples that was their heart, was a vision of social harmony and cooperation grounded in loyalty primarily outlined in The and respect for all forms of authority – towards parents within the family, Analects. Confucian thought has concerned teachers at school and the government within society as a whole. Allied to a itself with the twin keen work ethic and thrift, these values were seen as a recipe for social stability themes of human and economic success. relations and the The idea of Asian values was dealt a damaging blow by the Asian financial cultivation of the self. The crisis of 1997–8. This occurred not only because it cast doubt over the image of emphasis on ren (‘humanity’ or ‘love’) has ‘rising Asia’, but also, and more seriously, because Asian values were sometimes usually been interpreted held to be responsible for the crisis in the first place. In this view, Asian as implying support for economies had faltered because of a failure fully to embrace market principles traditional ideas and such as entrepreneurialism, competition and ‘rugged’ individualism, and this values, notably filial piety, failure had stemmed from aspects of Asian culture, particularly an emphasis on respect, loyalty and benevolence. The stress deference, authority, duty and loyalty. Nevertheless, the rise of China and, to a on junzi (the virtuous lesser extent, India has revived interest in the idea of Asian values, although in its person) suggests a modern form it tends to be orientated more specifically around the alleged capacity for human strengths of Chinese civilization and particularly of Confucianism. However, the development and general notion of Asian values has also attracted criticism. For some, it simply potential for perfection realized, in particular, serves as an excuse for the survival of authoritarian rule and absence of liberal- through education. democratic reform in many parts of Asia. The key Asian value, from this Confucianism has been perspective, is political passivity, an unwillingness to question authority based seen, with Taoism and on a trade-off between economic well-being and political freedom. The notion Buddhism, as one of the of an ‘Asian civilization’ from which a distinctive set of values can be seen to three major Chinese systems of thought, derive has also been criticized, in line with wider concerns about the ‘tectonic’ although many take model of civilizations. Not only does Asian culture encompass a wide range of Confucian ideas to be national traditions and a mixture of religions (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, coextensive with Chinese Christianity and so on), but its national traditions are often highly diverse as civilization itself. well. For example, so-called ‘Chinese civilization’ is not defined by Confucianism but, rather, by the competing influences of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism overlaid, in the modern period, by a Maoist version of Marxism- Leninism. Islam and the West The rise of political Islam, and particularly 9/11 and the advent of the ‘war on terror’, created the image of a deep, and perhaps civilizational, clash between Islam and the West. ‘Clash of civilizations’ theorists were quick to proclaim that this was to be one of the major fault-lines in twenty-first-century global politics. l Jihad: (Arabic) An Islamic However, the image of deeply-rooted tension between Islam and the West has term literally meaning ‘strive’ or ‘struggle’; although the term is two quite distinct faces. The first portrays political Islam, and possibly Islam sometimes equated with ‘holy itself, as implacably anti-western, committed to the expulsion of western influ- war’ (lesser jihad), it is more ences from the Muslim world and maybe to the wider overthrow of western properly understood as an inner secularism. In this view, the West is subject to an ‘Islamic threat’ that must be struggle for faith (greater jihad). combatted, not simply through the defeat of terrorism and jihadist insurrection,  I D E N T I T Y, C U LT U R E A N D C H A L L E N G E S T O T H E W E S T 203 Focus on... Cultural rights or women’s rights? Are women’s rights essentially a western concept? However, some postcolonial feminists have argued Which identity is more important: culture or gender? that women’s rights should be understood within a Feminists and others often argue that cultural rights in cultural context, recognizing that issues of gender general (linked also, for example, to multiculturalism) cannot be separated from matters of race, religion and and opposition to the West in particular are often ethnicity. In this view, the western idea of gender invoked to defend or justify violations of a whole range equality, based on supposedly universalist liberalism, of women’s rights, thereby strengthening patriarchal often fails women because it is based on a model of power. This has been particularly evident when female identity that abstracts women from the family, attempts have been made to reconfigure culture and social and cultural context that gives their lives politics on the basis of religion. Ruthven (2005), for meaning and purpose. Gender equality both devalues instance, identified one of the key features of religious women’s traditional roles as home-makers and mothers fundamentalism as the tendency to control, and limit, and exposes them to the rigours and pressures of life in the social role of women, and to act as a ‘patriarchal the public sphere. In Muslim countries, such as Iran, protest movement’. The values and norms of Muslim Pakistan, Sudan and, to some extent, Turkey, forms of societies have drawn special criticism is this respect, ‘Islamic feminism’ have thus emerged, in which the based on practices ranging from female dress code and imposition of Shari’a law and a return to traditional polygamy through to so-called ‘honour killings’. Not moral and religious principles have been portrayed as a only do such cultural beliefs and practices block the means of enhancing the status of women, threatened advance of universal human rights, but, by oppressing by the spread of western attitudes and values. From women, they may hold back social and economic devel- this perspective, the veil and other dress codes, and the opment, increase birth rates and distort gender rela- exclusion of women from public life, have been viewed tions, making such societies poorer and, arguably, more by some Muslim women as symbols of liberation. prone to violence. but also through the destruction of the fundamentalist ideas and doctrines that have nourished and inspired them. The second image of this clash suggests that Islam, and especially the Arab world, has consistently been a victim of western intervention and manipulation, supported by demeaning and insulting forms of ‘Islamophobia’. In other words, the problem is the West, not Islam. Is conflict between the Muslim world and the Christian West inevitable? And what role has religion played in inspiring this antagonism? Nature of political Islam Islam is the world’s second largest religion and its fastest growing. There are between 1.5 and 1.7 billion Muslims in the world today, more than one fifth of the world’s population, with at least 49 countries having a Muslim majority. The strength of Islam is concentrated geographically in Asia and Africa; it is esti- mated, for example, that over half the populati