Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) Subway Fires Standard Operating Guideline PDF

STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE TORONTO TRANSIT COMMISSION (TTC) – SUBWAY FIRES Date Issued: August 8, 2023 Rescinds: September 9, 2020 Section: Incident and Emergency Operations File Code: G-TTCF PURPOSE To provide all Toronto Fire Services (TFS) personnel with a guideline for Toronto Transit Commiss...

STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE TORONTO TRANSIT COMMISSION (TTC) – SUBWAY FIRES Date Issued: August 8, 2023 Rescinds: September 9, 2020 Section: Incident and Emergency Operations File Code: G-TTCF PURPOSE To provide all Toronto Fire Services (TFS) personnel with a guideline for Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) subway fires and emergency operations. Incident conditions may vary, which will dictate your actions. This guideline will be followed to the best of your ability. RESPONSIBILITY All personnel are responsible for understanding and following TFS Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG’s). All personnel are responsible for understanding and following TFS Training Notes relating to the TTC. The Incident Commander (IC) is responsible for the development of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) along with the safe, efficient, and effective management of the emergency incident, ensuring all guidelines are followed by personnel on scene. The IC is responsible for implementing Unified Command with the TTC Incident Commander (IC) who will be identified by an orange reflective vest with either Emergency Response Commander (ERC) or Chief Supervisor written on the back. GUIDELINES 1. Firefighter Equipment In addition to the standard complement of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), when responding to a fire in a subway station, all firefighters should be equipped with: SCBA (60-minute cylinders if proceeding into the tunnel at track level) Minimum of one Thermal Imaging Camera per crew 65mm Hose Packs and Standpipe Kits TTC access keys Additional equipment that should be considered: Class ‘C’ extinguishers One set of forcible entry tools (30” halligan and flat head axe- irons) File Code: G-TTCF Page 1 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE Search Ropes Entry Control Kit Bull Horn 2. Safety Precautions When Responding to TTC Subway Stations Always treat the Third Rail as live, even after performing an Emergency Power Cut/Trip. Refer to Training Note 303.2 – Emergency Power Cut/Trip. NOTE: TTC Transit Control Centre will never guarantee or confirm that the Third Rail has no power, they will only advise that they have an “indication of power off”. This is not confirmation of power off. Always treat the Third Rail as live. Track/Rail Switches are still operational even after an Emergency Power Cut/Trip to the Third Rail has been performed, as they receive power from a separate source. DO NOT step on them or near them. DO NOT step beside the control box as they are operated automatically from a remote location. A Track/Rail Switch is designed to crush anything in its path, and it will not release. Never try to force a switch with a pry bar. Request assistance from the TTC Transit Control Centre. Refer to Training Note 303.4 – Track Level Access and Equipment. NOTE: Track/Rail Switches are still operational even after an Emergency Power Cut/Trip to the Third Rail has been performed, as they receive power from a separate source. DO NOT step on them or near them. DO NOT step beside the control box as they are operated automatically from a remote location. A Catwalk is the walking area through the tunnel which is on an elevated platform above and beside the track bed. The height and width vary throughout the subway system depending on whether it is a circular or box design. The minimum width is 600mm (24 in) throughout the tunnel. If it is less than 600mm (24 in), it is identified as a non-clearance area. TFS crews shall NEVER walk on the catwalk when a train is in motion. Refer to Training Note 303.4 – Track Level Access and Equipment. Collector Shoes are located on both sides of the subway car and receive power from the Third Rail. The Collector Shoes must be treated as “live”, and contact SHALL be avoided. Refer to Training Note 303.1 – Priority One-Train Contact with Customer. Running Rails, Crossovers, Drainage Ditches, and Paper Catchers are trip hazards to be aware of while working at track level. Refer to Training Note 303.1 - Priority One-Train Contact with Customer, and Training Note 303.4 – Track Level Access and Equipment. File Code: G-TTCF Page 2 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE NOTE: TFS crews shall NEVER attempt to access track level by any means unless accompanied by TTC staff unless it is an emergency. Before entry to track level, TFS crews MUST confirm an Emergency Power Cut/Trip has been performed to the Third Rail and trains have been stopped. 3. Minor Smoke, Minor Fire or Burning Odour Responses to Track Level TFS will not be responsible for investigating these types of incidents unless specifically requested by TTC through TFS Communications. The TTC IC may exercise caution in investigating and extinguishing small fires not exceeding 30 metres (100 feet) into the tunnel. TTC personnel MUST be visible from the platform level, which allows TFS crews to clearly see where the TTC IC is upon arrival. TTC personnel will perform this investigation without requesting an Emergency Power Cut/Trip to the Third Rail. If investigation by the TTC IC would require exceeding 30 metres (100 feet), TTC policy requires the TTC IC to return to the platform and await assistance from TFS. 4. TTC Definitions Burning Odours: A burning odour is the property or substance (such as carbon or other particles) in the air, typically emitted from combustion and activates the sense of smell; a distinctive smell of a burning substance or combustion taking place. Minor Smoke: Minor smoke can be described as a haze. When a person can see 500 ft. through the smoke, it is considered minor. Also, consider whether the distribution of smoke is uniform. If combustion is not stopped, the density of the smoke will increase. Minor Fire: A minor fire is a fire in the incipient (growth) or smoldering (decay) phase and may be easily extinguished by a single person with a fire extinguisher. Minor fires may quickly become major fires depending on the supply of oxygen, fuel, heat and/or chemical chain reaction. The presence of electricity at track level increases the hazard and risk dealing with a minor fire in the subway. 5. Initial Approach Initial arriving apparatus will respond to the dispatched location. Subsequent arriving apparatus will respond to this location or a location otherwise dictated by the TFS IC or as per pre-planning. File Code: G-TTCF Page 3 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE Initial arriving crew shall assume Command as per Training Note 104.3.7 – Establishing Command. Crews shall remain on the assigned TAC Channel, and not switch to F/G 5/6 as in the past. A relay may be required if communication becomes an issue. Initial crew entering any subway station (during business hours) shall access the Fire Safety Plan Box and report to the Customer Service Booth in order to gain updated information from TTC personnel or security cameras which may show conditions at track level. The BM Key aboard TFS apparatus can be used for access to the subway station (outside of business hours) and to the Fire Safety Plan Box. When investigating, the IC may operate in a Mobile Command mode until a situation is encountered that requires a task level action. This may include switching to a Static Command mode when becoming the Platform Sector Officer. When the investigation reveals fire or heavy smoke, the initial IC, SHALL become the Platform Sector Officer, operating in a Static Command mode. The Platform Sector Officer shall upgrade to a 2nd alarm. NOTE: Transfer of Command protocol SHALL take place when the initial investigating IC becomes the Platform Sector Officer (see Training Note 104.1.6 – Transfer of Command). The Platform Sector Officer duties include but are not limited to: (a) maintaining Static Command (b) advise Command of their location from the label found inside the Emergency Alarm Station (EAS) door (c) communicate with TTC Transit Control Centre via the PAX phone and ascertain whether the fans have been activated and if there are any track switches located in the proximity of emergency operations (d) designate a Staging area in their Sector (e) designate a controlled area and assign an Entry Control person at the last safe location where SCBA is not required (f) notify Command when they require additional resources or personnel (g) set up air supply for their Sector (h) ensure adequate resources are maintained in the Sector (i) coordinate personnel re-assignment through Command (j) ensure that personnel are operating in a safe and effective manner (k) control when personnel are assigned to Rehab Sector (l) conduct and report PAR status of their Sector when necessary File Code: G-TTCF Page 4 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE Appropriate tasks shall be taken as per the Incident Action Plan (IAP): (a) immediate rescue (b) locating and extinguishment of fire (c) location of train (d) number of passengers The driver shall locate the Dry Drop/Dry Fire Line (DFL) FDC’s via the “Dry Drop Booklet” found aboard TFS apparatus. The driver will relocate the apparatus and connect to the appropriate Dry Drop/DFL FDC in relation to the location of the fire. This apparatus shall stay connected to this FDC location. If the location of the fire is unknown, to ensure a water supply to the other end of the subway station, a subsequent pump equipped apparatus shall be relocated and connected to the other Dry Drop/DFL FDC, located at grade level at the other end of the subway station. With two pump equipped apparatus connected to the Dry Drop/DFL FDC’s, an adequate water supply for firefighting operations is ensured. TTC FDC's are located at grade level at all TTC subway stations and Emergency Exit Buildings (EEB’s). Older TTC subway station FDC’s are NOT equipped with a clapper valve. Newer TTC subway station FDC’s MAY be equipped with clapper valves, but this is not guaranteed. To ensure that a second line may be connected later (in case the TTC FDC does not have a clapper valve), TFS crews shall ALWAYS use a 65mm CSA threaded hydrant gate, found in the TFS FDC Kit (Equipment Note 103.3 – Fire Department Connection Kit) when connecting to ALL TTC FDC’s. If the 65mm CSA threaded hydrant gate is not used, water may flow from the other side of the FDC or pressurize the cap, not allowing the cap to be removed. Before connecting to the FDC, always check inside of the connection to ensure that there is no debris. A water supply shall be established as soon as possible. When supplying water to, or when connecting to the Dry Drop/DFL in the tunnel, refer to Training Note 101.1.5 – Standpipe Operations. There may be times when stretching a hose line from the apparatus is the most appropriate tactic if there is no Dry Drop/DFL at the station or in an outside track area, or if the Dry Drop/DFL has a catastrophic failure (this may include a damaged FDC). This would negate the need for the first arriving pump equipped apparatus to relocate to the Dry Drop/DFL location as they are supplying fire attack hose lines directly from their pump. File Code: G-TTCF Page 5 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE NOTE: Davisville and Rosedale Subway Stations require that a hose line be stretched from the apparatus as both subway stations DO NOT have a Dry Drop or DFL system. 6. Accountability/Entry Control The IC shall establish Entry Control at the forward-most safe location within the proximity of the entrance to the controlled area. This location should be chosen with smoke, fire, and civilian crowd conditions in mind. Common areas can be at street level, in the station (Customer Service Booth, top of stairs to platform level, on the platform level, etc.) or other obvious points of entry (EEB’s, and other entrances etc.). Refer to Training Note 104.4.2 – Accountability Procedures and Responsibilities. If TFS crews reach the end of the platform area and investigation is required further into the tunnel at track level, 60-minute cylinders are required, and another Entry Control area should be established at this Sector with the Sector Officer/Entry Control being on air if required. 7. Firefighting Operations IC's should consider all access points, emergency exit shafts, EEB’s, subway station entrances, and tunnels for entry and evacuation. NOTE: Emergency exit shafts are typically a vertical ladder and should NOT be used for TFS crews or TTC passengers as they are extremely dangerous. However, they may be used to lower or hoist equipment to track level. In the event of an incident in the subway that requires moving people or equipment on the track system, the IC shall request at least one Subway Emergency Rescue Vehicle (SERV) be brought forward to the scene. On the newer sections of TTC subway routes, SERV Carts are placed at track level at locations at either EEB’s or at the end of subway station platforms. IC's shall advise TFS Communications to have additional apparatus respond to the next station in the direction and relation to the fire if needed (in the case of a large fire with heavy smoke conditions). This ensures that smoke and/or fire conditions are being relayed to the IC, who can then adapt their IAP, if needed. The crews responding to the next station may also have to assist passengers if they are evacuating from a train that is stranded in the tunnel. Prior to entering track level, TFS crews shall request an Emergency Power Cut/Trip to the Third Rail and to the Track Switches if the Track Switches are near the emergency incident location, refer to Training Note 303.2 – Emergency Power Cut/Trip. File Code: G-TTCF Page 6 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE NOTE: If the train is in the tunnel, let it glide into the station if possible before performing the Emergency Power Cut/Trip. This allows for a much easier route for passengers evacuating directly to platform level rather than having to exit the train in tunnel and walking along the tracks to platform level. Any time a fire is located in a subway station, hose lines may be stretched from an apparatus when feasible. This provides positive control of pressures and systems, as well as leads firefighters to egress. If stretching hose lines from the apparatus is not feasible, or when the fire is located at track level in the station or in the tunnel, this may not be possible. 65mm Hose Packs and Standpipe Kits shall be connected to Dry Drop or DFL 65mm CSA threaded hose valve connections in the tunnels (refer to Training Note 101.1.5 – Standpipe Operations). If the subway train is located in the station, 65mm Hose Packs and Standpipe Kits shall be connected to 65mm CSA threaded hose valve connections that are found on the platform level usually in red cabinets (refer to Training Note 101.1.5 – Standpipe Operations). NOTE: Crews must be aware when connecting to a platform level hose valve connection, usually found in red cabinets, that they are typically fed by domestic water pressure only. These systems are NOT connected to the Dry Drop or DFL FDC’s at grade level and apparatus pump operators are NOT able to increase pressure to them, but this is not an issue as the 65mm Hose Packs and Standpipe Kits only require 350 kPa (50 psi) at the nozzle. Refer to the TFS Pump Chart. The IC SHALL establish an Air Supply Sector, refer to Training Note 104.2.6 – Air Supply Sector. 8. Ventilation All TTC subway stations have a Fan Room(s). These rooms house high- capacity fans. TTC has a fan protocol that is initiated through the TTC Transit Control Centre and is used to evacuate smoke from the track and platform levels and route it to the surface. Fan rooms (refer to Training Note 303.6 – Emergency Service Buildings, Car Houses and Fan/Vent Shafts) inside subway stations shall NOT be accessed without a TTC staff member as fans are activated remotely, without warning. These rooms are shaped like a volute and can create a dangerous situation for crews entering if fan(s) activate. The activation or de-activation of fans and louvres for the tunnel shall be coordinated with the TTC IC to ensure proper removal of smoke and maintain control of flow paths within the tunnel for the safety of passengers and TFS crews. File Code: G-TTCF Page 7 of 8  STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINE TTC Transit Control Centre controls all fans and louvres in the subway system. Fans, louvres, and vents are strategically placed throughout the subway system for ventilation purposes. Each fan and louvre can be activated manually (next to each unit), or remotely (at TTC Transit Control Centre). Refer to Training Note 303.6 - Emergency Service Buildings, Car Houses and Fan/Vent Shafts. An integral component of ventilation control in the subway system is the Damper Tunnel Doors that unroll quickly to seal off openings. Doors can be activated remotely or locally, electrically or manually. When doors are closing, a horn sounds on both sides and a red strobe light flashes. Refer to Training Note 303.6 - Emergency Service Buildings, Car Houses and Fan/Vent Shafts. 9. Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) RIT shall be equipped with 60-minute cylinders. A separate SERV Cart should be considered as part of the RIT equipment being staged. ATTACHMENT(S) N/A RELATED SOGS N/A File Code: G-TTCF Page 8 of 8