Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sport Diplomacy Final Report 2021 PDF

Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sport Diplomacy Final Report December 2021 Research Team Professor Richard Parrish (Edge Hill University, UK) Dr...

Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sport Diplomacy Final Report December 2021 Research Team Professor Richard Parrish (Edge Hill University, UK) Dr Antoine Duval (TMC Asser Institute, Netherlands) Silvija Mitevska (formerly TAKT, Republic of North Macedonia) Associate Professor Carmen Perez-Gonzalez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain) Associate Professor Vanja Smokvina (University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law, Croatia) Professor Albrecht Sonntag (ESSCA School of Management, France) Professor Thierry Zintz (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium) Dr Andrea Cattaneo (Edge Hill University, UK) Associate Partner Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS): Council of Europe Academic Reviewers Associate Professor Stuart Murray (Bond University, Australia, and the Academy of Sport, Edinburgh University, UK) Dr Simon Rofe (SOAS University of London, UK) This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors (the research team), and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. 1  Contents Introduction …………………………………………………………………………….3 Chapter 1: EU Sport Diplomacy: Background and Context …………………………...5 Chapter 2: Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples …………………..17 Chapter 3: Towards an EU Organizational Culture of Sport Diplomacy……………..42 Chapter 4: Transnational Actors in Sport Diplomacy: Perspectives of Cooperation…70 Chapter 5: EU Sport Diplomacy, Mega-Sporting-Events and Human Rights………...92 Chapter 6: Grassroots Sport Diplomacy Initiatives …………………………………104 Conclusions and Recommendations …………………………………………………122 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………127 2  Introduction Sports policy is somewhat of ‘a new kid on the block’ for the EU. It only acquired a competence in sport following the adoption of Lisbon Treaty in 2007, in force since 2009. This is not to say the EU lacks experience in sporting matters. For many years, the EU institutions have grappled with the issue of how to reconcile the specificity of sport with the demands of EU law. This debate is ongoing, but not the subject of our enquiry. Our focus is to assist the EU in considering the merits of adopting a sport diplomacy strategy, first mooted by a High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy in 2016. Four members of that group form part of the research team for this study.1 EU action since that report indicates enthusiasm for sport diplomacy. However, to act effectively in this relatively new field of EU activity, the EU institutions and the Member States require an evidence-base. The aim of our project was to undertake primary research and stage a series of Multiplier Sport Events (MSE) to provide such evidence on the efficacy of sport as a diplomatic tool. During our six MSEs, we invited a wide range of actors to share their thoughts and experiences on the practice of sport diplomacy. These events reinforced our view of the value of sport in helping the EU achieve its external relations ambitions. In this study, we claim that now is the time for the EU to act more strategically in this field and adopt an EU Sport Diplomacy Strategy. Our project received generous financial support under the EU’s Erasmus+ Programme (Collaborative Partnerships). The Erasmus+ Programme is a great friend of sport and will be a valuable resource assisting the implementation of an EU sport diplomacy strategy. The project commenced in January 2019 and concluded in December 2021 following a 12-month Covid- 19 extension. The project was led by Edge Hill University (UK) and the project partners were the TMC Asser Institute (Netherlands), the North Macedonian NGO TAKT (Together Advancing Common Trust), the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Spain), ESSCA School of Management (France), the University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law (Croatia), and the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium). We co-operated with our associate partner, the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS) from the Council of Europe and we received academic support from our academic reviewers, Associate Professor Stuart Murray (Bond University, 1 Professors Parrish, Perez-Gonzalez, Sonntag and Zintz. 3 Australia, and the Academy of Sport, Edinburgh University, UK) and Dr Simon Rofe (SOAS University of London, UK). We are very grateful for this support and to the Erasmus+ Programme for facilitating their involvement in our MSEs. The views expressed in this report are those of the research team. Our MSEs were held in Zagreb (June 2019), Madrid (September 2019), Strasbourg (November 2019), The Hague (March 2020), Skopje (November 2021) with our final flagship event held in Brussels (November 2021). Our interim report was published as a special edition of Sport and Citizenship. We are grateful to Sport and Citizenship for its support. The study is multi-authored. Chapter 1 (EU Sport Diplomacy: Background and Context) is authored by Professor Richard Parrish and Professor Thierry Zintz. Chapter 2 (Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples) is authored by Associate Professor Vanja Smokvina and Associate Professor Stuart Murray. Chapter 3 (Towards an EU Organizational Culture of Sport Diplomacy) is authored by Associate Professor Carmen Perez-Gonzalez. Chapter 4 (Transnational Actors in Sport Diplomacy: Perspectives of Cooperation) is authored by Professor Albrecht Sonntag. Chapter 5 (EU Sport Diplomacy, Mega-Sporting-Events and Human Rights) is authored by Dr Antoine Duval. Chapter 6 (Grassroots Sport Diplomacy Initiatives) is authored by Silvija Mitevska. The recommendations reflect the views of the authors. 4  Chapter One EU Sport Diplomacy: Background and Context 1. Introduction “Sports diplomacy is a new term that describes an old practice: the unique power of sport to bring people, nations and communities closer together via a shared love of physical pursuits”.2 Whereas in the above quotation, Murray refers to sports diplomacy (in the plural), our study employs the singular, reflecting the common usage in official EU documents. Regardless of the preference, the same phenomenon is being observed and is being subject to greater academic scrutiny.3 This literature has not only strengthened our conceptual understanding of the issue,4 it has also highlighted the success of sport in diverting conflict, assisting with peace negotiations and fostering greater cultural understanding, while at the same time revealing that sport can fuel or be a source of conflict.5 Sport diplomacy therefore presents two faces, or “two- halves”6 and whilst it generally represents a low risk and low cost method for states to achieve diplomatic objectives, the EU needs to be aware of the challenges that it faces in piecing together and implementing a sport diplomacy strategy. As discussed throughout our study, these challenges are not only organisational but also relate to questions of how to adopt a values-based approach when faced with the realpolitik of international affairs. The academic literature has both reflected and encouraged a growing practice across the globe in which a number of countries are increasingly employing sport to amplify diplomatic messages. Our review of good practices, presented later, highlights examples of where sport can seek to reconcile estranged relations between states and peoples, promote the image and 2 Murray, S. (2020) Sports Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Practice. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Accessed at: https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore- 9780190846626-e-542 (16 December 2021). 3 For a review of the literature see Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (TES-D) (2021), Sport Diplomacy: A Literature Review of Scholarly and Policy Sources. Accessed at: https://www.tes-diplomacy.org/resources-io2/ (17 December 2021). 4 See for example, Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, and Rofe, J. S. (2016) Sport and diplomacy: a global diplomacy framework, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 7, 212-230. 5 Jackson. S. (2013) The contested terrain of sport diplomacy in a globalizing world, International Area Studies Review, 16(3), 274–284. 6 Murray S. (2012) The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 23(3) 576-592. 5 reputation of a state, employ sport for peace and development gains, and encourage new economic opportunities. As some of the EU’s main partners and competitors are employing sport diplomacy, the question should be asked, why is the EU not doing so? With such a rich sporting tradition, is it not time the EU turned its attention to this method of advancing its interests in the world? Before answering this question, it is worth reflecting on the location of sport diplomacy within the wider diplomatic field. 2. Conceptualising Sport Diplomacy In recent years, the EU has indeed signalled its intention to make diplomacy and sport diplomacy two strong axes of its policy, both foreign and internal. The graphic below positions sport diplomacy within the wider diplomacy field and highlights, amongst other things, the connection with public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. 7 7 This graphic was first published in the Erasmus+ funded study, Grassroots Sport Diplomacy: Overview, Mapping and Definitions. Accessed: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2wqkxi39sjm6my4/AABBGvByJV7K67L5b8bNBX1Qa?dl=0&preview=Grassro ots+Sport+Diplomacy+-+Overview+Mapping+and+Definitions.pdf (17 December 2021). 6 Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy refers to attempts by states to manage the international environment and achieve foreign policy goals by engaging foreign publics. 8 It concerns “the mechanisms short of war used by an international actor (state, international organization, non-governmental organization, multi-national cooperation or other player on the world stage) to manage the international environment”.9 Within the realm of public diplomacy, a number of common traits can be highlighted: (1) it is a key mechanism through which nations foster mutual trust and productive relationships; (2) it has state centric foundations but it has evolved so that a multitude of actors and networks are now involved; (3) it aims at promoting the national interest and advancing the nation’s foreign policy goals; (4) it rests on the leverage of soft power resources.10 Coined by Nye, soft power refers to “the nation’s ability to obtain its desired outcome not through coercion or payment, but through attraction, particularly through the attraction of its culture, its political values and its domestic and foreign policies”.11 Cultural Diplomacy Public diplomacy mainly refers to Government sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries. Commonly employed instruments include publications, film, TV and radio. Embassies and diplomats play a major role in this one-way form of communication. Whereas public diplomacy consists of a nation’s attempt to “explain itself to the world”, cultural diplomacy refers to “the use of creative expression and exchanges of ideas, information, and people to increase mutual understanding”.12 It establishes a greater two-way form of communication with other countries with a greater range of actors being involved, including private institutions and NGOs. The EU is no stranger to cultural diplomacy having made progress in this field in recent years.13 Over the years, it has also acquired 8 Dubinsky, Y. (2019) From soft power to sports diplomacy: a theoretical and conceptual discussion, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 15, 156–164, at 156. 9 Cull, N. J. (2009) Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, Figueroa Press. 10 Nye, J. (2008) Public diplomacy and soft power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94-109. 11 Nye, J. (1990) Soft Power. Foreign Policy, 80, 153–171, and Nye J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, PublicAffairs Books. 12 Schneider, C. (2006), Cultural diplomacy: hard to define, but you’d know it if you saw it, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.XIII, Issue 1, 2006, at 191. 13 For political developments see: European Commission (2016), Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, Join/2016/029, accessed at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2016%3A29%3AFIN (17 December 2021). 7 considerable experience in the area of educational diplomacy with its Erasmus+ programme being the embodiment of its soft power. 14 Sport Diplomacy Sport diplomacy falls within the framework described above, but one needs to guard against the assumption that the world has only just discovered its potential. As already highlighted, sport diplomacy might be a relatively new term, but it has ancient roots, illustrated most prominently by the Olympic Truce in Ancient Greece in the eighth century B.C. Since then, history has been littered with countless examples of sport being used, either strategically or sporadically, as an expression of state diplomacy, thus dispelling the myth that sport and politics do not mix. A number of incidences are well known to readers such as the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ between China and the United States, ‘cricket diplomacy’ between India and Pakistan, ‘hockey diplomacy’ between Canada and the USSR, and ‘baseball diplomacy’ between Cuba and the United States (U.S.). As Rofe observes, “when traditional diplomacy (be it international or domestic) does not appear to provide an avenue for change, athletes and others have used the tremendous audiences at sporting events as a platform for their message”.15 These often-cited examples are perhaps known as the public face of sport diplomacy, but they are “sporadic, opportunistic and, arguably, somewhat clumsy” and tend to be associated with ‘traditional sport diplomacy’.16 Whilst this type of sport diplomacy is still practiced, in the modern era states have adopted a more nuanced and strategic approach. In this regard, our examples of good practice presented below highlight the strategic approaches adopted by Australia and the U.S., in which sport diplomacy is no longer understood as state diplomacy For academic discussion see Carta, C. and Higgot, R. (eds.) (2020) Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the Domestic and the International, Palgrave Macmillan. 14 See for example Ferreira-Pereira, L and Mourato Pinto (2021), Soft Power in the European Union’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: The Erasmus Plus Programme, in Ferreira-Pereira, L. and Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Strategic Partnerships, 69-94, Palgrave Macmillan and Piros, S. and Koops, J. (2020) Towards a sustainable approach to EU education diplomacy? The case of capacity-building in the eastern Neighbourhood, in Carta, C. and Higgot, R. (eds.) Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the Domestic and the International, 113-138, Palgrave Macmillan. 15 Rofe, J.S. (ed.) (2018), Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, Manchester University Press, at 2-3. 16 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 61. 8 with a sporting backdrop, but rather an attempt to extend the appeal of a nation’s people and culture to third countries through the cultivation of people-to-people links, practiced by a wider number of players. As Murray explains, from this perspective, ‘modern’ sport diplomacy can be understood as the “conscious, strategic and regular” use of sport, sportspeople, sporting events and non-state sporting actors by the state to build long-term mutually beneficial ‘people- to-people’ partnerships with third countries and societies, particularly where relations have become estranged.17 The question for the EU is, which diplomatic turn does it want to take – traditional or modern? 3. The Road to EU Sport Diplomacy The EU is an economic, as opposed to a military, power. Soft power, the “power to persuade and attract” is, arguably, an underused tool of the EU’s external relations policies. 18 At the same time, sport is one of Europe’s most appealing attractions to third-country nationals and Europe is the home of some of the world’s most recognisable sporting leagues, competitions, clubs and athletes. The problem for the EU is that third country nationals tend to regard the EU in economic and political terms, whereas Europe is thought of with reference to geography, history, society, culture and sport. 19 By adopting a strategic approach to sport diplomacy, the EU can realign these perceptions amongst external audiences, thereby harnessing the power of sport to make the EU ‘brand’ more attractive. In doing so, the EU will join a number of states across the globe, including some EU Member States, who routinely employ sport to amplify diplomatic messages. The question for the EU, and one to be addressed in our study, is how should the EU proceed? As a sui generis form of political association, the EU is not simply the reconstruction of the state on a larger scale. Will sport diplomacy work as well in a supranational context as it does in a national setting? What follows is a chronology of attempts made by the institutions of the EU to plot a path to the development of EU sport diplomacy. Will EU sport diplomacy become the preserve of the diplomat, civil servant, European Commissioner, minister and MEP – a reconstruction of 17 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 94. 18 Pigman G. A. and Rofe J. S. (2014) Sport and diplomacy: an introduction, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 17(9), 1095-1097, at 1096. 19 For example, see: PPMI, NCRE and NFG (2015), Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU’s Policies Abroad. 9 traditional sport diplomacy at an EU level, or will its approach to sport diplomacy become imbued with a more strategic dimension, with a distinct non-state and grassroots character? An early example of EU diplomacy structured around sport came in 2006 when the European Commission and FIFA signed a Memorandum of Understanding to make football a force for development in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries. 20 The President of the European Commission at the time, José Manuel Barroso said: “Football has a great potential of building bridges between people. This is particularly important when we look forward to the first FIFA World Cup ever to take place in South Africa in 2010. Through this initiative, football will contribute to enhancing global capabilities for development.” This initiative highlighted not only the potential for the EU to employ sport to advance foreign policy goals, but it also revealed the potential for sports bodies to act in a diplomatic space in order to secure their own political objectives in terms of relations with public authorities. In recent years, the international sports movement has used this diplomatic strength to attempt to leverage concessions from the EU in relation to the protection of the autonomy and specificity of sport and as a means of seeking safeguards around the perseveration of the so-called ‘European model of sport’. The 2006 initiative, repeated in later years, stands as a reminder that private actors as well as public bodies practice sport diplomacy. 21 A year later, in the 2007 White Paper on Sport, the European Commission hinted at the potential for a more systematic deployment of sport diplomacy. The White Paper included a section on ‘Sharing our values with other parts of the world’ (s.2.7) in which the Commission stated it would “promote the use of sport as a tool in its development policy” and would “include, wherever appropriate, sport-related issues such as… cooperation with partner countries”.22 At the time, the section received little comment as the Lisbon Treaty, for which the White Paper had been prepared for, had not yet entered into force. In many ways, the Lisbon Treaty was the main political and legal breakthrough for EU sport diplomacy. The Treaty included Article 165 TFEU which, amongst other things stated: “The 20 European Commission (2006), European Commission and FIFA sign a memorandum of understanding for football in Africa, in the Caribbean and Pacific Countries, IP/06/968, Brussels, 9 July 2006. Accessed at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-968_en.htm?locale=en (17 December 2021). 21 See for example, Beacom A (2012) International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement: The New Mediators, Palgrave Macmillan. 22 European Commission, White Paper on Sport, COM(2007), 391 final (2007). 10 Union shall foster co-operation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of sport”. As the EU operates under the principle of conferral, it can only act within the powers conferred upon it by the Member States. Article 165 settled any political and legal doubts regarding the EU’s ability to use sport as part of its external relations policies and it has acted as the basis for the EU’s subsequent activity in this field. In 2010, a Group of Independent European Sports Experts, appointed by Commissioner Vassilliou, advised the Commission on priorities in the field of sport and recommended the use of sport in the context of the EU’s external relations policies. One member of the current research team (Professor Parrish) was a member of the group. In the 2011 Communication on Sport, the Commission took forward this recommendation and committed itself to “identify the scope for international cooperation in the field of sport with a focus on European third countries, in particular candidate countries and potential candidates, and the Council of Europe”.23 Also in 2011, sport was for the first time incorporated into the EU’s Erasmus+ programme. This equipped the EU with the capacity to deliver practical sport diplomacy initiatives, although at the time, the participation of third countries was restricted within the programme and so its value could not be fully realised.24 In 2015, in a move signaling a personal commitment to advance EU sport diplomacy, European Commissioner Navracsics established two High Level Groups, one on Sport Diplomacy and the second on Grassroots Sport. Both groups reported their findings in 2016. 25 The Sport Diplomacy group advanced recommendations in the context of (1) EU external relations (2) promotion of EU values in the context of major sporting events and advocacy and (3) the development of an organizational culture of sport diplomacy. Four members of the current research team were members of the High-Level Group (Professors Parrish, Perez-Gonzalez, Sonntag and Zintz). 23 European Commission (2011), Developing the European Dimension in Sport, COM(2011) 12 final, Brussels, 18/1/2011. Accessed at: https://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0012:FIN:EN:PDF (17 December 2021). 24 In addition to a number of practice-based projects, the Erasmus+ programme has funded three studies exploring the development of EU sport diplomacy: Grassroots Sport Diplomacy (2018-19), Promoting a Strategic Approach to EU Sport Diplomacy (2019-21) and Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (2020-21). 25 European Commission (2016), High Level Group on Sport Diplomacy, June. Accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/policy/cooperation/documents/290616-hlg-sd-final-report_en.pdf(17 December 2021) and European Commission (2016), High Level Group on Grassroots Sport, June. Accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/policy/cooperation/documents/290616-hlg-gs-final-report_en.pdf (17 December 2021). 11 Having become established as an area of potential interest for the EU, the first political steps towards EU sport diplomacy were taken by the Member States. In May 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Conclusions on ‘Enhancing Integrity, Transparency and Good Governance in Major Sport Events’.26 Within the Conclusions, the Ministers recognised the value of hosting major sporting events for transmitting a positive image and that the potential for joint hosting of events within the EU exists. Then in November 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Conclusions on ‘Sport Diplomacy’ under the Slovak Presidency. 27 The Conclusions made a series of recommendations to take forward the EU sport diplomacy agenda including, inter alia: raising awareness of sport diplomacy in the EU; encouraging cooperation between the EU, public authorities and the sports movement; using sport to promote positive sporting and European values; using sport diplomacy to advance economic objectives; maintaining sport diplomacy on the EU’s political agenda; exploring the possibility of using Sport Ambassadors; promoting evidence base research and activities; using sport within the framework of Accession, Association, Cooperation and European Neighbourhood agreements; and funding sport diplomacy projects, including engaging third countries in the European Week of Sport. Further ‘softening up’ of the issue was required and to facilitate this the European Commission staged an EU Sport Diplomacy seminar in Brussels in December 2016. The seminar brought together diplomats, politicians, civil servants and members of the sports community to discuss the recommendations of the High-Level Group.28 A second seminar was staged in Brussels in December 2017.29 The seminar adopted a series of conclusions on: opening the European Week of Sport to Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans states; encouraging the mobility of athletes and coaches; and how to use sport to increase the international position of a country. 26 Council of the European Union (2016), Council Conclusions on enhancing integrity, transparency and good governance in major sport events, 9644/16, Brussels, 1/6/2016. Accessed at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9644-2016-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 2021). 27 Council of the European Union (2016), Council Conclusions on Sport Diplomacy, 14279/16, Brussels, 23/11/16. Accessed at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14279-2016-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 2021). 28 European Commission (2016), Seminar on Sport Diplomacy. Outcomes, 6/12/16. Accessed here: https://ec.europa.eu/sport/sites/sport/files/seminar-sport-diplomacy.pdf (17 December 2021). 29 European Commission (2017), Seminar on Sport Diplomacy, 6/12/2017. Accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/sport/sites/sport/files/report-sport-diplomacy-seminar-2017.pdf (17 December 2021). 12 Following the adoption of Article 165 TFEU, the EU embarked on a series of multi-annual work plans for sport. In the 2017-2020 EU Work Plan for Sport, sport diplomacy was identified as a priority theme. 30 Paragraph 8 acknowledged, “the need to cooperate with third countries, in particular candidate countries and potential candidates to the EU, to promote European values through sport diplomacy, and with the competent international organisations in the field of sport, including the Council of Europe, WADA and the World Health Organization”. In November 2017, EU sport diplomacy took one of its first practical steps with the integration of sport into EU-China High Level People to People Dialogue (HPPD) which has been taking place since 2012.31 Commissioner Navracsics and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu Yandong met in Shanghai. Responding to the recommendation of the High-Level Group and the Slovak Conclusions that an evidence-based approach to sport diplomacy be adopted, in 2018, the Commission published a study on ‘Sport Diplomacy, Identifying Good Practices’.32 The study was carried out in the framework of the 2017-2020 EU Work Plan for Sport and highlighted examples of best practice. It made four recommendations: (1) that capacity building workshops be held (2) sport for development should be identified as an explicit priority in relevant EU funding instruments (3) larger scale research should be undertaken on the current state of play and (4) actions are developed to support dissemination of and knowledge sharing on good practices. A further step at operationalising EU sport diplomacy was taken with the amendments made to the 2018 Erasmus+ funding criteria which facilitated participation from third countries. Until that change, projects whose proposal did not demonstrate that the Partner-Country participant brought specific added value to the partnership would be rejected on eligibility grounds. However, this is no longer the case as now, if the Partner Country’s participation meets the 30 Council of the European Union (2017), Work Plan for Sport (1 July 2017 – 31 December 2020), 9639/17, Brussels, 24 May 2017. Accessed at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9639-2017-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 2021). 31 See European Commission (2017), EU and China strength cooperation on education, culture, youth, gender equality and sport, IP/17/4548, Brussels, 15/11/2017. Accessed at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17- 4548_en.htm (17 December 2021). 32 ECORYS (2017) Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to the European Commission. Accessed at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5- 01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809 (17 December 2021). 13 criteria, they are treated in the same way as the other partners. 33 This change was also recommended by the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy. The internationalisation of Erasmus+ and the growing significance of EU sport diplomacy was further evidenced by changes made to the European Week of Sport programme. From 2018, this was extended to permit participation from Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership states. 34 Further political impetus came in June 2018 with the adoption by the Council of the European Union of Council Conclusions on ‘Promoting the Common Values of the EU Through Sport’.35 In a wide-ranging set of Conclusions, the Council highlighted the role of sport in promoting common values among Member States, and also with third countries. At paragraph 28, the Council invited the Commission to “include sport as part of external relations, where appropriate to promote the common values of the EU, for example through including mobility and capacity building or supporting sport integrity, as well as integrating it in the discussions and High Level Dialogues with third countries”. At paragraph 38, the Council invited the sports movement to “continue developing mutually enriching relations and exchanges between grassroots sport organisations from EU countries and third countries, sharing values and principles, and illustrating the diplomatic value of such people-to-people relations”. EU sport diplomacy took another concrete step in February 2018 with the agreement between the European Commission and UEFA adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation between the European Commission and the Union of the European Football Associations (UEFA).36 This Arrangement for Cooperation added to that agreed between the parties in 2014. 37 The objectives of the 2019 agreement are: (1) to promote values and principles common in Europe (2) to strengthen cooperation in matters of long-term interest to football and sport and (3) to improve the overall financial health of European football. The staging of EURO 2020 was 33 See: Erasmus+ sport goes international. Accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20170724-erasmus-plus- sport-goes-international_en (17 December 2021). 34 European Commission (2018), Press Release: European Week of Sport, 23-30 September. Accessed at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_AGENDA-18-5910_en.htm (17 December 2021). 35 Council of the European Union (2018), Promoting the Common Values of the EU Through Sport, 2018/C196/06. Accessed at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2018:196:FULL&from=FR (17 December 2021). 36 European Commission (2018), Annex to the Commission Decision adopting the Arrangement for Cooperation between the European Commission and the Union of the European Football Associations (UEFA), C(2018) 876 final, Brussels, 19/2/2018. Accessed at: https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/EuroExperience/uefaorg/EuropeanUnion/02/53/98/34/25398 34_DOWNLOAD.pdf (17 December 2021). 37 C(2014), 7378 final. 14 highlighted as a key vehicle for achieving the first objective. In 2018, UEFA also agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Council of Europe.38 During the Bulgarian Presidency of the EU (January - June 2018), sport diplomacy was the focus of a high-level discussion at the EU Sport Forum in Sofia (March 2018). Sport diplomacy was retained in the EU Work Plan for Sport 2021-202439 and between January and June 2021, the Portuguese Presidency of the EU prioritised sport diplomacy and held a Council policy debate on the subject in May 2021 40 and staged a two-day sport diplomacy conference in Lisbon in June. At the policy debate in Brussels, the vast majority of Member States expressed a willingness to progress the development of a sport diplomacy strategy for the EU. Finally, in 2021, a study on EU sport policy commissioned by the European Parliament highlighted the limited role of the Parliament in the development of an EU approach, although it did note the Parliament’s role in extending financing instruments to third countries. 41 The subsequent Parliamentary Report, of the same name, conceded that the Parliament should play a more active role in the field of EU sport diplomacy. 42 Without expressly making the connection, the Parliament’s report highlighted the potential of sport diplomacy in addressing a number of challenges including, inter alia, the achievement of the EU’s strategic goals, the question of human rights and non-discrimination in sport, and the call for the Commission to establish a network of ambassadors for sport. 38 Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). Accessed at: https://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/General/02/56/17/27/2561727_DOWNLOAD.pdf (17 December 2021). 39 Council of the European Union (2020), Work Plan for Sport (1 January 2021 – 30 June 2024), 2020/C 419/01, accessed at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42020Y1204(01)&from=EN (17 December 2021). 40 Council of the European Union (2021), Sport diplomacy: Promoting Europe’s interests and values in the world, 8128/21. Accessed at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8128-2021-INIT/en/pdf (17 December 2021). 41 Mittag, J and Naul, R. (2021) EU sports policy: assessment and possible ways forward, European Parliament, Research for CULT Committee – Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels. Accessed at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/236742/PE652-251_Study-EU-Sport-Policy.pdf (16 December 2021). 42 European Parliament (2021), Report on EU sports policy: assessment and possible ways forward (2021/2058(INI)). Accessed at: http://isca-web.org/files/Report_on_EU_Sports_Policy-consolidated_version.pdf (17 December 2021). 15  4. Conclusion It is clear from the above review that the EU retains a desire to employ sport within its diplomatic repertoire. However, thus far, its approach has been somewhat piecemeal and lacking strategic orientation. The arguments for becoming more strategic are strong: the EU and its Member States have a strong sporting heritage; the EU has a maturing foreign policy and existing expertise and capacity to advance sports related goals; and without a more concerted effort, the EU is being left behind by some of its partners and competitors who now routinely deploy sport diplomacy. The risks are generally low, but significant. The EU needs to act in a way that complements Member States’ sport diplomacy strategies; it needs to reflect on the messaging so that publics, both within and outside the EU, see this activity as legitimate; it requires investment so that ‘diplomats in tracksuits’ carry appropriate messages and so that the issue is mainstreamed and retained on the political agenda; it needs to balance co-operation with, and distance from, sports bodies, so that relationships do not become too cosy particularly as the Commission is the ‘guardian of the Treaties’; and the impact of sport diplomacy needs measuring so that the public can be assured that expenditure represents value-for-money. 16  Chapter Two Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples 1. Introduction This chapter provides an overview of good practices in the field of sport diplomacy.43 In the chapter, numerous models of sport diplomacy are listed. Special attention is given to the Australian model of sport diplomacy because it is regarded as the world standard in the strategic use of sport as a ‘means to an end’, be that policy, development or human security outcomes.44 As discussed in chapter one, sport diplomacy can be succinctly defined as the conscious, strategic and regular use of sport, sportspeople, sporting events and non-state sports actors by ministries of foreign affairs and their diplomatic staff in order to create collaborative, long term and mutually beneficial partnership which ideally ‘maximise people-to-people’ links, development, cultural, trade, investment, education and tourism opportunities for governments.45 Therefore, sport diplomacy is the reification and specialisation of a familiar aspect of international relations in permanent, institutional and plural manner. 46 The genesis of this chapter came from the first Multiplier Sport Event (MSE) of this project held in Zagreb, Croatia, on the 12th June 2019. The topic of this landmark event – which included ambassadors, politicians, academics and sports stars - was ‘Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples’. Certain ‘new’ models of sport diplomacy were discussed alongside some examples that could be described as more traditional.47 43 For information on national approaches to sport diplomacy see: Towards an EU Sport Diplomacy (TES-D) (2021), Case Studies of Non-EU Sport Diplomacy. Accessed at: https://www.tes-diplomacy.org/resources-io2a2/ (17 December 2021). See also ECORYS (2017), Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to the European Commission. Accessed at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/- /publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809 (17 December 2021). 44 Note, Australia prefers to use the plural of sport to describe its approach (sports diplomacy). 45 Australian Government, Australian Sports Diplomacy Strategy, 2015-2018, at 1. Accessed at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aus-sports-diplomacy-strategy-2015-18.pdf (10 Jun 2019). 46 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 94. 47 Agenda for the 1st MSE “Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples”, Zagreb (Croatia), 12th June 2019, accessed at: https://www.pravri.uniri.hr/en/home/8-en/1689-obavijest-65.html (17 December 2021). 17 In this chapter, it is argued that the cliché that sport and politics don’t mix is just that: a cliché (an opinion that is overused and betrays a lack of original thought). Like it or loathe it, sport and politics have mixed since time immemorial, whether thinking of the Truce and the Ancient Olympiad, the emergence of nationalism and international sport in the late nineteenth century, or, more recently the instrumentalization of sport as a diplomatic and strategic means to policy ends. These links are illustrated by, for example, the practice of boycotts48 against various countries whose policies are denounced, or by well-known cases such as ping-pong diplomacy between China and the U.S.), wrestling diplomacy between Russia, Iran and the U.S.,49 cricket diplomacy between India and Pakistan, hockey diplomacy between Canada and the former Soviet Union, and the intermittent episodes of baseball diplomacy between Cuba and the U.S. In each of these cases, sport was co-opted to serve national interests or foreign policy outcomes. However, both the theory and practice of sport diplomacy is something quite different today. This chapter – which focusses on traditional sport diplomacy 50 - captures some of the changes taking place in how governments, non-state actors and representatives from the sports industry are beginning to work together, to bring strangers closer together, and advance positive, mutually reciprocal policy outcomes for the world. This chapter begins by examining the Australian case. 48 The efficacy of which is strongly contested, see Gomez, C. (2018) Boycotts and Diplomacy: when the talking stops, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 169-184, Manchester University Press; Eaton, J. (2018) Decentring US sports diplomacy: the 1980 Moscow boycott through contemporary Asian-African perspectives, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 203-222, Manchester University Press; Tulli, U. (2018) ‘They used Americana, all painted and polished, to make enormous impression they did’: selling the Reagan revolution through the 1984 Olympic Games, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 223-242, Manchester University Press 49 Abooali, S. (2017) Wrestling with Diplomacy: The United States and Iran, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds.) Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 137-153, FiT Publishing, at 146. 50 According to Murray, there are three other types of sport diplomacy: networked sports diplomacy, sport-as- diplomacy, and sports anti-diplomacy. See Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge. 18 2. Examples of good practice in sport diplomacy in the world 2.1. Australia Australia has a remarkable international sporting pedigree and is internationally recognised as a consistent, high-performing sporting nation and a world leader in sports policy, on and off the pitch, so to speak. For the sports mad Aussies, sport diplomacy provides a practical opportunity to inform, engage and influence key demographics, particularly youth, emerging leaders and women and girls. Through the Australian diaspora in the region and Indo–Pacific communities living in Australia, the influence of sport diplomacy means policy outcomes can be conveyed to broader audiences than traditional diplomacy activities allow. Sport, in other words, amplifies diplomatic messages. Australia started to include sport in its diplomacy in 2012 and mentioning sport as a diplomatic and cultural tool first came in the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper.51 Australia’s sport diplomacy strategies are whole-of-government approaches that intend to maximise people-to-people links, development, cultural, trade, investment, education and tourism opportunities.52 A few years ago, Australia published its Sports Diplomacy Strategy 2015-2018.53 Its development was guided by a working group co-chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Health’s Office for Sport. This initial Strategy had four goals: (1) Connecting people and institutions via the following programs: a. Sports Exchange Australia: exchanges of administrators, coaches, officials and athletes to provide sports knowledge, leadership and skills exchange between Australia and countries in the region. 51 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 99. 52 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/about- us/publications/Pages/australian-sports-diplomacy-strategy-2015-18 (10 Jun 2019). 53 Australian Government, Australian Sports Diplomacy Strategy, 2015-2018. Accessed at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aus-sports-diplomacy-strategy-2015-18.pdf (10 Jun 2019). 19  b. Australian Sports Fellowship: support sporting organisations and tertiary institutions to host fellows and scholars from the region for sport-related professional development and educational placements in Australia. c. The Sports Leaders Mentoring Program: mentoring and networking through the Australian sports network and private sector partners to develop emerging leaders in sports business, administration, and sports technical development. (2) Enhancing sport for development via: a. Pacific Sports Partnerships: partner Australian and regional sports organisations in the Pacific to deliver targeted sport for development activities. b. Sports Volunteers Australia: provide high-quality sports volunteers to help improve the capacity of sports organisations and develop people-to-people links in developing countries across the Indo–Pacific region. (3) Showcasing Australia via: a. Match Australia: The Australian Government’s international sports business program will enhance economic and bilateral relations through major sporting events. This program will be managed and implemented by the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade). b. The Major Sporting Events Taskforce: this will coordinate Australian Government involvement in identified major international events in Australia, capitalise on an international reputation for hosting major sporting events, and leverage the economic opportunities associated with such events and the on- going legacy in areas such as trade, tourism and investment. c. International Media Visits: this program will use sport to promote Australia’s engagement with the region and generate accurate and well-informed international media reporting on Australia. d. Sports Envoy: This program will use high-profile sports people to promote Australia through trade missions, Ministerial-led business missions, Match Australia activities, and targeted sport diplomacy initiatives. (4) Supporting innovation and integrity via: 20  a. Sports Innovation Australia: will establish sports education, business and science initiatives between the Australian sports industry and countries in the Indo–Pacific region. b. Sports Memorandums of Understanding: will establish government-to- government sports agreements to advance Australia’s skills capability in sport- related fields and promote Australia’s collaborative relationship with the Indo– Pacific region. c. The Sports Integrity Program: provide oversight, monitoring and coordination to advance and protect the integrity of sport in Australia. With a particular focus on doping, match fixing and corruption, the Australian Government will work with like-minded nations to develop best practice in consistent and effective approaches to protect the integrity of sport. The first Strategy and the programs described above were a success, particularly in integrating the various systems of sport and diplomacy at the international level. Both the sports industry and government were given a strategy, direction, and a common vision. Success came in the form of two sports for development programs – one in the Pacific and the other in Asia. One of the key pillars of the Australia’s public diplomacy strategy is to create a positive image in the pacific region, particularly among the population of small island states, and one of the most successful public-sport programmes has been Smash Down Barriers - an indicative to change perception of disabled people in the pacific region through table tennis. The programme is part of DFAT’s Pacific Sport Partnerships (PSP) which worked with over fifty institutions to enable 1.5 million people to participate in sporting activities, while helping address inequalities experienced by women, girls and people living with disability. The Smash Down Barriers programme operates across Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Thailand with the support of Australian Aid, Table Tennis Australia, Oceania Badminton and Oceania Paralympic Committee and, as well, as from Diplomats-in-chef.54 Sporting linkages in the Asian region were also strengthened by negotiating sport cooperation arrangements with India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka. In addition, the Australian Government awarded ten sports fellowships aimed at improving the capacity of individuals 54 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 95. 21 and institutions to deliver quality grassroots sport in the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, the review also described a volunteer’s initiative connecting skilled Australians with regional sporting organisations to support media and communications, disability and health outcomes in Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu.55 A successful PSP program is the Oceania Football Confederation’s Just Play program, which also involves Football Federation Australia. The program uses interactive football sessions to engage children with social messages integrated into all activities. Children increase their school and community engagement and learn healthy lifestyle habits while learning about gender equality and disability inclusion. The program received the Union of European Football Association Foundation for Children Award in 2016 – recognising improvements it is making to the lives of children in the Pacific. 56 Bolstered by such data, success and interest, the Government decided to renew this ground-breaking program and Strategy. After a long period of consultation with the Australian sports ‘industry’, the original strategy was followed by a second – Sports Diplomacy 2030 – which was launched by the Foreign and Sports Ministers at the Women’s Rugby World Sevens tournament in Sydney, in early 2019. Again, four pillars were introduced, each of which are described below: (1) Empower Australian sport to represent Australia globally: a. enhance Australian sports leaders’ knowledge, skills and connections to represent Australia on the global stage; b. leverage Australia’s strong sporting brand to enhance its global reputation and to build enduring relationships; c. increase Australia’s representation on international sporting bodies and associations; and d. develop tools, including a digital portal, to share sport diplomacy knowledge, expertise and successes across government and with the sport industry. (2) Build linkages with Australia’s neighbours: 55 Australian Government, Sports Diplomacy 2030, at 7. 56 Australian Government, Sports Diplomacy 2030, at 9. 22  a. develop pathways for elite Pacific athletes and teams to participate in Australian and international sporting competitions; b. facilitate access for emerging Pacific athletes to participate in high performance training in Australia; c. develop pathways for Australian sporting codes to increase their presence in the Pacific; and d. identify targeted opportunities to strengthen diplomatic and economic relationships through sport across the Indo-Pacific. (3) Maximise trade, tourism and investment opportunities: a. showcase Australia’s leadership and excellence in sport governance, high performance, technology and other areas in key global markets; b. promote Australia as a host of choice for major international sporting events and ensure to leverage the wider economic opportunities; c. connect Australian sports through its diplomatic and trade networks to unlock the potential of global markets for a wider array of Australian businesses and companies; and d. identify, educate and empower high-profile athletes and sports representatives to promote Australia, including through trade missions and targeted sport diplomacy initiatives. (4) Strengthen communities through sport in the Indo-Pacific and beyond: a. create leadership pathways and increase participation of women and girls in sport in the Pacific; b. harness the power of sport to promote gender equality, disability inclusion, social cohesion and healthy lifestyles; c. support institutional policies, practices and systems to help build safe, fair and accessible sport; and d. support global efforts to increase awareness of the contribution of sport to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).57 57 Australian Government, Sports Diplomacy 2030, at 9, 15, 17, 19. 23 This kind of sport diplomacy is called by Murray “Networked sports diplomacy” since the Australian Strategy encompasses a broad network of state and non-state actors: the Department of Health, the Australian Sports Commission (ASC), the Office for Sport, the DFAT, Tourism Australia and the Australian Trade Commission together with the administrative bodies of Australia’s major sporting codes (cricket, soccer, rugby and Australian rules football). 58 2.2. The U.S.A. and SportsUnited In the U.S., sport diplomacy is regarded as an important tool. Indeed, the Department of State, with its Bureau of Education and Culture Affairs (ECA) established by President Eisenhower in 1959,59 sees sport as “an integral part of efforts to build ever-strengthening relations between the United States and other nations. Sports diplomacy exchanges have involved tens of thousands of people from more than 100 countries to do just this”.60 The State Department’s SportsUnited is a good example of such initiatives. Born after 9/11 as a way to reach disenfranchised youth in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Africa and Latin America, sport was seen as a way to reach people that were immune to tried and tested soft power vessels like the Voice of America radio station and the Fulbright Scholarship programme. SportsUnited focuses on four main activities: the “Sports Visitors program” (where American Ambassadors nominate sports people from their host countries to travel to the U.S. for specialised training and clinics. Through participation in sports-based programming, these visitors learn to translate success in athletics into achievements in the classroom and life), 61 “Sports Grants” (awarded to U.S. based Civil Society Organisations who propose and manage international exchange programs for underserved youth athletes, coaches and administrators of youth sports), “Sports Envoys” (where athletes and coaches, such as Michelle Kwan (figure skating) and Billie-Jean King (Tennis) are employed as ‘diplomats in tracksuits’).62 These successful sportspeople lead youth clinics and team building activities 58 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 119. 59 Ibid., at 100. 60 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Initiatives, Sports Diplomacy. Accessed at: https://eca.state.gov/sports-diplomacy (15 Aug 2019). 61 Mitevska, S. (2019), Sport Diplomacy, Paper presented at the 1st MSE“Best Practice in Sport Diplomacy: National Examples”, Zagreb (Croatia). 62 Other examples are the world famous NBA legend Shaquille O'Neal who has visited Cuba as part of the Sports Envoy program, accessed at: https://eca.state.gov/video/sports-envoy-shaquille-oneal-cuba (17 December 2021), or the case when the U.S. Department of State sponsored ultra-marathon legend Dean Karnazes as he follows the ancient Silk Road through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to mark the 25th anniversary of these 24 overseas and represent their nation in much the same way a serving diplomat does (in terms of cultural diplomacy exchanges). Fourth is the “Global Sports Mentoring Program” (where a cohort of approximately 15 foreign sport leaders are identified and hand-selected by U.S. Embassies to spend one month in a mentoring placement with a female executive in the U.S.).63 The programmes are organized closely with U.S. Embassies and Consulates, American universities (such as George Mason University), and leagues and federations. The SportsUnited initiative is an excellent example of a range of political, diplomatic and mutually beneficial partnership between diplomats, sportspeople and foreign publics.64 Through SportsUnited, the State Department is able to promote American policy, sport, culture and values abroad, enhance international understanding and friendship, and dispel U.S. stereotypes and prejudices. As Trina Bolton, the team ‘captain’ of the program, notes of the versatility and reach of the program, “sport opens doors in hard-to-reach spaces, all the way from really grassroot levels and all the way up to the governmental level at home and abroad. Through our exchanges, Americans and international participants from all walks of life connect through the shared interest in sports.”65 The issue of employing sportspeople as envoys is common in U.S. sport diplomacy history starting in 1955 with Jesse Owens’ mission to India, the Philippines and Malaysia where he led running clinics and promoted and represented American values abroad or Althea Gibson, the first African-American tennis player to break into the female circuit visiting and playing tennis on a special tour in India, Pakistan and Burma as an inspiration in the world, but also in the U.S., since as a woman of colour was representing officially the U.S delegation. 66 To conclude, we may say that the SportsUnited is a great success. The numbers show that with a very few resources absorbed (U.S Sport Diplomacy Division employs only five staffers and countries’ independence from the Soviet Union from June 29 to July 10, 2016, accessed at: https://eca.state.gov/ultramarathon (15 Aug 2019). 63 Lecrom C. and Ferry, M. (2017) The United States Government’s Role in Sport Diplomacy, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 19-37, FiT Publishing, at 22-28. 64 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 101. 65 Alvarez, A. (2017) Sports Diplomacy in the Age of Trump, VICE Accessed at: https://sports.vice.com/en_au/article/mbj4bv/sports-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-trump, (16 Sep 2019). 66 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 103-104. 25 spend only 0.0001% of the Department Budget) 67 the results are impressive. Between 2010 and 2013, Sports Visitor programs were held in ninety-two countries with a total of 911 foreign participants. In terms of Sports Envoy, 317 athletes and coaches represented U.S in fifty-four different countries from 2005 to 2013. During the same period, the rate of participation for foreign participants in a Sports Grant program also increased with approximately 1,830 individuals from over thirty-five different countries visiting the U.S.68 Again, the power of sport to augment the perception of a nation, transcend entrenched foreign policy positions, or generate informal diplomatic networks (that, if strategized, can often usually open formal doors) is self-evident. 2.3. Japan Japan has a long history of using sport to advance diplomatic and foreign policy goals. The J1 professional football League, for example, was established in 1992 to overcome imperial stereotypes, as well as to improve the performance of the national team to reflect “a level worthy of its [Japan’s] economic power and overall achievements after 40 years of post-war peace and prosperity”.69 In the twenty-first century, the Japanese teamed up with old foes the Republic of Korea to co-host the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has employed football to “secure a peaceful environment for Japanese troops in Iraq”, to bridge divides between Balkan states, and frequently invites “Israeli and Palestinian youth players to participate in training camps in Japan” as a way of getting to know the ‘other’.70 Such activities are directly aimed at changing the way outsiders think about Japan. 71 Beyond these examples, MOFA is following a similar path to the French and the European Commission (including the clumsy sounding moniker). In 2014, a ‘Panel of Experts on Strengthening Sport Diplomacy’ was convened, followed by the appointment Mr. Jun 67 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 102. 68 ECA 2013 in Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 101. 69 Manzenreiter, W. (2008) Football diplomacy, post-colonialism and Japan's quest for normal state status, Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, 11(4), 414-428, at 417. 70 Ibid, at 422. 71 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 68. 26 Shimmi72 as an ‘Ambassador in Charge of Sport Diplomacy’ in 2015, as well as a final report submitted to Mr. Minoru Kiuchi, State Minister for Foreign Affairs. 73 Of further significance, is Japan’s Sport for Tomorrow program, an initiative to promote sport to more than 10 million people in over 100 nations until 2020.74 It should be mentioned, however, that Japan seems reactive rather than proactive. The Strategy emerged after the Land of the Rising Sun won bids to host two major mega-events: the 2019 Rugby World Cup and the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games. In addition, the Japanese approach is one of caution, low-risk and repetition. These two events have been employed by Japan to further banish old, unhelpful and inaccurate stereotypes, and cement its reputation as a truly sporting nation. No doubt that, especially taking into consideration that the COVID-19 pandemic strongly affected the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games, both these tournaments have been impeccably hosted. The research also threw up two interesting asides: first, that most of the organization and legacy work for the Rugby World Cup is being driven by World Rugby,75 rather than the Japanese government or any explicit strategy tied to this specific event. The Sport for Tomorrow program, on the other hand, is being driven exclusively by the Japanese government and many national sporting partners. As such, this program gives a clearer window into the nature, character and depth of Japan’s ongoing engagement with sport diplomacy. 2.4. North Korea and South Korea Taken apart, the sport diplomacy activities of the Republic of Korea (the South) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the North) can be described as normative. The North uses sport as a policy tool in the international arena to reinforce and reflect Juche, the official 72 Mr Shimmi is a career diplomat. At the time of writing, he has since moved on from the post of Ambassador of Sport Diplomacy and now serves as the Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Slovakia. It is unclear who occupies the Sport role. 73 The report describes the policies and measures that should be implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the relevant ministries, agencies and organizations for the themes of development, peace building and relationship between sports and socially vulnerable persons, under the three pillars of “Diplomacy by Sports,” which utilizes the influence and attractiveness of sports for the enhancement of diplomacy; “Diplomacy for sports,” by which diplomatic authorities implement various efforts for the development of sports; and the establishment of a foundation to promote sport diplomacy. See appendix C, or access https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000639.html (15 Sep 2019). 74 Sport For Tomorrow. Accessed at: https://www.sport4tomorrow.jpnsport.go.jp (10 Mar 2020). 75 See the ‘glossy’ brochure accessed at: https://www.asiarugby.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Impact- Beyond-RWC-2019-Brochure.pdf (10 Sep 2019). 27 state ideology which roughly translates as ‘self-reliance’, while the South folds sport into its broader public diplomacy strategy. Considered together, however, it is clear that sport creates the faintest, positive channel between the two fundamentally estranged nations. The 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games provides a good example of random meetings between representatives from adversarial states that can lead to significant, temporary (in this case), changes in diplomatic relations. As with the meeting between Glenn Cowan and Zhuang Zedong at the 1971 Table Tennis World Championships in Japan, the thaw began with a seemingly insignificant event: an invitation to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics by a South Korean, Mr. Choi Moon-soon, the governor of Gangwon province, to a north Korean, Mun Ung, head of the North Korean Athletic Committee. A few weeks later, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un announced that the Hermit Kingdom would send a large delegation to the PyeongChang Games. The story of North Korea’s appearance at the Games provides yet more evidence of the Mandelaesque “power of sport” to overcome political division.76 The North Korean leader sent his sister, Kim Yo-jong, to the opening ceremony, where she shook hands and chatted with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Kim Yo-jong’s appearance marked the first time since the Korean War ended in 1953 that a member of the ruling Kim dynasty had visited South Korea. As the world’s media scrambled to capture the rare moment, athletes from both nations marched into the PyeongChang Olympic Stadium under the Korean Unification Flag, a picture which was not so common but was also seen at the World Table Tennis Championship in 1991 in Chiba, Japan and at the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games. North and South Korean female ice hockey players also formed a joint team and were cheered on by a squadron of enthusiastic, well-drilled North Korean cheerleaders (a public diplomacy coup in its own right). To sport diplomacy watchers, it soon became obvious that both countries were using sport as a vehicle to test whether their respective publics would be accepting of a more formal diplomatic opening of frozen relations. It worked, and a few months later President Moon and 76 Mandela, N (2000) Address to the 1st Laureus World Sports Award, Laureus, 21st June 2000. Accessed at: http://www.laureus.com/content/nelson-mandela-speech-changed-world, (16 Sep 2019). 28 Supreme Leader Kim met in the demilitarized zone, the first of three summits aimed at denuclearizing the peninsula, building closer relations, and ending over sixty years of war. Hawks remain critical of North Korea, for they are still a kleptocratic dictatorship, a poor international citizen, and have a dreadful human rights record, not to mention that their nuclear weapons program is in clear violation of the global moratorium against nuclear weapons and its concomitant treaties. A more nuanced, ideal understanding of international affairs suggests otherwise: faint sporting channels with an adversarial, isolated state are better than no channels at all. 2.5. China China was the first to use international sport for its broader foreign and domestic policy goals, and its ping-pong77 diplomacy was used not just for the relationship with the U.S., but also to foster its diplomatic, economic and political goals in several African countries. It is important to note that with its African tour in Guinea, Mali and Sudan, female ping-pong players from China were promoting the slogan “men and women are equal” in countries where women were not fully free.78 China implemented an effective Olympic strategy enabling it to evolve from an average position on the Olympic medal table to the top of the medal table at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Following that success, China further strategic aim was to move from “a country of major sporting events to a sports world power”. To attain this ambition, China invested heavily in order to become a football superpower, although in recent years, this investment has been considerably reduced.79 77 The reason why table tennis or ping-pong was used was because Rong Guotuan was the first Chinese athlete to win any major world championship – men’s single title at the 1959 Table Tennis World Championship and the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) was one of the few international sports organization that consistently recognized the People’s Republic of China giving them the title of host of the 1961 Table Tennis World Championship. 78 Shuman, A. (2018) Friendship is solidarity: the Chinese ping-pong team visits Africa in 1962, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 110-112, Manchester University Press. 79 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 7. Accessed at: http://isca- web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_- _Overview_mapping_definitions.pdf (10 Mar 2020). 29 In April 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a macroeconomic management agency under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, announced a new reform programme called The Medium and Long-Term Development Plan of Chinese Football (2016-2050). This reform programme was jointly prepared by the NDRC, the Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State Council (China Football Association), the General Administration of Sport, and the Ministry of Education and was approved by the State Council.80 By developing grassroots football, the plan seeks to grow elite players who will qualify for another FIFA World Cup, play at a hosted FIFA World Cup and in the end eventually form a competitive team to win the FIFA World Cup by 2050.81 China, with its huge investments in football in line to fulfil “the Great Chines Soccer Dream”82 also points on the Mega-Events sport diplomacy and achieved that target by hosting the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. But like Russia, for its 2008 Olympic Games, China also faced huge criticism because of violations of human rights and minority rights,83 so the Games brought also huge international attention on topics which were not planned to be in focus. Another dimension of sport diplomacy was observed through so called “stadium diplomacy”. Stadium diplomacy can be understood as the construction of sporting facilities, in particularly in developing countries.84 For more than 60 years, China has practiced the so-called “stadium diplomacy” by providing support, for more than 85 indoor and outdoor stadiums (from 1,000 seats to 60,000 seats) across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the South Pacific. It was mostly used as means for geopolitical strategy and international strategy (for a diplomatic and political fight against Taiwan, for formation of strategic political alliances), access to valuable natural resources like oil, economic growth and entry into emerging markets mostly for its companies etc. 85 80 China Football 8. Accessed at: http://china-football-8.com/reform-programme-2016/ (15 Mar 2020). 81 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 7. Accessed at: http://isca- web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_- _Overview_mapping_definitions.pdf (10 Mar 2020). 82 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 116. 83 Rocha, C. and Grix, J. (2017) From “Diplomatic Dwarf” to Gulliver Unbound? Brazil and the Use of Sports Mega-Events, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 87-100, FiT Publishing, at 93. 84 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 117. 85 Kellison, T. and Cintron, A. (2017) Building Stadiums, Building Bridges: Geopolitical Strategy in China, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 121-135, FiT Publishing. 30 2.6. Other interesting models South Africa after decades of isolation used Mega Sports Events as a political tool and as a form of presenting the ‘new face of the state’. It started with the 1995 Rugby World Cup and had its grand finale with the 2010 FIFA World Cup presented also as the ‘African World Cup’.86 Brazil is an interesting example of how bidding for and hosting Mega Events such as the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro helped that big country (fifth- largest landmass, fifth-largest population and seventh-largest economy in the world) to foster its aims together with diverse political motivations to improve public diplomacy. 87 Although hosting such mega events helped Brazil to have an international focus, in the end they faced huge organisational, environmental and corruption problems. 88 However, although hosting Mega Events seems important from the promotion of a state point of view, construction of sports infrastructure and the huge support for the home Olympic team to achieve as more medals as possible, it is not a guarantee of growing diplomatic power if we take for instance Russia or China, see supra. Russia invested huge amounts of money for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, precisely around $50 billion total cost which are far much more than $12 billion cost for 2012 London Summer Olympic or $7 billion for 2012 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games. 89 Russian efforts resulted also in its special governance strategy to host the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and later in 2016 FIFA World Cup, but with its controversial law on intolerance towards the LGBT community and the Annexation of Crimea during the preparation or just after the closing ceremony of the 2016 Winter Olympics have not resulted in a complete success, just the opposite.90 Speaking about sport diplomacy we must note the U.S. Government employed three openly gay athletes Billie Jean King (a 86 Dowse, S. (2018), Mega sports events as political tools: a case study of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 70-86, Manchester University Press. 87 Rocha, C. and Grix, J. (2017) From “Diplomatic Dwarf” to Gulliver Unbound? Brazil and the Use of Sports Mega-Events, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 87-100, FiT Publishing. 88 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 124-125. 89 Ibid., at 249, 258. 90 Zhemukhov, S. and Orttung, R. (2017) Putin and the 2014 Sochi Olympics: Russia’s Authoritarian Sports Diplomacy, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 101-120, FiT Publishing. 31 retired tennis champion), Brian Boitano (a retired world champion figure skater) and Caitlin Cahow (a retired ice hockey player) as sports envoys during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games as a response to the Russian discriminatory policy towards LGBT community. 91 Compared to Russia, Canada “scored” on a diplomatic and political level with opening the first Pride House pavilions for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games and 2015 Pan/Parapan American Games in Toronto and highlighting the protection of human rights of LGBTQ- identified persons.92 3. Examples of good practice in sport diplomacy in Europe 3.1. France: l'équipe qui gagne93 The gold medal for sport diplomacy – outside of Australia, that is – must surely go to France. Their journey began in 2012 while watching London host the Olympic Games, a tournament they lost out on holding by a mere four votes at the IOC. A long period of consultations within government then crystalized into a sport diplomacy strategy which was launched by Laurent Fabius, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Valérie Fourneyron, then Minister of Sports, in 2014. Acknowledging that “sport plays a major role in attracting visitors to France and showcasing the country’s international outreach”, the Quai D’Orsay94 also established a working group consisting of government departments, sporting federations, major sporting businesses and the national Olympic committee.95 The sports industry was then mapped and measured, and several more innovations followed: the world’s first Ambassador for Sport (Philippe Vinogradoff),96 an Office for the Economics of Sport, and a new French Olympic Committee, which aims to 91 Murray, S. (2018) Sports Diplomacy, Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, at 105. 92 Rich, K. and Misener, L. (2017) From Canada with Love: Human Rights, Soft Power and the Pride House Movement, in Craig Esherick, Robert E. Baker, Steven Jackson, Michael Sam (eds), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, 155-170, FiT Publishing. 93 In English, the Team Who Wins. 94 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 95 France Diplomatic 2018. ‘Sports Diplomacy.’ Quai D’orsay. Accessed at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ (17 Sep 2019). 96 A seasoned diplomat whose career has taken him from Panama to Mexico, through Chile, Brazil, El Salvador (where he was ambassador), and the United States, where he served as Consul General in Miami and Deputy Consul General in Los Angeles. 32 promote French sport internationally, increase French presence in international bodies, and ensure French continues as the official language of the Olympic Games. French sport diplomacy is founded on three pillars that seek to: develop French influence through sport; make sport a priority for all ministries and relevant networks; and integrate sport into economic diplomacy. 97 So far, much French sport diplomacy activity has centered on building enhanced capacity for bidding, winning and hosting major sporting tournaments. Stung by the loss of the 2012 Olympics by the English, France simply ‘learned to lobby’, in the words of Marc Ventouillac, a journalist for L'Equipe.98 As figure 1 illustrate the investment has certainly paid off. In short, France has matched success in Figure 1. Major sporting sport – for example, a marvelous French events in France 2015- 2024 football team sailed through the 2018 Russia World Cup, eventually beating - 2015 World Rowing Championships Croatia 4-2 in the final. France looks set to - UEFA EUROPE 2016 Football innovate further, especially in the hosting Championship of major events. The 2018 Ryder Cup99 - 2017 Ice Hockey World symbolized the French culture of Championships innovation, being different, and the new - 2017 Canoe Slalom WC strategic direction. Played at the Golf - 2017 Men’s handball National in Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, a - 2018 Ryder Cup course purpose built for the unique - 2019 FIFA Women’s World atmosphere the match generates, over - 2024 Summer Olympic Games 300,000 fans turned out to watch the underdog Europeans comfortably beat the American team 17½ - 10½….and there was not even a Frenchman playing in the European team. It should come as no surprise that France understands the power of an esoteric sport diplomacy attitude. The annual Tour de France race 97 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 8. Accessed at: http://isca- web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_- _Overview_mapping_definitions.pdf (10 Mar 2020). 98 Lebrun, C., (2018) Le « soft-power » du sport: un potentiel encore trop peu exploité ?, Open Diplomacy. Accessed at: http://www.open-diplomacy.eu/blog/le-soft-power-du-sport-un-potentiel-encore-trop-peu-exploite, (17 Sep 2019). 99 The world’s third most-watched sporting event after the football World Cup and the Olympic Games. 33 endures as one of the world’s most successful, most watched 100 examples of sport, culture and tourism. 3.2. UK In the UK, sport is also extremely important, but football and rugby, as world-wide selling products, have been taken as a tool for promoting British values. The British sport diplomacy consists of partnerships between the British Council and major sports associations, like the Premier League and Premiership Rugby. One very good example of promoting UK values and English language in the world is the Premier Skills, the British Council's international partnership with the football Premier League operating in 19 countries across Asia, Africa and the Americas from Afghanistan to Zambia. 101 Through Premier Skills, young people, including the most vulnerable in society, are given opportunities to become better integrated into their local communities, to develop their skills for employability and raise their self-esteem. Premier Skills English helps teachers and learners of English with free, compelling learning materials, drawing on football-based content from the most exciting football league in the world. In this regard, Football English is also an interesting platform with teaching materials that teach general English through football and the words and phrases a person needs to talk about football on and off the pitch. 102 The British Council has also teamed up with Premiership Rugby in a project called Try Rugby and with the partnership with Brazilian partners Social Service for Industry (SESI) they try to bring an innovative rugby project to Sao Paulo State in Brazil. 103 Try Rugby SP is using the sport of rugby to engage with children and young people in schools and communities, delivering educational, social and health benefits, as well as helping to raise the number of young people playing the game in Brazil. Premiership Rugby coaches are embedded within 100 According to the organizers, 3.5 billion people in 190 countries tune in to watch the Tour de France each year and it is one of the best-attended annual sporting event on the planet, with 12 million roadside spectators cheering on cyclists. 101 Since Premier Skills began in 2007, 20.027 coaches and referees have been trained in 29 countries, who in turn have reached over 1.6 million young people. 6,000 teachers have received training in the use of the Premier Skills English materials, with 6.5 million views of the materials online. 102 Premier Skills English. Accessed at: https://premierskillsenglish.britishcouncil.org/ (10 Apr 2020). 103 Since September 2012, over 15.000 participants have been involved in rugby-based activity in Brazil every week as the coaches have worked with rugby clubs and other community based social inclusion projects. This includes 300 teachers and volunteers who have been trained to coach the sport. 34 secondary schools in five states across Brazil, coaching young people in the schools and their local community. As well as getting more young Brazilians to play the sport, the programme is designed to help them develop valuable skills in areas such as teamwork, leadership and self- discipline. It also tackles some of the social issues affecting the young people in their school or local community, for example lack of inclusion or juvenile crime. 104 As a 2012 London Summer Olympic Games legacy, UK Sport, UNICEF and the British Council deliver the International Inspiration Programme. The Premier League, the British Council, UNICEF and a range of other public and private funders assured the programme’s funding.105 Key actors are policymakers since they are made aware of the importance of physical education.106 We must note also one more important project of the British Council and the English Football Premier League called Addressing Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) through football, which uses football to tackle issues of violence against women and girls in Kenya. The project aims to address harmful behaviour and attitudes which perpetuate VAWG through football, by working with young people in Mount Elgon and Kisumu (Kenya). This three-year project was set up in 2014 and is funded by the UK Department for International Development (€1.8m).107 As for the use of Mega Sports Events, in 2002, the UK hosted the Commonwealth Games in Manchester and in 2014 in Glasgow which made a significant contribution to the rejuvenation of the cities and the regions as they struggled with a range of socio-economic challenges and industrial decline. In an attempt to secure the legacy of the 2012 London Summer Olympic 104 Try Rugby. Accessed at: https://www.britishcouncil.org/society/sport/current-programmes/try-rugby (10 Apr 2020). 105 From the beginning in 2007 the target was to take International Inspiration to 20 countries and inspire the lives of 12 million children. The programme far exceeded that target, with over 25 million children and young people enriched through the programme. 55 national policies, strategies and legislative changes were influenced and over 250,000 practitioners (teachers, coaches and leaders) trained. 106 Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, Overview, Mapping and Definitions, at 9. Accessed at: http://isca- web.org/files/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy/Grassroots_Sport_Diplomacy_- _Overview_mapping_definitions.pdf (10 Mar 2020). 107 ECORYS (2017), Sport Diplomacy. Identifying Good Practices, a final report to the European Commission, at 17. Accessed at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0efc09a6-025e-11e8-b8f5- 01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-65111809 (10 Jun 2019). 35 Games, it was aimed to secure seventy world-class events for the period 2013-2019, but the target was secured within a year. 108 3.3. Spain The importance of Barcelona’s Summer Olympic Games of 1992 for the improvement of the external image of Spain seems unquestionable.109 This Mega Sports Event tends to be considered an inflexion point in the evolution of the Spanish sport system.110 In fact, it was by the mid 90’s that the establishment of organizational structures and sporting infrastructures in Spain was completed. 111 However, awareness of the potential role sport can play in the international sphere is more recent. From an institutional point of view, the start of the “Marca España” (Brand Spain) project in 2000 marks the beginning of this initiative aimed to strengthen the image of the nation abroad. Being a governmental project, 112 it was created in partnership with some of the most important Spanish companies through the “Foro de Marcas Renombradas” (Forum of the Leading Brands), created in 1999. LaLiga, Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and Atletico de Madrid are part of this Forum.113 Marca España project has gained political and public and private financial support through the years and sport has played an important role in its implementation. In 2018, the Office of the High Minister for Marca España was substituted by the Spanish Secretariat for Global Spain aimed to defend and project the international reputation of Spain. Again, sport plays a key role. The Spanish Secretariat for Global Spain recently published a Report on sport diplomacy titled “Sports Diplomacy as an actor for Global Spain. The need of a model for Spain” (hereinafter: 108 Beacom, A. and Rofe, J. S. (2018) Post-match recovery and analysis: concluding thoughts on sport and diplomacy, in Rofe J. S. (ed.) Sport and Diplomacy: Games within games, 243-262, Manchester University Press. at. 254. 109 Rius Ulldemolins, J. and Zamorano, M. (2015) Spain’s nation branding project Marca España and its cultural policy: the economic and political instrumentalization of a homogeneous and simplified cultural image, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 21(1), 20-40, at 23. 110 Puig, N. et al (2010) Sport Policy in Spain, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 2(3), 381-390, at 381. 111 Ibid. 112 An Office of the High Commissioner for the Marca España was established in 2012. The High Commissioner was directly appointed by the Prime Minister, although it was functionally dependent of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 113 The Forum is a public-private strategic alliance of the main Spanish companies with leading brands and international projection in their respective sectors and the competent government departments. Acessed at: https://www.marcasrenombradas.com/ (15 May 2020). 36 Spanish Report).114 It has been elaborated in consultation with other governmental departments, in particular, the Higher Council for Sports and sporting organizations. The aim of the Spanish Report is to reflect on the role of sport as a diplomatic tool and on the importance of building a Spanish policy in this field. In this regard, it can be considered the first pillar of a more ambitious plan aiming to build a Spanish strategy on sport diplomacy which should be achieved in five phases. Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Political Analysis of the Elaboration and Implementation Follow-up, consensus about political and legal approval of the of the Spanish monitoring and the competent framework Spanish Strategy Strategy on Sport assessment of the authority for on Sport Diplomacy Spanish Strategy driving and Diplomacy on Sport coordinating the Diplomacy process Along with this central initiative, it has to been considered that some regions (Comunidades Autónomas - Self-governing Communities - in Spanish) are also trying to develop their own models on sport diplomacy. These attempts are clearly connected with traditional claims of more political autonomy coming from some regions. From a legal point of view, the question deserves some explanation. According to Spanish Law, the competence on sporting matters is shared among local, regional and central authorities. Thus, local authorities are responsible, for instance, of planning sport facilities and implementing research programmes. They are competent for making sport accessible to all. As to the Self-Governing Communities, it has to be considered that according to article 148.1.19 of the Spanish Constitution they can assume competences on the promotion of sport and the proper use of leisure. Based on this 114 La Diplomacia Deportiva como actor de la España global diego calatayud soriano la necesidad de un modelo para España. The report is available in Spanish at http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/Area%20publicacio nes/Diplomacia%20Deportiva_L.pdf, (15 May 2020). The main elements of the Report are the following: (1) It analyses the different ways a State can resort to sport as an instrument of Public Diplomacy in order to improve its image and to achieve its foreign policy objectives, (2) Carries out a study on the interaction between Diplomacy and sport throughout history, (3) Examines the importance of the moral, ethical, political, economic and social influence of sport in contemporary societies, (4) Includes a study of several national models of Sport Diplomacy, (5) Concludes how these other models could inspire a Sport Diplomacy model for Spain. 37 constitutional provision, all the Spanish self-governing Communities have legally assumed competences on sport issues. Finally, article 149 establishes that the central government will have an exclusive competence over international relations. Being aware of the political power of sport and its potential to project the image of the region abroad, some Self-Governing Communities have tried to explore the possibility of resort to sport to gain presence in the international arena. The Basque Country 115 and Catalonia116 are two interesting examples in this regard. 3.4. Croatia As Croatia is mostly known in the world because of its athletes and sporting results, developing a national sport diplomacy strategy certainly makes sense. As a country of just around 4 million inhabitants, Croatian sporting results are a winning card. Winning the tennis Davis Cup twice in 2005 and 2018, being third in the FIFA World Cup in France in 1998 and second at the last FIFA World Cup in Russia and having Luka Modrić as the France Football, FIFA and UEFA best football player in the world for 2018, or in the past having Janica and Ivica Kostelić winning gold Olympic medals and Ski World Cup titles although coming from a country without a proper skiing centre, meant a lot. To have a proper picture of how sport may serve as an outstanding promotion and political – diplomatic tool, first it should be noted that the final match of the FIFA World Cup in Russia between France and Croatia had a global audience of 1.12 billion,117 meaning that every sixth person in the world heard about Croatia. On the other hand, for such a small country, this kind of sporting event was an excellent opportunity for the Croatian President and Prime Minister to spend a lot of time doing, not just sport entertainment, but also politics, during the football games with Russian, British and French heads of state and governments. This is the reason why sport, and sport diplomacy, is getting much bigger attention for the governmental point of view. 115 García, C. (2012) The Use of Sports as a Tool of Public Diplomacy in Regions or "Stateless Nations": The Case of the Basque Country in Contemporary Spain, Journal of Sport Media, 7(2), 115-128. 116 Information about Catalonia and its sport diplomacy is available at https://diplocat.cat/en/about-us/ (15 May 2020). 117 Around half the world’s population tuned in to this year’s soccer World Cup. Accessed at: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/21/world-cup-2018-half-the-worlds-population-tuned-in-to-this-years-soccer- tournament.html (29 Sep 2019). 38 In January 2019, the first ever draft of the National Sports Programme (a national sports strategy) was released for public consultation. This bold move was backed by the Parliament on 12th July 2019 when the National Sports Programme was adopted. 118 In this document, Sports Diplomacy is regarded as an important initiative to be developed, implemented and evaluated over a seven-year period (2019-2026). The Croatian Central State Office for Sport at the time, and now the Croatian Ministry of Tourism and Sport and the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs are tasked to form a special state nominated body whose competence is to work on sport diplomacy issues. Using sport as a tool to enhance international engagement, brand and connections is a logical step for Croatia, such is the power, success and visibility of its world-famous sports stars and teams. The government felt that it made sense to ally national interests and policy outcomes with sport. Just to have a picture of the impact of the Russian FIFA World Cup success, we must note that during the 8th summit of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and China and the 9th Business Forum of CEEC and China held on 12 April 2019 in Dubrovnik there were signed two memorandums of understanding for building two stadiums, one in Rijeka119 and one in Velika Gorica120 meaning the Chinese project on “stadium diplomacy” is still going on (see supra). Sport diplomacy also makes good, economic sense. For instance, the representatives of the Croatian Chamber o