PREPMUN 2024 OAS Study Guide PDF

Table of Contents Welcome Letter 4 Student Officer Introductions 5 Introduction to the Committee 6 Topic 1: The Question of the Venezuelan Migrant Crisis Introduction to the Topic...

Table of Contents Welcome Letter 4 Student Officer Introductions 5 Introduction to the Committee 6 Topic 1: The Question of the Venezuelan Migrant Crisis Introduction to the Topic 9 Background of the Topic 11 Key Terms and Definitions 16 Scope of Debate 17 Key Stakeholders 23 Potential Solutions 26 Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) 28 Conclusion 29 Bibliography 30 Topic 2: The Question of Gang Violence in Latin America Introduction to the Topic 39 Background of the Topic 41 Key Terms and Definitions 47 Scope of Debate 48 Key Stakeholders 55 Potential Solutions 58 Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) 62 Conclusion 63 Bibliography 64 Welcome Letter Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Organisation of American States (OAS) in PREPMUN 2024! It is an honour to be your Dais for the OAS this year. In this year’s iteration of PREPMUN, the OAS will be focusing on two main issues that are highly prevalent in the Americas — The Question of Venezuela’s Migrant Crisis and The Question of Gang Violence in Latin America. As the Americas continue to evolve dynamically, its problems remain highly prevalent and relevant to the world we live in today. As delegates representing countries in the Americas, the Dais hope that all of you will step up to the task, and resolve these issues that have long plagued the Americas. This Study Guide aims to provide all delegates with a comprehensive understanding of the topics at hand. However, the information in the Study Guide is fundamental, and all delegates should continue to further their research on the topics and their specific stances on the issues. As you step into PREPMUN 2024, the Dais hope that all delegates will make the most out of the conference, and believe that the conference will be an enriching and enlightening experience for all delegates. The Dais urge all delegates to take this opportunity to polish their oratorical skills and uphold diplomacy in all discussions. Lastly, the Dais believes that the conference will be a great opportunity for all delegates to meet new people from various backgrounds, and forge lasting bonds with fellow delegates. With that, the Dais wish all delegates the best of luck in preparing for the conference, and we look forward to seeing all of you then. Warm regards, Marcus Cheong, Caydence Chu and Wang Ziyun Dais of the Organisation of American States Student Officer Introductions Head Student Officer: Marcus Cheong The oldest of the OAS Dais, Marcus is a Y5 student from ACS (Independent). Like many other 17-year-olds in the circuit, it is a wonder how his hair is still yet to turn grey from the truckload of commitments he willingly buries himself under. In his pockets of free time, he can be found pacing around aimlessly, rewatching sitcoms on Netflix for the fifth time in a row, or catching up on the 300 missed messages daily in his Dais' group chat (blame Caydence and Ziyun). He would like to claim that he is an avid music listener, but has to regrettably admit that most of his music taste can be summarised by Spotify's "Soft Pop Hits" playlist. While he may be a busy boomer, his positive and enthusiastic outlook on life keeps him afloat, and he looks forward to meeting all delegates at PREPMUN 2024! - Caydence Deputy Student Officer: Caydence Chu The funniest of the OAS Dais, Caydence is yet another debater in the circuit, just like her favourite USG Tan Yong Tat. As a Year 4 Triple Humanities student from River Valley High School, she somehow finds enjoyment while diving into the world of Chemistry. A very cute and amazing bubbling sparkling fizzy orange soda girl, Caydence only has two pressing worries in her life: passing O-Level Higher Chinese, and whether she should get her braces anytime soon. Since she is indeed the funniest chair, she shall now provide the delegates who had the patience to read till here a cheesy pick-up line: Forget Hydrogen — the delegates of OAS are her number one element. She hopes that all delegates will have a blast of a time at PREPMUN 2024! - Ziyun Deputy Student Officer: Wang Ziyun The tallest of the OAS Dais, Ziyun is yet another proud Year 4 Rafflesian in the circuit. An athletic gymnast who gained her biceps from using crutches instead of conditioning, she often wonders how she stumbled across the MUN circuit as a science student. In her free time, she can be found worrying about whether her hamster is eating enough, laughing at how her hamster drinks water, or (you guessed it) cleaning her hamster cage. Feel free to approach Ziyun about her very unique subject combination of Triple Science and Geography, and she will be very eager to convince you to take the same one. She looks forward to meeting all delegates at PREPMUN 2024 and hopes it will ROCK (get it?)! - Marcus and Caydence Introduction to the Committee The Organisation of American States (OAS) is a regional body in the Americas dating back to 1889, when American states decided to meet periodically and forge a shared institution. Established on April 14, 1890, as the International Union of American Republics, its initial purpose was “for the prompt collection and distribution of commercial information”.1 The Commercial Bureau of the American Republics was also set up as the Union’s secretariat. In 1910, the bureau became the Pan-American Union, and a permanent headquarters was constructed in Washington, DC, now the historic OAS building. The OAS Charter, officially forming the OAS, was adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogotá, Colombia on April 30, 1948.2 The Charter reaffirmed the fundamental rights and duties of states, and established goals for the OAS, as well as its organs and agencies. As of 2024, the OAS consists of 34 independent member states that have ratified the OAS Charter.3 All member states are judicially equal, with equal rights and duties within the OAS. As stated in Article I of the OAS Charter, the OAS focuses on four main pillars: democracy, human rights, security, and development.4 Represented by the General Assembly, its principal decision-making organ, the OAS operates with a legally non-binding mandate. The Organisation of American States (OAS) plays a crucial role for its member states, providing a platform for dialogue, cooperation, and collective action. By addressing issues while upholding peaceful resolution of disputes, the OAS helps foster stability and prosperity across the region and the collective advancement and unity of the Americas.5 The purpose of the OAS is primarily to strengthen peace and security in the Americas, foster representative democracy, ensure the peaceful and amicable resolution of disputes among member states, 1 OAS, “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development,” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp 2 U.S. mission to the Organisation of American States, “History of the OAS,” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, May 3, 2017, https://usoas.usmission.gov/our-relationship/about-oas/history/#:~:text=The%20OAS%20Charter%20was%20a dopted. 3 OAS, “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development,” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/member_states/. 4 OAS, “CHARTER of the ORGANIZATION of AMERICAN STATES (A-41),” Oas.org, August 1, 2009, http://www.oas.org/. 5 OAS, “CHARTER of the ORGANIZATION of AMERICAN STATES (A-41),” Oas.org, http://www.oas.org/. allow the American states to unite and take common action in the case of conflict, and to bolster economic, social, and cultural development.6 The OAS serves as a platform for countries to adopt multilateral treaties that shape the law within countries in the Americas and promote regional cooperation and better relations between member states and within the region of the Americas.7 Today, member states convene in the OAS and partake in discussions relating to the peace and security of the Americas. 6 OAS, n.d, “About the OAS.” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States. Accessed July 17, 2024, https://usoas.usmission.gov/our-relationship/about-oas/. 7 OAS, “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development,” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/about/juridical_heritage.asp. Introduction to the Topic Venezuela’s migrant crisis is one of the world’s largest. As of November 2023, over 7.7 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2014, of which 85% settled in Latin America.8 17 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean alone have accepted over 6.5 million refugees.9 Host nations throughout the Americas have generally welcomed refugees. However, they are now facing significant strains in accommodating these refugees. These strains have left many host countries unable to provide adequate food and housing for many refugees.10 Simultaneously, the strains have prompted some host countries, such as Chile and Peru, to restrict the flow of refugees at certain border points.11 Ultimately, the crisis stems from the multi-faceted humanitarian, political, and economic crisis in Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro’s regime has been criticised by international organisations, including the OAS, for eroding democratic institutions and perpetual human rights violations.12 His tenure has also overseen rampant hyperinflation, widespread poverty, soaring crime rates, and acute food shortages.13 This issue infringes upon two of the OAS’ four fundamental pillars: democracy and human rights. Hence, the OAS must address it to retain the legitimacy of its goal to “advance a common regional agenda on democratic governance [and] human rights”.14 Moreover, as the sole major regional organisation in the Americas to include noteworthy stakeholders like the US, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the OAS is uniquely placed to address this issue with input from all major parties.15 8 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis,” Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 2024, https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/venezuelan-refugee-crisis/. 9 UNHCR, “Over 4 Million Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants Struggle to Meet Basic Needs across the Americas,” UNHCR, September 23, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/over-4-million-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-struggle-meet-basi c-needs. 10 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 11 R4V, “RMNA 2023 - REFUGEE and MIGRANT NEEDS ANALYSIS | R4V,” www.r4v.info, September 12, 2023, https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis. 12 OAS, “Statement from the OAS General Secretariat Regarding Recent Actions from the Regime in Venezuela towards Guyana,” OAS - Organization of American States, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-082/23. 13 Rocio Cara Labrador and Will Merrow, “The Venezuelan Exodus,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/venezuelan-exodus. 14 OAS, “Organization of American States,” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/. 15 CFR.org Editors, “Backgrounder - the Organization of American States,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/organization-american-states. To solve this, delegates must explore short- to medium-term solutions to manage refugee flows. Simultaneously, they must explore long-term solutions targeting the root cause of the crisis, namely Venezuela’s internal situation. Ultimately, as long as the humanitarian and economic crisis in Venezuela persists, Venezuelans will continue to flee. Background of the Topic Migration has been a longstanding issue in Venezuela, first originating during Hugo Chávez’s presidency. The Central University of Venezuela estimates that 1.5 million Venezuelans emigrated between 1999 and 2014, largely corresponding to the period of Chávez’s tenure.16 This large-scale emigration from Venezuela was reinvigorated following Nicolás Maduro’s election as president in 2013,17 with 600,000 Venezuelan professionals alone emigrating between 2013 and 2015.18 Maduro’s regime has been widely criticised as a dictatorship since his election as his tenure saw the violation of many tenets of democracy, such as electoral fraud and suppression of political dissent.19 Additionally, OAS reports have found that state security forces have carried out 18,093 extrajudicial executions, and 15,501 cases of arbitrary detention since 2014.20 The OAS has publicly condemned the Maduro government’s suppression of democratic institutions, crackdown on opposition voices, and human rights abuses.21 Simultaneously, Venezuela has suffered a major economic crisis under Maduro’s tenure. With the world’s largest oil reserves, more than two-thirds of the government budget has relied on oil exports in the past. From 2014 to 2016, oil prices plunged from more than USS100 to US$30 per barrel, resulting in a widespread economic crisis.22 Even with the recovery of oil prices, conditions remain bleak — Venezuela’s GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) collapsed by more than 70% from 2014 to 2020. As of 2024, 82% of the population lives in 16 Antonio Maria Delgado, “Venezuela Overwhelmed by Massive Brain Drain,” El Nuevo Herald, September 9, 2014, https://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/america-latina/venezuela-es/article2039010.html. 17 BBC News, “Chavez Heir Maduro Wins Venezuela Presidential Election,” BBC News, April 15, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22149202. 18 Delgado, “Brain Drain”. 19 Freedom House, “Venezuela: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” Freedom House, 2023, https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2023. 20 Diario la Nacion, “PGA Group Estimates That 1.8 Million Venezuelans Have Emigrated in 10 Years,” Diario La Nacion, April 23, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150519092717/http://www.lanacion.com.ve/nacional/pga-group-estima-que-18- millones-de-venezolanos-han-emigrado-en-10-anos/. 21 OAS, “OAS General Secretariat Report Reaffirms Crimes against Humanity in Venezuela,” OAS - Organization of American States, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-122/20. 22 Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2023), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis. poverty, and 53% in extreme poverty.23 Due to the economic crisis among other factors, as of November 2023, over 7.7 million Venezuelans have emigrated since 2014.24 In October 2023, Maduro’s government committed to holding largely free elections in an agreement with opposition leaders.25 In response, the United States lifted some sanctions.26 Yet, in January 2024, Venezuela’s highest court upheld a ban on the candidacy of opposition leader María Corina Machado, arrested two leaders of Machado’s campaign, and issued arrest warrants for seven more of her allies.27 Machado is largely considered one of the opposition’s most popular candidates, having previously won 90% of all votes in the opposition’s presidential primary.28 Moreover, the government set an extremely compressed timetable for the elections,29 which only allocated four days for candidates to register, and for the estimated five million new or displaced voters to be recorded.30 This short time span gave international election observers little time to supervise the election conditions. In response, the US proceeded to roll back most sectoral sanctions relief.31 In July 2024, Maduro was reelected to another six-year term in office, giving him the political capital to further his authoritarian regime, which has exacerbated the Venezuelan crisis in recent months.32 Simultaneously, the international community has criticised the 23 OHCHR, “Venezuela: UN Expert Calls for Human Rights, Not Charity, to End Hunger and Malnutrition,” OHCHR, February 14, 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/venezuela-un-expert-calls-human-rights-not-charity-end-hunge r-and. 24 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 25 Samantha Schmidt, “Maduro, Venezuelan Opposition Agree to Freer Election in 2024,” Washington Post, October 17, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/17/us-venezuela-sanctions-deal/. 26 Congressional Research Service, “Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy,” CRS Reports, January 26, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10715. 27 Regina Cano, “Venezuela’s Highest Court Upholds Ban on Opposition Presidential Candidate,” AP News, January 26, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-opposition-candidate-ban-machado-maduro-ed68b5d422e454371186c745 046ebd75#. 28 Cano, “Ban on Opposition Presidential Candidate”. 29 Christopher Sabatini, “Maduro Is Flouting His Commitment to Hold Free Elections in Venezuela. The US Must Respond – Carefully,” Chatham House, March 22, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/03/maduro-flouting-his-commitment-hold-free-elections-venezuela-us-mus t-respond-carefully. 30 Sabatini, “Free Elections in Venezuela”. 31 Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Sanctions Policy”. 32 Vivian Sequera, Delsy Bultrago, and Mayela Armas, “Venezuela’s Maduro, Opposition Each Claim Presidential Victory,” Reuters, July 31, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelans-vote-highly-charged-election-amid-fraud-worries-2024-07 -28/. election for being fraudulent, sparking widespread rebuke from many OAS members, who have recently expressed willingness to implement harsher measures on Venezuela.33 Hence, it is essential to discuss this issue now to determine how exactly these harsher measures can be implemented, if at all. Past Actions Cartagena Declaration The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is a non-binding resolution, adopted at the 1984 Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America.34 While global definitions of a refugee have been outlined by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,35 the Cartagena Declaration expands on these global definitions to include a generalised set of circumstances “which have seriously disturbed public order”.36 In full, the definition of refugees has been hence expanded to “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”.37 Though the Cartagena Declaration is non-binding, 14 Latin American countries have incorporated it into their national legislation.38 Yet, apart from Brazil and Mexico, no other nations have adopted prima facie recognition of Venezuelan migrants as refugees, whereby their status as refugees is presumed to be true unless otherwise rebutted.39 This has been attributed to countries’ unwillingness to accept even more migrants, which may exacerbate the existing strains that migrants are placing on them.40 OAS Working Group 33 Samantha Schmidt et al., “World Leaders, Ordinary Venezuelans Doubt Maduro’s Reelection Claim,” Washington Post, July 29, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/29/venezuela-presidential-election-result-maduro/. 34 Amera International, “Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,” AMERA International, n.d., https://amerainternational.org/cartagena-declaration-on-refugees/. 35 Cécile Blouin, Isabel Berganza, and Luisa Freier, “The Spirit of Cartagena? Applying the Extended Refugee Definition to Venezuelans in Latin America – Forced Migration Review,” Forced Migration Review, accessed June 13, 2024, https://www.fmreview.org/blouin-berganza-freier/. 36 UNHCR, “The Refugee Concept under International Law,” UNHCR, March 15, 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/5aa290937.pdf. 37 Amera International, “Cartagena Declaration”. 38 Amera International, “Cartagena Declaration”. 39 Legal Information Institute, “Prima Facie,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, n.d., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie#. 40 Blouin, Berganza, Freier, “Spirit of Cartagena”. The OAS has also established a working group to “address the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis in the Region”.41 The working group’s initial goals were to raise awareness of the gravity of the refugee and migrant situation in the Americas, collect testimonies from refugees, and support the Venezuelan migrants and refugees.42 Some initiatives the working group had pushed out were fieldwork in countries receiving Venezuelan migrants, interviews with Venezuelan migrants and refugees, and public education campaigns to better protect Venezuelan migrants and refugees from facing any sort of ostracisation.43 However, this working group focuses mainly on raising awareness and establishing dialogues; it does not provide a united, comprehensive solution to manage refugee flows.44 Resultantly, it has failed to address the issue in any significant way. Regional Humanitarian Plans The international community has established several regional humanitarian plans in the region. Two of the most notable ones are the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP).45 The HRP focuses on coordinating aid from humanitarian partners to people within Venezuela, while the RMRP focuses on the immediate humanitarian and protection needs of Venezuelan refugees, usually those in host countries.46 41 OAS, “Working Group on the Crisis of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in the Region,” www.oas.org, 2024, https://www.oas.org/ext/en/human-rights/crisis-venezuelan-migrants-refugees. 42 OAS, “Working Group on the Crisis of Venezuelan Migrants”. 43 OAS, “Working Group on the Crisis of Venezuelan Migrants”. 44 OAS, “Working Group on the Crisis of Venezuelan Migrants”. 45 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 46 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. Yet, both are heavily underfunded. The HRP aimed to raise US$720 million in 2023 to help 5.2 million people, but it only received US$362.8 million in 2023.47 Moreover, as of April 2024, the RMRP has only received 0.5% of its US$1.59 billion funding target.48 These funding shortages can largely be attributed to donor fatigue and lack of sufficient attention — by the media, politicians, and the public — to the Venezuelan migrant crisis, whose current iteration has persisted for over a decade.49 Hence, it can be observed that coordinated international humanitarian solutions have largely failed thus far. 47 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 48 R4V, “Home | R4V,” www.r4v.info, April 25, 2024, https://www.r4v.info/en/home. 49 Bryan Pietsch and Hari Raj, “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Similar to Ukraine’s in Scale, but Not Aid,” Washington Post, September 4, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/04/venezuela-refugee-crisis-ukraine-syria/. Key Terms and Definitions Terms Definitions Migrant “Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence”.50 Migration flow The “number of migrants crossing a boundary, within a specific time period, for the purpose of establishing residence”.51 Irregular migrant Any person who “owing to irregular entry, breach of a condition of entry or the expiry of their legal basis for entering and residing, lacks legal status in a transit or host country”.52 Regularisation The process of granting legal status to irregular migrants.53 Host country Any country where migrants take up residence for prolonged periods.54 National The “absolute capability and power of a sovereign nation to independently sovereignty govern free from external interference”.55 Prima facie A “fact or presumption that is sufficient to be regarded as true unless otherwise disproved or rebutted”.56 50 United Nations, “Migrants,” United Nations, 2021, https://www.un.org/en/fight-racism/vulnerable-groups/migrants. 51 European Commission, “Migration Flow,” home-affairs.ec.europa.eu, n.d., https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossa ry/glossary/migration-flow_en. 52 European Commission, “Irregular Migrant,” European Commission, n.d., https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossa ry/glossary/irregular-migrant_en. 53 International Organisation for Migration, “Regularization,” 2023, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/documents/regularization.pdf. 54 European Commission, “Host Country - European Commission,” home-affairs.ec.europa.eu, accessed June 14, 2024, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossa ry/glossary/host-country_en. 55 IGI Global, “What Is National Sovereignty,” IGI Global, 2019, https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/national-sovereignty/69922. 56 Legal Information Institute, “Prima Facie.” Scope of Debate Regularisation Regularisation stabilises a migrant’s status within a host country, preventing them from being deported.57 It allows migrants to work in formal jobs — hence weakening the underground economy — and allows them access to public services such as healthcare and education.58 Further, it can benefit host countries, such as by increasing their social security and tax revenues, and making data on the labour market and economy more accurate.59 However, 40% of Venezuelan migrants remain undocumented, entering host countries as irregular migrants.60 A possible measure to resolve this would be to adopt more lenient regularisation processes. The process of regularisation itself allows a country to enhance its security through better managing and keeping track of the migrants. With a more lenient regularisation method, the host country may attract more asylum-seeking refugees, which may then contribute to the country through tax revenues or labour. When legal status is obtained by the migrants, they will be able to participate fully in the formal economy by contributing to tax revenues and social security systems.61 Besides direct economic benefits, more lenient regularisation methods can allow for mass filling of labour shortages in various sectors, boosting the country’s labour productivity and further economic development. One example of a lenient regularisation process is the prima facie recognition of Venezuelan migrants, providing regularisation avenues with less stringent requirements.62 Countries may adopt more lenient regularisation processes upon evaluating the benefits they can potentially bring to the country. However, many other countries have not done so, which may be perceived to be in conflict with the Cartagena Declaration. Instead, they have resorted to a patchwork of innovative, mostly temporary residence permits.63 For example, some countries have leveraged existing programs like visas, migration agreements, and asylum or refugee programs to grant 57 International Organisation for Migration, “Regularization”. 58 International Organisation for Migration, “Regularization”. 59 International Organisation for Migration, “Regularization”. 60 UNHCR, “4 Million Venezuelan Refugees”. 61 UN Migration and Migration Policy Institute , “A Winding Path to Integration Venezuelan Migrants’ Regularization and Labor Market Prospects,” October 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-iom_venezuelan-regularization-2023_final. pdf. 62 Legal Information Institute, “Prima Facie.” 63 UNHCR, “4 Million Venezuelan Refugees”. Venezuelans legal status, while others have implemented new temporary programs specifically for Venezuelans.64 These approaches, though creative, fall short of full legal status, due to their narrow scope, temporary nature, and the lack of access to public services that they permit.65 Moreover, some host countries have begun restricting these temporary permits.66 Resultantly, these countries have been criticised for failing to comply with obligations under international law to safeguard Venezuelans’ lives, integrity, and human rights.67 Host countries have not applied prima facie recognition of Venezuelans as refugees due to several reasons. First, they struggle to justify accepting more migrants, whose influx has significantly strained their resources, job markets, and infrastructure. Recognising all Venezuelans as refugees will entail accepting large quantities of people and being obligated to provide public services for them, risking large costs.68 Second, providing this recognition could create ‘pull factors’ attracting even more refugees, creating an unsustainable cycle of migrants flooding into host countries, and overwhelming already-burdened public services.69 However, it is important to note that these measures are not primarily because of a lack of will to accept migrants. Rather, they are due to a lack of capability to accept more migrants, as the scale of migration is far beyond what many of these countries’ immigration systems were built for.70 Despite this, many countries have largely attempted to maintain an open-door policy nonetheless.71 Moreover, the Venezuelan government has made it difficult for citizens to obtain documents such as passports and other identification documents, requiring citizens to pay large sums of money and wait years for their requests to be processed, if at all.72 Visa and permit 64 Andrew Selee et al., “Creativity amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America,” Migration Policy Institute, January 2019, https://doi.org/10.21428/74d826b1.b1ae638e. 65 Selee et al., “Creativity amid Crisis”. 66 Amnesty International, “Peru: Refugees in Peru Face Impossible Deadline,” Amnesty International, November 6, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr46/7377/2023/en/. 67 Amnesty International, “Growing Exodus of Venezuelans Reveals Failure of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile to Comply with Regulations,” Amnesty International, September 21, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/exodus-venezuelans-colombia-peru-ecuador-chile-obligations/. 68 Blouin, Berganza, Freier, “Spirit of Cartagena”. 69 Blouin, Berganza, Freier, “Spirit of Cartagena”. 70 Selee et al., “Creativity amid Crisis”. 71 Selee et al., “Creativity amid Crisis”. 72 Oriana Van Praag, “Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis,” Wilson Center, September 13, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-venezuelan-refugee-crisis. applications are also prohibitively expensive for many Venezuelans.73 Many host countries’ legal processes to facilitate migrant flows require migrants to provide these documents.74 Yet in the process, these requirements may ironically end up restricting migrant flows instead. Hence, delegates need to consider how to balance the need to regularise and accept migrants, with the need to protect the national interests of host countries, many of which are burdened by migrant flows far larger than they were prepared for. In the process, delegates must also consider how the OAS can fairly distribute the responsibility and costs of protecting Venezuelans. Integrating Existing Migrants Beyond considering the criteria to accept migrants, delegates should also consider how best to integrate migrants that have already been accepted. Struggling to cope with the strain of accepting migrants, numerous host countries have faced difficulties providing adequate support to them. Apart from this strain, migrants also face some integration-specific challenges. In some scenarios, regularisation can harm, and not aid, integration measures. Irregular migrants can be paid lower wages without social security benefits, which may allow them to find work more easily than regular migrants.75 Moreover, some countries have quotas on what percentage of the payroll can go to migrants, and what percentage of workers can be foreign.76 Beyond material challenges, migrants have also faced experiences of “xenophobia and intolerance”.77 Hence, even in countries with extensive regularisation, migrants can face integration issues. As a result, migrants have “faced significant challenges accessing food, housing and livelihood” in host countries. In 2022, a UNHCR report found that half of all Venezuelan migrants could not afford three meals a day, and lacked access to “safe and dignified housing”.78 These challenges are partially responsible for some 300,000 migrants returning to 73 Wilson Center, “Venezuelan Refugee Crisis”. 74 Wilson Center, “Venezuelan Refugee Crisis”. 75 Diego Chaves-González and Natalia Delgado, “A Winding Path to Integration: Venezuelan Migrants’ Regularization and Labor Market Prospects,” October 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-iom_venezuelan-regularization-2023_final. pdf. 76 Diego Chaves-González and Natalia Delgado, “A Winding Path”. 77 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 78 R4V, “RMNA,” RMRP, November 30, 2022, https://rmrp.r4v.info/rmna2022/. Venezuela since September 2020.79 International humanitarian assistance efforts have been established to help alleviate this strain, such as the aforementioned RMRP and HRP. However, they suffer from chronic funding shortages due to a lack of international support.80 Discussing the funding for these international humanitarian plans falls outside the scope of the OAS mandate. Instead, delegates should consider what measures the OAS should take to allow host countries to better support migrants in areas such as employment, housing, and access to social services, while simultaneously managing the strain that the influx of migrants poses. Delegates should also consider whether it is worthwhile coordinating socioeconomic integration programmes across the region, and if so, how best to do so. There is also room to consider social programmes to help locals and migrants in host countries be more accepting of each other. Political Instability Ultimately, as long as the crisis’ root cause — Maduro’s regime, and its associated political and economic instability — persists, Venezuelans will continue to flee.81 Many OAS member states agree that Maduro’s regime has violated the OAS pillars of democracy and human rights. At a 2022 OAS General Assembly meeting, nine countries expressed their “deep concern at the systemic violations and abuses of human rights that continue to occur in Venezuela, and the aggravation of the political, economic, social and humanitarian crisis in that country”.82 Several countries, most prominently the United States, have implemented economic sanctions on Venezuela. However, economic sanctions have been largely ineffective at countering Venezuela thus far. Despite extensive U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s economy, especially through an oil embargo, it is not clear how exactly Maduro has been influenced. Venezuela has instead rerouted oil exports to friendlier countries such as China.83 The bulk of sanctions’ 79 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 80 Disaster Philanthropy, “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis”. 81 Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian and Alexandra Winkler, “The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 27, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/persistence-venezuelan-migrant-and-refugee-crisis. 82 U. S. Mission OAS, “OASGA Statement on Venezuela,” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, October 17, 2022, https://usoas.usmission.gov/oasga-declaration-on-venezuela/. 83 William Neuman, “Venezuela Sanctions Aren’t Working. Don’t Repeat the Mistakes of the Cuba Embargo | William Neuman,” the Guardian, June 6, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/06/venezuela-sanctions-arent-working-dont-repeat-the-m istakes-of-the-cuba-embargo. impact has instead fallen onto ordinary Venezuelans, such as by contributing to a one million percent inflation rate in 201884 By the Congressional Research Service’s admission, these sanctions have “failed to dislodge Maduro and exacerbated an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis”.85 Apart from sanctions, there are many other ways for countries to intervene in Venezuela’s affairs. Yet, there is no clear consensus on how to do so. This is mostly due to concerns over infringing upon Venezuela’s national sovereignty. Many countries have pushed for more diplomatic measures like dialogues and technical monitoring, deeming them to be sufficient.86 This could be due to concerns such as: honouring their existing ties to Maduro, potential exacerbation of humanitarian issues in Venezuela, and setting a precedent for meddling in member states’ internal affairs.87 Simultaneously, other countries may push for harsher measures, including diplomatic pressure and sanctions.88 Examples of diplomatic sanctions include introducing entry bans on government officials, downgrading diplomatic relations, and expelling diplomats.89 Any diplomatic pressure and sanctions that are implemented must also have some key criteria. First, they must have clear and specific goals. Second, they must create clear incentives for Maduro’s government to agree to those goals. Third, they must be feasible for a broad base of OAS countries to implement for a long period of time, to ensure that they will create consistent pressure for Maduro. Fourth, they have to strike a balance between being too weak, which will result in ineffective sanctions, and being too strong, which may propel Venezuela to limit its relations with other countries even further and devolve further into becoming a pariah state. 84 Robert Valencia, “What Does a 1.29 Million Hyperinflation Rate Look Like?” Newsweek, December 14, 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/venezuela-million-hyperinflation-losing-lives-everyday-1256630. 85 Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Sanctions Policy”. 86 Lisandra Paraguassu, “Brazil’s Lula Seeks Dialogue with Both Venezuelan Government and Opposition,” Reuters, March 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-lula-seeks-dialogue-with-both-venezuelan-government-oppositi on-2023-03-09/. 87 Reuters, “Maduro and Lula Hit out at US Sanctions on Venezuela,” Reuters, May 29, 2023, sec. Americas, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-maduro-meets-lula-first-visit-brazil-since-2015-2023-05-29 /. 88 Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Sanctions Policy”. 89 US Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Tools for Atrocity Prevention,” USHMM Prevention Tools, accessed June 14, 2024, https://preventiontools.ushmm.org/diplomatic-sanctions/. Furthermore, delegates can consider other measures such as supporting opposition groups and civil society organisations in Venezuela, increasing their legitimacy and capacity to challenge Maduro's regime more effectively. The use of diplomatic support for opposition groups was done previously in 2019. Following the 2018 presidential elections, the opposition-controlled National Assembly declared the elections neither free nor fair, and cited articles in the constitution to call for the leader of the National Assembly to become Acting President.90 Then-leader of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, declared himself Acting President and was recognised by more than fifty countries.91 This created some legitimacy for Guaidó, with eleven countries fully ending diplomatic relations with Maduro in favour of Guaidó.92 However, all other countries either maintained relations with both Maduro and Guaidó or only Maduro, leaving Guaidó with little practical power. Moreover, many countries simply stopped recognising Guaidó after a period of time, such as the European Union in 2021.93 With the military remaining loyal to Maduro, Maduro remained firmly in power for the most part. When Guaidó entered Colombia from Venezuela to attend an international conference, he was expelled and sent to the United States, where he has stayed ever since.94 Hence, for any international recognition or support for opposition leaders to succeed, they must be politically feasible to be maintained long–term by the international community and must create sufficient pressure to be diplomatically effective. Overall, delegates must determine whether negotiations, pressure, and sanctions, can effectively compel change in Venezuela in the first place, and if so, how best to do so. They must also determine the appropriate level of intervention in Venezuela’s internal politics, balancing sovereignty with democracy and human rights.95 90 BBC, “Venezuela Crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC News, August 12, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877. 91 BBC, “Political Situation”. 92 Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights, “Interactive Map: Degrees of Diplomatic Recognition of Guaidó and Maduro,” Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights, October 15, 2020, https://www.venezuelablog.org/interactive-map-degrees-of-diplomatic-recognition-of-guaido-and-maduro/#. 93 Latin America Advisor, “Why Is International Support Falling for Venezuela’s Guaidó?” The Dialogue, October 21, 2022, https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/why-is-international-support-falling-for-venezuelas-guaido/. 94 Associated Press, “Venezuelan Opposition Leader Juan Guaidó Denounces Being Expelled from Colombia.” NBC News, April 25, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/venezuelan-opposition-leader-juan-guaido-denounces-expelled-colombia -rcna81356. 95 OAS, “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development,” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/about/principles.asp. Key Stakeholders Countries with a Large Number of Venezuelan Refugees Certain countries, especially those closer to Venezuela, have accepted far more migrants than others. For example, Venezuela’s direct neighbour Colombia has accepted 2.5 million migrants with a population of 52 million, while Brazil has accepted less than 0.4 million with a population of 215 million.96 Countries already hosting many Venezuelan refugees have faced greater economic and societal strains, and will be hesitant to adopt policies that further these strains. Resultantly, many of these countries have neither established prima facie recognition of Venezuelans as refugees nor applied the extended Cartagena Declaration to Venezuelans.97 Some of these countries have also restricted temporary permit applications, further limiting regularisation processes.98 Moreover, due to the significant strain they are facing in accommodating existing migrants, they have not adopted strong integration programmes, leaving migrants in these countries to continue to face severe integration issues.99 Countries with Comparatively Fewer Venezuelan Refugees Countries further away from Venezuela have typically fewer migrants entering the country, and hence can better cope with the strain that the influx of migrants will bring. Resultantly, they are more likely to be willing to adopt broader regularisation policies, such as establishing a simplified prima facie recognition of Venezuelans as refugees, and will be more likely to support an expanded definition of refugees for the region.100 Migrants in these countries also tend to enjoy strong integration programmes, allowing them to become self-reliant. For example, one relocation programme in Brazil contributed to 80% of Venezuelan migrant adults being able to find employment or start their own businesses.101 96 Vanessa Buschschlüter, “Venezuela Crisis: 7.1m Leave Country since 2015,” BBC News, October 17, 2022, sec. Latin America & Caribbean, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-63279800. 97 Amnesty International, “Growing Exodus of Venezuelans”. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/exodus-venezuelans-colombia-peru-ecuador-chile-obligations/. 98 Amnesty International, “Impossible Deadline”. 99 R4V, “RMNA.” 100 UNHCR Asylum Capacity Support Group, “Brazil: Simplified Prima Facie Recognition of Venezuelan Refugees,” ACSG, 2024, https://acsg-portal.org/tools/55071/. 101 Gema Cortes, “After 5 Years, Brazil Relocation Strategy Benefits over 100,000 Venezuelans,” International Organization for Migration, April 4, 2023, https://www.iom.int/news/after-5-years-brazil-relocation-strategy-benefits-over-100000-venezuelans. Opponents of the Maduro Regime Certain OAS member states have been extremely critical toward Venezuela and in particular, Nicolás Maduro. These countries have expressed “serious concern” over Venezuela banning prominent opposition leaders in March 2024.102 Some of these countries have expressed a willingness to apply diplomatic sanctions on Maduro.103 Further, the U.S. in particular has strongly criticised Venezuela and has implemented various political and economic sanctions on Venezuela. These countries will advocate for harsher responses to pressure Venezuela to adopt political security, including diplomatic sanctions. However, they seem unlikely to support substantive economic sanctions, as these countries have also expressed some hesitation at adding additional economic sanctions on Venezuela.104 Allies of the Maduro Regime In recent years, various politicians eager to strengthen ties with Maduro have been elected as leaders of their respective countries.105 Hence, they have strived to cultivate strong political and economic ties with Venezuela and have denounced sanctions on Venezuela, especially those carried out by the United States.106 Some of these countries published a statement in October 2023 denouncing U.S. sanctions on Venezuela as “contrary to international law”.107 Hence, they would be unwilling to support further measures against Venezuela. However, they are willing to support dialogue and mediating measures alongside Venezuela. For example, some of these countries have met with Venezuelan opposition candidates with Maduro’s consent, in a bid to help foster democracy in Venezuela.108 These countries are 102 Andres Oppenheimer, “Argentina’s Pro-Trump Leader Javier Milei Says It’s Time to Get Tougher on Venezuela | Opinion ,” Miami Herald, March 27, 2024, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article287132100.html. 103 Oppenheimer, “Javier Milei”. 104 Kejal Vyas and Alexander Saeedy, “WSJ News Exclusive | How Wall Street Won a Battle over Venezuelan Sanctions,” WSJ, February 13, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/how-wall-street-won-a-battle-over-venezuelan-sanctions-a97fd329. 105 Lorenzo Santiago, “The Challenge the New Brazilian Ambassador to Venezuela Will Be to Condemn Sanctions and ‘Maintain Neutrality’, Says Expert,” Brasil de Fato, February 23, 2024, https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2024/02/23/the-challenge-the-new-brazilian-ambassador-to-venezuela-will-be-t o-condemn-sanctions-and-maintain-neutrality-says-expert. 106 Zedryk Raziel, “Latin American Countries Urge US to Lift Sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to Curb Migration,” EL PAÍS English, October 23, 2023, https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-10-23/latin-american-countries-urge-us-to-lift-sanctions-on-cuba-a nd-venezuela-to-curb-migration.html. 107 Raziel, “Lift Sanctions”. 108 Andreina Acosta, “Colombia Leader Meets Venezuela Opposition Candidate with Maduro’s Consent,” Bloomberg.com, April 10, 2024, likely to advocate that such measures will be sufficient to help improve Venezuela’s political stability, without further sanctions. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-10/petro-meets-venezuela-opposition-candidate-with-madur o-s-consent. Potential Solutions Regional Response to Hosting Refugees One solution delegates can consider is a cohesive regional response strategy for hosting Venezuelan refugees. This involves harmonising policies in several avenues: coordinating socioeconomic integration programmes and developing joint strategies for refugee flow and border management.109 Within this regional response, one specific element to consider is the definition of refugees. The definition of refugees outlined by the Cartagena Declaration is the closest to a regionally adopted one, as it has been adopted by fourteen countries.110 Yet, many of these countries have not adhered to it when dealing with Venezuelan migrants. Hence, delegates can explore how this definition of refugees should be modified, if at all, to allow for standardised criteria across the region for regularising Venezuelans. An OAS resolution could encourage member states to regularise all Venezuelans who are classified as refugees under the updated definition. However, adopting a regional response faces several challenges. Firstly, in coordinating a regional framework, nations will inevitably have to cede some control over their immigration policies or border security, which may be perceived as an infringement on their sovereignty. Secondly, coordinating and synchronising policies across the entire region will fail unless robust administrative mechanisms are present, which can be complex and slow to establish. Thirdly, such a solution is vulnerable to political changes within individual countries. Political changes, such as changes in government, could easily disrupt or derail the strategy’s implementation. Fourthly, OAS members have differing capacities to accept Venezuelan migrants, due to varying levels of political will, bureaucratic capacity, and economic resources.111 Delegates may hence face significant difficulties in determining collective action. 109 Response for Venezuelans, “Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan”. 110 Amera International, “Cartagena Declaration”. 111 Response for Venezuelans, “Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,” 2019, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/press_release/file/rmrp_venezuela_2019_onlineversion_final.p df. Fifth, for the definition of refugees specifically, the OAS cannot directly adopt a standardised, legally binding definition for refugees. Hence, delegates must consider how effective a legally non-binding definition, such as that outlined in the Cartagena Declaration, will be. They should also consider ways that the OAS can ensure that member states adopt this definition as extensively as possible. More broadly, delegates must evaluate how, if at all, the OAS can adopt concrete methods to manage refugee flows. Diplomatic Pressure and Sanctions OAS members can come to a consensus on collective diplomatic pressure, or potentially sanctions, on Venezuela. If scoped properly, this could aim to encourage political and economic reform in Venezuela by imposing targeted sanctions and creating pressure on key government officials and institutions. However, sanctions may exacerbate existing economic hardships for ordinary Venezuelans, prompting further instability and migration. Moreover, the pressure may backfire as Venezuela may retaliate against the OAS and further isolate itself as a pariah, leading to long-lasting impacts on diplomatic relations. Resultantly, Venezuela may be more hesitant to engage in further diplomatic discussions in the future, hence causing broader regional instability. Lastly, some delegates may oppose a coordinated approach against Venezuela, perceiving it as a precedent for the OAS to meddle in other countries’ affairs, such as their own in the future. Additionally, delegates must ensure that any measures taken are in line with the OAS’ legally non-binding mandate — as a reference, they can consider the language used in past OAS resolutions on this issue. Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) 1. How can the OAS effectively balance protecting Venezuelan migrants with managing the strains they impose on host countries? 2. How can the OAS fairly distribute the responsibility and costs of protecting Venezuelan migrants? 3. How should the OAS allow host countries to provide stronger support for migrants? 4. Should the OAS coordinate socioeconomic programmes across the region, and if so, how? 5. How should the OAS balance its pillars of democracy and human rights, with the need to respect Venezuela’s national sovereignty? Conclusion This issue requires delegates to consider two main areas — short- to medium-term solutions to manage refugee flows, and long-term solutions targeting the root cause of the crisis, namely Venezuela’s internal situation. Both of these areas require delegates to explore significant technical nuances, especially regarding the feasibility of implementing regional solutions without compromising on national sovereignty and overstepping the mandate of the OAS. Delegates must also pay special consideration to their stance and bloc formation. Due to the intricate complexities of many countries’ stances, delegates must ensure that they push for their countries’ national interests while collaborating to achieve comprehensive solutions for the region. Bibliography Acosta, Andreina. “Colombia Leader Meets Venezuela Opposition Candidate with Maduro’s Consent.” Bloomberg.com, April 10, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-10/petro-meets-venezuela-opposition-c andidate-with-maduro-s-consent. Amera International. “Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.” AMERA International, n.d. https://amerainternational.org/cartagena-declaration-on-refugees/. Amnesty International. “Growing Exodus of Venezuelans Reveals Failure of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile to Comply with Regulations.” Amnesty International, September 21, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/exodus-venezuelans-colombia-peru-ecuad or-chile-obligations/. ———. “Peru: Refugees in Peru Face Impossible Deadline.” Amnesty International, November 6, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr46/7377/2023/en/. Associated Press. “Venezuelan Opposition Leader Juan Guaidó Denounces Being Expelled from Colombia.” NBC News, April 25, 2023. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/venezuelan-opposition-leader-juan-guaido-denounc es-expelled-colombia-rcna81356. BBC. “Venezuela Crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated.” BBC News, August 12, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877. BBC News. “Chavez Heir Maduro Wins Venezuela Presidential Election.” BBC News, April 15, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22149202. Blouin, Cécile, Isabel Berganza, and Luisa Freier. “The Spirit of Cartagena? Applying the Extended Refugee Definition to Venezuelans in Latin America – Forced Migration Review.” Forced Migration Review. Accessed June 13, 2024. https://www.fmreview.org/blouin-berganza-freier/. Buschschlüter, Vanessa. “Venezuela Crisis: 7.1m Leave Country since 2015.” BBC News, October 17, 2022, sec. Latin America & Caribbean. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-63279800. Bush, Sarah. “Forms of International Pressure and the Middle East.” Project on Middle East Political Science, August 21, 2015. https://pomeps.org/forms-of-international-pressure-and-the-middle-east. Cano, Regina. “Venezuela’s Highest Court Upholds Ban on Opposition Presidential Candidate.” AP News, January 26, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-opposition-candidate-ban-machado-maduro-ed68b5d 422e454371186c745046ebd75#. CFR.org Editors. “Backgrounder - the Organization of American States.” Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/organization-american-states. Chaves-González, Diego, and Natalia Delgado. “A Winding Path to Integration: Venezuelan Migrants’ Regularization and Labor Market Prospects,” October 2023. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-iom_venezuelan-regul arization-2023_final.pdf. Cheatham, Amelia, and Diana Roy. “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis. Congressional Research Service. “Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy.” CRS Reports, January 26, 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10715. Cortes, Gema. “After 5 Years, Brazil Relocation Strategy Benefits over 100,000 Venezuelans.” International Organization for Migration, April 4, 2023. https://www.iom.int/news/after-5-years-brazil-relocation-strategy-benefits-over-100000-ve nezuelans. Delgado, Antonio Maria. “Venezuela Overwhelmed by Massive Brain Drain.” El Nuevo Herald, September 9, 2014. https://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/america-latina/venezuela-es/article2039010.html. Diario la Nacion. “PGA Group Estimates That 1.8 Million Venezuelans Have Emigrated in 10 Years.” Diario la Nacion, April 23, 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20150519092717/http://www.lanacion.com.ve/nacional/pga-gr oup-estima-que-18-millones-de-venezolanos-han-emigrado-en-10-anos/. Disaster Philanthropy. “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis.” Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 2024. https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/venezuelan-refugee-crisis/. European Commission. “Host Country - European Commission.” home-affairs.ec.europa.eu. Accessed June 14, 2024. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum- and-migration-glossary/glossary/host-country_en. ———. “Irregular Migrant.” European Commission, n.d. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum- and-migration-glossary/glossary/irregular-migrant_en. ———. “Migration Flow.” home-affairs.ec.europa.eu, n.d. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum- and-migration-glossary/glossary/migration-flow_en. France-Presse, Agence. “Maduro Hosts Colombia’s Petro for ‘Very Fruitful’ Talks.” Voice of America, January 7, 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/maduro-hosts-colombia-s-petro-for-very-fruitful-talks-/69091 23.html. Freedom House. “Venezuela: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2023. Global Forum on Migration and Development. “Colombia’s Temporary Protection Status (Estatuto Temporal de Protección Para Migrantes Venezolanos, or ETPV), | Global Forum on Migration and Development.” www.gfmd.org, 2023. https://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/19146. IGI Global. “What Is National Sovereignty.” IGI Global, 2019. https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/national-sovereignty/69922. International Organisation for Migration. “Regularization,” 2023. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/documents/regularization.pdf. Itriago Acosta, Andreina, and Stephan Kueffner. “Maduro Cuts Venezuela’s Diplomatic Ties with Ecuador after Raid.” Bloomberg, April 17, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-16/maduro-cuts-venezuela-s-diplomati c-ties-with-ecuador-after-raid. Labrador, Rocio Cara, and Will Merrow. “The Venezuelan Exodus.” Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/venezuelan-exodus. Latin America Advisor. “Why Is International Support Falling for Venezuela’s Guaidó?” The Dialogue, October 21, 2022. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/why-is-international-support-falling-for-venezuelas-g uaido/. Legal Information Institute. “Prima Facie.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, n.d. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie#. Muñoz-Pogossian, Betilde, and Alexandra Winkler. “The Persistence of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 27, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/persistence-venezuelan-migrant-and-refugee-crisis. Nations, United. “Migrants.” United Nations, 2021. https://www.un.org/en/fight-racism/vulnerable-groups/migrants. Neuman, William. “Venezuela Sanctions Aren’t Working. Don’t Repeat the Mistakes of the Cuba Embargo | William Neuman.” the Guardian, June 6, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/06/venezuela-sanctions-arent-worki ng-dont-repeat-the-mistakes-of-the-cuba-embargo. OAS. “CHARTER of the ORGANIZATION of AMERICAN STATES (A-41).” Oas.org, August 1, 2009. http://www.oas.org/. ———. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/about/what_we_do.asp. ———. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/about/general_assembly.asp. ———. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/about/principles.asp. ———. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/member_states/. ———. “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development.” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/about/juridical_heritage.asp. ———. “OAS General Secretariat Report Reaffirms Crimes against Humanity in Venezuela.” OAS - Organization of American States, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-122/20. ———. “Organization of American States.” www.oas.org, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/. ———. “Statement from the OAS General Secretariat Regarding Recent Actions from the Regime in Venezuela towards Guyana.” OAS - Organization of American States, August 1, 2009. https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-082/23. ———. “Working Group on the Crisis of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees in the Region.” www.oas.org, 2024. https://www.oas.org/ext/en/human-rights/crisis-venezuelan-migrants-refugees. OAS, U. S. Mission. “OASGA Statement on Venezuela.” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, October 17, 2022. https://usoas.usmission.gov/oasga-declaration-on-venezuela/. OHCHR. “Venezuela: UN Expert Calls for Human Rights, Not Charity, to End Hunger and Malnutrition.” OHCHR, February 14, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/venezuela-un-expert-calls-human-rights-n ot-charity-end-hunger-and. Oppenheimer, Andres. “Argentina’s Pro-Trump Leader Javier Milei Says It’s Time to Get Tougher on Venezuela | Opinion.” Miami Herald, March 27, 2024. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article 287132100.html. Otis, John. “The U.S. Predicted His Downfall but Maduro Strengthens His Grip on Power in Venezuela.” NPR.org, December 8, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/12/07/1061290155/maduros-grip-on-power-in-venezuela-only-ge ts-stronger. Paraguassu, Lisandra. “Brazil’s Lula Seeks Dialogue with Both Venezuelan Government and Opposition.” Reuters, March 10, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-lula-seeks-dialogue-with-both-venezuelan- government-opposition-2023-03-09/. PHRP. “This Is No Way to Live: Public Security and Right to Life in Venezuela.” Police and Human Rights Resources, September 27, 2018. https://policehumanrightsresources.org/this-is-no-way-to-live-public-security-and-right-to-l ife-in-venezuela. Pietsch, Bryan, and Hari Raj. “Venezuela’s Refugee Crisis Similar to Ukraine’s in Scale, but Not Aid.” Washington Post, September 4, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/04/venezuela-refugee-crisis-ukraine-syria /. R4V. “Home | R4V.” www.r4v.info, April 25, 2024. https://www.r4v.info/en/home. ———. “RMNA.” RMRP, November 30, 2022. https://rmrp.r4v.info/rmna2022/. ———. “RMNA 2023 - REFUGEE and MIGRANT NEEDS ANALYSIS | R4V.” www.r4v.info, September 12, 2023. https://www.r4v.info/en/document/rmna-2023-needs-analysis. Raziel, Zedryk. “Latin American Countries Urge US to Lift Sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to Curb Migration.” EL PAÍS English, October 23, 2023. https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-10-23/latin-american-countries-urge-us-to-lift -sanctions-on-cuba-and-venezuela-to-curb-migration.html. Response for Venezuelans. “Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,” 2019. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/press_release/file/rmrp_venezuela_2019_ onlineversion_final.pdf. Reuters. “Colombia and Venezuela Sign Deal to Revive Trade.” Reuters, February 16, 2023, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-venezuela-sign-deal-revive-trade-2023- 02-16/. ———. “Maduro and Lula Hit out at US Sanctions on Venezuela.” Reuters, May 29, 2023, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-maduro-meets-lula-first-visit-brazil-si nce-2015-2023-05-29/. Sabatini, Christopher. “Maduro Is Flouting His Commitment to Hold Free Elections in Venezuela. The US Must Respond – Carefully.” Chatham House, March 22, 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/03/maduro-flouting-his-commitment-hold-free-electio ns-venezuela-us-must-respond-carefully. Santiago, Lorenzo. “The Challenge the New Brazilian Ambassador to Venezuela Will Be to Condemn Sanctions and ‘Maintain Neutrality’, Says Expert.” Brasil de Fato, February 23, 2024. https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2024/02/23/the-challenge-the-new-brazilian-ambassador-t o-venezuela-will-be-to-condemn-sanctions-and-maintain-neutrality-says-expert. Schmidt, Samantha. “Maduro, Venezuelan Opposition Agree to Freer Election in 2024.” Washington Post, October 17, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/17/us-venezuela-sanctions-deal/. Schmidt, Samantha, Ana Vanessa Herrero, Leo Sands, and Marina Dias. “World Leaders, Ordinary Venezuelans Doubt Maduro’s Reelection Claim.” Washington Post, July 29,  2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/29/venezuela-presidential-election-result- maduro/. Selee, Andrew, Jessica Bolter, Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, and Miryam Hazán. “Creativity amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in Latin America.” Migration Policy Institute, January 2019. https://doi.org/10.21428/74d826b1.b1ae638e. Sequera, Vivian, Delsy Bultrago, and Mayela Armas. “Venezuela’s Maduro, Opposition Each Claim Presidential Victory.” Reuters, July 31, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelans-vote-highly-charged-election-amid-fr aud-worries-2024-07-28/. Tsafack, Mbong Akiy Fokwa. “DR Congo’s New Face of Neocolonialism: Its Own Government.” www.aljazeera.com, August 18, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/8/18/drcs-forests-for-oil-sale-reeks-of-neocoloni alism. U.S. mission to the Organisation of American States. “History of the OAS.” U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, May 3, 2017. https://usoas.usmission.gov/our-relationship/about-oas/history/#:~:text=The%20OAS%20C harter%20was%20adopted. UN Migration Network. “Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V).” United Nations Network on Migration, 2022. https://migrationnetwork.un.org/practice/regional-inter-agency-coordination-platform-refug ees-and-migrants-venezuela-r4v. UN Migration, and Migration Policy Institute. “A Winding Path to Integration Venezuelan Migrants’ Regularization and Labor Market Prospects,” October 2023. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-iom_venezuelan-regul arization-2023_final.pdf. UNHCR. “Over 4 Million Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants Struggle to Meet Basic Needs across the Americas.” UNHCR, September 23, 2023. https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/over-4-million-venezuelan-refugees-and-migran ts-struggle-meet-basic-needs. ———. “The Refugee Concept under International Law.” UNHCR, March 15, 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/5aa290937.pdf. UNHCR Asylum Capacity Support Group. “Brazil: Simplified Prima Facie Recognition of Venezuelan Refugees.” ACSG, 2024. https://acsg-portal.org/tools/55071/. US Holocaust Memorial Museum. “Tools for Atrocity Prevention.” USHMM Prevention Tools. Accessed June 14, 2024. https://preventiontools.ushmm.org/diplomatic-sanctions/. Valencia, Robert. “What Does a 1.29 Million Hyperinflation Rate Look Like?” Newsweek, December 14, 2018. https://www.newsweek.com/venezuela-million-hyperinflation-losing-lives-everyday-12566 30. Van Praag, Oriana. “Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis.” Wilson Center, September 13, 2019. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-venezuelan-refugee-crisis. Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights. “Interactive Map: Degrees of Diplomatic Recognition of Guaidó and Maduro.” Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights, October 15, 2020. https://www.venezuelablog.org/interactive-map-degrees-of-diplomatic-recognition-of-guai do-and-maduro/#. Vyas, Kejal, and Alexander Saeedy. “WSJ News Exclusive | How Wall Street Won a Battle over Venezuelan Sanctions.” WSJ, February 13, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/how-wall-street-won-a-battle-over-venezuelan-sancti ons-a97fd329. Wallenfeldt , Jeff. “DACA | Meaning, Requirements, Renewal, & Dreamers | Britannica.” www.britannica.com, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/topic/DACA. Introduction to the Topic Violence in Latin America has long been a prevalent issue of concern. Criminal organisations — more commonly referred to as gangs — contribute to violence in Latin America as one of the leading perpetrators of violence. Typically, gang violence is used as a broad term, referring to criminal and violent activities conducted by organised groups, the gangs.112 Although gangs are not exclusive to Latin America, they are prevalent throughout the region. In Mexico alone, there were more than 200 active, major gangs involved in all forms of violence in 2023.113 Gang violence branches out into a large variety of crimes, such as trafficking, armed robbery, and kidnapping to name a few. These crimes often come with varying degrees of violence, with assault, threats and homicides not being uncommon.114 The uncontrolled growth of gangs has led to a significant increase in their presence, resulting in profound impacts on Latin American societies. The crimes and violence perpetrated by the gangs have instilled widespread fear and exerted considerable societal influence. Innocent civilians live in constant fear of being targeted by gangs and often lack the power to resist when experiencing violence.115 Moreover, many crimes, such as counterfeiting, generate substantial profits for the gangs,116 and in severe cases, provide them with enough power to influence the economy and become involved in the government. Gang violence in Latin America extends beyond the region itself, bringing on ripple effects affecting the entirety of American states. Some significant challenges, such as increased illegal migration and a pervasive sense of fear due to the criminal activities stringing throughout many countries, affect regional stability. With regional stability being a core purpose of the establishment of OAS, it is crucial that OAS takes action to address this distressing issue.117 Moreover, the OAS serves as a key platform for the American states to 112 U.S. Department of Justice , “Criminal Division | about Violent Gangs,” www.justice.gov, May 28, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-vcrs/about-violent-gangs. 113 Morelia, “Mexico’s Gangs Are Becoming Criminal Conglomerates,” The Economist, May 11, 2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/11/mexicos-gangs-are-becoming-criminal-conglomerates#. 114 National Drug Diligence Center, “Drugs and Gangs Fast Facts,” Justice.gov, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs11/13157/index.htm#:~:text=Gangs%20engage%20in%20an%20array. 115 Fastercapital , “Violence, Fear, and Intimidation ,” Fastercapitals, accessed June 12, 2024, https://fastercapital.com/topics/violence,-fear,-and-intimidation.html. 116 UNODC, “The Illicit Trafficking of Counterfeit Goods and Transnational Organized Crime,” 2014, https://www.unodc.org/documents/counterfeit/FocusSheet/Counterfeit_focussheet_EN_HIRES.pdf. 117 U.S. Mission to the OAS, “About the OAS,” About the OAS, June 8, 2017, https://usoas.usmission.gov/our-relationship/about-oas/#:~:text=Purposes%3A%20To%20strengthen%20peace %20and. collaborate and address shared challenges. With the OAS, international cooperation and coordinated efforts can be achieved, ensuring the harness of international support measures to address gang violence. Although meetings have been conducted within the OAS on this topic, concrete solutions have yet to be proposed. Delegates must identify the underlying causes of gang violence, and evaluate the effectiveness of past solutions, for improvised measures to be proposed. Delegates will have to propose more targeted solutions addressing gang violence in general whilst taking into account the different priorities and interests of individual Latin American states. Overall, as gang violence in the Americas gains prominence, even in parts of the region that were not plagued by gang violence issues previously, it demands urgent action for the betterment of Latin America, the safety of civilians, and the improvement of the Americas as a whole. Background of the Topic Violence is a severe issue in Latin America. In particular, Latin America is home to 8% of the world’s population, but 33% of its homicides.118 In 2021, Latin America’s murder rate was three times the global average.119 Brief History of Gangs and Violence The origin of gangs is unknown, but semi-formalised groups of young adults have always been present throughout history.120 Gangs in some ancient societies engaged in activities similar to those of gangs today,121 and violent street gangs have been recorded since the 17th century.122 However, the rise of gangs in Latin America only began in more recent times. Many of the most notorious gangs now can be traced back to the United States. Youth gangs flourished in the colonial U.S. during the American Revolution, where unemployment and lack of security resulted in people finding safety in large groups,123 especially during periods of violent population shifts. With gentrification and deportation as officials tried combating the gangs, these youth gangs slowly started emerging in Latin American countries, evolving or expanding into the more notorious and violent gangs as seen today. For example, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a Salvadoran dominant gang with an estimated 50 thousand gang members, was established in Los Angeles during the period of civil war in El Salvador. Gang members who fled to America came together to support each other in foreign land. Over time, MS-13 evolved into a highly violent gang involved in various criminal activities, including drug trafficking, extortion, and murder. The U.S. government’s crackdown on gang activities in the 1990s led to the deportation of gang members back to El Salvador. This 118 Amanda Erickson, “Latin America Is the World’s Most Violent Region. A New Report Investigates Why.,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/25/latin-america-is-the-worlds-most-violent-re gion-a-new-report-investigates-why/. 119 UNODC, “Global Study on Homicide 2023 Chapter 1,” 2023, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH23_ExSum.pdf. 120 Glen D Curry and Scott H Decker, “Gang | Crime,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, August 20, 2010, https://www.britannica.com/topic/gang-crime. 121 James C. Howell and Internet Archive, Gangs in America’s Communities, Internet Archive (Thousand Oaks, Calif. : SAGE Publications, 2012), https://archive.org/details/gangsinamericasc0000howe. 122 Tripod, “Gangs in the 1700s,” gangstory.tripod.com, accessed June 12, 2024, https://gangstory.tripod.com/id4.html#:~:text=Crime%20rates%20soared%20and%20the. 123 The Public Information Education Division, “What Is a Gang?” (Missouri State Highway Patrol, n.d.), https://www.16thcircuit.org/Data/Sites/1/media/family_court/Documents/Gangs_Sheriff.pdf. deportation led to the spread and growth of MS-13 throughout Latin America, where it became even more entrenched and powerful.124 Common Facets of Gang Violence Now, gang violence is more common throughout Latin American countries than ever. While gangs predominantly rose throughout Latin America for the above reason of deportation, different reasons also influenced the uproar of violent gangs in recent times. The common facets of gang violence can be categorised into two segments: the causes and impacts of gang violence. Causes of Gang Violence Individuals resort to joining gangs for several common reasons, including the lack of education, financial struggles, and lack of law enforcement.125 In some cases, people are even coerced into gangs. However, not all gangs are inherently violent. Gangs may turn to more violent behaviour due to a variety of reasons, but are often linked with the socio-economic and political state they experience. Economic incentives, such as opportunities in drug trafficking and robbery, may result in violent actions such as assault and threat in the process. The community environment may foster gang rivalries, leading to violent and devastating physical conflicts.126 Additionally, weak law enforcement not only prompts gang formation, but also perpetuates gang violence due to the lack of accountability, as gang members feel they can act without fear of legal repercussions. Overall, the causes of gang formation and the escalation to violence are interconnected and often rooted in socio-economic and political contexts. Impacts of Gang Violence The impact of gang violence is long-lasting, affecting both perpetrators and victims. Gang members are often lured to join gangs at a young age, and their early exposure to violence hampers their psychological development without proper guidance. Taking part in violent 124 InSight Crime, “MS13,” InSight Crime, February 28, 2024, https://insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile/#:~:text=The%20Ma ra%20Salvatrucha%2C%20or%20MS13. 125 Youth.Gov, “Risk & Protective Factors | Youth.gov,” Youth.gov, 2019, https://youth.gov/youth-topics/preventing-gang-involvement/risk-and-protective-factors. 126 Malcom W. Kelin and Cheryl L. Maxson, Street Gang Patterns and Policies (Oxford Academy , 2006), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195163445.003.0035. acts also heightens their risk of incarceration. On the other hand, victims suffer evident physical and psychological trauma. Gang violence has detrimental effects on Latin American communities as well. Beyond physical harms, gang influence sows fear in the people, who are concerned about being targets of violence or being drawn into violent activities. This pervasive fear contributes to increased social fragmentation, where communities become divided and distrustful of each other. Persistent violence erodes trust within communities, wearing down social bonds essential for collective well-being. Moreover, gangs often lay eyes on vulnerable youths, not just as victims but also by luring them into joining violent gangs. This leads to an unhealthy cycle of violence and crime, where new recruits continue to fuel the violence, and the overall environment of the local community becomes increasingly dangerous and concerning. As a nation, whilst grappling with the surge of notorious and ever-so-violent gangs, political instability and decline in its economy become rising concerns as well. The growing power of the gangs, driven by illicit weapon trafficking, raises the spectre of rising gang influence and threat in the governments. Corruption in the region results in an array of illicit markets taking root, and the growing markets have allowed gangs to deepen their influence and control in the regional communities.127 Major escalations in gang violence demonstrate the potential for gangs to overthrow the government, as their influence in national politics becomes dominant.128 Furthermore, a nation’s economy can also be negatively impacted. For instance, Mexico, which had their tourist hotspots marred by gang violence, saw a significant drop in visitor numbers, resulting in the overall loss in GDP due to tourism amounting to US$249 billion.129 A nation’s reputation for violence poses a threat to the nation’s economic prospects, such as tourism and investments, contributing to a downward spiral of a country’s economy. 127 International Crisis Group, “Latin America Wrestles with a New Crime Wave,” www.crisisgroup.org, May 12, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/latin-america-wrestles-new-crime-wave. 128 Sarah Melchiades , “Haiti: Major Escalation in Gang Violence Threatens to Overthrow Government, Crisis24,” crisis24.garda.com, March 7, 2024, https://crisis24.garda.com/insights-intelligence/insights/articles/haiti-major-escalation-in-gang-violence-threaten s-to-overthrow-government. 129 Ashley Slud, “Drugs, Violence and Crime in Mexico: Their Drastic Impact on the Tourism Industry and the Economy – Michigan Journal of Economics,” Michigan Journal of Economics, May 10, 2022, https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2022/05/10/drugs-violence-and-crime-in-mexico-their-drastic-impact-on-the-tour ism-industry-and-the-economy/. Past Action Gang violence has plagued Latin American countries for ages, prompting each nation to implement its own strategies and measures to address the issue. The following are two case studies of Latin American countries confronting their problem of gang violence. Firstly, the recent Haiti gang violence of 2024. The sudden surge in gang violence in early 2024 has resulted in injuries or casualties of around 2500 people.130 In addition to gang wars, raids on police stations and international airports were also orchestrated by gang leaders in an attempt to overthrow unpopular prime minister Ariel Henry.131 Despite heightened security measures and international aid from Kenya, approved by the UN, these efforts were ineffective. The military aid from Kenya focused on stabilising the situation and maintaining the country, not the elimination of gangs. Ultimately, international forces lacked the training to identify the gang members in a complex urban environment.132 In addition, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had several calls for the implementation of a “peaceful and inclusive dialogue, free and fair elections and the strengthening of security mechanisms”.133 At present, a transitional government will be established to address the chaotic state of the country.134 Simultaneously, there have been instances of apparent successful measures to reduce gang violence. In 2022, the Salvadoran government under President Bukele launched a new round of gang crackdown to address gang violence once and for all. Since then, they have embarked on mass-scale violence crackdown programmes, imprisoning anyone with suspected associations with gangs.135 Such initiatives have succeeded at curbing murder rates, with 130 United Nations, “Deadly Violence in Haiti at Record High, Some Worst Scenarios Now Realities, Special Representative Tells Security Council, Urging Deployment of Support Mission | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” press.un.org, April 22, 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15674.doc.htm. 131 AlJazeera , “Haiti Gang Violence Deaths Surge in 2024, UN Says,” Al Jazeera, March 28, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/28/haiti-rocked-by-gang-violence-with-over-1500-killed-so-far-this-yea r-un. 132 Tom Phillips and Archie Bland, “Haiti: What Caused the Gang Violence Crisis and What Might Happen Next?,” The Guardian, March 8, 2024, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/08/haiti-crisis-gang-jailbreak-explained. 133 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights , “IACHR Expresses Concern over the Significant Upsurge of Violence in Haiti,” Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), 2024, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2024/039.asp. 134 News Wires, “New Haiti Government Formed to Tackle Gang Violence, Political Chaos,” France 24, June 11, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240611-new-haiti-government-formed-tackle-gang-violence-political- chaos. 135 ​Will Freeman, “Nayib Bukele’s Growing List of Latin American Admirers,” Americas Quarterly, February 16, 2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/nayib-bukeles-growing-list-of-latin-american-admirers/. homicide rates in 2024 reaching an all-time low of 2.4 per 100 thousand.136 Despite the effectiveness, however, criticisms for breaches in human rights arose, including the inhumane state of arrest and detention conditions suspects face upon arrest. Harsh methods were additionally employed by military troops, with violent threats and arbitrary arrests of many males.137 Whilst many case studies of domestic measures implemented for gang violence exist, measures from organisations such as the OAS tackling the issue of gang violence in Latin America as a whole are rare. However, throughout the years, OAS has established working groups to address gang violence in specific countries. For instance, a working group was established in the Permanent Council of the OAS to combat the threats of gangs from Central America and Mexico in the United States. The working group adopted several strategies, broadly classified under diplomacy, prevention, law enforcement, repatriation and capacity enforcement.138 Meetings are also held by the OAS, such as one in 2023 to discuss the surge in gang violence in the Americas, to “emphasise the critical need for a united, multilateral response from law enforcement agencies across the OAS member states.”139 However, there are no tangible breakthroughs from these international efforts, possibly owing to the complexity of international cooperation. International cooperation to address issues regarding another country’s domestic politics affects countries’ international decisions. Conflicts between national interests and the greater good, tensions between states as well as the balance between practical considerations and ideological principles make it challenging for such corporations to occur.140 136 Catherine Ellis, “‘Trapped in This Hell’: How One El Salvador Town Transformed under Bukele,” Al Jazeera, February 2, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/2/trapped-in-this-hell-how-one-el-salvador-town-transformed-under-bu kele. 137 Catherine Ellis, “‘Trapped in This Hell’: How One El Salvador Town Transformed under Bukele”. 138 OAS Permanent Council, “Working Group to Prepare a Regional Strategy to Promote Inter-American Cooperation in Dealing with Criminal Gangs ,” 2010, https://scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_10/CP23790E04.doc. 139 OAS, “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development,” OAS - Organization of American States, August 1, 2009, https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=AVI-215/23. 140 The Politics Shed, “Why Is International Cooperation so Difficult to Achieve?,” sites.google.com, n.d., https://sites.google.com/site/thepoliticsteacherorg/home/why-is-international-cooperation-so-difficult-to-achieve. The status quo of gang violence in Latin America is a result of a complex interplay of historical context, socio-economic factors and past actions taken. Addressing the root cause and multifaceted nature of gang violence is necessary through the adoption of a variety of strategies. As shown in the examples, past solutions are not comprehensive, and international cooperation faces challenges with implementation. OAS members should build on previous efforts, facilitate regional cooperation and enhance strategies through learning from past actions. By doing so, gang violence can be substantially reduced and prosperity and stability can be fostered. Key Terms and Definitions Terms Definitions Gang “A group of persons, usually youths, who share a common identity and who generally engage in criminal behaviour”.141 Latin America The “entire continent of South America in addition to Mexico, Central America, and the islands of the Caribbean whose inhabitants speak a Romance language”.142 Gang violence “Criminal and non-political acts of violence committed by a group of people who regularly engage in criminal activity against innocent people. The term may also refer to physical hostile interactions between two or more gangs”.143 Recidivism “Tendency toward chronic criminal behaviour leading to numerous arrests and re-imprisonment”.144 Harsh-on-crime (or Severe penalties and strict law enforcement towards offenders of acts of tough-on-crime) violence and crimes.145 141 Curry, Glenn D., and Scott H. Decker. 2024. “Gang | Definition, History, & Facts.” Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/gang-crime. 142 David Bushnell, “History of Latin America,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Latin-America. 143 “Gang Violence Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc.” n.d. U.S. Legal Definitions. Accessed June 16, 2024. https://definitions.uslegal.com/g/gang-violence/. 144 Bernard, Thomas J. 2024. “Recidivism | Prisoner Reentry, Rehabilitation & Prevention.” Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/recidivism. 145 Shari Stone-Mediatore, “Tough Questions for Tough-On-Crime Policies,” Ohio Wesleyan University, n.d., https://www.owu.edu/news-media/from-our-perspective/tough-questions-for-tough-on-crime-policies/. Scope of Debate Law Enforcement Practices One of the biggest considerations delegates will have to make during committee debate is the law enforcement practices that will be put into action to counter gang violence threats. As the prominence of gang violence continues to remain a problem for most, if not all countries in the Americas, many countries have employed very different measures to best counter the threat. In Central America, for example, most governments have implemented the La Mano Dura policy in response to its persistent gang violence issues. Originally implemented in El Salvador in 2003, the La Mano Dura policy, or Iron Fist policy, is also implemented in many other Central and Latin American countries.146 The La Mano Dura policy is one where the basic rights of any citizens could be stripped from them where military and law enforcement agencies deem reasonable.147 However, such a policy had its fair share of problems. As of February 2024, two years after the implementation of the Mano Dura policy in El Salvador, a hefty 2% of the population in El Salvador — amounting to more than 76,000 people — had been arrested under the La Mano Dura policy, and this was seen as a major human rights violation.148 While such a policy remains highly contested by people due to the harsh overcrowding conditions in the jails of El Salvador, the majority of the Salvadorians have welcomed this policy openly,149 since it has managed to keep the