EP Quiz Notes PDF

Slides 13: 1. Kin Selection and Altruism - Kin Selection: Favoring kin to increase inclusive fitness (passing on genes through relatives). - Examples of altruistic behavior: - Alarm calls in animals (e.g., monkeys) - increases the individual's risk but benefits kin. - Suicidal behavior i...

Slides 13: 1. Kin Selection and Altruism - Kin Selection: Favoring kin to increase inclusive fitness (passing on genes through relatives). - Examples of altruistic behavior: - Alarm calls in animals (e.g., monkeys) - increases the individual's risk but benefits kin. - Suicidal behavior in bees and ants (sacrifice for the colony). 2. Hamilton’s Rule - Hamilton's formula: \( rB > C \) - r = relatedness - B = benefit to others - C = cost to self - Genes for altruism favored if the benefit to relatives outweighs the cost to self. 3. Inclusive Fitness - Concept by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene. - Fitness is about gene survival, not just individual survival. - Vervet monkeys: Alarm calls vary for different predators, showing kin-based social behaviors. 4. Modern Nepotism - Inheritance, favoritism in legal and business practices are modern forms of kin selection. - Favoring family members aligns with inclusive fitness. 5. Kin Detection and Incest Avoidance - Proxies for kinship (in humans): - Co-residence during childhood. - Maternal association. - Inbreeding depression: Harmful genetic effects in small, isolated groups (e.g., Hutterites). - Westermarck Effect: People raised together are less likely to marry (e.g., Kibbutzim). 6. Tribal Kinship Systems - Kinship systems organize social and political structures in small societies. - Descent: Rules for lineage (e.g., matrilineal, patrilineal). - Marriage alliances: - Exogamy (marrying outside kin group). - Endogamy in certain cultures (e.g., cousin marriage in Arab societies to preserve inheritance). Slides 14: 1. reciprocal altruism - Helping others with the expectation of future reciprocation. - Examples: Reciprocal grooming in animals, blood-sharing among vampire bats, and cooperation in humans.  - Requirements: Recognizing partners, keeping records of interactions, and maintaining motivation to reciprocate. 2. social exchange and free-rider detection - Foragers have norms for sharing, especially for resources with high variance like big game. - Free-rider problem: Individuals who take benefits without sharing costs. - Wason Selection Task: A logic task used to study how people detect rule violations, especially in social contracts. 3. human generosity beyond reciprocation - Humans engage in non-reciprocal helping, like tipping or giving directions. - Situational factors often influence helping behavior more than personality traits. - Helping is common even without immediate reciprocation, seen in actions like tipping in restaurants or helping strangers. 4. theories of generosity: punishment vs mutualistic interpretations - punishment interpretation: Altruistic norms are upheld by punishment, enhancing group cohesion. Boyd & Richerson argue that such norms spread through cultural group selection. - mutualistic interpretation: People choose cooperative partners, leading to genetic selection for fairness as cooperation becomes more beneficial. Baumard & Sheskin support this view. 5. economic games and human behavior - Dictator Game: One player divides a sum with another who has no say. Results often show people offering part of their endowment, which reflects fairness rather than pure self-interest. - Ultimatum Game: One player proposes a division; the second player can accept or reject. Offers around 30-70% are commonly accepted, while lower offers are often rejected. 6. cultural differences in economic games - Studies by Henrich show that offer behaviors in economic games vary widely across cultures. - Inequality aversion model (Ernst Fehr): Suggests people adjust behavior to avoid inequality, but it’s unclear why people feel this way. Slides 15: Here are simplified quiz notes on cooperation, punishment, and mutualism based on the presentation: 1. theories of human generosity - punishment (strong reciprocity): cooperative norms are maintained by punishment, enhancing group cohesion. Boyd & Richerson model suggests such norms spread through cultural group selection. - mutualistic partner-choice: individuals prefer cooperative partners, encouraging fairness and genetic selection for cooperation. Baumard & Sheskin support this view. 2. strong reciprocity and punishment evidence  - Game Evidence: Games like Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Dictator Game (DG) show players often punish defectors, even at personal cost. - Third-Party Punishment (TPP): Rare outside modern contexts where it's cheap (e.g., calling the police). Raises questions about altruism since TPP often lacks direct costs to the punisher. 3. limitations of economic games - Unrealistic structure: Many games assume fixed partners and anonymity, which is rare in real-world cooperation. - Differences in motivation: Economists assume clear game rules; psychologists suggest players’ actions are also shaped by implicit norms and psychological factors. 4. reputation and altruism - Reputation cues: Studies show people act more prosocially when subtle cues (like images of eyes) suggest they're being observed. - Image Management Hypothesis: Suggests altruistic behavior can be driven by reputation concerns, not just pure altruism. 5. partner-choice in biological markets - Biological Markets: Individuals “choose” partners who maximize mutual benefit, as seen in relationships like cleaner fish and their clients. - Fairness through Partner Choice: The ability to select partners can enforce fairness, as exploiters are left without cooperative partners. 6. conclusion on cooperation mechanisms - Evidence indicates real-world cooperation may rely more on partner-choice dynamics and reputation management than punishment alone, challenging assumptions made in controlled economic games. Slides 16: 1. dilemmas of cooperation - Cooperation presents challenges, such as limiting one’s own utility and dealing with free-riders who benefit without contributing. - Time-discounting makes future rewards less valuable, impacting long-term cooperation. 2. economics of moral feelings - Moral feelings can bypass discounting, acting as immediate rewards that counter the delay in benefits. - Feelings like guilt or loyalty help sustain cooperation by acting as commitment devices. 3. commitment devices and examples - Fictional examples: Ulysses tying himself to resist the Sirens (self-imposed limitations). - Real examples: public commitments like engagement rings in romantic love or bonded businesses in commerce.  - Characters signaling willingness to retaliate or show honesty make threats credible, reducing exploitation. 4. love as a commitment device - Love stabilizes relationships through public signals (e.g., engagement rings), expensive displays, or signs of irrational devotion, making commitment costly to fake. 5. friendship and the banker’s paradox - Banker’s Paradox: assistance is offered based on reciprocation potential, but in friendship, commitment goes beyond rational exchange. - Friendship often involves small, incremental acts, is culturally universal, and can fail if one partner exploits the other. 6. evolution of commitment - Long-term cooperation is advantageous but requires signals hard to fake. - Involuntary signals like facial expressions strengthen commitment, making it immune to self-interest in the short term. Slides 17: 1. morality as a challenge for evolution - Morality is non-material, raising questions about its place in an evolutionary framework. - Cooperation models explain moral-like behavior either through punishment or self-interest, but the moral imperative itself is less clear. 2. moral psychology: intuitions and reasoning - Moral judgments often rely on intuitions (e.g., feeling something is wrong) rather than explicit rules. - Studies show people have strong moral reactions, sometimes with limited reasoning to back them up. 3. moral rule vs. convention - Moral rules are seen as universal and inherent, while conventions are situational and can vary (e.g., driving on one side of the road). - Children distinguish moral rules from conventions early on, a distinction that persists across cultures. 4. consequentialist vs. deontological models - Consequentialist model: Actions are moral if they increase overall utility (e.g., saving more lives). - Deontological model: Actions are moral if they follow specific principles, regardless of outcomes (e.g., not harming others). - Trolley problems reveal differences in moral intuitions, showing that people don’t always follow a utilitarian approach. 5. two interpretations of moral judgments - Emotional effects: Judgments can be swayed by how personal or active an action feels. - Fairness intuitions: Situations with pre-existing risks or inequalities affect moral intuitions differently. 6. empathy and social contract theories - Empathy-based morality is shaped by taking others’ perspectives. - Social contract theory suggests that moral behaviors maintain a mutually beneficial social order, though it’s often metaphorical rather than literal. 7. mutualist models of morality - Mutualist morality explains fairness as an evolved mechanism, focusing on just distribution and proportionate punishment. - This model suggests morality supports genetic selection by promoting fairness and cooperative behavior. 8. haidt’s moral foundations - Five core moral domains include care-harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity-purity. - These domains explain a range of moral judgments, beyond just harm and fairness. 9. moral foundations and political perspectives - Different moral emphases explain polarized views in politics, with certain domains (e.g., sanctity) more important to some groups than others.