Engine Operations Experience PDF

is able to advance down the stairwell and into the fire room for a quick knockdown. With the fire controlled, the ladder crew checks for extension and completes a more thorough secondary search. The officer of the engine asks the second due engine officer to mop up hot spots with the ladder crew and...

is able to advance down the stairwell and into the fire room for a quick knockdown. With the fire controlled, the ladder crew checks for extension and completes a more thorough secondary search. The officer of the engine asks the second due engine officer to mop up hot spots with the ladder crew and heads straight to his pump operator. advancing into the structure; apologizes and is clearly rattled. filling the tank at the last fire; firefighter and said, lesson learned, and no on Second Edition 01/31/22 So, screwed up, luckily one of the medics on scene came over and p lever. I had closed it after ngine back together. I feel like we have a third 5 By Lt. Steve Kerns Approximately 10 years ago we were sitting around the kitchen table at Station 8 when a report of a fire was dispatched on the south end of town. While we were not on the initial dispatch, crews were familiar with the location as numerous fires had occurred there in the past. The location was a large recycling facility located in Station 14 s first due district. The facility processed large amounts of Class A materials for trash/recycling purposes. Accessibility had been an issue there in the past in regards to getting fire apparatus in and out. There was only access from the main drag, which was located north of the plant. There was no access to the facility from the east, west, or south, with the only hydrants located on the northern side of the property. However, we did know from past incidents that the water main feeding the street was a larger main capable of flowing a high volume of water. Knowing the fire history of the dispatched location, we flipped the radio on just in time to hear the FAO relay to crews responding that they were receiving multiple calls of thick black smoke in the area, and employees were quoted as stating there was active fire on the property. We listened to the initial crews mark on scene, give their run down of a large trash fire, and make the incident a working fire. We knew that we would be dispatched on the working fire assignment, and we headed for the engine. We responded with a crew of 1 and 2 that day. The driver of Engine 8 had about five years of service at the time. He was a proficient pump operator and a smart firefighter. The back-step member was a senior member of the engine company and had seen his fair share of fire. As we were responding, it became apparent that things on scene were escalating quickly, and crews were struggling to contain the incident. Luckily, because of our familiarity with the location due to past incidents and the on-scene radio traffic, we were able to paint a decent visual picture of what was occurring before our arrival, which was very helpful later in the incident. The initial attack crews on scene did a forward lay into the facility and set up a simple supply hydrant to the engine intake. They then attempted to quickly contain the fire using their deck gun and were trying to set up an elevated master stream with one of the ladders on scene. Conversely, they were running into issues due to a lack of water and were unable to supply both their deck gun and the ladder master stream. When Battalion 4 arrived, he quickly recognized the need for big water due to the large amount of fire showing and the potential fire load being impinged upon. Battalion 4 ordered the next engine to lay in from a separate hydrant because of the water supply issues crews were having. The next engine company grabbed a hydrant northwest of the scene that they thought was on a separate water main and proceeded to lay into the fire. The lay was attempting to supply water to additional companies on scene that they were on a feeder line Second Edition 01/31/22 6 connected to the first engine s water main. Because both supply lines were operating off the same main and feeder, they were simply stealing water from each other and were unable to supply all the defensive master streams needed. At that time, on-scene crews were attempting to flow deck guns from three engines and the ladder s elevated master stream. Battalion 4 had to direct crews to shut down certain master streams to successfully flow the ladder, which was needed to stop the spread of fire in locations the deck guns could not reach. Essentially, crews were faced with the no win situation of robbing Peter to pay Paul. They needed both the deck guns and elevated streams if they were to contain this incident. At this point in time, we arrived and marked on scene over the fireground channel. Battalion 4 instructed us to find a hydrant on a separate water main on the opposite side of the roadway that the facility was located on. As we were struggling to locate an appropriate hydrant on a separate main, we decided as a crew that we would back into the scene to the ladder, drop off our 5 inch hose, and reverse lay out to the hydrant that the initial supply line had been established on. We communicated our plan to command and advised that we felt, after looking at the water atlas, as if we could adequately supply the ladder and the first engine by placing our engine directly on the hydrant. Once we reverse laid out from the ladder and parked on the hydrant, we radioed to the crews flowing water and briefly turned off the hydrant. We quickly connected Engine 8 to the hydrant and charged the 5 inch line now laying between the engine and ladder, and we successfully got the elevated master stream in service. After supplying the d supply a 5 inch to the initial attack engine, allowing them to flow their master streams. When it was all said and done, we were able to supply both the ladder master stream and the initial supply engine with the deck gun operation while maintaining a residual supply of approximately 5-10 PSI. We were only able to do this because we parked the engine directly on the hydrant. Eventually after multiple alarms were called and after a long night, the situation was contained. Interesting side note: later in the evening they were trying to send us back to quarters to rotate fresh crews. The initial plan was to switch out Engine 8 on the hydrant with the relief , we realized that the hydrant had broken, and Engine 8 became stuck on the hydrant. We had to leave Engine 8 on the hydrant all night until the situation was contained the next day. Luckily, we had a full tank of fuel! I felt as if this incident was a great learning experience for our crew and provided lessons that will stick with us for the rest of our careers. The first lesson that we took was how reverse laying helped with scene congestion and organization. With so many companies responding to an incident like this with limited access to the fireground, it really demonstrated how important it is to slow down, avoid the moth to a flame mentality, and set up our operations with the mindset that they could always progress and develop to larger incidents. Lastly and most importantly, this was a great experience for all of us to truly see the benefits of series supply operations firsthand. our ability to maximize the supply. We do not have big water fires like this often, that we set ourselves up for these types of incidents and are prepared to handle them if they come our way! Second Edition 01/31/22 7 By Capt. Steve Riley Following morning roll call the crew made our way to the engine bay to begin daily equipment checks. Our crew for the day was minimum staffing consisting of myself and two firefighters. I had a sense of confidence going into the day as between the driver and the back seat firefighter there was over 50 years of firefightin station PA opened up and the fire tone sounded: The dispatched address was close, about a mile south of the fire house. Battalion 4 had just pulled out of the station for his morning rounds when the dispatch came out, and therefore arrived first. The Chief marked on the scene of a single-story wood frame residential structure with smoke and fire showing from the alpha side, and with information from the neighbor advised Engine 14 that we did have a confirmed elderly occupant still inside. Chief was waiting at the officer s door on our arrival and informed us that the victim was most likely in the front room as that is where he reportedly spent most of his time according to the neighbor. The decision was made to make fast entry and take up an immediate search for the victim. The back seat firefighter quickly forced the door and gained access. To speed up our interior search we decided to split at the door with the back-step firefighter going right and myself going left. As we progressed through our search, we quickly met back up with each other towards the rear of the structure as this residence was a single story, and only approximately 1,000 square feet. As we met up on the search we heard the driver of the engine yell from the front door, Unknown to us at the time, as we were conducting our primary search, the pump operator had driver side pre-connect, placed it in position for fire attack, and charged it on his own. He was then able to, from the relative safety of the front door, communicate with us and darkened down the main body of fire while we continued our search. Ultimately the victim was overcome by fire and pronounced inside. stressful situation without being directed. Knowing that his crew was committed to an interior search for a confirmed life hazard and under active fire conditions, he took action to ensure the safety of his crew. I assure you that during morning equipment checks the driver was NOT considering that he may have to accomplish every initial attack function of the engine company by himself. Understand that making entry as the initial arriving engine company without an attack line is not a common practice. Due to multiple on scene factors, the risk vs. reward decision was made to initiate a primary search without one. This was an ideal scenario to showcase the importance of or scenarios. Second Edition 01/31/22 8 By Capt. Ian Garriott Late one evening, M21 arrived on the scene of a working fire in a large commercial structure which held multiple businesses. A size-up was completed, and a run-down was reported. Soon after the battalion chief arrived, fire was through the roof of the structure, and a defensive second alarm was struck. When we arrived, I instructed the driver to stop at the hydrant (which had a large water main) and advised the crew to standby as I went to the battalion chief to receive orders. Engine 20 was staffed with myself and a solid crew; the driver/pump operator was an apprentice firefighter only out of the academy five months. Engine 20 was dispatched on the second alarm. The order was given to supply Ladder 23 on the delta side of the structure. Four h pump operator and I verified the gauge for the remaining incoming (residual) pressure. Engine 20 was supply PSI. The remaining pressure on the intake gauge was around onitor could be flowed off its pump panel discharge. When the quick attack monitor was flowing, the incoming pressure gauge dropped to 0 PSI. This was not an issue due to a defensive fire; give all the water you can give. In order to maintain the required pressure for the ladder pipe and quick attack, Engine 20 was pumping around 200 PSI. Constant communication between the Engine 20 pump operator and the Ladder 23 operator was maintained throughout the incident which was vital to ensuring our success. it pushed the required water down to Ladder 23. instructed him to maintain this pressure. I told him that no matter what anyone said not to reduce the pressure. I told them that if they had an issue, to tell them he got the order from me and they could address any issues with me. Engine 20 continued supplying water at this pressure for well over two hours as the incident went on. At the end of the incident, my pump operator told me that two different crews approached him and told him to lower the pressure. He did not. Second Edition 01/31/22 9 LESSONS LEARNED The First This apprentice firefighter was trusted to operate Engine 20, because of TRAINING. A lot of training We worked countless days and nights on engine operations, until he and I were confident in his ability to operate unsupervised He earned his right to drive and pump The Second We knew Engine 20 was loud when pumping at 200 PSI We also knew Engine 20 could handle 200 PSI, because of TRAINING This was not the pump or driver s first time. They had been there before The Third ngine our engine Because of training, you will be confident in your e making ability Second Edition 01/31/22 decision- 10 By Lt. Steve Treinish More than a few years ago, I was doing a shift as the driver of Ladder 2. At that time, Ladder 2 was a Sutphen platform with its own 1500 companies carried hose. We even had a cross lay attack line! Anyhow, I was very comfortable with pump operations and hydraulics, and we frequently trained on throwing big water. All the firefighters assigned to 2s knew how to run each piece of apparatus, including both engines assigned there. Sometime after lunch, a fire call came in on the south end, a report of a house explosion. While responding, the dispatcher informed arriving crews that they were getting multiple calls, and we could see smoke on the tree line as we traveled south from downtown. We knew Engine 14 would be first in, and we knew they were very likely going to approach from the south. The discussion on the ladder while responding was to expect big fire, and to approach as if we were going to set up the platform, either as a direct fire attack or to cover potential exposures. Engine 14 quickly had a wrench thrown in their gears when they were blocked a good distance from the fire building by a fallen, live power line. They reported a fully involved 2.5 story house, with exposures on each side in jeopardy. We still had good access from the north, and the driver of Engine 2 knew the ladder would need to go first to get the front of the building. He pulled over to the left at an intersection and let the ladder by. Lesson #1, a good driver, whether it is an engine, ladder, medic, whatever, will stay aware of the need to balance their job while not interfering with others trying to do their job. By swinging left, the driver allowed us to have an easy turn and take the front of the building. rather than going straight in. (This was before series pump supply operations). We knew full well we were going to need water to the ladder, and that the bucket was going up. But, since this was pump discharges, and I would supply from the hydrant, enough residual pressure to supply a couple handlines, and had thought The lesson learned is to know the capabilities of the truck you are on, not only for the bread and comfortable running everything with a pump, in a bunch of different evolutions. Think ahead during the run (even while responding), be ready to change the game plan if required, and know Second Edition 01/31/22 11