Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building: The Case of Canada PDF

International Political Science Review (2009), Vol. 30, No. 2, 163–183 Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building: The Case of Canada Rita Dhamoon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban Abstract. In this article we develop a theoretical framework attuned...

International Political Science Review (2009), Vol. 30, No. 2, 163–183 Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building: The Case of Canada Rita Dhamoon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban Abstract. In this article we develop a theoretical framework attuned to the relationship between discourses of security, race/racialization, and foreignness. Applying this framework to three historic instances of Canadian national insecurity (Japanese-Canadian internment, the Front de libération du Québec crisis, and the Kanehsatake/Oka crisis), we argue that “foreignness” is produced and regulated in historically specific ways with consequences for how “the nation” is viewed. We demonstrate how this is especially evident in relation to racialized constructions of “internal dangerous foreigners.” Our framework and findings invite larger disciplinary consideration of the post-September 11 security environment both in and outside Canada. Keywords: Canada minorities immigration racialization security The events of September 11 2001 have overtly challenged the study of politics in the twenty-first century. In countries of the West, long-standing discussions of “security” are now peppered with renewed discussions of the global and national implications of “terrorism” and a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996), and even new discussions of Islamophobia and of the “state of exception” (Agamben, 1998, 2005). Post-September 11 responses, at popular and policy levels, give lifeblood to certain dimensions of these discussions. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the fortification of borders and the rapid passage of anti-terrorist legislation across many polities, the growing use of extraordinary rendition (Amnesty International, 2006), and in many countries popular attitudes combine in seeing Islamic fundamentalism as a threat. The embodiment of this threat is contained in newsworthy familiar foreign figures (Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein), but it has also come to be represented internally in relation to members of certain diasporic communities – especially those that are Arab and/or Muslim – living in migrant receiving liberal-democratic states. This latter feature was poignantly driven home to Canadians through the case of Maher Arar. Arar, DOI: 10.1177/0192512109102435 © 2009 International Political Science Association Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) 164 International Political Science Review 30(2) a dual Canadian and Syrian citizen, while traveling through the United States in 2002 on his Canadian passport, was accused by American officials of being a member of Al Quaeda and deported to Jordan and ultimately Syria, where he was imprisoned and tortured for over a year (O’Connor, 2006).1 What is extraordinary about this instance of post-September 11 rendition was that, upon Arar’s return to Canada, the questions his case raised, both about his possible innocence and the possible role of Canadian officials in his deportation, led to public pressure to form a fact-finding commission. This commission resulted in a clear rejection of any illegal or terrorist activity on the part of Arar, serious criti- cisms of the role of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in the post-September 11 environment, and the Prime Minister of Canada publicly apologizing to Arar in 2007 and extending him 10.5 million dollars (Canadian) in compensation. In its final report, the commission argued: Canada has faced threats to its national security and the safety of Canadians from Confederation on. The focus of the threats has evolved over time from Fenians, to “enemy aliens” during the World Wars, to communists in the Cold War, to terrorists in the modern era that includes the October Crisis, the Air Indian bombings and the events of 9/11... At the same time, the past contains reminders of the harms of overreacting in trying to achieve national security – the internment of Japanese Canadians during World War II, and excesses with respect to investigating communists and those affiliated with the Quebec sovereignty movement are examples. (O’Connor, 2006: 24) The historically rooted understanding of security threats and changing group- harm forwarded in the Arar Commission forms the starting point of our quest to develop a theoretical framework which can account for the construction of both global and domestic threats, and the consequences of this for racialized groups at particular historical junctures. To do this we take a twofold approach. In the first part of our article we bring together insights from political and social theorists to suggest that in western liberal democracies, whether intended or not, “foreign- ness” and especially the construction of “internal dangerous foreigners” seem to coincide with discourses of nation-building, security, and race-thinking. In the second part, drawing on this theoretical frame, we return to the case of Canada in greater depth to consider how these discourses come together. We suggest Canada is particularly pertinent to address because of the particular nature of its diversity (elements of which can be found in different ways across world states). While most countries of the world are ethnically heterogeneous (UNESCO, 1995), Canada stands out for its combination of four major internal differences: that between an indigenous population and a settler population; that between whites and nonwhites; that between European groups (French and British origin or French speakers and English speakers); and that between immigrants and native-born. Combined, these internal differences mean that Canada is not only a “country of immigration” but also a “nation-state” which also contains “stateless nations” in its borders. These stateless nations include Indigenous peoples (some of whom are organized as First Nations) and the Québécois in the predominantly French-speaking province of Quebec. Though specific expressions of racism vary in relation to the relative power of these different groups symbolically, materially, and even constitutionally (Abu-Laban and Nieguth, 2000), stateless nations as  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 165 well as immigrants and their descendants can be targets of racialization in given historical moments. Utilizing government documents and secondary accounts, we focus on certain historic instances of racialization in the context of national insecurity to exemplify how foreignness is dialectically productive of the dangerous Other and the nation- state. By this we mean that processes of Othering and processes of nation-building (or what we refer to as re-nationalization) are, in some instances at least, mutually constitutive. Specifically we address: 1) the internment of Japanese-Canadians during World War II; 2) the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ)/October crisis of 1970; and, 3) the Kanehsatake/Oka crisis of 1990. Each of these cases reflects important groupings in the Canadian polity that are also variously found in other world states. Thus while the phenomenon of re-nationalization is not unique to Canada, the study of Canada can allow us to see the different ways in which foreignness is manifested. Our findings suggest that while each of the historic moments is distinct, there are certain common patterns which acted to shape membership in terms of not only rights (citizenship) but also belonging (in the nation-state). We conclude by suggesting that these patterns may also be seen to reverberate in the post- September 11 period, and thus that political scientists may potentially deal better with the challenges posed in our time by being analytically attuned to racialized discourses of foreignness, nation, and security. Theoretical Framework: Racialization, Foreignness, Security, and the Nation-State We begin by noting that within the discipline of political science at best sporadic attention has been given for much of the postwar period to issues of race and ethnicity. Indeed, it was not until 1995 that there was a specific section devoted to dealing with race/ethnicity in the American Political Science Association – important both because this is the location of the bulk of the world’s political scientists and because American developments shape much in the human sciences globally. Despite the advent of this section and developments in the subfield of international relations based on constructivist approaches, there remains insufficient analysis of racialization as a historically and socially constructed process (Taylor, 1999) or the complex intersections of race, gender, and class among other forms of inequality (Dawson and Cohen, 2002: 503). As Dawson and Cohen note in reviewing the state of the study of race: One central theme... is the need to understand the process of racialization and racial orderings throughout history and from the perspective of different racial and ethnic groups. More often than not political science seems oblivious to the different methods, times, and reasons groups become racialized subjects. Further, the dynamic trajectory of racial ordering and its consequences for not only policy areas such as immigration but also the evolution of state operations and orientations seems noticeably absent from our analyses. Exploring the historical and specific processes of racialization should provide greater insight into such staples of political science inquiry as electoral realignment, public opinion shifts, and interest group proliferation. (Dawson and Cohen, 2002: 489) Although Dawson and Cohen are concerned with the study of American politics, the absence of attention to racialization, as both socially constructed and historically 166 International Political Science Review 30(2) specific, has hampered the study of politics in other polities such as Canada (Abu-Laban, 2007). In taking up the call of Dawson and Cohen to better understand how, when, and why groups become racialized, we highlight the relevance of also explicitly considering foreignness, security, and the nation-state. In what follows we theoretically link together discourses of foreignness, security, racialization, and nation-state so as to illuminate how they function through one another. The interplay between these discourses, we suggest, may be as relevant today as it has been historically, as demonstrated in the next section through a study of three instances in Canada’s history. We aim to show that in the case of 20th-century Canada, while foreignness is a constant and long-standing marker of racialized Otherness, the subject marked as foreign is not static but is, instead, historically changeable according to the security threats deemed most significant to those with the power to the “nation-state.” Here, the nation-state is understood as a historically specific international legal entity in which the continuously imagined boundaries of a “common identity” coincide with territorial and government sov- ereign authority (Anderson, 1991). Foreignness, we argue, is a floating signifier, subject to variation according to the specific ways in which discourses of nation, security, and racialization interact. In particular, our goal is to demonstrate that constructions of foreignness are deployed and legitimized through state-driven appeals to security, and that these appeals to security serve as alibis for, a) specific forms of nation-building and, b) constructions of the omnipresent danger posed by racialized Others. While discourses of foreignness are driven by nonstate as well as state-based actors, we focus primarily on state-led appeals to security because the state is a key player in constituting and regulating racialized Others and the nation, as the cases in the next section illuminate. In critically examining the relationship between discourses of foreignness and the nation-state, political theorist Bonnie Honig poses a set of questions: “What problems does foreignness solve for us? Why do nations or democracies rely on the agency of foreignness at their vulnerable moments of (re)founding, at what cost, and for what purpose?” (Honig, 2001: 1–2, 4). While it may be the case that dis- courses of foreignness are relevant to the ways in which absolute monarchies, theocracies, military states, one-party states, and transitional states build and consolidate particular conceptions of the nation, Honig’s questions are especially interesting for the study of western liberal democracies, because these claim to be more responsive to diversity. For Honig, foreignness does not merely describe or maintain the subject marked as foreign; it also institutes and reinstitutes markers of national citizenship and belonging. She traces familiar and unfamiliar symbols of foreignness to illustrate the ways in which discourses of foreignness produce images of the founder, immigrant, and citizen, whether these are positive and negative, or privileging and penalizing images. In particular, foreignness serves as a device “that gives shape to or threatens existing political communities by marking negatively what ‘we’ are not,” and, less conventionally explored, also as a device “that allows regimes to import from outside (and then, often, to export back to outside) some specific and much-needed but also potentially dangerous virtue, talent, perspective, practice, gift or quality that they cannot provide for themselves” (2001: 3). While in the first instance foreign- ness is deemed to be outside of the nation-state and threatening its coherence/ unity, in the second, foreignness enables the (re)founding of the nation-state. In both instances, foreignness is necessary to nation-building precisely because it is  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 167 productive in determining which subjects are legitimate and which are illegitimate citizens, and which set of values is morally acceptable and which unacceptable. Foreignness thus differentiates “us” from those Others who are outside the nation- state, and it shapes practices of re-nationalization in moments of crisis. Re-nationalization occurs through foreignness in different ways, as Honig notes. In some cases the re-founder is gendered, whereby female immigrants can be constructed as giving and maternal (Honig, 2001: see especially 58–62), even if they are still fundamentally undesirable. In other cases, as subjects marked by foreignness, specific immigrants are considered necessary to the nation or un- welcome, or sometimes both, depending on how they contribute to the economic growth of the nation (Honig, 2001: 80–2). Further still, discourses of foreignness operate both to privilege some ethnic groups over others and to penalize what Honig calls “extraethnic groups,” e.g. gays and lesbians (2001: 82–6). In this regard, we see foreignness as linked to a range of discourses that shape constructions of Otherness and normality, which might include those related to gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality, as well as liberal democracy and the support of capitalism. While Honig situates foreignness within contexts of xenophobia and xenophilia, racial categorizations tend to be implied rather than explicitly addressed in her analysis of foreignness. Certainly foreignness is not only constituted through modes of racialization, but because racialized foreignness has been historically instrumental to the dialectic of Othering and nation-building we foreground racialization as a process of signification. Racialization refers to ways of thinking about the “represen- tational process whereby social significance is attached to certain biological (usually phenotypical) human features, on the basis of which those people possessing those characteristics are designated as a distinct collectivity” (Miles, 1989: 74). It is a process through which ideas about race are socially and politically produced with manifold effects; put differently, racialization refers to the socially constructed work of race-thinking. In acts of re-nationalization, racialized foreignness plays out in two ways. First, racialization determines which specific subjects are constructed as outside the nation-state (i.e. who racially belongs and does not belong). As Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown illuminate in their study of racism, the identity of a nation-state is premised on a racialized distinction between the Other and the Self (2004: 142–3), namely the foreigner and the “us.” Through national discourses in the UK and elsewhere, the Self is specifically equated with the white citizen, and the Other with the nonwhite or not-white-enough foreigner. As Miles and Brown go on to note, in some processes of racialization, language (and not only skin color) constitutes differences between European populations, and creates notions of superior and inferior racial groups (2004: 146). To extend this observation, it can be noted that while whiteness is privileged in (western) nation-building practices and all subjects marked as white are beneficiaries of whiteness, there are hierarchies of whiteness that are produced in re-nationalization practices which serve to shift the markers of who counts as foreign. However, regardless of how racialization translates, expres- sions of identity that are contrary to that of the nation-state are conceived as foreign, subversive, and threatening. Second, racialization legitimizes re-nationalization endeavors even when there is no concrete evidence that the nation-state is at threat from a specific (often overly homogenized) racialized group. Racialized discourses can therefore be a guise to secure “our” national identity. The desire underlying this representational process 168 International Political Science Review 30(2) of re-nationalization is to reinstitute what Miles and Brown refer to as a history and an emotional sense of shared distinctiveness that creates “a collective sense of the [racialized] Self defined dialectically by the presence of the [racialized] Other” (2004: 145). These reified conceptions of national identity and the ideal citizen work by constructing some subjects as racially foreign. Classifications based on race-thinking specifically operate to secure the economic and political conditions that sustain the reproduction of a national identity (Miles and Brown, 2004: 147). On this basis, the violence that constructs representations of racialized foreignness is explicitly configured and justified on the basis that the nation-state must do what is necessary to secure itself from the “evil-doers,” from the barbarians who threaten “our way of life.” Moreover, this specific form of violence is constituted as a moral and patriotic national duty. The contextually sensitive analysis of racism developed by Miles and Brown may be further potentiated by bringing their study of nation-building and racialization together with other accounts of security. To begin to examine the work of security discourses in the production of representations of the nation-state and the racial- ized Other, we turn to the work of Wendy Brown (1995, 2006) and Rob Walker (2006, 2007). Each starts from the premise that “security” is imprecisely termed a right or a first freedom. This understanding of security, Brown argues, emerges through social contract ideas “in which we largely surrender to the state the power to protect our lives and our property... [On this premise] the state [is] founded on the promise to secure its members against each other” (Brown, 1995: 111, emphasis added). In other words, the idea of security as a right and freedom is historically ingrained in the need to be protected from each other – from internal enemies as well as external ones. In this understanding, the role of the state is to secure both the nation and the individual right to security. Further, both Brown and Walker identify the ways in which security concerns are deployed to legitimize the transcendence of law and changes in the law that broaden state powers, in the name of the security of the nation-state. Justifications for expanded state powers to monitor, regulate, and discipline those internal for- eigners who are deemed to be potentially dangerous gain legitimacy by emphasizing that the nation’s security is under threat, and that the agencies of the state must respond so as to secure the nation’s people and its borders. In these instances, national security concerns are deployed so as to justify states of emergency or states of exception (Walker, 2006: 72), and security serves as a guise to build “a national consensus behind state violence” (Brown, 2006: 106). This masking of state violence occurs even though, as Walker rightly argues, claims about security as the surveillance and regulation of targeted subjects are contestable because in reality it is unclear “who is to be secured, from what, and for what” (2007: 96). Walker specifically contends that the concept of security should be reformulated so as to shift away from the idea that it is simply a policy or legislative stance by gov- ernments, and towards an understanding of security as a problem of knowledge. We would add that security can be posed as a problem of what “we” think we “know” about racialized foreigners and why. Building on Brown and Walker, we examine how specific forms of racialization produce particular subjects as risky, threatening, and dangerous, as well as particular understandings of the nation-state. Our goal is to offer an approach that examines how differing modalities of foreignness simul- taneously constitute representations of the racialized Other and the nation-state in the name of security. It is precisely this undertaking of specifying historical and  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 169 theoretical patterns and differences that we argue becomes possible when discourses of foreignness, nation, racialization, and security are examined together. Internal Dangerous Foreigners When we bring together discourses of foreignness, nation, racialization, and security, it becomes evident that while all foreigners are positioned outside the nation-state, symbolic categories of the “foreigner” are enormously varied. Indeed, as Honig (2001: 8) notes: “To the foreigner as founder, immigrant, and citizen, one could add other categories – the foreigner as refugee, boundary crosser, terrorist, outlaw, repository of irrationality, erotic excess, madness, anarchy, and so on.” Through the study of interrelated discourses of nation-state, security, and racialization we take Honig’s analysis further to examine specifically one symbolic category of the foreigner that has been, and continues to be, politically salient: what we call the internal dangerous foreigner. In particular, we emphasize that the category of the internal dangerous foreigner, a) transcends the distinction between legal and nonlegal national citizen, and, b) illuminates the ways in which foreignness has been intri- cately linked to threat. We suggest that the internal foreigner is legally distinct from the external foreigner. Specifically, the external foreigner is signified through socio-legal discourses that differentiate legal citizens/residents and noncitizens/residents, whereby the territorial borders of the nation-state set the framework for determin- ing insiders and outsiders. These external foreigners may be welcomed into the nation as potential citizens, guests, or visitors; they may be ambiguously positioned because their status is nonpermanent or in transition; or they will be marked as un- desirable because they have no legal status within the nation. The internal foreigner, in contrast, challenges the citizen/noncitizen dichotomy in that foreignness operates within the borders of the nation-state and within the category of citizenship. This “internal foreigner” is both an insider who legally belongs to the state and simul- taneously deemed an outsider/Other who does not substantively belong within the nation. Thus unlike “metics” or resident aliens who are deemed to have illegal status and who are conferred status by insiders/us, internal foreigners have legal and in some cases constitutional status within the nation-state but can nonetheless be signified as Other because “they” are deemed to be unlike “us.” Internal foreigners are constituted along a shifting spectrum through a historical lens in which “they” can become represented as dangerous at certain political junc- tures (Avery, 1979). As internal foreigners, they are thus not merely intolerable, ignorable, discriminated, and marginalized but threatening and treacherous. Spe- cifically, the internal dangerous foreigner is accused of corrupting and threatening “our” national identity; “our” dominant norms of the body politic (e.g. those related to “our” health and population); “our” familial, legal, symbolic, ideological, and economic values; “our” economic agenda and employment opportunities; “our” property rights as well as control of the land and its resources; and “our” public space. While discourses of the dangerous foreigner can easily construct images of the racialized female subject (e.g. consider the specter of the female Arab suicide bomber today), archetypically it is the male subject who is constructed as the potential or actual perpetrator of violence. The female dangerous foreigner is more typically constructed as an outsider and threat to the nation-state – specifically because there is a fear that she will reproduce an undesirable and unfit population, both literally and socially – but she is not as closely associated with notions of violence, 170 International Political Science Review 30(2) peril, and treachery as the male dangerous foreigner. Thus to the extent that the female dangerous subject threatens the nation-state through reproduction, she is constructed as a future, not immediate, danger. Such a construct is produced and legitimized through gendered valorizations of the woman as the agent of care, passivity, and domesticity. In the following analysis, to demonstrate the significance of the dual and inter- linked processes of Othering and nation-building in relation to discourses of foreignness, racialization, and security, three historically specific instances will be examined in Canada. This time-sensitive case study of Canada brings into view differing manifestations of the internal dangerous foreigner, and how the internal dangerous foreigner is regulated through discourses of national security.2 Contextualizing and Historicizing National Insecurity, and the Regulation of Racialized Foreignness A: Japanese-Canadians and World War II On December 7 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong. Swiftly the Canadian government acted by impounding fishing boats owned by Japanese- Canadians, by closing Japanese language schools, and by shutting down the operations of many Japanese language newspapers (Ujimoto, 1985: 120). As in World War I, the 1914 War Measures Act was invoked in the name of national security. The War Measures Act conferred emergency powers on the federal cabinet in the event of a real, or apprehended, war, invasion, or insurrection, and was used in 1914 in relation to immigrants from eastern, southern, and central Europe (Avery, 1979). However, in World War II the effects were wider and came to target citizens, as well as, eventually, “women and children.” Thus while the initial focus was on male “enemy aliens” (the dangerous foreigners), in fact by early 1942 over 20,000 men, women, and children of Japanese origin (three-quarters of whom were Canadian citizens) were sent into detention in British Columbia and other project areas, including sugar beet farms in Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario (Ujimoto, 1985: 127). Indeed, “enemy aliens” lacking citizenship (and defined by their Japanese nationality) were a stepping stone to targeting all those (irrespective of citizenship) who were officially categorized as “persons of Japanese race,” by the federal government. There was only one (notably gendered) exception: a female of “Japanese race” could be exempted if her husband were of the “Caucasian race” (Conklin, 1996: 229). This distinction reveals much about the relationship between racialized and gendered stereotypes which have emphasized the “submissiveness” of Japanese women (Kato, 2003) and which have been furthered through stereotyped accounts of the meaning of the “silence” of Japanese-Canadian women who ex- perienced internment (Sugiman, 2003). This experience of what the Canadian government at the time more euphem- istically labeled “evacuation” was wide-sweeping and total. As Conklin (1996: 227) notes, all movement, communication, association, and expression of opinion were regulated and controlled. Moreover, between 1943 and 1946 all property owned by Japanese-Canadians was sold, with any costs associated with the owners’ living in confinement deducted (Sunahara, 2000). In short, it was clear that measures were designed to restrict the economic activities of Japanese-Canadians and to undermine any basis to a vibrant or strong Japanese-Canadian community (Kobayashi, 1992).  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 171 In the name of security, such practices of racialized Othering served to reinstate the desire for a preference for a white nation. Indeed, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King asserted in 1944 that “the government is of the view that, having regard to the strong feeling that has been aroused against the Japanese during the war and to the difficulty of assimilating Japanese persons in Canada, no immigration of Japanese into this country should be allowed after the war” (Canada, House of Commons, 1944). Prime Minister King reiterated this sentiment after the war when he outlined that “large-scale immigration from the orient” would change “the fundamental character of the population” and that the government “had no thought of making any change in immigration regulations which would have consequences of this kind” (Canada, House of Commons, 1947). This statement guided Canada’s immigration policy until well into the 1960s. Despite the findings of the 1947 Bird Commission that property seized from Japanese-Canadians was not sold at fair market value, the federal government did not systematically compensate Japanese-Canadians until 1988. The 1988 redress included an apology from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and some limited financial compensation for surviving individuals who had experienced internment, deportation, relocation, or property losses between 1941 and 1949. While the com- pensation was important, the politics of redress is interesting because the federal government channeled the lobbying efforts of Japanese-Canadians during the 1970s and 1980s to the multiculturalism sector of the Canadian bureaucracy. As such, the redress may be seen as important to symbolizing Canada’s post-1971 official adoption of a policy of multiculturalism which lent legitimacy to the diverse origins of all Canadians. Indeed, it is notable that Prime Minister Mulroney’s apology stressed “our solemn commitment and undertaking to Canadians of every origin that such violations will never again in this country be countenanced or repeated” (Canada, House of Commons, 1988). However, the historic experience of Japanese-Canadians also remains highly relevant for considering issues regarding the nation-state, foreignness, security, and racialization. In particular, it has been by now well established by historians that the Othering of Japanese-Canadians in the name of the “security and defence of Canada” (Miki, 2004: 51) in the 1940s had more to do with a re-nationalization project than the “necessities” of war. Specifically, the rounding up of over 20,000 people and their confinement and forced labour were done despite the evidence of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Defense Department, which showed that it was un- warranted and unnecessary (Broadbent, 1992: 12; Miki, 2004: 89). In the famous words of journalist Ken Adachi (1991), who wrote the first history of Japanese- Canadians, they were “the enemy that never was.” Rather, what was significant was the pressures coming from the province of British Columbia – the place where a majority of Japanese-Canadians resided prior to World War II, and the place where the resentments of the majority white population were strong on economic grounds (their “cheap labour”) and racial grounds (“a white man’s province” could not deal with “inassimilable” Asians/the “yellow peril”) (Ayukawa, 2002: 6–10; Taylor, 1994). The power of the “politics of racism” (Sunahara, 1981) in constructing Japanese-Canadians as internal dangerous foreigners was also evident in the aftermath of the war. Indeed, it is notable that in 1945 the Canadian government gave those who had experienced detention the option of either “repatriation” to Japan or dispersal “east of the Rockies,” i.e. outside the province of British Columbia to other parts of Canada (Conklin, 1996: 229). 172 International Political Science Review 30(2) The relationship between this plan and nation-building (or at least building a nation free of “the yellow peril”) was graphically contained in film. As the war came to an end, the federal Department of Labor hired a company to produce a 22-minute documentary entitled Of Japanese Descent. As Miki notes, this was a propaganda film, but its depictions reflect much about the Canada of the 1940s. To quote from Miki: Of Japanese Descent glossed over the more brutal aspects of the uprooting to offer Canadians a reassuring narrative about “these Japanese,” primarily because the dispersal policy meant “they” would soon appear in the audience’s neigh- bourhoods. In this light, the documentary form of the film belied a more immediate ideological intent: to rationalize the displacement of Japanese Canadians as a normal outcome of wartime conditions and to portray their resettlement east of the Rockies as a productive solution to the long-standing “Japanese problem.” (Miki, 2004: 40) Thus through security discourses related to the “Japanese problem,” Japanese- Canadians were constructed as being contrary to the (racialized) development of the nation-state, which was tied to securing white privilege. It should be noted that the experience of Japanese-Canadians was also qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from that of other groups. As Sherene Razack (2007: 10) notes, the intern- ment of Japanese-Canadians was a “security regime that relied upon the prior idea of ‘Orientals’ as racially inferior to Europeans,” as evidenced in part by the fact that during World War II internment did not apply in the same way to Canadians of German and Italian origin, even though Canada was at war with Germany and Italy. In this regard, processes of racialization and the construction of the (foreign) Other played out in a particularly virulent way in this period of building Canadian national identity through discourses of security. B: The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ)/October Crisis of 1970 The status of Quebec in the Canadian confederacy has always been a source of tension, such that the province has gained an insider–outsider position: it is both part of Canada’s nation-state (read: nonforeign) and yet removed from it because of its cultural, linguistic, ideological, and historical distinctiveness (read: foreign). This insider–outsider tension provides the context in which to examine one sig- nificant moment of Quebec history that reverberated throughout Canada, namely the 1970 October crisis. The crisis began on October 5, when cells of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped the British trade commissioner, James Cross, and then kidnapped and later murdered the Quebec Minister of Labor, Pierre Laporte. On October 15 1970 the Quebec government requested the help of the Canadian armed forces in responding to the crisis; the next day the federal govern- ment utilized the War Measures Act to declare a state of “apprehended insur- rection.” Invocation of the act was expressly justified on the grounds that the nation-state faced an emergency. The “threat” posed by Quebec nationalists was especially emphasized by falsely suggesting that “3,000 armed FLQ terrorists were ready to begin an insurrection; that the FLQ had a ‘hit list’ of 200 Quebec leaders marked for assassination; that the kidnappings of the British diplomat and the Quebec Labour Minister were but the first step in a revolutionary plot; that a massive bombing campaign was in the works; and that there would be a bloodbath of executions following the installation of a provisional government in  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 173 Quebec” (Conway, 2006: 1). On this basis, the FLQ (and Quebec nationalists more generally) were constructed not only as the internal foreigner who was contrary to the growth of the rest of (English) Canada, but also as a danger lurking in “our” midst. During the 1970 October crisis, the work of foreignness in producing Others specifically marked the FLQ as non-English extremists who posed a danger to Canadian nationhood. Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of the day, referred to the FLQ as “kidnappers, revolutionaries, assassins,” and “self-selected dictators” who wanted to undermine “the elected representatives of all Canadians” (Trudeau, 1970). Certainly, the FLQ , with roots in the strong tradition of labor organizing and union politics in Quebec, had always self-declared as a movement grounded in armed action. However, state-based agencies with responsibility for securing the nation-state directly cited the danger posed by FLQ members as a way to re-entrench the idea that they were dangerous internal foreigners. In doing so, these agencies extended the claim that FLQ nationalism conflicted with Canadian nationalism, even if the crisis also underscored to feminist and other activists – both inside and even outside Quebec – the historic battle waged by Francophones against Anglophone domination that mirrored the battles of other marginalized groups (Ross, 1998: 193). Indeed, in 1971 some Quebec feminists drew from the famous FLQ manifesto when producing their own “Manifeste des femmes québécoises” (ClioCollective, 1987: 360). In his 1971 controversially titled book White Niggers of America (written before the October crisis), active and prominent member of the FLQ Pierre Vallières drew on his conversations with African-Americans and his understandings of their situation to argue that the FLQ were Othered through racialized and class-based discourses. He likened the situation of the working class in Quebec to that of Blacks in America as “exploited men,” “servants of the imperialists,” “slaves,” and “inferior sub-men” (1971: 21). Though his analogy between white Quebec nationalists and African-Americans problematically erased the specific and historical ways in which racial categorizations of Blackness structured socioeconomic differences, Vallières raises issues about the Othering of working-class Quebec nationalists. His analysis points toward a capitalist hierarchy of whiteness in which some subjects marked as white were differentiated, both socioeconomically and ideologically. In this regard, the insight that Vallières brings is that, like other Quebec nationalists, members of the FLQ were represented not only as the mirror image of English Canadians who desired the unity of Canada as a whole, but also as contrary to the Quebec elite who favored a federalist vision of a united Canada. This federalist vision of a united Canada evidently shaped Trudeau’s view that military rule was necessary during the October crisis. In his national broadcast to the country, for example, he opened by saying: “I am speaking to you in a moment of grave crisis, when violent and fanatical men are attempting to destroy the unity and freedom of Canada.” He went on to say that: Canada remains one of the most wholesome and humane lands on this earth. If we stand firm, this current situation will soon pass. We will be able to say proudly, as we have for decades, that within Canada there is ample room for opposition and dissent, but none for intimidation and terror... I am confident that those persons who unleashed this tragic sequence of events, with the aim of destroying our society and dividing our country, will find that the opposite will occur. The result of their acts will be a stronger society in a unified country. Those who would have us divided will have united us... Every level of government in this country is prepared to act in your interest. (Trudeau, 1970) 174 International Political Science Review 30(2) In citing Trudeau, our purpose is not to argue that the FLQ posed a real, or alternatively an imagined, threat, but to illustrate that representations of the FLQ as a danger to the “freedom and personal security” of Canadians served to construct a particular set of Others who were foreign to the Canadian way, as well as a particular image of Canada as a tolerant, unified, and strong nation. Representations of Otherness were specifically operationalized by arguing that there was a need for “us” to be secure against “them” and, at the same time, by advancing a federalist vision of the nation. Trudeau’s commitment to a federalist vision of the Canadian nation was further evident when, in a 1977 interview with CTV (a major television news station), he declared that he would not hesitate to use the War Measures Act again if Quebec tried to separate from Canada legally (Bélanger, 2000). Following the end of the October crisis, two commissions investigated the activ- ities of the police during the event. The first investigation, the Keable Commission, was established in 1977 by the pro-separatist Parti Québécois (provincially elected in 1976). In terms of nation-building, this report served both to condemn the actions of the previous provincial government, which had favored a federalist vision of Canada, and to redeem the project of Quebec nationalism by countering constructs of the extremist. The motivations behind the second investigation, the 1977 federal McDonald Commission (officially named the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), were somewhat less clear, for the federal government was scrutinizing its own structures and policies. But, despite the time lag between the events of 1970 and the publication of the McDonald Commission report in 1980, such a commission made sense in terms of the project of nation-building: it presented the state as democratic and responsive to police abuse, as well as proactive in taming the secur- ity arm of the state. The federal government garnered further credit when the great majority of the provisions in the McDonald Commission were incorporated in the 1984 Security Intelligence Service Act, an act that purportedly “considered balance between the legitimate needs of security and the essential requirements of a democratic society” (Cameron, 1985: 210). Importantly, both the Keable and McDonald reports criticized law protection and enforcement agencies for practices that went beyond the law in the name of national security. And each identified that there was a legally sanctioned zone in which law was absent, or what Razack calls a legally authorized zone of nonlaw (2007: 13). The McDonald Commission, for instance, revealed that the RCMP embarked on “a campaign of intelligence gathering, infiltration, harassment and disruption directed at many forms of nationalist sentiment in Quebec. This cam- paign included activities that were clearly not authorized by law, including (among the more notorious) burning down a barn to prevent a meeting of so-called militant nationalists and American radicals; breaking into a Montreal news agency seen as ‘left-wing’ and stealing and destroying files; and breaking into a Parti Québécois office and stealing membership lists” from this separatist political party, which from 1976 onwards went on to serve as the governing party of Quebec on four occasions (Conway, 2006: 30). In the name of national security, much of this criminal activity was carried out by the RCMP’s Security Service, and targeted Quebec indépendantistes as well as left-leaning groups who challenged the authority of the state, such as socialists, peace and student groups, trade unions, and militant Black and Indi- genous groups (Cameron, 1985: 201–3) – namely those who were seen as dangerous to a federalist vision of the Canadian nation.  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 175 The October crisis was thus not simply a story of disciplining the indépendantistes, for claims of security also enabled federalist projects of re-nationalization. As Vallières argues, use of the War Measures Act was an excuse to teach the indépendantistes a disciplinary lesson not to challenge federally driven nation-building (1977; see especially pp. 23, 28, 44, 52, 55, 173). In particular, Quebec separatism was delib- erately equated with terrorism and insecurity by provincial and federal govern- ments so as to bring into disrepute the cause of Quebec nationalism and, at the same time, bolster the idea that the values of Canadian nationhood could be best secured through a federalist vision. C: 1990 Kanehsatake/Oka Crisis If the FLQ crisis represented how a stateless nation (the Québécois) could be pos- itioned as a threat to the nation-state, the 1990 Kanehsatake/Oka crisis revealed how a stateless nation spanning present-day Canada (specifically the provinces of Ontario and Quebec) as well as the United States (specifically New York) could be positioned as a threat to both Quebec and Canada. This reflects on the tension between Indigenous peoples and settlers which plays out in Canada given its formation as a settler colony of the French, and then the British. The Oka crisis originated in historic and contemporary disputes regarding land claims in Canada, specifically when, in March of 1990, the municipality of Oka proposed plans for an additional golf course and condominiums on ancient Indigenous sacred burial grounds. After unsatisfactory talks with local and provin- cial government officials, Indigenous peoples set up barricades. To deal with the perceived threat posed by Indigenous resistance to colonial tactics, the mayor of Oka requested the help of the law enforcement agencies. And so, on July 11 over 100 members of the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), the provincial police, conducted a paramilitary-style assault upon the people of Kanehsatake. During the raid, Corporal Lemay was shot and later died in hospital, instigating more anger; while the Mohawks blamed the police for his death, the police blamed the Mohawks. The police retreated but surrounded the barricaded area (which stopped the entry of medical and food supplies), and the standoff began. The police attack on July 11 ignited further confrontations in Kahnawake (near Châteauguay), Quebec, where Mohawks had blocked the Mercier Bridge in solidarity. The presence of Mohawks from across Canada and the US was especially seen as a threat to the nation-state because the Mohawks (and other Indigenous peoples) rejected the legitimacy of colonially defined national borders, and because of fears that alliances would be strengthened among Mohawks. Despite negotiations (that now involved the provincial and federal government), on August 14 more than 2500 Canadian soldiers were deployed to four locations near Kanehsatake/Oka and Châteauguay. The presence of the army continued under the orders of the federal government, with regular military raids. On September 26, after a 78-day standoff, the Mohawks surrendered to an unprepared army; this unexpected surrender was followed by the arrest of 34 people. In July 1992 all 34 Mohawks involved in the standoff were found not guilty and acquitted on charges ranging from weapons possession to assault and participating in a riot. These events echo the 1970 October crisis in that “the suspension of rights [by the state] appears not as violence but as the law itself” (Razack, 2007: 8). Further, the 1970 October crisis and the 1990 Kanehsatake/Oka crisis are both illustrative of the clash between stateless nations and the Canadian nation-state. However, 176 International Political Science Review 30(2) although both the 1970 October crisis and the 1990 Kanehsatake/Oka crisis emerged through nationalist sentiments that challenged the federal agenda of nation- building, the specific form of foreignness imposed on Indigenous nations was rooted in historic colonial and racialized violence against nonwhite subjects and the expropriation of Indigenous land. In this form of foreignness, Indigenous peoples and nations were denied (and continue to be denied) self-determination of their own territory by both the British and the French. During the Oka crisis, this denial functioned through discourses of foreignness in ways that mutually reinforced the racist idea that a racially marked savage subject posed a danger to “our” security, and the myth of a benevolent Canadian nation (whose territory is defined by the standards set by settlers). More specifically, processes of racialized Othering constructed the Indigenous subject as an outlaw who posed an internal danger to Canadian law and order, even though it was the land and security of Indigenous people and nationhood that was underthreat. During the standoff, federal Indian Affairs Minister Siddon, for example, stated that he would not negotiate with the Mohawks unless they laid down their arms (CBC, 1990), and the Deputy Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development called the protest an “armed insur- rection” by a “criminal organization” (Lavery and Morse, 1991). Constructs of the unruly Indian were engendered by presenting Indigenous resistors as criminals who threatened the security of “our” nation and were foreign to “our” laws. As Donna Goodleaf (1995: 67) highlights in her analysis of the standoff, popular media representations of the Indigenous people deflected the problem of racism and represented Mohawks as savage extremists who were beyond the rule of law. Goodleaf notes that in the Montreal Gazette, for instance, there were headlines such as: “Warriors Hold 6,000 Guns, $30 Million in Coffers” (August 1: A1, A2); “Warriors Denounced at New York Hearings” (August 3: A3); “Homes behind Barricades Looted: Mohawk” (August 4: A4); “Police Union Warns Quebec: Let Us Act or We’ll Put Out: Fed-up Sûreté Officers Want Army to Move in and Arrest ‘Terrorist’ Mohawks and rioters” (August 16: A4). To bolster this construct of the dangerous Mohawk, visual images of Indigenous men in army-like uniforms were repeatedly used. These Indigenous “radicals” were represented as oppositional to the native who was spiritual, and, in turn, deemed to be less authentically Indian. As Goodleaf states: “It is a tactic of the state to convince the Canadian public that it is the oppressed who are the ‘terrorists’ in order to justify the use of violence against the Kanienkehaka; that in the oppressor’s mind the use of force is the only solution ‘in the fight against terrorism’” (1995: 81). The internal dangerous foreigner was specifically gendered such that the Mohawk male warrior was constructed as the primary threat, even though, as Kahn-Tineta Horn (1991: 39) notes, the “word [warrior], too, is not what it sounds like. In your vocabulary it sounds like, he’s got a gun and he’s going to shoot you. In Mohawk it means the carrier of the burden of peace.” In Mohawk traditions, the responsibility of the warrior is distinguishable but not separate from that of Mohawk women, who are “the heads of the families and also held the land as well as all of the possessions” (Horn, 1991: 35). During the events at Kanehsatake/Oka, while the women negotiators did not claim authority over Indigenous men, they were not taken seriously by provincial government officials because of the sexist expectation that men would be the leaders (Horn, 1991: 38).  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 177 Foreignness was thus deeply informed by colonial and gendered constructions of Indigenous people as barbarians who posed a militant threat to national identity (territorially and colonially defined), economic development (defined as property), and civilization (culturally and racially defined). Indigenous nations were accord- ingly represented not only as dangerous to national economic development and state sovereignty over territory but also as a danger to Canadian law and order, cultured society, and the physical well-being of Canada’s “civilized” people. On this basis, “they” (read: dangerous, tribal, and pre-modern Others) carried uncontrol- lable explosive hate, unlike “us” (read: western, progressive, rational peoples) who could reason and operate within the law. Any sympathy for or questioning of the real nature of the threat posed by Indigenous militants could easily be squashed by racialized stereotypes in which “the Indian” was represented as intrinsically threatening. This racialized construction of the Indigenous barbarian not only gained legitimacy so as to demarcate Others from “us,” but it served to secure the primacy assigned to a western territorial, material, and legal conception of nationhood. This was an act of re-nationalization in which the federal government entered the negotiations on the premise that the nation’s security was at threat. This discourse of security, however, reinstituted European notions of the nation, which were based on “territorial consolidation and rationalism” (Alfred, 1995: 11). Taiaiake Alfred calls this “an internal colonialist regime” (1995: 190), which operates “on the prin- ciple that only in the collective forming the majority of the population does the right to self-determination reside” (1995: 189). The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), which was federally commissioned in 1991 as a response to the events in Kanehsatake/Oka, served to present the federal state as responsive to the claims of Indigenous nations, both within Canada and internationally. The RCAP, in this sense, served as an act of re-nationalization which promoted the idea that the Canadian nation-state was democratic, fair, and historically conscious. This was especially evident in the federal government’s 1997 official response to the RCAP report (a response that came over a year after the publication of RCAP). The response took the form of a docu- ment entitled “Gathering Strength,” which concluded that: We recognize, as did the Royal Commission, that a truly Canadian approach must be multi-dimensional and will have many players. That is why Gathering Strength is designed to provide a comprehensive, flexible framework in which all parties can work together to address the priorities of Aboriginal people. We envision a partnership not just between the federal government and Aboriginal people, men and women, Elders and youth, but one that also includes provincial, territorial and local governments; national, regional and local Aboriginal leaders; the private sector; and other interested groups and organizations. This partnership must extend to include all Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike. (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1997) This democratic tone, however, did not transfer into substantive action. Certainly, to some extent, the final 1996 report served to place some Indigenous issues on the political agenda (e.g. self-governance, reconciliation, and redress for the forced removal of generations of Aboriginal children from their families in state-supported residential schools). However, the 1996 RCAP report condemned 178 International Political Science Review 30(2) past actions as moral failures rather than as violations of human rights and, more- over, few of the 400 recommendations have been implemented. Ultimately, despite the work of nation-building that royal commissions carry, not only was the report published several years after the events of 1990, but the Prime Minister of the day, Jean Chrétien, dismissed “the RCAP report and recommendations as too costly, and asserted that Liberal policies already addressed much of what was in the RCAP Report” (Diabo, 2004). D: Summary of Cases To summarize from our cases, the wartime experience of Japanese in Canada served to mark them as internal dangerous foreigners, even though most had legal status in Canada. Those of Japanese origin were specifically constructed as illiberal to the security of the nation through anti-Asian racism and nationalist discourses which favored whiteness, as well as through notions that there was an economic threat to the value of “white labour.” Through these racist ideas, it was argued that the real national homeland of Japanese-Canadians was Japan. At the same time, this racialized process of Othering reproduced the idea that Canada was a white man’s nation and ideologically liberal. These constructs were bolstered by global fears regarding the military capacities of Japan in the context of World War II, especially the attack on Pearl Harbor. The second case explored how, in the 1970s, the FLQ was dominantly constructed as an extreme (stateless) nationalist group which destabilized the law and order of the rest of (English) Canada. The threat to the Canadian nation-state was twofold: first, that of French-Canadian nationalism, in which the struggle was over Quebec (rather than an external nation-state) and its place in the structure of the federation; and second, that of growing class-consciousness, which was closely aligned to the international mobilization of socialist and communist groups. In both instances, constructs of the dangerous internal foreigner were deployed by the Canadian state in ways that (intentionally and/or unintentionally) reinstituted its vision of a federally united and free-market nation-state. The third case examined representations of one indigenous stateless nation during the Kanehsatake/Oka crisis of 1990, which were entrenched in ideas about dangerous and uncivilized Indians who refused the (so-called) generosity of the “post-colonial” Canadian nation-state. Foreignness worked to (re)produce non- white (especially male) Others as subjects whom “we” needed to be secure from, and simultaneously served to further consolidate the idea that a national identity was determined by specific territorial, property-based, and civilizational boundaries that secured the “us” as an “us.” While not constructed as a global threat, the Kanehsatake/Oka crisis did raise transnational questions about Canada’s image as a tolerant and peaceful country, and the integrity of an international system of territorial bordering that is determined by historic colonial projects. Importantly, processes of Othering and nation-building do not permanently banish all internal foreigners, for some are necessary in (re)imagining the nation. Accordingly, not all internal foreigners are simply dismissed or ignored (even if they continue to be inferiorized, criminalized, and discriminated); instead they are “managed” by the state because their presence also facilitates nation-building. In Canada’s case, the welcomed newcomer or model immigrant is necessary to build the myth of a multicultural nation, even though racism continues to privilege subjects  Dhamoon & Abu-Laban: Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building 179 marked as white, western, European, and male; the French-Canadian signifies a bilingual nation even while practices of dominance continue; and the Indigenous subject serves as the marker of a post-colonial nation despite ongoing white supremacy and colonialism. At the same time, as the cases demonstrate, racialized foreignness works to secure the nation’s identity economically ( Japanese case), ideologically and federally (1970 October crisis/FLQ), as well as territorially, materially, and culturally (1990 Kanehsatake/Oka crisis). Conclusion The purpose of this article was to develop a theoretical framework which could inform our understanding of how, when, and why the nation and certain groups come to be constructed through a combination of discourses related to foreignness, racialization, security, and the nation-state. Three themes stand out. One is method- ological: cross-disciplinary fertilization between political science and disciplines like history and sociology opens up new avenues of exploration and consideration, and ways of bridging social and political theory. Specifically, it becomes possible to explore the interplay between concepts and discourses (i.e. nation, racialization, security, and foreignness) that are not typically linked. The second theme is empirical: that there is a need to be attuned to historical patterns and differences, and that this can lead to both theoretical and practical insights. In particular, we have shown that, historically, foreignness transcends legal distinctions of citizen/ noncitizen, and that it is useful to contextually examine how constructs of the internal dangerous foreigner vary over time and history. Attention to history especially reveals much about the reactions (and over-reactions) to groups deemed to be a danger to the nation and its security. The third theme is theoretical: as well as a dialectical relationship between re-nationalization and Othering, there is also a complex interaction between gender, race, and class dynamics. As such, not only is it useful to embrace work which considers processes of racialization, but it is also useful to address the manner in which race-thinking interacts with other forms of difference and inequality. We utilized actual events in Canada to illuminate how our theoretical framework is attuned to these methodological, empirical, and theoretical insights. Our histor- ical examples from Canada might on one level seem to be simply a “case study.” However, as noted, Canada stands out for embodying several forms of diversity, and the specific instances we addressed considered an immigrant group, a linguistic minority group, and an Indigenous group. These forms of diversity are found in different ways across all polities today, and give rise to different political responses (Kymlicka, 2007) and sometimes conflicting claims, such as those between Indigenous nations and Quebec (Salee, 2004). Accordingly, the Canadian example may serve to illuminate issues found in other countries, including the US and countries in Europe which are also diverse in racial and religious terms, an evident outcome of contemporary forms of globalization, including the move- ment of peoples. Finally, we are, as the Chinese saying goes, living in “interesting times.” The post-September 11 context is one in which the threat of terrorism has evoked a global war. Today, national security is especially deemed to be in danger because of the terror posed by Arabs and Muslims (as well as those who appear to be Muslim and Arab). This is not only in terms of the “terrorist” who threatens the nation-state 180 International Political Science Review 30(2) from the outside, but also in terms of the “terrorist” who lives within the nation, namely the “homegrown terrorist” or the terrorist who permeates national borders and national citizenship. In other words, ideas about the internal dangerous foreigner continue to be salient, both in reproducing the racialized Other and in giving legitimacy to (American, British, Australian, as well as Canadian) re- nationalization endeavors that can deflect criticism of imperialist agendas through discourses of democratic and liberal identity. The racialized image of “the terrorist” especially rests on religiously, culturally, and territorially based distinctions (i.e. the terrorist is dark, Muslim, has illiberal values, and lives outside the West), and is legitimized in the name of securing the nation-state. On this basis, Islamophobia functions by representing Islam as a fundamentalist religion rather than a variedly interpreted faith, a source of spirituality, an element of ethno-cultural identity, a marker of geography, an oppositional ideology, and an official state ideology for a number of countries (Ashgharzadeh, 2004: 130). Even in the absence of a locatable enemy, through Islamophobia those who share racialized characteristics associated with the perpetrators of the attacks in the US may be constructed as guilty and dangerous. These unreflective and evidence-free constructions of all Arabs and/or Muslims become defensible through race-thinking in the name of national security (Razack, 2007: 6). Ultimately, an analysis of the linkages between discourses of foreignness, nation, racialization, and security not only reveals historical patterns of Othering and nation-building, but also, more specifically in the post 9–11 context, invites us to consider how practices of Othering and re-nationalization may be operating even today. Notes 1. It is notable that in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks American politicians and news accounts put forward the idea that the September 11 hijackers may have come through Canada, and more generally that Canada’s approach to immigration and security was a threat to the United States. In actual fact, none of the September 11 hijackers came through Canada, and there are relatively few instances of lawbreaking among the nearly 20 percent of the population made up by immigrants. Nonetheless, the Canadian government moved quickly to implement policies relating to anti-terrorism and public safety, and by 2002 had committed $7.7 billion to fight terrorism and strengthen public safety. These developments need to be read against public (or domestic) concerns for safety, as well as Canada’s continuing and deepening economic dependence on the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Canadian economy was dramatically impacted by the closure of the US–Canada border in the days following September 11, and business groups in Canada (along with their counterparts in the United States) sought to ensure the security of the border in order to maintain the flow of goods and services. See Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2003) for an overview of this period. We can anticipate that historians and social scientists in the future will continue to examine the immediate post-September 11 responses in relation to the extent to which fears were legitimate, and the extent to which a balance was achieved between security and freedom (or civil liberties). For a start on this debate see the work of Kent Roach (2003). 2. 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Biographical Notes Rita Dhamoon is a faculty member in the Department of Political Science and Philosophy at the University of the Fraser Valley. Her research interests include contemporary political theory, specifically identity/difference politics, multicultural politics, feminist and gender theory, critical race theory, and postcolonial and anti- colonial political thought. She is author of Identity/Difference Politics: How Difference Is Produced and Why It Matters (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, spring 2009), and co-editor of Sexual Justice/Cultural Justice: Critical Perspectives in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2007). address: Department of Political Science and Philosophy, University of the Fraser Valley, 33844 King Road, Abbotsford, BC V2S 7M8 [email: [email protected]]. Yasmeen Abu-Laban is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta. Her research interests center on the comparative dimensions of gender and ethnic politics; nationalism, globalization, and processes of racialization; and public policy and citizenship theory. She is editor of Gendering the Nation-State: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives (University of British Columbia Press, 2008), and co-editor of Politics in North America: Redefining Continental Relations (Broadview and University of Toronto Press, 2008). address: Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, 10–16 Tory Building, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H4 [email: [email protected]]. Acknowledgments: We would like to extend our thanks to Claude Couture, Stella Gaon, Tom Keating, and Andy Knight, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their comments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting in Saskatoon, Canada, June 2007.