District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) PDF

Day 3 Readings District of Columbia v. Heller United States Supreme Court 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) Rule of Law Subject to certain safety limitations, the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution creates an individual right to keep and bear arms apart from a...

Day 3 Readings District of Columbia v. Heller United States Supreme Court 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) Rule of Law Subject to certain safety limitations, the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution creates an individual right to keep and bear arms apart from any military purpose. Facts Dick Heller (plaintiff), a Washington, DC, special police officer, applied for a registration certificate from the city of Washington, DC, for a handgun he wished to keep at home. A Washington, DC, statute prohibited possessing a handgun in the home without a license, and it also required any lawful handgun kept in the home to be rendered inoperable through use of a trigger lock. The District of Columbia (defendant) denied Heller’s application for a registration certificate based on its law. Heller then filed a lawsuit in federal district court for the District of Columbia arguing that the city’s bar on the registration of handguns, its prohibition on guns in the home without a license, and its requirement of trigger locks for lawful guns in the home all violated the Second Amendment. The district court dismissed Heller’s complaint, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed on the grounds that the Second Amendment grants an individual the right to bear arms. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue Does a law prohibiting the possession of usable handguns in the home violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution? Holding and Reasoning (Scalia, J.) Yes. Although the Second Amendment appears to have been created for the purpose of ensuring the creation of a future militia, this purpose ultimately does not change the fact that the Second Amendment was designed to create an individual right to keep and bear arms. Nothing suggests that the individual right to keep and bear arms is conditional on being for a strictly military purpose. However, states must be free to regulate who can possess firearms based on certain safety concerns (for example, states are free to deny handgun registration and possession to felons and the mentally ill). However, provided Heller does not fall within the categories of people prohibited from owning handguns due to safety concerns, the District of Columbia’s prohibition on handgun possession in the home, as well as its requirement that lawful handguns in the home be rendered inoperable for self-defense, is unconstitutional. Dissent (Stevens, J.) The majority does not adequately describe the scope of the individual right to keep and bear arms. The text of the amendment itself, its history, and the Supreme Court’s prior decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), provide an ample discussion of the bounds of the right that differ from the majority’s conclusion. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that it was unlawful for two men to possess a sawed-off shotgun because their reasons for doing so bore no relationship to the purpose of preserving a well-regulated militia. The Miller holding, as well as the historical context and debate surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment, means that the individual right to keep and bear arms was designed to be solely for the purpose of preserving a well-regulated militia. Heller seeks to own a handgun for self- defense and not a militia-related purpose. Therefore, the majority’s holding that his right to do so is constitutionally protected is incorrect. Dissent (Breyer, J.) The District of Columbia’s law does not violate Heller’s Second Amendment rights. The Second Amendment’s protection of the right to bear arms is not absolute. The District of Columbia’s law should be overturned only if it is an unreasonable or inappropriate regulation of Heller’s Second Amendment rights. Even if the Second Amendment could be interpreted as protecting a self-defense (and not militia-based) purpose for owning a handgun, the District of Columbia law does not unreasonably interfere with the right of self-defense, because its purpose is to combat the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas. In examining future similar laws designed to combat health and safety risks by limiting Second Amendment rights, courts should adopt a unique level of scrutiny. A better approach would be an “interest-balancing inquiry” whereby the court would seek to determine whether a particular statute burdens an interest protected by the Second Amendment in a way that is disproportionate to the statute’s effects on other important governmental interests. In applying this new level of scrutiny to the District of Columbia’s law, the law is a permissible, proportional legislative response to the serious problem of handguns and urban crime, and thus it furthers an important government interest in health and safety. C. THE SOURCES OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS: TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, STRUCTURE, MORALITY” (Focusing on Text & Original Meaning and the Heller Case) 1. General Overview of Sources of Constitutional Doctrine Key sources traditionally include: 1. The text of the Constitution. 2. Original meaning (what the language was understood to mean at the time of enactment). 3. Structure (e.g., inferences from the overall constitutional design). 4. Natural law / moral or philosophical arguments about rights. Other recognized sources: tradition, precedent, public policy, contemporary social norms, and even international norms. 2. Text vs. Original Meaning Text: Almost everyone agrees the actual words of the Constitution are binding. Original meaning: More controversial; asks what those words originally meant at the time of framing or ratification. The two can diverge because: ◦ Text may be ambiguous or open-ended. ◦ Original meaning inquiries can involve historical research that extends beyond the bare words. 3. District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) Issue: Whether D.C.’s ban on the possession of usable handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment. Holding (5–4): The ban was unconstitutional because the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms, at least in the home for lawful purposes (e.g., self- defense). A. Majority Opinion (Justice Scalia) 1. Interpretive Approach: Focuses heavily on original meaning of the Second Amendment’s text. Distinguishes an “individual right” view (which the Court adopts) from a “collective right” (tied only to militia service). 2. “Operative Clause”: “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” “Right of the people” (in the 1st, 4th, 9th Amendments) refers to individual rights for all members of the political community. “Keep and bear arms”: ◦ “Arms” included all weapons, not limited to those used only by the military. ◦ The right extends to modern weapons, just as the 1st Amendment extends to modern forms of communication. ◦ Historically, “to bear arms” did not solely mean military service unless it was followed by “against,” referencing a hostile force.  3. “Prefatory Clause”: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State” “Militia” historically meant “all males physically capable” of common defense. “Well regulated” implies discipline and training, but does not confine the right to a small, official force. Purpose: to prevent the government from disarming citizens (which would undermine the militia). 4. Historical Context: 18th-century English legal history (e.g., Blackstone) shows an individual right to have arms for self-defense was already recognized. Postratification commentary further confirms a historical consensus that the Second Amendment protected an individual right. 5. Limitations on the Right: Not unlimited: long-standing prohibitions on felons, the mentally ill, concealed carry restrictions, bans on firearms in “sensitive places,” and commercial sale regulations are presumptively valid. The right applies to weapons “in common use,” not every conceivable weapon. 6. Rejecting “Interest-Balancing”: Court compares the Second Amendment to other enumerated rights, concluding that once a right is recognized, it is not to be diminished by case-by-case interest balancing. Emphasizes that some policy choices (like an absolute handgun ban) are “off the table” if they contradict the Constitution. B. Justice Stevens’s Dissent 1. Collective vs. Individual Right: Argues the Amendment protects gun ownership primarily linked to militia service, not broad personal uses like self-defense. Points to the Amendment’s prefatory clause focusing on militia-related purposes; no direct mention of hunting or personal self-defense. 2. Language Analysis: “Bear arms” in 18th-century usage often meant military service. “Keep” might refer to storing arms for militia use. Criticizes the majority for ignoring the lack of universal application to all individuals (e.g., felons, mentally ill) while still insisting “the people” is always an individual phrase. 3. Concerns About Judicial Role: Warns that the majority’s interpretation invites courts to become more deeply involved in setting gun policy—an area he believes was meant to be left largely to legislatures.  Skeptical that the Framers intended to enshrine a broad personal right limiting modern legislative efforts. C. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 1. Regulatory Balancing: Concedes some protection for gun ownership but asserts it is not absolute; government may regulate where reasonable. Proposes a more flexible standard—evaluating regulations for “reasonableness” in light of the Second Amendment’s purposes. 2. Historical Changes: Argues original self-defense concerns in the 18th century differ from modern urban- crime concerns; thus, courts must apply judgment in contemporary settings. 3. Critique of Majority’s Method: Believes the majority’s “original meaning” approach still requires a lot of judicial interpretation (and thus “ipse dixit”). Prefers a transparent balancing test to address modern dangers (e.g., accidental shootings, child access). 4. Key Takeaways Text & Original Meaning: Heller demonstrates how the Court uses historical sources (18th- and 19th-century texts, legal commentary, postratification practice) to interpret constitutional language. Individual Right vs. Collective Right: Heller sets a major precedent that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, though subject to some longstanding limitations. Limits on Gun Rights: Even the majority accepts certain historical restrictions (e.g., barring felons) and indicates that future questions might require more detailed analysis. Role of the Courts: The majority’s stance diminishes “interest balancing” by legislatures on “core” constitutional rights, whereas the dissenters favor giving governments more regulatory leeway under a reasonableness standard. TEXT AND “ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING” 1. The Role of Text Basic Premise: Many believe that the Constitution’s text is binding, so judges must adhere to its words. Challenge: The text can be ambiguous or broad, leaving many questions unresolved (e.g., scope of “the freedom of speech”).  Counterpoint: Even if we agree the words bind us, we still have to figure out what those words mean—that meaning can be elusive. 2. The Original Meaning Contemporary Originalism: ◦ Focuses on “original public meaning,” i.e., how the text was publicly understood when ratified. ◦ Different from seeking the private “intentions” of the drafters or ratifiers (which may be subjective). Implication: ◦ The original meaning might yield concrete answers (e.g., an individual right to possess firearms). ◦ Or it might indicate that certain provisions were meant as broad concepts, giving modern judges latitude to flesh out specifics. ◦ In any event, originalism always starts with historical inquiry. 3. The Authority of the Original Meaning Reasons Often Given: 1. Legal Reason: The Constitution is law, so its text—as originally understood—is binding. 2. Interpretive Reason: To “interpret” a document, you look to what it meant when adopted. 3. Pragmatic Reason: It promotes stability, reduces judicial discretion, and ensures “We the People” (from the time of ratification) remain in control of constitutional meaning. Scalia’s Take: A “living constitution” approach undermines the very purpose of a written constitution, turning it into whatever current majorities want it to be. 4. The Second Amendment Debate Heller Context: ◦ Both Justice Scalia (majority) and Justice Stevens (dissent) focus on how the Second Amendment’s words would have been understood in the 18th century. ◦ They consult similar historical sources yet reach starkly different conclusions. Problem for Originalism?: ◦ Critics argue that if originalists often split along political lines, this might show that “original meaning” can be shaped by personal or ideological preferences. ◦ Raises the question: How much of a problem is it for originalism that judges come to different “originalist” results? 5. Original Meaning and Historical Change Modern Circumstances: ◦ Heller states the Second Amendment is not limited to weapons known in the 18th century (like muskets).  ◦ Raises questions about new weapon technologies (rifles, machine guns, etc.) and new social realities (urban gun violence). Underlying Question: ◦ If the Framers did not foresee certain inventions or conditions, do we still apply the same original understanding to them? ◦ How far can we extend the notion that the text covers modern developments? 6. Original Public Meaning and Discretion Heller’s Approach: ◦ The Court insists it is not simply balancing policy interests, yet acknowledges longstanding prohibitions (e.g., felons, mentally ill, sensitive places, etc.). Tension: ◦ If the Second Amendment’s original public meaning supposedly bars some regulations but not others, how do we justify certain exceptions that may not be explicitly part of the 18th-century understanding? ◦ Suggests that some policy judgments inevitably shape how original meaning gets applied. 7. Justice Breyer’s Approach Judicial Judgment: ◦ Breyer advocates a “framework of constitutional analysis” that openly factors in consequences, effectiveness, and reasonableness. Question: ◦ Is his “judicial judgment” just a form of policy-making in disguise? ◦ Breyer argues transparency in how judges weigh constitutional interests is better than claiming purely historical or textual mandates. Legitimacy Concerns: ◦ Some might see open policy-balancing as more legitimate if done transparently; others see it as straying from purely legal interpretation. 8. Stun Guns (Caetano v. Massachusetts) Lower Court’s Errors: 1. Argued stun guns were not in common use at the time of enactment. 2. Labeled them “dangerous and unusual” because they are modern inventions. 3. Said there was “nothing in the record” suggesting they had military utility. Supreme Court’s Response: ◦ All three justifications contradict Heller’s clear statement that the Second Amendment extends to weapons not in existence at the founding. Justice Alito’s Concurrence: ◦ Emphasizes that the core right is individual self-defense; the relevant question is whether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes today. ◦ Criticizes requiring someone to resort to a firearm instead of a less-lethal weapon like a stun gun.