Introduction to Criminal Procedure Outline PDF

**[Introduction to Criminal Procedure.]** - The Supreme Court: from Civil Liberties to the Tough-on-Crime Era. - The **Warren Court** (1953-1969, especially 1962-1969) "**Criminal Procedure Revolution**"---**emphasis on civil liberties and rights of criminal defendants**....

**[Introduction to Criminal Procedure.]** - The Supreme Court: from Civil Liberties to the Tough-on-Crime Era. - The **Warren Court** (1953-1969, especially 1962-1969) "**Criminal Procedure Revolution**"---**emphasis on civil liberties and rights of criminal defendants**. - **Burger, Rehnquist, Roberts Court** (1969+)---**emphasis on empowering law enforcement and limiting Warren Court decision**. - The **Fourth Amendment**. - "The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against **unreasonable searches and seizures**, shall not be violated **and no warrants** **shall issue,** **but upon probable cause**, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." - Fourth Amendment only applies if a government agent carries out a "search" or "seizure." - The Basics of a Search: a **search** under the Fourth Amendment occurs if: - A government agent/agency violates a person's "**reasonable expectation of privacy**" (***Katz***), or - A government agent physically **trespasses** on a constitutionally protected area (that is, a person, house, paper, or effect, where "house" includes the curtilage but not open fields outside the curtilage) for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence (***Jones***). - What is a **search** under the Fourth Amendment? Some specifics: - No reasonable expectation of privacy for **trash** left for collection in an area accessible to the public and outside the curtilage of a home (***Greenwood***). - Use of a **thermal imager** (technology "not in general public use" at the time of case) on a home from outside the curtilage constitutes a search (***Kyllo***). - Use of a **beeper** to track an automobile on public roads is not a search because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in movements on a public highway from one place to another (***Knotts***: "public exposure"). - Use of **pen register** is not a search, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for numbers dialed on telephone---because the information is conveyed to telephone company (***Smith v. Maryland***: "third-party doctrine"). - Fourth Amendment prohibits **unreasonable** searches or seizures. - Initial issue is **whether a search or seizure occurred at all**, without any search or seizure there can be no Fourth Amendment violation. - SCOTUS recognizes two different types of Fourth Amendment searches: one depending on a defendant's privacy interest and the other on a defendant's property interest. - For both types, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of persons, houses, papers, and effects. - If a search does not fall under any of these categories, then it is not subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. - **Privacy Interest Search**: When a law enforcement or government **agent** discovers, inspects, or monitors a person (or their oral or written communications), personal property, or home with the agent's senses (touch, sight, hearing, or smelling) and detects something incriminating, they have violated the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy (***Katz***). - A trespass on the personal or real property that results in a law enforcement officer's detection of incriminating evidence of information qualifies as a search **even if it does not violate the property owner's reasonable expectation of privacy** (i.e., officers placing a GPS under a car without a warrant and monitoring a suspect for several weeks) (***Jones***). - **Property Interest Search**: A person's private activity is generally protected if it occurs in their residence (traditional home, apartment, hotel room, etc.). This includes the curtilage, or the area immediately outside of a home that society recognizes as being afforded special privacy protections under property law (examples: porches, backyard patios, etc.) (***Jones***). - What is a **search**? More Specifics: - "**Open Fields Doctrine**": **no** **reasonable expectation of privacy** in "open fields," i.e., areas on property outside the "curtilage," to be defined on a case-by-case basis by considering **four factors**: - Proximity of the area to the home; - Whether area included in enclosure surrounding the home; - The nature of uses to which area is put; and - Other steps to protect area from observation by passers-by. - No search was conducted when law enforcement walked around a locked gate with a "no trespassing" sign (***Oliver***); no search conducted when law enforcement crossed several fences and peered into a barn with flashlight (***Dunn***). - No search was conducted when law enforcement viewed the defendant's land with naked eye or ordinary camera from a plane in public airspace (***California v. Ciraolo***). - No search conducted when law enforcement viewed a partially covered greenhouse from a low-flying (400 ft) helicopter (***Florida v. Riley***). - **Limiting the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age**: - There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term historical cell site location information---even though shared with cell service provider; this is a narrowing of the third-party doctrine in response to the digital age (***Carpenter***). - A person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with a third-party (***Smith v. Maryland***), except when third-party records allow law enforcement officials to detect public movements of a person for at least seven days (***Carpenter***). - Law enforcement officers can obtain a person's bank records of the telephone calls made to and from the person's phone; this is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. - **The Use of Narcotic Dogs**: - Sniff by a trained narcotics dog in a **public place** is **not** considered a "search" (***Place***). - A sniff by a trained narcotics dog within the curtilage around a home is a "search"---based only on the trespass test from ***Jones***, not the reasonable expectation of privacy test from ***Katz***. - Sniff by a trained narcotics dog of a car during a traffic stop is **not** considered a "search" (***Caballes***). - **But** if officers, without reasonable suspicion, lengthen a traffic stop to conduct a narcotics dog sniff, then the stop becomes an unreasonable seizure (***Rodriguez***). - An alert by a qualified narcotics dog presumptively creates **probable cause** for search (***Florida v. Harris***). - A person has **no reasonable expectation of privacy** in the airspace outside their luggage or car. A police-trained dog, certified to detect illegal substances, provides probable cause when the dog alerts agents to a suspect's car or luggage in a public place (***Florida v. Harris*** & ***Illinois v. Caballes***). - Officers can **seize** the luggage **until a warrant is given** or search the car under the automobile exception. **[Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion.]** - Modalities of Constitutional Argument: - Historical - Textual - Doctrinal - Structural - Ethical - Prudential - Probable Cause & Reasonable Suspicion. - Fourth Amendment: "... and no warrants shall issue, but upon **probable cause**... - **And** regardless of whether a warrant is required: - A "**search**" requires **probable cause** to believe that the search will produce evidence bearing on a criminal offense. - An **arrest** (a form of "seizure") requires **probable cause** to believe that the seized person has committed or is committing a crime. - A search or seizure requires probable cause to believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that incriminating evidence exists in a particular place to be constitutional. - Probable cause requirement exists independently from the Fourth Amendment's general-warrant requirement. - Probable Cause. - "Exists where 'the fact and circumstances within \[the officers'\] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information \[are\] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable causation in the belief'...." - In the case of an **arrest**, that the arrested person committed a crime. - In the case of a **search**, that the search will produce evidence of a crime. - A "fair probability," more than a "reasonable suspicion," but less than a "preponderance of the evidence." - Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within a person's knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person a reasonable causation in the belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, or that incriminating evidence exists in a particular place (***D.C. v. Wesby***). - Lower burden of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence. - Anonymous person called law enforcement, named and described a drug dealer who they knew flew from NY to Miami to obtain heroin. Caller also described how the suspect moved the drugs past security and gave enough info for police to find him. Officers followed suspect from Miami to New York and asked to see what was in the bag. Officers arrested the suspect and searched him when he refused. The Court ruled that law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest the man (***Illinois v. Gates***). - Law enforcement officers arrested a man for jaywalking (was a sign posted that said no jaywalking) but the jaywalking was actually a pretense to question him about a suspected drug dealing. Officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a drug offense, but asked for the man's id and, while it was being ran, they asked if they could search him for drugs. The man agreed; officers found drugs, seized the drugs, and arrested the man on drug charges. The seizure for jaywalking was determined to be valid under the Fourth Amendment even though it was not their subjective motivation (***Whren***). - Reasonable Suspicion. - Requires "some minimal level of objective justification"---more than a mere suspicion, but less than probable cause. - Must be based on specific and articulatable facts, not an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." **[Warrants]** - Requirements for a Warrant. - Warrant must be issued by a "**neutral and detached magistrate**." - E.g. not by the state attorney general (***Coolidge v. New Hampshire***). - Must be based on **probable cause** established from facts submitted by government agent upon **oath or affirmation**. - See "totality of the circumstances" test for probable cause from ***Illinois v. Gates***. - Must **particularly describe** place to be searched or person/things to be seized. - *See* e.g., the degree of precision help sufficient in ***Andersen***. - Warrant itself must provide reasonable precision on its face---not enough if underlying affidavit describes what is to be searched/seized (***Groh***). - Executing Warrants: the "Knock-and-Announce" Rule. - Generally, officers are **required** to "**knock and announce**" before entering a place to execute search warrant---**unless** officers have reasonable suspicion that doing so "would be dangerous or futile or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime"---e.g. destruction of evidence (***Wilson v. Arkansas***, ***Richards v. Wisconsin***). - **But** courts must determine whether a no-knock raid was justified on a **case-by-case**, fact-specific basis. For example, no blanket to the "knock-and-announce" rule for ALL investigations (***Richards***). - Even if no-knock raid was unreasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment, exclusionary rule does not apply to the evidence obtained (***Hudson v. Michigan***). **[Warrant Exceptions.]** - General Warrants and the Fourth Amendment. - **James Otis** argued **against writs of assistance** (a kind of **general warrant**) in "Paxton's case" before Massachusetts' highest court in 1761. John Adams attended and later said: "then and there was the first scene of the first Act of opposition to the Arbitrary claims of Great Britian. Then and there the Child Independence was born." Under 18th-centru common law, Otis lost. - ***Entick v. Carrington***: a famous **civil liberties** ruling in favor of a critical journalist, John Entick, in his trespass suit against royal officials who searched his home and seized his papers based on a warrant issued by Lord Halifax, who was a secretary of state, not magistrate; in Lord Camden's judgment, Halifax lacked legal authority to issue the warrant. - Plain View Doctrine. - The police may **seize an object** without a warrant if: - The object is in a place where the officer is **lawfully present**; - And the object is in **plain view** when the officer discovers it. - ***Note***, the object must truly be in plain view---an officer may not exceed his authority to obtain better view of the object---e.g. it is impermissible even to move some stereo equipment a few inches to view its serial number based on reasonable suspicion that the equipment was stole (***Arizona v. Hicks***). - The officer must have **probable cause** to believe the object is the **fruit**, **instrumentality**, or **evidence** of a crime (***Coolidge v. New Hampshire***; ***Horton v. California***). - "**Plain Feel**" **Doctrine**: if, during a valid frisk, an officer, through sense of touch, immediately develops probable cause to believe there is contraband on the stopped person, officer seized it (**but** officer may not expand frisk to develop probable cause, once there is no longer any reasonable suspicion of weapon, the frisk of that area must stop immediately) (***Minnesota v. Dickerson***). - Automobile Exception. - Police may search an automobile **without a warrant** if they have **probable cause** to believe it contains contraband or fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime (***Carroll v. United States***). - Originally justified by **exigency** rationale, i.e. automobiles are **mobile**, it would be impractical to require a police officer to obtain a warrant and then return to conduct the search. - Later also justified by the argument that people have a **lesser expectation of privacy** in their vehicles than in their homes. - In addition, if the police have **probable cause** to search a vehicle for something, they may search any container in the vehicle that might contain that thing (***Acevedo***). - **But** if police only have probable cause to search a container within the vehicle (e.g. a paper bag recently placed in trunk), that probable cause does not extend to justify a search of the entire vehicle. **[Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest (SILA).]** - Warrant Exception: Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest. - When the police **lawfully arrest** someone in a private place, they do not require a warrant or any suspicion to search (1) the arrested **person** and (2) the area within the arrestee's **immediate** **control** (the "lunging" area)---but a warrant is required to search beyond (***Chimel***). - The police require a warrant to search the **digital information on a cell phone** seized from an arrested person (***Riley v. California***). - Police may search a **vehicle** without probable cause, incident to a recent occupant's lawful arrest, but only if (1) the arrestee is **unsecured** and within "**reaching distance**" of the passenger compartment at the time of search, **or** (2) it is "**reasonable to believe**" the vehicle contains evidence of the **offense of arrest** (***Arizona v. Gant***). - For **traffic violations**, if the suspect is not arrested, there can be no search incident to a lawful arrest (***Knowles v. Iowa***). **[Consent]**. - Warrant Exception: Consent. - Not a violation of Fourth Amendment to conduct a search without a warrant or probable cause if the police receive **voluntary** consent from person who **apparently** has the **authority** to offer it. - "**Voluntary**": knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not required (***Schneckloth***); but the false claim by an officer to have a warrant negates the possibility of voluntary consent (***Bumper v. North Carolina***). - "**Apparently**": an officer's **reasonable belief** that the consenting person has the right to permit a search is sufficient, even if later turns out that the person lacked such rights (***Illinois v. Rodriguez***). - "**Authority**": police officers may search a jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants gives consent, unless another occupant is **physically present** and objects to the search (***Randolph***). If the objector is then removed on an objectively reasonable basis (e.g. lawful arrest), the police may search with consent of remaining occupant (***Fernandez***). **[Exigent Circumstances]** - Warrant Exception. - **Hot Pursuit**: probable cause is sufficient to arrest a felon in a **public place**---no warrant is required (***Watson***, see ch. 19). **But** a search warrant (or at least arrest warrant accompanied by "reason to believe the suspect is within") is required to enter a **home** in order to make an arrest (***Payton***). **But** officers in **hot pursuit** of a **fleeing felony suspect** may make a warrantless search and seizure to the extent necessary to prevent a felon's escape---including pursuit into a home (***Hayden***). **But** hot pursuit of a **fleeing misdemeanor suspect** does not categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance; "when the officer has time to get a warrant, he must do so" (***Lange***). \[**Note**, regardless, still need **probable cause** that suspect committed crime\]. - The exigent-circumstances exception permits officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter and search a home without a warrant (***Hayden***). - The exigency justifies the possible consequences (e.g. increasing safety concerns) that are incurred by waiting. - Absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a person's home to make an arrest without a warrant (***Payton***). - **Preservation of Evidence**: officers may also make a warrantless entry of a home to prevent the **destruction of evidence**---even if the officers cause the exigency by knocking---as long as their creation of the exigency did not involve an actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation (***King***). \[**Note**, even if warrant exception applies, still need **probable cause** that evidence of a crime will be found.\] - The exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to an exigency that is officer created if the exigency does not arise from the officer's unreasonable or unconstitutional conduct (***King***). - **Public Safety Exception**: in an emergency, officers may make a warrantless entry of a home to assist a seriously injured occupant or protect an occupant from imminent serious injury if they have an "**objectively reasonable basis for believing**" that a person in the home is in need of immediate aid, or that persons were in danger (***Stuart***, ***Fisher***). - Police may enter a home without a warrant as long as they objectively believe that the occupant is injured or in immediate danger (***Stuart***). - A warrantless search of a home is allowed when there is an objectively reasonable basis for law enforcement officers to believe that someone in the house needs immediate help (***Fisher***). **[Exigent Circumstances: Preservation of Evidence: Drunk Driving]** - Warrant Exception. - If police can reasonably obtain a **warrant**, the Fourth Amendment requires them to do so before taking a non-consensual blood alcohol content ("BAC") **blood** test (***McNeely***). - In drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency that in every case is sufficient to justify conducting an involuntary blood test without a warrant (***McNeely***). - A state cannot pass a law that makes it a crime for a suspected drunk driver to refuse a **blood** test but can criminalize refusal to take a **breath** test (***Birchfield***). A breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a warrantless **search incident to a lawful arrest** (**SILA**) for drunk driving (***Birchfield***). - A law requiring a motorist to submit to a blood-alcohol-concentration breath test after being lawfully arrested for driving while being impaired does not violate the Fourth Amendment (***Birchfield***). - **Limitation on "exigent circumstances" exception**: warrantless home arrest likely no justified by risk of lost evidence (e.g. dissipation of blood alcohol) if underlying offense is "extremely minor" (***Welsh***). - The exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment does not allow warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest for a minor offense (***Welsh***). **[Ports of Entry.]** - Warrant Exception. - At the border or its "functional equivalent," **routine searches** do **not** require a warrant or **any** evidentiary basis (no probable cause, no reasonable suspicion) (***Ramsey***; ***Flores-Montano***), although **extended** **detention** requires at least **reasonable suspicion** of criminal activity (***Montoya de Hernandez***). - Reaffirms the government's broad authority to conduct border searches without suspicion or warrant; there is a **reduced expectation of privacy** for vehicles **at the border** and the **government's significant interest** in border security (***Flores-Montano***). - Customs officials may **search international mail entering the U.S.** without a warrant if there is a **reasonable cause** to suspect a **violation** of **customs laws**. The reasonableness of border searches is established by the fact that they occur at the border, a principle deeply rooted in the history and tradition of **sovereign** **authority** to relegate the entry of persons and property in the country (***Ramsey***). Decision underscores the importance of **national** **security** and **customs** **enforcement** at the borders (balancing act that can be seen later between privacy rights and government interests at the border). - The Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border, allowing routine searches and seizures without probable cause or a warrant, and the level of suspicion required for non-routine searches such as alimentary canal smuggling is **reasonable** **suspicion** (***Montoya de Hernandez***). Establishes that the **level or suspicion required** for **non-routine border searches** is **reasonable** **suspicion**. - **"Away from the border,"** border officials may **stop** a vehicle at a **fixed** checkpoint and briefly **questioned** occupants regarding citizenship **without** individualized reasonable suspicion (***Martinez-Fuerte***). - Routine stops for **brief questioning** at **permanent** **checkpoints** are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and do **not** **require** **individualized suspicion** or a **warrant**, even if such **referrals are made largely** on the basis of **race** or **ethnicity** (***Martinez-Fuerte***). Court is prioritizing the enforcement of immigration laws over the privacy interests of individuals. **[Checkpoints.]** - Warrant Exception. - Stopping a vehicle is a "**seizure**," like a ***Terry*** stop, and thus generally requires at least **reasonable suspicion** of illegality (e.g. ***Delaware v. Prouse***). - **However**, police may stop cars at **checkpoints, without reasonable suspicion**, if the "**primary purpose**" of checkpoint is not **general crime control** (e.g. finding narcotics) (***Edmond***), but rather certain "**special needs**" such as policing the border or ensuring roadway safety by combating drink driving (***Martinez-Fuerte***; ***Sitz***)---or where the police are not seeking evidence that stopped drivers committed crimes (***Lidster***). - Warrant Exception: Protective Sweeps. - When the police **lawfully arrest** someone, the police do not require a warrant or any suspicion to search (1) the arrested **person** and (2) the area within the arrestee's **immediate control** (the "lunging" area) (***Chimel***). - In addition, even if the arrest is in a **home**, the police may conduct a **protective sweep** of "places in which a person may be hiding": - They may, **without a warrant or any suspicion**, "look in the closets and other spaces **immediately adjoining** the place of arrest from which an attack could immediately be launched." - And **beyond that**, they may conduct a cursory, warrantless sweep based on **reasonable suspicion** "that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others" (***Maryland v. Buie***). **[Searches of Person in Jails & Prisons, Probation, Parolees; Administrative Searches; and DNA Tests of Arrestees.]** - Warrant Exception. - A **prisoner's cell and effects** are **not** **protected** by the Fourth Amendment. Even if someone is arrested for a minor offense, **jail** **officials** **need** **no** **warrant** **or** **reasonable** **suspicion** of contraband to strip search the person before admitting him to the general population in a jail (***Florence***). - Warrant Exception: Inventory Searches. - As long as the search follows an established routine for the purpose of inventory, the police may conduct a warrantless, suspicion-less **inventory** **search** of an i**mpounded vehicle**, including containers in the vehicle---even if the vehicle was only impounded for a parking violation (***South Dakota v. Opperman***). - Warrant Exception: Administrative Searches. - When inspectors search private residences and commercial buildings based on a reasonable, neutral plan that has the purpose of enforcing administrative regulations, a **warrant** is required, but the warrant need **not** be based on **individualized probable cause** (***Camara***, etc.). - Also, **no warrant required** for administrative searches of "**closely regulated** **industries**"---e.g. liquor sales, firearms dealing, mining, or "running an automobile junkyard" (***New York v. Burger***), but not, e.g., car leading or general manufacturing. - DNA Test of Arrestees. - When officers make an arrest based on **probable cause** for a **serious offense**, police may collect a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA at police station, without warrant or suspicion, as part of routine booking procedure (***Maryland v. King***). **[Seizures: Arrests]** - What is a "seizure" of the Person? - **Seizure of a person**: an encounter with police rises to the level or a "**seizure**" if: - Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would **not** feel free to **terminate** **the encounter** (***Mendenhall***: "free to leave"; ***Florida v. Bostick***: "free to terminate the encounter"), and the person in-fact **submits** to the **assertion** **of** **authority** (***Hodari D***: if someone flees without submitting to the officer's show of force, there is no seizure) **or** - The police apply **physical force** (note, this includes striking someone with a bullet) with intent to restrain. This is a seizure even if the person then flees (***Torres v. Madrid***). - **Police encounters ranked by level of coercion**: - Lethal force - **Arrest** (custodial seizure for indefinite period, usually for interrogation or persecution, requires **probable cause**) - Custody - ***Terry* Stop** (temporary limited seizures, requires **reasonable suspicion**) - **Consensual police encounter** (NOT a seizure, totally unrestricted by Fourth Amendment) - **Arrest**: custodial seizure for indefinite period, usually for interrogation or prosecution. - Requires **probable cause** to believe the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime. - **Test** for **probable** **cause** is based on **facts** that officers **knew at the time of the arrest**, but is **not affected** by the officer's **erroneous** **legal** **conclusions** (e.g., if officers have probable cause to arrest a suspect for crime X, but instead arrest a suspect for crime Y, erroneously believing that they have probable cause from crime Y, arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment (***Devenpeck v. Alford***; ***Wesby***). - A **warrant** is required to enter a **home** to make an arrest (absent proof of exigent circumstances) (***Payton***), but a warrant is **not** required for a felony arrest in a **public place** (***Watson***). - Warrantless misdemeanor arrests are permissible even if misdemeanor cannot be punished by incarceration (***Atwater***). **[Seizures: Stop-and-Frisk]** - The Fourth Amendment allows police to briefly detain ("**stop**") a person based on **reasonable suspicion** of criminal activity (***Terry***). - Police officers may perform a limited search for weapons of a person's outer clothing when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person may be armed and presently dangerous, regardless of whether there is probable cause for an arrest (***Terry***). - Temporary investigative detention of **effects** (e.g. luggage) based on reasonable suspicion is also permissible (***Place***). - The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement from **temporarily detaining personal luggage** for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dogs based in a **reasonable suspicion** that the luggage contains narcotics. However, the seizure must be **properly** **limited** in scope (***Place***). - Once a person is lawfully stopped, the police may conduct a protective pat-down ("**frisk**") based on the **reasonable suspicion** that the individual is **armed and dangerous** (***Terry***). - There is no rigid time limit for a stop, although its **duration must be reasonable** in light of its **purpose** and the **means** of the investigation. The police must be diligent in confirming, or dispelling, their suspicions (***Sharpe***). - An investigatory detention must be **temporary** and **last no long than necessary** to effectuate the **purpose** of the stop. The reasonableness of the detention's duration is measured by the **diligence of the police pursuing the investigation**. - A state statute that makes it a crime for legally stopped persons to refuse to provide their names does not violate the Fourth Amendment (***Hiibel***). - A **state law requiring a suspect to disclose their name** during a **valid** ***Terry*** **stop** does **not** violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against **unreasonable** **searches** and **seizures**, **or** the Fifth Amendment's **protection** against **self-incrimination**, **unless** the suspect **reasonably** believes that their name would be used to incriminate himself/herself (***Hiibel***). - Under the Fourth Amendment, the stop is a **seizure**, and the frisk is a **search**. - The only justification for a frisk is that the officer has a **reasonable** **suspicion** that the individual is **dangerous** and that by searching, they can **protect themselves** and those **around them**. - Even if they **reasonably** **suspect** that there is something in a pocket that is evidence of a crime, they **cannot reach into the pocket without probable cause**. **[Reasonable Suspicion]** - Reasonable suspicion must be based on a **specific and articulable facts**, not an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or **hunch**." Reasonable suspicion requires "**some minimal level of objective justification**," but ***less*** justification than **probable cause**. - Reasonable suspicion for a stop is determined by considering the **totality of the circumstances** to see if there is a **particularized** and **objective** **basis** for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Officers may draw on their own experience and specialized trainings to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them (***Arvizu***). - Whether the standard is met is judged under the **totality of the circumstances** (***Sokolow***). - Unprovoked flight from police in high crime area established reasonable suspicion (***Wardlow***). - Law enforcement officers can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if they have an enforceable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot, **even if they lack probable cause**. The reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and does not require proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence (***Sokolow***). - An officer may conduct a **brief**, **investigatory** **stop** when the officer has a **reasonable**, **articulable** **suspicion** that criminal activity is afoot. The determination of **reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior**, and officers are **not** **required** to **ignore** the **relevant** characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation (***Wardlow***). - Whether suspicion is based on informant's tip, tip must have **indicia of reliability** sufficient to make officer's suspicion reasonable (***Alabama v. White***; ***Florida v. J.L.***), but officers need **not *personally* witness evidence** of **criminal** **activity** (***Navarette v. California***). - An **anonymous tip**, as **corroborated** by **independent** **police** **work**, can exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the reasonable suspicion needed to make an investigatory stop (less demanding standard than probable cause) (***Alabama v. White***). - An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person, unless the tip is suitably corroborated and exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion (***Florida v. J.L.***). - ***Tip***: To determine whether some set of facts provides reasonable suspicion, compare the facts of the case we have studied where the Court found there was, or was not, reasonable suspicion.