COPYRIGHT FINAL.pdf
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LAW OF COPYRIGHT MODULE 2 What is Copyright? The term 'copyright' comes from 'the right to copy', signifying the exclusive right of the owner of a work to make copies and to exercise other rights granted by law. Copyright protection is automatic and begins as soon as a work is created...
LAW OF COPYRIGHT MODULE 2 What is Copyright? The term 'copyright' comes from 'the right to copy', signifying the exclusive right of the owner of a work to make copies and to exercise other rights granted by law. Copyright protection is automatic and begins as soon as a work is created. Modern copyright law recognises a set of rights for authors regarding their copyrighted works. Copyright owners are granted exclusive rights with monopolistic advantages, and they have the option to sell or transfer these rights to others. Principle of national treatment: each member state of the Convention Berne Convention- would give citizens of other member 1886 states the same rights of copyright that it gave to its own citizens. Minimum standards for national copyright legislation – each member state agreed to certain basic rules which their national laws must contain, although it could if it wished increase the amount of protection given to right holders. One of these minimum rules was that copyright should arise with the creation of a work and not depend upon Berne Convention- any formality such as a system of public registration. This entailed the end of the 1886 British system of registration at Stationers’ Hall when the UK finally implemented the Berne Convention in the Copyright Act 1911. Another important Berne rule, also implemented in the 1911 Act, was that the term of copyright was to be a minimum of the author’s lifetime plus 50 years. A focus on the author as the key figure in copyright law: the Berne Convention emphasized in other ways the centrality of authorship in copyright. Its purpose was ‘the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works’. In the 1928 revision of the Convention, the concept of moral rights was introduced giving authors the right to be identified as such and to object Berne Convention- to derogatory treatment of their works (moral rights could not be transferred to others) 1886 The possibility of exceptions to copyright, enabling the reproduction of literary and artistic works without the right holder’s prior permission. Free use of works was expressly permitted in the cases of quotation from lawfully published works, illustration for teaching purposes, and news reporting. SECTION 13 OF THE COPYRIGHTS ACT OF 1957 Subject to the provisions of this section and the other provisions of this Act, copyright shall subsist throughout India in the following classes of works, that is to say,— (a)original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works; (b)cinematograph films; and (c)sound recording. CONCEPTS Let’s go STEP by OUTLINE STEP! Authored TYPES OF WORKS PROTECTED Related/ entrepreneurial CRITERION OF Originality PROTECTION Fixation Economic reproduction communication to public SCOPE OF distribution PROTECTION MORAL Integrity Attribution Divulgation Retraction Fair use Educational DEFENCES Criticism/ review parody PRIMARY CONCEPTS Originality "Original" means that the work was independently created by the author and possesses some level of creativity. The author must have used their intellectual ability to produce the work. Originality does not imply a completely new idea or inventive thought, but rather the work must not be copied from another source; it should originate from the author. FIXATION Copyright does not need to be registered; the right arises automatically when the work is fixed in a tangible medium or material form. EXCLUSIONS Copyright consists of several components. It does not protect ideas, facts, procedures, processes, systems, concepts, principles, or discoveries. Copyright does not cover an idea; it only applies once the idea is expressed in a tangible form. There is no copyright in an idea as such Idea- Expression Once expressed, it becomes the Dichotomy subject matter of copyright Copyright exists in a work only when it is represented in a material form Art.9(2) TRIPs: Copyright protection extends to expression and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such. DOCTRINE OF MERGER If there is only one way of expressing an idea, or limited ways, the idea and expression are merged and not covered under copyright. Merger is not just a defense but renders the expression uncopyrightable. Merger operates when the expression is truly inseparable from unprotected matter. R. G. ANAND V. DELUXE FILMS & ORS 18 AUGUST, 1978 CASE FACTS: The appellant, R. G. Anand, an architect by profession and also a playwright, dramatist and producer of several stage plays, wrote and produced a play called ‘Hum Hindustani’ in 1953. It ran successfully and was re-staged in 1954, 1955 and in 1956. Aware of the interest of the appellant in filming the play in view of its increasing popularity, the second defendant, Mr. Mohan Sehgal, contacted the appellant. CASE FACTS: In January, 1955, appellant met the second and third defendants and had detailed discussions about the play and its plot and the desirability of filming it. However, after this discussion, the appellant received no further communication from the second defendant. In May, 1955, the defendants started to make the film ‘New Delhi’, which, the appellant gathered, was based on his play, “Hum Hindustani’. The defendant, however, assured him that it was not so. In September, 1956, the movie was released and after viewing it, the appellant filed a suit for infringement of his copyright in his play ‘Hum Hindustani’. His claims included damages, account of profits and a permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from exhibiting the movie. ISSUE: Whether the production, distribution and exhibition of the film ‘New Delhi’ made by the defendants are in infringement of the appellant’s copyright in the play, ‘Hum Hindustani’? RULE OF LAW: Unless there is any substantial resemblance between the original work and the alleged copy, the play and the movie here respectively, in terms of scenes, incidents and treatment, and similarity between the two is so much that a reasonable man would consider the ‘copy’ to be more or less an imitation of the original, an infringement of copyright cannot be said to have taken place. ANALYSIS: It was argued by Anand that Delux Films and the other defendants were fully aware of the theme of his play and its intricacies. He had had detailed discussions with them about the same. There were various similarities between the play and the movie made by Delux Films in terms of the main theme of provincialism, characterization and situations. Anand pleaded that he was the owner of the copyright in the play ‘Hum Hindustani’ and that his copyright in the play had been violated. The Delhi High court recognized the copyright of the appellant under the Copyright Act of 1911. Delux Films and others, on the other hand, asserted that the movie was not substantially similar to the play in terms of the themes it dealt with and there were lot of differences in terms of characterization and treatment. HELD: The court held that the film produced by the defendants can not be said to be a substantial copy of the play and the defendants can not be held to have committed an act of piracy because of differences in story, theme, characterization and climaxes. Moreover, copyright can not be acquired in an idea; the idea being provincialism in this case. A copyright offers protection only to the expression of an idea and not the idea itself. The allegation by Anand that the defendants violated his copyright by copying his idea was held invalid. HELD: The appellant could not prove that the defendant had committed a colorable imitation of his play. Where similarities between the copyrighted work and the copy are so many and the similarities between the two works are not coincidental, a reasonable inference of colorable imitation can be drawn. The court held that a case for infringement may be made out only when such infringement may be identifiable by a reasonable man; and, in this case, the court observed, that no prudent person could get an impression that the film appears to be a copy of the original play. The Supreme Court did not find any violation of copyright and dismissed the appeal. BAKER V. SELDON Selden was the author of a book called “Selden's Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping Simplified”. It was published in 1859 and rightful copyrights were registered for the same. This work contained a new system of book-keeping. Selden also held the copyrights for future improvements made to this FACTS: system. In total, Selden had authored 6 such books. These books explained the system and the reasoning behind it. Baker had used a similar system in his books, but the tables used had different headings and column arrangements. ISSUES: Whether Baker had infringed copyrights held by Selden? ANANLYSIS: The court looked at the evidence presented by both sides and decided in favor of Baker. They did not find Baker's usage to be violative of copyright held by Selden. It was held to be true that Baker did use the system mentioned in Selden’s book, but that alone was not enough to prove infringement. The Court emphasized that if this type of use was held to be infringing, then the copyright owner could potentially stop others from using the book-keeping system mentioned in the book; and that would be a counter the purpose of copyright law protection. CONCLUSION: This judgment established an important principle of the present copyright law. The aspect of the “idea-expression dichotomy” was fortified through this case law. Copyright protection is provided only to the expression of an idea and not the idea itself. Therefore, in this case, protection was awarded to the expression made by Selden in his 6 books and not the system of book-keeping mentioned in his books. Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak FACTS: The Petitioners, Eastern Book Company, a partnership firm, and EBC Publishing Private Limited were engaged in the business of printing and publishing various legal books together. One such publication was titled ‘Supreme Court Cases’ or SCC. This publication has existed since 1969 and consisted of all non-reportable, reportable and short judgements, orders, records of proceedings and directions of the Supreme Court. They published copy-edited versions of these judgments along with certain additions such as formatting, numbering, cross-referring, and other contributions that rendered it user-friendly. It also incorporated headnotes, footnotes, and long notes. FACTS: In 2004, the Respondents, Spectrum Business Support Limited, (also called Respondent-1) and Regent Datatech Private Limited (Respondent-2) put out a software titled ‘Grand Jurix’ and ‘The Laws’ respectively. These companies were alleged to have copied the entire module from SCC onto CD-ROMs, thereby infringing the appellants’ IP rights. ISSUES: Whether the Petitioners’ work is eligible for protection under Copyright Law? Whether the Defendants infringed the Petitioners’ copyrights? Whether individual elements added by the Petitioners suffice to receive copyright protection over the entire work? Section 13, 14 and 52 (1) (iv) (q) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957. LAWS: ANALYSIS: The Petitioners contended that they have copyright in their version of the judgements compiled in SCC, which is a product of their skills, ability, labour and capital. They did not intend to claim monopoly over the judgement, but the specific format in which they publish them. The Petitioners further claimed that their work was infringed by the Respondents because all the modules contained in the CD-ROM were similar to their work and they had replicated the Petitioners’ way of publishing the legal reports with the exact arrangements, sequences, and choices of cases. It was further alleged that the Respondents copied the entire judgement as put forth in the Petitioners’ law report with the same formatting, paragraph numbers, copy-editing and footnotes. ANALYSIS: The Respondents, however, presented that the Petitioners’ product is not eligible for protection under copyright law as it is merely a derivative work of Supreme Court’s judgments. Since it does not portray independent creation, it is not an original work. It was argued that the additions made by the Petitioners were not sufficient enough to render it protection under the Copyright Act. Further, they applied the merger doctrine and stated that the idea intended to be expressed by the Petitioners and the form in which they express the idea are inseparable, therefore leaving no room for a possible alternative expression. ANALYSIS: The Court held that for a derivative work to receive copyright protection, it must be demonstrated that the derivative work is more than just a copy of the original. It must contain the author’s independent skill apart from capital and labour. The court wanted to identify whether the petitioner's work was original. For doing so, they determined that the modicum of creativity was too high of a standard whereas sweat of the brow test was too low of a standard. ANALYSIS: Hence, they decided to apply the test of "skill and judgement". According to the court, skill meant those which are not trivial and are substantial and judgement meant the use of resources that went beyond the mere expenditure of labour and capital. The Respondents were ordered to refrain from copying the paragraphs made by the Petitioners for internal referencing and to stop using the Petitioners’ views on dissent and concurring opinions of the cases. The final judgement was in favour of the Petitioners, giving them an exclusive right over their content, prohibiting the utilisation of the same. CONCLUSION: Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D. B. Modak and Anr. created a new benchmark for the interpretation of "originality" as a concept by defining a balance between ‘Sweat of the Brow’ and the ‘Modicum of Creativity’ test. At one end of the spectrum, there is the ‘Sweat of the Brow’ test to determine originality, which entitles anybody with the provisions of labour and capital to be eligible for copyright protection. On the other hand, we have a benchmark of creativity, which requires a creation or a production to be novel and non- obvious. The Court is seen to have adopted a ‘middle path’ with the prerequisite of ‘adequate skill and judgement’, thereby setting a standard for proving originality. SWEAT OF THE BROW DOCTRINE According to this doctrine, an author gains rights through simple diligence during the creation of a work. Substantial creativity is not required. The creator is entitled to these rights because of the efforts and expense put into the creation of the work. For example, the creator of a telephone directory or a database must have copyright protection over the product not because such a compilation of data showcases any creativity, or the author has expressed anything original, but merely due to the effort, time, and money invested by the creator to collect and organize all the data in a specific manner. However, this compilation must be the original work of the author and must not be copied from another source. Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co. FACTS The Rural Telephone Service Company, the Plaintiff/ Respondent, is obliged to release an annual telephone directory in accordance with state regulations. This directory, known as the “White and Yellow Pages,” must be distributed free of charge due to the Plaintiff's monopoly in the market. Feist Publications, the Defendant/ Appellant, specializes in compiling directories for areas beyond the Plaintiff’s monopoly. However, the Defendant's directory goes beyond the typical "White and Yellow Pages" by including additional details. When creating a directory that encompassed the region of the Plaintiff’s monopoly market, the Defendant was refused a license by the Plaintiff to include entries from the Plaintiff's directory. The Defendant proceeded to include these entries without permission. As a result, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement. ISSUE Whether names, phone numbers and addresses from a directory be copyrighted or not? ANALYSIS The existing law on copyright protection in the US followed the Sweat of the Brow doctrine, which stated that any work that had a significant amount of time and energy invested in it would be eligible for copyright protection. According to this doctrine, the District Court of Kansas and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, stating that Rural Co. had invested substantial effort in creating their directory, and therefore they should be considered the copyright owners of the contents of the directory. ANALYSIS The defendant filed an appeal arguing that the contents of a directory are factual and therefore not eligible for copyright protection. The court examined the following established principles: Facts themselves cannot be copyrighted. However, compilations of facts can be eligible for copyright protection. ANALYSIS The court ruled that in order for a work to be considered "original" under copyright law, it must be independently created by the author and must display a minimal amount of creativity. A work that closely resembles another can still be considered original as long as it is not a result of copying. However, facts cannot be considered original under copyright law, as they are discovered and not created. In addition, the court stated that compilations of facts with the necessary level of creativity can be copyrighted. This creativity could be due to the order or arrangement of the facts, designed to enhance reader efficiency. ANALYSIS The Modicum of Creativity test was created to determine whether a work meets the originality requirement. According to this test, a compilation of phone numbers and addresses that simply presents the information as facts without any original input by the author would not be eligible for copyright protection because it does not meet the minimum requirement of creativity needed to establish originality. Even if the compilation is copyrighted, only the creative part of the work is protected, not the facts themselves. CONCLUSION The court determined that the copyright law doesn't cover facts themselves, but only their selection and arrangement. In this case, Feist Publications had arranged subscriber details in alphabetical order, similar to the Rural Telephone Service Co.'s directory. However, since subscriber details are considered facts and alphabetical listing lacks creativity, it was ruled that there was no infringement. HYPOTHETICALLY…. Pradhyumna, a famous politician of GiGi Land delivered multiple speeches during 2021. The reporters of The Jindal Times, Yukti and Srishti, took down the speeches in shorthand, wrote out their notes, corrected, revised and punctuated their reports for publication. The reports were published in The Jindal Times, the speeches being given verbatim as delivered by Mr. Pradhyumna. The reporters were employed under the terms that the copyright in all reports and articles composed by them for The Jindal Times should belong to the proprietor Shannon. In 2023, Mahek published a book called ” The Legendary Address of Pradhyumna” It consisted of reports of the above speeches of Pradhyumna, the speeches being preceded by short notes explaining the occasion. It was admitted that these reports were taken (substantially verbatim) from the reports in The Jindal Times. Shannon brought an action against Mehek, claiming a declaration that the copy right of the articles and reports was vested in the proprietors of The Jindal Times, as well as an injunction, damages, and costs. Whether the labor, skill, and judgment involved in reporting and transcribing speeches were sufficient to establish “authorship” under the Copyright Act Whether a speech, once transcribed, could be considered a “literary work” eligible for copyright protection, even if it was originally an oral address by Pradhyumna? ANSWER THESE If so, who owns it? Has Mahek infringed the copyright? If so, whose? Walter v. Lane The owners of The Times newspaper sued the publisher John Lane for copyright infringement. The lawsuit focused on a book published by Lane called FACTS "Appreciations and Addresses delivered by Lord Rosebery," which was accused of closely copying a series of reports that had been previously published in the London paper. The work of the reporters who transcribed Lord Rosebery's speeches involved significant intellectual labor and skill, bringing in elements of novelty and innovation. This kind of work requires much more skill than simply listing names and addresses in a directory for a PETITIONERS: translator to copyright. The petitioners drew parallels to printed lists of stock exchange rates and quotations, which were also considered literature and the subject of copyright. The discretion to decide on punctuation and to convey the reactions of the audience were also highlighted. The process of transcribing speeches was argued to be original work deserving of copyright protection under the Literary Copyright Act of 1842. The petitioner argued that Lord Rosebery is not the author of these speeches, as "Copyright is the right to multiply copies of a work already PETITIONERS: published," and in order to be the owner of the copyright, the author must have the original copy. The plaintiffs contended that the "author" of the reports of speeches is not the one who makes the speeches, but the one who first reduces them to writing. If he writes on behalf of another person, the law gives copyright to that other person. The defendant, John Lane, argued that the transcripts of public appearances are not copyrighted and that he has the right to copy those reports. The defence contended that the transcriptions of Lord Rosebery's speeches lacked the originality required for copyright protection, likening the act of reporting to a RESPONDENTS: mechanical operation similar to a phonograph. They claimed that reporters are not authors, but rather just copy from dictation. The defense maintained that since the speeches were delivered in public, they were in the public domain and not subject to copyright. According to the Copyright Act of 1842, newspapers are covered under section 18, but there is no copyright protection for plain news. This challenges the idea that hard work alone, without creativity, should be enough to establish copyright. The defense argued that the reporters' RESPONDENT skilled work did not turn the speeches into original “literary works” suitable for copyright. They also S pointed out that Lord Rosebery was the only potential ‘author’ and that he had presented the speeches to the public, as discussed in the court case Nicols v Pitman. The respondent's arguments and cited cases aimed to distinguish between transcription and authorship, asserting that the former does not automatically lead to the latter. The House of Lords ruled that reporters who transcribed speeches for The Times newspaper were considered authors under the Copyright Act of 1842. Their work, including decisions on punctuation and conveying audience RATIONALE: reactions, was considered an original work deserving of copyright protection. This ruling set the "originality" threshold for future copyright cases, affirming that intellectual skill and labor are protected by copyright law. The House of Lords ruled that the work of the reporters deserved copyright protection. They found that the reporters were authors under the KEY 1842 Act. The decision in Walter v Lane has OBSERVATION since been seen as the authority on the concept of originality in English copyright law. In the case of Walter v Lane, a legal principle was established stating that copyright does not depend on how "literary" or creative a work is. Instead, it focuses on whether the work required more than just basic writing skill. The reporters' transcriptions of Lord Rosebery's speeches were considered original enough for copyright because RATIO they involved intellectual effort beyond mere mechanical writing. This principle set the "originality" threshold for future copyright cases, affirming that the types of labour protected by copyright law include those that are products of editing, re-creation, preservation, conservation, or reconstruction where they are the result of intellectual skill and labour. 1. The Right of Reproduction 2. The Right of Distribution 3. Rental Right ECONOMIC 4. The Right of Public Performance RIGHTS: 5. Right to Communicate the Work to Public 6. Right of Adaptation and Translation LICENSING: The licensing of copyright involves a legal agreement between the copyright owner and the licensee. This agreement permits the licensee to use the copyrighted work in a specific way for a set period of time. In this scenario, the copyright owner gives the licensee a limited right to use the copyrighted work based on the terms outlined in the license agreement, in exchange for payment. The license can be absolute or non-exclusive and may include clauses that allow the licensee to make copies of the work or distribute it to others. A license agreement can be valid for a limited time or for the duration of copyright protection. ASSIGNMENT: An "assignment of copyright" is a legal agreement in which the owner of a copyright transfers some or all of their exclusive rights in the copyrighted work to another party. This transfer of ownership usually involves payment in exchange for the rights. The copyright assignment must be in writing and signed by the copyright owner. Licensing Assignment It is an agreement between the owner and the It means the transfer of ownership of copyright. licensee. The owner retains ownership of his work. The owner transfers the ownership of his work. The license can be exclusive or non-exclusive. The assignment must be exclusive. The licensee can use the work but cannot transfer it The assignee becomes the new owner. further. Generally, the owner gets royalty payments in Generally, the owner gets a lump sum payment in the licensing. assignment. The duration of the license can be fixed. The assignment is a permanent transfer. The owner has control over the work and can After an assignment, the owner has no control over the terminate it. work. Source: legalwindow.in University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press FACTS: The University of London chose two examiners, Professor Lodge and Mr. Jackson, for the matriculation exam, The condition for their appointment was that the copyright of the examination papers they created would belong to the University. Later, the University made an agreement with the University of London Press (Plaintiff), to transfer all copyrights owned by the University to the Plaintiff. After the exams, the University Tutorial Press (“Defendant”) published a collection of papers, which included the work of the two examiners, an answer key, and critiques of FACTS: how the question papers were prepared. The Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the Defendant for copyright infringement. As the legal proceedings unfolded, the two examiners were named as co-plaintiffs. Are examination papers considered 'literary works' under the meaning of the Act? Are the examination papers 'original'? ISSUES: Who owned the copyright in the examination papers after they were prepared? Did the Defendant infringe the copyright of the two examiners? Whether examination papers are ‘literary works’ under the meaning of the Act? The UK Copyright Act of 1911 provides copyright protection for "original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work." While the Act does not specifically define a literary work, it offers a non-exhaustive list of inclusions such as maps, charts, plans, tables, and ANALYSIS: compilations. Therefore, the quality or style of writing does not affect what constitutes a 'literary work' compared to 'literature'. According to the Act, any written or printed material can be considered a literary work. Based on these points, the Court concluded that examination papers, being in a printed form, could be classified as literary works under the meaning of the Act. Whether the examination papers are ‘original’? The court said that in copyright law, "originality" means expressing an idea or thought, not the idea or thought itself. The law doesn't require the expression to be completely new, but it must not be copied from another work and must come from ANALYSIS: the author. The two examiners used their judgment and expertise to create questions to test students' understanding of the syllabus. The questions were based on common knowledge but were not directly copied from any other source. Therefore, they were considered original and could be protected by copyright law. Who was the owner of the copyright subsisting in the examination papers after they had been prepared? The law specifies that the original creator of a work holds the copyright, unless they were under a contract of service. In this instance, the two examiners were under a contract for service and were the initial copyright owners. The employment contract required the two examiners to transfer ANALYSIS: their copyright to the University. In the absence of any specific assignment agreement, the copyright belonged to the two examiners, but the University had a fair claim to the copyright. By entering into a deed, the University transferred this fair claim over the copyright to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, the involvement of the two examiners as co- plaintiffs gave the Plaintiff the right to file a lawsuit for infringement, leading to the current legal action. Whether the Defendant University infringed the copyright of the two examiners? The concept of 'fair dealing' suggests that any copyrighted work can be used without permission as long as it is for the purposes stated in the Act. However, simply republishing copyrighted work for private study does not automatically qualify as fair dealing. In the specific case, the Defendants published papers originally released by the Plaintiff ANALYSIS: University. While the Defendants did include answers to two examination papers, they did not provide answers for the advanced papers. Additionally, the Defendants only published eleven lines criticizing the difficulty of the questions. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Defendants had used the Plaintiff’s work inappropriately and that it did not qualify as fair dealing. The court ruled in favour of Plaintiff for the examination papers created by two examiners - Professor Lodge and Mr Jackson. However, the lawsuit was unsuccessful regarding the other papers published by the Defendant Conclusion: University. The judgement established the "test of originality" that is still relevant today, and it clarified the difference between a "literary work" and "literature." Additionally, it clearly distinguished between the examination papers for which the Plaintiff held the copyright and those for which they did not, ruling only on that specific issue. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid “Work made for hire” WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY? The copyright in a work vests initially in the author or authors of the work. In the case of so-called "works made for hire," the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright FACTS The Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV") was a non-governmental organization which worked for the benefit of the homeless. They decided to participate in the Annual Christmas Pageant of Peace Exhibition in Washington D.C. by displaying a work that highlighted the plight of the homeless. The display would consist of a pedestal, a stream gate, and three life-size structures of black men, named "The Third-world America". CCNV hired a sculptor named Reid to create the life-size structures. They entered into a contract where CCNV would pay Reid for the expenses amounting to $15,000, and Reid would deliver the structures by December 6, 1985. FACTS: Reid did not charge for his services. CCNV provided suggestions to Reid regarding the structures, and he made changes to accommodate their requests. With the help of an assistant, Reid delivered the structures made from a bronze look-alike material on time. CCNV proceeded to pay him $15,000. CCNV secured the pedestal and the stream gate from another contractor. FACTS: After the exhibition, CCNV sent the structures back to Reid for repairs as the feet were damaged. In 1986, they intended to take the structures on an awareness tour across the country. Reid objected, stating that the material was too delicate. He refused to return the structures and filed for copyright registration. He also decided to take the structures for another exhibition and a less-ambitious tour. CCNV then filed a competing copyright application. PROCEEDINGS: The petitioners commenced this litigation against the respondent, seeking the return of the sculpture and a determination of copyright ownership. The District Court held that the structures were “work made for hire” and hence, CCNV owned them. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the District Court and held that Reid was an independent contractor and not an employee. Hence, third-world America is not a work made for hire. SUPREME COURT: While determining whether a work is a work made for hire, common law agency principles should be applied. The court set out 11 factors that would help one determine the relationship between the hiring party and the hired party. 11 FACTORS the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; 11 FACTORS the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. HELD: Based on these factors, the court concluded that Reid was an independent contractor. Reid provided his own tools, worked without extensive supervision, and had the freedom to meet his deadlines in the way he saw fit. CCNV was unable to assign more projects to Reid, and paid him in the typical manner for independent contractors. MORAL RIGHTS: Right of Paternity/Attribution Right of Integrity They are best described as the The moral rights of the author spiritual connection that binds a are the essence of their work. creator to their creation. WHAT IS A MORAL The author has the right to In India, moral rights are preserve, protect, and nurture protected by the Copyright Act RIGHT OF AN their creations through their under the concept of Author’s AUTHOR? moral rights. Special Rights. Moral rights are separate from economic rights and remain with the author even after they This means that these rights have transferred all their cannot be transferred and economic rights to someone always remain with the author. else through a license or assignment. The right of paternity is essentially the right of an author to claim authorship of their work and have it attributed to them. It is the right of an author to be identified whenever a work is published, performed, or broadcast. This means authors, scriptwriters, playwrights, painters, sculptors, illustrators, and translators must be properly credited for their works. WHAT ARE THE MORAL RIGHTS? The law gives authors the right to object to any distortion, mutilation, modification, or any other act that could harm their honor or reputation. The phrase "other act" is similar in nature to the words "distortion" and "mutilation." However, merely failing to display a work at all, or not displaying it to the satisfaction of the author, does not constitute an infringement of the right of integrity. Mannu Bhandari v. Kala Vikas Pictures Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. AMARNATH SEHGAL V. UNION OF INDIA FACTS: Amarnath Sehgal, a prominent sculptor, was commissioned by the Indian Government to create a mural for the Vigyan Bhavan. The intricate piece took five years to complete and was unveiled in 1962. However, during renovations, the Government decided to remove the mural without notifying or seeking authorization from Amarnath. As a result, the mural suffered some damage due to mishandling and negligence. In response, Amarnath filed a lawsuit against the Government, alleging mistreatment of his artwork and a violation of his moral rights. ISSUE: Whether the author had rights over his work post-sale under moral rights provisions? HELD: The court affirmed that an author's moral rights are fundamental to their work and cannot be forfeited, even after the work is sold. It held that the destruction or mutilation of the work constitutes a violation of the author's moral rights. The government contended that once a sale is finalized and adequate consideration is received, it has the authority to use the work as it deems appropriate, including the decision to remove it from public display. However, the court rejected this argument and stressed that the defacement and partial destruction of the mural was detrimental to the author's reputation, irrespective of ownership. Consequently, the author was granted a compensation of Rs. 5,00,000, and it was ruled that the remaining mural be handed over to Amarnath for restoration and subsequent sale. IMPORTANCE: The case established the interpretation of moral rights. The Court also allowed special reliefs not seen before, such as returning the copyrighted work to the author. This case set the tone for future interpretations of moral rights and the residual rights of an author. EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT FAIR USE Copyright law aims to protect the interests of creators and their unique works. Using an original work requires the creator's prior permission, but there are exceptions, such as fair use and fair dealing. Fair use allows for limited use of copyrighted material without needing the copyright holder's approval, provided it adds value to the original piece. In India, INTRODUCTION "fair use" and "fair dealing" are synonymous. The scope of fair use is broad and subjective, whereas fair dealing is restricted to specific exceptions outlined by the law. Under the Copyright Act, 1957, certain acts do not amount to infringement of copyright. Some of the exceptions are as follows: 1. A fair dealing with any creation, not being a computer programme, for the purpose of- i. Private or personal use, including research; ii. Criticism or review, whether of the work or any other work; THE iii. Covering current affairs and current events, including the coverage of a lecture given in public. COPYRIGHT 2. The reading or recitation in public of reasonable extracts from an ACT, 1957 already published literary or dramatic work; 3. Reproducing any research work or private study with the motive of publication of an unpublished literary, dramatic, or musical work kept in a library, museum, or other institution that is accessible to the public at large. 4. The production or publication of any Act or set of rules or orders in a language that is not already translated in or published, or produced by the Government. CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC The Case of Parody https://youtu.be/3KFvoDDs0XM?si=B https://youtu.be/rMqnPVU207M?si= EQZJKLsQzTlgkt0 Jr_TbOb_I7q_qYUb In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad called “Oh, Pretty Woman” and assigned their rights to respondent Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which registered the song for copyright protection. Petitioners 2 Live Crew, a popular rap music group, wrote a song entitled “Pretty Woman” in 1989. Campbell described the song as intended to satirize the FACTS original work. When 2 Live Crew's manager informed Acuff- Rose of the parody, offering credit and payment, Acuff-Rose refused permission for the use of a parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Despite the refusal, 2 Live Crew released the song in a collection of songs entitled “As Clean As They Wanna Be,” explicitly identifying the authors of “Pretty Woman” as Orbison and Dees, and its publisher as Acuff-Rose. Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recording had been sold, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew and its record company, Luke Skyywalker Records, for copyright infringement. The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, reasoning that the commercial purpose of 2 FACTS Live Crew’s song was no bar to fair use and that it was "extremely unlikely that 2 Live Crew’s song could adversely affect the market for the original." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, emphasizing that every commercial use is presumptively unfair, and concluding that its "blatantly commercial purpose prevents this parody from being a fair use." When determining whether the use of a work is considered fair use, there are several factors to consider: 1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether it COURT OF APPEAL is for commercial or non-profit educational purposes. THROUGH 2. The nature of the copyrighted work. CERTIORARI 3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The first factor in determining fair use considers the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is commercial or for nonprofit educational purposes. The goal of copyright is to promote science and the arts, and this is generally accomplished through the creation of transformative works. The more transformative the new work, the less other factors, like commercialism, will weigh against a finding of fair use. REASONING Parody can provide social benefit by shedding light on an earlier work and creating a new one. Parody, like other forms of criticism, may claim fair use and may reasonably be perceived as commenting on or criticizing the original work. The second statutory factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work," is not much help in parody cases, as parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works. The third factor asks whether "the amount and substantiality of the portion used" is reasonable in relation to the REASONING copyrighted work as a whole. In the case of parody, context is crucial, and it is essential to consider what else the parodist did besides closely copying the original work. The fourth fair use factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," requires courts to consider whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential REASONING market for the original. Parodies and original works usually serve different market functions, and it is more likely that the new work will not affect the market for the original. While a parody may harm the market for the original to some extent, when a parody aims at destroying the original commercially as well as artistically, it does not produce a harm CONCLUSION cognizable under the Copyright Act. CCH CANADIAN V. LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA FAIR DEALING? FACTS The Law Society operates the Great Library at Osgoode Hall in Toronto, which is a reference and research library with a large collection of legal materials. The library offers a photocopy service for Law Society members, the judiciary, and other authorized researchers. Legal materials can be reproduced by Great Library staff and delivered in person, by mail, or by fax upon request. Additionally, the Law Society provides self-service photocopiers in the Great Library for patrons to use. In 1993, publishers initiated copyright infringement actions against the Law Society, claiming ownership of copyright in 11 specific works and alleging that the Law Society had infringed copyright by reproducing copies of the works. FACTS The publishers sought a permanent injunction to prevent the Law Society from reproducing these works and any other works published by them. In its defence, the Law Society maintained that its services were essential for ensuring everyone had equal access to the library’s legal materials collection. Due to many materials in the library being non- circulating, accessing the original copies is challenging for individuals not working in the vicinity. Consequently, the Law Society sought a legal declaration affirming that its practices, whether it involved making a single copy of a document or enabling patrons to use self- service photocopiers, did not violate the copyright laws of the publishers. FACTS The Federal Court, Trial Division partially sided with the publishers, finding that the Law Society had infringed copyright in certain works and dismissing the Law Society’s counterclaim. The publishers appealed, and the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in their favour, holding that all of the works were original and covered by copyright and dismissing the Law Society’s cross-appeal. ISSUES 1. Did the Library authorise copyright infringement by maintaining self-service photocopiers and copies of the publishers' works for its patrons' use? 2. Were the law society's dealings with the publishers' works "fair dealings" under s.29 of the Copyright Act? REASONING There is no evidence that the copiers were used in a manner inconsistent with copyright law. The court held that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that LSUC's posting of the notice constitutes an express acknowledgement that copiers will be used in an illegal manner. LSUC lacks sufficient control over the works a patron chooses to copy, the purposes for copying, or the photocopiers themselves. LSUC does not have to prove that people who use copiers or take advantage of the custom photocopy service have done so in accordance with the law; the burden of proof rests on CCH (which can rely on the fair dealing exception). REASONING Fair dealing is considered to be an essential part of the Copyright Act, rather than just a defense. The fair dealing exceptions are seen as a right for users and must be balanced against the rights of copyright owners. To claim fair dealing, the defendant must demonstrate that: 1) the dealing was for the purpose of research or private study, and 2) it was fair. The court emphasized that "research" should be broadly interpreted to ensure that users' rights are not overly restricted. Therefore, it is not limited to private and non-commercial contexts. In this case, the library made the copies for research purposes. REASONING In order to demonstrate that a dealing was fair under section 29 of the Copyright Act, the defendant must prove the following: 1. The purpose of the dealing 2. The character of the dealing 3. The amount of the dealing 4. Alternatives to the dealing 5. The nature of the work 6. The effect of the dealing on the work HELD Based on these factors and the facts, the Supreme Court determined that the library was acting fairly, considering the restrictions imposed by the Law Society for copying materials. The court also found that the library could establish fair dealing based on its general practice, and was not obligated to prove that all patrons used the material fairly. THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS & SCHOLARS OF UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AND ORS. VS. RAMESHWARI PHOTOCOPY SERVICES AND ORS. THE DU PHOTOCOPY CASE BACKGROUND In August 2012, a legal case was initiated at the Delhi High Court by leading book publishers, Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, and the Taylor & Francis Group (collectively referred to as "Plaintiff-Publishers"). They sought a permanent injunction against copyright violation by the University of Delhi ("Delhi University" or "Defendant No. 2") and Rameshwari Photocopy Service ("Defendant No. 1"), a photocopy shop licensed by the university. The Plaintiff-Publishers accused both defendants of copying large portions of their copyrighted texts, which were included in the curriculum, and distributing these copies as unauthorized compilations or anthologies in what are known as course packs. This, they alleged, infringed upon their copyright under Section 51 of the Copyright Act. They further suggested that Delhi University should obtain a license from the Indian Reprographic Rights Organization (IRRO), a society that oversees copyright permissions under the Act. BACKGROUND The suit's initial hearing on August 14, 2012, led to the court appointing a Local Commissioner to enter the premises of Defendant No. 1 unannounced, to seize and list all copies made from the Plaintiff-Publishers’ materials. The Defendants then challenged the case, arguing their reproduction of the materials was legitimate under the provisions of sections 52(1) of the Act, citing fair use and thus not constituting copyright infringement. SINGLE BENCH’S JUDGMENT On September 16, 2016, Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw dismissed the entire lawsuit of the plaintiffs. He concluded that the actions of the defendants did not amount to copyright infringement. He relied on Section 52(1)(i) of the Act, which states that reproducing a copyrighted work by a teacher or pupil during instruction does not constitute copyright infringement. KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DECISION: 1. Copyright is a statutory right, not a natural or divine right. 2. Section 52 should be seen as a full defense in favor of educational institutions and students, not just a narrow exception. 3. The term "teacher" in Section 52(1)(i) includes educational institutions as a whole, not just individual teachers. 4. The word "instruction" in section 52(1)(i) encompasses activities beyond classroom lectures, such as the reproduction of works for creating and distributing course packs. 5. Section 52(1)(i) covers reproduction by an educational institution throughout the academic session, not just in classrooms or tutorials. 6. Reproduction of pages from books by students for private use, whether by photocopying, copying by hand, or taking photographs, does not infringe copyright. Therefore, the university's photocopying of the same pages for students due to resource constraints is also not infringement. 7. The method or location of producing course packs by a university does not change the conclusion that it does not constitute infringement. 8. Since the defendants' actions were covered under Section 52(1)(i) of the Act, there is no need to pay any licensing fees to IRRO. APPEAL On October 5, 2016, the Plaintiff-Publishers filed an appeal against this decision before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The court admitted the appeal on October 6 but refused to grant an interim injunction against Defendant No. 1 that the Plaintiff-Publishers prayed for. However, it directed the Defendants to maintain a record of photocopied course packs sold. DIVISION BENCH’S JUDGMENT On December 9, 2016, the Division Bench, comprising Justices Pradeep Nandrajog and Yogesh Khanna, decided the appeal. They refused to grant an interim injunction to the plaintiff-publishers. The ruling emphasized that making and distributing course packs to students is not considered copyright infringement as long as the inclusion of the photocopied works, regardless of quantity, is justified by the purpose of educational instruction. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: The court notably mentioned that the fairness of use under this clause should be based on the purpose of the use, which is education, rather than its quantitative or qualitative extent. It also clarified that the fair dealing standard is only specified in clause (a) of Section 52(1) and cannot be applied to other clauses, including clause (i). Therefore, the Division Bench's judgment clearly stated that the use of a copyrighted work under Section 52(1)(i) should be evaluated based on whether the work used was necessary for achieving the purpose of educational instruction. This evaluation should not be dependent on whether only a certain percentage of the work or the entire work was used. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: The court dismissed the publishers' argument that creating and distributing course packs without authorization would harm or is likely to harm the market for their books. It noted that students who use the course packs are not potential buyers of the various books included in the packs. Additionally, it mentioned that if course packs weren't available, students would likely access these books in the library. Importantly, the court also stated that improved education could actually increase the market for these books. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: The court then proceeded to interpret Section 52(1)(i), which was the central issue in the case. It determined that the term 'reproduction', which means 'making a copy of', also includes its plural form, i.e., making more than one copy of the original or photocopying. Similarly, it concluded that the words ‘teacher’ and ‘student’ also include ‘teachers’ and ‘students’, indicating that making multiple copies of a work by teachers or students is allowed under this provision. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: The court addressed the contested interpretation of the phrase "in the course of instruction." It agreed with the respondents that regardless of whether the word "course" is read as a verb or a noun, the phrase refers to the entire educational process in a semester, rather than just the classroom teaching. The court acknowledged that teaching involves more than just lecturing and note- taking, but also interactive discussions based on pre-reads, regulated by the teacher. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: It rejected the argument that the issue of course packs in this case amounted to publication on the basis that publication requires an element of profit, which was absent in this case. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: The court addressed the publishers' argument that only a teacher or a student could reproduce works under Section 52(1)(i) and not an intermediary, such as a photocopier. The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not practical for teachers or students to purchase photocopiers and make copies of literary works for classroom instruction. It also noted that the photocopier in question was not making any extra profit beyond standard photocopying fees. Therefore, the court found the argument against using a photocopier or similar service to be irrelevant. THE KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JUDGEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: The court rejected the publishers' argument that Section 52(1)(i) was not applicable to educational institutions, but only to an individual teacher. The Single Judge had held that this provision was available to educational institutions, including DU. The Division Bench did not address this question. Instead, it stated that there was no institutional approval for photocopying in this case, as DU's role was limited to designing the course curriculum, and it was the individual teacher or teachers who selected the copyrighted works for the course packs. In summary, the Division Bench found that the course packs in this case were created and distributed by the teachers, not DU, and thus fell within the scope of Section 52(1)(i). HELD The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench, concluding that according to Section 52(1)(i), unauthorized preparation and distribution of course packs to students is allowed if the included works are essential for the educational instructions. The case was sent back to the trial court for factual determination of whether the works included in the course packs were necessary for educational purposes. AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE INC. FACTS: In 2004, Google launched the Google Books project, aiming to digitize and create a searchable database of books. To do so, Google scanned millions of books, including those still under copyright, without first obtaining permission from the authors or publishers. The Authors Guild, representing authors whose works had been scanned, sued Google, claiming that the project infringed their copyright and that the scanning of their works without permission violated copyright law. Google, in response, argued that its project constituted fair use, providing a valuable public service by making books more searchable and accessible. Did Google's unauthorized scanning and digitization of copyrighted books for its Google Books project constitute copyright infringement, or was it protected under the ISSUE: doctrine of fair use? The case primarily hinged on the interpretation of the U.S. Copyright Act particularly the doctrine of fair use, which allows limited use of copyrighted material without permission for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. The four factors of fair use include: 1. The purpose and character of the use. 2. The nature of the copyrighted work. LAW: 3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used. 4. The effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 1. Purpose and character of use: The court noted that Google's use was transformative, as it did not provide full access to the books but allowed users to search for terms and view only snippets. Google was not using the works in the traditional sense but was providing a research tool that significantly enhanced public access to knowledge. APPLICATION : 2. Nature of the copyrighted work: While many of the works were creative, the court found this factor less significant in the overall determination because Google was not using the creative elements of the works but merely indexing them for search purposes. 3. Amount and substantiality of the portion used: Google scanned entire books, but users could only view small snippets, meaning the use of the material was limited from the perspective of the end user. 4. Effect on the market: The court found that Google's actions did not harm the market for APPLICATION the authors' books. In fact, by making the books more discoverable, Google Books could potentially increase sales by directing users to places where they could purchase the full works. The court ruled in favor of Google, holding that its scanning of books and display of snippets constituted fair use under U.S. copyright law. The decision allowed Google Books to continue its digitization project, emphasizing the transformative nature of the use and the public benefit of increased access to knowledge. CONCLUSION The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, and in 2016, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, leaving the decision in Google's favor intact. The doctrine of first sale in copyright law (also known as copyright exhaustion) is a legal concept that limits the rights of a copyright owner once a lawfully made copy of a copyrighted work has been sold or otherwise transferred. Once the copyright holder sells or transfers ownership of a particular copy of their work, they "exhaust" their exclusive rights over that specific copy. The buyer is free to resell, lend, or give away that copy DOCTRINE OF without further permission from the copyright owner. FIRST SALE This doctrine promotes the free flow of goods and ensures that owners of legally obtained copies of works can use them freely. However, this right typically applies only to the distribution rights of the particular copy, and it does not permit the buyer to reproduce or create derivative works. Applies after the first authorized sale of a copyrighted item. The new owner can resell, lend, or give away the physical copy. Does not allow the new owner to make copies or create derivative works. KEY POINTS Mainly applies to physical goods (books, CDs, DVDs) and not digital content, since digital copies involve the process of reproduction, which is outside the bounds of the first sale doctrine. If you purchase a book, you can resell it at a garage sale, lend it to a friend, or donate it to a library. However, you cannot photocopy the EXAMPLE: entire book and sell those copies because making additional copies would violate the copyright owner's reproduction right. The concept of exhaustion of rights is closely related to the doctrine of first sale and operates in the same way. It means that once a copyright owner authorizes the sale of a copy EXHAUSTION of their work in a specific market (e.g., a OF RIGHTS national or regional market), their distribution rights over that specific copy are considered exhausted. This typically applies to tangible goods like books, DVDs, and software. If you legally buy a DVD, the doctrine of exhaustion means that you can resell or lend EXAMPLE: that DVD without needing permission from the copyright holder. Intermediary liability in copyright infringement refers to the legal responsibility of intermediaries—such as internet service providers (ISPs), hosting platforms, or social media networks—for unlawful activities, INTERMEDIARY including copyright infringement, that occur LIABILITY IN through their services. Intermediaries typically COPYRIGHT provide platforms or infrastructure through which third parties can share, distribute, or access content. The key question is whether and to what extent these intermediaries are liable for infringing content posted by users or others. SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS: Many jurisdictions provide "safe harbor" protections to intermediaries, exempting them from liability for third-party actions under certain conditions. These provisions allow intermediaries to avoid liability if they meet specific criteria, such as: Lack of Knowledge: The intermediary has no knowledge of the infringing activity. No Active Role: The intermediary does not play an active role in promoting or managing the infringing activity. Take-Down Procedures: Upon becoming aware of the infringing activity (through notices like DMCA takedown requests in the U.S.), the intermediary acts promptly to remove or disable access to the infringing material. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. vs. MySpace Inc. & Another FACTS: Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. (SCIL), a major player in the Indian music industry and owner of the T-Series music label, filed a lawsuit against MySpace Inc., a U.S.-based social networking website. The core issue revolved around MySpace users uploading copyrighted content owned by SCIL on the platform without permission. SCIL alleged that MySpace was not taking adequate measures to prevent such infringements, despite notifications, and sought to hold MySpace liable for hosting and displaying the infringing content. ISSUE: The primary issue was whether MySpace, as an intermediary or host platform, could be held liable for copyright infringements committed by its users under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, and whether the protection offered to intermediaries under Section 79 of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, applied to MySpace in this case. LAW: 1. Copyright Act, 1957 (India): Governs the protection of original works, including music, literary works, and other forms of intellectual property. It defines copyright infringement and provides legal remedies for copyright owners. 2. Information Technology Act, 2000 (Section 79): Offers protection to intermediaries (online platforms) from liability for third-party content, provided they act as neutral conduits and comply with legal obligations, such as removing infringing content upon notice. 3. Doctrine of Safe Harbor: Under Section 79 of the IT Act, intermediaries are not liable for third- party content unless they fail to take down infringing content after receiving actual notice of it. SCIL contended that MySpace failed to adequately prevent or take action against the repeated infringement of its copyrighted works. SCIL also argued that MySpace could not be considered a neutral intermediary because the platform was making content available to users and allowing third parties to upload copyrighted works without SCIL’s consent. APPLICATION MySpace, on the other hand, invoked the safe harbor provisions under Section 79 of the IT Act, asserting that it was merely a platform that facilitated user interaction and was not directly involved in the copyright infringement. MySpace also claimed that it had a mechanism in place to take down infringing content when notified. The court ultimately held that MySpace was not entitled to the safe harbor protection under Section 79 of the IT Act because it was found that the platform had not taken adequate measures to prevent copyright infringement, CONCLUSION despite being notified by SCIL multiple times. MySpace was ordered to pay damages and was required to implement stronger mechanisms to prevent future copyright violations on its platform. SUBAFILMS LTD. V. MGM/PATHE COMMUNICATIONS CO. Subafilms Ltd., the copyright holder of the movie Yellow Submarine, entered into an agreement with MGM/Pathe Communications for the distribution of the film. MGM licensed the movie for videocassette distribution within the United States. Later, MGM sublicensed the film to a FACTS: company for distribution outside the U.S., specifically for videocassette sales in foreign markets. Subafilms objected to this sublicensing arrangement and filed suit, alleging that MGM had violated their copyright by authorizing unauthorised reproduction of the film in foreign markets. Does the U.S. Copyright Act provide protection against acts of ISSUE: infringement that occur entirely outside of the United States, even when those acts are authorized from within the U.S.? The extraterritoriality doctrine, under U.S. copyright law, generally limits the protection of copyright to acts of infringement that occur within the United States. LAW: Section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act gives copyright holders certain exclusive rights, but it does not explicitly extend these rights to foreign countries unless there is an applicable treaty or international agreement. The court held that although MGM authorized the reproduction of the copyrighted material from within the U.S., the actual acts of infringement (distribution and reproduction) occurred outside the United States. Applying the extraterritoriality doctrine, the court ruled that APPLICATION: U.S. copyright law does not cover acts of infringement that take place entirely outside the United States, even if the authorization for those acts was given from within the U.S. The court emphasized that Congress did not intend for the Copyright Act to apply extraterritorially without explicit language to that effect. CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the U.S. Copyright Act does not extend to acts of copyright infringement occurring outside of the United States, even if authorized from within the U.S. The ruling was in favour of MGM, affirming that Subafilms had no grounds for their claim under U.S. copyright law for foreign infringement. NICHOLS V. UNIVERSAL PICTURES CORP. FACTS: Plaintiff, Anne Nichols, was the author of the play "Abie's Irish Rose," which depicted the marriage of a Jewish man and an Irish Catholic woman, and the subsequent conflict between their families. Nichols claimed that Universal Pictures Corporation's film "The Cohens and the Kellys" infringed on the copyright of her play by copying the general theme of an interfaith marriage and the resulting familial discord. Nichols argued that the characters, plot, and basic conflicts of her work were copied. ISSUE: Did Universal Pictures Corporation's film "The Cohens and the Kellys" infringe upon the copyright of Nichols’ play "Abie's Irish Rose" by copying the general themes of interfaith marriage and family conflict? LAW: Copyright Law: To constitute copyright infringement, there must be substantial similarity between the original and the allegedly infringing work. Courts will examine whether protectable elements, including specific expressions, characters, and sequences of events, have been copied, as opposed to unprotectable ideas, themes, or general storylines. Scenes à faire doctrine: Under copyright law, elements that are common in certain types of stories, such as stock characters or typical plot situations, are not protected. APPLICATION: The court analyzed the two works and determined that while both dealt with the idea of interfaith marriage and family conflict, these were general themes or ideas that were not subject to copyright protection. The court held that copyright law protects specific expressions of ideas, not the ideas themselves. APPLICATION: Judge Learned Hand explained that similarities between the works were at the level of unprotectable generalities or “scenes à faire,” which are standard or commonplace elements that arise from the subject matter itself. He concluded that the characters in Abie’s Irish Rose were not sufficiently delineated or unique to be protected by copyright, and the overall similarity was based on a common idea, not a substantial copying of protectable expression. CONCLUSION: The court ruled in favor of Universal Pictures Corporation, finding that no copyright infringement had occurred. The judgment emphasized that copyright law does not protect general ideas or themes, but only specific expressions of those ideas. The similarities between the works were too general to be actionable under copyright law.
