Constitutional Law Reviewer PDF

1. Definitions and Concepts Political law -branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the state -defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory Constitutional law -branch of political law that treats the nature of constitutions, their establishment, construction, and interpretation, and the validity of the enactments in conformity with the fundamental law. -Interprets and applies the constitution, Defines the structure of the government, Outlines the powers of the government's branches, and Defines the rights of the people Constitution: -Cooley’s Definition: Body of rules and maxims with which the powers of the sovereignty are habitually exercised. -set of fundamental principles that establish how a country is governed, It defines the structure of the government, the powers of its branches, and the rights of its citizens Administrative law -branch of law that governs the creation, operation, and activities of government agencies. It also regulates the relationship between government agencies, the public, and other government bodies Law of Public Officers -a field of public law that covers the qualifications, appointment, duties, and termination of public officials. Law on Public Corporations -is covered by the Revised Corporation Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 11232). This law governs the establishment, management, and administration of public corporations Election Law -branch of public law that governs the election of representatives and office holders, and referendums, through the regulation of the electoral system 2. Constitutional Interpretation: -Verba Legis: words used in the constitution must be given their ordinary meaning -Ratio Legis anima: where there is ambiguity. The words of the constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers -Ut magis valeat quam pereat: The constitution is to be interepreted as a whole -Constitutional provisions must be harmonized, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative 3. Supremacy of the constitution -is the principle that the Constitution is the highest law in the land and all other laws must conform to it. This means that any law, action, or policy that goes against the Constitution is invalid 4. Self-executing v Non-self executing -A self-executing provision is one that is enforceable and operative by itself even in the absence of enabling legislation. -Non self-executing is unenforceable without the existence of an implementing law passed by the Congress Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sought to sell 30% to 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) through public bidding. The winning bidder was expected to provide management expertise, an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support. Two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. Manila Prince Hotel bid P41.58 per share for 51% of MHC, while Renong Berhad bid P44.00 per share. The bidding rules stated the highest bidder would be declared the winner after contract execution and approvals. Before Renong Berhad was declared the winner, Manila Prince Hotel matched the P44.00 bid. GSIS refused to accept the matching bid from Manila Prince Hotel. Manila Prince Hotel filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, invoking the Filipino First Policy of the 1987 Constitution. The court issued a temporary restraining order, preventing the sale to the Malaysian firm. Issues: Is the Filipino First Policy in the 1987 Constitution self-executing, or does it require implementing legislation? Do the 51% shares of MHC fall under the national economy and patrimony as defined by the Constitution? Is the Manila Hotel, a historical landmark, part of the national patrimony? Does the Filipino First Policy apply to the sale of 51% of MHC shares, even if it is not a sale of the hotel or land? Should the bidding rules incorporate the Filipino First Policy? Was GSIS's refusal to accept Manila Prince Hotel's matching bid a grave abuse of discretion? Does the Filipino First Policy apply to corporations with at least 60% Filipino ownership? Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the Filipino First Policy is self-executing and needs no implementing legislation. The Court found that Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, including not only natural resources, but also the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. The Court determined that 51% of MHC's equity falls under the Filipino First Policy as it gives control and management of the hotel. The Court clarified that the Filipino First Policy applies to corporations at least 60% owned by Filipinos. The Court held that bidding rules must adhere to the Constitution, including the Filipino First Policy. The Court concluded that GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing Manila Prince Hotel's matching bid. The Court ordered the respondents to halt the sale to Renong Berhad and accept Manila Prince Hotel's bid. The Court emphasized that the Filipino First Policy should be enforced whenever the Constitution mandates it, while also encouraging foreign investment. The Court stressed that the Constitution is the supreme law and that all laws and contracts must conform to it. In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the Filipino First Policy, declaring it self-executing and applicable to the sale of 51% of Manila Hotel Corporation. The Court stressed the importance of national patrimony, the role of the Manila Hotel, and the need for government actions to align with the Constitution. The ruling ensures that qualified Filipinos are given preference in transactions involving the national economy and patrimony, aligning with the spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Macariola v Asuncion Facts: Bernardita R. Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte for "acts unbecoming a judge". The case stemmed from a civil case (No. 3010) involving a partition of properties among the heirs of Francisco Reyes, which Judge Asuncion presided over. In the partition case, Mrs. Macariola, one of the heirs, made several claims, including that one of the plaintiffs was not a legal heir, that certain properties were conjugal and should be divided, and that she was the sole heir of her mother, the first wife of Francisco Reyes. Judge Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 3010 that declared the legal heirs, identified the conjugal properties of Francisco Reyes with his two wives, and specified the share of each heir. A project of partition was submitted and approved by Judge Asuncion, despite not being signed by the parties but only their counsels. The project of partition allocated specific properties to different heirs. Lot 1184, which was part of the estate, was subdivided to Lot 1184 A-E. Lot 1184-D was conveyed to a court stenographer and Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon, who then sold a portion of it to Judge Asuncion and his wife. The Asuncions and Dr. Galapon later sold their shares in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.," where Judge Asuncion was president and his wife was the secretary. Macariola filed a complaint alleging that Judge Asuncion violated the law by purchasing a portion of Lot 1184-E, associating himself with a business while being a judge, and other charges. A subsequent civil case (No. 4234) was filed by Macariola seeking to annul the project of partition and conveyances, which was eventually dismissed against Judge Asuncion and other parties. Issues: Did Judge Asuncion violate Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code by purchasing a portion of Lot No. 1184-E, which was involved in Civil Case No. 3010?. Did Judge Asuncion violate Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and other rules by associating himself with a business while being a judge?. Ruling: Regarding the purchase of Lot 1184-E: The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Asuncion did not violate Article 1491 of the New Civil Code because the purchase occurred after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the approval of the project of partition. The prohibition applies only to sales during the pendency of litigation. The Court also found that Judge Asuncion did not purchase the lot directly from the parties in the case, but from a third party, Dr. Galapon. The Court found no evidence to suggest that Dr. Galapon was a "dummy" for Judge Asuncion. Regarding Judge Asuncion's involvement in "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.": The Court determined that Article 14 of the Code of Commerce, which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce, was abrogated upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States. The Court also ruled that Judge Asuncion did not violate the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because his participation in the business did not involve his official capacity as a judge. The Court did note the impropriety of a judge engaging in business and that it is not allowed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics but it also noted that the Judge and his wife sold their interest in the company shortly after its formation, which they considered as a sign that he realized his mistake. Regarding the "impostor" claim: The Court agreed with the Investigating Justice that there was no reason to disbelieve that Judge Asuncion did not know that Dominador Arigpa Tan was not a lawyer. The court also stated that "friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge". Regarding the project of partition: The court acknowledged that Judge Asuncion should have required the parties' signatures on the project of partition but that this error was done in good faith. The court found that Mrs. Macariola was aware of the contents of the project of partition and that she gave her conformity to it as she sold a portion of land that she received from the project of partition. The Court found no evidence to support Macariola's claim that the properties adjudicated to her were "insignificant lots and the least valuable". Overall Ruling: While the Court found no violation of law, it reminded Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his private and business activities, as his conduct must always be above suspicion. The Court also stated that his actions "gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice". In summary, while Judge Asuncion was not found to have violated any specific laws, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity and appearance of propriety in the judiciary. The Court focused on the fact that the purchase of the property happened after the finality of the decision and that Judge Asuncion did not engage in any transaction that had anything to do with his position as judge. However, the Court stated that the transactions caused suspicion and that judges should be more cautious to avoid these circumstances. ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional convention. Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. Section 4.Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. RA 6735 August 4, 1989 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR 1. Requisites for a Valid People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution: Signatories: A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories. Representation by Legislative District: Every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters in that district. Frequency: Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. Petition Content: The petition must state the following: ○ The contents or text of the proposed amendment. ○ The proposition. ○ The reason or reasons for the proposed amendment. ○ A declaration that it is not one of the exceptions provided in the Act. ○ Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters. ○ An abstract or summary of not more than one hundred (100) words, legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. Registration with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC): The petition must be registered with the COMELEC. Verification of Signatures: The Election Registrar will verify the signatures against the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. Publication: The COMELEC must publish the petition in both Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation. Date of Initiative: The date of the initiative should be set not earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition. Approval: The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution must be approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite to become effective. Special Registration: The COMELEC shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative. Prohibited Measures: A petition cannot embrace more than one subject. 2. Distinction between "Revision" and "Amendment" of the Constitution: Mabanag v Lopez Vito Facts: This case involves a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution proposing an amendment to the Philippine Constitution. The petitioners are senators, representatives, and presidents of political parties. The respondents are members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The core issue revolves around whether the resolution proposing an amendment was passed with the required three-fourths vote of all members of Congress, as mandated by Article XV of the Constitution. Three senators and eight representatives were not allowed to participate in the vote and were not counted toward the required three-fourths majority. These members had been proclaimed as elected but were suspended or not allowed to sit in Congress due to alleged irregularities in their election. If these members had been counted, the affirmative votes for the proposed amendment would have fallen short of the necessary three-fourths in either branch of Congress. The resolution proposed an amendment to the Constitution regarding parity rights for Americans in the Philippines, allowing them equal rights as Filipinos in the ownership and cultivation of public lands, exploitation of natural resources, and operation of public utilities. Republic Act No. 73 was enacted to submit the proposed amendment to the people for approval. The presiding officers of both houses certified that the resolution was adopted by three-fourths of all members of each house. The petitioners contend that this certification is false. The respondents argue that the court cannot go behind the certification, relying on the "enrolled bill rule," which holds that a duly authenticated bill or resolution is conclusive proof of its passage. A stipulation of facts was submitted which details the election, proclamation and suspension of the senators. Issues: Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the validity of a congressional resolution proposing a constitutional amendment, or is it a political question that is not justiciable? Ruling: Jurisdiction: The court acknowledged that the amending process is political in nature, but that the question of whether the process was followed is a judicial one. The Court rejected the argument that the judiciary is barred from reviewing the actions of the legislative branch. It found that the judiciary has the power to determine if the Constitution has been complied with. Conclusiveness of the Certification: The court ruled against the "enrolled bill rule" as applied in this case. Instead, the court held that it is proper to look into the journals of Congress to verify the actual proceedings and determine if the resolution was passed in accordance with the constitutional requirements. The court pointed out that the certification of the presiding officers is not conclusive, especially when it is proven to be false. Validity of the Amendment: The court concluded that the proposed amendment was not validly adopted because the three-fourths vote was not obtained in both houses of Congress, since the suspended members were not counted. The Court pointed out that the Constitution requires the votes of three-fourths of all members, whether or not those members were allowed to participate in the voting process. Enrolled Bill vs. Journal Entry Rule: The court favored the "journal entry rule," holding that the journals of the legislative houses are the primary evidence of the proceedings and can be used to impeach the enrolled bill or resolution. The court found that the "journal entry rule" is more consistent with the principles of democracy and transparency. Membership in Congress: The court stated that the suspended members were still considered members of Congress for the purpose of computing the three-fourths vote requirement. Standing: The court determined that the senators and representatives had sufficient interest to bring the action because they are duty-bound to uphold the Constitution. The court also found that the presidents of the political parties had standing since they represent a large portion of the population. The court found the issues to affect every citizen of the country. Estoppel: The Court determined that those members of Congress who approved Republic Act No. 73 would only be estopped from questioning the validity of the Act and resolution if they did not oppose it in Congress. Dissent: A dissenting opinion argued that only members who actually vote should be considered in the calculation for the required three-fourths vote. Revision vs. Amendment: The main focus of the case is whether the constitutional requirements for proposing an amendment were met. The case clarifies the procedure for a constitutional amendment proposal, emphasizing the need for a three-fourths vote of all members of Congress voting separately in each house. The court is concerned with protecting the integrity of the constitution by ensuring compliance with its requirements. Tolentino v Comelec (Doctrine of Proper Submission) Facts: The 1971 Constitutional Convention was established through resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines, acting as a constituent assembly. The delegates to the Convention were elected under these resolutions and the implementing legislation, Republic Act 6132. The Convention's first formal proposal to amend the Constitution was Organic Resolution No. 1, which aimed to lower the voting age to eighteen years. This resolution was approved in the early morning of September 28, 1971. Organic Resolution No. 1 stated that the amendment would be valid when approved by a majority of votes in a plebiscite to coincide with local elections in November 1971. The Convention authorized the use of funds for this plebiscite, with delegates waiving per diem if needed. The President of the Convention asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to help implement the resolution. COMELEC agreed to hold the plebiscite, provided the Convention handled the printing of ballots and security. An Ad Hoc Committee was formed to implement the resolution. The Convention passed a resolution calling for a recess from November 1 to November 9, 1971, to allow delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. On October 12, 1971, the Convention confirmed the President's authority to implement Organic Resolution No. 1. The petitioner, Arturo M. Tolentino, filed a petition to restrain the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite, arguing that the Convention did not have the power to call a plebiscite and that amendments should not be presented separately. Intervenors from the Convention argued that the power to call a plebiscite was within the Convention’s authority. Issues: Does the Constitutional Convention have the power to order a plebiscite for the ratification of a proposed amendment to the Constitution, or is that power exclusively with Congress? Can the Convention submit a proposed amendment separately from other amendments or must all amendments be submitted in a single election? Is the issue of the Convention’s authority to call a plebiscite a political question beyond judicial review, or is it a justiciable issue? Rulings: Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court asserted its jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Convention's actions, rejecting the idea that the issue was a political question beyond the Court's purview. The Court held that it has the power to determine if acts of the Convention are within constitutional limits. Convention's Power to Call a Plebiscite: The Court ruled that the Constitutional Convention does not have the power to call for a plebiscite for the ratification of a proposed amendment. The Court held that this power is only granted to Congress as a legislative body. Single Election Requirement: The Court decided that all amendments proposed by the Convention must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite, not separately. The Court interpreted Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution to mean that only one election can be held to ratify all amendments proposed by a single convention. Reasoning for the Single Election: The Court argued that submitting amendments separately would make it impossible for voters to intelligently assess the impact of each amendment in relation to the whole Constitution. The court stressed that voters need a fixed frame of reference. Invalidity of Plebiscite: The Court declared Organic Resolution No. 1, and all subsequent acts related to the plebiscite scheduled for November 8, 1971, to be null and void. Proper Submission: The Court emphasized that amendments must be fairly presented to the people with sufficient information and opportunity for deliberation. Improper timing: The Court determined that the plebiscite was improperly timed due to the concurrent local and national elections. It held that voters would be distracted from the constitutional amendment by these other elections. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: ○ Justices Reyes, Zaldivar, Castro, and Makasiar concurred with the main opinion, emphasizing the importance of fair submission and undivided attention during a plebiscite, and that the people are not adequately informed about the proposed amendment. ○ Justice Fernando dissented, arguing that the Convention has the power to call for a plebiscite since the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it. He maintained that the word “election” in Article XV of the Constitution does not necessarily mean a single election. Justice Makalintal reserved his vote due to doubts about the legal and constitutional premises but acknowledged that the majority decision achieved a result from a legal and constitutional viewpoint. Constitutional Convention's Power: The 1971 Constitutional Convention was convened to propose amendments to the existing Constitution. The Court acknowledged that the convention derives its authority from the existing Constitution. It is not considered a sovereign body but rather a constituent one. The convention does not have unlimited power and is subject to the existing Constitution. The Supreme Court has the power to review the actions of the Convention to ensure they are within constitutional limits. The Court ruled that the Convention does not have the power to call a plebiscite for the ratification of its proposed amendments. This power is reserved for Congress. Process of Amendment and Ratification: Article XV of the Constitution specifies the process for amending the Constitution. Amendments can be proposed by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Proposed amendments must be ratified by a majority of votes cast at an election. The Court interpreted the phrase "an election" in Article XV to mean that all amendments proposed by a single convention must be submitted to the people in one single election or plebiscite. The court emphasized the importance of an intelligent vote that would require an understanding of the proposed amendments in light of the entire constitution. Key Rulings and Reasoning: The Court declared the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 (to lower the voting age) and all implementing acts to be null and void because the plebiscite was not authorized by Article XV of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that submitting a single amendment separately would prevent voters from understanding how that amendment fits into the broader framework of the Constitution. The court pointed out that the voters did not know the full scope of the changes being proposed by the convention, meaning voters would be unable to make an intelligent decision. The court emphasized the importance of a fair and intelligent submission to the people, in which the people are sufficiently informed about the meaning, nature and effects of proposed constitutional amendments. The Court also noted that the plebiscite was improperly timed as it coincided with other elections, distracting voters. The court acknowledged that the process of amending the constitution is just as important as the constitution itself. People's Initiative: The court does mention that the power to amend the Constitution is part of the inherent power of the people. However, it is noted that the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not called directly by the people but by Congress, therefore it does not have the same status as a revolutionary convention or people's initiative. The Court states that the people, as the source of sovereignty, are limited in the exercise of their power only by the explicit terms of the Constitution. Defensor Santiago v COMELEC (Source: Jur) The case challenged the validity of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution, focusing on term limits for officials. The Supreme Court ruled that an enabling law is required, R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient, and lifting term limits constitutes a revision, not an amendment. Facts: 1. Background of the Case: The case revolves around the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. This system was introduced as an innovative method, distinct from the traditional methods of constitutional amendment under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which only allowed amendments through Congress or a constitutional convention. 2. The Delfin Petition: On December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, a founding member of the Movement for People’s Initiative, filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) titled "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative." The petition sought to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution by removing term limits for elective officials. 3. COMELEC’s Actions: The COMELEC issued an order directing Delfin to publish the petition in newspapers and set a hearing for December 12, 1996. During the hearing, Senator Raul Roco and other intervenors opposed the petition, arguing that it was not the proper initiatory petition for a people’s initiative. 4. Petitioners’ Arguments: On December 18, 1996, petitioners Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court, arguing that: The constitutional provision on people’s initiative requires an implementing law, which Congress has not passed. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6735, which provides for systems of initiative, does not adequately cover constitutional amendments. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, which governs the conduct of initiatives, is ultra vires because the COMELEC lacks the authority to regulate constitutional amendments. Lifting term limits constitutes a revision, not an amendment, of the Constitution, which is beyond the scope of people’s initiative. 5. Respondents’ Counterarguments: The respondents argued that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law for people’s initiative and that the lifting of term limits is an amendment, not a revision. They also claimed that the signature-gathering process would not entail government expenses, as the costs would be borne by Delfin and his volunteers. 6. Supreme Court’s Interim Action: On December 19, 1996, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive. Issue: 1. Whether the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can be implemented without an enabling law from Congress. 2. Whether R.A. No. 6735 adequately provides for the implementation of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. 3. Whether COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid and sufficient to govern the conduct of people’s initiative for constitutional amendments. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and permanently enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. The Court held that: 1. Lack of Implementing Law: The constitutional provision on people’s initiative requires an enabling law, which Congress has not passed. R.A. No. 6735, while providing for systems of initiative, does not adequately cover constitutional amendments. 2. Invalidity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300: The COMELEC lacks the authority to promulgate rules and regulations for constitutional amendments through people’s initiative. Only Congress has the power to pass the necessary implementing law. 3. Amendment vs. Revision: The lifting of term limits constitutes a revision of the Constitution, which is beyond the scope of people’s initiative. Amendments involve specific changes, while revisions entail a re-examination of the entire Constitution. 4. No Government Funding: The signature-gathering process for a people’s initiative does not require government funding or supervision, as the costs are borne by the proponents. Ratio: 1. Necessity of an Enabling Law: The Constitution explicitly requires Congress to pass a law to implement the right of people’s initiative to propose constitutional amendments. R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient because it does not provide specific guidelines for constitutional amendments. 2. Limitation on People’s Initiative: People’s initiative is limited to amendments, not revisions, of the Constitution. The lifting of term limits alters the fundamental structure of the Constitution and thus constitutes a revision. 3. Separation of Powers: The COMELEC cannot usurp the legislative function of Congress by promulgating rules for constitutional amendments. Only Congress has the authority to pass the necessary implementing law. 4. Protection of Public Funds: The Court emphasized the need to protect public funds from unnecessary expenditures, especially in processes that lack a clear legal basis. PREAMBLE We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. Aglipay v Ruiz Facts: The case involves a challenge to the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress by the Director of Posts. The Director of Posts announced in May 1936 that he would order the issuance of these commemorative stamps, which were organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The stamps featured a chalice with grape vines and wheat as a border design, and came in various colors and denominations. The petitioner, Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the sale of these stamps, arguing that it violated the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. The stamps were issued and sold, though a significant portion remained unsold. The government aimed to advertise the Philippines and attract tourists through the stamps. Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature appropriated funds for the printing of postage stamps with new designs and authorized the Director of Posts to dispose of these funds as deemed advantageous to the government. The printing and issuance of the stamps were approved by the President of the Philippines. The design of the stamps was altered, and instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamps included a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila with an inscription stating "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937". Issues: Is a writ of prohibition the proper legal remedy in this case? Did the Director of Posts violate the Constitution by issuing and selling postage stamps commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress? Does the issuance of these stamps violate the principle of separation of church and state as enshrined in the Constitution? Rulings: Propriety of Writ of Prohibition: The court ruled that a writ of prohibition is a proper legal remedy in this case, as it can be issued to restrain the actions of an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of their authority. The court noted that the writ can be used to prevent the misuse of power or to ensure orderly administration of justice. Constitutional Violation: The court ruled that the issuance of the postage stamps did not violate the constitutional provision against using public funds or property for the benefit of any particular religious sect or denomination. Separation of Church and State: The court clarified that the principle of separation of church and state does not imply hostility or indifference to religion. It emphasized that religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution but does not prevent the government from recognizing religion's positive influence. Purpose of the Stamps: The court determined that the stamps were issued not for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, but to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists. The court noted that while the stamps were linked to a religious event, the primary purpose was not religious. The court acknowledged that the stamps were connected to a religious event, but that the resulting propaganda for the Roman Catholic Church was incidental to the primary objective. Government Authority and Discretion: The court noted that Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government. The court stressed that the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution or appropriation of public funds to support a religious sect. However, the court maintained that even if the officials involved made a poor judgment, it did not amount to a constitutional violation. Incidental Religious Effect: The court stated that the government should not be restricted in its activities simply due to incidental religious results, as long as the main purpose is legitimate and undertaken by appropriate legislation. Rejection of the Petition: The court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, concluding that there had been no constitutional violation. The court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, highlighting that while vigilance against violations of the separation of church and state is crucial, the circumstances of this case did not show an infraction of the constitutional principle. ARTICLE I NATIONAL TERRITORY The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. MAY GINAWA KA NOTES D2 DOUBLE CHECK Republic Act No. 9522, enacted on March 10, 2009, amends previous acts to define the archipelagic baseline of the Philippines. AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Baselines Defined: The Act specifically defines the baselines of the Philippine archipelago using a series of basepoints with corresponding coordinates in the World Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84). These basepoints are listed with their locations, coordinates, and distances to the next basepoint. Regime of Islands: The Act establishes that the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) are under the "Regime of Islands" consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This means the Philippines exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over these areas. National Territory: The Act affirms that the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and applicable laws. Documentation: The Act mandates that it, along with the geographic coordinates, charts, and maps, be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations. NAMRIA's Role: The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) is tasked to produce and publish charts and maps that clearly show the basepoints and baselines. Funding: The funds needed to implement the Act will be provided through a supplemental budget or included in the General Appropriations Act. Amendments: Republic Act No. 9522 amends or modifies previous laws that are inconsistent with it. Effectivity: The Act becomes effective 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two newspapers of general circulation. Legislative History: The Act is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216, and was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 17, 2009. It was approved by the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on March 10, 2009. Republic Act No. 5446, enacted on September 18, 1968, amends Section One of Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-Six, which defines the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES" Amends Typographical Errors: The Act corrects typographical errors in the previous act, specifically in Section one. Defines Baselines: The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are defined by a series of geographic points with specific latitudes and longitudes. Basepoints and Lines: The baselines are described using a series of points and connecting lines, with the latitude, longitude, azimuth, and distance in meters provided for each line. ○ Examples of points include Y'ami Island, Tumaruk Rk., Balintang Islands, Didicas Rk., Iligan Pt.. Examples of lines include Line 1 (Y’ami I. (E.) - Tumaruk Rk.), Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk. - Balintang Is.), Line 3 (Balintang Is. - Didicas Rk.). Sabah: The definition of the baselines does not prejudice the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around Sabah, over which the Philippines claims dominion and sovereignty. Effectivity: The Act takes effect upon its approval on September 18, 1968. Presidential Decree No. 1596, issued on June 11, 1978, declares certain areas in the South China Sea as part of the Philippine territory. AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTION OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED ONE, SO AS TO EXTEND THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH VOLUNTARY PAYMENT WITHOUT INTERESTS OF PRE-WAR OBLIGATIONS MAY BE MADE AS WELL AS THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH INTERESTS PAID SHALL BE APPLIED IN PAYMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION The decree defines the Kalayaan Island Group using specific coordinates: According to the decree, this area, including the seabed, subsoil, continental margin, and air space, belongs to the Philippines and is subject to its sovereignty. The area is established as a distinct municipality of the Province of Palawan, named "Kalayaan". The decree states that the area is vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and that much of it is part of the Philippine archipelago's continental margin. It also claims that the area does not legally belong to any other state, and the Philippines has established control through history, need, and effective occupation. The decree asserts that other states' claims have lapsed and cannot prevail over the Philippines' claims. Pending the election of regular officials, the administration of the area is vested in the Secretary of National Defense or other designated officials. The decree took effect immediately. Presidential Decree No. 1599, AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO issued on June 11, 1978, establishes an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for the Philippines. This zone extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines used to measure the territorial sea. The decree recognizes this zone as vital for the economic survival and development of the Philippines and acknowledges the concept as a principle of international law. Here's a breakdown of the key provisions of the decree: Establishment of the EEZ: The Philippines establishes an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles from its territorial sea baselines. When this zone overlaps with that of a neighboring state, boundaries will be determined by agreement or international law. Sovereign Rights: The Philippines has sovereign rights within the EEZ for the exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of natural resources, including living and non-living resources, renewable and non-renewable resources in the sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters. This includes the production of energy from water, currents, and wind. Exclusive Rights and Jurisdiction: The Philippines has exclusive rights and jurisdiction over the establishment of artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations, and structures. This also includes the preservation of the marine environment, pollution control, and scientific research. Prohibited Activities: Unless authorized by the Philippine government, no person can explore or exploit resources, conduct research, build structures, or engage in activities that undermine the country's sovereign rights within the EEZ. However, this does not prohibit Philippine citizens from such activities if allowed under existing laws. Freedoms of Other States: Other states maintain freedoms of navigation and overflight, as well as the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and communication within the EEZ. Enforcement: The President can authorize government agencies to create rules and regulations for the decree. Violators of the decree or its rules face fines, imprisonment, and seizure of equipment. In addition to this decree, Presidential Decree No. 1596, also issued in 1978, defines the Kalayaan Island Group using specific coordinates, and declares it to be part of the Philippine territory [Conversation history]. The area, including its seabed, subsoil, continental margin, and air space, belongs to the Philippines and is under its sovereignty.The decree states that this area is vital to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and is part of the Philippine archipelago's continental margin. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines key maritime zones and the rights and responsibilities of states within those zones. 1. Article 46 of the sources defines terms related to archipelagic states. Specifically, according to Article 46: An "archipelagic State" is a state that is made up completely of one or more archipelagos, and it may include other islands. An "archipelago" is a group of islands, which may include parts of islands, the waters connecting them, and other natural features. These islands, waters, and features must be so closely related that they form a geographical, economic, and political entity, or that they have historically been regarded as such. 2. Article 49 of the sources concerns the legal status of archipelagic waters, the airspace above them, and their seabed and subsoil. Here's a breakdown of the key points: Sovereignty: An archipelagic state's sovereignty extends to the waters enclosed by its archipelagic baselines, which are known as archipelagic waters, regardless of the depth or distance from the coast. This is a key aspect of the legal regime for archipelagic states, as it establishes their jurisdiction over these waters. Airspace: The sovereignty of the archipelagic state also extends to the airspace above the archipelagic waters. Seabed and Subsoil: The archipelagic state's sovereignty includes the seabed and subsoil beneath the archipelagic waters. Archipelagic Baselines: The archipelagic baselines are drawn in accordance with Article 47. As described in our previous conversation, an "archipelagic State" is a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos, and an "archipelago" is a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features. These baselines are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. Delimitation of Internal Waters: Within its archipelagic waters, an archipelagic state may draw closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters, following articles 9, 10, and 11. 3. In essence, Article 49 establishes that archipelagic states have the same level of sovereignty over their archipelagic waters, airspace, seabed, and subsoil, as a coastal state has over its internal waters. 4. Article 2 of the sources outlines the legal status of the territorial sea, the airspace above it, and its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty: A coastal state's sovereignty extends beyond its land territory and internal waters to an adjacent belt of sea, which is known as the territorial sea. In the case of an archipelagic state, this sovereignty extends from the archipelagic waters. Airspace: The sovereignty of a coastal state also extends to the airspace over the territorial sea. Seabed and Subsoil: The sovereignty includes the seabed and subsoil beneath the territorial sea. 5. Article 3 of the sources addresses the breadth of the territorial sea. It states that every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with the sources. 6. Article 76 of the sources defines the continental shelf of a coastal state. The continental shelf includes the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas. These areas extend beyond a coastal state's territorial sea, which we've previously discussed as a zone over which a state has sovereignty. The shelf extends throughout the natural prolongation of the coastal state's land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. If the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend to 200 nautical miles, the continental shelf extends to 200 nautical miles. A coastal state's rights over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the waters above it or the airspace above those waters. The coastal state's exercise of rights over the continental shelf must not infringe on navigation or other rights of other states. In summary, the continental shelf is defined by the natural extension of a coastal state's land territory under the sea, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles, and it is an area over which the coastal state has specific rights, without affecting the status of the waters above it or the rights of other states. 7. Article 33 of the sources defines the contiguous zone as a zone adjacent to a coastal state's territorial sea. Here's a breakdown of the key aspects: Purpose: Within the contiguous zone, a coastal state may exercise the control necessary to: ○ Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. ○ Punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. Extent: The contiguous zone cannot extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. We have previously discussed that the breadth of the territorial sea cannot exceed 12 nautical miles. In summary, the contiguous zone is a specific area beyond the territorial sea, where the coastal state has limited jurisdiction to enforce certain laws and regulations. This zone allows a state to address potential violations of its laws, before they impact its territory or territorial sea. It is not an area of full sovereignty, as the territorial sea is, but rather an area of limited jurisdiction for specific purposes. 8. Article 121 of the sources addresses the regime of islands. Here are the key points: An island is defined as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. The territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of the sources applicable to other land territory. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. This means that: Islands generally have the same maritime zones as other land territory. However, some islands, specifically rocks, do not generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf if they cannot sustain human habitation or economic life. This article clarifies that the rules generally applicable to a coastal state's maritime zones also apply to islands, but with a significant exception for rocks. Specifically, the concept of rocks not having an EEZ or continental shelf is important when determining the maritime rights of a state that includes many small, uninhabited islands, as this may significantly reduce the overall area of ocean over which the state has rights. 9. Article 47 of the sources outlines the rules for drawing archipelagic baselines, which are used by archipelagic states to measure their maritime zones. These baselines are significant because, as discussed previously, an archipelagic state's sovereignty extends to the waters enclosed by these baselines, called archipelagic waters. Here's a breakdown of the key aspects of Article 47: Straight Baselines: An archipelagic state can draw straight archipelagic baselines by joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago. These baselines are not drawn following the low water line of the coast as with normal baselines, but rather, they connect the outermost points of the islands that make up the archipelago, creating an enclosure around the archipelago. Inclusion of Main Islands and Water to Land Ratio: Within these baselines, the main islands must be included and the ratio of water area to land area, including atolls, must be between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. Baseline Length: ○ Generally, the length of such baselines should not exceed 100 nautical miles. ○ However, up to 3% of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles. Charts and Coordinates: ○ The baselines drawn according to this article must be shown on charts of an adequate scale for determining their position. ○ Alternatively, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, can be substituted. Publicity and Deposit: The archipelagic state is required to give due publicity to these charts or lists of geographical coordinates and must deposit a copy of each with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In summary, Article 47 defines how archipelagic states establish their baselines, which are used to measure the extent of their territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. These baselines, drawn connecting the outermost points of the islands and reefs, create a special maritime zone called archipelagic waters. This is a departure from the way that a coastal state establishes baselines from the low water line of its coasts. The baselines are further defined by a maximum length for individual baselines, as well as the inclusion of the main islands of the archipelago and a specific ratio of water to land within the baselines. 10.Methods used in fixing baseline from which the territorial belt is measured: a. The Normal Baseline Method The normal baseline is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. This means that the baseline follows the contour of the coast at the point where the water reaches its lowest level during low tide. This is the default method used for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, except where other methods are specifically provided for in the sources. The normal baseline is a dynamic line that changes with the movement of the tides and the natural changes to a coastline. b. The Straight Baseline Method The straight baseline method is an exception to the normal baseline, and is used in specific circumstances. It involves drawing straight lines connecting appropriate points along the coast, rather than following the low-water line. This method is applicable in localities where: ○ The coastline is deeply indented and cut into. ○ There is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity. ○ The coastline is highly unstable due to the presence of a delta or other natural conditions. When using straight baselines: ○ The drawing of straight baselines must not depart significantly from the general direction of the coast. ○ The sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land to be subject to the regime of internal waters. ○ Straight baselines should not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations have been built on them, or where such baselines have received general international recognition. ○ Economic interests peculiar to a region, evidenced by long usage, may be considered when determining particular baselines. ○ The system of straight baselines cannot be used to cut off the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. When straight baselines are established, they can have the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas that were not previously considered as such. In these cases, a right of innocent passage exists in those waters. If the coastline is highly unstable due to a delta or other natural conditions, appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and, the straight baselines will remain effective, even if the low water line regresses. The straight baseline method provides a way for states with complex coastlines to establish a more manageable baseline, but it is subject to specific constraints to ensure that it does not infringe upon the rights of other states or the broader international community. In summary, the normal baseline follows the low-water line of the coast, while the straight baseline method uses straight lines to connect points on the coast in specific geographical situations. The straight baseline method is an exception to the normal baseline and is used only where a coastline is complex, but must follow certain rules, particularly related to not cutting off the access of other states to the high seas or exclusive economic zones. 11.National Territory and Executive Power National Territory: While not explicitly defined, the sources imply that a nation's territory includes its landmass and internal waters. The sources also make reference to the concept of the territorial sea as an area adjacent to the land territory and internal waters over which a state has sovereignty. The sources describe a number of ways that a nation can define the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. These baselines are the low-water line along the coast and can be defined by straight lines across the mouths of rivers, across bays, or by straight lines connecting points along indented coastlines or fringing islands. The sources also describe how an archipelagic state can establish baselines that enclose its archipelagic waters. The sovereignty of a coastal state extends to the territorial sea, its airspace, and its bed and subsoil. Similarly, the sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to its archipelagic waters, their airspace, and their bed and subsoil. Executive Power: Although the term "executive power" is not used explicitly, the sources outline the various jurisdictions and rights that a state can exercise within its maritime zones. These demonstrate a state's ability to govern and enforce laws, which can be seen as an aspect of its executive power. Key examples include: ○ Territorial Sea: A coastal State has sovereignty over its territorial sea and can exercise its jurisdiction and enforce its laws within this zone. This includes the right to regulate navigation and protect its security. ○ Internal Waters: The sources note that internal waters are on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea, and are therefore under the full sovereignty of the state. ○ Contiguous Zone: A coastal state can exercise the control necessary to prevent infringements of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea, and punish such infringements, in a zone contiguous to its territorial sea. ○ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Within its EEZ, a coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the waters, seabed and subsoil, and also has jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands and structures, marine scientific research, and the protection of the marine environment. The coastal state also has the right to enforce its laws and regulations within this zone. ○ Archipelagic Waters: Archipelagic states have sovereignty over their archipelagic waters, including the right to establish sea lanes and regulate passage. ○ High Seas: While states don't have sovereignty over the high seas, they have rights and responsibilities, such as the right of navigation and the duty to take measures against piracy. ○ The Area: The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind, and are governed by the Authority established by the sources. The Authority exercises control over activities in the Area, and ensures compliance with the provisions of the sources. In summary, although the sources do not directly discuss "National Territory" and "Executive Power", they describe how the concept of territory extends to include internal waters, and how a state's sovereignty and its associated "executive power", understood as the ability to govern and enforce laws, are exercised over specific maritime zones as defined by the baseline and methods described in the sources. The sources establish rules for how states can extend their jurisdiction and control over different areas of the sea, seabed, and subsoil, as well as the airspace above them. The specific rights, jurisdiction and control a state exercises varies in different areas such as the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, archipelagic waters, high seas, and the Area. CASES: Navarro v Ermita The provided sources detail a legal case, Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., which revolves around the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, an act creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The case involves a challenge to the law's compliance with the requirements for creating a province as outlined in the Local Government Code (LGC). Here's a breakdown of the facts, issues, and ruling: Facts: R.A. No. 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, was approved on October 2, 2006. A plebiscite was conducted on December 3, 2006, which resulted in affirmative votes, and the province's officials assumed office on January 26, 2007. Former political leaders of Surigao del Norte filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355, but the Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. The Court initially declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional on February 10, 2010, citing non-compliance with the LGC's requirements regarding population and land area for the creation of a province. The court also declared a provision in the LGC-IRR regarding the land area requirement of island provinces as null and void. Following the ruling, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8790, stating that if the Supreme Court's decision became final before the May 10, 2010 elections, Dinagat Islands would revert to its previous status as part of Surigao del Norte. New officials elected in Surigao del Norte during the May 10, 2010 elections, whose positions would be affected by the nullification of R.A. 9355, sought to intervene in the case. These officials argued that their legal interest in the case only arose after the election results were determined. The Court initially denied the motion to intervene, citing that it was filed after the resolution of the case. An entry of judgement was issued stating that the decision had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. The Court subsequently received motions for reconsideration, including an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by the intervenors. Issues: The main issue was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 in light of Section 461 of the LGC which sets the requirements for creating a province, particularly concerning land area and population. Specifically, the key issues were whether: ○ R.A. No. 9355 effectively amended Section 461 of the LGC. ○ The exemption from territorial contiguity for provinces composed of islands included an exemption from the minimum land area requirement. ○ Article 9(2) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code (LGC-IRR), which exempts island provinces from the land area requirement, was valid. Ruling: The Court granted the motion to recall the entry of judgment and allowed the intervention of the newly elected officials. The Court reversed its previous decision and declared R.A. No. 9355 valid and constitutional. The Court also declared the provision in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, which exempts island provinces from the land area requirement, as valid. The Court's reasoning included: ○ The primary consideration in creating local government units, particularly provinces, is economic viability. ○ The LGC, read as a whole, can be interpreted to mean that provinces consisting of islands should be exempted from the land area requirement. ○ The legislative intent, as shown in congressional debates, supports the exemption of island provinces from the minimum land area requirement. Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be considered a valid correction of congressional oversight and a reflection of the true legislative intent. The need to ensure that every party directly affected has the opportunity to be heard and for the proper disposition of their cause, even if they become interested after a decision was rendered. The concept of local autonomy and decentralization is promoted by allowing island provinces to be created without the same land area requirements as mainland provinces. The Court emphasized that it is not only a court of law but also of justice and equity. It considered the potential negative impact on the intervenors if they were not allowed to be heard, and the need to achieve a correct interpretation of the LGC. The Court highlighted an exception to the "moot and academic principle" that allows the courts to decide cases if a situation has exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved. Dissenting Opinions: The dissenting opinions argued that the majority decision violated the Constitution and the LGC by allowing the creation of a province (Dinagat Islands) that did not meet the minimum land area and population requirements. The dissenters also argued that: ○ The congressional oversight committee had no power to approve or disapprove the implementing rules of laws, making Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR invalid. ○ The Court should not have lifted the entry of judgment and allowed intervention by new parties after the case had become final. ○ The majority's ruling opens the floodgates to the proliferation of small provinces and legislative districts, mangling principles of democratic representation. ○ The majority effectively included the enclosed marine area of Dinagat Islands in its land area calculation, which was not the intent of the law. The majority engaged in judicial legislation by amending the law rather than interpreting it. In summary, the Supreme Court case Navarro vs. Ermita ultimately upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355, which created the Province of Dinagat Islands. This ruling hinged on a broad interpretation of the Local Government Code and a consideration of the legislative intent to promote local autonomy and decentralization, despite the province's failure to meet the strict requirements on land area. However, this decision was not unanimous and faced strong dissents arguing that the ruling was a violation of the constitution and the rule of law. Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., which concerns the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States. Here’s a breakdown of the facts, issues, and ruling in this case: Facts: The petitioners, including Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) and several party-list representatives, filed petitions questioning the constitutionality of EDCA. They argued that the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion by entering into EDCA as an executive agreement, rather than as a treaty requiring Senate concurrence, and that the agreement violated multiple constitutional provisions. The respondents, including the Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary, and the Executive Secretary, argued that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the suit. The respondents invoked the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents to support the legality of EDCA. The Executive Department sent an official confirmation to the U.S. Embassy stating that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with". The Senate expressed its position through SR 105, indicating that EDCA infringes upon its constitutional role and needs the Senate’s concurrence to be valid. The case was brought to the Supreme Court for judicial review. Issues: The primary issue was whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion by entering into EDCA as an executive agreement. Specifically, the Court addressed the following issues: ○ Whether the essential requisites for judicial review were present. ○ Whether the President can enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. ○ Whether the provisions under EDCA were consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties. Additional issues that were discussed include: ○ Whether petitioners have legal standing to bring the case. ○ Whether EDCA modified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) or the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the case was a proper subject for judicial review, despite the initial lack of standing of the petitioners, because the case involved matters of transcendental importance. The Court held that the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities if it is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines. ○ The Court emphasized that the Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities except by way of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, but also recognized the President's role as the sole authority in foreign relations. The Court noted that the EDCA was an implementing agreement of prior treaties such as the MDT and the VFA. The Court determined that EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and VFA. The Court found that EDCA's provisions are consistent with the Constitution and existing laws and treaties. The Court stated that an executive agreement may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments to existing agreements. The court clarified that the term “activities” in the VFA was intended to be ambiguous and that EDCA specifies the details of these activities. The Court determined that the EDCA does not violate Philippine sovereignty and that the Philippines retains ownership of the Agreed Locations. The Court acknowledged that the President must have discretion in matters of foreign relations, especially when the situation calls for crafting programs and setting timelines for approved activities. The Court emphasized that the EDCA explicitly states that all activities of US personnel and contractors must be consistent with Philippine laws and regulations. The Court stated that the Agreed Locations do not qualify as US military bases, and operational control of the Agreed Locations pertains to US personnel and not the locations themselves. The Court ruled that the EDCA did not impair national security and territorial integrity. The Court concluded that EDCA was not a reincarnation of US military bases, and that it was consistent with the spirit of self-determination, nationalism, and independence of the Philippines. Dissenting Opinions: Dissenting opinions argued that the EDCA substantially modifies or amends the VFA and introduces new concepts not contemplated in the VFA or MDT. The dissenters also argued that the EDCA allows temporary stationing on a rotational basis of U.S. military personnel and their contractors with permanent facilities and pre-positioned military materiel, which goes beyond the scope of the VFA. The dissenters contended that EDCA was not merely an implementing agreement but a treaty requiring Senate concurrence. In summary, the Supreme Court case Saguisag vs. Ochoa ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the EDCA, finding that it was a valid executive agreement consistent with the Constitution, the MDT, and the VFA. The Court emphasized the President's authority in foreign relations and the need to allow flexibility in implementing defense agreements, while also noting that the agreement did not violate Philippine sovereignty or national security. However, the decision faced strong dissents arguing that the EDCA was effectively a treaty requiring Senate approval and that it went beyond the scope of existing agreements. Republic of the Philippines vs. Republic of China, Decision of the UN Arbitral Tribunal in the Hague, The Netherlands The provided sources detail a legal case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China regarding disputes in the South China Sea. Here's a breakdown of the facts, issues, and rulings in this case based on the sources: Facts: The South China Sea, a semi-enclosed sea, is the subject of overlapping maritime and territorial claims by several states, including China and the Philippines. China's claims are based on a "nine-dash line" depicted on a map submitted to the United Nations in 2009. Within this line, China occupies several geographical features, including Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef. The Philippines also claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal. China has reportedly interfered with the Philippines' exploitation of resources within 200 nautical miles of its baselines, such as intercepting a seismic survey vessel at Reed Bank in 2011. There have been incidents where Chinese vessels obstructed Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal. Chinese fishing vessels have engaged in environmentally harmful practices, such as trawling, dredging, and using explosives, and harvesting endangered species at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. From 2013, China began constructing artificial islands and installations on seven reefs in the Spratly Islands using heavy equipment, creating over 12.8 million square meters of new land in less than three years. The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China in 2013, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Several instruments existed for dispute resolution between the Philippines and China, including the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), bilateral agreements, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976. In 2006, China declared under Article 298 of UNCLOS that it would not accept any of the procedures for dispute settlement related to maritime delimitation, historic titles, military activities, and law enforcement activities. Issues: The Philippines raised several issues before the Tribunal: ○ The source of the parties' maritime rights and entitlements, arguing that China's rights must be based solely on UNCLOS, not on historic rights. ○ The maritime entitlements of specific features, seeking a declaration that features like Scarborough Shoal are either rocks or low-tide elevations that do not generate an entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ). ○ The lawfulness of China's actions in the South China Sea, including interference with the Philippines' resource rights and environmental damage. ○ Whether China has aggravated and extended the disputes through its actions, such as restricting access to a Philippine detachment at Second Thomas Shoal and land reclamation projects in the Spratly Islands. The Tribunal had to address several matters related to its jurisdiction: ○ Whether the dispute concerned the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. ○ Whether the dispute concerned territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitation. ○ Whether any third parties were indispensable to the proceedings. ○ Whether the Parties had agreed to seek settlement by a means of their own choice. ○ Whether the issues of jurisdiction possessed an exclusive preliminary character. ○ The scope of UNCLOS in relation to title to land territory, historic rights to maritime spaces, and the extent of maritime entitlements under the convention. Whether certain features in the South China Sea constituted low-tide elevations or rocks. Whether China's actions violated the UNCLOS articles concerning marine environment protection. Ruling: The Philippines requested the Tribunal to declare that: ○ China's maritime entitlements in the South China Sea do not extend beyond those permitted by UNCLOS. ○ China's claims to sovereign rights and "historic rights" within the "nine-dash line" are contrary to UNCLOS. ○ The specific ruling on Scarborough Shoal and other features is not detailed in the provided excerpts. The provided sources detail a legal case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China regarding disputes in the South China Sea. Here's a breakdown of the facts, issues, and rulings in this case based on the sources: Facts: The South China Sea, a semi-enclosed sea, is the subject of overlapping maritime and territorial claims by several states, including China and the Philippines. China's claims are based on a "nine-dash line" depicted on a map submitted to the United Nations in 2009. Within this line, China occupies several geographical features, including Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef. The Philippines also claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal. China has reportedly interfered with the Philippines' exploitation of resources within 200 nautical miles of its baselines, such as intercepting a seismic survey vessel at Reed Bank in 2011. There have been incidents where Chinese vessels obstructed Philippine vessels near Scarborough Shoal. Chinese fishing vessels have engaged in environmentally harmful practices, such as trawling, dredging, and using explosives, and harvesting endangered species at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. From 2013, China began constructing artificial islands and installations on seven reefs in the Spratly Islands using heavy equipment, creating over 12.8 million square meters of new land in less than three years. The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China in 2013, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Several instruments existed for dispute resolution between the Philippines and China, including the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), bilateral agreements, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976. In 2006, China declared under Article 298 of UNCLOS that it would not accept any of the procedures for dispute settlement related to maritime delimitation, historic titles, military activities, and law enforcement activities. Issues: The Philippines raised several issues before the Tribunal: ○ The source of the parties' maritime rights and entitlements, arguing that China's rights must be based solely on UNCLOS, not on historic rights. ○ The maritime entitlements of specific features, seeking a declaration that features like Scarborough Shoal are either rocks or low-tide elevations that do not generate an entitlement to a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ). ○ The lawfulness of China's actions in the South China Sea, including interference with the Philippines' resource rights and environmental damage. ○ Whether China has aggravated and extended the disputes through its actions, such as restricting access to a Philippine detachment at Second Thomas Shoal and land reclamation projects in the Spratly Islands. The Tribunal had to address several matters related to its jurisdiction: Ruling: The Philippines requested the Tribunal to declare that: ○ China's maritime entitlements in the South China Sea do not extend beyond those permitted by UNCLOS. ○ China's claims to sovereign rights and "historic rights" within the "nine-dash line" are contrary to UNCLOS. ○ The specific ruling on Scarborough Shoal and other features is not detailed in the provided excerpts.. Article II – Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The 1987 Philippine Constitution defines the Philippines as a democratic and republican state, where sovereignty resides in the people, and all government authority emanates from them a. State is a community of persons permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the body of inhabitants render habitual obedience Case: Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Antonio Campos Rueda, revolves around the interpretation of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code concerning tax exemptions on intangible personal property of non-resident foreigners. Facts: Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a Spanish national, resided in Tangier, Morocco from 1931 until her death in 1955. Upon her death, she owned intangible personal properties in the Philippines. Antonio Campos Rueda, the administrator of her estate, filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return, and paid the assessed taxes. Rueda later filed an amended return, claiming exemption from taxes for the intangible personal properties, arguing that Tangier had reciprocal tax exemptions. The Collector of Internal Revenue denied the exemption, stating that Tangier was not a "foreign country" as required by Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code and that reciprocity was lacking. The Court of Tax Appeals reversed the Collector's decision, stating that a "foreign country" did not need to have an international personality for the exemption to apply. The case was initially sent back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the laws of Tangier granted the reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122, with the Court of Tax Appeals subsequently submitting copies of Tangier legislation. The Court of Tax Appeals found that Tangier did not impose death taxes on movable properties, whether corporeal or incorporeal, including securities, bonds and shares, regardless of the nationality of the deceased or heirs. Issues: The primary issue was whether the term "foreign country" in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code required the entity to possess an international personality to qualify for the tax exemption. Another issue was whether Tangier's laws provided the necessary reciprocal tax exemption. Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals' decision, holding that a "foreign country" does not need to possess international personality to be eligible for the tax exemption under Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court cited previous cases such as Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara and Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue, which also held that states within a union and tiny principalities, respectively, could be considered "foreign countries" under the law, without international personality. The court noted that the critical factor is reciprocity - if the foreign country does not impose transfer or death tax on the intangible personal property of Filipino citizens not residing in that foreign country, or if the foreign country has similar exemption provisions. The Court agreed with the Court of Tax Appeals that the laws of Tangier provided the required reciprocal tax exemption, as it did not impose death taxes on movable properties. The Supreme Court stated that the key criteria for a foreign country, in the context of Section 122, is whether the jurisdiction's laws allow a similar exemption from transfer or death taxes, regardless of its international status. The Supreme Court also noted that in a subsequent case, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, it found that the reciprocity found in the California statutes was partial not total, thus holding that Section 122 would not apply, without however reversing the doctrine that an international personality is not a requisite. The Court emphasized that the intent of the law was to allow an exemption when there is reciprocity, and that this intent must be honored. The test mentioned in the case Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Antonio Campos Rueda concerns the criteria for a "foreign country" to qualify for a tax exemption on intangible personal property under Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The central question was whether a "foreign country" needed to possess international personality to be eligible for the tax exemption. Here's a breakdown of the test and its application: International Personality is Not Required: The Supreme Court explicitly stated that a "foreign country" does not need to possess international personality to qualify for the tax exemption. This means that even entities that are not recognized as sovereign states under international law can be considered a "foreign country" for the purposes of Section 122. The court cited previous cases, Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara and Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue, to support this, where a state within a union (California) and a tiny principality (Liechtenstein) were considered foreign countries for the purposes of the tax code, even without international personality. Reciprocity is Key: The main test for determining if a jurisdiction qualifies as a "foreign country" under Section 122 is whether its laws provide a reciprocal tax exemption. ○ This reciprocity can be met in two ways: If the foreign country does not impose a transfer tax or death tax on intangible personal property of Philippine citizens not residing in that foreign country. If the laws of the foreign country allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes on intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country. Focus on Tax Laws: The focus of the test is on the tax laws of the foreign jurisdiction. The critical factor is whether that jurisdiction's laws allow a similar exemption from transfer or death taxes on intangible personal property, regardless of its international status. In the case of Tangier, the Court found that the laws of Tangier did not impose death taxes on movable properties, whether corporeal or incorporeal, including securities, bonds, and shares, regardless of the nationality of the deceased or heirs. This established the necessary reciprocal tax exemption, so it was considered a "foreign country" for the purposes of Section 122. Therefore, the test is not based on the international standing or recognition of the jurisdiction, but on whether its laws provide the reciprocal tax exemption as required by Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court emphasized that the intent of the law was to allow an exemption when there is reciprocity, and that this intent must be honored. Elements of a state: a. People b. Territory c. Sovereignty d. Government Different meanings of the word “people” as used in the Constitution: i. As inhabitants (Article XIII, Section 1; Article III, Section 2); As inhabitants of the Philippines, Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to prioritize measures that protect human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably distributing wealth and political power. As inhabitants of the Philippines, Article 3, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and specifies the conditions for issuing search and arrest warrants ii. As citizens (Preamble; Article II, Section 1 and 4; Article III, Section 7) As citizens, Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution establishes the Philippines as a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the people, from whom all government authority emanates As citizens, Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guarantees the right to information on matters of public concern and access to official records, documents, and government research data, subject to certain legal limitations iii. As voters (Article VII, Section 4) In a presidential system, the president is the head of government and is not directly responsible to the legislature. In a parliamentary system, the prime minister is the head of government and is accountable to the legislature Constituent and ministrant: the former constitutes the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter the those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interest of society, and are merely optional. The government performs two kinds of functions: constituent and ministrant. Constituent functions are compulsory and constitute the very bonds of society. These include: ○ Keeping order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. ○ Fixing legal relations between husband and wife and between parents and children. ○ Regulating the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. ○ Determining contractual rights between individuals. ○ Defining and punishing crimes. ○ Administering justice in civil cases. ○ Administering political duties, privileges and relations of citizens. ○ Dealing with foreign powers, preserving the state from external danger or encroachment, and advancing international interests. Ministrant functions are undertaken to advance the general interests of society and are merely optional. Examples of these functions include public works, public charity, and the regulation of trade and industry. According to the sources, the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is not always relevant in the Philippine jurisdiction. The traditional classification of constituent functions being exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and ministrant functions being for the welfare and progress of the people, has become unrealistic as society has become more complex. Areas that were once considered private are now often administered by the government, and the government must engage in activities to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Case: Bacani v Nacoco Facts: Court stenographers Leopoldo T. Bacani and Mateo A. Matoto provided transcripts of stenographic notes to the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) during a court case. NACOCO paid the stenographers for these transcripts at a rate of P1 per page. The Auditor General disallowed these payments, claiming NACOCO was exempt from such fees as a government entity, and sought reimbursement from the stenographers. The Auditor General ordered deductions from the stenographers' salaries to recover the amounts paid. The stenographers filed a case to prevent these deductions and to obtain a ruling that NACOCO is not a government entity subject to the exemption. The lower court ruled in favor of the stenographers, declaring that NACOCO was not a government entity for the purposes of the fe

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