CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide PDF Chapter 5: Assets

Assets CHAPTER 5 This chapter presents the following: Identification and classification of information and...

Assets CHAPTER 5 This chapter presents the following: Identification and classification of information and assets Information and asset handling requirements Secure resource provisioning The data life cycle Data compliance requirements You don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone. —Joni Mitchell An asset is, by definition, anything of worth to an organization. This includes people, partners, equipment, facilities, reputation, and information. We already touched on the importance of some of these assets when we addressed risk in Chapter 2. While every asset needs to be protected, our coverage of the second CISSP domain in this chapter and the next one focuses a bit more narrowly on protecting information assets. This is because, apart from people, information is typically the most valuable asset to an organi- zation. It lies at the heart of every information system, so precision focus on its protection makes a lot of sense. Information, of course, exists in context; it is acquired or created at a particular point in time through a specific process and (usually) for a purpose. It moves through an organization’s information systems, sometimes adding value to processes and sometimes waiting to be useful. Eventually, the information outlives its utility (or becomes a liability) and must be disposed of appropriately. We start off our discussion of asset security by addressing two fundamental questions: “What do we have?” and “Why should we care?” The first question is probably rather obvious, since we cannot protect that of which we’re not aware. The second question may sound flippant, but it really gets to the heart of how important an asset is to the organization. We’ve already tackled this (at least with regard to data) in Chapter 4 in our discussion of the categorize step of the NIST Risk Management Framework. Data and asset classification, as we will shortly see, is very similar to the categorization we’ve already explored. Let’s get to it! 213 CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 214 EXAM TIP An information asset can be either the data, the device on which it is stored and used, or both. In the exam, when you see the term asset by itself, it typically means only the device. Information and Assets An asset can be defined as anything that is useful or valuable. In the context of products and services, this value is usually considered financially: how much would someone pay for it minus how much does the thing cost. If that value is positive, we call the thing an asset. However, if that value is negative (that is, the thing costs more than what someone would pay for it), then we call the thing a liability. Clearly, assets can be both tangible things like computers and firewalls and intangible things like data or reputation. It is important to narrow down the definition for purposes of the CISSP exam, so in this domain, we consider assets as tangible things and we deal with data separately. Information is a set of data items, placed in a context, and having some meaning. Data is just an item. It could be the word “yes,” the time “9:00,” or the name “Fernando’s Café” and, by itself, has no meaning. Put this data together in the context of an answer to the question “Would you like to have coffee tomorrow morning?” and now we have information. Namely, that we’ll be sharing a beverage tomorrow morning at a particular place. Data processing yields information, and this is why we often use these two terms interchangeably when talking about security issues. Identification Whether we are concerned with data security or asset security (or both), we first have to know what we have. Identification is simply establishing what something is. When you look at a computing device occupying a slot in your server rack, you may want to know what it is. You may want to identify it. The most common way of doing this is by placing tags on our assets and data. These tags can be physical (e.g., stickers), electronic (e.g., radio frequency identification [RFID] tags), or logical (e.g., software license keys). Using tags is critically important to establishing and maintaining accurate inventories of our assets. But what about data? Do we need to identify it and track it like we do with our more tangible assets? The answer is: it depends. Most organizations have at least some data that is so critical that, were it to become lost or corrupted or even made public, the impact would be severe. Think of financial records at a bank, or patient data at a healthcare provider. These organizations would have a very bad day indeed if any of those records were lost, inaccurate, or posted on the dark web. To prevent this, they go to great lengths to identify and track their sensitive information, usually by using metadata embedded in files or records. While it may not be critical (or even feasible) for many organizations to identify all their information, it is critical to most of us to at least decide how much effort should be put into protecting different types of data (or assets, for that matter). This is where classification comes in handy.  Chapter 5: Assets 215 Classification Classification just means saying that something belongs to a certain class. We could say, for example, that your personnel file belongs to the class named “private” and that your organization’s marketing brochure for the latest appliance belongs to the class “public.” Right away, we would have a sense that your file has more value to your organization than the brochure. The rationale behind assigning values to different assets and data is that this enables an organization to gauge the amount of funds and resources that should PART II go toward protecting each class, because not all assets and data have the same value to an organization. After identifying all important data, it should be properly classified. An organization copies and creates a lot of data that it must maintain, so classification is an ongoing process and not a one-time effort. Data Classification An important metadata item that should be attached to all our information is a clas- sification level. This classification tag, which remains attached (and perhaps updated) throughout the life cycle of the data, is important to determining the protective controls we apply to the data. Information can be classified by sensitivity, criticality, or both. Either way, the classification aims to quantify how much loss an organization would likely suffer if the information was lost. The sensitivity of information is commensurate with the losses to an organization if that information was revealed to unauthorized individuals. This kind of compromise has made headlines in recent years with the losses of information suffered by organizations such as Equifax, Sina Weibo, and Marriott International. In each case, the organizations lost trust and had to undertake expensive responses because sensitive data was compromised. The criticality of information, on the other hand, is an indicator of how the loss of the information would impact the fundamental business processes of the organization. In other words, critical information is that which is essential for the organization to continue operations. For example, Code Spaces, a company that provided code repository services, was forced to shut down in 2014 after an unidentified individual or group deleted its code repositories. This data was critical to the operations of the company and, without it, the corporation had no choice but to go out of business. Once data is segmented according to its sensitivity or criticality level, the organization can decide what security controls are necessary to protect different types of data. This ensures that information assets receive the appropriate level of protection, and classifications indicate the priority of that security protection. The primary purpose of data classification is to indicate the level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability protection that is required for each type of data set. Many people mistakenly only consider the confidentiality aspects of data protection, but we need to make sure our data is not modified in an unauthorized manner and that it is available when needed. Data classification helps ensure that data is protected in the most cost-effective manner. Protecting and maintaining data costs money, but spending money for the information that actually requires protection is important. If you were in charge of making sure Russia does not know the encryption algorithms used when transmitting information to and CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 216 from U.S. spy satellites, you would use more extreme (and expensive) security measures than you would use to protect your peanut butter and banana sandwich recipe from your next-door neighbor. Each classification should have separate handling requirements and procedures pertaining to how that data is accessed, used, and destroyed. For example, in a corporation, confidential information may be accessed only by senior management and a select few trusted employees throughout the company. Accessing the information may require two or more people to enter their access codes. Auditing could be very detailed and its results monitored daily, and paper copies of the information may be kept in a vault. To properly erase this data from the media, degaussing or overwriting procedures may be required. Other information in this company may be classified as sensitive, allowing a slightly larger group of people to view it. Access control on the information classified as sensitive may require only one set of credentials. Auditing happens but is only reviewed weekly, paper copies are kept in locked file cabinets, and the data can be deleted using regular measures when it is time to do so. Then, the rest of the information is marked public. All employees can access it, and no special auditing or destruction methods are required. EXAM TIP Each classification level should have its own handling and destruction requirements. Classification Levels There are no hard and fast rules on the classification levels that an organization should use. Table 5-1 explains the types of classifications available. An organization could choose to use any of the classification levels presented in Table 5-1. One organization may choose to use only two layers of classifications, while another organization may choose to use four. Note that some classifications are more commonly used for commercial businesses, whereas others are military classifications. The following are the common levels of sensitivity from the highest to the lowest for commercial business: Confidential Private Sensitive Public And here are the levels of sensitivity from the highest to the lowest for military purposes: Top secret Secret Confidential Controlled unclassified information Unclassified  Chapter 5: Assets 217 Organizations That Classification Definition Example Would Use This Public Disclosure is not welcome, How many people are Commercial but it would not cause an working on a specific business adverse impact to company project or personnel. Upcoming projects Sensitive Requires special precautions Financial information Commercial to ensure the integrity Details of projects business PART II and confidentiality of the Profit earnings and data by protecting it from forecasts unauthorized modification or deletion. Requires higher-than- normal assurance of accuracy and completeness. Private Personal information for Work history Commercial use within a company. Human resources business Unauthorized disclosure information could adversely affect Medical information personnel or the company. Confidential For use within the Trade secrets Commercial company only. Healthcare information business Data exempt from disclosure Programming code Military under the Freedom of Information that Information Act or other keeps the company laws and regulations. competitive Unauthorized disclosure could seriously affect a company. Unclassified Data is not sensitive or Computer manual and Military classified. warranty information Recruiting information Controlled Sensitive, but not secret. Health records Military unclassified Information that cannot Answers to test scores information legally be made public. (CUI) Secret If disclosed, it could cause Deployment plans for Military serious damage to national troops security. Unit readiness information Top secret If disclosed, it could cause Blueprints of new Military grave damage to national weapons security. Spy satellite information Espionage data Table 5-1 Commercial Business and Military Data Classifications CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 218 The classifications listed in Table 5-1 are commonly used in the industry, but there is a lot of variance. An organization first must decide the number of data classifications that best fit its security needs, then choose the classification naming scheme, and then define what the names in those schemes represent. Company A might use the classification level “confidential,” which represents its most sensitive information. Company B might use “top secret,” “secret,” and “confidential,” where confidential represents its least sensitive information. Each organization must develop an information classification scheme that best fits its business and security needs. EXAM TIP The terms “unclassified,” “secret,” and “top secret” are usually associated with governmental organizations. The terms “private,” “proprietary,” and “sensitive” are usually associated with nongovernmental organizations. It is important to not go overboard and come up with a long list of classifications, which will only cause confusion and frustration for the individuals who will use the system. The classifications should not be too restrictive either, because many types of data may need to be classified. As with every other issue in security, we must balance our business and security needs. Each classification should be unique and separate from the others and not have any overlapping effects. The classification process should also outline how information is controlled and handled through its life cycle (from creation to termination). NOTE An organization must make sure that whoever is backing up classified data—and whoever has access to backed-up data—has the necessary clearance level. A large security risk can be introduced if low-level technicians with no security clearance have access to this information during their tasks. Once the scheme is decided upon, the organization must develop the criteria it will use to decide what information goes into which classification. The following list shows some criteria parameters an organization may use to determine the sensitivity of data: The usefulness of data The value of data The age of data The level of damage that could be caused if the data were disclosed The level of damage that could be caused if the data were modified or corrupted Legal, regulatory, or contractual responsibility to protect the data Effects the data has on security Who should be able to access the data Who should maintain the data Who should be able to reproduce the data Lost opportunity costs that could be incurred if the data were not available or were corrupted  Chapter 5: Assets 219 Applications and sometimes whole systems may need to be classified. The applications that hold and process classified information should be evaluated for the level of protection they provide. You do not want a program filled with security vulnerabilities to process and “protect” your most sensitive information. The application classifications should be based on the assurance (confidence level) the organization has in the software and the type of information it can store and process. CAUTION The classification rules must apply to data no matter what format PART II it is in: digital, paper, video, fax, audio, and so on. Asset Classification Information is not the only thing we should classify. Consider that information must reside somewhere. If a confidential file is stored and processed in the CEO’s laptop, then that device (and its hard drive if it is removed) should also be considered worthy of more protection. Typically, the classification of an asset (like a removable drive or a laptop) used to store or process information should be as high as the classification of the most valuable data in it. If an asset has public, sensitive, and confidential information, then that asset should be classified as private (the highest of the three classifications) and protected accordingly. Classification Procedures The following outlines the necessary steps for a proper classification program: 1. Define classification levels. 2. Specify the criteria that will determine how data is classified. 3. Identify data owners who will be responsible for classifying data. 4. Identify the data custodian who will be responsible for maintaining data and its security level. 5. Indicate the security controls, or protection mechanisms, required for each classification level. 6. Document any exceptions to the previous classification issues. 7. Indicate the methods that can be used to transfer custody of the information to a different data owner. 8. Create a procedure to periodically review the classification and ownership. Communicate any changes to the data custodian. 9. Indicate procedures for declassifying the data. 10. Integrate these issues into the security awareness program so all employees understand how to handle data at different classification levels. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 220 Physical Security Considerations We discuss data security in detail in Chapter 10. However, that data lives physically in devices and printed documents, both of which require protection also. The main threats that physical security components combat are theft, interruptions to services, physical damage, compromised system and environment integrity, and unauthorized access. Real loss is determined by the cost to replace the stolen items, the negative effect on produc- tivity, the negative effect on reputation and customer confidence, fees for consultants that may need to be brought in, and the cost to restore lost data and production levels. Many times, organizations just perform an inventory of their hardware and provide value estimates that are plugged into risk analysis to determine what the cost to the organiza- tion would be if the equipment were stolen or destroyed. However, the data held within the equipment may be much more valuable than the equipment itself, and proper recov- ery mechanisms and procedures also need to be plugged into the risk assessment for a more realistic and fair assessment of cost. Let’s take a look at some of the controls we can use in order to mitigate risks to our data and to the media on which it resides. Protecting Mobile Devices Mobile devices are almost indispensable. For most of us, significant chunks of our per- sonal and work lives are chronicled in our smartphones or tablets. Employees who use these devices as they travel for work may have extremely sensitive company or customer data on their systems that can easily fall into the wrong hands. This problem can be mitigated to a point by ensuring our employees use company devices for their work, so we can implement policies and controls to protect them. Still, many organizations allow their staff members to bring their own devices (BYOD) to the workplace and/or use them for work functions. In these cases, it is not only security but also privacy that should receive serious attention. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to protecting company, let alone personal, mobile devices. Still, the following list provides some of the mechanisms that can be used to protect these devices and the data they hold: Inventory all mobile devices, including serial numbers, so they can be properly identified if they are stolen and then recovered. Harden the operating system by applying baseline secure configurations. Stay current with the latest security updates and patches. Ensure mobile devices have strong authentication. Register all devices with their respective vendors, and file a report with the vendor when a device is stolen. If a stolen device is sent in for repairs after it is stolen, it will be flagged by the vendor if you have reported the theft. Do not check mobile devices as luggage when flying. Always carry them on with you. Never leave a mobile device unattended, and carry it in a nondescript carrying case.  Chapter 5: Assets 221 Engrave the device with a symbol or number for proper identification. Back up all data on mobile devices to an organizationally controlled repository. Encrypt all data on a mobile device. Enable remote wiping of data on the device. Tracing software can be installed so that your device can “phone home” if it is taken from you. Several products offer this tracing capability. Once installed and configured, PART II the software periodically sends in a signal to a tracking center or allows you to track it through a website or application. If you report that your device has been stolen, the vendor of this software may work with service providers and law enforcement to track down and return your device. Paper Records It is easy to forget that many organizations still process information on paper records. The fact that this is relatively rare compared to the volume of their electronic counter- parts is little consolation when a printed e-mail with sensitive information finds its way into the wrong hands and potentially causes just as much damage. Here are some prin- ciples to consider when protecting paper records: Educate your staff on proper handling of paper records. Minimize the use of paper records. Ensure workspaces are kept tidy so it is easy to tell when sensitive papers are left exposed, and routinely audit workspaces to ensure sensitive documents are not exposed. Lock away all sensitive paperwork as soon as you are done with it. Prohibit taking sensitive paperwork home. Label all paperwork with its classification level. Ideally, also include its owner’s name and disposition (e.g., retention) instructions. Conduct random searches of employees’ bags as they leave the office to ensure sensitive materials are not being taken home. Destroy unneeded sensitive papers using a crosscut shredder, or consider contracting a document destruction company. Safes An organization may have need for a safe. Safes are commonly used to store backup data tapes, original contracts, or other types of valuables. The safe should be penetration resis- tant and provide fire protection. The types of safes an organization can choose from are Wall safe Embedded into the wall and easily hidden Floor safe Embedded into the floor and easily hidden CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 222 Chests Stand-alone safes Depositories Safes with slots, which allow the valuables to be easily slipped in Vaults Safes that are large enough to provide walk-in access If a safe has a combination lock, it should be changed periodically, and only a small subset of people should have access to the combination or key. The safe should be in a visible location, so anyone who is interacting with the safe can be seen. It should also be covered by a video surveillance system that records any activity around it. The goal is to uncover any unauthorized access attempts. Some safes have passive or thermal relocking functionality. If the safe has a passive relocking function, it can detect when someone attempts to tamper with it, in which case extra internal bolts will fall into place to ensure it cannot be compromised. If a safe has a thermal relocking function, when a certain temperature is met (possibly from drilling), an extra lock is implemented to ensure the valuables are properly protected. Managing the Life Cycle of Assets A life-cycle model describes the changes that an entity experiences during its lifetime. While it may seem odd to refer to assets as having a “life,” the fact is that their utility for (and presence within) organizations can be described with clear start and end points. That is the lifetime of the asset within that organization (even if it gets refurbished and used elsewhere). After the asset departs, its utility is oftentimes transferred to its replace- ment even if the new asset is different than the original in meaningful ways. That new asset will, in turn, be replaced by something else, and so on. The life cycle, which is shown in Figure 5-1, starts with the identification of a new requirement. Whoever identifies the new requirement either becomes its champion or Figure 5-1 The IT asset Replace or life cycle Dispose Business Case Operate & Maintain Create or Acquire  Chapter 5: Assets 223 finds someone else to do so. The champion for this requirement then makes a business case for it that shows that the existing assets are unable to satisfy this need. The champion also explains why the organization really should get a new asset, which typically includes a conversation about risks and return on investment (ROI). If the champion is successful, senior management validates the requirement and identifies the needed resources (people, money, time). The validated requirement then goes to a change management board, giving the different organizational stakeholders a say in what, how, and when the asset will be PART II acquired. This board’s goal is to ensure that this new asset doesn’t break any processes, introduce undue risks, or derail any ongoing projects. In mature organizations, the change management process also attempts to look over the horizon and see what the long-term ramifications of this asset might be. After the board determines how to proceed, the new asset is either developed in-house or acquired from a vendor. The third phase of asset management is also the longest one: operation and maintenance (O&M). Before the asset is put into operation, the IT and security operations teams configure it to balance three (sometimes competing) goals: it must be able to do whatever it was acquired to do, it must be able to do it without interfering or breaking anything else, and it must be secure. This configuration will almost certainly need to change over time, which is why we discuss configuration management in Chapter 20. NOTE This initial part of the O&M phase is usually the most problematic for a new asset and is a major driver for the use of an integrated product team (IPT) such as DevOps, which we discuss in Chapter 24. Eventually, the asset is no longer effective (in terms of function or cost) or required. At this point, it moves out of O&M and is retired. This move, as you may have already guessed, triggers another review by the change management board, because retiring the asset is likely to have effects on other resources or processes. Once the process of retirement is hashed out, the asset is removed from production. At this point, the organization needs to figure out what to do with the thing. If the asset stored any data, the data probably has to be purged. If the asset has any environmentally hazardous materials, it has to be properly discarded. If it might be useful to someone else, it might be donated or sold. At any rate, the loss of this asset may result in a new requirement being identified, which starts the whole asset management life cycle again, as shown in Figure 5-1. Ownership In most cases, whoever makes the business case for an asset ultimately owns it, but this is not always the case. Asset ownership, once the asset shows up and as long as it remains in the organization, entails responsibility for the effective management of the asset over its whole life cycle. Ownership in this sense is somewhat different than ownership in a strictly legal sense. The legal owner of a server could be the corporation that buys it, while the life cycle owner would be whatever employee or department is responsible for it on a day-to-day basis. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 224 Inventories One of the fundamental responsibilities for asset owners is to keep track of their assets. Though the approaches to tracking hardware and software vary, they are both widely recognized as critical controls. At the very least, it is very difficult to defend an asset that you don’t know you have. As obvious as this sounds, many organizations lack an accurate and timely inventory of their hardware and software. Tracking Hardware Seemingly, maintaining awareness of which devices are in your organization should be an easier task than tracking your software. A hardware device can be seen, touched, and bar-scanned. It can also be sensed electronically once it is connected to the network. If you have the right tools and processes available, tracking hardware should not be all that difficult, right? Not so fast. It turns out that the set of problems ranges from supply chain security to insider threats and everything in between. Let’s start with the basics. How do you ensure that a new device you’ve ordered is the right one and free of back doors or piracy issues? There have been multiple reports in the news media recently of confirmed or suspected back doors installed in hardware assets by either manufacturers (e.g., pirated hardware) or by third parties (e.g., government spy agencies) before the assets get to the organization that acquired them. In response to these and other threats, the International Organization for Standardization published ISO 28000:2007 as a means for organizations to use a consistent approach to securing their supply chains. In essence, we want to ensure we purchase from trusted sources, use a trusted transportation network, and have effective inspection processes to mitigate the risk of pirated, tampered, or stolen hardware. But even if we can assure ourselves that all the hardware we acquire is legitimate, how would we know if someone else were to add devices to our networks? Asset monitoring includes not only tracking our known devices but also identifying unknown ones that may occasionally pop up in our enclaves. Examples that come to mind from personal experience include rogue wireless access points, personal mobile devices, and even (believe it or not) telephone modems. Each introduces unknown (and thus unmitigated) risks. The solution is to have a comprehensive monitoring process that actively searches for these devices and ensures compliance with your organization’s security policies. In many cases, monitoring devices on the premises can be as simple as having a member of the security or IT team randomly walk through every space in the organization looking for things that are out of place. This becomes even more effective if this person does this after work hours and also looks for wireless networks as part of these walks. Alternatively, much of this monitoring can be done using device management platforms and a variety of sensors. Tracking Software Obviously, we can’t just walk around and inventory our software. The unique challenges of tracking software are similar to those of managing hardware, but with a few important differences. Unlike hardware, software assets can be copied or installed multiple times. This could be a problem from a licensing perspective. Commercial applications typically  Chapter 5: Assets 225 have limits on how many times you can install a single license. The terms of these licens- ing agreements vary wildly from single-use to enterprise-wide. It bears pointing out that tracking what software is installed on which systems, and for which users, is an important part of software asset management. Otherwise, you risk violating software licenses. Using unlicensed software not only is unethical but also exposes an organization to financial liability from the legitimate product vendors. This liability can manifest in a number of ways, including having the organization reported to the vendor by a disgruntled employee. It could also come up when certain software packages “phone PART II home” to the vendors’ servers or when downloading software patches and updates. Depending on the number and types of licenses, this could end up costing significant amounts of money in retroactive licensing fees. Pirated software is even more problematic because many forms of it include back doors installed by the pirates or are Trojan horses. Even if this were not the case, it would almost certainly be impossible to update or patch this software, which makes it inherently more insecure. Since no IT staff in their right mind would seriously consider using pirated software as an organizational policy, its presence on a network would suggest that at least some users have privileges that are being abused and to which they may not be entitled. Another problem created by the fact that you can copy and install software on multiple systems, apart from unlicensed or pirated software, is security. If you lose track of how many copies of which software are on your systems, it is harder to ensure they are all updated and patched. Vulnerability scanners and patch management systems are helpful in this regard, but depending on how these systems operate, you could end up with periods (perhaps indefinitely long) of vulnerability. The solution to the software tracking problem is multifaceted. It starts with an assessment of the legitimate application requirements of the organization. Perhaps some users need an expensive photo editing software suite, but its provisioning should be carefully controlled and only available to that set of users in order to minimize the licensing costs. Once the requirements are known and broken down by class of user, there are several ways to keep a handle on what software exists on which systems. Here are some of the most widely accepted best practices: Application whitelisting A whitelist is a list of software that is allowed to execute on a device or set of devices. Implementing this approach not only prevents unlicensed or unauthorized software from being installed but also protects against many classes of malware. Using Gold Masters A Gold Master is a standard image workstation or server that includes properly configured and authorized software. Organizations may have multiple images representing different sets of users. The use of Gold Masters simplifies new device provisioning and configuration, particularly if the users are not allowed to modify them. Enforcing the principle of least privilege If the typical users are not able to install any software on their devices, then it becomes a lot harder for rogue applications to show up in our networks. Furthermore, if we apply this approach, we mitigate risks from a very large set of attacks. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 226 Device management software Unified endpoint management (UEM) systems allow you to fully and remotely manage most devices, including smartphones, tablets, laptops, printers, and even Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Automated scanning Every device on your network should be periodically scanned to ensure it is running only approved software with proper configurations. Deviations from this policy should be logged and investigated by the IT or security team. Licensing Issues Companies have the ethical obligation to use only legitimately purchased software applications. Software makers and their industry representation groups such as The Software Alliance (BSA) use aggressive tactics to target companies that use pirated (illegal) copies of software. Companies are responsible for ensuring that software in the corporate environment is not pirated and that the licenses (that is, license counts) are being abided by. An operations or configuration management department is often where this capability is located in a company. Automated asset management systems, or more general system management systems, may be able to report on the software installed throughout an environment, including a count of installations of each. These counts should be compared regularly (perhaps quarterly) against the inventory of licensed applications and counts of licenses purchased for each application. Applications that are found in the environment and for which no license is known to have been purchased by the company, or applications found in excess of the number of licenses known to have been purchased, should be investigated. When applications are found in the environment for which the authorized change control and supply chain processes were not followed, they need to be brought under control, and the business area that acquired the application outside of the approved processes must be educated as to the legal and information security risks their actions may pose to the company. Many times, the business unit manager would need to sign a document indicating he understands this risk and is personally accepting it. An application for which no valid business need can be found should be removed, and the person who installed the application should be educated and warned that future such actions may result in more severe consequences—like termination. This may sound extreme, but installing pirated software is not only an ethical violation but also both a liability risk and a potential vector for introducing malware. Organizations that use or tolerate unlicensed products are sometimes turned in by disgruntled employees as an act of revenge. Companies should have an acceptable use policy (AUP) that indicates what software users can install and informs users that the environment will be surveyed from time to time to verify compliance. Technical controls should be emplaced to prevent unauthorized users from being able to install unauthorized software in the environment.  Chapter 5: Assets 227 A fundamental best practice in software asset management is to prevent users from installing software and requiring them to submit a request for a system administrator to do so instead. This allows the administrator to ensure the software is properly licensed and added to the appropriate management systems. It also enables effective configuration management across the enterprise. Controlling the existing hardware and software on our networks should be a precondition to provisioning new services and capabilities. To do otherwise risks making an already untenable position even worse. PART II Secure Provisioning The term “provisioning” is overloaded in the technology world, which is to say that it means different actions to different people. To a telecommunications service provider, it could mean the process of running wires, installing customer premises equipment, configuring services, and setting up accounts to provide a given service (e.g., DSL). To an IT department, it could mean the acquisition, configuration, and deployment of an information system (e.g., a new server) within a broader enterprise environment. Finally, to a cloud services provider, provisioning could mean automatically spinning up a new instance of that physical server that the IT department delivered to us. For the purpose of the CISSP exam, provisioning is the set of all activities required to provide one or more new information services to a user or group of users (“new” meaning previously not available to that user or group). Though this definition is admittedly broad, it does subsume all that the overloaded term means. As you will see in the following sections, the specific actions included in various types of provisioning vary significantly, while remaining squarely within our given definition. At the heart of provisioning is the imperative to provide these information services in a secure manner. In other words, we must ensure that both the services and the devices on which they rely are secure. We already discussed supply chain risks in asset acquisition in Chapter 2. So, assuming you have a trusted supply chain, you would want to start with a Gold Master image applied to your devices as soon as you receive them. Ideally, you would then configure them according to the needs defined in the business and adapted to whatever classes of user they will support. Finally, you scan for vulnerabilities (just to be sure) and deploy it on the network. Easy, right? Well, it gets a bit trickier when you deal with remote employees, which for many organizations are an increasing portion of their workforce. Some of the added concerns to consider are listed here: Securely shipping the devices to users Securely sending credentials to users Requirements for virtual private network (VPN) connectivity Remote monitoring of whether or not the device is on the VPN Making remote configuration changes Multifactor authentication while the device is disconnected CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 228 Obviously, the list of issues will very much depend on your particular situation. You may not have any remote users but perhaps you have a data center or hosting provider who owns the physical environment in which your assets reside. That presents its own set of concerns you need to think through in terms of secure provisioning. Finally, and perhaps inescapably, many of us have to consider unique issues when dealing with cloud assets. Provisioning Cloud Assets Generally, cloud provisioning is the set of all activities required to provide one or more new cloud assets to a user or group of users. So what exactly are these cloud assets? As we will see in Chapter 7, cloud computing is generally divided into three types of service: Infrastruc- ture as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS). The provisioning of each type of service presents its own set of issues. When we are dealing with provisioning IaaS assets, our user population is limited to the IT department. To see why this is true, we need only consider a noncloud (that is, physical) equivalent: provisioning a new server or router. Because these assets typically impact a large number of users in the organization, we must be very careful in planning and testing their provisioning. Accordingly, these provisioning actions often require the approval of the senior leadership or of the change control committee. Only a very small group of IT personnel should be able to perform such provisioning. PaaS is similar to IaaS in terms of organizational impact, but oftentimes has a more limited scope. A platform, in this context, is typically a service such as a web or database management service. Though the IT team typically handles the provisioning, in some cases someone else in the organization may handle it. Consider, for example, the case of a development (intranet-only) web service that is being provisioned to test a web application that a team of coders is developing. Depending on the scope, context, and accessibility, this provisioning could be delegated to any one of the developers, though someone in IT would first constrain the platform to ensure it is accessible only to that team. Finally, SaaS could be provisioned by a larger pool of users within the constraints established by the IT team in accordance with the organizational policy. If a given group of users is authorized to use the customer relationship management (CRM) system, then those users should be able to log into their accounts and self-provision that and any other applications to which they are authorized. As you can see, the provisioning of cloud assets should be increasingly more controlled depending on the organizational impact and the risk profile of the specific asset. The key to secure provisioning is carefully setting up the cloud computing environment so that properly configured applications, platforms, and infrastructure are rapidly available to authorized users when and where they need them. After all, one of the benefits of cloud computing is the promise of self-service provisioning in near real time. Asset Retention Assets typically remain in use until they are no longer required, they become obsolete, or their O&M costs exceed their value to the organization. If they are no longer required, they may still be retained for some time in anticipation of future needs or perhaps for emergency use. Asset retention should be a deliberate decision that is documented and periodically revisited. Ideally, this is done as part of the change management process to ensure the retained (and no longer in use) assets don’t pose undue risks.  Chapter 5: Assets 229 Suppose your organization has a policy of refreshing laptops for its workforce every three years. After the latest refresh, you end up with a dozen laptops that are no longer required. Someone suggests you keep them around in case of an emergency, so you do. A couple of refresh cycles later, you end up with dozens of laptops (some of them potentially unable to run modern software) clogging up your storage spaces. This is a problem for at least four reasons. Firstly, you’ve run out of storage space. Secondly, there is a risk of theft since nobody is paying much attention to the laptops in the closet. Thirdly, they may no longer work when that emergency finally happens and you decide to pull them out and PART II use them. Finally, and perhaps most seriously, unless they were properly decommissioned, they could have sensitive data in their disk drives that nobody is aware of. Your asset retention decision-making should consider the fact that your asset life cycle may differ from its manufacturer’s intended one. Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sell a particular product only for a specific period of time, typically one to three years. After that, they’ll move on to the next version or may stop making it altogether. Either way, the product is no longer sold. OEMs will, however, continue to support their product after this point for some time, usually another three to six years. Replacement parts may still be sold and customer support resources will remain available to registered owners. End-of-life (EOL) for an asset is that point in time when its OEM is neither manufacturing nor sustaining it. In other words, you can’t send it in for repairs, buy spare parts, or get technical assistance from the OEM. The risk in using assets after their announced EOL is that hardware failures will be much more difficult to address at reasonable costs. There is a related term, end-of-support (EOS), which is sometimes also called end- of-service-life (EOSL), that means that the manufacturer is no longer patching bugs or vulnerabilities on the product. Typically, manufacturers will continue issuing patches after a product reaches EOL for another few years. Sometimes, however, EOL and EOS coincide. Either way, we face significant risk after the product reaches EOS because whatever vulnerabilities are discovered will remain unpatched, meaning the asset is much more likely to be exploited. Whether the business needs change or the asset reaches EOL or EOS, eventually it’s time to retire it, which may drive a new business case. Before throwing an asset in the recycling bin, however, we need to properly decommission it. Decommissioning Assets Once an asset has reached the end of its useful life in your organization, it’s important to follow a thorough process to decommission it. Decommissioning is the set of all activities required to permanently remove an existing asset from an operational environment. In a way, it is the opposite of provisioning. The specific tasks required to decommission assets vary greatly depending on what the asset is. However, there are some overarching thoughts to consider before pulling the proverbial plug. These include the following: Decommission only within the change management process. The only way to minimize the risk of unintended (adverse) consequences when you pull the plug is to ensure that everyone who may have a stake in the asset is part of the decision. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 230 Ensure that the asset is no longer in use. It may seem obvious, but there may be unknown users (or uses) of the asset that were never properly documented. You’d hate to pull the plug, only to find out you killed a critical business process. Review the impact on data retention. We’ll discuss data retention later in this chapter, but you have to ensure that there isn’t any data in the asset (and only in that asset) that needs to be preserved. Securely wipe any data on the asset. It seems like just about every asset has the potential to hold sensitive data in nonvolatile memory or disk. Be sure you understand the persistent data storage capabilities in the asset, and you wipe them. Safely dispose of the hardware. Many assets have hazardous components such as lithium batteries that require special handling. Don’t just toss that old computer into the dumpster before checking for environmental or safety hazards first. Data Life Cycle The data life cycle differs from the asset life cycle in some important ways. First, it usu- ally doesn’t cost anything to acquire most of the data our organizations use. Sure, there are notable exceptions, but, overall, we don’t really have to demonstrate the ROI or get the chief financial officer (CFO) to agree that we need to know what each customer buys on an e-commerce site. (Actually, a CFO should be justifiably worried if that data is not being collected.) Another significant difference is that we can share our data with as many others as we’d like without losing it. Finally, data tends to be archived rather than disposed of when it is no longer immediately useful. Sure, we can put a workstation in a storage room in case we need it later, but this is the exception rather than the norm when dealing with tangible assets. There are a number of data life-cycle models out there. The one we will use for our discussion is fairly simple but still effective when considering the changing nature of data and the security implications of those dynamics. At a macro level, we can divide the life of our data into six phases: acquisition, storage, use, sharing, archival, and destruction, as shown in Figure 5-2. Data Acquisition Generally speaking, data is acquired by an organization in one of three ways: collected directly, copied from elsewhere, or created from scratch. Collection is possible when an organization has sensors in an environment of interest. For example, an e-commerce site has a web server that can collect the IP address of visitors and what page referred them to the site. The application server can further collect the identity of each customer, which products they explored, and what they eventually bought. All this data can be enhanced by buying customer data from ad agencies and having it copied into a local data store. Finally, the marketing department can analyze all that data and create reports and forecasts.  Chapter 5: Assets 231 Figure 5-2 The data life cycle Acquisition Storage PART II Destruction Use Archival Sharing Data Collection We must ensure that the data we collect, particularly when it is personal in nature, is necessary for our jobs. Generally speaking, organizations should collect the least amount of private personal data required for the performance of their business functions. In many cases, this is not a matter of choice but of law. As of 2020, over 128 countries have enacted privacy protection laws that affect organizations within their jurisdictions. It is important to note that privacy protections vary widely among countries. The European Union is one of the most restrictive regions with respect to privacy, while China effec- tively has no restrictions, and therefore no real privacy protections. The United States has very few restrictions on the collection of private data by nongovernmental organizations at the national level, but has states such as California with protections similar to those of the EU. The point is that you have to be aware of the specific privacy laws that pertain to the places in which your organization stores or uses its data. This is particularly impor- tant when you outsource services (which may require access to your data) to third parties in a different country. Apart from applicable laws and regulations, the types of personal data that your organization collects, as well as its life-cycle considerations, must be a matter of explicit written policy. Your privacy policy needs to cover your organization’s collection, use, disclosure, and protection of employee and client data. Many organizations break their privacy policy into two documents: an internal document that covers employee data, and an external document that covers customer information. At a minimum, you want to answer the following questions when writing your policy: What personal data is collected (e.g., name, website visits, e-mail messages, etc.)? Why do we collect this data and how do we use it (e.g., to provide a service, for security)? CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 232 With whom do we share this data (e.g., third-party providers, law enforcement agencies)? Who owns the collected data (e.g., subject, organization)? What rights does the subject of this data have with regard to it (e.g., opt out, restrictions)? When do we destroy the data (e.g., after five years, never)? What specific laws or regulations exist that pertain to this data (e.g., HIPAA, GDPR)? Data Storage After data is acquired, but before it can be used, it must be stored somewhere. There are also other steps we must take to make the information useful. Typically, we attach both system metadata (e.g., author, date/time of creation, and permissions) and business pro- cess metadata (e.g., classification, project, and owner) to it. Finally, the data is indexed to facilitate searching and assigned to one or more data stores. In smaller organizations, much of this process is invisible to the user. All that person knows is that when they create a contact in the CRM system, an order in the purchasing system, or a ticket in the workflow system, the entry is magically available to everyone in the organization who needs to access the information. In larger organizations, the process needs to be carefully architected. Finally, there are policy controls that we have to apply. For instance, we have to encrypt credit card numbers and certain other personally identifiable information (PII) wherever Where in the World Is My Data? Data location can be a particularly important issue, especially when dealing with personal, healthcare, or national security data. As we discussed in Chapter 3, some countries have data localization laws that require certain types of data to be stored and processed in that country (examples include China and Russia). Other coun- tries have enacted data sovereignty laws that stipulate that anyone who stores or pro- cesses certain types of data (typically personal data on their citizens), whether or not they do so locally, must comply with those countries’ laws. Meeting these require- ments can be impossible without data classification. It can also be either enabled or hindered by cloud services. Used properly, cloud service providers can help ensure data localization requirements are met by restricting certain classifications of data to a region or even a specific country. If, on the other hand, data location is not con- sidered when architecting a cloud solution, it is very likely that sensitive data will end up in some random location at some point, potentially causing no shortage of headaches (and perhaps legal and financial liability) to its owners.  Chapter 5: Assets 233 we store them. We also have to implement strict controls on who gets to access sensitive information. Additionally, we may have to provide some sort of rollback capability to revert data to a previous state, particularly if users or processes may be able to corrupt it. These and many other important considerations must be deliberately addressed as we store the data and not as an afterthought. Data Retention There is no universal agreement on how long an organization should retain data. Legal PART II and regulatory requirements (where they exist) vary among countries and business sectors. What is universal is the need to ensure your organization has and follows a documented data retention policy. Doing otherwise is flirting with disaster, particu- larly when dealing with pending or ongoing litigation. It is not enough, of course, to simply have a policy; you must ensure it is being followed, and you must document this through regular audits. NOTE When outsourcing data storage, it is important to specify in the contract language how long the storage provider will retain your data after you stop doing business with them and what process they will use to eradicate your data from their systems. A very straightforward and perhaps tempting approach would be to look at the lengthiest legal or regulatory retention requirement imposed on your organization and then apply that timeframe to all your data retention. The problem with this approach is that it will probably make your retained data set orders of magnitude greater than it needs to be. Not only does this impose additional storage costs, but it also makes it more difficult to comply with electronic discovery (e-discovery) orders. When you receive an e-discovery order from a court, you are typically required to produce a specific amount of data (usually pretty large) within a given timeframe (usually very short). Obviously, the more data you retain, the more difficult and expensive this process will be. A better approach is to segregate the specific data sets that have mandated retention requirements and handle those accordingly. Everything else should have a retention period that minimally satisfies the business requirements. Commonly, different business units within medium and large organizations have different retention requirements. For instance, a company may want to keep data from its research and development (R&D) division for a much longer period than it keeps data from its customer service division. R&D projects that are not particularly helpful today may be so at a later date, but audio recordings of customer service calls probably don’t have to hang around for several years. NOTE Be sure to get buy-in from your legal counsel when developing or modifying data retention and privacy policies. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 234 Developing a Retention Policy At its core, every data retention policy answers three fundamental questions: What data do we keep? How long do we keep this data? Where do we keep this data? Most security professionals understand the first two questions. After all, many of us are used to keeping tax records for three years in case we get audited. The “what” and the “how long” are easy. The last question, however, surprises more than a few of us. The twist is that the question is not so much about the location per se, but rather the manner in which the data is kept at that location. In order to be useful to us, retained data must be easy to locate and retrieve. Think about it this way. Suppose your organization had a business transaction with Acme Corporation in which you learned that Acme was involved in the sale of a particular service to a client in another country. Two years later, you receive a third- party subpoena asking for any data you may have regarding that sale. You know you retain all your data for three years, but you have no idea where the relevant data may be. Was it an e-mail, a recording of a phone conversation, the minutes from a meeting, or something else? Where would you go looking for it? Alternatively, how could you make a case to the court that locating and providing the data would be too costly for your organization? What Data We Retain There are many reasons to retain data. Among the more common ones are data analysis (to plot trends and make predictions), historical knowledge (how did we deal with this in the past?), and regulatory requirements. Again, legal counsel must be involved in this process to ensure all legal obligations are being met. Beyond these obligations, there will be specific information that is important to the business for a variety of reasons. It is also worth considering what data might be valuable in light of business arrangements, partnerships, or third-party dealings. The decision to retain data must be deliberate, specific, and enforceable. We want to keep only the data that we consciously decide to keep, and then we want to ensure that we can enforce that retention. Importantly, there should be a way for us to ensure that data that should not be retained is promptly and properly disposed of. If this sounds painful, we need only consider the consequences of not getting this process right. Many companies have endured undue hardships because they couldn’t develop, implement, and enforce a proper retention policy. Among the biggest challenges in this realm is the balance between business needs and employee or customer privacy. How Long We Retain Once upon a time, there were two main data retention longevity approaches: the “keep nothing” camp and the “keep everything” camp. As the legal processes caught up with modern computer technology, it became clear that (except in very limited cases) these approaches were not acceptable. For starters, whether they  Chapter 5: Assets 235 Data Retention in the Age of Big Data The term big data refers to collections of data that exhibit five characteristics: volume, velocity, variety, veracity, and value. Volume refers to the sheer size of the data collection, which exceeds what can reasonably be stored in traditional systems like a regular data server or a conventional database management system. Velocity describes the high speed with which new data is added, while variety means that the data is not all in the same format or even concerning the same PART II things. Because the data comes from a multitude of sources, its veracity is difficult to establish, but we oftentimes deal with this by looking for trends and clusters rather than individual data points. Finally, there is an expectation that all this data adds value to our organizations, which justifies the costs of storing and processing it in the first place. This last point is the crux of data retention in the age of big data: just because we can keep every data point from every business unit and occasionally get valuable insights is not sufficient reason to keep the data. It is far easier (and way more cost effective) to develop a retention policy that allows us to build big data stores as needed, but does so in a way that balances risks, costs, and value. Are there privacy or confidentiality issues concerning any of the data? Could any data create a legal liability for the organization? Is any of the data likely to be subject to e-discovery? If so, how difficult would it be to comply with an e-discovery order? Apart from any legal or regulatory concerns, there’s also the practical one of deciding what data is useful and what is just taking up storage space. Even if the price tag of storage doesn’t seem excessive now, left unchecked, we can get there quicker than expected if we keep pumping data in. And when we get there, how would we go about removing the data we no longer want or need? This all underscores the importance of being deliberate about building our big data stores and having policies and procedures that support valid organizational requirements, while mitigating risks at a reasonable cost. retained nothing or everything, organizations following one of these extreme approaches found out it was difficult to defend themselves in lawsuits. The first group had nothing with which to show due diligence, for instance, while those in the second group had too much information that plaintiffs could use against them. So what is the right data retention policy? Ask your legal counsel. Seriously. There are myriads of statutory and regulatory retention requirements, which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (sometimes even within the same country). There are also best practices and case law to consider, so we won’t attempt to get too specific here. Still, Table 5-2 provides some general guidelines sufficient to start the conversation with your attorneys. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 236 Type of Data General Period of Retention Business documents (e.g., meeting minutes) 7 years Invoices 5 years Accounts payable and receivable 7 years Human resource files 7 years (for employees who leave) or 3 years (for candidates who were not hired) Tax records 3 years after taxes were paid Legal correspondence Permanently Table 5-2 Typical Retention Periods for Different Types of Data How We Retain Data In order for retained data to be useful, it must be accessible in a timely manner. It really does us no good to have data that takes an inordinate (and perhaps prohibitive) amount of effort to query. To ensure this accessibility, we need to consider various issues, including the ones listed here. Taxonomy A taxonomy is a scheme for classifying data. This classification can be made using a variety of categories, including functional (e.g., human resources, product development), chronological (e.g., 2020), organizational (e.g., executives, union employees), or any combination of these or other categories. Classification The sensitivity classification of the data determines the controls we place on it both while it is in use and when it gets archived. This is particularly important because many organizations protect sensitive information while in use, but not so much after it goes into the archives. Normalization Retained data comes in a variety of formats, including word processing documents, database records, flat files, images, PDF files, video, and so on. Simply storing the data in its original format is not sufficient in any but the most trivial cases. Instead, we need to develop tagging schemas that make the data searchable. Indexing Retained data must be searchable if we are to quickly pull out specific items of interest. The most common approach to making data searchable is to build indexes for it. Many archiving systems implement this feature, but others do not. Either way, the indexing approach must support the likely future queries on the archived data. Ideally, archiving occurs in a centralized, regimented, and homogenous manner. We all know, however, that this is seldom the case. We may have to compromise in order to arrive at solutions that meet our minimum requirements within our resource constraints. Still, as we plan and execute our retention strategies, we must remain focused on how we will efficiently access archived data many months or years later. E-Discovery Discovery of electronically stored information (ESI), or e-discovery, is the process of producing for a court or external attorney all ESI pertinent to a legal proceeding. For example, if your company is being sued for damages resulting from a faulty product,  Chapter 5: Assets 237 the plaintiff ’s attorney could get an e-discovery order compelling you to produce all e-mail between the QA team and senior executives in which the product’s faults are dis- cussed. If your data retention policy and procedures are adequate, e-discovery should not require excessive efforts. If, on the other hand, you have been slack about retention, such an order could cripple the organization. The Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) identifies eight steps, though they are not necessarily all required, nor are they performed in a linear manner: PART II 1. Identification of data required under the order. 2. Preservation of this data to ensure it is not accidentally or routinely destroyed while complying with the order. 3. Collection of the data from the various stores in which it may be. 4. Processing to ensure the correct format is used for both the data and its metadata. 5. Review of the data to ensure it is relevant. 6. Analysis of the data for proper context. 7. Production of the final data set to those requesting it. 8. Presentation of the data to external audiences to prove or disprove a claim. Electronic Discovery Reference Model Processing Preservation Information Identification Review Production Presentation Governance Collection Analysis Volume Relevance (Source: EDRM; www.edrm.net) Data Use After data is acquired and stored, it will spend much of its time being used. That is to say it will be read and modified by a variety of users with the necessary access level. From a security perspective, this stage in the data life cycle presents the most challenges in terms of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability. You want the information available, but only to the right people who should then be able to modify it in authorized ways. Consistency is also an issue with regard to policy and regulatory compliance. As the information is used and aggregated, it may trigger requirements that must be automatically enforced. For example, a document that refers to a project using a code word or name CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 238 may be unclassified and freely available, but if that word/name is used in conjunction with other details (a place, purpose, or team members’ names), then it would make the entire document classified. Changes in the information as it is in use must be mapped to the appropriate internal policies, and perhaps to regulations or laws. Data Maintenance As data is being used, we have to ensure that it remains accurate and internally consistent. Suppose that Sally is a salesperson in our organization. She meets a prospective customer named Charlie and enters his contact information and other details into a CRM system. E-mails are exchanged, meetings are scheduled, and documents are filed with Charlie’s data. One day, Charlie gets a promotion and moves to corporate headquarters. Just like that, his title, phone number, and address all change. How do we ensure that we update this data and that we do it across the entire organization? Sure, the CRM piece is easy, but what about the myriad of other places in which the now obsolete data exists? We need to have a plan for maintaining the accuracy of data that is being used and may be critical to our business processes. We must also consider what happens when the data is incorrect when it is first acquired. There was a recent story in the news about a police clerk who incorrectly entered the personal information of a convicted murderer who had just been transferred to his station. The information was actually that of an innocent citizen who had, earlier that day, applied for a permit. The erroneous information was shared across the country with local, national, and even private organizations. By the time the error was discovered, there was no way to globally correct the entry. To this day, that innocent man is periodically denied employment or services because some system shows that he is a convicted murderer. For most of our organizations, this scenario would likely result in hefty fines or a major lawsuit unless we had an effective way to maintain our data. Another case for data maintenance deals with corruption and inconsistencies. For instance, if we have multiple data stores for performance or reliability purposes, we must ensure that modifications to the data are replicated. We also need to have mechanisms for automatically resolving inconsistencies, such as those that would occur from a server having a power outage after data has been modified but before it has been replicated. This is particularly important in very dynamic systems that have rollback capabilities. Data Sharing Gone are the days when any of us could accomplish anything significant solely on our own. Virtually every organization in the world, particularly those with information sys- tems, is part of a supply chain. Information sharing is a key enabler of modern supply chains. Without it, we wouldn’t be able to log into our systems (especially if you have a third-party identity management service like Google or Facebook), send or receive e-mail, or sell widgets online (it’s hard to sell something without sharing payment card information with a payment processor). While we all have some data sharing requirements imposed by our IT infrastructure, we also willingly share data with others for specific business reasons. For example, an e-commerce site will almost certainly partner with a digital advertising firm to drum up  Chapter 5: Assets 239 business and with a logistics company to deliver tangible goods. It may also partner with other companies that offer complementary goods or services and collect referral fees from each other. There are many other reasons to share data, but the important concept here is that this sharing needs to be deliberate. If you share the wrong data, or do so in the wrong way, you could lose competitive advantage or even break the law. To avoid data sharing nightmares, be sure to involve all the necessary staff (business, IT, security, legal) in the conversation early. Discuss the business need to share data and restrict that data to the minimum essential to satisfy that need. Document the agreement PART II in a legally binding contract that’s been approved by your legal counsel. This agreement needs to specify the obligations of each party with regard to the entire shared data life cycle. For example, what data will be shared, how it will be stored and used by each party, with whom it may be shared, how it will be archived and for how long, and, finally, when and how it will be destroyed. Data Archival The data in our systems will likely stop being used regularly (or at all) at some point. When this happens, but before we get rid of it, we probably want to retain it for a vari- ety of reasons. Maybe we anticipate that it will again be useful at a later time, or maybe we are required to keep it around for a certain period of time, as is the case with certain financial information. Whatever the reason for moving this data off to the side, the fact that it is no longer regularly used could mean that unauthorized or accidental access and changes to it could go undetected for a long time if we don’t implement appropriate controls. Of course, the same lack of use could make it easier to detect this threat if we do have the right controls. Another driver for retention is the need for backups. Whether we’re talking about user or back-end backups, it is important to consider our risk assessment when deciding which backups are protected and how. To the extent that end-user backups are performed to removable disk drives, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which these backups should not be encrypted. Every major operating system provides a means to perform automatic backups as well as encrypt those backups. Let’s take advantage of this. This all leads us to the question of how long we need to retain data. If we discard it too soon, we risk not being able to recover from a failure or an attack. We also risk not being able to comply with e-discovery requests or subpoenas. If we keep the data for too long, Backup vs. Archive The terms backup and archive are sometimes used interchangeably. In reality, they have different meanings that are best illustrated using the life-cycle model described in this section. A data backup is a copy of a data set currently in use that is made for the purpose of recovering from the loss of the original data. Backup data normally becomes less useful as it gets older. A data archive is a copy of a data set that is no longer in use, but is kept in case it is needed at some future point. When data is archived, it is usually removed from its original location so that the storage space is available for data in use. CISSP All-in-One Exam Guide 240 we risk excessive costs as well as increased liabilities. The answer, once again, is that this is all part of our risk management process and needs to be codified in policies. Data Destruction Sooner or later, every organization will have to dispose of data. This usually, but not always, means data destruction. Old mailboxes, former employee records, and past finan- cial transactions are all examples of data sets that must, at some point, be destroyed. When this time comes, there are two important issues to consider: that the data does in fact get destroyed, and that it is destroyed correctly. When we discuss roles and respon- sibilities later in this chapter, we’ll see who is responsible for ensuring that both of these issues are taken care of. A twist on the data destruction issue is when we need to transfer the data to another party and then destroy it on our data stores. For instance, organizations hosting services for their clients typically have to deal with requests to do a bulk export of their data when they migrate to another provider. Companies sometimes sell accounts (e.g., home mortgages) to each other, in which case the data is transferred and eventually (after the mandatory retention period) destroyed on the original company’s systems. No matter the reason, we have to ensure that the data is properly destroyed. How this is done is, again, tied to our risk management. The bottom line is that the data must be rendered sufficiently difficult for an adversary to recover so that the risk of such recovery is acceptable to our organization. This is not hard to do when we are dealing with physical devices such as hard disk drives that can be wiped, degaussed, or shredded (or all of these in particularly risk-adverse organizations such as certain government entities). Data destruction can be a bit more complicated when we deal with individual files (or parts thereof ) or database records (such as many e-mail systems use for mailbox storage). Further complicating matters, it is very common for multiple copies of each data item to exist across our information systems. How can you ensure that all versions are gone? The point is that the technical details of how and where the data is stored are critical to ensuring its proper destruction. Data Remanence Even when policies exist (and are enforced and audited) to ensure the protection of privacy, it is possible for technical issues to threaten this privacy. It is a well-known fact that most data deletion operations do not, in fact, erase anything; normally, they simply mark the memory as available for other data, without wiping (or even erasing) the origi- nal data. This is true not only of file systems but also of databases. Since it is difficult to imagine a data store that would not fit in either of these two constructs, it should be clear that simply “deleting” data will likely result in data remanence issues. NOTE NIST Special Publication 800-88, Revision 1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization (December 2014), describes the best practices for combating data remanence. Let’s consider what happens when we create a text file using the File Allocation Table (FAT) file system. Though this original form of FAT is antiquated, its core constructs  Chapter 5: Assets 241 Figure 5-3 Root Directory Writing a text Story1.txt 161 803 file to disk Story2.txt 163 714 Ricin.txt 222 0.663 PART II FAT 0 162 EOF 164 EOF 0 0 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 Disk 165 164 163................................................................ a Mouse to of your favo to help you, “You ridicul the ropic wit to the groun cought by so It happend sure to repo “If you woul kill him, who Rising up an from sleep b The Lion an.............. (e.g., disk blocks, free block list/table, file metadata table) are also found at the heart of all other modern file systems. Its simplicity makes it a wonderful training tool for the purpose of explaining file creation and deletion. Suppose we type up the famous Aesop fable titled “The Lion and the Mouse” in a text editor and save it to disk. The operating system will ask us for a filename, which will be Story2.txt for this example. The system will then check the File Allocation Table for available blocks on which to store the text file. As shown in Figure 5-3, the system creates a directory entry for the file containing the name (Story2.txt), location of the first block (163), and the file size in bytes (714). In our simplistic example, each block is 512 bytes in size, so we’ll need two of them. Fortunately, block 164 is right next to the start block and is also free. The system will use the entry for block 163 (the first block of the file) to point to the next block containing it (164). This allows files to occupy discontinuous blocks if the disk is heavily fragmented. That chain of blocks could be quite long if the file was big enough and we didn’t run out of disk space first. In our simple example, however, we just need two blocks, so block 164 is the final one in use and gets a special label of EOF to denote the end of the file. Suppose we