Chatterjee, Introduction to Indian Philosophy - PDF

CJTAPTER 111 ’1'›iE JAINA PPI:sOsornt I. Ih'¥RODTfCTIO2s The Jainab“ recouiit the frames of twenty-four teachers The founders of (tiithxiikaras; thl-ough whom their °' ^ faith is believed...

CJTAPTER 111 ’1'›iE JAINA PPI:sOsornt I. Ih'¥RODTfCTIO2s The Jainab“ recouiit the frames of twenty-four teachers The founders of (tiithxiikaras; thl-ough whom their °' ^ faith is believed to have come down lroiii tiiikriowii antiquity. The {ii st of these teachers was I3nabli:tdeva. The last was Ya@haniäna, nlso styled bfahiivii a (‘the breat hero’). the ta said to lieve lived in the sixth century B.C. during the time of C oiama- Buddha. The teacher who imeiediately prec‹:ded Vardhamäna was Par$ranätha, who lived in the ninth century B.(i. The olher twenty-twti teachers belorig to pre-historie ageE.' The woi'd ‹tina› ety- iuolo;;iCilily 'ilii‘iillB 8 conqueror. It is the common name applied to the twenty four teaohers, because they have coiiquered ail passioriB *räga and dve5a) and tia ve attaiiied liberatiou. Tlio Jainas do mot Gelieve in Crod. 'Ihey adore the net ri« :»ipjpg '£irthaïïkaraa or the founders of the fG'th. faith. 'I'hese are the liberated come who were once in bundage, but became, through their own e8orl.s, free, perfect, omniscient, omnipoterit and all-blissfu1. Tha Jainas believe that every spirit (jiva), that is in boodage now, can follow the example actby F F » complete aooou»i, »id‹ Th» flu « ‹str« of Bhadmbiiin lJncobi, Jaiti« aiifrar, 1'art II and Mtrs. 9teveneon’s 7'he Heoét oJ  the Jinas and attain, like theni„perfect knowledge, power a.nd joy. 'I'his is the great eloiiieilt of optlmiGlIl that inspirer› ever,y truc Jaina with abeuiute self-eoIl- fideiice. The possibility of the ieaiizatiozi of iibsolute perfection, through peroinal effoit. is for him not 8 niere specu rat ion but a promise repeated fry the life of every liberated saint. In course o f time Ïhe foJlon ers of faiiiisin were the Svt tauiba'as and the an‘ D'gauib'’‘‘ 'the diiierent'e be- Dt anibar'as. tween them lies, liowevei‘, not so iiiiiuli iii tire basit' philosophical docti'inee aa in some iiHnor detaila of faith and practice. 'Phe teat'liing.« of tlit*.Iinas ore accepted hy both the sects. But the Digarnb ps are more rigorous and puritanic, while the 6vetambaraa are more actonimodating to the common frailties ‹›f men. The Digoiubaras hold, for example, ili:it as‹ etics should give up all poasesuiona, even clothes, ivliereas the iIvetâriil›aran hold that they should put oii white clothes.' Again, accordin{; to the lvi iiiiibarus,a saint women cannot obtain liberaiion (u ithout beiiig born once more as rrieii). 'the Sveiiiiiibara do not accept theae views. Jainism possesses a vast literatui'e, mostly in Präkrta. 'thecanonieal or authori- Jnino Literature. ’ tative worke accepted by all eeets are sam to eontaiii the teaciiings of the last Tirthaïi- karii, Mahiivïra. They aretoomaiiy to be inentioned ' Diä6t°bntn' lit4tally ineane node and ' flietanibaro' qh;te.  CRE JAINA PB]LOSOPIIY 86 here. Much of the early literature haa been lost. When Jainisui had tu defend itself a.gainst the criti- cism of other achouls, it adopted, for this purpose, the technical phiioeopliic:il terminoiogy of ganakrii ana thus developed ita literature in ,}iaiisi‹rit as well. The philosophical outiook of Jaiiiism ia coimon- sense realim and luralisin. 'Phe obje‹:ts perceived by us nre real, and they are many. The world consiata of 4wo kinda of reality, living aiid non-living. Every living being li;ia a spirit outlook of Jainis i. ora eoul (jiva),q however iitiperfect iia body may be. Avoidance ct all injur3' to life (ahiinsä) piays, therefore, an impor- tant röle in Jaina ethiek. Along with tiiis respec,t for' life there is iii Jainism another b reat element, nainely, t-eapect for the opinion of others. 'Phis last attitude is justified by a metapliysical theory of reality as niany- faced (anekäntaväda) and a consequent logical doetrine (syäilväda) tlfat every juJgiiieiit is subjeet to aonie' contlit rem and liiiiit at ioii, und various jud{; irielits about the maine reality iriii), t lierel'ore, lee true, each in its own seiise, subject te its ‹»x'n conditioii. The plnlo phy ol’ the JiiiiiaE iila3' be convenieiltly tÏlbtiUshttI Ii ttÖür t lll'cc topics, r iz. Jïipisi einology (or theory ol’ knowledge includin magic), hletaphysics, and Ethics oud Belig'ion. ÏÏ. ATtE )AINA T tEORY OF ÊNOWLEIiGR ,.’ 1. The Natureatid JfitiJö o] fÉttotoledge C'uiisciouaiiess is the iilseparable essetico o1'every, houI, according to the Gainab; it is accidental property, ariaing only ’fl6 *NINTRODPOTION lo INDIAN @EIL06OPB¥ under some conditions. Moreoyer, consciousness is conceived like the sun's right, t'aJiable of manifesting itself and every thing elee unless "^" nome obsti'ur'tion }n'esents it ivom , reaching iis object.' Had there been rio obstacles, the soul would ha*e been omniscient. Omniscient:e is a potentiality inherent ine+97 eoul. As it is, however, we find ihat ordinary eouls are all more orless ignorant; their knowledge is limited. The Jainas hold that this limitation in due to the obstacles created by di8erent karnias which obstruct iii diBerent degrees fire natural aoiisciouboess of the eoul' arid thuB deprive it of its omniscience. 'the body, the senses and the mind (mamas) are all constituted by karmas and t.he soul's power islimited by them. Life other thinkers, the Jaimes adeiit the twofold classification of knowledge into IwwMbte aa4^"'” iminediaie and mediate (aparoksa. atekaoYñcdge. and parok§a). But they point out that what is ordinarily redarded as immediate kiiow- led,ie is only rslotioefp imiziediate. Perception of exterlial or internal objects through the aenses (indri3a) or iiiiiid (nntiia») is iunnediate as coinpai'ed with infer- ence. Still such kiioz'ledgo cainioi be said to be absolutely immediate, because even here the soul knows through the nieJiutn of something Two Linda of ieune- else, namely, the senses or nianas. ditte £sowledge, ordi- up immediate and In addition to ouch ordinary or empirical (vyavahñrika) immediate knowledge, there is alaoa really or absolutely (piirainarthika) immediate knowledge, which“ a soul attains, gy ramoving its karma ob»t8cl®®.' ID the aout’s eonseioueneos beeomes itnme- ‹iigtely rela4ed to objzcta, without the medium ofsenees, etc,., simply b3' the removal of the karman th$b p£8- vented it from reaching thoae objects.' 'three different kinds of such roctly immediate knowledge are distin- guished. Whena person has 'partially debtroyed and nilayed the in8uences of karmas, he imniediats knowledge acquires the power of knowing — isdhi, icnobpor objecta which hare forms, brit *re jLya and messie. two distant or minute or obscure to be observed by the senses or marian. b“uch immediate knowlrd ,e by th e unaided aoul is*however, liniitedz z rte objects art limited a.nd, Cher cfore, il s qalled dud‹fJiijñûtin (lNniled knowledge). Alain, when ri person Iras overcooie hatred, )eu1ousy, etc. twhich create ol ’tacles that stand in the way of knowing oilier ininds), he can have direct access io the present and post tliouglits of other8. 'fliis knowledge ia called nianah-paryäya (entering a mind. But when all karnia,a that obstruc.t knowletlge are coinpletely remov- nd from the soul, there ariseo in il absoiute knowledge or oinniseience. 'l'liis is ‹*alle‹l kevalu-jñ°aiia. OnlJ' 1 lie iiberated eunlcs have sueli knowledge.' * EarlÿJ cruz writers like ü niâoxaizii oonfioe ‘ aparok9u’ ônly to tbe eogl’8 iæœediate £a0wledge without 4ay æeÂiuœ. IJatey critère libe Bhainonndm extend it to ordinary sense-perception s well, ac neat other Indian logioians do. To justify the narrower coup ’ akin' ia interpmkd we’ jiro’ rod not ‘ indriyc’ sc ordiiinrily axplainea (vide * Wide 7offo4r/kédîiipame ctra, Chap. 1, atrae il, je, 31.2e,  'Phese are, then, the iliree kinds pf extraordinary or extra-nenaory perceptioiia whirh Ordi are immediate bar excellence. But and know- in addition io these, t.here are the two kinds of ordinary knowledge possessed by en average person. 'Phese are called mati and £ruta. ‘ 'Phere are diiferenceR »f opinion among Jaina writers regarding 1 he exact meanings of i.hese terms. But ordinarily, mati ia taken to mean any kind of knowledge which we east obtain through t he senses or tllrough mana,s.' Tliun undt rstood, mnii includes orifiitary immediate knowledge (orinternal acrid exlei nal Jiereeption), memory, recognition and infer- eiice,' Sruta i* knowleJ e obtaiiied fi'om authority. The Jainaa give an account of the process by which ordinary perception takeB place and is retained.' At firat 4here ia onlya dlBtinot Sensation, say ofo nound. It ia not heh moge what ib means. Thia primary state of con- aoioueneaa is oolled atio9roiin (i.e., graaping the object). 'Phen ar:sea 4he query: “ What is this eound? ” Thia qiiestioning atate of the mind ia oslled ihä (i.e., quory). Then comesa definite judgment like“ Thi8 is the aound ot a car." 'Phie is oalled ëviiya (removol of doubt). Than what isaaoerfained ia rstained in tho mind. ThlB retention ia oalled dhärana (ï.s., holding in the mind). Sruta, the aeoond kind o1 ordinary knowledge ia mO8tly iztterpreted a8 ïzaowledge obtained froza 'o'bat is heard frora Ob)n02°B.‘ Thia included all kinds of knowledge derived from apoken or written authority. As 4he understanding of any authority is dependent on the peroeption of sounda or written ïettars› gruta is said to ha precedad by mgti. Itia pototeü out, fuztber, tbat tbeae two kiads of or4i- nary knowledge (namely, mati and öruta), as well as the lowest kind of immediate extraordinary knowledge (nemely, avadhi), are not absolutely free from ehanoea of  89 sory knowledge (mana§peryiiya and kevala) are nerer liable to and error. For ordinary purpcsea, theJ aims accept the p enera1 view that there are three J›rainiinas, namely, perception, inference and testimon)‘ (i.é. authority).' In atcepting non-perce ›tiial sources of kiiowledi;e like inferent e and :estinioiiy, the Jaiiia writers feel it riecessnry to justify tlieir view by reiuting the Cărvăka tlieory that ț›ercept it›ii is tnc oi‘.iy aouxce of valid knowletlge.' They :lbk: 11 a Cărvăka were cnlletl upon to show why even Jeer- Infercnoe ie not in- ‹ cpu ion slioultl not be rejecte‹t as vA¥a theœy preeup an invalid aource of‘ knowledge, poeeoîofer‹uoe. n'hat would he say? He would either remain silent mid thus confess tliot he lias no reason to support his s iew, or’ iiold that perception is valid becnttre it' is not misleading. If he adopts the first course, his view i»-a mere ipse digit, an opinion unsup}›orterl by reason, and, tlierefort , riot acceptable. If he adopts the second alternative, then lie supports his view b3’a reason, aiitl therefore, lie ia himself takin3’ the helt› of inference. Besides, if the Ciirvâka admits that perception is valid because it is uneontradicted ariel not uiislea‹liii , lier similar reasons...-..---- --- - - - inference anti teaiimony aJeu sliould be accepted. If the i Pidc äyñyërotèra riryfi ép. 4, S. G. Vidysbbiise9e,’s ed j : ‘ ptaœC95ai pratyak§ûoaœäoa ûabéBoi.' ^ Promrya-komo/« mërfoÿgo, Cbap. 9 tZfirpa$a-8ëgara Preae\;  AN INTRODUCTION TO IBDIAN PRIL08OPBY Cñiraka says to this, tliot infei ence and ïestiniony. are eometimea iiiislending, then it is ssibie to point out that even perception is sometiines misleadint,. no the only reasonable conclusion ia that any courez of know- ledge, be it perception or int‘erence or testimoriy, diould be regardelas valid in,so far as ii yields a knowleilge that does not prt›ve iriisleading. the criteriou oî validité ehou!d be the harmoiiy (sariir äda) of know1ed¡;e with the practical conse‹juences to whieli it ready. Moreover, when theCärväka demies the existence of non-perceptible obje‹'t,s like life-afiei‘-death, he goes beyond perceJition a*d infers the non-existence of the objects from the fact of their non-perception. Even when t,Iie Cär vàkn maya about pereepiion in Mènerai that it is valid, lie goes beyoii‹l i lie perceived caaes o/ perception lound lo be valid iii the post and infers, from general similarity, something a-bout the Îuture unpercoived cases * i»rcepiiori as well. iiimilarly, when Gärvàba arÿues with hiscrimes, lie irifers their tlioui¡lits from their expressions: l'or bthern ise the Cirvàka could roi take part in any dise ussion. Henoe theCàrvñks s iew that perception is the only valid source of knowle‹lp e, is not eorre‹ t. 3. 7’h J'oino ’T'fieorg o/ 7udgttteftf (i) Syédvä‹la oi the Theoi'y t.hat Every Indûment is Belotive The d a.iras J.oint out llial the ilitfereiii kinds of Erer2 jodg-ent ex in met iu te arid mediate knowledge |#" OD8 GOÿOCÈ OÎ ' reality sud is therefore that we possess about objects show. sulntfu end sub,ect to that every object has innumerable  TBÜ 3à IVA P111L08OPÏlï 91 eharactera.' En omniscieni being can obtain (tliroutih kevalG-j8úna) an immediate knowledge, of an objeci in all its iiniumerable aspecte. But imperfec,t beings look at objecte from oneqgartic,ular point of view ata time and have consequentÍy the kiiowlede of oJily oiie aapect or charac.ter of the t1iing: nucli par'iaÍ know- ledge about some orre of l{¡e’iiniumernble aspecte of en objert ia calien batre Jaina wiitei's naya.’' Jnddment (parúniaréal based on sudh pariiai bnowledgo ia aiso- caJleda nayn.’ Every jiidgment that we pass in daily life about any objecl is, theieJ'ore, true only in rtference to the staiitl Joint oceiipisíl and the aepect ol' the objeet considered. It is becanse we forget lliia Jimitatioii aiid regai'd oiti’ jul mentr ah un‹'ondi- tionaliy (riie, that z'e conte to quarrel and dieaqi'ee very ol‘ten in life. The story of the blind meu wlià i'ormed tbeir ideas of an elepliant by touÚiin§ its legs, cars, tail and lrunk respectively and tlius canie to quarrel abui:t the real sliape of the animal, illustrates thia lruth. They quarrelled because encli iliouglit that his knowledge was the only true and complete knowiedge and should be accepted uneonditionally. The quarrel was over as aoon aa each of tliem realized that liiB knoz'ledge was only otic of the maiiy parta of the a»iznal. * Vide Qoj-doraanu.rattiuccayo, 6*: "znantadbartothaiii ststa, eto." end Ou9sratna'e Com. * tidoN g€yãtglâ rs, rem 2P: “ Ehzdeds Yi$içÍo’rthonoJacys Yiseyo inetab.“ t " tjgyg[j Jjt§,pgy u}i pgtii t-cfigp8ni ãrohsyatf, itÍ u8g&Jj QtfluiãQfl pra çtteiuttarih£lsbbúNt {›arttu»iiabi” üpãfóectór¢ nir.. í '  *‹ The varJous systeaıs of J›hilosopiıy whiclı give di8erent acccunts of the universe Di$erent systeus of philosophy repceaent similarJy oceupy di$erent puint8 ol' view and ‹liscorer the diilerent aspecls of the many-sided tıniverıe. They qııaı.el berause birey do not belr in mind that eaclı aecount in trne oııly from its oz'ıı atandpoinl, itrld İ fi sıIi›j eüt t0 £' Pl't:ı İn coltdil ron s. 'they fiıİİ tO realize, tlıerefore, that the different vıews nıay be true like the di8erent deacıiptions of the eleplıurrt. ^ lu view of tlıeae fact s, the Jainas iris.st that t'very Erefy judgmenb elıould 'j"g‘°'ıt (rıaya) slıould be qualified be qualified by s some woıd lıke 'tomelıow' (syât, '.""” limitation“*of tİııs jı«1gment and the poasibiiity or otlier alternative judginents from other inta of view may be always ‹'leah7 boriie in mind. For exemple, instead of a juögment liée“ être elepliant is lik‹' a @lar,” it sliould be said, to remove the chante of conl'usion, “8timeliow (i.e. in respect of its legs!, the elepliant is iike a jJiİ1a ‘." Eîin3iJarly, en yeı'ccivi»g a l›la«k uariheı jun’ ez‹stîug ina t"co»z ata t›artic‘uTaı’ tiu›e, y'e s}joHId not assert unconditionally, “ The jog exists,” but should rather say,“ ioow6otc, the jug ezists,” wliit'li won1‹l reniiiid us ths4 tlie judgment is true only svith regaid to the many toiiditioiis of space, time quality, etc., under vliir'li the jug exists. The qualified ' judgment“ Somehow, the jug exists” (syéd gliatali ! asti) would prevent the possibility of the inisapprehen- '’ bion that the pot exiats fit all liınes or in evory place, or tlınta pot of amy otlıeı colour, slıape, ete., ezista. The  't'lil*. J.iihx I’1f1LOSO1'H i)3 unqualified 'judgmeiii, ’1'lie jug exists,” leaves the ' possibility of such misapprehension. Thia theor3' of the Jainas has vome tobe known as ey“vöv lt ie the view‘ that syfidv6da. *""’ every ordiiiary judgnient (passed by iinperf‹x't miiids like oura) fields good only of the parlicular aspect of the ubject. jodged and of the point of view from xvhicli the jiidgmeul is yssse‹1. Tliia J nina view is ‹juite in keopiilg with tlio view acceJ›ted t›y \\’estern lo¡;icians gcner- This vies tain beep- :tIly, ii,i:iiely, 4hnt evcry jtirlgrnent ie ing with the West‹ iii pnssotl 'o s pgrGculn' uoiyezxe of ment relatts to diacouru‹' ni: i ontext rend meat be partieular u nilorseo un‹lcrsi ood only in reference i hereto. stituentz are too '° ' ’the universe pl diseourse is coosti- to be mentioned. “’ tute‹i by diffei'ent fnotors li1ie spa e, time, do ree, uquiity, etc„ wtc ro Jelt uunieiitioned papy liüüSi'l¥e by ure nb ions and pnrlï}’ hucause tbej/ aru leo znaoy to be stated exb/itis- tively, how, il thèse conditions cnnnot be ezhauativrlJ enuixserated„as come nio‹lern logieiana like SQ :ilao adzriit, it is good fuvthe safe of precision to qualify' the judgment explicitly by a worrl lilie somehow tsyñt). The priiiciple unrlerlyinÿ ‘ syiidv‹idu inakes Juinn tbinÏters catiiohv in their outlooli. Jtina pbiloiopby They entertain and accept the viewa oatbolio and tolezant. of other philo8opbers ue different {iOt›öibl0 vcFSjOllB Of tire universe ftom di8erent pointa ot view. ä'be onl3' thing thut the Jainas, disliks in other tliinkers is the dogmatie clsim of erich tbat tte alone is in the ridh° '" › défini nmounls to flic follaey of ezoluaive prediention (ekñnte-rñda). A¡;oinat sueha fnllaoy of philosophi‹'al speoulation a protest haa been roised recently in America by the leo-realiate have ealled it the fallao7 o unee p u i i y. But no Western or Eastarn philosophor baa so eornestly tried to avoid thie error in practiee aa the Jainas lias'e oone. ,  84 AN i NTRO c c’T1O a’O 1N1›IAN P 1I OsOPii (ii) Sapt*bliaiigfnayo or ih* geven'Pornis of Judgment Ordinarily, logic distinguishes two kinds of jodg- ment, atfirmative and iie«ative. The ieven forais of ‘ eonditi»l p »d:«- 'the Joinas distinguish aeven kind.« of judgment iiiclnding these two. Any object iiia.j’ be described a&rmntively bya judg- iett which predicates of it any of the cliarariers it possesses, or it mo) be described negatively by a judgment which denies of it characters belonging to other objects but absent in this.' 'lhese two are the aBirtnative and negative judgments ordinarily recog- nized but the Jainas qualily eoch with ' somehow' (syst) to emphasize its coii‹liiiona1 or rela‹tive character. Aifirmative judgments abouta ju¡,*, for example, would be like rome/torn the jug is in the room' (i.s. in the rooos at a. particular place and ata particular time, and asa jug ofa part.icular description) ; roitieliow the jug is red ' (i.e. not aln'ays i'ed but only during a particular liine or under particular circumstances and the red ia ofa specific shade, el.c.). The geoeral form of all ai6rlnatiee judgments can P ’ leyñt anti). then be symbolically repi'eseiited as sootehoto S izP ' (syat nstil. Again, negative jiidginents obout aii object would be like 8omehoto the jar is itot outside the r‹xiai' (mean- ing that the jar of that particular kind, at that particu- lar time, etc., is not outside);' somehow thejari4 not “ t {’idt Gpp#t#lnt’a Cont, op. cit. tpp. 219-2b, Aerobic 8ot. nd.)I {ba dvidha vaiiibcndbo’s1il+ena n8slitveno ce. Intra evapar ñyairas tjtqeng gadibandbsb,......paraparyiyaielu n8stitreao.”  time and under thèse conditions, i' ete,) We find then that the general form of all negative judg- ments is iomeàou 8ÿs_ When, owe*er, we have \o degeribe the complex f' " that the jar i.« eonietiniea red t8)‘ flouielow8 ii und allo is notP ' and soinetimes not, we must have " “ ' * compounil juddiHent like some- how the jaria and aleo is not red, The general form of this judgment would, ilierefore, be ‘ 8omefiow g ia is 0_f tlü d "ÎOI'I22 of judgment reeugnized by Taina lo;;ic. 'l'liis form iaobtaiiied b3 t'ombillillg 8ttCrC fl86Ït7v Ç the points of view of the hrst two judgments into one composite point o1 rien'. the necessity of sucli ‘coni- pound judgment lies in the need ofa comprehensive view of the positive and the negative cliaraeiei of an object. ù jar is black when raw, and red wlien it is baked. if eve are a«hed, what is the indeieribsble ( i«i real ‹-oloiir of the jar alwaya or ’ '’’' ’ 1 itt€'i' «ll coltdition8, the on)y honest reply would be that the jar caiinot be described then, i.e. under the conditions of the quesiion. Uiider such cireumstantes when we arel'orced te predicate siniultaneoilsiy, of‘ any objPcl, t’1iaF*lt't81’B which al'o incompatible, being contrasy or c‹iiiti’adictory, oiN judg-. ment, according to the Jaiiias, woul‹1 be of the general iprm ieinehow fi is inile»‹'ribabie' I. )'Bl avahtavyain). This is the fourth’ kiild oi’ jud,ginent recognized by' Jbina lo¡;ic.  JC AN IN'1'R0DVC’I'IO5 ’/O INDIAN PTZII O8OPBv Iteoognition of thia fourtb form of j(iddment is of groat philosophioal value. It points out, first, that though nn object osn be described trom diserent atondpointa,. in 48p Gt6 e *T*t8l\ OE 8GCG*88 B1y,it GaDn0Ahä described nt all, i1 no auch distinotion of atandpoint and tispoot is made. An objeot in general in nn indesoribaole entity. Secondly, thia alao pointa out thnt philoeophiool wiedom doea Dot nlwaya ¿oneiat in the abili(y to answera quesGo» byÄ or nrgetire, but alao in lising that aomo queations, ivy their rery nature, are hnawerable. Thirdly, the rooognition ot this form of judgmeo0 shows tfia0 theJaioalogizdoesno€ ëola€e€he prineiple of contradiction. On the eontrary, it Bhows thnt obedience tothifl law makee thebairn conleaa that incom- patihle characters cannot be simultaneously predicnted of any aubjeot in the aame aapect. The other three of the seven forme of judgment, aie obtained by combining suc- l6) ’’flouiehowg i› P and is also indos t:essively eiicli ct the first three oribable,’ lay8t " standpoints with the fourth. Tliua by combining the first and the fourth ci(coeczizely, we get the fifth form of judgment, 'toniehou›S isP aitd is a-lso indercribable' ca, avaktavyadi caL When we consiJer together, froma comprehensive point of view, the fact taint o jug is sometimes red, but aleo that without refereiit'e to any particular time or state it cannot be dose:ribed ’as having any predi‹'a-b1e character, oin judgment is ' of the form, The jug is somehow retl brit ia also 'fit' SomehowB in somehow int1escrib:ililP.’ Fliiniliii'ly, not P and is also indes- r'oinbiniii a u,i ii Hoe se uii‹l nd eribsblo’ lay6t nBsti we halve the sixtli judgment olthe enei'a1 f‹›rin, «oiite- i7J 8oinehowS is P, also i zotP qnfl is in describable (syät nêsii «a, avek- tavyatii cx). Lastly, coiribining ” * *^’ °*' 8pcoeccioelp the third with the  “iHz JAI« P»ILOsOPHx 87 fourth point of view, we get the seventh form of ,udgment, ' fioinekou› S is F, aleo ñ not P, atid jr in- deseribable t‹›u ây â»t’i ca, iiâaii ; avaktavyam cv). If we oootbioa simttllaneousty any of tbe 8r8t tbree pcinte of view w'itiü tbe fourtb, inBtead No oCher fora. is yos- of doiog so cuoceeaiveJy, we 8batl ' home io each caB8 ibe simtzltaztt5OUB predioation of incompatible charaotera (liko is and ia indeaorib8bl0 ’; or’ is not end is indeacribtible ; or' ia, ie not and is indescribable ’). Hence in eneh caae the judgment would be the same inform as in the fourth caae, namely, 8oinehow8 ia indescribable (ayñt araktavyam,. ’J'herefore, tbough tbere are ionnrnerable asyecta of eyerjr thing, the forms of judgnient would §e only sevon, neither tTtO¥'B OO¥' tB8B. 'Iosuiii uJ›,.T:iimii logi‹: i'eccgii izer t lie léllowin;q' kinds r›l’ ‹'ondit ional jlitl;›’irieiit f. ii.pt alil{angi- y ($) iluineliow. S is P, ii iul is a ls‹› not P (»yfi1 alli i‹t r (4J Sonieli‹›si, S is iiidest ril›a l›le (stat :tvatil ii- i y a nil. (3) Sonielio w. fi ie 1’. ii ii il 1 a 1 i i iitlest'rilaalilt' tsyùt asti cii iivakt av¿'ain mil. (6) Rumelioy, i3 is ii‹it P. a iitl i..i! -‹› i ntlvsei ibii ble (syät näati co avaklavyain ca). (7' ßonieliow, 8 is P, aurl isa lsu not P, tind als› iiide ribablo (syäta sli c‹i mä sli ‹ i :tvaktavyRni ‹-a). 'the Naina dootrina of ayiids*da i» aometimee uenipared with the praginatiam of aome Western 8yßtsßéa ia zealicfic tkiokerB. II is true tbato pragaatiu nd, ther»for», not lpgioian, like Schiller, also reoogniEea the truth th8t no judgi ent is true 1W1606B  98 « iNTiÌODøCJi‹3N TO IsDIA« PBJI.OsOPaY or false witbout particular zeferenee to ita oontezt anü purpose. Even a so-called self-evident judgment, like A square is not a oirole or' 'f'wo and two ate four,' is true only ino specific sense, according to Schiller. 'Phia is z x€riłiog poinŁof reReœblanoe. Dub were bs very great üiBereoee nlso abiGü 8ÏtOUIfÎ Eloa ÒC f0r{Ț0tÈØŁt. Ÿb6 ‹fainaa are cønliøtc, '»ut the pragmatists lureo distinct bjns. ÅCGOŁdir.g to tbe Jainas, tbe üi8eient judgments about nn object are n‹›t simply different sub- jeetiye ideaB oź tîe objeoŁ, õut Obey reyea1 tbo diflerent rem aspects of łlie objeot. The bairns would oooepf, thœetore, a realistic riew of truth' whic'h is rejected by nl1 thorough- The Jaina oyiidvñdn is sometimes compared with the Țfeetern theory r›f relativity. Thei'e It iea k:nd of rel ti- :ire two kinda of relativity, idealistic si.em, but ie realistic and DO$ İ‹leC1İstİc. (as of Protagoraa, T3erl‹eley, Schiller), and realistic (oß ot Whitehead or Boodin). And i( the Jainn is to be calleda relatiriøt, he must be understood to bo ot the realistic type. Our judgments shout things nre relative—but volative łe or dependent upon not simply the iriood of the iudging mind, but upon the relntionnl nhnrnotørs of the many-aide‹l reality ibøelt. i¥nother misunderstanding ofìen found’ is the intor probation of the Jaina word syñt m:iy lie.’ 'fhia woulrl impart sceptical or agnostic form tothe Jaina theory, rind make itlooJz like tbe 'eiew ol Mae Gree who also recommended the qualifies every judgment with a phrase like ‘ may be.’ But it should be notød that the judyțnent, but its conditional or relative character, that is ‘*pärtieTń ”øÿnt.’ Ofl the unw0raö’ oT õsO0UI8O under whicłi any judgment is made, thejudgment iø valid beyond nl1 doul›t. ‘there iø, therefore, no i oom for B£i8 ttJCİß2Tl. „, ” ”*"’”’ ' ’ 7sthãrcstliitbrtharyarai8yirfipodi hi akiiivedaueiii pramgpaøt  tI9 Ill. TiiL JzIhA ETAT'IIYSICS ’Jho Jaiiiau hold tlin' every object hiiown by us bra iiinunierabJo cliai’acter.« ianunta- livery o6jrot is found to poseeso innumerable dliariiiiikain vastiil. Let us try to i t > ' uuilerel uii‹\a little more ‹'learly ' the iinplicat iori of‘ this x iew. kYery obje‹'l is wlinl il is l›ecause ml‘ its J›oRili ve and Tlir jxi.sitivi character» ile!eriniin , for exam}›1‹ , an ol›jet'l liken uian,* his ize, culoHr, sliap‹ , weiglit, ‹'oiistitution, lieredity, f'ainlly, ruce, iiiit ionalit y, edncatiup, einployiiieiil, p1trce ol‘ liittli, maie ‹›l‘ birtli, liabital ron, :i e, r'l‹'., aud Hee ii itiiibei lesni ehtlit›iis lie l›eai‘slo the uii‹ oiiii lablo otlit'l’ ubjeeis uf tlir ivorlil. The iiegui ivo‹ hiii-acl urs xvliit'li ‹leti:i'iiiine the mari ronsi. f oJ‘ what lie is not. o know ’!''i' fully. ve »l d_know how lie is distinguisli- e x!-iin Jile’.ălat ln'”i» i(‹›t.i N.m oJit'aii i@t a C liiiiese, noi a. Ne ro, etc.. flial li‹' is not.i (!lii’istitiii, nor u hIoliainliie- il:in nor a fioi'oustriail, ele., iiot dislionest. net l'colisli, nul selfisli, t'tc..\s the iiegativt' eliai icters of the umum cuiisist in li is tlistiiictions from all other ubjec-ls in the universe, the number‘ of these woiil‹l, i lierefore, br 1’:ir iq*reator tlinu that of the posit ive ‹characters.‘ II we c‹nieider, then, an objecl in the light, of its own }msitive ‹'baractei's and a 1 no in the 1ipht of the i liaractera of all other objects which areabsent in it, the object z ould mo longer a{›pear to " olokgli seapar2ñyih psroparJtyñitu vyes$ttiziipñ snGntL, onantebhyo draw ebbyo rJñvj ttiteñt,” Oo9cratna or God., verm 66.  100 lN INTRODBGTION TO INDIAN PNIEO6OPMY beo niınple t)ınıg travma. on)ya liınjtdfi nuınber of qualities, aa we ordino1'ily take it to be. The objet't, on i he conta‘ary, turu. out t‹ı be one po«»essed of unlimited ‹'lıarnclers. Bııf n'iıen, ırıoı'eoveı‘, ilıe eleıııenf of iime İH fftΣ0ll İtlttl t'O1J8İderation. aııd ii "" is remembered flint the object take.« on new cliaraclers’z'iili the cliaiige ‹if time,i lıe objecl is founıl ren.ty to Jırıasess iııfinitt' rhnı acters fannntadlıar'rnü). bir ima vo il etme, tlıeı‘efoı‘t', reın:tı‘k tlıaI i te why know’x one objer-t 1‘ull,y, kno»» eveı'y t1ıiıı¡i. t full the omniacient O ıly a lı onı ııiscierıt {›erson (kesaliı ' ‹:un, therefou, know an objoct fully ‹ ım lı:rve sııc'lı eomplele knowledge ‹if n lı object. Pen‘ pra‹:ticaJ (u‘- J›osestryavalı;ıra)a Jıat'fiııl ku owletlge ol wlıala n objecl is im in not. is ol’ cour»e. tjııiit' sııdicient. But. this sholıld n‹ıt ıınıko us I Itink. as we ılo. thata linite object is reaJiy ’pu»sesneı) ol‘ lnniled ‹'lıarnciers, Nor slıouJrl u'e tlıink thato mr oı’‹lı u:ı ry knuu ledr alı‹›ııl it is e‹›ın- J›1ele ‹nd J›erfect. ed of come uneban¢ versatiuıı so in philosoplıj also ‹listirıction is nıa‹le between ınodes tpnry°aya -- ››ıe characters (dharmo-) and thnt which (x›ssesses tlle characters (diiarmil. the latter i,s generally ‹'alleda substance (dravya). The Jaino» accept ihis ‹'oiinnon philosophical view of substance. But they puini out tint there nre two kinds of charac- ters found in every substenc,e, essential and accidental.  THIS.7AINA l HIfO 8 OPHY 10J. Tha essential eliaraeters uta substa-rice reiiiain in tlir ,«ubstance 8a loilg as the substance rann,ins. WithoutI there tlie aubstanct' will cea.in to l›e what it is. Con- s onane s, for’ exaiii p1‹.is air essential ‹'liai'actei’ of the ru| Ag&in, the aou›‹te«tai rharacteı« of a BuGsanta, ‹-oıtıe and go ; I hey sue‹'eed um anotlıer. 1 greg, x'olı- İ icns, pieasu1'ea ıu. e amir :ıccidonttıl ‹'lıaracters J›usseaaed by tht' amir-aııb6tance. It is ilırout;lı euclı ‹lı&raetora tlıiıt a sııbstancr ımtler¡;oea r-hande ‹u ınodificatiun. They may.tlsu be culletL therefore, rhodes. The Jaınaa nah atı ‹:.«seııtıa1 unchaııging charat' tur guı):ı, and ını act'identa1. clıaugiJıg t'lıaracter parytıya ‹›r parçaya. ı¥ subatan‹'e is tlefıIıetl, therefore, as tllkt Wi1İc)1 pO8»Ofl8e8 qUo Iİ tİOı (gılRils), iı we} 1 »8 fıo‹jeg The svo*’tJ ia c'oınptıoetl ol sulıata ıtcoa oi tiitlerent hindi. lr so lar as the esaentıal and pt'rın ehara‹ters ml the ultinıuto aub- ther‹'f‹,r‹. lu›th real. slu tjt'eg im ı' itl›ldilı. I IıP w ‹ırld ı' )xrınaın nt, aı«l in su 1’aı’ as th‹'.tccitieıılal ‹'lıarat'ters nnderp‹ı ınodıfi‹'atioıı, tlıo wGı'ltl :ılso t 1ıangea. '1hc Jııinas, ıhcrefor‹', lıoltl that those Jıhilosopheıa li le the Hauddlıas, wlıo say tlıal I here is nolhıııg ıea.lly perınsııent ın the ınnverse, and that everytl'ing changea frorn rnorrıent to ınoıneııt tkşa9ika- vûilal, are one-aıded and dogmatic. Equaliy miatzben :ıleo are plnloaıpııers like the monıstic Uedûntins, wf.o declare that chan¡;e is unreal ıtnd that Realitj ia :ıbsolutely utıclıangini; (nitya vâda).' Faı'lı of thenı 1‹›ukz et one kitle (ekântal of realitj only antl theo ' Oupa-paqLyaıad drvryu», 'F t. sıt., 6.S 103.àN l ET ltol3 lJ€i’fION 'CO INDIAN PiTlLO SOi RY et›iiitriila the fa ilacy of excliisive }›i‘edicatitin. Chaiige itnd perriiiliience ai'e both i‘eal. It alloijld not, be tlI‹Ju;ilit ‹‘oi1lJ‹ï.dict‹»'y Îo say t)jttt a, )›at(it'fl]iî1 subgtaïjra Ive the uiiiverse asa ivliole) is heih siihje‹'t to change iiiiil l'ree i‘l’oin it. fi!liaii ‹' ia ti'iie t›f the atilistaiit:e iri t›lIo t'e8}8ectq (Stat), W1}g1’eIt,9 pel'nlaIlel1Ce i8 Îl'Be iT1 nnollier respect (a3'at). The ‹‹»rti“adietioIl V’4iiia1ies wlieii wc remember that eilr ii preJication is rela.tive iiii‹l moi abæ›lute, as Gandhi li; syärlväda. zt 8till8l a't1GR i6 1 ci$l (8iii ). Iteiility t‘oll si 61s uf tllt‘t'c hgrqg g tipi; pg l*ictora: J@'i Rhiiieiire, ‹iriginul iau l'octors prr nt in *{ltl ilecay. I ii 8pJ23 o is reality, vtz. pertnz-.-' , nencc, oÿ,ine{ît›n d}1d 1 ü Î i y Î Ïl€l‘t'- iiÿiiin the ui-imin a nui* dec‹iy ‹ii‘ its rh‹iii int inudea tpary iya). Eeine alli lie llir‹'t' ‹'lements i mai ‹ lia'a‹ - lerizi i'eality iii'o tiretc iti ii aulist ance. Uy au:epting Kbis ‹:rite›'ioa of ›‘eality the Naina i'üjeet tbe Dauddüa view tbat reality coa- Oaueal eateicncy sists in causal eJ1icien‹:y, i.r. that an not bea mark of est. ‹Objeet is ›'eal ïf it is oapahÎe of iiy, a Ba»ddha tbinb. i:ausing nny e8ect. The I3auddhti t'riterion ie laulty, beeause aeeording to it, even an ill usory snake must be eailed real as it cati cauae effestn ïiÏze fear, 8ig§t, etc. l'roin thia ioulty criterion dl reality of m‹›:uetltarineas istbe Oauddbos deüuoe the tbeory ot the momentarineas ot tbinga, whioh, therefore, tums out to be tallecious..tgainst the one-sided theory of inomentariness the Jainas also sdduee the following arguments:' (1) If eyery tbizig be zooœentary, tête soul alec woulü be so. and then we could not axplain Retulatio0 of tDonieo- tarinces. memory, reeognition, the immédiate feeling of personal identité, eto. (2) * Sy,-ou.duiéutia-sciiq matt a, Ch. on.J aioa, and G onarctna's G‹iai. on Liberation would then l›e meaninglesa, because there wöuld be no permanent soul to be liberated. (3) 1'fo moral life would be possible then, becausea monientary pernon could not attempt to attain any end. 'I'he work of the person who would begin an eflort would bring abuut a fruit tbot would be enjoyed by the person succeeding him. (4) Gon- seqiientl; there would be no moral 1nw; the oonsequencea of one's own action would be list to him ,4rtnpra9äsa) :ind the coniequeäfies ol onother man'a action z'oiild be- f«11 him (akrtiibhyupagnoia). (3) klere moinenfary stntea ivould not eren conatitute any individual series, because u'itbout aomething permuneiitr uoning through tht: chantt- ing mo‹les, the ‹lifferent cliangirl@ Btatea cannot bo held togotber to form :i continuouB indi9id11aI. (6) üeithei' pereept ron tior inlerenee rcvenls tito existenee of ony thing in the \ orld iii xvhi‹'ht Iit'i'e is r›nly i:itaDgé anil no element of rc›ntin uitg. 'rht l u‘t›,it1t s1 t'li1ssifie.il item ui si if›sl ii1 it-t*cs, areorili iii 1 ‹›ti ii'.)a i ii:i, is i i i1 ‹› l i tu. ext on i1+'il Substanr s extended and non estenJeil., ‹ri it; ‹inc sii bstitin'e, iiii iiiely, time (k:,1;t). ,i liiell is rlt v‹›id ‹›l’ ext ension. Ali other’ St› typ)’il llit Itlt' rt.st lift Jtl, )ltCil1l6£’ € ¥’0 fi)' fillllfitü llCt IIf t 1, jB kj ti(1 e ists (ii fit i) l Ïife *t )l‹idy (kim yil), tx›8sessirim 'i'lie liring «nd t|jp S1Il›divi‹lerli rit r›t wo ki iid: , namel), ' "'"g' t lie living (jii-a1 antl t lie nou-living * i'idp Dcappa-ioiigtalio, 24. According to O0natatnoi b°W°9P°' ’ antik«7 mee naa eolleot'jpO Of indivisible parta of spnoe.  104 xs 1NTAODUC’1’I0N TO INDfAN 1 HII 0801'AS (ajiva). Living aubstnncea (jivaa) are identical with aoule or spirits. 'the soula egain can t liberated. be claaaifie‹l into those that are eiuaiieipated or perfecf (mukta) snJ titose tltst iire iii l›onda'pe (l›a‹ldha). The aoula in bondage are agail} of two kinda, 'Phe moeing and the those thtit are capnble t›f movement (i raati) aiitl thuse that irre immobile (.stli.$r*{'g,). The immobile living silbsta-iices have the most itriJ›erfec.t kiii‹ls of hodiea. 'they live in the five ltiiids of bodies iilade uf earth, water, fire, air or one eensN. Plantsi espectivei}v.' '1'hey have only t he aense t›f much; t hey {iosssos. 1lierefoi‘e, factual ‹'ons‹i!oueness. 2'lie niotiite living aiibstan‹:es have l›odios of’ ‹different dep‘rees of’ perfe‹-- '1he roobile li vin g »ub teoea« h« iu¢ two I ion mud › ariously }xissesn fwu. t" *°e °en4‘” t)›i'ee, four ‹»" fi› e se›ises. Souls oi” those of toii‹'li nn‹l t-aste, th oso like ants fia c I liree »enaes, n:tinely, (.horn of tenth, taste an‹l »mel!; those like beea possess 1'our senses, nnmely, tlioae of touch. taste, amell and siqht. -tip lier :inimala like beaats, birda and men have hve aenses, namely. those ot touch. taste. srneJl, sight an‹JI rearing. Non-living aub8iaiices posseaain exieiisi‹›ri are dharine, adha.rma, iikiiln and piitlgalu.  THr.PIN £RITCsOtMY lÛ5 'the foİlowing table will clearly. liow the above scheme of clossificatİOn: ZJxceoted faetiè&yai ten-estaiided íanastik6yø), e. tims íl$la - hon-moving (0t.b£sara1 Atoms (s9u) of e.q. thoße living in eectb, wsłor, bodiee of esch, etc. , fire, air. fi øensed, 4-ar*ossJ, 9-8eaaed, 2-æaaed, c p. u›en e.y. I›erc, e.y. aats c.p. worzae.4. 7’fie ó'ouf or Jia« A jiva or a. soul isa ‹conscious.substarice. Con-, sciousne s is the essence ‹I‘ łlie soul.' It is always tnesenl in the soul, thoubh its HIY8 18G ßODI‹ nature and degree may vary. ßouls may ba theoretically arrang'ed ina continuous ’ Ûgtgaã yßjçyaęo jleaț, Ouęez'BtOa Oh gôÿ.. ‘ś'7. ‘ OpaŞ'0gO laãșcțcm.’ 'Z'or. Sfît., 9.9.  108 ANIMTRODUUTION TOIND NFBILO8OPBY series according to the degreei of eonsciousness. At the highest end of tits sC&le would be perfect souls that have degrece and kinds of knowledge. overcome all karmaa end attained omniscience. At the lowest end would atand the most impet'fect aouls ;wliich inhabit bodiea of earth, wa.ter, fire, air or vegetable.' In them life and consc,ioiisiiesa appear to be absent. But really eren here consciousness ofa factual kind is pre- sent; only consciousness ia ina dormant form owing to the overpowering influence of karma-obstacles.' Midway between woiild lie sculs hasing two to five senses, like worms, ants, bees and men.' It i¿ the soi:1 that knows tliings, perforuis activities, unjoys pleasures, surfers pains, and the soul manifeets lllumines itaolf and other objecfs. itself and othera. It is “‘°‘ The soul is eternal, but it alao undergoes change of states. It. is different from the body and its existence is directly proved’ by itn coi- st'ionsness of itself.‘ Owiiip to the inclinatioris t;enerated by its pas Lihea light the cool actionsa jiva comea toiiihabii dise- per9adoa the eotire reit bodiea succeasisely. Like a body in which it livei. lfpht it illuminates or rendern con- scioiia the entire body in wliicli it lives. Though it has * Yanaapatynnlaniui exam, Titt. ¿',tit., S.d2. ' Pid8O U9flt&tD8I &6d., 4!l) f0P 0J01I0ntt4 argunietits ppppytipg tJtp existence of life in plsnts and minerals. * S{ ii-pipilil£ b1iianiari tnznusy8dinaoi e§sJ§ctpddbdpj, q'pt, pttt.,  'rBz I.intA PBILOSOJ aY U7 noform (myti), it acquires like a light the size aiid form of the body wherein it lives. It is in this sens e tlia e f rmlegs,i s id too c r gon. The jiva is not infinito but cc- extensive with the body, as it can immediately know objects only within the body. Consciosnesa is not present exer3 where, but only in the bodys'. Students of Western philosophy fin‹l ib difficult to understand how u aoul can poaae»s How can tbo soul both oonseiouenesa and extensions occopy space? qualities which are diametrically opposed, according to e Extension, Descartes exolu-ive quay ofir sterial substances, and eunsoiouenesa ia the exclusive qtiBJity of the aoul. But the aoul, ‹ie proved by Deecortes, ia essentially'a t£inhinp being i and ' thougbt' aeema to hare no connection with space or matter. BUT tbe JainsB cuseeise tbe sou! primfiril2 aaa tiuinq beizig (jiva). Conaciouaneaa ia found in every part ofa living body, and if eonseiouaness be the character of the soul, the soul ahould be adtt›itted to be present in every part of the body and, therefore. to occupy apeou. The soul'a a1›ility 4o pervade spoce is admitted by other Indian thinkers, os atau by many Greek philosophers like Plato, and eren by some modern realistic philosophers like Alexander. It ahould be borne 'Phe tool does not inmind, hoirever, thatn aouI's occu- pying spnce aimpiy meona itapresence in the digerent parta o mo e ce awal lie body. A ma i o y part of apace in u y at while it is ther8, no other m8tter ean occupy it. But a soul's presence ina particular space doea not prerent another sou e en inspaoa there; two Huh.day.. tbe saza ;“-tba -poiot -oM, ,u a lih ni u h e a. The‘ Jaina philonop e ary to meet the Cârvékn views regarding the soul. Ounaratna, a great vide ,sydJ.. 8, and rdf. dirt,, 5.1£: “ Prade4«-ttiiibare viierpa  108 Av IrTsonpoTIOs 'NO’INDIAN PHILO80PItY 7aiaa fbinLer, giyes elaborate ayguoze¥ttB to }Q9et Câr9é@B seeptieisa aad prove tbe e.sisteooe of tbo soul. W'e ozay state beze tbe puzpozt of bie argnraent8. '1he existonce oí the aoiil is directly proved tu suki uncontradioted immediate eaperienoe P ojo- a8 ’I feet pleasure.* WBen we per- tene ofi oeive the quxliíy of a eul›e€arce, we say, wk pereeise 4he aubatanoe. For example, on aeeinga roay oolour wo hold that we poroeiie the aubstanee rose, to whioh the eoiour belonga. On similar grolinds we can hold that the soul is directly tica life plTisore. yarueiyed, Lecause wa iasnzediate/y per¢etve aueB cbaractera of tbe soul ca pleaaure, pain; remenibranee, volitioo, doubts, knowledge, etc. ’Ehe fsxiatence of the soul muy alao Ire indirer.th proved by interencea like the followiog: ’£he body can be oioved and cóntrolled lt is ala6 itnowoble, at will limea oar, and, tlieraford, there niediatrl2 throogh muet be so›n» otie that moves and controla it. The senaes of sight, hearing, etc., are only instrumento, and there muat be, colina opent wbo ezoploy8 tbezn. Agaia. tbere aust be aoin. e}Jicient cama or produoer of the body, oacause materi objeeta whioh have a begiiining aro tound to reqnize| tome agent tor ihaping their material cnuze. 'Ibua io di8ereat waya tbe ezi8tence ot a auLstaoce like the soul can cleo be inferred. '£he that iuiotinsciona oiste tbe pzoduot of tbe raaterisJ ele.toenta. riel eleaienta con pro duce mnseionnesc ie But w'e neyer prrcaioe saywbere tbe got serified by pgrebp , generation of conaoiousness by the unoonacioua material elemento. '£he Cüryúltg belieaae tbot peroeption the only va1jd eouroe nowledge. Jfow can he then believe in what peroeption hit to show? Even if inferenoe wera anoapted an valid by the Cñrvñka, it would not prove that consciousness is the nar by iofereaee. eBeot of aatter or the material body. Beoause, if tbe body wete tbe eouae of oonaoiousnesa, there would be no ab8ence of consoious- nesa ao long aa the body eziated, and eonsequently, loaa ot oonsciouaneaa in sleep, awoon, or ina deadbod7 gould be  TTÏE JA12tA PHILOSOPBr 109 conoo-i€sAt müa€ o bB€ween¢6e bodyaod conscioueoess, the development and deeay of the body are not invariably followed by oorresponding changes ot consciouaneea. Bo no oauacl oonneotion between mattar and oonsciousneso can be proèed e'yea by iofezenee. 'I'be CäzyBka woulü pertapsszy€ha€, €hougR every bind ol m*fier doe* n‹ü produoe ooneGousuexe ye€mDen m%€eris orgagiEed iotox liring body, it producer consoiousness. In reply to this ii is pointed out that, bu( for ome organizer, would not bo iormed into a liring body, und that thia organiser ia the aoul itaelf. Judgments line I ann stout I na thin, on which the Cärvaka tries to proxe that the soul ia identical with the bod} , muBt be understood figuratively and not literally. 'Fhe eoul sometimes treate the body as ibnslf, because it is intimately interested in the body. Again, iÏ the soul z ere absolutely unreaJ, tbe negative judgment there ia no aoul in the body would be uninteliigible. Denial of_jp.' -ptaoo implie the Ïrnow'1edgao tea«e soaewbete Ap e 4co ruil other argumeats, does'aah exist Ï8 a8 absuzd as barzao° o› ‘tttig sen, tba giver of ligbt, toss got 4. T/is Jitanittiets 8ubstnocei or djioar The liliysical world iii which route live is constituted by the niaterial bodies that the ’l'he fire inaniuiata snbstances: matter, noiils uc‹'iipy and tiie other iiinierial objects that t'orin their envii'on- ment. I3ut in additioR tO tllübH iiiaterial substanc'es, there aie space, linie and the c'onditioiis of moi ion and reci, without wliieli 11n world aud its events cannot be l'ully explaiiied. I.et us coiicsider these dltterent SUb8tane,es oiie by one.  (i) Matter or I'udgala Matter in Jaina philosophy is called pudgala, which etymologically means that Mst4risl substances capable of com- which is liable to integration bination and eepara arid dininfegral.ion.’ Material sub- sty»‹'es can ‹.ombiue togettiex to form large and iar cr wholes, and c an tlso break uJ1 itito smaller and smaller pa.rts. The amnllest parts ot matter which cannot bo further divided, being part- less, are called atoms (anu). 'Pwo or iiiore such atoms may combine together to form coinpuiinda (sañ hâta. or akandha)J Our, bodies and the objects of nature are sur‘?i’ c”ou:ttxnJti/In of t\iafet'icl atoms. Mind (inanas), breech ori‹l breat‘li are also the products of mistier.' A iiniterial ‘iul›sla lice fpudgala) possesses the four qtialitieh of tout li, taste, smell and T6ey 1am ttir qoa colour.' Tliest qualities are ""’ ’ "“” }xIs*essed bY alolnh artd also by llieir }xodut t.«, the ‹'our[founds. Sound is not an origiiml quality like these four, as most oilier Indian philosophers liol‹l. The Jaina points out that sound aloiig «'itli light, heat, shadow, ditFknens, union, disuqion, h"newess, ;:rossness, shape is produced latter by the accideiital modifications of matter.‘ I.ii) Space or Akasa 'the filiiction of opace in to afford room fortheexia-) tent'e of all exleiided nubstan ces.' for extension. °°'^ 8oul, matter, dliarma and adliarm all exist in space. Uliougli apac * ‘ Pdroysnti pnlcnti eat’ P4roudo feita, III. T’«t. sgt., 6.t9. /hid., 6.99,  TïIE NAINA PTïILO8OPJTY IIl is imperceptible, its existence is knoz'n by on inference like the following: 8ubstanves which are extended can have extension only in some place, and that ia called iikñea. 'Ehough to be extended iB the very nature of some substances, and rio substance which lac¥s that qature can bd mada extehded b3' space, yet ii is alao true that, tobe_e ended a sub- stance requiiea apace, asa necessary condition. ‘/t àiiould not be thought that exiension is explaiiied fully by substances extended, with- Without space, sab ot oees could noG bs oui the supposition of * ome other entended condition like space. Por, subs- t,oncea are those that occupy or pervade, arid space, in that which is occupied or pervadetl.‘ Spac,e is not the *ame as extension, a.s Descartes thought, but it is ‘die locua of extension, ‹ir of extended things, as Locle held. The Jaina distinguishes two hinds ' i' ce, they space einpty spsee. , an‹1 ilie otlier substances live ilokü- hàsa), and einpty space beyontl su‹-1i world (alukñkñsa). (iiil 'ï'irne or liiila 'Piine (kälu}, as Uinàsväiui states, makes possibie the continuité, modification, niovement, condition of duration, newness and oldiiess of’ substance..' change, motion, new- nens sud oldnesi. Like space, lime also is inferred, thout;h not perceived. It is iuterreJ a» the condition witlioui- which substances coultl, not how I edu e c rac e ned, though it is true that time alone cannot cauee a thing to 112 AT IN'l’RODH€i' IO TO INDIAN PHII OSOPHY have the characters. Without nnot endure or ice let; duration implies moments of time in which existence is prolonged. Modification or change of stntes also cannot be conceived without time. A mango can be tween rind rip+I only successively, i.e., at iti8erent aiomenta of time; and without the oiip}x›sition of time-distinctions we cannot understand how a thing can possess such incompa.tible chnrncters. Similarly, movement which implies the assumption of successive states by on objec4 can be conceived only with the supposition of time. Laetly, the distinction between the old and the-new, thy earlier and the later cannot be explained without time. ’these are, thern fore, the groiinds on which the rxi*lenee of time can be inferreil. 'Phe reaaon why time ia not re ardeJ es an aotikñya. is that time is one indivisible substance. One and the gaine time is pi'ecsent es eiywliere iii the world.' Uulike all other substanees called astikâyas, time is devoid of extension in spa‹'e.. Jaina n riters sometimes distinguished between real tiine (pñrninarthika kâla) and ^°’e'°*i’ empirical or conx entional time (vyñvaliârika kiila, also colled samaya). City or djjy8tion (vartanñ) is the mark ofreal time, wlier 6es ol’ cli kinds of empirical time. It is this la-tter (samaya) which is conventionally divided into moments, hours, etc., and is limited bya beginning and an en‹i. But real time ih  TBR JAIN* PRIr.Os0PRY ıı3 fornilens and elernal. By impusing conventional limita- tions and distinctions on real time, empirical time is Jno‹li«-ed.' Soıııe Jaiııa lear'1ıeı a, Gunarafna observes, do not aılınit time aaa separate sI1f)Rttınce, but re;:ard it as a ınor)e‹ J›iıryâya) off the ol her sılllsta.n‹'es.' Like spare anJ time,I lıese two sılbntancen :ılso aa‘e are the oonditiooa of lity and iınnıobility—nıotion and ıııov‹'nı nt " ""’ resf—at ‹' t ha groııtıds of sut'h inference. 'the Tiı ina ar ııcs t İcat just as the rınıre-1 ınent ofa fishiu t he l'iveı’, tlı‹nıglı in itial e‹l by ı lık fish it.«elf, uould not lm possil›lt uitlıoııt the ıııcr?itını of water, wlıicla is, tlıeı‘elore, a necessary ‹'oıı‹lit ioıı/ sımi)arJ3' the nıoveıııent ‹if suni or a iııatt:ria\ tlıiııg require surea uxil i ı ı'y ‹-ou d itir›rı, wit Iıout u lıiclı its ıııot itin x‘oultl rı‹ıt lee }x›nsılıle. tut lıa con‹lition is ilie siil›stanee ‹-alletl ‹Pharma. Pharma ran oiily l'as ciii’ or’ help ilie motion tif in‹›s in objects; it i-a ii riot iiiukea non-niox'in olijei-t move, just as water ‹'annot make a fish move. Adharina, on tire t'on- trai'y, is the substance that helps the restful state ‹n’ iiiiniobilitj of ‹objects, juht as the shade of a tree helps o traveller to rest, or the earth soppurts things that rest on it. It cannot, however, ai‘rest the movement ofany moving object. Pharma and adliarma, 114 AN INTBOD CTION TO I IAN P$ILOSOP^* tli0llglj tl ljb op{johe‹l, ü1t £tU üinlii»r iE1 UD far 8*!Oh areeternel, o wl‹ -.movin. 3'hey are fownle8s an boi e a e d- pasai›e aübstan0ee. je (Jokäkä$al. As conditions O iriutiola ant) rest, botli are [iassive,' aii‹l not actlve. khanna aud adliarrn:i tr'e iisetl here in tliese tecliriieal *eiises, and not in the:r ordinary irioi'a1 senaes (i.e. iiiei'it and deinerit. i' Regnrîtir›g nllt be four suf›stanct s—spfiee, time, dhnrtne and adbarma—il should bo noted that Space, time, dharnin as ciiusq0 ct›nditions they all bave ri peculiar adams. ’l'he causal conditions niot,e aod paesir‹ in- (kñrtiys) mtiy bc distinaiiiBhed into strnmeatal conditions. tbree cbief étions, iiyeat (ns yott er ia ol Ihe pot) and iosti-uoiPnt (ug the potter's wheel is ‹›f the pot) ltnrl iri:it‹ui«l (»s cl:iy is of the pot)?‘ Space, tiiiie, r*tc., come under the category of instru- mental condition , btib thr y should !›e diatinguishad f om ordinary conditirina of that bind, being orore indirect and paaaive khun ordinnry instrument:il conditions. Ouqaratnn gives them, ther lore,a special name, apekaäkärana.' 'l'he atone on wJiioh the potter's ivheel reeta may be oited as ri condition o/ this kind in reiation to the pot. Bpaco, time, etc., rire similar conditions. The most iniportant part of’ I:iina piiiloFii)¡›liy ih ito fitJiicS. hfelii Jili,i «i‹-s ‹ir eJiisft nioJtip y—iii far:t, know- letlge of any kind—in useful for the Jaiiia in so far as ii helps him to right conduct. the ;toal of right conduct ° ’ tfdasinalara9a’ touparatna, God., p. l7S). ' */." Dharr»ad yah cajc'ah smaiitzh,” t. lPati»artlaroj«- vòrtfiàa, 5. 1. l7 18j. ayin is aalTfltıon (moky), which mans negatisely reaıoâal of all bondage of tlıg cool eod.. pqsitively the olİainınent oÎ perfetıon. z 1. Doudoge o/ t/ıe8oul Bondo¡;o uıeaılp, in Indiınl phlloeoyhy iıı {¡tueral, the puoceseed of infiuite &l1d i¥ll Consec}uent sıılfeı'inga. Thin li ’ general ‹xınception of bondage iB differently interpreted by the different systems in I lie li¡;lit of their ideas of t lie indiviJ'ial and the world. The suffering iiidividual, for the Jainti, is a jiva ora livıng, cuııscious ubstaıtco called the pul. This soul is inlıerent ty peı 1‘ect. It has infinite poteı2tiulity witlıiıı. Infıııite knowle‹l e, infınite fmılı, iaıiıİe ,srfi- rud i.›fir un 1.ıi.., ca›ı all ti it t..i.ıed by tito‘Üuİ il’ it tutı o lily reın‹›ru ftuın witlıiıı itself all obstac.leo llı*t sta.nd u the way. Tuot as the sun shiues f‹p’tlı to illuıuinata the eutire world as soon as the atıuosJ›lıero is freed of cloud and for, similarly the ouul attains oııınincienct' aıHl hic other Jmrfections il1lıet'allt i lı it a.s soon an the obntncles ¡srq reınoved. But ıv)1itt tllt'll are tlıese ulıstaeles, and how ‹lot hey ‹:oıııe to rob the soul ol’ its Owıng to dortrts İt ie Or LOa4 g6 «Ors. Ivy nıatteı'-} ticles wlıiclı infe‹t the e ul and oveıpuwer its nxtural ‹jualities. lu utlıer oı’ı1», the liınitatiuııs t hat we hud in individuol »utıl are dııe lo the ınaterial ixıdy whiclı the aonl fren idenl ified itself. The bodJ/ in nıade of particles of ıuntter fpudpale), and tor  tise formation ofa particular kin‹1 of body, particular kinds of matter-particles are to be an anged and organized in :i. particular way. In the fom&t.ioi¡ of this body the guiding force is the. soul's ‹iwn passions. Roughly spe:ikin , a soul acquires the body that it inwardly cj aves for. ’fho kariuis or the ésuni of‘the past life o1‘ a auul its }iast thou 'lit, speech an‹l a,ctivity—generate» in it certain lilind ci'avini:»- :irn1 passions thai seen satisfaction. These cravings iiia soul attract to it {›art it'uiai‘ sorts of matter-particles and of' atiinet Item it1t‹› lieu fiody ul\uei\sciou«ly de i e‹l. ’lire soul willi its }iassioiis or katrina-lfirc'es is, tlierelùre, regaided by the.7aina as the orÿanizer uf tiie l›o‹Iy, flic etfieient t'ause of it, u'liereas incl ter (pud¡;alal is sitiil to be its inateri*l cause. 'I'lie ‹›rga.in.sin which the ,soul ee[ifible body,b ut :tlso i lie ecu see, inaila , the vitaI truces and all the other elements which curb and liiiiil the soul's potentialities. The hotly that we liavt* iiilieriteil fr‹›ln our J›arents is not a mere claan‹:e ‹icquisit ioii. The bedy und other conditions of en in Our pasf karrua ‹determines t li‹' dieidonl are all due to fainil) iii which we are from iis ivt'li as the nature of the body—its COlOllr, stature, ahape, loilgeâity, the number and nature of sense organa and tnotor organs which it possesses. While all these, taken ccllectivel3, may be said to be ‹me to karina, taken also iii the reflective sense (of the suni-total of all tendencies generated by past lit’e„ each of' these taken sepairately may be said to be due to a particular kind of karma. Tlie Jaina,  11‹ therefore, ape ks of the inony kaiaias, and narnes eacli after the’ eg»«t it produces. For exainple, got.ra-koriua is the karina that determines tlia family iuto wliieli one is horn, "ayu-karina is the karnia deterniinilig ilie lent, th of life, iind su oii. i3imilarly, we are told of the karma. that oiuutls knowlodgoq (jîiâ,ia,,varan,ya), tl'ist whieh clouds foitli tdardariâvaraiiya', that wliicli produuea ‹leluaion (inoliaoiya), tiiaf amicii pi‹irlticea einotioiis ‹if pleasure and tiain tvedaniya.), and ou ori. The p:issions wliioiicrime bondage are aiiger, pride, infat netten *nd greep( oiÏÏia, ’.Plie pnaaiona causing bondsge are onger, lrlälla, ljqay'd, lOb11it).' 'Ä'lleSe itrt pride, infstuation and stances), because the pr sei/ce ol’ those in the soul in*kosyuat ter-pparticles stick o ts the nat ure and flllIllber of iiiatei ial pa ticlc.« attracted by the soul depeud on its ’1be inBux of karma- *ttütt0[ iNto thO BODi. kai'nia, llieee particies iliêoiselves come t‹i be cailed kai‘ina -mal ier’.. (kai'in*-putlgaia1 er even simply katrina. ’Plie 8uw of such kai'ints-watter into the emil is calle‹l, therefore, in8ux (äsruval of karma. t t› in ca.ti l lie l'ac:t t 1 ixvii. iilege letJt BoDdaga of the‘ »uuI to asattez' dc due te ite with passions, tal‹ecs up iiiall c'l' iii beoüage to bal dis- accordance with its kai‘ina.“ As poeitieni or psmions. of ilie.vul is the internal anrl priinal-y i'‹su.«e tif ° Fit. tol., 8.0 : "sukntiyatväJ jiia9 karn›s9o yogyaii titid. aläu  bondage, and the inJ i a r(aa=°ax22t ›i* » › is only the eseci of It, the Jaina writers point out thet bondage or fall of tlie aoul begins in thought. 'Phey. therefore, speak sometiiiies of two kinds ot booJage: f1) internal or i }_jjt 1 ge, i.e. the sent’s hon‹lage to b*d diupositioti 'bl*va-btsiitllis), and (2) its e$ect, material bondage, i.e. the aoul's actuai' "l'lia intet'penotrntion of inivtter and soul (which, according to the Jaina, ie the nature 1iitert›riieirition of of bondage) would appear to be orude proved by the ptt'eence to aoine. But we Bhould bear in mind that the soul, Jor tlia Jaina, i» not every psrt of the body. d0VOid of extension, but co-extanBive with the living body, The soul is the jitui, the liring being; «nd in every part of the living body we find motter an \v«I1 as uoaBciousaeBe aDd, therefore, the uompveEenüe or intèrtinnetrotion ol mtitter and the eonsoiOUB living au0 tanee (i.e. tbe aoul) ia os good a tuot of experienee aa t1ia intorpenetration ol milk and water in n iriixture ol hoe two. or of lire and iron in ii red-hot iron i r r»dade ofthevul i. its assoc.atioii wilh mal Ier, liberation must tnean tiic complete di»sociation of tlio knul froin inatter. ezpu)aiaa ol zoatter fxora t1e ¥oal. Sbis can be attaiued by stoppiiig tltr' in nu: off new itiat ter the tt} its geil as by coiiiplete eIi›nitiiiiion ol’ the q¡t}t w}i¡uli the soul l*s bocoin‹* :ilrcirtly n1ingIet1. The Jjp ț ț,rOcess is t:ai letl saiiiviit”.v (i.s. tiic stoppu,ge opt ¡p ) and the secoiid nirjara fi.e. i:xliaustion or wea,r- ing ou[ of bai ura iii the aoul). * Gupore!nw,€oo. oo #o#., p. 181.  TBE NAINAPBILOSOP£tY 119 We have :›ein tliist the passions or cravings of the aoul lead to ilie assctaotion of the soul with matter. Looking into the cause of the passions tlieiiisolvos, we find tlia.t they ultiiriately spring caitee oi psaeioas. from our igiioi-.tnce. Our ignoi'ance about the re¡tl mat rire of pour mule a,nd otlier tliiiagd lt tids to anger, van il 3',i iifatuation ii nd droeil. Erica letl c* al‹ine Knowledge clone n remove ignorance.“ remove ignorance. The J therefore, stress the necessity of rig tk!i°srled (naniyag-jti*na) or the knowledge of reality. Ridht hnowled;;'e can be obtained only by st ii‹lying carefully the teachings o1‘ RigAs bnowl‹Ig‹ is ob%inab1c: f1'otn fbi: ttacbing of the cin °ii‹ ac'lier. who have alreatlj‘ attuiiied ationt tirthañkarae. li i c, t liei‘ef‹iFe. ›‹t lead otliers oul of boidage. I3iit before eve feel incliiie‹l to ntudy t lieir tea‹'liirigs, eve rn tim liavt a gc'neral acquaiiil ii nce with the eşecn lial. uf llie tea‹-li: iiiis and conseqnent t‘ait1i in the ‹-onit›eteii‹-e of tliese teacliers. 'Phis right sort of laitli base‹l ori general }›i eliminary at'quaintaiic:e(called sainyag-darj*țlgj '£hersfore faith 'n payes the way for right knowledge then i4 neeossorJ. (samyag-jñana) antl is, tlierefore, regarded as indispensable But nièreis u»elesa uuless it is put to practice. Right conducl (aamyak-eäritra) is, tlierefore, regarded by the Jaina as the third indispensable condition of liberation. In right chon m ras tO Knowledge is Jietfect- ed in right eondiiet. natif, euro speet'li and action, in the light of rig oowledge. This enablen liiin to stop the in8ux of new karma and eradicnte old*karmas, securing..120 AN INTRODccTIO TO INDiAN PnILOsOP Y grcdualiy thereby the elimination of matter which ties the auul into bondage. iglii faith, right knowledge, a.nd right conduct right knowledge 8.nd in Jaina ethies os ilie three gems right conduct. non- (trJotno) thn-t aliine ina good life. In the very first stitra of J'attoärfitä- dliiyaitia-cïilra., I;”niäsvämi statent Iris ‹'ar‹Iin ai te'a‹'liinp ol’Jainisin: leo he a be i 'they juintly prodiim lie.s 1 irt'oiiyli iglil faith, kn‹›w'lege liberation. antl conduct.' eration is 4he biijf fuillt {zaiiiyay-daréatia).—UrnR>xïiizii detines i i¡;lit iaitli ns the attitude of respect (sraddli.) towards trutli. 'fhiB f8itli may l›e inborn und liigbt taiIb i" '°"’ sJ›ontaneoua in some; by otliers it pee@ot- t,rutb. may be acquived by learning or oulture.' Tn auy «mee faith can arise only when theltarinas that stund in its way (i. c. the tendeneies th›it eause dirbeliel) are allayed or worn out. It should not ba thought bhut Jainism u nnts its followers to accept blindly ivliot is It ia »nt blind faith. taught by tbe tirt/ta*f‹ara8. èB äteni- bhadra, u Jaina writer, atotes, the attitudC Of the Jaina iB Fationalistie, rather than dogmntio, and it is summed up inthefollowing dictum: 3__[giy_e no bias for Mahiivïra, and zone and othel g. me, öBe-sec r tttey"ïfïigIit bë: Tiia iriitinl fnitli ieo renaonable atliturle, firat, b.ceaiise it is based on sonio iniiial ci quaint- IG is the minimum anee and is propoi'tir.nate to llils, and will to beliese, with Ber:ondly, because e ithout such faii li otit which’ no etudy there would be no incentive1o furtber study. £lvena seeptieal philoaoplier, * 'fisniyag-daréana jüäna eäritrL9i moÏtsc tnkzgah.’ * 'Pal. stil., 1. 2 8. Puin, on Jd., 44 {Cliowliba4 ba ed., p. 89,.  THE JAINA I'EILO 8O1'HY Ml who begins td atiidy something rationally, mum possess some faith in the utility of hia method end the subject he studies. £itarting with a partial faith rind studying further, if the beginner 6nda that the Jaina teachings are reasonable, hie faith knov1tdge. inereaaeB. ’the Jnina claims that the more one st2idiea theae 'wiews, the greater »'ould faitli'grow. Perfect knowledge would cause, therefore, perfect taith (aamyag-dardana). Itipfst knowludga (aomyoy-jfiazt«).—\Vftile faitb is initially finaed on knowledge of only the esaentiale of the.Taina teachings, right knowledge ia, ltight lnowlodge coti- aa £h’ei›yn aaripi ate abates, the “de- i»s i« the detsilod knowledge of‘ iill tailed cognition of the real nature ref the ogo and non ego, and is free from doubt, error and uncertainty’' (verae 4J). We have ‹already seen in connection z'it1i Irina epistemology the different sva3'a in »'1iich correol› cognition em ba obtained. An in the case of faith, so in the ‹:ase of knowledge, the existence o1 certain iifhate < I.endenoies (karmae) aband in the way oi correct knowledge. £’or the attainment o1 it«»«i»r i»« i» perfect itnou-ledge the reizioval of »ees ^ 7 *° * - these liarmas should ba attempted. Perfection of this proceaa ends in the iittainment of absolute omniscienoe (kevalajññno). light con.duet (snmy‹tb-cfit’ii*-ti).- -€’zood conduct ia briefly deeeribed in Dt'eolfa-ooñyrobe (verse 45) 8B r i'raining from what is and performing z'hat harmful and doing whet ia beneficial. Ina ii ord, it ia what heJpa the aelt to jat z'id OI Gbe It8¥'ZnaB tlJat 108d him Ie bondage and Buffering. ror the stoppage of theinflux of new karmas, and c'radioation of the old, one must (1)take the fivc great. rows (pa8ea-malirivrata), (fl) prnefiae extreme c0refulnoaa (aamiti) in walking, B@e*kiog, receivng smB zod other thinba, and anBwar- in;; calla of nature, so aa to ovoid doing any harm to any life› (6) practise restraint (gUpti) of thought, apeech and bodily moveneo€e (4) proofise tcp different kinds namely, forgiveness, humility, abraight- lorwardness, truthtulneaa, cleanliness, aelf-restraint, austerity (internal and external), BaCrifioe, non-attachment lmlfl0sB 1S8 *mINTRODDGTION TWINDTAh FBILOBOPBY and celibacy, (5) meditate on the cardinal trotha taught regarding the aelt end the world, (aj conquer, through fnrtitude, all paina and discomfort» that ari e from hungers thirst, heat, cold, ate., and (’fj attain aquanimity, purity, absolute greedlaaeneea and pertect eonduot.’ But Jaina writera are not unanimoua regarding the necesaity of all the above atepa fiome 3’he 6ve gy"at morve of thorn solecb the firat, nain ly. the lorna tbe baei8 of r›gbC coudwt. ève grua€ sows ag sufbcien€ 1or perfection of conduit. Many otthe other steps reeommended rire fouud to repeat in different wayB thebaaic prineiploa of theae five. ’the vnlue of the fivo great vows (pañca-mahä- vrafn) ie recogiiised by the Upanisadio 'fl›e pt inciplea under- thinkera aa weli aB the Eauddhua (who lyinp tbene sccepted ‹:nll them Pañcn éïla). ’fh0 principleB of moat of thèse are reeognized alao in the ten t'liri-tian comm»ndinents. But ihe Jninaa try to praetise theBa witha r}§OUF Bc»rcoly fouud elaowhere. The.›« vowa consist of the following: Ÿhirhsñ: Abstinenee from all injtn-y to life. Life, oP wc huve seen, exi»ts uoi simt›ly in the in‹›ving lieiogs (trasa), but alec› in abiiiiañ or son-in,urJ come non moving ones {stliiivara) such a« plauta und beiiigu iiiliabiGing bodie» of eaitli. 'the ideal of tbe lama is, theçefore, to avoid molesting life not only of the moving creatures but also o1 the non-moving ones. The Juina sainfa who try to follow thia idenl nre, th. roi‘oro, found evrn to breathe lhriiiigh a piece of cloth tied over tbeir unsee lest they ini›ale aod de$troy the life of any organiam Meeting in the air. Ordiunry luymen would fiiid tlii- idesl too high. They uro adviaed, therefo ’e, to begin with tha partial obaervatice ‹›f ohirilsä by sbstaining from iniury to moviug beiuga whioh rire endowed with et leust two en6eu. ’J'üe J iae attitude où ahizñ Ô ia tbe logicaï oyt- aott›e ul tbetr oi tapby-lent theory of tia polential eq ›a ity ‹i all aoula and re‹'ogn tlou of the I t. ie baaed on the Ju'inciple ‹›f rccipr city, i.e. we ah‹›uld idea of p tenlial e9ualily of all svu la. de to OthePa nfi wc w‹›uld br done by. fi 'a ui›fair to think that ahiriiaù is tbe reœnaztt of tba euvage's prio iti›e awe for 1›(e;  TBE JlINA PBILOSOPSY 123 as some critici buve thought.' If every aoul, however lowly nov-,. can beooru« na gr.at aa any ot ier soul, iheo on« hould recogniza the value au,l thu olaima of sverJ life aa hia own, ‘ ltesp ct for lifu wherever louod becomes then an irresiatibie dui y. The J«ina trie» to pr rforin i hia duty in every minute aot in life, because he wnnta to ba tliorouglily c‹›usi-that wi}L the h.eis p/iociplu be Abitiisë must he aa aecepted. 5’ho Jainn :ilso th nim prtotinea in tbo''glit, speech and action. th. refore, that it iB not sufficii nt simply Url te t uke life;i ne should not even thisk and speel ot tuking li’e, nor even perrri it; noi' oticoureqe otbrrs t‹i t ake life. Otherwisu tbe vos' of abiiilBa eunni›t be fully mn inl nined. bati ant: Abai inenee fry nr fo1«ehoed.—’fhi vow also is krn very Trutlifulness 21 The vow of salyn." or l'ruibl nlnee.s c‹'n ak ia ‹›nly true, ai ls in spculi inz w hat but spc'oking whar is t' in' oa well ac a er ne, as eli g ›‹›d und t›l 'astini. W illiout tlie-e pleasani t.i g"od. gus lificutioris the practice nl truth f nl- nes w‹ uld be of liit ir use ns an aid tO nior® i"'*!'J°’ Because, mere!y sp :iking what ia i rus may s‹›metiu eB de cend into gurrulity, vu gurit›, frisolit y, vilificntion, eto. Truth eetas the ident of this sow is scmetimes ca!led, theret. re, runri«, to suggest the fuller meauii›§ of truth which iaol o »holes‹.me arid pleasant. It 1s AlB0 printed out tbat for the pc rl'eet inait›tenanco of thia vow, one must conquer greed, fenr und nnger and even reatrain the hobit ol jest ing. Asteyani: Abstinence from st enling.—Thia vow consists in not talting wfint ie ö‹ t gil eo. TBe 13d The vow ol s»nctity o( the properly of othera, like is baaed on the idea thot of their livea is r eogoised ty the 4uino. A Jsina writer wittily propetty refïl FkB thDt wealth iabut the out r life of man und to rob wealth is to rob li(e. 11 human ! Side Nadkeozie, Eindt‹ 2thiosi p. 119 : “ WIie mot i*ea of the doctrine of abidisñ.....in the awe with wbicl the eavag re.:arde life in all its forms." But even the early xina tooehera uia£e it. clear that it ie the zen0¢ of tellow-f eIiog and equity on which ahidis6 is bzaed. Vide d cñ dñga zñtro, I.4 8. iJacobi, JnittorCtioc, P.'rt I, pp. g8.99), aah g0tra-£ I4*ya, 1.1.4 (op cit. 1* rt IE, pp. 2S7-46), ohi‹ b epesk of abi&gB aB ‘ Èhe legitïaiate coael0aioa fraai tbe priaciple of life ia impossible without wealth ‹n some forzn or otlier. there ia no exaggeration in the Jaina thought that depriv- inga tnan of his wealth ia virtually to deprise him of an eggential condition on wbicb hislife dépends. ’fbia vow, tberefore may be said to be logically inseparable from the vos ofahiñieii, the aaoctity of property beiog a logioal semence ofthe sanctity of life. Brahæscaryam:.4bà4inenee from self-indu1genee.— Thia wow is generally interpreted as t4l The ron of l›roh ioccrys consiste ifim€ o1 oeGbacy But iRe Nanm nttaohes to this alsoa deeper zrieaning /o m« et ul/-ind»/ thet raieea the etanderd of tbiB 909' *’^°*- far above znere aexual Beïl-eontiaenue. Tt ia intarprete‹I :ia the vow to give up aelf-indulgenee /âm*) o1 esery form. ’1'heJ»inu, bene ou selforiücisRv discerns that though out»'ardly indulgence may stop, it may continue still in aubtle forms—in apeeob, in thought. in t1¡e hopes of enjoyniont hereafter in heaven, even in askinp or permitting others to indulge themselves. For' the ‹complete maintenance oft.his vow one muet, therefore, deaisv from ail formé cl' self-indulgenee —exteroal and internnl, subtle and prose, mundano and extra iniindanc, direct ond indirect. Aparigraha: Atiatinen‹:a from all atta‹:binent.—’l’bis is explaine3 ns the voa' to give up.ill at›tae1itxiant for the objpcts of ih‹: lix'e abstaininb Irons ›ill neuves—pleaaant aonnd, touoh, eolour, /›tgacb1r›r'fJl En seoüe- t astt. :in‹l smell.' Ils nttucbnienf to ‹›bjate. t.tte world's oojeots meane Sondage 1o thO iYOPlii, VIH $he force Of this Gousea rebirth, liberotion impossible without. the ss-it.hdrawal of nttaclitrient. :i ii‹l i:onilut'l a re inse}iartiblj. light Knowledge. fsitli and condnct ‹legetiera,ti‹›yi ‹Jî t[it‘ che I eact cH jointly bring about t he other tw‹i. Perl‘eclion of con- '°“ ° ""'°" ‹1 tit-t goes haiid in haiiti with tli‹ ›erÎectioii ‹if Ènuwled;;e and l'aitli. )Yliena persoii, through ilie liarinonious deveiopiïient of thèse three dcñräùp‹ts iit rs,J ucobi, iL N., p. ä0ö.  'ï'HM JAII2A ï'HJLO80PN1' succeeds ni overccnhn{J the forces of all passions and §arznou, u)d god oew, the soul becomes freu fruzo its bondage tu matter and attains liberation. Being freu loom tLie obstacTuu uJ‘ matter, the scul ”eaJiaes its inherent potentiality. It attains the fourfold perfec- tion fananta-caiiistaya), namei§, infinite l riowledpe infinite faith, infinite power and infinite bliss. ’3. Jainicm aco 2teIigioii without Go‹ï Jainisin presentc , aJony with Buddliisni, u. religiuii ThegroundsofJoirz without belief ir Oud. Thr iitlieieni ‹›l’ the Jainas is basrd ‹›ri the ÏollcwilJg cÏiief grctind« : , !i/ Go‹J is not yeireived, l›ul uugÏ›t t‹› l›e j»'‹yye‹1 lhrouigh iriferoncr. 'Plit Nyä3a f1) Neitber percep- liolds, l'or example, t.hat as evt r,y "“" “ prodrif.i. liken hoiise, i,« i1i‹ woi'ä ol‘ an agent tkartä), the wor‘ld, which is ii )u’oduct. iiiusl aJs‹› have arievent or creator wiit› is ‹ al led O‹iil. But this iii 1'ererit:e is liiconeiusive, because tme of tlir preiiiises, the world is u product,' i,« JoUbtfu!. flow is il. proved that the world isa product '' Ii carinot bo said that the world isa p@duci becaii ïe it' Ïlaa paris. TÏioiigÏi äkäéts has parts, it i. riut adoiitte‹l by llit Nyäya t‹› lie a proJuct; it is said to be an eteriial substnnce not {»odueed by anytiiin else. Ap'ain, wiierever we perceivo anytliind beinp }iruduce‹l, the producer or the agent is found to word ‹nr the inaterial with lii.« liinbs. Go‹l is said to btw * Pido P,romego ka ruta-wiñrldpda, ihep. II, and fipñdoddomanyori, ter0e fl and con, for 0labor0te argtiaionta in a0pport o* ctlieisai.  126 IN lNTRODPcsnon TO INDIAN rairogorav bodiless. Row csn He, then, work on matter to produce the world† (ii) Like the existence of God, the qualities of omnipotence, unity, eternity and perfec'tion, generally attributed to Rim, are» so doubt- Rt{fiâD(Pfl {O L0d BAB N ’ If God is omnipotent, Re notreasonab1£ should be supposed to be the cause of all thint;s. But this is not. true, beeauss we per- ceive daily that many objects like houses, pots, etc., are not produced by Ood. God iB held to be one on the ground that, if there were rna.ny ;;odn, they would actwith di$erent plitiis and purposes, end consequently a harmonious world. aB we have, would not have been possible. But this argument is not sound, because we obeeJve that IIiany human beinys like maaons, and even lower animals like ants and bees, iic't ioJetlier harmo- niously to build objects iike J›ala‹ms, ant-mil Is, and hives. €'>od, again, in said to be eternally perfect. Bi:t eternal perfection iaa meaningless ‹.pilhel. Perfyi'tioii is only a removal of iinperfee.tion, and it is meaningless to call a being perfect who was neser imperfect. Though t.he fainas thus coine to reject €’>oJ, as the creator of the worl‹l, iliey think it r i»ñns wornh:. tbt lihernted aoula necessary io riieditate on and poseeeeiag Ood.like worship the liberated, perfect soU lR “’ (oiddhas). The* liberated aouls possess:ng the God-like perfections mentioned a.lready easi!y take the place of God. Prayers are o$ered to 1.heni for ;;uidance and inspiration. The o8ering of pra.yers to five kinds ol pure souls (paaca-paramasti)‘ 'fbeae are the Azhats, the 8iddhai, the ñeñryot, the ITpñdhyayss, the flhdhue; oide Drarpii.sdiigrolta, 48.  TBE JAN* PDILOBOPaY 187 aleo forms a, part of ilie daily routine of the devout Jainas. In spite of the absence ofa creator-Ood, tlia religious spirit of the Jaina laeks 'the religione fetvoui of the Jsinas does not, lieitlier in internal fervour nor in tbersfore, sufler. external r:eremoriial expressions. By meditaîing ori the pure qnalitJe- of the lil›erated and tliose who are ad tanced ori the path to libeiation, the Jaiiia reniiiids hii)lb0lf da iiy of the possibilily of attaiiiirig the high ‹lestiny. Ee piirifies his mind by t lor contenq›lalion ol‘ tJ ie ț›ure ;i n‹I »trerigtliens liis lieait 1’or the ii}›liill journey l‹› iil›erat i‹iii. W‹›rsliij›, ftn’ [email protected], is nt›1 aeckin¿° for inerc.y, aiiil pardon. The Jaina l›elievt's iii tim inex‹›ra1›le in‹›ral 1:iw of ktirnla ivliicli rio mercy r:in beinl. The conseqiieii en ol paat niitdoe‹l» t-an only bt coiiiitera‹:le‹) t›y generaiin witliin the sun1 slio °l'I»6ite lorces of goo‹l tlir›u}ilit, ‹rod njieecli aii‹1 o‹›‹l iictioii. J3reiy oiie innst work out mrsuwn s:i1vation. Tlir libcrated soiiis aerve only as l›eaeon lii:hts. 'lhe religion of J aioftsJr ieu i'e1yiua cf aelf-ht lp. religion ol‘ sel1‘-lielj›. Tliis is wliy tfiä”TibUated soiii is calle‹1* victor (jim! and a hero (vira). In Jliis respeet it hae some otlirl }iariillels in Tritlia. in Biirltlliisin, the öänkliya and tlir Advaita-X’etlänt.a.