Chapter 9 Emergencies PDF

TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 CHAPTER 9 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SECTION I. EMERGENCY DEFINITIONS 9-1. HELICOPTER SYSTEMS...

TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 CHAPTER 9 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SECTION I. EMERGENCY DEFINITIONS 9-1. HELICOPTER SYSTEMS actually occurred. If time permits, during response to emergency situations, the crew This section describes immediate emergency actions must consider transmitting a Mayday call, and defines the various emergency terms. Emergency selecting the XPNDR button on the emer- operation of aircraft and mission equipment is contained gency panel and locking shoulder harness. in this chapter. Emergency messages are provided by EUFD and Master Warning (MSTR WARN) and Master Steps that must be performed immediately in an emer- Caution (MSTR CAUT) illuminated pushbuttons. Emer- gency situation are underlined. These steps must be gency procedures are given in MPD format and check- performed without reference to the checklist. When the list form when applicable. A condensed version check- situation permits, confirm steps accomplished and com- list of these procedures is contained in the condensed plete non-critical steps from the written checklist. If the checklist, TM (QT) 1-1520-263-CL. ENG page is displayed on either MPD, and the eRMM emergency procedures are loaded, emergency proce- 9-2. IMMEDIATE ACTION EMERGENCY STEPS dures are automatically displayed. If neither MPD has the ENG page displayed, the system will automatically display the ENG page in response to all aircraft warning messages that have an associated voice message. In the event of a procedural difference between the written and displayed emergency proce- 9-3. DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY TERMS dure, the steps in this chapter take precedence. a. Land Without Delay. The term LAND WITH- OUT DELAY is defined as a landing in which the pri- NOTE mary consideration is continued control of the aircraft and survival of the occupants. It is meant to be more The urgency of certain emergencies requires urgent than Land As Soon As Possible. The situation immediate and instinctive action by the pilot. may not permit the crew to continue to maneuver the The most important single consideration is aircraft to a suitable landing area (e.g., open field). If helicopter control. All procedures are subor- maneuvering to an open area is not practical, then the dinate to this requirement. crew must make the decision to land in an area that will When continued flight is in question, due to have the least amount of negative impact on crew sur- a loss of rotor RPM or reduction of available vivability. (e.g. Over dense forest, select an area with power (as a result of equipment malfunctions the smallest trees, in a mountainous area, choose an or environmental conditions), the immediate area with the least amount of slope). corrective action should be to adjust collec- tive to maintain NR within limits and jettison- b. Land as Soon as Possible. The term LAND AS ing of the aircraft wing stores. This should SOON AS POSSIBLE is defined as landing at the near- be done as the immediate means of reduc- est suitable landing area (e.g., open field) without delay. ing power requirement by approximately 1% The primary consideration is to ensure the survival of torque per 200 lbs. of weight reduction. occupants. MSTR WARN and MSTR CAUT buttons c. Land As Soon As Practicable. The term LAND should be reset after each malfunction to AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE is defined as landing at a allow systems to respond to subsequent suitable landing area. The primary consideration is the malfunctions. It is always possible that a urgency of the emergency. caution light can unnecessarily illuminate. Whenever possible, check the caution or d. Autorotate. The term AUTOROTATE is defined advisory message against the appropriate as adjusting the flight controls as necessary to establish MPD page to verify that a malfunction has an autorotational descent and landing. 9-1 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 9-5. EMERGENCY EXIT AND ENTRANCE When shutting down an engine that has mal- functioned in flight, it is important to identify Activation of the canopy removal system the malfunctioning engine to avoid shutting when combustible fuel/vapors are present down the wrong engine. in the cockpit can result in an explosion/fire. An explosion/fire can also occur if the air- Monitor TGT after shutdown. If TGT rises craft has rolled on its side and fuel vapors above 540° C, or there is evidence of com- bustion as indicated by a rapid rise in TGT, have gathered on the ground adjacent to place the ENG START switch in IGN ORIDE the canopy side panels. The crewmembers position and motor engine until TGT de- survival knife may be used to fracture the creases below 540° C. canopy side panel as an alternate means of egress. e. Emergency Engine Shutdown. The term EMERG ENG SHUTDOWN is defined as engine Continuing to twist the canopy jettison handle while pushing can cause the actuator to jam shutdown without delay. Engine shutdown in flight and prevent operation of the canopy sever- is usually not an immediate action item unless a fire ance system. If the canopy jettison does not exists. Before attempting an engine shutdown, identify occur on the first attempt, ensure the handle the affected engine by checking engine-out warning is in the 90° position, and push again. A push messages on the EUFD and observe the ENG page for force of 140 - 150 lb may be required to over- TGT, NP, NG, TORQUE%, and OIL PSI. come the jam and initiate canopy jettison. POWER lever (affected engine) — OFF. In the event that canopy jettison does not oc- f. Wing Stores Jettison. The term WING cur when the canopy removal system is ac- STORES JETTISON is defined as jettisoning any or tuated, the personal survival knife should be all of the wing stores as appropriate using one of two used to fracture the canopy panel and permit methods: emergency and selective. The method to be egress. used will be determined by the crew depending on the In all cases of canopy jettison, remain clear situation at the time of the emergency and the wing of canopy side panels to avoid high velocity stores inventory. canopy fragments. 9-4. AFTER EMERGENCY ACTION If emergency egress is required before the rotor blades have stopped, ensure MSTR After a malfunction of equipment has occurred, appro- IGN - BATT and cyclic remains centered to priate emergency actions have been taken and the heli- prevent rotors from striking personnel/fuse- copter is on the ground, an entry will be made in the Re- lage/ground. marks Section of DA FORM 2408-13-1 describing the a. Emergency Egress. Emergency exits and malfunction. Ground and flight operations will be dis- equipment (Figure 9-1) permit emergency egress by continued until corrective action has been taken. the crew from the helicopter, when required. If possible, use the canopy handles to open the canopy and exit the aircraft. If emergency egress becomes necessary, proceed as follows: 1. Helmet visors — Down. 2. Area around helicopter — Clear of personnel. 3. CANOPY JETTISON handle — Turn 90°, release, then push to jettison canopy. 9-2 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-1. Emergency Equipment and Emergency Exits 9-3 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 SECTION II. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT 9-6. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT Emergency equipment on the helicopter consists of: Canopy Jettison System Stores Jettison System Portable fire extinguisher Engine and APU Fire Detection/Extinguishing Sys- tem Aft Deck. Pass Thru Bay, and Tailboom Fire Detec- Figure 9-2. CANOPY JETTISON Handle tion System Two first aid kits b. Stores Jettison System. Jettison of wing Master Zeroize Switch stores can be accomplished using the collective jetti- son button (emergency) or the STORES JETTISON CBR Blower panel button (selective). CMDS jettison can only be Emergency Locator Transmitter accomplished via the STORES JETTISON panel. Underwater Acoustic Beacon a. Canopy Jettison System. The canopy jetti- son system provides a rapid emergency exit for the Flares may become trapped or lodged in the crewmembers. The transparent portions of the four dispenser payload module after being fired. canopy side panels can be jettisoned by means of a Fire/sustained burning of lodged flares could detonating cord installation. The system is controlled occur and result in damage to the aircraft. manually. If flares are ignited and lodged in the dis- penser, jettison all flare munitions and LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. To prevent eye injury, pilot and CPG helmet visors should be down prior to canopy jettison. NOTE Debris may be expelled 50 feet outward. Only the crew station arming the STORES JET- TISON panel can disarm it. Once armed, either The CANOPY JETTISON handles (Figure 9-2) located crew station can activate jettison. in each crew station, incorporate a safety pin which is to be removed before flight. Canopy jettison is accom- plished by turning the handle 90°, releasing, and push- (1) STORES JETTISON Panel. Pressing one ing in. An external ground handle is located under a or more of the ARM pushbuttons on the STORES JET- quick release panel directly forward of the CPG wind- TISON panel (Figure 9-3) will illuminate the selected shield. All four canopy side panels are jettisoned by ac- pushbutton(s) to indicate that the stores jettison func- tivating any of the three jettison handles. tion at the selected station(s) is/are ARMed. Pressing an illuminated pushbutton a second time will disarm that station. Pressing the recessed JETT pushbutton will cause armed stores to be jettisoned. The jettison panel is equipped with a CMDS jettison arm pushbutton which arms the CMDS system for the jettison of flares. The jet- tison will only occur if the CMDS arm power is selected to ARM on the MPD. 9-4 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-3. Selective Jettison Panel (2) Emergency Stores Jettison (JETT) But- Figure 9-4. Fire Detection/Extinguishing Panel ton. Pressing the guarded JETT button on the collec- tive flight grip will cause all external stores to be jetti- (2) Fire Detection/Extinguishing (FIRE soned from the aircraft at the same time. DET/EXTG) Panel. Each crew station contains a FIRE DET/EXTG panel (Figure 9-4). FIRE warning lights are combined with Ready (RDY) lights in each pushbutton for the engines and APU. The FIRE/RDY pushbuttons have cover guards to prevent inadvertent Exposure to high concentrations of fire ex- actuation. The RDY, Primary (PRI) Discharge (DISCH), tinguishing agent or decomposition products and Reserve (RES) DISCH legends are NVIS green. should be avoided. Contact could cause frost- bite or low temperature burns. If agent comes An AFT FIRE indicator light illuminates when a fire is in contact with the skin, seek medical help detected by Tailboom or Pass-Thru Bay flame detector immediately. amplifiers or the Transmission Bay overheat/fire sen- c. Portable Fire Extinguisher. A fire extinguisher sors. The AFT FIRE indicator light is NVIS Yellow. is mounted on a quick release support in the right EFAB access door above the main landing gear. The fire ex- NOTE tinguisher compound is released by a hand operated When positioning the fire detection test switch lever on top of the extinguisher. Inadvertent discharge to position 1 or 2, hold the test switch in the 1 or of the bottle is prevented by a breakaway safety wire 2 position for approximately 2 seconds before across the actuating lever. Operating instructions are releasing it to the spring loaded center position printed on the fire extinguisher. (off) to ensure full voice warning activation. If the above procedure is not followed, the crew d. Engine and APU Fire Detection/Ex- will not receive a proper response to the test ini- tinguishing System. tiation and may not receive a full voice warning reply of all circuits. (1) Engine and APU Fire Extinguishing Bot- tles. Fire extinguishing agent stored in two bottles con- (a) Fire Detection Circuit TEST taining a nitrogen pre-charge are designated as primary Switch. The TEST switch is a three position toggle (PRI) and reserve (RES), and mounted on the fuselage switch used to test fire detection circuits 1 and 2. The side of the engine 1 firewall. Bottle integrity can be switch is spring loaded to center (off) position. checked by inspecting the thermal relief discharge in- dicator disk (viewed from below the engine 1 nacelle). Placing the TEST switch to the 1 position A pressure gauge on each bottle indicates the nitrogen tests one-half of the fire detection circuit for each en- precharge pressure. gine and the APU and tests the master warning light and voice warning. All three FIRE pushbuttons illu- minated confirm all circuits are operable. Placing the TEST switch to the 1 position also tests the left side Pass-Thru Bay and Tailboom Flame Detector and tests integrity of both right side and left side overheat/flame 9-5 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 detectors in the Transmission Bay. The AFT FIRE indi- the ENG page Emergency format is automatically cator illuminated confirms all circuits are operable. displayed. Placing the TEST switch to the 2 position 1 Pressing an illuminated FIRE button: tests the other half of the fire detection circuit in the same manner. All three FIRE pushbuttons and both Arms the fire extinguishing system DISCH buttons illuminated confirm all circuits are op- erable. Placing the TEST switch to the 2 position also Shuts off fuel to the indicated engine or tests the right side Pass-Thru Bay Flame Detector. The APU AFT FIRE light illuminated confirms all circuits are op- Shuts off bleed air from the indicated en- erable. gine or APU Failure of a pushbutton or light to illuminate or a voice Closes the fire louvers to the indicated warning to annunciate during either test indicates a fault engine in the circuit being tested. Stops the voice warning message for both crew stations Extinguishes the MSTR WARN light in that crew station Ensure aircraft controls are configured for single engine operation prior to pressing the 2 When the RDY light is illuminated, the FIRE pushbutton. system is armed. Pressing the FIRE pushbutton (whether illu- 3 Pressing the armed FIRE/RDY push- minated or not) will shut off fuel to the se- button (in the same crew station) will reverse the above lected engine or APU. This action can only functions and disarm the fire extinguishing system. be reversed from the same crew station. Pressing the FIRE pushbutton will arm the (c) Fire Extinguisher Discharge (DISCH) extinguishing system from that crew station Lighted pushbutton. When a FIRE pushbutton is only but will illuminate the RDY and DISCH armed and the RDY light is illuminated, pressing the lights in both crewstations. In order to dis- illuminated PRI DISCH or RES DISCH pushbutton charge the fire bottles from the opposite crew will discharge the selected fire bottle and extinguish station, that crew station will also have to the selected DISCH light, indicating the fire bottle has arm the system by selecting the desired FIRE discharged and is no longer available. If this fails to pushbutton. No additional indications will be extinguish the fire and the FIRE light is still illuminated, provided when the second crew station se- pressing the illuminated DISCH pushbutton will dis- lects the FIRE pushbutton. charge the other bottle and extinguish the DISCH light. (d) AFT FIRE Indicator. The AFT FIRE in- NOTE dicator is part of an expanded fire detection capabil- ity to include the Tailboom, Pass-Thru Bay and Trans- FIRE pushbuttons remain illuminated until mission Bay. This capability only includes fire detec- sensors no longer detect a fire. For a crew tion in the additional aforementioned areas and does station to reset the system, that crew station not include fire suppression. This capability is provided FIRE pushbutton must be deselected. by new Optical/infrared Flame Detector sensors in the The air particle separator will automatically Pass-Thru-Bay on right and left sides of the airframe. A turn off upon illumination of an engine fire separate Optical/infrared Flame Detector sensor is in- pushbutton. stalled in the forward portion of the Tailboom facing aft. Three pneumatic fire/overheat detectors are located in the aft deck area. One detector is mounted on each of (b) FIRE Lighted Pushbutton. The FIRE the two firewall louver doors. There is no extinguishing pushbutton is used to isolate a fire and arm that area’s agent for the aft deck area. fire extinguishing system. When sensors detect a fire in either engine nacelle or the APU compartment, the When a fire is detected by the system, the AFT FIRE FIRE pushbutton associated with that area will illumi- light will be illuminated on the fire panel and the related nate in both crew stations along with the MSTR WARN warning will be generated by the system for an aural light and voice warning. When the warning occurs, warning and display on the EUFD and MPDs. Change 2 9-6 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 The three EUFD and Audio indications for the additional a. Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Fil- fire warnings are: ter/Blower. The CBR Filter/Blower system is capable of providing filtered air to the crew, when the cockpit air Pass-Thru Bay Fire supply is believed to be contaminated. Each crewmem- Aft Deck Fire ber carries his own CBR mask. Tailboom Fire e. Passive Fire Protection. A fire proof barrier will isolate the pass-thru bay from the tailboom. f. Pass-Thru Bay Fire Insulation. The Pass-thru Bay surfaces are primed with in a fire insulation coating. g. First Aid Kits. The helicopter is equipped with two first aid kits, one on the inside aft portion of the pilots right canopy panel and one on the lower side of the CPG left console. The use of the MASTER ZEROIZE switch is a ”Last Ditch” procedure that should be used only when the compromise of classified infor- mation to hostile forces is imminent. This pro- cedure causes physical damage to aircraft cir- Figure 9-6. Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) cuit cards, and should not be used as a normal operation procedure. b. Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT). The ELT (Figure 9-6) is provided to allow search/rescue teams to locate the aircraft and/or the crew in the event of an emergency. The ELT is actuated by internal gravity (crash) or manually using the TEST-RE- SET/ARM/ON switch. The ELT is located behind the CPG seat on the right side. It can be removed (as required) and carried with the crew. To prevent inad- vertent activation, the G-switches are disabled when the ELT is removed from its mount. The ELT is battery operated and fully self-contained. The transmitter transmits a tone at 121.5 MHz, 243.0 MHz and 406 MHz. Figure 9-5. Master Zeroize Switch NOTE Transmitter test shall only be performed during the first five minutes after the hour. h. MASTER ZEROIZE Switch. The MASTER ZE- ROIZE switch (Figure 9-5), is covered by a red guard secured with safety wire. The switch will erase all data (1) TEST-RESET/ARM/ON Switch. The fol- listed in the description of the Emergency Panel Zeroize lowing three switch positions are supported by the ELT: Switch (Paragraph 9-8c). It also includes a destructive zeroize of the non-volatile memory of the FCR Radar (a) ON This position (located closest to the Electronics Unit, TMMA REU, AGP UDM and the eR- antenna connector) manually activates the ELT. The MMs. ELT immediately will begin radiating a distress signal on 121.500 MHz and 243.000 MHz, and within fifty 9-7. SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT seconds, will radiate an emergency coded signal on 406.028 MHz. All three tones are transmitted simulta- Survivability equipment includes a CBR Blower, Emer- neously at this point. gency Locator Transmitter and Underwater Acoustic Beacon. 9-7 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 (b) ARM This position (center position) is location; and 2) the radio and/or preset-net data previ- the normal operating position for the ELT. When prop- ously in the standby location is swapped back into the erly installed in it's mount, the ELT is armed and ready to EUFD’s primary location. activate if an accident is sensed. When removed from it's mount, the G-switch is disabled and any mishandling b. XPNDR Lighted Button. The XPNDR button will not result in activation. sets a code of 7700 in mode 3/A. The XPNDR Mode 3/A button has to be moded ON and XPNDR MAS- (c) TEST-RESET This position (closest to TER button can be in NORM or STBY prior to acti- the LED) is used to self-test and to deactivate the ELT. vating the XPNDR emergency button. The EUFD pro- vides a status of 7700 EMER to indicate that emer- 1 To deactivate the ELT, momentarily gency transponder mode has been selected. To exit the hold the switch in this position for about one second emergency transponder mode, press the XPNDR but- and quickly release. The ELT will perform a self-test ton again, which will extinguish the light. Deactivation and then deactivate. of the XPNDR button on the emergency panel will reset the transponder mode 3/A from 7700 to the previously 2 To self-test the ELT momentarily move selected transponder code. If the button is selected, an the switch from the center position to the TEST-RESET automatic MAYDAY message is transmitted via a Pri- position, hold for about one second and quickly release. vate Net (P) tuned radio to the URNs found in an AMPS The ELT will perform a self-test and then deactivate. generated MAYDAY member list. c. Underwater Acoustic Beacon. The UAB al- NOTE lows search/rescue teams to locate the aircraft if it has Emergency zeroize does not erase classified been ditched. The UAB is actuated by water. The data in the FCR/eRMM. UAB is located on the upper, back left of the CPG's c. ZEROIZE Switch. The ZEROIZE switch is ac- seat. The UAB is battery operated and completely tioned by first pulling it up and out of the locked posi- self-contained. When actuated, the UAB transmits a tion, next to the forward position, and then returning the signal at 37.5 KHz. switch to the locked or aft position to complete the ze- roization process. Actioning the ZEROIZE switch ze- 9-8. EMERGENCY PANEL roes-out the following classified data: The EMERGENCY panel (Figure 9-7) provides for tun- (1) COMSEC variables for all radios ing the VU radio to the guard frequency, selection of the transponder (XPNDR) emergency mode, zeroizing classified data and energizing the emergency hydraulic (2) VU2, FM1, and FM2 Hopsets and Lockout accumulator. sets (3) Order wires from VU1 (4) HQ2 MWOD from radio, and MMP Non- Volatile Memory (NVM) in VU2 (5) All SOI tables/data in MMP NVM (6) Mode 4/Mode 5 (7) IDM and L16 network parameters Figure 9-7. Emergency Panel (8) IDM subscribers team indications in the IDM and MMP NVM a. GUARD Lighted Button. The GUARD button (9) TSD points tunes the VU2 radio to its UHF guard frequency, which is displayed on the EUFD, and causes the system to au- tomatically RTS to the VU2 radio. Pressing the GUARD (10) EGI 1/2 GUV's button again commands the system to swap the primary and standby locations on the EUFD: 1) the guard fre- (11) ASE quency is swapped into the EUFD’s standby frequency 9-8 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 (12) AGP data d. Emergency Hydraulics. An override solenoid valve, normally de-energized closed, permits crew man- (13) AAG keys agement of utility accumulator pressure. Upon acti- vation of the EMERG HYD ON button on the EMER- (14) Link 16 keys GENCY panel, the button will illuminate, the valve en- ergizes open and accumulator fluid passes via emer- (15) UR keys gency routing to the utility side of the servo actuators. 9-9 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 SECTION III. EMERGENCIES 9-9. ENGINE SYSTEMS turn will require more power. During single-engine flight, airspeed should be kept at the optimum (Figure 9-8). c. Dual Engine Failure. If both engines fail, imme- Prior to movement of either POWER lever, it is diate action by the pilot is required to make a safe au- imperative that the malfunctioning engine and torotation descent. The altitude and airspeed at which the corresponding POWER lever be identified. a dual engine failure occurs will dictate the action to be taken. After the failure, main rotor RPM will decay a. Introduction. The various conditions under rapidly and the aircraft will yaw to the left. Unless a dual which an engine can fail or experience a power loss, engine failure occurs near the ground, it is critical that an prevent a standard procedure for all cases. A thorough autorotation be established immediately. During cruise knowledge of both emergency procedures and flight at airspeeds to VNE, reduce collective immediately to re- characteristics will enable the pilot to respond appropri- gain NR and then adjust as required to maintain RPM ately in an emergency. as indicated on Figure 9-8. The cyclic should be ad- justed as necessary to attain and maintain the desired b. Flight Characteristics. airspeed as indicated on Figure 9-8. In autorotation, as airspeed increases above 70 - 80 KTAS, the rate of de- (1) Autorotation: The flight characteristics scent and glide distance increase significantly. Below and the required crewmember control response after a 70 KTAS, the rate of descent will also increase, but glide dual engine failure are similar to those during a normal distance decreases. Autorotation during an out of trim power-on descent. Full control of the helicopter can be condition will increase the rate of descent and decrease maintained and airspeed should be kept at the optimum the glide distance. A landing area must be selected (Figure 9-8). immediately after both engines fail, and control inputs must be made to fly to the intended site. Throughout (2) Engine Failure/Performance Lim- the descent, adjust collective as necessary to maintain ited: When one engine has failed (completely or NR within normal range. At high gross weights, the rotor partially) or performance limited, the helicopter can may tend to overspeed and the collective must be used often maintain altitude and airspeed until a suitable to maintain the desired rotor RPM. NR should be main- landing site can be selected. Whether or not this is tained at or slightly above 100% to allow ample RPM be- possible at the time of the engine failure becomes a fore touchdown. NR above 100% may result in a higher function of such combined variables as: than desired rate of descent. Aircraft weight At 80 to 130 ft AGL, use aft cyclic to decelerate. Main Density altitude rotor RPM will increase momentarily when the cyclic is moved aft with no change in collective pitch setting. Airspeed This reduces airspeed and rate of descent, but causes an increase in NR. The degree of increase depends The jettisoning of wing stores will immediately reduce upon the amount and rate of deceleration. Ground an aircraft's gross weight and correspondingly reduce contact should be made with some forward speed. If power requirements. Crewmember response time and a rough landing area is selected, a more pronounced control technique may be additional factors. When a deceleration is necessary and touchdown speed should loss of rotor RPM is encountered, the pilot on the con- be minimized. It is possible that during the autorotative trols should immediately adjust the collective to main- approach, the situation may require additional deceler- tain NR within limits. The reduction will vary with the al- ation. In that case, it is necessary to assume a landing titude and airspeed at the time of failure. For example, attitude at a higher altitude than normal. Should both the collective should not be reduced when an engine engines fail at low airspeed, initial collective reduction fails while the helicopter is hovering below 15 ft. During may be necessary to maintain NR within normal range. cruise flight, when altitude and airspeed permit a sig- In some instances at low altitude or low airspeed, nificant reduction in collective pitch, NR can be restored settling may be so rapid that little can be done to avoid to 100% before landing. When practical, consideration a hard-impact landing. In that case, it is critical to main- may be given to making a right banking turn or a right tain a level landing attitude. Cushion the landing with pedal turn to aid in reducing the immediate power re- remaining collective as helicopter settles to the ground. quirements; whereas, a left banking turn or left pedal 9-10 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 d. Engine Failure. The engine instruments often In forward flight at low altitude (as in takeoff or provide ample warning of an impending failure by devi- landing), when a single-engine capability to maintain al- ating from normal indications. Engine failure is normally titude does not exist, a decelerating attitude will initially indicated by a rapid drop in NG, NP, torque, TGT, oil pres- be required to prepare for landing. sure and the symbolic torque value on the MPD/HMD displays flashing. Engine failure is annunciated by a If airspeed is low and altitude above the obstacles voice message ENGINE 1 (or) 2 out as applicable, EN- is sufficient, the helicopter should be placed in an accel- GINE 1 (or) 2 OUT warning, and flashing MSTR WARN erating attitude to gain sufficient airspeed for single-en- lighted pushbutton. The MPD will autopage to the ENG gine fly away to a selected landing site. Page if not already displayed. Engine failure accompa- e. Engine Partial Failure/Performance Lim- nied by an explosion or loud noise would indicate en- ited. A partial engine power loss can follow certain gine damage, and there is a possibility that an attempt mechanical failures, such as an EDECU malfunction, or to restart the engine would result in a fire. an operator may make a power demand that exceeds Figures 9-9 and 9-10 provide height velocity diagrams an engine's performance capability. An engine's per- based on an engine ETF of 0.85 or ETF of 1.00. The formance may be environmentally limited (high temp, unshaded region in the height velocity diagrams repre- high-pressure altitude/high gross weight) as a result sent the air speed and wheel height combinations that of TGT, fuel flow and NG/MACH. An impending engine may permit a safe landing in event of an engine fail- TGT limiter activation will not provide any cues prior to ure with average pilot alertness, skill, and reaction time. functioning. Performance limiting will continue to dis- The avoid, shaded, region represents hazardous air- play normal NG and oil pressure indications; as power speed and wheel-height combinations from which a sin- demand increases, NP and NR will collectively decay gle engine landing would be extremely difficult without and the TGT will remain at the engine limiter setting; some degree of aircraft damage or crewmember injury. torque indications will vary as a result of collective Crewmember alertness, correct recognition and subse- manipulation. Proper use and understanding of the quent actions are essential to perform a single engine PERF page and the application of performance calcu- landing. Crewmember actions should be based on the lations will significantly reduce the potential for engine following general guidelines: performance limiting. Caution must be exercised when operating close to an engine performance limit. For At low density altitude and low airspeed, it may be example, when operating near the dual engine TGT necessary to lower the collective only enough to main- limiter setting, a gust of wind from aircraft's rear or left, tain NR in the normal range. or an activation of the engine anti-ice could result in a reduction of available engine power. The crew should At higher density altitude the collective may need not engage any hold modes when operating near the to be lowered significantly to increase NR to the normal dual engine limiter setting. range. When hovering in ground effect, the collective should be used only as required to cushion the landing, primary consideration is in maintaining a level attitude. 9-11 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 f. Engine Malfunctions. Due to the various differences in aircraft, ad- If the MMP is unable to communicate with vancing the PL forward past the fly detent may an EDECU, an EDECU 1 (or 2) FAIL cau- inadvertently place the engine in lockout. In- tion will be annunciated along with the MAS- advertent activation of engine lockout requires TER CAUTION light and tone. The NP, TGT, immediate and instinctive action by the pilot to and Torque display data will be removed from prevent engine overspeed. the MPDs and replaced with white “?” indica- tors. The HMD will show the highest of the (1) Dual Engine Failure- Low Altitude / two engine torque values from EDECU 1 or Low Airspeed and Cruise. A voice message will 2 (this may be a frozen torque value from the announce ENGINE 1 OUT and ENGINE 2 OUT. The non-communicating EDECU); the NG value MSTR WARN pushbutton will illuminate. The MPD will will still be available. In the event this con- autopage to the ENG page and the EUFD will display dition associated with an EDECU communi- ENGINE 1 OUT and ENGINE 2 OUT. cation failure, the crew shall evaluate NR for normal range prior to executing any emer- gency procedures for overspeed or under- speed conditions. With the POWER levers in FLY, resetting the In the event of an inadvertent activation of the CHOP button will cause an erroneous engine 1 engine chop button, initial indications from NP and NR could be interpreted as a dual en- out and engine 2 out warning to be activated. gine failure. Engine chop is annunciated by 1. AUTOROTATE. a voice message ENGINE CHOP. ENGINE CHOP is displayed on the EUFD and ENG 2. CHOP button — Reset only if an engine page. Engine idle indications for NG, TGT, chop warning message is present. and NP are displayed on the ENG page. Reset may be accomplished by either crewmember. 3. Wing Stores Jettison — As appropriate. 9-12 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 (2) Engine Restart During Flight. Abort start for any of the following reasons: A failed engine should not be restarted un- If it becomes apparent that TGT will exceed less it can be determined that it is reasonably safe to do so. 851° C before NG idle speed (63% or more) is attained. When attempting to restart ENG1 following a If TGT does not increase within 45 seconds single engine failure, a malfunctioning cross- feed valve could cause the remaining engine after moving POWER lever to IDLE. (ENG2) to fail. If no NP within 45 seconds after moving POWER lever to IDLE (unless rotor is locked). NOTE If positive oil pressure indication does not oc- After an engine failure in flight, an engine cur within 45 seconds after moving POWER restart may be attempted. lever to IDLE. Inflight restarts do not need to utilize a warm If ENG1 or ENG2 START advisory is re- start procedure. moved prior to attaining 52% NG. (3) Aborting Engine Start. ABORT START PROCEDURES are as follows: 1. POWER lever — OFF. 2. ENG START switch — IGN ORIDE for 30 seconds and TGT is below 540° C. Aborted engine starts may cause fuel to col- lect in the engine nacelle. Subsequent engine (4) Single Engine Failure – Low Alti- starts may be attempted only after the nacelle tude/Low Airspeed and Cruise. A voice message door/work platform is opened and the nacelle will announce ENGINE 1 OUT (or) ENGINE 2 OUT. The inspected for fuel. If during the initial start an MSTR WARN pushbutton will illuminate. The MPD will abnormal TGT rise was evident, or fuel is ev- autopage to the ENG page and the EUFD will display ident in the nacelle, the ignition system shall ENGINE 1 OUT or ENGINE 2 OUT. be checked IAW standard maintenance proce- 1. Airspeed — Adjust as appropriate. dures. 2. Wing Stores Jettison — As appropriate. 3. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. 9-13 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-8. Autorotative Glide Chart 9-14 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-9. Height Velocity Plots ETF = 0.85 (Sheet 1 of 3) 9-15 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-9. Height Velocity Plots ETF = 0.85 (Sheet 2 of 3) 9-16 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-9. Height Velocity Plots ETF = 0.85 (Sheet 3 of 3) 9-17 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-10. Height Velocity Plots ETF = 1.0 (Sheet 1 of 3) 9-18 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-10. Height Velocity Plots ETF = 1.0 (Sheet 2 of 3) 9-19 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 Figure 9-10. Height Velocity Plots ETF = 1.0 (Sheet 3 of 3) 9-20 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 EDECU - Complete or Partial failure of the EDECU can display erroneous or erratic NP, During an engine NP overspeed, the overspeed TGT and/or TQ indications or any combination protection will cause the engine to flameout. of those indications. Without proper analysis, Engine EDECU auto-ignition may sense the the crew could misidentify the affected engine. flameout and provide ignition to re-ignite the engine. This cycle of NP overspeed, flameout, auto-ignition, and re-ignition may cycle over If NR is increasing due to an Engine Overspeed, the and over at or near the overspeed protection crew can identify the affected engine by an EDECU 1 limit of 118.1% NP. This cycle may repeat until or 2 Fail EUFD message with associated master cau- the NP overspeed fault is corrected, the engine tion and white question marks on the engine page in fails, or the auto-ignition fails to re-ignite the lieu of the TQ, NP and TGT values with increasing NG engine. indication. NG of the affected engine will be higher than that of the unaffected engine. (5) Engine 1 or 2 Overspeed – NP Failed During an overspeed event induced by an EDECU fail- High. A voice message will announce ENGINE 1 ure, the unaffected engine NP will transiently follow the OVERSPEED or ENGINE 2 OVERSPEED. The MPD rotor system before normal governing will resume. It will autopage to the ENG page and the EUFD will can stay above 100% NP and match the Rotor speed display ENGINE 1 OVERSPEED or ENGINE 2 OVER- if the NR is at or below 110%. Action must be taken SPEED. by retarding the power lever of the affected engine if 1. Collective — Adjust to maintain NR within the rotor does not respond to collective input in order to limits. avoid the NP overspeed and subsequent engine shut- down. Auto-Relight may not engage depending on the If condition persists: EDECU failure. 2. POWER lever (affected engine) — Retard to equalize torque or NG. If the affected engine produces more TQ than required 3. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. by the aircraft, the unaffected engine will reduce TQ to as low as 0% in order to try and maintain NP/NR at gov- erning conditions. The unaffected engine may indicate (6) Low RPM Rotor – NP Failed Low. a flight idle condition as low as 70-75% NG, depending NOTE on ambient conditions. In the event the engine with the failed EDECU reaches Advancing the POWER lever of the engine with low torque and TGT to LOCKOUT dis- NP overspeed protection and shuts down, the unaf- ables the automatic temperature limiting for fected engine will increase NG speed and TQ to assume that engine. The engine must be controlled the load demand of the aircraft if the affected engine manually to ensure that it does not exceed does not relight. This can take up to 4 seconds. Crews operating limits. must be aware that the rotor may transiently droop depending on collective position until the unaffected LOCKOUT provides no increase in power if engine is up to the required engine speed. LOW ROTOR RPM warning occurs due to engine performance limiting on NG, NG/Mach It is possible for the T700-GE-701D engine to self-ignite or fuel flow. following an NP overspeed and shutdown event if the TGT is high enough. Self-ignition differs from auto re-ig- A voice message will announce ROTOR RPM LOW. nition in that it is uncommanded and not a normal func- The EUFD will display LOW ROTOR RPM. tion of the AH-64E. If auto re-ignition engages, there will be an accompanying EUFD ENG 1 or 2 AUTO IGN 1. Collective — Adjust to maintain NR within message. Self-ignition or auto re-ignition can be identi- limits. fied by an increase in NR and NG after the affected en- gine has shut down following an NP overspeed event. If condition persists: The crew must retard the power lever of the affected 2. POWER lever (affected engine) — engine to avoid possible continuous NP overspeed shut- LOCKOUT and then retard to equalize down and self-ignition or auto re-ignition cycles. torque output of both engines. 9-21 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 If manual control is not possible: If condition persists: 3. POWER lever (affected engine) — IDLE. 2. POWER lever (affected engine) — Retard. 4. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. If TGT decreases and there is no further evidence of a If continued flight is not possible, proceed as in Para- stall; graph 9-9 f (4) SINGLE ENGINE FAILURE. 3. POWER lever (affected engine) — FLY. If stall condition recurs: 4. POWER lever (affected engine) — IDLE. Following a complete failure of an alternator, 5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. operation of the corresponding engine and all indications from engine instruments will be nor- mal, except that NG indications will be lost and 9-10. TAIL ROTOR, TRANSMISSIONS, AND DRIVE will activate the MSTR WARN light and EN- SYSTEMS GINE 1 OUT or ENGINE 2 OUT voice and EUFD messages. Pilot situational awareness is critical in the suc- (7) Engine Alternator Malfunction. The en- cessful accomplishment of these procedures. gine alternator has three windings, providing power for The low inertia rotor system, coupled with high engine ignition, aircraft NG speed indication, and elec- rates of descent during vertical autorotation, trical control system operation. may not provide the pilot with adequate reac- A failure of the ignition winding would result tion time and cushioning pitch. Activation of in loss of electrical power to the ignition circuitry which the CHOP button or reduction of the POWER would be detected by inability to start the engine. levers prior to reduction of the collective will re- sult in a rapid decay of rotor RPM. Successful A failure of the NG speed indication winding completion of an out-of-ground effect hovering would not affect actual engine operation; however, the autorotation is doubtful. crew would have no NG indication. A failure of the winding providing electrical power to the EDECU will have no immediate indication. The EDECU is provided 115V, 400Hz backup power from the air- frame and can perform all of it's control functions using If engine chop is used to minimize main rotor either independent power source. torque, increasing collective pitch without first retarding POWER levers to OFF will cause en- gine acceleration and uncommanded yaw. (8) Engine Compressor Stall. An engine compressor stall is normally recognized by a notice- a. Tail Rotor Malfunctions. These procedures able bang or popping noise and possible aircraft yaw. represent a best estimate of helicopter reactions and These responses are normally accompanied by a rapid crew procedures. The most critical consideration in increase in TGT and fluctuations in NG, TORQUE, and responding to any tail rotor malfunction is that the NP readings for the affected engine. In the event of a crewmember correctly interprets the nature and extent compressor stall: of the problem. Tail wheel shall be locked during all 1. Collective — Reduce. landings. 9-22 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 gross weight, drag and improve air flow over the verti- cal fin. Some left cyclic should be used to stop the slow right turn induced by the loss of thrust. Care should A Main Transmission Tail Rotor Idler Gear or be taken to avoid slowing the helicopter. The airspeed Output Shaft Bevel Gear Set failure will result indicator may not provide useful information once the in the loss of tail rotor thrust coupled with an sideslip is established, but true airspeed, yaw angle, en- immediate loss of hydraulics and generators gine torque, and rate of climb or descent should provide requiring immediate crew response to safely cues necessary to maintain flight. If yaw angle becomes land the aircraft. Movement of the flight con- excessive, reduce power and lower the nose to retain trols prior to activation of the Emergency Hy- adequate airspeed. A minimum of 100 KTAS during a draulics may result in decoupling the AARD shallow approach to a roll on landing should be main- which will result in loss of control in the respec- tained until approximately 10 to 20 ft above the touch- tive axis, even after the emergency hydraulics down point. Begin a gradual deceleration to arrive at are activated. The CHOP button will be inop- approximately 5 to 10 ft above touchdown as the yaw erative during this emergency and reduction of angle begins to increase (to the right). At this point, re- the POWER levers prior to reduction of the col- tard the POWER levers as necessary to align the heli- lective will result in a rapid decay of rotor RPM. copter fuselage with the landing direction. Lateral cyclic All electrical systems, sights, communications, can also be used to control aircraft yaw angle once the and lighting equipment not powered by the bat- tail wheel contacts the ground. Care should be taken tery and emergency bus will be lost. The crew to use minimum collective pitch to cushion the landing must activate the Emergency Hydraulics and during touchdown. After touchdown, the wheel brakes LAND WITHOUT DELAY. should be used to maintain heading and the collective should be lowered to minimize torque effect. 1. EMERG HYD button — Press ON (1) Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust - Gen- 2. Airspeed — 100 KTAS minimum (until 10 eral. Loss of tail rotor thrust occurs when there is a to 20 ft above touchdown). break in the drive system; for example, a severed drive 3. Wing Stores Jettison — As appropriate. shaft. The nose of the helicopter will turn to the right. If the helicopter is in forward flight, there will be a right 4. POWER levers — Retard as necessary (5 roll of the fuselage along the longitudinal axis, and to 10 ft above touchdown). the nose of the helicopter may pitch downward. This downward pitch will be more pronounced if a tail rotor (b) Continued Flight Not Possible. If component has been separated from the helicopter. powered flight is not possible at an airspeed sufficient to In some cases, depending on the severity of the right maintain helicopter control, initiate a power-on descent. rotation, powered flight to an acceptable landing site Collective should be adjusted so that an acceptable may be accomplished by maintaining or increasing compromise between rate of turn and rate of descent airspeed. The degree of sideslip and amount of roll is maintained. Jettison wing stores to reduce gross may be varied by changing airspeed and by varying weight, drag and improve airflow over the vertical fin. collective pitch. Neither, however, can be completely At approximately 10 to 20 feet above touchdown, mini- eliminated. mize the rate of descent. At approximately 5 to 10 feet, power levers OFF. After touchdown, the wheel brakes (2) Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust in Cruise should be used to maintain heading and the collective should be lowered to minimize torque effect. Flight. 1. EMERG HYD button — Press ON 2. Collective reduce (compromise between rate of turn and rate of descent). If airspeed is allowed to approach effective 3. Wing Stores Jettison — As appropriate. translational lift, the sideslip angle may become 4. Minimize rate of descent (10 to 20 feet quite severe and helicopter control may be lost. above touchdown). 5. POWER levers — OFF (5 to 10 feet above touchdown). (a) Continued Flight Possible. At cruise airspeeds, it may be possible that level flight at some (3) Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust at Low Air- stabilized yaw angle can be maintained. The degree speed/Hover. Loss of tail rotor thrust at slow speed of sideslip will depend on the airspeed and power re- may result in extreme yaw angles and uncontrolled ro- quired to maintain flight. Jettison wing stores to reduce tation to the right. Immediate collective pitch reduction should be initiated to reduce the yaw rate and begin 9-23 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 a controlled rate of descent. If the helicopter is high (b) Out-of-Ground Effect. enough above the ground, an attempt should be made to increase airspeed to streamline the helicopter. This If little or no right rotation or if left rotation is experienced and control can be maintained, the aircraft may permit continued flight with a stabilized and man- should be accelerated into forward flight and perform ageable yaw angle. Following collective reduction, jet- approach and landing appropriate to power setting and tison wing stores to reduce gross weight, drag and im- condition of flight at time of failure. prove airflow over the vertical fin to aid forward accel- eration. If this increase does reduce yaw, proceed as If the aircraft cannot be accelerated into outlined for Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust in Cruise Flight forward flight, initiate a power-on descent. Collective - Continued Flight Possible. If the aircraft cannot be should be adjusted so that an acceptable compromise accelerated into forward flight, initiate a power-on de- between rate of turn and rate of descent is maintained. scent. Collective should be adjusted so that an accept- At approximately 5 to 10 ft above touchdown, perform able compromise between rate of turn and rate of de- a hovering autorotation by CHOP button - Press or scent is maintained. At approximately 5 to 10 ft above POWER levers -OFF. touchdown, perform a hovering autorotation by POWER levers - OFF. b. Main Transmission Input Drive Clutch Fail- ure. An input drive clutch malfunction is most likely to NOTE occur during engine start or when an engine POWER Continuous right rotation during descent and lever is advanced. Indications may include: touchdown can be expected. Erratic torque indication on affected engine. 1. EMERG HYD button — Press ON Complete loss of torque indication on affected en- 2. Collective — Reduce (compromise gine. between rate of turn and rate of descent). NP of affected engine exceeding NR. 3. Wing Stores Jettison — As appropriate. If the failure is a sudden disengagement, the torque of 4. Minimize Rate of Descent — (10 to 20 ft the opposite engine will double as it attempts to carry above touchdown). the load. A sudden high torque input drive clutch en- 5. POWER levers — OFF (5 to 10 feet above gagement may cause severe engine and/or drive train touchdown). damage. A sudden engagement is indicated by a loud noise and/or sudden increase in engine torque. Should (4) Tail Rotor Fixed Pitch Malfunction. A an input drive clutch malfunction occur, perform the fol- fixed pitch failure may be evidenced by slow, intermit- lowing: tent, or no response to pedal input or no pedal move- ment. A left or right yaw may be apparent. (a) In-Ground Effect. If a failure occurs dur- ing in ground- effect hover, reaction may vary from ad- When a clutch fails to disengage, damage to justing collective and POWER levers during a left rota- the affected engine will result (due to lack of tion to activating the CHOP button to stop a right rota- oil pressure) if both engines are not shutdown tion. In any case, the primary concern should be to land simultaneously. the aircraft with as little yaw rate as possible. When a clutch fails to engage, do not shut If the aircraft has an uncontrolled turn to the down both engines simultaneously. Damage left, a reduction in the POWER levers coordinated with may result if there is sudden engagement. an increase in collective may slow or stop the rotation In Flight. so that a controlled power on descent to landing can be accomplished. 1. POWER lever (affected engine) — IDLE. If the aircraft is not turning, a slight reduc- If NP (affected engine) is below NR (indicating the clutch tion in collective pitch will begin a descent. During the is disengaged): descent, a slight rotation to the left may be present; in- 2. EMERG ENG SHUTDOWN (affected en- creasing collective just prior to touchdown should stop gine). the rotation. 3. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. If the aircraft has an uncontrolled turn to the right, reduce collective to begin descent. At approxi- If NP (affected engine) does not drop below NR (indicat- mately 5 to 10 ft AGL, perform a hovering autorotation ing the clutch has failed to disengage): by CHOP button - Press or POWER levers - OFF. 4. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 9-24 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 5. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN (both en- a crew station to discharge or reset the sys- gines simultaneously). tem, that crew station FIRE pushbutton must be armed/dearmed. On Ground. (with indications that a clutch has failed to engage): Signals sent from the MMP will automati- (1) EMERG ENG SHUTDOWN (affected en- cally turn off the Air Particle Separator (APS) gine only). blower under ALL fire detection conditions. (2) Check NG is less than 10% (affected en- However, smoke may still be drawn into the gine). crew stations if the crew station blowers con- tinue to operate. Turning the ECS off will turn (3) Normal engine shutdown — Perform. off the crew station blowers. On Ground. (with indications that a clutch has failed to The PRI bottle should be selected first; in the disengage): event of a malfunction or failure to extinguish EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN (both en- the fire, select RES. gines simultaneously). If APU is running, accomplish an APU shut- 9-11. FIRES down prior to evacuating the aircraft. a. Engine Fire in Flight. If an ENG 1 or ENG 2 FIRE pushbutton on the FIRE DET/EXTG panel illuminates, a voice message will an- Prior to moving POWER lever or pressing any nounce ENGINE 1 (or) ENGINE 2 FIRE. When the fire ENG FIRE button, either achieve a safe single is confirmed: engine airspeed or prepare for a single engine landing. 1. EMERG ENG SHUTDOWN (affected engine) — When conditions permit. 2. Illuminated ENG FIRE button — Press and RDY light illuminates. 3. FIRE DISCH button(s) — Press. To prevent additional smoke and fumes from 4. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. being introduced into either crew station, dur- ing all suspected FIRE incidents, considera- b. Engine Fire On Ground. tion should be given to power the Environ- If an engine fire is detected while aircraft is on the mental Control System (ECS) OFF, via the ground, a voice message will announce ENGINE 1 aircraft UTIL page. FIRE or ENGINE 2 FIRE and pushbuttons illuminate. Due to the sensitivity of some Line Replace- When fire is confirmed: able Units (LRUs) on the AH-64E aircraft, 1. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. prolonged operations with the ECS selected off may cause impending overtemperature 2. Illuminated ENG FIRE button — Press and condition damage to some avionics systems RDY light illuminates. and result in failure of the Mission Proces- 3. FIRE DISCH button(s) — Press. sors. c. APU Compartment Fire On Ground. The safety of the helicopter occupants is the primary If fire is detected in APU compartment, a voice message consideration when a fire occurs. On the ground, will announce APU FIRE. it is essential that the engine(s) be shut down, the crew evacuated, and fire fighting begin immediately. 1. APU — OFF. If airborne, the most important single action that can 2. Illuminated APU FIRE button — Press and be taken by the crew is to land the helicopter. If time RDY light illuminates. permits, a MAYDAY radio call should be made before electrical power is turned off to expedite assistance 3. FIRE DISCH button(s) — Press. from fire fighting equipment and personnel. Considera- tion should be given to jettisoning external stores prior d. APU Compartment Fire In Flight. to landing. 1. Illuminated APU FIRE button — Press and RDY light illuminates. NOTE 2. FIRE DISCH button(s) — Press. The FIRE switches will remain illuminated 3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. until the sensors no longer detect a fire. For 9-25 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 channels. If the BUCS FAIL is not asso- NOTE ciated with the GENERATOR FAIL or the The APU FIRE pushbutton will have no affect reset, the pilot should assume other prob- at extinguishing an Aft Deck, Pass-Thru Bay or lems have occurred and complete the BUCS Tailboom fire. FAIL emergency procedure. e. Aft Deck Fire, Pass-Thru Bay Fire, Tailboom After a generator 2 reset, FCR power should Fire. If fire is detected in the deck, pass-thru, or tail- be cycled to ensure the FCR is working prop- boom area or if the AFT DECK FIRE warning is dis- erly. played, an “Aft Deck Fire”, “Pass-Thru Bay Fire”, or A battery charged to 80% will normally sup- “Tailboom Fire” voice message will be activated and the ply the battery busses for approximately 12 FIRE light on the Fire Detection Extinguishing panel will minutes at 25° C. Time decreases if the tem- illuminate. The EUFD will display an AFT DECK FIRE, perature is increased or decreased from 25° PASS-THRU BAY FIRE, or TAILBOOM FIRE message. C. 1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 2. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. a. Both Generators Fail/Complete Loss Of Electrical Power. f. Fuselage Fire On Ground. If a fuselage fire is observed and a fire warning has not been annunciated: 1. GEN 1 and GEN 2 — OFF/RESET , then ON (Pilot GEN OFF/RST panel). 1. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. If condition persists: 2. APU — OFF (If applicable). 2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. g. Electrical Fire In Flight. Prior to shutting off all electrical power, the crew must consider the equipment b. Single Generator and Single RTRU Failure. that is essential to a particular flight environment which 1. Affected GEN 1 or GEN 2 — OFF/RESET will be affected; e.g., flight instruments, flight controls, — then ON (Pilot GEN OFF/RST panel). etc. With electrical power off, engine anti-ice is auto- If condition persists: matically ON. If an immediate landing cannot be made, 2. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. the defective circuit may be isolated by selectively turn- ing off electrical equipment. c. Dual TRU Failure (Transformer Rectifier 1 and 1. GEN1 and GEN2 switches — OFF. Transformer Rectifier 2). When a dual TRU failure occurs, a number of Cautions and Advisories will be 2. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. displayed on the EUFD. These may include BUCS FAIL h. Smoke and Fume Elimination. and FMC FAIL. Conduct Emergency Procedures for the 1. Airspeed — Slow to 20 KTAS maximum. displayed EUFD Cautions in order of importance. All DC services will be lost, except those provided by the 2. Canopy door (affected crew station) — battery. Charging of the battery will no longer be con- Open to intermediate position. ducted. The crew can expect the following: 3. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MPDs will be inoperative. 9-12. ELECTRICAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS TADS/PNVS will be inoperative. NOTE IHADSS and HDU will be inoperative. In the event of an In-Flight electrical system FMC functions will be lost. malfunction, the power interrupt protection Stabilator control will be lost. may cause blanking of one or more MPDs for Primary crew station lighting will be lost. as long as 6 seconds. When on the ground during an electrical system malfunction, MPD Engine Anti-Ice will activate. blanking may occur up to 12 seconds in du- The KU will be inoperative. ration due to increased BIT cycle. The SFD will be available for controlling NAV2. Failure or reset of generator 2 can result in BUCS FAIL caution and FMC DISENGAGE MMP’s will be partially inoperative and weapons cautions and a loss of one or more FMC systems will not be functional. channels. After completing the Generator The ECS will be inoperative. Fail emergency procedure (GEN RESET), reset the BUCS FAIL and the FMC DIS- The ice detector will be inoperative. ENGAGE by re-engaging the affected FMC The left and right pitot heater will be inoperative. 9-26 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 The TRA6036 radio control head will be active and 9-15. DITCHING (POWER ON) available for radio tuning and the crew can change the frequencies and communicate. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 9-13. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Activation of the canopy jettison system with the cockpit partially full or submerged full of water will generate a pressure wave that may result in crew injury and/or death. If the canopy jettison system has not been Immediate emergency action must follow fail- activated prior to ditching in water, the exter- ure of both hydraulic systems. Any hesitation nal water pressure may cause the canopies could result in loss of helicopter control. to implode (collapse inward) as the aircraft sinks below 2-3 meters. The cockpit will With emergency hydraulic power in use, flight flood almost immediately and the aircraft will control inputs and elevated G loading must be kept to an absolute minimum. begin to descend rapidly in an uncontrolled manner; canopy sections may also block the Hydraulic power availability is a function of egress route. the frequency and magnitude of the control inputs and G loading placed on the aircraft. In static conditions the hydraulics will bleed down in approximately 6 minutes. If the con- trols are moved continuously at an approxi- If the canopy jettison system is operated under- mate 1 Hz rate this may be as little as 30 to water, the canopies are likely to implode (col- 41 seconds. lapse inward) due to the external water pres- The amount of control movement may be re- sure. This may hinder egress and/or block es- duced to zero depending on the severity and cape routes. location of hydraulic fluid loss within the util- ity hydraulic system. The decision to ditch the helicopter will be made by the crew when an emergency makes further flight unsafe. Once the EMERG HYD pushbutton is 1. Approach to hover. pressed ON, it must remain ON. Flight control loss will occur when emergency accumulator 2. Canopies — JETTISON prior to entering pressure drops to approximately 1650 psi. water. 3. Pilot shoulder harness — Lock. a. Primary Hydraulic Pressure Low and Utility Hydraulic Pressure Low. The EUFD will display HY- 4. CPG — Exit helicopter. DRAULIC FAIL message. 5. Hover downwind to a safe distance. 1. EMERG HYD button — Press ON. 6. POWER levers — OFF. 2. LAND WITHOUT DELAY. 7. Perform hovering autorotation — Apply full collective to decay RPM as helicopter 3. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. settles. b. Primary Hydraulic Pressure Low and Utility 8. Cyclic — Position in direction of roll. Hydraulic Level Low. In the event of a PRI HYD 9. Exit when main rotor has stopped. PSI LOW failure and UTIL HYD LVL LOW condition, hydraulic power to the Tail Rotor (T/R) servo may be 9-16. DITCHING (POWER OFF) lost. This may require a landing in accordance with T/R FIXED PITCH MALFUNCTION. The EUFD will display If autorotational landing over water becomes neces- TAIL ROTOR HYD. sary: LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 1. AUTOROTATE — Apply full collective to decay rotor RPM as helicopter settles. 9-14. EMERGENCY LANDING IN WOODED AREAS 2. Canopies — JETTISON prior to entering (POWER OFF) water. AUTOROTATE — Apply full collective to 3. Cyclic — Position in direction of roll. decay rotor RPM as helicopter settles. 4. Exit when main rotor has stopped. 9-27 Copyright © 2023 Boeing. Export Controlled Information  TM (QT) 1-1520-263-10 9-17. FLIGHT CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS 1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 2. APU — ON. a. Failure of Components. Failure of components within the flight control system may be indicated through 3. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. varying degrees of feedback, binding, resistance, slop- piness or abnormal control responses. These condi- d. Main Rotor Components. tions should not be mistaken for the malfunction of the stabilization equipment. b. BUCS Fail. Danger exists that the main rotor system could collapse or separate from the aircraft after land- ing. A decision must be made whether occu- pant egress occurs before or after the rotor has Activation of one of the BUCS FAIL cautions stopped. inflight shall signal a flight control emergency. Imminent failure of the main rotor components may be It can mean either a failure within the sys- indicated by a sudden increase in main rotor vibration tem or a mistrack between the crew station and/or unusual noise. Severe changes in lift character- controls. The CPG should only activate the istics and/or balance condition can occur due to blade BUCS trigger select if the pilot is incapable of strikes, skin separation, shift or loss of balance weights maintaining control of the aircraft. or other material. Malfunction may result in severe main If BUCS has been activated, attempt to land rotor flapping. If the main rotor system malfunctions, as far away from any known transmitters as proceed as follows: practical. 1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 1. LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 2. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. 2. APU — ON. During ground operations any abnormal control inputs 3. EMERG ENG(S) SHUTDOWN. required to maintain desired fuselage attitude may be indicative of a problem.