Chapter 7.PDF

Chapter 7 Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 7.1 Explain the differentiated structure of self-concept in middle child-...

Chapter 7 Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence Learning Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 7.1 Explain the differentiated structure of self-concept in middle child- hood and early adolescence, identifying influences on self-concept development and factors affecting individual differences in viewing and valuing self. 7.2 Discuss classic and contemporary views of moral development as well as factors that promote prosocial and antisocial behavior and suggest interventions to encourage healthy development in middle childhood and early adolescence. At 9 years old, Josie is a talkative and active fourth grader. She is a good student when she likes a subject (e.g., science) but she often loses focus with other subjects. If you asked her if she likes school she would probably say that it was “okay,” but she would rather be free to play with her friends. She especially loves outdoor activities, and she is good at the sports that she has tried. Josie’s family recently moved from the northern United States to a small Southern town, an affluent suburb of a large city. For many reasons Josie is finding the transition difficult. First of all, she and her friends played basketball every day in the park across from her old home. Now, there are few kids in her new neighborhood, and there is no place close by to play basketball. Second, she is experiencing peer rejection at school. Not only is she the new kid, but also she’s the only Catholic child in her public elementary school. Unlike her former community, most of the Catholic children in her new town attend private, religious schools, so she is an outsider in multiple ways. She feels like no one wants to be her friend, and sev- eral of her classmates routinely make remarks like “You don’t belong here,” and “Our school is not for Catholics.” Josie is flummoxed by these assaults and is unhappy much of the time. She is also starting to see herself as less likeable than she had thought. Adding to her problems, Josie’s mother recently discovered that she had stolen a lip- stick (a very pretty pink lipstick with sparkles) at the local drugstore. She tried to deny it at first, but her mother was having none of it. Her mother made a bit of a show of making an appointment to meet with the store manager, and then she accompanied Josie to the store to confess her misdeed, return the lipstick, and apologize for her mistake. The store manager spoke solemnly about the problems that thefts cause for 252  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 253 others, and then he accepted the lipstick and Josie’s apology. Fortunately for Josie, her mother is also looking into moving her to a parochial school, hoping to ease some of Josie’s burden. Honesty, dependability, kindness, fairness, respect, self-control, truthfulness, and diligence. Rare is the adult who would not agree that any one of these traits is desirable for children to attain. The advantage is very basic: Behaving in accordance with these values makes the world a better place for everyone. Josie’s life in her new home would certainly be better if respect and kindness were guiding her class- mates’ behavior. Certainly, individuals or groups might disagree on the particulars, such as what “being fair” may mean in a given situation. But it is truly difficult to imagine any sizable group of parents, teachers, or helpers who would promote the opposite values: meanness, laziness, dishonesty, irresponsibility, or disrespect, to name a few. Not too long ago in the United States, there was considerable agreement that inculcating these values, virtues, or behavioral habits was perhaps the most impor- tant responsibility that adults have relative to their children. The public schools had as their express purpose the creation of good citizens—people who, for the most part, valued and practiced these virtues. Consider the advice educator Charles Davis presented in 1852 in a lecture to parents and teachers on their duties toward children: Education is the system of training which develops in their right direction and in their proper proportions our physical, intellectual, and moral natures.... The moral nature of the pupils will be, with the teacher, a subject of earnest and constant solicitude. What are the first things to be done? To establish his [the teacher’s] authority over his school—to ensure the obedience of his scholars—to win their confidence—to gain their respect, and to call into exercise their warmest affections. (Davis, 1852, pp. 6–8) Hiram Orcutt, writing in a famous manual to parents in 1874, advises thus: The child must establish a character of integrity and to be trained to habits of honesty, benevolence and industry or he will be lost to himself and to society.... We may not expect benevolence to spring up spontaneously in the heart of the child.... Without knowledge and experience, the child cannot appreciate the rights and wants of others, nor his own duty in regard to them. (Orcutt, 1874, pp. 72–73) If this seems a bit quaint and outdated to you, consider the fact that even in mod- ern times there is evidence for broad consensus among North American parents about what they consider fundamental for children to achieve their life goals. When David R. Shaffer and his students asked young parents what they considered to be the most important aspect of a child’s social development, most placed morality at the top of their lists (Shaffer, 2000). They apparently felt that acquiring a moral sense and liv- ing by its dictates were critical for self-development and central to successful adult functioning. Perhaps this consensus is shaped by our experience of the culture we share. We are benumbed by the repetitious refrain that comes from all manner of media report- ing on a world marred by violence, aggressiveness, hopelessness, underachievement, and declining civility. Is something happening to the healthy moral and self-development we wish for our children? As you might have already guessed, the issue is complex. The world is changing in many ways at once, and understanding how those changes affect our children’s development is among the goals of developmental science. The answers researchers can make available have profound significance for practice, given helpers’ investment in their clients’ healthy development. In this chapter and the next, we will introduce the topics that are fundamental to understanding social and emotional development in middle and late childhood and provide some guide- lines and suggestions for interventions. We pick up the discussion with the topic of the self. 254 Chapter 7 Self-Concept 7.1 Explain the differentiated structure of self-concept in middle childhood and early adolescence, identifying influences on self-concept development and factors affecting individual differences in viewing and valuing self. The Development of Self-Concept—An Overview Imagine that you live across the street from an empty lot. One day, you notice that work- ers have placed piles of building materials, bricks, lumber, and bags of concrete on the property. After some time, the frame of a large, boxlike house takes the place of the piles of materials. From your vantage point, you can see the empty beginnings of where rooms will be. With more time, the internal structure becomes clear. Walls are assembled; doors and stairways connect the parts. Each section of the new house—living, dining, bedroom, and storage areas—has multiple divisions that provide useful space dedicated to some purpose. The disparate piles have been transformed into a coherent structure, and the once simple structure has become increasingly complex. Finishing touches are made, and ongoing renovations will undoubtedly accompany the life of the home. This image illustrates how Western science describes the development of the self- concept or the “me-self,” from early childhood through adolescence and adulthood. It is important to recognize that self-concept or self-knowledge is very much like any other kind of knowledge, for the self is a cognitive construction. Therefore, knowl- edge of the self will be constrained by the child’s general level of cognitive devel- opment and will most likely progress unevenly. As Harter (1999) has pointed out in her description of general cognitive-developmental stages, “... it is expected that the particular level of development at which one is functioning will vary across different domains of knowledge” (p. 30), as we noted in Chapter 6. In addition, remember that the self-concept is multidimensional, like a house with various rooms (see Chapter 5). In many homes, rooms are added on after the initial con- struction. In contrast to this somewhat static analogy, the self-system is dynamic and changes throughout development. Generally, the child’s self-concept proceeds from a rather undifferentiated state or simple structure to a much more differentiated, orga- nized, and coherent structure in adulthood through a process of stage-like changes. Let us consider some of the developments in self-knowledge that occur as children mature. The preschool child’s rendering of herself is something like the lot filled with building materials. Self-descriptors such as “big,” “girl,” and “nice” are separate, uncoordinated elements in the child’s self-portrait because she is cognitively unable to integrate these elements into an organized whole. We know from our discussion of cognitive development (see Chapter 3) that young children’s ability to hold in mind several ideas at the same time and to integrate these in some meaningful way is quite underdeveloped. Furthermore, preschool youngsters find accommodating opposing characteristics, such as being “nice” and “mean,” or opposing emotional states, such as “happy” and “sad,” to be especially difficult (see Harter, 2012, 2016). Nor do young children make much use of perspective taking at this age, as we saw in Chapter 6. In failing to do so, they show limited ability to use the behaviors or perspectives of oth- ers as guides for evaluating their own conduct or performance. Stated in other words, they do not use comparisons of themselves with others as a way of assessing their competencies. Consequently, the young child’s self-evaluations are often overly posi- tive (e.g., Davis-Kean, Jager, & Collins, 2009). Four-year-old Jamar might insist he has won the round of miniature golf despite hitting the ball outside the lane every time! Gradually, the early-elementary-school-aged youngster begins to organize the characteristics of the “Me-self” into sets of categories that display some coherence. For example, the child might relate being good at drawing, at coloring, and at cutting as an indication that she is good at art. However, the child still does not accommodate sets of characteristics with opposing features. As one 5-year-old insisted, “Nope, there’s no way you could be both smart and dumb, you only have one mind!” (Harter, 2016). Given her tendency to perceive personal qualities as good and to discount the subtlety of coexisting negative attributes, the child’s thinking about herself may still have an all-or-nothing quality that is often unrealistically positive. Gradual improvements  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 255 in perspective-taking ability, however, allow the child to begin to evaluate her own behavior according to others’ standards. The child’s anticipation of another person’s reaction, be it as a reward or a punishment, becomes internalized (Harter, 2012). As others’ rules or standards become internalized, they become adopted as self-regula- tory guidelines and form the basis for the looking-glass self. In middle to late childhood (approximately 8 to 10), the child becomes capable of integrating opposing characteristics. For example, Josie may now consider herself “smart” in science but “dumb” in social studies. Her growing working memory capacity also helps her to keep in mind information about herself and her peers and to make com- parisons. Her improving perspective taking skills also help her to identify and integrate how others see her into her self-portrait. So, as she brings to bear the cognitive skills that emerge during the middle childhood years, her self-concept becomes more accurately reflective of how she compares to others and how others view her. Self-esteem may begin to decline somewhat as children become more realistic about themselves. As the child moves into early adolescence, her ability to think more clearly about abstract content helps her to form more abstract trait-like concepts to describe herself, generalizing across more concrete or singular traits. For instance, she might now see herself as “intelligent,” including being smart, curious, and creative into this overrid- ing concept. Or, she might start to consider herself an “airhead,” combining academic failings, awkwardness in social situations, and the feeling that she never knows what’s going on in the world (Harter, 2016). Self-esteem typically declines in early adolescence for a host of complex reasons. Ado- lescence is a time of such great change in so many ways—cognitively, physically, and with regard to social and cultural expectations—that self-concept development is profoundly affected. We will save detailed discussion of adolescent self-development for later chapters. The Structure of Self-Concept Although we continue to use the term self-concept, it is not a unidimensional construct, as we noted in Chapter 5. One’s overall sense of self is a composite of several related, but not necessarily overlapping, elements that are evaluated by the individual to determine self-esteem, our feelings about ourselves. Although technically they are sepa- rate constructs, self-concept and self-esteem are closely intertwined and are difficult to discuss separately. In a classic analysis, Shavelson and colleagues (Marsh & Shavelson, 1985; Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976) proposed a useful theoretical view of the self. In this model (see Figure 7.1), children’s general self-concept can be divided into FIGURE 7.1 Structure of self-concept. General self-concept Academic Academic Nonacademic English mathematics self-concept self-concept self-concept Physical Physical Peer Parent General Reading Mathematics ability appearance relationships relationships school Students have many separate but sometimes related concepts of themselves. The overall sense of self appears to be divided into separate, but slightly related, self-concepts. SOURCE: Marsh, H. W. & Shavelson, R. J. (1985). Self-concept: Its multifaceted, hierarchical structure. E ­ ducational Psychologist, 20, 114. Adapted with permission from Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. and H. W. Marsh. Used by permission of H. W. Marsh. 256 Chapter 7 two main domains: academic and nonacademic self-concepts. Academic self-concept is further divided into specific school subject areas such as math, science, English, and social studies. Other developmentalists have proposed the addition of other compo- nents such as artistic self-concept. The nonacademic self-concept is divided into social, emotional, and physical self-concepts. The last domain is further subdivided into physical ability and physical appearance. Other theories of the self also emphasize multidimensional and hierar- chically arranged self-structures (see Rentzsch, Wenzler, & Schütz, 2016). Despite this general consensus, however, many researchers have retained the notion of global self- esteem within their frameworks. This reflects the view that a global sense of self coex- ists with, shapes, and is shaped by self-appraisals in specific domains. By grade school, children can articulate their own assessments of their specific competencies as well as a generalized overall perception of themselves. Harter (1985, 1988b) found evidence that different domains of self-concept emerge at different points in the life span (see Table 7.1). The number of dimensions of the self that can be appraised, however, increases dramatically from early childhood through adolescence and adulthood. In middle childhood, the dimensions of importance include academic or scholastic competence, athletic competence, physical appearance, peer acceptance, and behavioral conduct. Is one domain more important than the others to a child’s overall sense of self- esteem? Evidence from many studies clearly documents the powerful association between physical appearance and overall self-esteem (correlations are as high as 0.80) TABLE 7.1 Domains of Self-Concept Across the Life Span EARLY MIDDLE TO LATE EARLY THROUGH CHILDHOOD CHILDHOOD ADOLESCENCE COLLEGE YEARS ­MIDDLE ADULTHOOD LATE ADULTHOOD Cognitive Scholastic competence Scholastic Scholastic competence competence competence Intellectual ability Intelligence Cognitive abilities Creativity Job competence Job competence Job competence Job competence Physical competence Athletic competence Athletic competence Athletic competence Athletic competence Physical appearance Physical appearance Physical appearance Physical appearance Physical appearance Physical appearance Peer acceptance Peer acceptance Peer acceptance Peer acceptance Sociability Close friendship Close friendship Close friendship Relationships with friends Romantic Romantic relationships Intimate relationships relationships Relationships with Family relationships parents Behavioral conduct Behavioral conduct Conduct/morality Morality Morality Morality Sense of humor Sense of humor Nurturance Nurturance Household management Personal, household management Adequacy as a provider Adequacy as a provider Leisure activities Health status Life satisfaction Reminiscence Global self-worth Global self-worth Global self-worth Global self-worth Global self-worth SOURCE: Harter, S. (1990). The construction of the self: A developmental perspective. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Used by permission of Guilford Press.  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 257 for older children, adolescents, college-aged students, and adults (e.g., Baudson, Weber, & Freund, 2016; see Harter, 2012, for a review). The strength of this association holds up for special student populations such as individuals with learning disabilities and those with academic talents as well. This somewhat disconcerting reality may be due to the fact that physical attractiveness is such an omnipresent, recognizable aspect of the self. It is also true that more attractive individuals receive more positive atten- tion from others (Maestripieri, Henry, & Nickels, 2017). They receive more affection from parents and other adults in infancy. In later childhood and adolescence, teachers have higher expectations for them, and peers show more positive regard for them. As adults, they have more good qualities ascribed to them, and they are generally more successful in life, advancing more rapidly in their careers and earning more income. Thus, physically attractive individuals may be getting a consistently larger number of positive reflected appraisals with which to construct the self than their less attractive counterparts. It also appears that cultural emphasis on rigid and often unobtainable standards of beauty, particularly for females, contributes to observed differences in self-esteem for males and females, which we will discuss in a later section of this chapter. Begin- ning around early adolescence, girls report more dissatisfaction with their appearance and their bodies than do boys of the same age. We should note that, increasingly, phys- ical appearance is becoming a central element to male self-valuing as well (Frederick, Sandhu, Morse, & Swami, 2016). In fact, in one large study of Norwegian adolescents, body satisfaction predicted self-esteem equally strongly for both girls and boys (Wich- strom & von Soest, 2016). Influences on the Development of Self-Concept We have already presented the earliest influences on the developing self of the infant, toddler, and preschooler (see Chapter 5). What can we add to the story of self-concept development that applies to older children? Are the same processes at work? What can we say about the nature of self-esteem, that evaluative dimension which colors our self-appraisals? As you might suspect, the traditional positions of James (1890) and Cooley (1902) have much to offer contemporary researchers looking for explana- tions. Recall that William James believed that self-esteem was dependent on the ratio of our successes to our aspirations. Harter (1990) found support for James’s position. Children’s, as well as adolescents’ and adults’, global self-esteem is heavily dependent on competence in areas of personal importance. Individuals of all ages are more able to MyLab Education discount weak performance if it occurs in unimportant areas. For example, if it is very Video Example 7.1 important to Ashley (and to her peers and parents) to be athletically competitive, hav- Global self-esteem is related to ing a relatively weak performance in this area is likely to lower her overall self-regard. feelings of competence. How might On the other hand, if Sharon’s goal is to be a stellar student, a weak athletic showing is a growth mindset influence these likely to have less punishing consequences to her global sense of self. children’s self-esteem and self- In general, Harter found that the greater the discrepancy between adequacy in efficacy beliefs? some domain and the importance of that domain, the greater the negative impact on self-esteem. This helps explain why some students who display low levels of compe- tence in certain domains may still have high self-esteem overall. Evidence suggests, however, that this reality is not well understood and may even contradict conven- tional wisdom. Consider a survey of U.S. teachers, school administrators, and school counselors in which approximately 60% of the respondents believed poor academic performance was the major cause of low self-esteem among students (Scott, Murray, Mertens, & Dustin, 1996). Yet, many other attributes are important to children (e.g., social relationships, hobbies, other recreational activities and interests; Tatlow-Golden & Guerin, 2017). In addition, academic success may not be highly valued by everyone. Interestingly, in the same study, 69% of counselors compared to 35% of administra- tors believed that the self-esteem of underachieving students could be improved by more unconditional validation, a strategy we will examine more thoroughly later in the chapter. How do children appraise their competencies? For a child at school age and beyond, there are obviously some concrete standards of performance that can be used to infer 258 Chapter 7 competency, such as getting good grades or being selected for a sports team. Cooley also emphasized the importance of social influences on appraisals of competence. In other words, he believed that self-perceptions can be based on the internalization of approval or disapproval of others in the social network. In one study, for example, 8- to 12-year-olds participated in an online “game” in which a jury of same-aged, anony- mous peers ostensibly judged each child’s “likeability” in comparison to four other “contestants” (Thomaes et al., 2010). Actually, the researchers randomly assigned a high, low, or intermediate likeability score to each participating child. The children filled out self-esteem questionnaires both before and after the “game.” Receiving a low likeability score decreased their self-esteem, and receiving a high score increased their self-esteem. Children with narcissistic tendencies (that is, who had demonstrated extreme, unrealistically positive self-views) before the manipulation actually were the most vulnerable to the negative peer feedback. It does appear that, “As social beings we live with our eyes upon our reflection, but have no assurance of the tranquility of the waters in which we see it” (Cooley, 1902, p. 247). Children put more stock in how their peers see them as they get older. For exam- ple, one study found that sixth graders’ self-appraisals match those of their peers more closely than third graders’ self-appraisals do (e.g., Cole, Maxwell, & Martin, 1997). For both age groups, parents’ and teachers’ appraisals also contributed to the process. But the role of the social network involves more than just providing an accumula- tion of comments or responses from others that become part of the self-concept. The self-system also assimilates and accommodates evaluative data from internal (“How am I doing in reading compared to math?”) and external (“How does my reading performance compare with that of my classmates?”) sources in ways that involve comparison. In social comparison, people observe the performance of others and use it as a basis for evaluating their own abilities and accomplishments (Festinger, 1954). When they do this and how they do it vary somewhat depending on context and level of global self-esteem. Social comparison processes are particularly active in situations that are novel or ambiguous or when more objective standards of performance are unavailable. It is fairly obvious that classrooms provide a wealth of material for this ongoing process. Generally, children tend to make comparisons with other children who resemble them in some important ways. Most people, at least in Western cul- tures, are motivated to maintain moderately positive beliefs about themselves, called the self-enhancing bias (Taylor & Brown, 1988), which is considered a good thing in most cases (McKay & Dennett, 2009). Strategies for protecting one’s self-esteem differ depending on children’s level of self-esteem. When self-esteem is low, children may prefer situations that are rich in positive reinforcement. For example, Smith and Smoll (1990) reported that children with lower levels of self-esteem responded most favorably to coaches and instruc- tors who were highly encouraging, and least favorably to those who were least sup- portive. Children with high or moderate levels of self-esteem showed less variation in their responsiveness to adult reinforcement styles. Researchers (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985) have also noted that children will make “downward” social comparisons by comparing themselves to less competent or less successful peers when their own self-esteem is at stake. Such comparisons protect the child from negative self-evaluations. Generally, children and adults with lower levels of self-esteem are more susceptible to the kinds of external cues that carry evalua- tive messages and are more reactive to social feedback (Campbell, 1990). They are reluctant to call attention to themselves and are more cautious and self-protective. Possibly they feel they have more to lose if they experience negative evaluations from others. This contrasts with individuals with high self-esteem, who demonstrate more self-enhancement strategies and are more likely to call attention to themselves (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). What message can we draw from research in the tradition of James and Cooley? Harter (e.g., 2006) concludes that the two theorists’ positions operate in an additive way to explain the variation in self-esteem found in older children and adolescents. In other words, both competence and support contribute to the final product. The higher  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 259 the level of competence in important domains and the greater the level of social sup- port, the higher the level of self-esteem is overall. What is the importance of self-esteem for children’s development? As you might expect, positive self-esteem not only is a consequence of competence and social sup- port, but also has consequences for life outcomes. Many longitudinal studies lead to the same conclusion: Self-esteem influences the quality of life from childhood through adulthood (see Orth & Robins, 2014). For example, one longitudinal study followed participants from adolescence through old age (Orth, Robins, & Widaman, 2012). Higher self-esteem early in life predicted more positive and fewer negative emotional experiences over time, as well as more relationship and job satisfaction. Another lon- gitudinal study began when participants were 13 years old and followed them to age 30 (Birkeland, Melkevik, Holsen, & Wold, 2012). The researchers identified three typi- cal trajectories of global self-esteem: consistently high, chronically low, and U-shaped. In the U-shaped group, participants reported positive self-esteem when they were 13 years old and then showed a decline, reaching a low point at about 18 years old. Subse- quently, their self-esteem climbed so that by their mid-20s they saw themselves much more positively again. By age 30, self-esteem trajectories appeared to have effects on life satisfaction as well as the likelihood of depressive mood, health problems, and insomnia. The importance of self-esteem is especially evident when we examine out- comes for the group that experienced an adolescent decline and subsequent rise in positive feelings (the U-shaped group). Even though by age 30 their global self-esteem was as positive as the consistently high group, they still reported more negative life outcomes. Understanding Different Kinds of Self-Valuing: Self-Esteem, Self-Efficacy, and Narcissism It is important for helpers to understand the distinctions among self-esteem, self- efficacy, and narcissism. Someone with high self-esteem sees herself as a worthwhile person and feels general satisfaction with herself. Self-efficacy specifically refers to a person’s belief in her ability to control events in her life, especially her ability to overcome challenges successfully (Bandura, 1989). Feelings of self-efficacy often go together with positive self-esteem, but not always. Suppose Toni plays soccer well for her age, and she is recruited to play in an elite league. Unfortunately, she rarely can control the ball against the more skilled players in the new league, and she “messes up” repeatedly. If she has strong self-efficacy beliefs, she is likely to believe that she can improve her skills with hard work, and she will put in extra practice time to make that happen despite her initial experience of failure. But if her self-efficacy beliefs are weak, she is likely to attribute her failure to inadequate ability, and she will not be motivated to work harder. She is more likely to find an excuse to leave the new league, maybe moving back to a team where she can feel like she excels. Her self-esteem might recover, but her approach to difficult challenges will limit her success in the long run. Self-efficacy beliefs are similar to what Erikson (1950/1963) called a sense of industry (see Chapter 1), which he saw as emerging in middle childhood. A child with a sense of industry believes in her ability to master the skills and tools needed to be productive, and she gets pleasure from facing challenges. You will learn a bit about what kinds of interactions support self-efficacy in the Applications section of this chapter, and we will look again at self-efficacy beliefs and the experiences that strengthen them in Chapter 12. What about narcissism? Narcissus, a figure from Greek mythology, fell in love with his own beautiful reflection, and wasted his life pining after his own reflected image. In the past it was not uncommon for self-concept researchers to define narcissism as “excessive self-esteem,” but the evidence now shows that these are different charac- teristics, developing from different experiences. People who score high on measures of narcissism “feel superior to others, believe they are entitled to privileges, and crave respect and admiration from others” (Brummelman, Thomaes, & Sedikides, 2016, p. 8). Narcissists feel that they are better than other people; they often try to dominate or use others to meet their own needs and seek to be the center of attention. If others 260 Chapter 7 are admiring and respectful, they feel great; but if not, or if they are humiliated, they often lash out aggressively. Narcissists are more likely to behave delinquently to get what they want than non-narcissists. In contrast, people who score high on measures of self-esteem are happy with themselves, but they don’t see themselves as superior. They are more likely to try to build good relationships with others than to dominate them. It’s not impossible to have narcissistic tendencies and to have high self-esteem (or at least to report that you do; see Brookes, 2015), but most narcissists are vulnerable to slights or criticism, sug- gesting that their apparent self-esteem is fragile. How do children develop narcissistic traits? One longitudinal study provides some clues (Brummelman et al., 2015). Children ranged from ages 7 to 11 at the initial assessment, and the researchers re-evaluated the children and their parents every 6 months after that for two years. Children rated statements that could reveal narcis- sism (e.g., “Kids like me deserve something extra”) and self-esteem (e.g., “Kids like me are happy with themselves as a person”). Both children and parents rated statements about parents’ warmth and affection (e.g., “My mother lets me know that she loves me” or “I let my child know that I love her”), and parents rated statements that could reveal tendencies to “overvalue” their children (e.g., “My child is more special than other children”). The researchers found very different pathways to narcissism compared to self- esteem. Corroborating other research, warm, supportive parenting predicted high self-esteem as children matured. But children’s narcissism was not related to parents’ warmth. Narcissism was predicted by parents’ overvaluing of their children. Always keep in mind, of course, that causal processes are multidimensional. Parenting behav- iors interact with other child and environmental characteristics. So, for example, nar- cissistic traits are also more likely to develop in children who are more impulsive than other children (Cramer, 2017). In the Applications section, you will learn about the pitfalls of praise that overvalues a child or that can otherwise be problematic for a child’s self-development. Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Self-Esteem Differences GENDER Much attention has been paid to the apparent decrease in self-esteem experienced by females around the time of their entrance to middle school. This phenomenon has been called the “loss of voice” by Gilligan and her colleagues (Brown & Gilligan, 1992), who purport that a girl experiences a gradual silencing of an authentic, imperious, and often willful self in order to identify with certain culturally prescribed roles of women as self-sacrificial and pleasing to others. Speaking one’s mind, at least for women in certain contexts, can be threatening to the relationships that are such an important part of their lives. These authors argue that suppressing one’s voice becomes the only possible way of maintaining important connections to others. In time, they conclude, women become disassociated from their true selves and may lose touch with their own opinions and feelings. Comparably negative claims of gender bias or silencing have been directed toward schools for “shortchanging” girls by giving them less atten- tion than boys and for attributing their academic failure to lack of ability rather than to lack of effort (Ornstein, 1994; Sadker & Sadker, 1991). Popular accounts of these reports have contributed to the notion that the self-esteem of girls plunges precipi- tously around the early adolescent period, whereas that of boys remains robust. What actually happens to girls’ level of “voice” and to their views of themselves in late childhood and early adolescence? Are gender differences in self-regard real and universal? First, let’s consider studies of girls’ versus boys’ level of voice. Harter and colleagues (Harter, Waters, Whitesell, & Kastelic, 1998) assessed level of voice by asking 9th to 11th graders to rate how able they feel to “express their opinions,” “share what they are really thinking,” and so on. They also asked the teens about whether others— parents, teachers, male classmates, female classmates, and close friends—­listen to their opinions, respect their ideas, and show interest in their views. Finally, the researchers measured “relational self-worth” with different groups of people, asking respondents  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 261 to say whether they liked or didn’t like themselves the way they are around different people in their lives, such as parents or friends. The results support Gilligan’s ideas about the importance of voice for self-esteem, but they do not support her notion that girls are more subject to “voice suppression” than boys. Levels of voice were the same for both girls and boys with teachers, parents, and male classmates. But with female classmates and close friends, girls reported a stronger level of voice than boys did! For neither gender did level of voice decline with age, and for both genders, level of voice varied dramatically depending on whether the adolescent felt support for self- expression. For both girls and boys, feelings of self-worth varied with level of voice: In social contexts where kids felt like they could express themselves freely, they felt more self-worth. Many more recent studies buttress the conclusion that girls are not more likely than boys to lose their “voice” in adolescence (see Faraday, 2010). For example, a large- scale survey of 10- to 30-year-olds examined their reported general willingness to “go along” with peers even when they do not agree with them. Females overall reported more self-reliance: They were less likely to change their behavior to conform with peer pressure than males (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007). Now, what about the claim that girls’ overall self-worth declines in late childhood and early adolescence? Many studies of developmental change in self-esteem establish that for both girls and boys, self-esteem begins to decline in late childhood, levels off in late adolescence and begins a slow, moderate climb in young adulthood, peaking in the sixth decade of life and then declining again (see Helwig & Rupricht, 2017; Orth, 2017). And, there is a gender difference. As you can see in Figure 7.2, girls’ self-esteem drops more in late childhood than boys’ does, and there is a small but significant dif- ference between females and males until late adulthood. For example, one group of FIGURE 7.2 Self-esteem for males and females across the life span. 4.10 4.00 3.90 Men Women 3.80 3.70 3.60 Self-Esteem 3.50 3.40 3.30 3.20 3.10 3.00 2.90 2.80 9–12 13–17 18–22 23–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–79 80–90 Age SOURCE: Robins, R. W., Trzesnlewski, K. H., Tracy, J. L., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2002). Global self-esteem across the life span. Psychology and Aging, 17, 428. 262 Chapter 7 researchers looked carefully at the data from two large studies of global self-esteem, which included a combined total of 155,121 participants (Kling, Hyde, Showers, & Buswell, 1999). They found that males showed higher self-esteem. Another group of researchers who included nearly a million participants found the same gender dif- ference in countries around the world (Bleidorn et al., 2016). The level of difference is typically small, however, compared to gender differences in aggressive behavior and activity level (Hyde & Else-Quest, 2012). The idea that girls’ self-esteem plunges dramatically at adolescence relative to that of boys is overstated. Other studies even indicate that gender gaps in self-esteem for specific competency areas favor girls in some domains (e.g., behavioral conduct) and boys in other domains (e.g., sports); they usually appear in early elementary school, and do not increase in magnitude at adolescence (Gentile et al., 2009; Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles, & Wigfield, 2002). For both girls and boys, weight and physical attractiveness are important predic- tors of self-esteem as early as 9 years old, but more so for girls (Harter, 2012; see Chapter 9). In fact, decline in body satisfaction with the onset of puberty appears to make an important contribution to declining self-esteem in early adolescence (Cribb & Haase, 2016). The small but stable gender difference in global self-esteem should be taken seri- ously, but Kling and her colleagues (1999) caution that inflating the significance of the self-esteem slide may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Adults who believe that girls have lower self-esteem than boys may convey this impression to girls in subtle but powerful ways. Girls may internalize this message and alter their self-appraisals accordingly. In addition, championing the self-esteem deficits of girls may lead some to conclude that boys do not have self-esteem problems. Clearly, there are gender role strains for boys as well. For example, they are more likely than girls to feel social pres- sure to conform to gender stereotypes (Yunger, Carver, & Perry, 2004). Also, as noted earlier, boys are more vulnerable to peer pressure than girls (e.g., Steinberg & Mona- han, 2007). Boys who are not athletically inclined can suffer greatly in social status and self-esteem relative to their peers (Kilmartin, 1994). In Chapters 8 and 9, we will examine other facets of the link between gender and self-evaluation. RACE AND ETHNICITY For many years it was assumed that the self-esteem of minority group children would be lower than that of White children because of their minority status in North Ameri- can culture. This interpretation was based on Cooley’s idea of reflected appraisals and social comparison processes. Members of oppressed groups, for example, would be more likely than members of non-oppressed groups to internalize the discrimi- natory appraisals of others in constructing their sense of self. Similarly, social com- parisons would be more negative when oppressed minorities held themselves to the standards of the majority culture (see Zuckerman, Li, & Hall, 2016). Large studies of self-esteem have challenged these interpretations by demonstrating a slight but rela- tively consistent self-esteem advantage for Black Americans, the minority group most extensively studied, over White Americans (Gray-Little & Hafdahl, 2000; Twenge & Crocker, 2002). Several explanations have been proposed to account for this phenomenon. Crocker and Major (1989) posit that, to maintain their self-esteem, members of histori- cally marginalized groups engage in three complementary processes. They attribute negative feedback directed toward them to the prejudice that exists in society. They make social comparisons to members of their own group rather than to members of the advantaged majority. Finally, they tend to enhance the importance of self-concept domains in which members of their group excel, while discounting the importance of domains in which their members do not excel. Black Americans are also less likely to show a gender difference in self-esteem. Zuckerman et al. (2016) suggest that specific aspects of Black American culture and experience may be important here. For example, within the Black community, appear- ance standards for women are somewhat different than in the White majority culture, and they may be easier to reach. Also, Black males may be more marginalized or stig- matized by the majority culture than Black females are. When Gray-Little and Hafdahl  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 263 (2000) summarized the existing data on this subject, they concluded that Blacks and other minority groups demonstrate a higher level of ethnocentrism than do Whites. In other words, racial identification is a more salient component of self-concept for members of these groups (see Chapter 9). Black Americans, in particular, may benefit from this emphasis on their desirable distinctiveness within the larger society (Orth, 2017). In fact, strong racial or ethnic identity correlates positively with level of global self-esteem (Harris-Britt, Valrie, Kurtz-Costes, & Rowley, 2007). It is important to realize, however, that these results cannot be generalized to members of all minority groups, nor even to all members within a single minority. Gray-Little and Hafdahl (2000) make the important point that race is a complex con- struct, confounded with socioeconomic status, culture, gender, and other important variables. Using race as a dividing criterion to compare groups is appealing because it seems so simple, but it may mask great within-group variability. How individual differences arise within cultural/racial groups is now an important focus of research. For example, Bean, Bush, McKenny, and Wilson (2003) found that maternal support and acceptance are key factors in both academic achievement and the development of global self-esteem in African American youth, more so than paternal support. These researchers suggest that mothers play an especially central role in many African Amer- ican families, and mothers’ influence on youngsters’ self-esteem is commensurate with that role. Cross-Cultural Differences in the Development of the Self As you have seen, very young children learn about themselves largely in the contexts of relationships with parents and other caregivers (Chapter 3). As children get older and their perspective taking skills improve, peer assessments, peer acceptance, and social comparisons become increasingly more important. The construction of self-con- cept is a social process, and any social process is conditioned by culture. The judg- ments, beliefs, values, and expectations of others—parents, teachers, and peers—are embedded in sociocultural meanings and practices. For example, parents in a culture that emphasizes individuality might value “knowing your own mind,” identifying your own interests, and learning how to make your own choices. If so, their parenting practices are likely to promote independence, encouraging children to formulate and express their own opinions, interests, and needs, and to participate in family decision making. Parents from a more collectivist culture that emphasizes interdependence might place more value on conformity, respect for others, and group harmony. If so, their parenting practices might discourage children from identifying or expressing their own opinions and interests, but rather encourage them to be obedient and to concern themselves with supporting the needs of the family. Such cultural differences suggest that the “self” that develops in one culture will be different from the self that would develop in a different culture. To illustrate, let’s examine self-concept and self-esteem in individualistic as compared to collectivist cul- tures. Table 7.2 lists just a few of the values and expectations that characterize each of these cultural types. Western societies, and especially the United States, are typical of individualistic cultures, whereas Eastern societies, such as China and Japan, and many other regions of the world are more collectivist. Such categorizations are often overly simplistic, however, as we noted in Chapter 1. There are elements of both individual- ism and collectivism in all societies, and there are many shared values across cultures. For example, relationships with others are central to human functioning in all cultural environments, but the typical approaches to relating may vary. In more individual- istic cultures, for example, people may feel comfortable seeking relationships with new partners, whereas in collectivist cultures, loyalty to in-group members (such as family) is often the primary path to meeting relationship needs. Needs for autonomy also appear to be important across cultures, but what contributes to feelings of auton- omy may differ substantially. For example, in a more collectivist context, accepting the choices that trusted others make for you may feel as “right” for the individual as making your own choices does in a more individualistic setting (see Miller, Goyal, & 264 Chapter 7 TABLE 7.2 Individualistic and Collectivist Cultures: Differences in Values and Emphases INDIVIDUALISTIC COLLECTIVIST Becoming autonomous and self-reliant is important; this includes separat- Relatedness rather than autonomy is emphasized; personal choices are sub- ing from others and following one’s unique course, making one’s own ordinated to the needs of the group. choices. Personal opinions, ideas, experiences, and feelings are important; their Perspective taking and identifying group needs are more valued than open, articulate expression is valued. self-expression. Social relationships serve personal goals. Social relationships are more important than personal goals; social harmony with close others (in-group) is the ultimate value. Achievement and competitive advantage are closely linked; they indicate Achievement is an indicator of both hard work and social support; failure pro- ability and are self-enhancing; failure is negative. vides information about avenues for self-improvement. Wice, 2017). It is also important to recognize that there are cultural differences among subgroups within countries and regions (e.g., among socioeconomic, racial, or eth- nic groups), and there can be substantial differences among individuals and families within groups (e.g., Carey & Markus, 2017). See Table 3.5 (Chapter 3) and Table 5.4 (Chapter 5) for examples related to caregiv- ing behaviors and parents’ values. When there are cultural differences in patterns of social behavior, what effects do they have on children’s developing self-concepts? In more individualistic con- texts, independence is a central element of the self. Separateness, personal choice, and standing out from others are part of this independent pattern (e.g., Markus, 2017). “Standing out” is often made possible through achievement, and having pride in one’s achievements is expected. That would suggest that seeing yourself as better than others in some ways would be important, and therefore seeing yourself in a posi- tive light (high self-esteem) would also be important. Sure enough, from middle child- hood onward, North Americans are more likely than people from Eastern cultures to report high self-esteem and to use self-enhancement strategies, such as downward comparisons, to help maintain their positive self-views (Heine & Hammamura, 2007). Even by age 4, Western children refer more to themselves in their narratives, and they make larger drawings of themselves, than children from more collectivist cultures (Schroder, Tõugu, Lenk, & De Gee, 2011). Western children are also more willing to express their own opinions and reactions, including emotional ones (Harter, 2012). Children and adults in many Eastern societies are more likely than those from Western societies to incorporate the characteristics of close family and friends into their self-concepts rather than emphasizing their own uniqueness (Markus, 2017). A striking illustration of this comes from a study of the neural processes involved in self-representation (Zhu, Zhang, Fan, & Han, 2007). Participants judged whether traits (e.g., brave, childish) were true of themselves, true of their mothers, or true of distant others (President Clinton for U.S. participants; a former Chinese premier for Chinese participants). fMRIs indicated that when Chinese individuals made judgments about themselves the same area of the cortex was activated as when they made judgments about their mothers. Different cortical areas were activated when they judged more distant others. For U.S. participants, the cortical areas activated when they judged themselves were distinct from the areas that were activated when they made judg- ments about either their mothers or distant others. Rather than being concerned with self-esteem as it is usually measured (e.g., rat- ing oneself high on statements such as “I am proud of who I am”), people in East- ern cultures place more value on self-criticism and self-effacement (Diener & Diener, 2009). Negative self-evaluations are less likely to be associated with emotional prob- lems (such as depressive tendencies) and more likely to spur self-improvement efforts (Heine et al., 2001). Hard work and achievement are important indicators of self- improvement, but they are seen as intimately related to others’ efforts, not just one’s own. Pride in personal accomplishments is often interpreted as arrogance; self-respect depends more on having harmonious relationships.  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 265 FIGURE 7.3 Cultural differences in views of the self. TRUE SELF Self as Self with Student Parents Self as Self with Student Parents TRUE SELF Self with Self with Romantic Friends Other Self with Self with Friends Romantic Other Western Self Eastern Self SOURCE: Harter, S. (2011). The construction of the self: Developmental and sociocultural foundations (2nd ed.). New York, NY: ­Guilford Press. Used by permission of Guilford Press. Overall, in Eastern cultures the concept of the self includes relationships with others; a person’s roles in, and duties to, the in-group are part of the self. Relation- ships for Western children and adults are not as central to self-concept. They are more like voluntary connections that serve personal needs, and they can be given up or changed (Markus, 2017). Western children and adolescents may strive to be like someone else, but that kind of identification process (see Chapters 9 and 10) is not the same as incorporating relational processes into the self-concept. A study of thousands of people’s Facebook habits seems to demonstrate these cultural dif- ferences (Hong & Na, 2017). The researchers found that Eastern participants gave more “likes” than Western participants, suggesting more attention to others. West- ern participants made more “status updates” than Eastern participants, suggesting that they focused more on their individual behavior. Figure 7.3 illustrates some of these differences in self-concept for developing independent and interdependent self-schemas. MyLab Education Self-Check 7.1. The Moral Self 7.2 Discuss classic and contemporary views of moral development as well as factors that promote prosocial and antisocial behavior and suggest ­interventions to encourage healthy development in middle childhood and early adolescence. One important ingredient in self-development is the acquisition of values. Colby and Damon (1992) found that adults who lead exemplary lives tend to have very clear 266 Chapter 7 beliefs about what is right, and they consider those beliefs to be a central feature of their own identities. Their self-esteem hinges on acting in responsible ways, consistent with their beliefs. As early as age 5, a child’s view of herself as a moral person predicts good behavior (Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 2010). For children in the middle years, behavioral conduct is an important self-concept domain that is linked to global self-esteem. Generally, moral beliefs are increasingly central to self-definition as children get older, influencing them to act in responsible ways, but as Damon (1995) points out, the development of the self can take many paths, and persons vary widely in the extent to which they look to their commitments and convictions in defining their personal identities.... For some... morality may always remain peripheral to who they think they are. (p. 141) In this section, we will examine some theories and research on how the moral self develops and why for some it is more compelling than for others. Let’s begin by specifying what we mean by a moral sense, or morality. First, it is a capacity to make judgments about what is right versus what is wrong, and second, it is preferring to act in ways that are judged to be “right.” In other words, morality involves both an “evaluative orientation” toward actions and events (Damon, 1988) and a sense of obligation or commitment to behave in ways that are consistent with what is right. Early on, this sense of obligation is partly influenced by rewards or pun- ishments from parents, teachers, and other adults. Gradually, a slate of standards and principles—a conscience—is internalized (see discussion of self-regulation in Chap- ters 4 and 5) and becomes the primary guide to action, so that a moral adult could even behave in ways that are disapproved by others if she judged the behavior to be right (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017). It is also important to recognize that moral development and religious experience are not the same thing. Religions do, of course, address issues of morality, and they prescribe standards of conduct. But moral development is part of normal self-develop- ment in all individuals, regardless of whether they are practitioners of a religious faith or whether they receive formal religious training. As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, it is not surprising that parents regard the development of morality as a critical concern. Even though there are cul- tural and historical variations in the specifics of what is construed as moral, the mean- ing of morality generally includes some social interactive principles or propensities that are necessary to the successful functioning of all societies and of individuals within society (Damon, 1988; Killen & Smetana, 2008; Sachdeva, Singh, & Medin, 2011; Turiel, 2015). First, concern for others is important, as well as a willingness to act on that concern by sharing, forgiving, and other acts of benevolence. Second, a sense of justice and fairness, including a willingness to take into account the rights and needs of all parties, is part of a moral sense. Third, trustworthiness, defined primarily as honesty in dealings with others, is critical to most discussions of morality. Finally, self- regulation (self-control) is essential. To live by standards requires a capacity and will- ingness to inhibit one’s own selfish or aggressive impulses under some circumstances, that is, to avoid misbehavior. This is one aspect of self-regulation. Also, to be a useful member of society, or even to fully develop one’s talents or abilities, requires effort and persistence regardless of discomfort or difficulty. This is a second aspect of self-regu- lation—a willingness to do things that are not much fun, such as work and practicing skills, even when play is more enticing. For example, there may be no exciting way to learn multiplication tables. Hard work and self-control are necessary to achieve long- term goals at any point in the life span. Research on the development of morality has largely focused on this set of fundamentals: concern for others, justice, trustworthiness or honesty, and self-control. Elements of Morality Morality requires a complex interweaving of three elements—emotions, cognitions, and behaviors—that do not always work together in perfect harmony. Consider the  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 267 following true-life experience. Several decades ago, in a blue-collar city neighborhood, 10-year-old Carmen headed for a local grocery store to buy some items for her mother. Her family never saw her alive again. But some other folks later did see her. They were motorists, driving at high speeds on an inner-city expressway, heading home in the evening rush hour. They remembered seeing a girl who looked like Carmen, running naked along the edge of the expressway with a man following her. Apparently, she had escaped from his car when he parked along the side of the road. But none of the motorists stopped, and the man caught the girl. Her raped and beaten body was later found in a remote location. In the days and weeks following Carmen’s disappearance, first one motorist and then another either phoned police anonymously or came forward openly to describe what she or he had seen, although none had reported the incident when it happened. The city’s inhabitants were horrified both by the crime and by the failure of the wit- nesses to help or to come forward immediately, but none were more distressed than the witnesses themselves. Their moral emotions—empathy and sympathy for the girl and her family, shame and guilt at their own failure to come to the girl’s aid—were experienced by many as overwhelming. These feelings in many cases were triggered from the beginning, when they first saw the naked child. Why did their behavior not match their feelings? Many witnesses reported confusion and disbelief when they passed the strange scene, and though they felt concern for the girl and guilt at their own inaction, they reasoned that there must be a sensible explanation, one that would make them feel foolish if they made the extraordinary effort to stop. Others indicated that it was impossible to process the events—so unexpected and atypical of their ordi- nary experience—in the split second of decision making, and they had only “put it all together” when they heard about Carmen’s disappearance on the news. Others thought that someone else would take care of it—after all, hundreds of motorists were passing the same spot—or that the risks of helping were too great. Most adults believe that their behavior is usually consistent with their beliefs or feelings. But the witnesses to Carmen’s plight illustrate that even adults with strong moral feelings do not always think clearly about moral issues or behave in ways that are consistent with their moral sense. Some of the earliest research on children’s moral development indicated that children are particularly prone to such inconsistencies. Hartshorne and May (1928–1930) observed 10,000 children between the ages of 8 and 16 in a wide variety of situations where they had opportunities to lie, cheat, or steal. For example, children could raise their scores on a test by sneaking a look at an answer key, cheat on a test of strength, pilfer some change, or tell lies that would place them in a good light. In every situation, the researchers had devised techniques to surrep- titiously detect cheating, lying, or stealing. They found that children’s knowledge of moral standards did not coordinate with how likely they were to cheat or to help others to cheat. They also found that children’s honesty varied from one situation to another. Some children cheated in academic tasks, for example, but not on tests of ath- letic skill. Hartshorne and May concluded that moral conduct is usually determined by the particular situation and is not coordinated with moral reasoning or training. However, more recent research, with more adequate measures of children’s emotions and cognitions, indicates that emotions, cognitions, and actions do tend to become more synchronized with age and that their interrelations are influenced by many fac- tors, including training. Before we consider these many factors, let’s take a brief look at some classic theo- ries of moral development with which you may be familiar, theories that emphasize either emotions or cognitions as the most important source of moral behavior. How do these theories fare in light of modern research? Some Classic Theories of Moral Development FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY In Freud’s (1935/1960) psychoanalytic theory of moral development, the behavior of very young children is driven by the inborn impulses of the id, which are completely self-serving desires for sustenance and release, such as hunger or the need to defecate. 268 Chapter 7 The superego, which emerges in the preschool period, is the source of moral emo- tions, such as pride in good behavior and shame or guilt about bad behavior, and once a child has a superego, it is these emotions that impel moral functioning, like an internalized system of rewards and punishments. Freud argued that the superego develops when a complex set of id-driven motives and emotions come into conflict with parental authority. Specifically, beginning at about age 3, vague sexual desire for the opposite-sex parent puts the young child in competition with the same-sex par- ent, who is much more powerful than the child and thus a frightening competitor. The child’s solution to this no-win situation is to identify with the same-sex parent. Identification with the (imagined) aggressor is a solution for two reasons. First, by trying to be like the angry parent, a child wins the parent’s approval and affection. Second, by pretending to be the parent, the child attains some vicarious satisfaction of her or his sexual longing for the other parent. The critical element of this situation for moral development is the identification process itself. Identification includes both imitation of the parent’s behaviors and, most important, internalization of the parent’s standards and values, creating the child’s superego. As we will see in the next chapter, the identification process described by Freud is an explanation of both moral development and sex role development in young chil- dren. Unfortunately, research fails to support its predictions. With regard to moral development, attributing moral emotions to the emergence of the superego, some- time between ages 3 and 5, is not consistent with findings that many toddlers show signs of empathy and shame as early as 18 to 24 months, beginning when they dem- onstrate self-recognition while looking in a mirror. By age 3, sympathy, pride, and guilt appear to be part of the emotional repertoire as well (see Chapters 4 and 5; Lewis, 2016b). In addition, even toddlers perform prosocial actions based on empathy (Kim & Kochanska, 2017) and sometimes they seem eager to comply with a parent’s rules, even if the parent is not around (Kochanska, Tjebkes, & Forman, 1998; Turiel, 2006). Such early signs of conscience development undermine the psychoanalytic view that early behavior is driven only by selfish impulses. Finally, and perhaps most important, Freud argued that children develop a conscience because they identify with a parent whom they fear. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 5, parents who intimidate their children are least successful in fostering the development of conscience. Rather, warmth, affec- tion, and support are more likely to be characteristic of parents whose children show signs of mature conscience formation—self-control in the absence of authority figures (Goffin, Boldt, & Kochanska, 2017; Thompson, 2015). We should note that psychoana- lysts since Freud have increasingly explained conscience formation as linked to the bond between child and parent, that is, more as a function of the strength of attach- ment and the need to keep the parent close than as a function of fear (Emde, Johnson, & Easterbrooks, 1987). THE COGNITIVE THEORIES OF PIAGET AND KOHLBERG Whereas Freud focused on the impetus that emotions provide to moral behavior, cog- nitive theorists have emphasized the importance of changes in logical thinking as a source of moral development. To understand how children think about rules and stan- dards of conduct, Piaget (1932/1965) presented children with moral dilemmas and asked them to both judge the behavior of the protagonists and explain what should be done. He also played marbles with children and asked them to describe and explain the rules of the game. Piaget proposed that preschoolers are premoral in the sense that they seem unconcerned about established rules or standards, making up their own as they go along in a game of marbles, for example, and having little regard even for their own rules. At about age 5, Piaget described children’s morality as heteronomous. They regard rules as immutable, existing outside the self, and requiring strict adherence. So, 5-year-old Jasmine might argue that a rule should never be broken, even if some greater good might prevail or even if all the participants in a game agree to the change. When her older sister crosses the street without waiting for a “walk” signal, rushing to help a neighborhood toddler who has wandered into the street, Jasmine might insist that her sister should have waited for the signal no matter what. She might also judge that a boy who broke 15 cups trying to help his mother get ready for a party deserves  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 269 more punishment than one who broke one cup while actually misbehaving. In heter- onomous morality, the letter of the law must be followed, and failure to do so requires punishment. In fact, Jasmine might believe in immanent justice, expecting that mis- behavior will eventually be punished, even if no one knows about it, as though some higher authority is always watching. Piaget argued that heteronomy is based on the child’s experiences in relation- ships with parents and other authority figures, where rules seem to come from above and must be obeyed. But in middle childhood, both experience with the give-and- take of peer relationships and advances in perspective taking skill help children to see the rules of behavior differently. As children and adolescents have more experi- ence in egalitarian relationships with their peers, their moral thinking becomes more ­autonomous, meaning that they begin to understand that rules are based on social agreements and can be changed. Advancements in perspective taking skills, which also are benefited by interactions with peers, help young people understand that rules and standards are not just a function of authoritarian dictates but that they promote fair play and cooperation, serving to establish justice. They can also be set aside for some greater good or changed through negotiation. So, by about 9 or 10, Jasmine could support her sister’s violation of their parents’ rule about not crossing the street, recog- nizing the greater importance of protecting a younger child. Also, she would probably be more consistently well behaved than she was earlier, because, in Piaget’s view, she has a better understanding of the value of rules and standards for social interaction. Kohlberg (e.g., 1976, 1984) further investigated children’s moral reasoning from late childhood into the adolescent and early adult years. His theory goes beyond Piag- et’s, offering a fine-grained analysis of changes in the older child’s, adolescent’s, and adult’s reasoning about moral issues (see Table 7.3 for a comparison of ages and stages in Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories). Unlike Piaget’s dilemmas, which focused on everyday challenges familiar in the lives of children, Kohlberg’s stories were outside ordinary experience and raised broad philosophical issues. Perhaps the most famous of these is the story of Heinz, whose wife is very ill and will die without a certain med- icine, which Heinz cannot afford. The druggist who makes the product refuses to sell it, though Heinz offers all the money he has managed to raise—about half of the retail cost—which would more than cover the druggist’s expenses. The druggist argues that he discovered the drug and plans to make money from it. In desperation, Heinz breaks into the druggist’s establishment and steals the medicine. Kohlberg was not interested in whether participants judged Heinz’s behavior to be right or wrong, assuming that reasonable people might disagree. He focused instead on the reasons they gave for their judgments. He found there to be three levels of moral reasoning, each characterized by two stages. At the first level, elementary school chil- dren usually show preconventional morality, roughly corresponding to Piaget’s heter- onomous level, in which what is right is what avoids punishment, what conforms to the dictates of authority, or what serves one’s personal interests. Then, young adolescents move to conventional morality, more consistent with Piaget’s autonomous level, in which what is right depends on others’ approval or on the need to maintain social order. Finally, by adulthood, some people move to postconventional morality, in which right is defined by universal principles or by standards of justice, not by the particular rule in question (see Table 7.3 for further elaboration of the stages within each level). Although individuals at different levels of moral reasoning might come to the same conclusion about what is “right,” their explanations reveal that they come to their decisions by different routes. Compare the “pro-stealing” decisions of Jay and Jesse when given the “Heinz” dilemma to resolve. Jay, a preconventional thinker, bases his choice on personal need: Heinz should take the drug, because the druggist won’t really suffer, and Heinz needs to save his wife. Jesse, a conventional thinker, bases her decision on the importance of others’ agree- ment or approval: Heinz should take the drug, because nobody would blame him for wanting to keep his wife alive. They might blame him if he didn’t. 270 Chapter 7 TABLE 7.3 Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development APPROXIMATE AGES PIAGET’S STAGES KOHLBERG’S STAGES Preschool Premoral Period Child is unconcerned about rules; makes up her own rules. Preconventional Level 5 to 8 or 9 years Heteronomous Morality Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation Child is a moral realist: Rules are determined by authori- Child obeys to avoid punishment and because authority ties; are unalterable, moral absolutes; must be obeyed. is assumed to be superior or right. Rules are interpreted Violations always punished. literally; no judgment is involved. 8 or 9 to 11 or 12 years Autonomous Morality Stage 2: Concrete, Individualistic Orientation Social rules are arbitrary, and promote cooperation, Child follows rules to serve own interests. Others’ inter- equality, and reciprocity; therefore, they serve justice. ests may also need to be served, so follow the principle They can be changed by agreement or violated for a of fair exchange, e.g., “You scratch my back, I scratch higher purpose. yours.” Conventional Level 13 to 16 years Stage 3: Social-Relational Perspective Shared feelings and needs are more important than self-interest. Helpfulness, generosity, and forgiveness are idealized. Late adolescents/young adults Stage 4: Member-of-Society Perspective The social order is most important now. Behaviors that contribute to functioning of the social system are most valued, e.g., obeying laws, hard work. Postconventional Level Some adults Stage 5: Prior Rights and Social Contract The social contract now is most valued. Specific laws are not most valued, but the process that they serve is, e.g., democratic principles, individual rights. Some adults Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles Certain abstract moral principles are valued over any- thing else, e.g., above specific laws. Social order is also highly valued, unless it violates highest moral principles. (Theoretical; Kohlberg’s subjects did not achieve this stage.) There is some research support for the general trends in moral reasoning sug- gested in the work of Piaget and of Kohlberg. Consistent with Piaget’s view, for exam- ple, when young children judge moral culpability they usually pay more attention to consequences (e.g., the number of cups broken by a child who is helping his mother prepare for a party), whereas older children pay more attention to intentions (e.g., whether the child was helping or misbehaving). Consistent with Kohlberg’s view, young people around the world progress through the stages of the preconventional and conventional levels of moral reasoning in the same, invariant order. Cross-cultural MyLab Education differences are more likely to be found at Kohlberg’s higher stages: The few who reach Video Example 7.2 Stage 5 of the postconventional level are most often Western, middle-class, urban ado- Young children tend to state that lescents and adults (for reviews, see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; Jensen, people should not cheat because 2008; Snarey, 1985). they’ll be punished, whereas older Perhaps most important, the roles of perspective taking and peer interactions in children and adolescents are more the growth of moral reasoning skills, emphasized both by Piaget and by Kohlberg, likely to consider the reasons one might cheat as well as possible have been supported. For example, advances in perspective taking skills such as those alternative actions. How would you described in Chapter 5 generally precede, although they do not guarantee, advances classify each of these four children, in moral reasoning (Jambon & Smetana, 2014; see Killen & Smetana, 2015). Also, when according to the theories presented children discuss moral issues with their peers they are more likely to think carefully by Piaget and by Kohlberg? about the ideas and to advance in their reasoning than when they discuss those issues with adults (Kruger, 1992; Kruger & Tomasello, 1986). Perhaps challenges from a peer  Self and Moral Development: Middle Childhood Through Early Adolescence 271 may seem less threatening and create less defensiveness than challenges from adults (Walker & Taylor, 1991). LIMITATIONS OF CLASSIC COGNITIVE THEORIES Despite the support that these cognitive approaches to explaining moral development have received, their usefulness is limited in several ways. First, young children have a greater capacity for moral reasoning than Piaget’s theory indicates. For example, although young children judge people’s actions by their physical consequences (such as how many cups are broken) more than older children do, still they are capable of focusing on the intentions behind behavior if those intentions are made salient (Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). In one study, even preschoolers could tell the difference between intentional lying and unintentional mistakes, and they judged real liars more harshly than bunglers (Siegel & Peterson, 1998). Another important challenge to Piaget’s theory is the finding that young children do not necessarily treat all rules and standards as equally important just because they are specified as such by parents or other authority figures. Moral philosophers point out that some standards, called moral rules, address fundamental moral issues of justice, welfare, and rights, such as rules about stealing, hurting others, or sharing. Other standards, called conventional rules, are more arbitrary and variable from one culture to another and are a function of social agreement, such as gender norms or rules about appropriate dress, forms of address, and table manners. Finally, there are areas of functioning that individuals or families might have standards about—such as choices of friends or recreational activities or participation in family life—which are not governed by formal social rules in Western societies. We’ll call these personal rules (Nucci, 2014; Turiel, 2015). Piaget assumed that young children treat all rules as “handed down from above,” that is, as determined by authority figures. But even by age 3, children are more likely to judge violations of moral rules as more serious than violations of conventional rules (Smetana & Braeges, 1990). By ages 4 or 5 children believe that moral rules should be obeyed despite what authority figures might say (e.g., Crane & Tisak, 1995). For example, at 5, Jasmine believed it would be wrong to steal even if there were no laws against it and even if a friend’s mother said it was okay. As children get older, they make clearer and clearer distinctions between moral and conventional rules, so that by age 9 or 10 children accurately categorize even unfamiliar rules (Davidson, Turiel, & Black, 1983). Turiel (1978) reexamined data from Hartshorne and May’s (1928–1930) classic study of children’s honesty and found that the participants were much more likely to cheat in academic tasks than they were to steal when given an easy opportunity. He argued that children probably saw the aca- demic tasks as governed by conventional rules, whereas stealing more clearly violates a moral rule. By adolescence, children assume that their parents have a right to regulate and enforce moral behavior. They usually accept parents’ regulation of conventional behavior as well, although there is more conflict with their parents in this domain than in the moral arena. Finally, with regard to personal issues such as appearance, spending, and friendship choices, adolescents balk at parental regulation, often argu- ing that parents have no legitimate authority in this domain (Rote & Smetana, 2016; Turiel, 2017). Interestingly, Arnett (1999) argues that parents may push for their right to control personal behavior more as a function of how they judge that behavior (e.g., in some instances they may see it as crossing over into the moral domain) than because they are reluctant to grant their children personal freedom. So, in other words, parents and adolescents may differ in how they categorize rules and regulations. We address this issue again in Chapter 10. Given what you have learned about cultural differ