Chapter 2.docx

Peter Kraska and his colleagues (Kraska, 1993, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997; Kraska and Paulsen, 1997) have created a cottage industry with their research on the “militarization of the police.” However, is thisresearch correct? In order to examine this question, I reviewed their art...

Peter Kraska and his colleagues (Kraska, 1993, 1996, 1997a, 1997b; Kraska and Kappeler, 1997; Kraska and Paulsen, 1997) have created a cottage industry with their research on the “militarization of the police.” However, is thisresearch correct? In order to examine this question, I reviewed their articles. Then the sources that were cited in their articles were also reviewed. In a number of cases, it was found that the articles by Kraska and his colleagues (often referred to in this analysis as “Kraska’s research” or “Kraska’s work”) misinterpreted or distorted the original source material. Kraska also conducted research in a U.S. city. Interviews were then conducted to see if Kraska’s research was correct. It often was not. Also, data was collected by the author from an ethnographic study on the topic of police socialization of part-time officers in a suburban department. This is presented in the next chapter in order to illustrate or clarify points that Kraska has left unexamined.DEFINITIONS: 1Kraska and Paulson (1997) argue that the bulk of U.S. police scholarship in the last 15 years has focused on police-community relations. However, they believethat most academics have missed a parallel development. That development is police militarization. They feel that the prime example of this is police paramilitary units (PPUs). Such units are usually referred to as Emergency Services Units, Emergency Response Teams, Tactical Response Units, or simply, SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams. We will use this last term in this study. The first question to ask in analyzing Kraska’s argument is: What is meant bythe phrase “the militarization of the police”? Kraska cites the work of Jefferson (1990), Waddington (1993), and Hills (1995) as early studies of paramilitarism in policing. The work of these three authors comes from England. However, the term “paramilitary” is used differently in England than in the United States. For example, Jefferson has used the term solely in regard to controlling large public disturbances. He has labeled this form of policing as “public order policing.” In such situations, highly mobile quasi-military units engage in “search and destroy missions” against “enemy troublemakers” and crowd ringleaders. Jefferson saw the primary function of such units to be limited to situations such as soccer riots (1990, pp. 1, 2, 16, 100, and 134). Waddington (1993) took a different tack. For him, the essence of the para-military approach is not in the police function itself. Instead, he saw it as the coordination of police officers in a military-style command-and-control structure. This reduced the possibility of officers acting in a brutal or uncontrolled manner against citizens based solely on the prejudices of each officer. Hills took yet a different approach. She argued that the willingness to use force,or even the use of specialized units, does not turn police officers into paramilitary police. Instead, “paramilitarism” for her was the “extremely tight” bond between the police and the military. However, she later confused the issue by arguing that “paramilitarism must be defined in terms of function” (1995, pp. 453, 457). Kraska had a different perception of (para)militarism. He quoted WoodrowWilson as saying: “Militarism does not consist of any army, or even the existence of a very great army. Militarism is a spirit. It is a point of view. It is a purpose. The purpose of militarism is to use armies for aggression.” Kraska then went on to list several characteristics of the militarization of police work. The most salient feature was “the subtle, yet pervasive militaristic ideology that stresses aggressiveness and the use of force as an effective problem solving tool” (1997b, pp. 298–299). Since the three English studies do not follow Kraska’s definition, it is not clearwhy he cited them. We may conclude that for Kraska, police militarism revolves around notions of “aggressiveness” and “the use of force” for “problem solving.”His perspective can be summarized by one source he cites: (Para)militarism is “all forms of socially organized physical coercion” (Kothari, R., Falk, R., Kaldor, M., Deshingkar, G. 1988, p. 23).DEFINITIONS: 2A second complication is that Kraska relied heavily upon the terms “militarism” and “paramilitarism” for his argument. However, these terms were vaguely defined. This vagueness allowed Kraska to blur the fundamental difference between military and police actions. A good example of the difference between the two is the description of the attempt to free the hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in April 1980. Delta Force, the elite counterterrorism unit of the U.S. Army, was to beflown to Desert One, a landing strip in the Iranian desert, 270 miles from Tehran. They were then to be transferred to Sea Stallion helicopters and to be flown to a hiding place 50 miles from Tehran. The following night, 75 Delta opera-tors were to be driven into Tehran to assault the embassy. The operators would scale the wall. Then a high-explosive charge was to blow a hole in the wall large enough for an 18-wheel truck to be driven through it. The troops would then assault the compound. The Delta operators had been trained to kill anyone car-rying a weapon. Therefore, all the guards were to be shot “twice, right between the eyes.” It was expected that all, or most, of the 125 Iranian “students” in the compound would also be “hosed.” One military officer commented: “We were not there to arrest anybody. We were there to kill them.” (Beckwith and Knox, 1983, pp. 16–23, 175, 272; Martin and Walcott, 1988, pp. 1–42; Emerson, 1988, pp. 12–26; see also Klein, 1995). One general simply declared: “War is death and destruction” (quoted in Summers, 1982, p. 40). This is not the function of police work.IDEOLOGYA third complication is Kraska’s ideological stance toward the police use of force. For example, Kraska has published an article on his personal experiences while conducting fieldwork among SWAT officers. Kraska explained that he felt uncomfortable doing this research because he “disdains militarism” (1996, p. 407; emphasis in the original). He explained that his research focused on the micro-analysis of coercive state power. He quoted Ferrell (1995) as saying that his research concerned “confronting and exposing the law as the machinery of centralized authority.” However, after spending time with several SWAT officers, he observed: “How could someone who had fully thought out and condemned these implications have enjoyed [so] many aspects of the experience?” (See also Ferrell, 1997.) Further, he found this experience of “a deeply embedded ideologyof violence—militarism and ... hypermasculinity” to be “addictive” (Kraska, 1996, p. 406; emphasis in the original). There are four problems with this argument. The first is that Kraska conceived ofhis research as an exposé. Therefore, he did not approach his study in a value-free manner. Value-free research is the essence of social science research. Second, he states that he opposed “centralized authority.” Does this mean thatKraska is an anarchist? Does this mean he opposed the Social Security Administration? Does this mean he opposed Eastern Kentucky University (which paid his salary)? Third, he opposed militarism and hypermasculinity. It is not clear if he opposedour “militarism” during World War II. Or did he oppose militarism against Osama bin Laden? Fourth, because police officers frequently face threats to their physical safety,being macho and physically aggressive is a necessary evil. An example of these biases occurred during his description of an informalsession on a firing range with several SWAT officers. He observed that “the high-tech shotgun ammunition entertained these military and police personnel for almost an hour. During the pyrotechnics frenzy, even I ceased to connect the technology with its use on real people” (Kraska, 1996, p. 414). Kraska’s choice of words is worth noting: Their shooting turned into a “pyrotechnics frenzy.” The implication here is that the men were also “in a frenzy.” Without any further description of the men’s behavior, this is a loaded use of language, and unfair. Later in the paragraph, Kraska noted that this “fun-filled activity ... was notbenign” (1996, p. 414). He then went on to observe that the military and police special operations subcultures “hold the sniper in especially high reverence. The subculture glorifies the skill, discipline, endurance, and mindset necessary to execute people from long distances” (1996, p. 411). His use of language is again loaded: snipers “execute” people. In the military, however, snipers “kill the enemy” (before they can kill you). In police work, snipers are often used in hostage situations. They are considered by officers to be the last line of defense. That is, if negotiations fail, then an assault or selective sniper fire may be the only way to save an innocent hostage. Later in the article, Kraska makes a striking observation. He notes that “manyof these individuals were repulsive ideologically” (1996, p. 415). However, he did enjoy the shooting session because he was “stepping out of the halls of aca-deme into unregulated, original experience.” He found this to be “exhilarating” (1996, p. 416). These quotes are quite revealing. The first implicitly indicates that anyone who routinely uses force in his occupation is “ideologically repulsive.” This is strikingly similar to a story a part-time police officer told me: “When I began my police job several years ago, I told a colleague at my school about my new career. She said: ‘Don’t tell people here about your police job. They won’t understand.’ What she was saying was that the faculty and administrators at my school wouldn’t understand why anyone really needed policemen. Because, isn’t everyone basically nice (in the suburbs)?” We may conclude that Kraska felt that policemen are ideologically repulsive because they are not “nice.” Kraska also noted his implicit excitement in being able to live for a short periodof time in an “unregulated, original experience.” To him, this was “exhilarating.” In other words, his middle-class life was not genuine. Only police work had “unregulated, original experience.”1However, if you discuss the lives ofpolicemen among themselves, they, like most people, see their lives as rather routine and ordinary. They certainly do not see their lives as “unregulated.” In fact, their behavior is constantly regulated by their sergeants and “the bosses” (see Barker, 1999). There is also the fear that the “rat squad” (internal affairs) will (inappropriately) punish or entrap them. Additionally, there is distaste for reporters by the police, because they may distort or sensationalize an officer’s actions. In fact, one officer commented: “The job of the media is to report the truth. If they can’t find it out, they’ll make it up.” Officers are also concerned that a citizen will “beef them” (lodge a complaint) to the administration, or that they will be sued for excessive use of force. In fact, one officer commented: “If you haven’t been sued in Federal court for excessive use of force, you’re just not doing your job” (“Smith, F.”, personal communication, 2000).2 An example of such regulation and its consequences occurred in Cincinnati.A white police officer shot an unarmed black man during a foot pursuit on April 7, 2001. This was the 15th black suspect that had been shot and killed by the Cincinnati police in the previous six years. The officer was indicted (and later acquitted). However, after the shooting, a riot broke out. It lasted from April 9 until April 13, 2001. Because of the riot, the police abandoned their “proactive” policing strategies. As a result, there was a six-fold increase in shootings in the city. Also, arrests and traffic stops dropped about 50 percent after the riot. The head of the police union commented that the officers had “been afraid to take enforcement action in black neighborhoods,” because they feared being labeled as racists and that they faced a “lynch-mob mentality” by the press and local politicians (Clines, 2001). A similar notion currently exists. It is called “the Ferguson effect.” It is argued that officers are “holding back” or avoiding interactions on the street in minority neighborhoods. There is no proof to substantiate this assertion. In Seattle, the shooting of a black man by a white officer in the spring of 2002led several hundred demonstrators to shut down a downtown freeway during rush hour. However, the protests abruptly ended when a mentally ill man, who was running naked in traffic, killed a white police officer. In the incident, the officer was knocked to the ground, lost his weapon, and was repeatedly shot by the man in front of 50 people. The head of the local police union observed that if the police officer had “gotten to his gun first and used it, he would have been vilified by some people for his actions.” The chief county executive, who was black, commented: “There’s no question [that] race probably had an inhibiting effect” on the white officer’s behavior. A police union official concluded: “When police officers become victims, suddenly everyone loves a cop” (Egan, 2002). In 2014, Eric Garner died after a choke hold was used on him during an arrest.The police felt that the New York City mayor, Bill de Blasio, did not support the police after this incident. In December 2014, two police officers were executed by a gunman in New York City. The gunman killed himself when the police closed in on him. The head of the police union said that the mayor had “blood on his hands” because his lack of support led to the police officers’ deaths (Celona, 2014; Newman, 2014). We may conclude that the premises of Kraska’s work are flawed. His definitions are vague and he is ideologically biased. Consequently, this does not appear to be a balanced social science analysis. Instead, his research appears to be an attack on the police.KRASKA’S RESEARCHThe heart of Kraska’s argument is drawn from a study that he and Paulsen (1997) conducted on a police department in a southeastern U.S. city of 250,000 people. The department employed 391 sworn officers. Kraska and Paulsen’s analysis was based upon participation observation, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and quantitative data analysis. The research was conducted from the early to the middle 1990s. Kraska and Paulsen found that from 1982 until 1995, the SWAT team from this city had 208 call-outs. These call-outs were for barricaded suspects, hostage situations, felony arrests, drug raids, civil disturbances, and other serious situations. Barricaded suspects and hostage situations were labeled as “reactive call-outs.” All other types of call-outs were considered to be “proactive call-outs.” Kraska and Paulsen (1997) found that from 1982 to 1985, the SWAT team per-formed “traditional” SWAT functions, such as dealing with barricaded suspects and hostage situations. During that time, it was called out 14 times. Eighty-five percent of these were reactive call-outs. From 1986 to 1989, 71 call-outs occurred. However, 74 percent of these call-outs were proactive. Of these proactive call-outs, 43 were for drug raids. From 1990 to 1993, there were 69 call-outs. Sixty-seven percent of these were proactive. In 1994 and 1995, the unit had 54 call-outs. Of these, 50 percent were proactive. The change in the unit’s functioning appears to be a direct result of the crackepidemic. The department’s chief stated that the “dopers started barricading ... and arming themselves extensively very often far better ... than the police.” Since the SWAT team had the appropriate equipment to conduct no-knock drug raids, the chief felt they could “get in without getting killed” (Kraska and Paulson, 1997, p. 260; Brewer, J., Wilford, R., Guelke, A., Hume, I., Moxon-Browne, E., 1988, p. 237). Kraska and Paulsen see this shift from reactive to proactive policing as alarming. They refer to Enloe (1980) in noting that a citizen’s freedom can be guaranteed only when the state clearly separates its military from its police. They conclude that “an eroding separation between the military and the police, whether ideolog-ical, operational, or material, should cause alarm” (1998, p. 261; emphasis added). However, Enloe’s (1980) work deals primarily with repressive Third World governments involved in insurgencies or ethnic conflicts. A better example of Kraska and Paulsen’s point could be taken from the work of Turk. Turk has argued that military and police functions are blurred where the authorities consolidate their position by instituting a system of police oppression. In such situations, internal control is maintained by “policing.” However, in such situations there is no real difference between policing and military oppression (1982, p. 21). Kraska’s com-plaint is that “any movement of the state toward reverting to the use of military power ... signals its eroding ability to ensure order and compliance. This is true for the military becoming law-enforcement oriented, and the police becoming more military oriented” (1993, pp. 195–196). Kraska, however, then notes that the SWAT officers he studied did not enjoytaking on military roles. Instead, what they enjoyed was the military-style training. To Kraska, such training allowed police officers to “dramatize most men’s boyhood fantasies about being a warrior” (Kraska and Paulsen, 1997, p. 262). However, Kraska and Paulsen offer no proof of this. In fact, the officers may have enjoyed the training because it enhanced their skills, or, simply, because it was fun. Kraska and Paulsen (1997) also find it alarming that 45 percent of U.S. SWATteams serving in cities with populations of 50,000 or more people have recently received training from military Special Forces personnel (see also Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). It is a further concern of theirs that many officers on SWAT teams have a military background. It is unclear why Kraska is alarmed by these two points. In the first instance, this is simply a matter of experts training individuals in particular skills. Secondly, in terms of personnel, it is a matter of choosing veterans who already possess many of the technical skills needed for a SWAT unit. Kraska and Paulsen also find it disturbing that most SWAT teams resemble military units in their dress and appearance. They quote Gibson (1994) as saying that this is essential in creating a “warrior mentality.” This mentality is used to “instill ... fear in others” (1997, p. 263; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 3–6). However, Waddington (1993) has noted that the military-style helmets, visors, shields, etc. are defensive; that is, they are used to protect the officers in riot-control situations. In discussing this military-style gear of SWAT teams, Kraska and Paulsen (1997)do not take the next step in their argument. They avoid concluding that if fear is instilled in citizens, they will be too afraid to fight with the officers. So, fear is a good thing because it reduces the chances of injuries occurring to officers or to civilians. In other words, the more the officers look like they are willing to use force, the more it will deter the actual use of violence. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993, p. 95) call this the “paradox of coercive power.” They cite Muir’s (1997) observation that the nastier one’s reputation, the less nasty one actually has to act. In this regard, officers sometimes say: “Don’t mistake my kindness for weakness.” In addition, one officer commented: “To do this job people don’t have to like you, they just have to fear you.”POLICE SUBCULTURE (OR, DISTASTEFUL WORK AND UBS CALLS)Kraska and Paulsen then go on to explore the broader reasons for police behavior. They note that “there exists ... a universal fear of being a victim of violence among regular police officers. This fear is a foundational element in the construction ... of police subculture. It acts as a unifying trait that forms deep bonds between police officers.” Because of their dangerous assignments, this fear is heightened among SWAT officers (1997, p. 263; Kraska, 1996). However, this heightened fear is counterbalanced by the mundane, boring, and unpleasant nature of routine police work. For example, Bayley has noted that... a police officer does a grubby, physical job that involves coming into close hands-on contact with people who are dirty and foul smelling, often coveredin vomit, urine, and blood. People think that police use their guns and clubs often. They don’t. But they frequently have to wrestle with people, struggle with them on the ground, push them up against walls, restrain them in the back seat of patrol cars, twist their arms behind their backs, or hold them tight to prevent violence. The work of police officers is also physically grueling. They have to work all hours of the day and night in many departments rotating from day to evening to night shifts every week or ten days. Bone tired and often perpetually jet lagged because they “swing” through different shifts, they also have to work outdoors in rain, snow, or blistering heat. (1994, p. 67)As a result of all of this, “the status of police officers is low ... because physicality,danger and sleaze contaminate the standing of the work itself. Policing taints those who do it. The only escape ... is promotion off the street” (Bayley, 1994, p. 71). An example of this was a suicide call the author observed one night. A womanhad taken Seconal and vodka in an attempt to commit suicide. However, by the time the police and paramedics had arrived, she had already vomited up the concoction. Upon their arrival, she was stable. Since this had been a legitimate suicide attempt, the paramedics decided to take the woman to the hospital. The firefighters and paramedics then began to lift the woman onto a stretcher in order to transport her to a hospital. Because she was heavy, they were having a difficult time lifting her. One of the paramedics asked one of the police officers if he could help. “Sure,” the officer replied. He reached down and helped pull the woman onto the stretcher. One of the paramedics then said: “Oh, I’m sorry. I didn’t know you weren’t wearing gloves.” “That’s okay,” the officer jauntily replied. “It was only vomit, not blood.” One way to avoid this type of situation is to be promoted to an administrative position. The other way to avoid all of this is to join a SWAT team. That is because SWAT teams do “real police work” by apprehending “real criminals.” Another complaint Kraska and Paulsen have is that officers “actually derivepleasure” from the dangers of the work of the SWAT team. One young officer explained to Kraska and Paulson that he liked the “rush” he got from the work of the SWAT team. Another SWAT officer told them that “most people ... [on the team] like that feeling of being afraid ... and yet at the same time being in control.” Another officer added that “it’s an adrenaline rush. ... You’re ... getting in on the real stuff” (1997, pp. 264–265). Kraska and Paulsen (1997) again fall back to Gibson’s work (1994) for an expla-nation for these attitudes. They cite his notion of becoming an “armed man” and “a real warrior.” However, this is an extremely superficial analysis of police behavior. A more appropriate one would be to see this in terms of police subculture. For example, Reiner has pointed out four components of police subculture. One is mission. That is, officers believe that police work is a calling—a calling to protect the weak against the predatory. Second, in their day-to-day work, officers often overlook the mundane and routine nature of police work. Instead, they see it as a game of wits and skill against “the bad guys.” The third characteristic is cynicism. That is because police work is “boring, messy, petty, trivial, and venal.” The fourth component of the subculture is the most important; it is the police officer’s addiction to adrenaline. In other words, police officers are “action junkies” (1992, pp. 111–114; see also Barker, 1999). On a day-to-day basis, most of police work is very routine. A typical eight-hourshift might consist of a family disturbance, a traffic stop, a traffic accident, assisting a motorist, a traffic stop, a loud party, a family disturbance, an intoxicated individual, a family disturbance, and a traffic stop. Also, officers tend to see the same people over and over again. One officer was asked why he did not go crazy seeing the same people making the same mistakes day after day. He replied in a slow and sing-song cadence: “It’s just the usual bull-shit.” In other words, it’s “UBS calls.”3 However, employing “police subculture” as an explanation paints the policeprofession too broadly. Broderick (1973) and Brown (1988) found four types of police role that an officer may take on. One is the “enforcer.” This role emphasizes law enforcement at all costs. The second is the “idealist.” The idealist aspires to make policing a profession. Third, the “realists” see both society and policing as a shambles. Fourth, the “optimist” derives his or her pleasure from non-criminal tasks (such as helping people in trouble). Muir found four orientations in his research on the police. Some officers were“professionals.” These officers saw the dignity as well as the tragedy of the human condition. They used proportionate force to enforce their notions of morality. Other officers were “enforcers.” They were cynical about society and were confident in their personal use of force. Another group of officers were “reciprocators.” These officers were conflicted over the necessity to use force, because they were sympathetic to the citizenry. Finally, there were “avoiders.” They were socially inept and unsure of when they could legitimately use force (1977, p. 56). In the 1990s, these descriptive typologies were replaced by statistical analyses(Ingram, Paoline, and Terrill, 2013; Paoline and Terrill, 2014, p. 19). For example, Paoline (2001; 2003) found five types of officers: “traditionalists,” “law enforcers,” “lay-lows,” “peacekeepers,” and “old-pros.” These closely resemble earlier categories. However, Paoline also found two other styles among police officers. One was officers who hated supervisors but viewed citizens favorably. He called these officers “anti-organization street cops.” The other style of officer believed in aggressively fighting street crime and disorder, even if it meant violating the civil rights of citizens. Paoline called these officers “dirty harry enforcers.” Warden (1995) synthesized this earlier work to describe five styles of policing.He found that one type of officer was the “tough-cop,” who selectively enforced the law against serious crime. These officers did this even if it brought them into conflict with citizens and supervisors. “Clean-beat crime-fighters” resembled tough cops. However, they believed in enforcing all of the laws while following police procedures. “Problem solvers” tried to help citizens rather arrest them. These officers were often seen as “soft” by other officers. “Professionals” were considered to be well rounded; that is, they treated citizens fairly and had a good relationship with their supervisors. “Avoiders” did as little work as possible and spent their time “laying low.” In 2010, Chapell and Lanza-Kaduce examined how community policingwas integrated into traditional police academy training. They found that the academy emphasized physical training, performing under stress, mastery of defensive tactics, weapons proficiency, and the use of force. Officers also learned their place in the police hierarchy. Most importantly, officers realized the need for loyalty and the reliance on their fellow officers. Community policing, however, involved problem solving, community involvement, organizational decentralization, and crime prevention. The researchers found that the paramilitary nature of the academy often conflicted with the community-policing approach. An earlier study by Walsh (1997) neatly fits our perspective on police work.Walsh saw three types of police officers. One was the “street cop,” who becomes a police officer because it is a secure job. Second were “middle class mobiles” who were attracted to the status of the job and the chance for career advance-ment. Third were “action seekers,” who were lured by the prospect of excitement. Therefore, it is likely that SWAT team members are action seekers (and formermilitary personnel) who gravitate toward SWAT work because they enjoy the “rush.” Thus, SWAT team members are only one segment of the police profession (see also Reiner, 1992; Wilson, 1968).PARAMILITARY SUBCULTUREAnother complaint by Kraska and Cubellis (1997) is that SWAT teams followed a militaristic model (see also Kraska, 1996, p. 420). They argued that this is due to the rhetoric of the war on crime over the last several decades. However, Kraska and Cubellis fail to realize that militarization was a reform imposed by police administrators around 1900 in order to establish discipline and to extricate the police “from the stink of municipal machine politics.” Police administrators used the military model in order to tie the police to three themes. The first theme was to associate the police with the heroes and victories of military campaigns. The second theme was to strike a note of moral urgency about crime. The third theme was to make the police chief analogous to a general and to remove politicians from interfering in day-to-day police operations (Klockers, 1988, p. 243). Thus, Kraska’s complaint that “the police in the U.S. have been decoupled from their traditional link to political power” is both naive and specious (1996, p. 418; see also Kraska and Cubellis, 1997, p. 613n). Kraska and Cubellis (1997) also failed to note that policing has always been aparamilitary occupation. That is, all officers wear the same uniform, they carry the same weapons, they salute, and there is a formal chain of command. One part-time officer explained: “During the day I’m a high school teacher. If the department chairman told me to dress in a certain way, since the faculty doesn’t have a dress code, I would refuse. But at the P.D. [police department], if thesergeant says to stand in the rain for six hours for no apparent reason, I’d say, ‘Sir, yes sir!’” (“Smith, F.”, personal communication, 2000). Also, Kraska and Cubellis constantly argued that SWAT teams have been“conducting operations that could be characterized as militaristic” (1997, p. 622; emphasis added). However, such operations could also be characterized as tac-tical. This is a far more neutral word, and if one switched to this word, it would, in and of itself, defeat their argument. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) also argued that the emergence of SWAT teamscoincided with the rise of “paramilitary culture” in the United States (see Sherry, 1995, p. 453). However, the emergence could also be tied to the rise of heavily armed drug dealers during the crack epidemic (Blumstein, 1995). Furthermore, it could be the result of free training and free surplus military supplies donated by the federal government to local police departments. It could simply be the product of the police “Ya’ never know” mentality. By this we mean that whenever a police officer answers a call, “Ya’ never know what you’re goin’ to find.” Since they might find heavily armed individuals, a SWAT team is merely an insurance policy for a department. For example, in New York City, it is said: “When a citizen is in trouble, he calls the cops. When a cop is in trouble, he calls the Emergency Services Unit” (their SWAT team). Kraska and Cubellis (1997) also noted that the paramilitary subculture hasa status hierarchy. This hierarchy begins with military units (i.e., special forces teams) and progresses down to local, part-time SWAT teams. This is hardlysurprising, because those with the highest technical skills (full-time special forces units) would be admired by units with fewer skills (part-time units) (see Manning, 1988, p. 33; 1977). Kraska and Cubellis also complained that “an enormous police paramilitary community has developed,” which included 10,000 members (1997, p. 622). Kraska and Cubellis did not explain what constitutes “an enormous” number of such officers. If we simplistically take the 10,000 figure (which, I assume, includes full-and part-time officers), that averages out to only about 200 paramilitary officers in each of the 50 states. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) also complained that a complex of for-profittraining, weapons, and equipment suppliers promoted “the paramilitary subculture.” This is hardly surprising in a capitalist economic system. Ifwe were surprised that gun manufacturers would promote “gun culture,” the “gun mystique,” or “paramilitary policing,” then we would be surprised that General Motors promoted “car culture,” or that DuPont promoted “better living through chemistry.” Kraska and Cubellis also observed that these paramilitary officers had a “professional organization, numerous periodicals and even their own art work” (1997, p. 622). The professional association for SWAT team members is known as the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA)4. Its magazine is The Tac-tical Edge. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) imply that such a publication is somehow sinister. However, a review of the magazine revealed that it is essentially a trade publication. That is, it is an advertising and informational publication. In this regard, it is similar to any other trade publication, such as Chilton’s Hardware Age, Restaurant Hospitality, or Adult Video News. A review of an issue of The Tactical Edge by the author a few years ago foundthat almost 45 percent of the 104 pages of the issue were advertisements. Another 17 pages were of association news. The remainder of the issue were articles. Typical titles were, “SWAT in the 21st Century,” “Critical Incident Stress,” and “Less Lethal Projectiles - Part 2.” A review of a recent (2014) issue of The Tactical Edge by the author found 31 pages of advertisements, 17 pages of association news, and 63 pages of articles. The titles of some of these articles were, “The Pull-up: An Overlooked But Important Exercise For The Tactical Officer” and “NTOA SWAT Standard User’s Manual - Part 2.” Furthermore, this publication was quite similar to other magazines that can be purchased on the newsstand, such as S.W.A.T. and Guns And Weapons For Law Enforcement.THE WAR ON DRUGSKraska and Cubellis saw the rise of tactical teams as a direct product of the war on drugs. They noted that “most of the increases in paramilitary deployments began in 1988, at the apex of drug war activity and hysteria.” Tactical units wereoften used to conduct raids on “private residences in search of drugs, guns, and ‘drug money’” (1997, p. 623). Kraska and Cubellis argued that these raids were “a crude form of investigation into drug and gun law violations.” These actionswere “not necessarily a reaction to a dangerous ... situation”; instead, the police manufactured dangerous situations (1997, pp. 626–627; emphasis added). This argument overlooked the evils of widespread drug abuse and the illegal possession of high-powered firearms. Should such situations be ignored? One can argue that some or much of the war on drugs was based on hysteria.However, it was also true that the crack epidemic was a scourge on poor, minority communities that produced an explosion of drug abuse and a dramatic rise in homicide rates. For example, the rate of juvenile homicide arrests almost doubled from about 1984 to 1994. These crimes were highly concentrated among black males. For example, in 1994, males constituted 86 percent of the arrests for vio-lence by juveniles. This was six times higher than for females. Although blacks were then only 11 percent of the population, half of all the juvenile arrests for acts of violence were of blacks. This was an arrest rate that was over five times higher than for whites (Cook and Laub, 1998). This explosion in the black homicide rate was the direct result of the introduction of crack cocaine and high-powered handguns into poor, black neighborhoods (Blumstein, 1995). It was the political consensus of the time that the crack epidemic had tobe controlled. Since many private residences that sold drugs were heavily fortified, SWAT teams were needed to gain entry into these homes. Also, Kraska and Cubellis (1997) put the phrase “drug money” in quotes. This implied that drug money did not exist. But, in fact, many high-level drug dealers were very wealthy. For example, the Arellano Felix brothers presided over a $30 billion drug trafficking empire in Mexico. They were thought to have hundreds of millions of dollars stashed away. The personal worth of the late Pablo Escobar, the Colombian drug lord, was estimated at $3.3 billion by Forbes magazine (“The Border Monsters,” 2001; Jenish, 1993; Bowden, 2001, p. 22). More recently, Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, who was the leader of theSinaloa drug cartel in Mexico, was rated by Forbes magazine as one of the rich-est men in the world. In 2012, he was believed to have a net worth of $1 billion (Estevez, 2013b).In 2001, El Chapo bribed his way out of a high-security prison in Mexico.He was free for over a decade. He was then arrested again. He was placed in the most secure prison in Mexico. In 2015, while under video surveillance, he escaped through a mile-long tunnel that opened into his cell. In 2016, he was finally recaptured. He was incarcerated in a high-security prison in Mexico. In 2017, he was extradited to a prison in New York City (Feuer and Rashbaum, 2017; Ahmed, 2017). Guzman has been accused of trafficking 1,500 to 2,000 kilograms of cocainethrough Chicago each month. He was named Chicago’s Public Enemy No. 1. The arrest of Guzman may have little practical effect on the flow of drugs into the United States. The arrest of Guzman may simply lead Ismael (El Mayo) Zambata, the second in command of the organization, to take over and continue the cartel’s functioning. If the cartel were to lose control of its trafficking networks, other drug gangs would simply take over the Sinaloa cartel’s territory and trafficking routes (Daly, 2014; Estevez, 2013a; Grillo, 2014; Thompson & Archibold, 2014; Ahmed, 2016; Keefe, 2012). Another topic Kraska and Cubellis (1997) touch upon is police reform. Thiswas also problematic for them. They found it hard to see how proactive para-military units fit into the conception of community policing. They observed that “police paramilitary teams are used as proactive patrol forces to ‘suppress’ highly politicized problems, such as guns, drugs, gangs and community disor-der in economically deprived areas” (1997, p. 623). It certainly was true that one could see law enforcement as politicized (or racist). That is, most arrests occur in poor, minority communities. The U.S. prison population has exploded by 600 percent over the last 30 years. Many of these inmates are poor, minority males. For example, in the 1970s, in Washington, D.C., 40 to 50 percent of all black males between the ages of 18 and 35 were caught in the criminal justice system. Drug violations accounted for 30 to 50 percent of all convictions. Blacks were 40 percent of all those arrested for drug violations. However, self-report surveys show that whites were three to five times as likely to use drugs as did blacks (Chambliss, 1994, p. 181). Kraska and Kappeler cited the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) of theWashington, D.C. police, as a SWAT team that oppressed inner-city blacks (1997, p. 3n). However, the RDU was not a SWAT team. Instead, it was a patrol unit that conducted undercover drug buys, vehicle stops, and warrant service in the Washington, D.C. ghetto. Other officers described the RDU officers as “Dirty Harrys” or “very serious bad-ass individuals.” In one incident, an officer said to a juvenile he had just arrested: “I should kick your little black ass right here for dealing that shit. You are a worthless little scumbag, do you realize that?” Another officer then asked: “What is your mother’s name, son? My mistake ... she is probably a whore and you are just a ghetto bastard. Am I right?” The arresting officer then concluded: “This is Southwest [Washington] and the Supreme Court has little regard for little shit like busting in on someone who just committed a crime involving drugs” (Chambliss, 1994, pp. 177–178). Such behavior has a great deal to do with poor police work and racism. However, it has little to do with SWAT teams. Although the RDU’s behavior was extreme, its roots can be found in normalpolice work. Police administrators saw the “good, hard-working people” of their community terrorized by a small group of criminals. Therefore, it was only sensible for them to target those who possessed guns and drugs. It also was the consensus in the United States that gangs were evil. They were seen as intimately involved in drug trafficking, gun running, drug abuse, and large numbers of homicides. Therefore, the public felt that they should be suppressed. In Los Angeles, for example, gang members were beaten, shot, and framed for crimes they did not commit. A reporter noted that “Angelenos of all ethnicities tacitly condone[d such] harsh measures to suppress ... gangs.” This led to “a noticeable lack of out-rage” when these abuses were exposed. A former LAPD detective, who was also a lawyer, observed that “we have a war on crime. The people want the criminals caught. The supervisors of the officers want them caught. The politicians want them caught. It’s the system.” Therefore, when abuses occurred, there was a “wink and [a] nod” (Cannon, 2000, p. 62). More generally, Kraska and Cubellis (1997) cited Christie as seeing such actionsas cleaning up the “social junk” or “social dynamite” of society (1993, pp. 64–67, 162–165). Although the police might view drug users and dealers in this light, they saw themselves as attempting to save the community. A good example of this was Operation Pressure Point. In the 1980s, the Lower East Side of Manhattan in New York City had become a huge source for drugs. It was called “the largest open-air drug market west of Tangier.” This lower-class neighborhood saw a daily influx of thousands of customers from throughout the New York metropolitan area to buy drugs. Some lines to buy drugs were a hundred persons long. Public pressure led to a police crackdown. Two hundred and fifty officers flooded into the neighborhood. Seventy-four drug locations were targeted. In 1984, before the crackdown, only 11,000 arrests for all types of crimes had occurred in the area. After Operation Pressure Point began, about 36,000 arrests a year were made. Many of these arrests of were of buyers for minor crimes. These arrests disrupted the demand side of the drug equation. Because of Operation Pressure Point, crime in the area fell by as much as two-thirds. The police felt that they had recaptured the neighborhood, block by block. A sociologist might view this as merely the displacement of the drug market to indoor locations or another neighborhood. However, to the area’s residents and to the local police commander, the operation was seen as a dramatic success (Carroll, 1989; Zimmer and Hughes, 1987; Blauner, 1985; Press and Stille, 1984; Krauss, 1996).HIGH MODERNITY OR BUREAUCRACY?Kraska and Cubellis find the “most compelling” reason for the emergence of SWAT teams is a change in the formal means of social control. They note that “street-level policing has always been individually based, discretionary, andunregulated.” They now see force being shifted to well-managed teams of officers. They view this as an attempt to rationalize the use of force (1997, p. 625). This is not true. For example, the first modern police were created in London in 1829. Before that, police functions were carried out, if at all, by individual citizens acting as sheriffs, constables, and magistrates. Also, groups of militias, posses, or yeomanry corps enforced the law. However, the role of such a corps, which was composed of small rural landowners, was very limited. They were only employed to conduct sabre charges against urban mobs (Silver, 1988). In 1829, this old system was replaced when Robert Peel created the Londonpolice. The police substituted bureaucratic authority for “personalized local, and violent forms of policing.” The aim of police reform in the early nineteenth century was “to create a formal, paid, trained, and neutral ... force that wouldact on behalf of the citizens and in the name of the state.” In so doing, it would “reduce inequities, prevent riots, and lessen the fear of crime” (Manning, 1992, p. 3). In fact, the best indicator of this rationalized bureaucratic control is that one of the most important characteristics of a SWAT team is “strict fire discipline” (Greenstone, 1995, p. 363). “Cowboys,” who act without orders, are not tolerated by SWAT teams. More broadly, Kraska and Cubellis (1997) see this militarization as part of theshift to “high-modernity.” Such modernity is characterized by standardization, routinization, and technical efficiency. This includes risk minimization, actuarial thinking, a “what works” mentality, and moral indifference (see also Feeley and Simon, 1992; Christie, 1993, pp. 162–165). However, one can view this process differently. Packer (1968) has presented twomodels of the criminal justice system: the due-process model and the crime-con-trol model. The due-process model focuses on an individual’s innocence until proven guilty. In the due-process model, a factual case must be presented in a public court and must be adjudicated by an impartial tribunal in order to prove guilt. However, the crime-control model is premised upon the repression of crime. The repression of crime prevents the breakdown of public order and the loss of personal freedom. In order to achieve this, the criminal justice system must function efficiently; that is, it must produce high rates of apprehensions and convictions. Because caseloads are large and resources are small, speed and finality are important in this process. The police believe this process cannot be cluttered with individual rights. That is because facts can be established far more quickly through interrogation than court proceedings. Therefore, in the crime-control model, justice becomes mechanical and routinized. In this bureaucratic approach, the innocent are quickly dismissed, and the guilty are expeditiously processed. Thus, the crime-control model resembles an assembly line, whereas the due-process model resembles an obstacle course (see also Feeley and Simon, 1994). Instead of seeing the change in criminal justice as an amorphous culturalshift, it can be viewed as a movement from a due-process (lawyers) model to a crime-control (police) model. However, such an argument is somewhat specious, because the vast majority of criminal defendants plead guilty and accept plea bargains for lesser charges. Therefore, the due-process model has always been more of an ideal than a real model. Alternately, one can see a shift in styles of policing. Wilson (1968) has identifiedthree styles of policing. The first is the service style. This type of policing occurs in homogeneous, middle-class communities where there is a high degree of valueconsensus. Here, the main function of the police is to control unruly teens and “outsiders.” The officers in these departments are to arrive promptly when called and to maintain high-visibility patrol. In the watchman style of policing, officers are expected to ignore the “littlestuff” but to “be tough” on serious crimes. In juvenile matters, the police warn misbehaving “kids” or take them home to their parents. For minor adult crimes, informal settlements are common. Major crimes or threats to public order pro-duce an arrest. Otherwise, the police avoid formal actions. Overall, the policefollow the path of least resistance. The officer is “to keep his nose clean” and to “not rock the boat” (Wilson, 1968). In legalistic-style departments, the administrators want high arrest and ticket-ing rates. They want this because “it is right.” They also want this because it reduces the public’s suspicion of corruption. Almost invariably, a legalistic department has recently suffered from a corruption scandal. When a new chief is hired, he or she “cleans things up” by reducing discretion and enforcing “all” the laws. That is, the chief imposes a bureaucratic structure with more centralized control and an endless number of reports of all “significant” incidents (Wilson, 1968). “High modernity” is not needed to explain recent changes in police behavior.One can see change as the reform of old-style police departments in cities once dominated by corrupt political machines. This is often the product of the civil rights movement and the rise of minorities to political power in the last 50 years. Also characteristic of “high modernity” is moral indifference and a “what-works” mentality. However, as we noted earlier, the threat of militarized force actually reduces the use of such force. Therefore, SWAT teams impose morality without using force. This is an example of a police tactic that “works.” We may conclude that much of Kraska’s arguments can be seen in a differentlight. First, SWAT teams may instill fear in people. However, this allows them to avoid using force. Second, SWAT teams draw officers who enjoy action, wish to avoid mundane police work, and like catching “real criminals.” Third, police SWAT teams were used in the 1980s and 1990s in order to save poor, minority neighborhoods from the ravages of the crack epidemic. Also, beginning in the 1970s, the public became more conservative. In other words, they were less concerned with civil liberties and became more pro-police. However, recently, the police use of force has come under severe criticism. Irrespective of this shift in public opinion, Kraska’s arguments are wrongheaded.THE REAL ISSUE: POLICE VIOLENCEFor Kraska and Cubellis, the “central policy issue” in this controversy is whether SWAT teams “constrain police violence ... or escalate it.” They note that no systematic, national data exist to answer this question (1997, p. 626).5However, each year thefederal government issues the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. (This book is now available online.) This is a compendium of data on the entire criminal justice system. From 1997 through 2001, the sourcebooks did not even mention SWAT team shootings in over 2,500 pages of tables and analysis (Maguire and Pastore, 1998; Maguire and Pastore, 1999; Pastore and Maguire, 2000; Maguire and Pastore, 2001). Interestingly, Kraska and Kapeller, themselves, point out that SWAT teamspossess “an array of ‘less than lethal’ technology.” This includes percussion gre-nades (to disorient, but not harm, individuals), CS tear gas, OC pepper spray, and non-lethal bean-bag shotgun rounds (1997, p. 3). However, they do not take the obvious inference from this that SWAT teams use “less than lethal technology” in order to avoid lethal force. When Kraska wrote his articles, there was no national data on SWAT teams.Instead, Kraska gives us two examples of the failure of SWAT teams: the siege at Waco and the shoot-out at Ruby Ridge. He has pointed out that Waco and Ruby Ridge were indications of how the paramilitary model can go wrong (Kraska and Kappeler, 1997, p. 1). However, in 1993, at Waco, the evidence indicates that the FBI did not fire into the Davidian compound. Although FBI tactics may have been inept or overly aggressive (in using tear gas), the Davidians killed themselves. In 1992, at Ruby Ridge, normal FBI rules of engagement were not followed. Consequently, one sniper fired and killed one individual. Another person and one U.S. Marshal were killed in an earlier shoot-out (Klein, 1995). If Kraska is correct, these would be the first two incidents in a long string of governmental abuses. However, that is not the case. The third standoff the FBI was involved in ended quite differently. After Waco and Ruby Ridge, the FBI revamped its policies. In 1996, they became involved in a standoff with the Freeman, an anti-government group, in Montana. The FBI negotiation strategy was “patient” and a “comparatively pacifist” approach. Also, 45 outside mediators were allowed to negotiate with the group. Eventually, the group realized its position was untenable, and they surrendered (Greenburg and Haynes, 1996). Although these first two incidents were well publicized, the data on police shoot-ings does not support Kraska’s implication that the police are killing large numbers of civilians. For example, in a comprehensive overview of the use of deadly force by the police in the United States, Geller and Scott (1992) estimated that there had been about 1,000 justifiable homicides by the police per year over the last few decades. It was also estimated that about 3,600 suspects were shot at during each year. If one considers the millions of police–citizen contacts per year, these numbers are minuscule. In fact, even the use of any physical force by officers is rare. For example, in the study by Geller and Scott (1992) of New York City patrol officers, they found that physical force was used against civilians in only one-tenth of 1 percent of all police–citizen encounters. Firearms were used in only 5 of the 1,762 incidents in which officers used physical force against civilians. In Chicago, police made 164,175 felony arrests from 1974 through 1989. During these arrests, the police shot 1,300 civilians. This is less than 1 percent of the total number of persons arrested. Also, observational studies indicate that police draw their weapons only once in every 100 police–citizen encounters. Additionally, the number of police shootings fell by one-third in Chicago from 1975 until 1995 (Geller and Scott, 1992, pp. 59–77). Geller and Scott note that in New Jersey, 502 police agencies answered8.5 million calls in 1990. The police fired their guns only 167 times in regard to these calls. In Chicago, the police dispatched units to 2,489,604 calls in 1977. In response to these calls, 90 offenders and 24 police officers were shot. That isless than .00004 percent for the shooting of offenders and about .0001 percent for the wounding of officers. In Portland, Oregon, a sample of 220 officers reported drawing their firearms a total of 4,300 times in 1991. However, only 15 officers fired their weapons in eight of the incidents. The use of firearms, however, varies widely from city to city in the United States. From 1970 to 1974, civilians in Atlanta, Georgia were killed at a rate that was 44 times that of Oklahoma City (per 100,000 residents). From 1980 to 1984, the rate of shooting of civilians by police officers in New Orleans was 52 times that of Honolulu. Also, the fatality rate varies widely from city to city. For example, 18 percent of the civilians struck by bullets in Philadelphia (from 1985 to 1988) and Baltimore (in 1991) died from their wounds. In New York City, 40 percent of the civilians shot by the police died (in 1986). However, 88 percent of suspects shot by the Milwaukee police (in 1991) died (1992, pp. 71–100). Geller and Scott also point out that the rate for civilians being hit by policegunfire is rather low. For example, 1,585 suspects were shot at by officers from 155 Michigan police departments from 1976 to 1981. The officers fired warning shots in 13 percent of these cases. When they fired at the individual, they missed in 60 percent of the incidents. Nationally, the hit rate ranges from 24 to 42 percent in the six largest cities in the United States (1992, pp. 100–105). These statistics are in sharp contrast to studies of police shootings in ThirdWorld countries. For example, Chavigny (1995) found that Jamaican police com-mitted 288 of the 808 homicides (36 percent) in the country in 1984. This rate is 15 to 20 times that of the police in large U.S. cities. In Sao Paulo, Brazil, which has about twice the population of New York City, there were almost 2,400 deaths by the police between 1982 and 1987. An additional 1,000 persons were shot non-fatally. In 2009, Cruz reported that the percentage of people abused by the police was thehighest in Argentina, El Salvador, and Bolivia. Police in these countries were most likely to victimize young males in urban areas. They also commonly victimized left-wing political activists. Based on data from the World Health Organization (WHO), Fondovila and Reyes (2014) found that homicide rates in 2011 in Latin America were the highest in the world. The regional average was 16.8 per 100,000 population. This was 19 times higher than in Oceania, 8 times higher than in Europe, and 4 times higher than in the United States and in Canada (see also Klinger, 2012). Some researchers have tried to explain this high level of homicide in LatinAmerica to the tradition of “machismo.” However, others point out that social inequality, poverty, discrimination, drug and alcohol abuse, and paramilitary activity are better explanations.6Also, in Latin America, government agents,political groups, militias, and terrorist organizations play a significant role in the number of homicides. Colombia, for example, showed a spike in homicides a year after its war on drugs began. Mexico also showed a spike in homicides after it began its own war on drugs. However, without a war on drugs, Brazil has shown a consistently high rate of homicides. Brazil had a rate of 18.45 per 100,000 population for deaths due to “legal [police] intervention.” Colombia had a rate of 16.95 per 100,000 population. Venezuela had a rate of 14.30 per 100,000 population. Honduras had a rate of 11.2 per 100,000 population. (See Chart 2-1.) Human Rights Watch (HRW) did an extensive study of police violence andpublic security in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, Brazil. They found there were 10,000 victims of “intentional homicide” in Rio and Sao Paulo in 2008. Rio’s homicide rate was 34.50 per 100,000 population. Sao Paulo was 10.76 per 100,000 population. Drug traffickers routinely resort to violence in both cities. However, police-linked militias regularly engage in violent crime. Human Rights Watch concluded that in Rio, “public security is in permanent crisis.” This is partly due to gang-related crime waves that occurred in 2006 and 2009 (2009, pp. 10–11). In 2017, prison riots by drug gangs killed over 100 inmates. Many of the victims were decapitated and mutilated (Phillips, 2017). Police corruption is also a major problem in Brazil. Military and civil policehave very low salaries. A starting military police officer makes less than a drug trafficker. Because of the low salaries and the e