Sri Lanka's Macroeconomic Crisis: Case Study PDF

t os W31827 SRI LANKA’S MACROECONOMIC CRISES...

t os W31827 SRI LANKA’S MACROECONOMIC CRISES: THE TALE OF TWIN DEFICITS1 rP Dr. Preeta George and Dr. Monika Gupta wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western yo University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveypublishing.ca. Our goal is to publish materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to [email protected]. i1v2e5y5pubs Copyright © 2023, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2023-06-20 It was baptism by fire for the newly appointed prime minister of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe, when he assumed office on May 12, 2022 after the previous prime minister, Mahindra Rajapaksa, resigned amidst op public protests.2 After taking the oath of office, Wickremesinghe found himself leading a government that was struggling to find $1 million3 to pay for the country’s import bill of essential items;4 a more pressing challenge was the $1 billion bond due in July 2022.5 President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the ex-prime minister’s brother, was forced to assign a new prime minister due to anti-government protests and sovereign debt crises. The brothers were alleged to have been tC responsible for Sri Lanka’s worst economic crisis since the country gained independence from British rule in 1948. The crisis led to double-digit inflation, skyrocketing prices (including a more than 100 per cent increase in fuel prices), multi-hour power cuts, depleting foreign exchange reserves, an acute shortage of food and medicines, a dramatic collapse in incomes, mounting government deficits, devastating government policies, record debt defaults (a first in the Asia Pacific region), and a downgraded currency rating.6 Wickremesinghe had a mammoth task on his hands. He needed a carefully crafted plan that would bring No his country out of this devastating state. The substantive question was what this plan exactly would entail. OVERVIEW OF SRI LANKA Situated in the Asia Pacific region, Sri Lanka was a founding country of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).7 An island country in the northern part of the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, was sometimes referred to as the pearl of the Indian Ocean due to its rich biodiversity, stunning natural beauty, and large plantations that enabled exports of cinnamon and tea.8 Its Do world-famous tea had made the country the world’s second largest tea exporter.9 Enriched with natural resources, Sri Lanka had always been a centre of trade since its geopolitical situation and modern ports made the island a strategic trade country. It was also a major travel destination and boasted of many popular tourist attractions.10 This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 2 W31827 t In 2020, Sri Lanka was a lower-middle-income country with a population of 21.91 million.11 It enjoyed the os coveted status of having the second-highest per capita income in terms of purchasing power parity in the South Asian region.12 Human development in Sri Lanka was high when compared with its neighbouring countries. With a Human Development Index of 0.782 in 2019, it ranked the highest among countries in South Asia, especially with regards to health and education.13 The service sector made up around 60 per cent of Sri Lanka’s gross domestic product (GDP), with agriculture at 8.4 per cent and the manufacturing rP and industrial sectors at around 30 per cent combined.14 Almost all Sri Lankan households had access to electricity, and 93 per cent of residents had access to safe drinking water.15 Sri Lanka’s economic situation was worsened by trade and travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in March 2020.16 yo ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SRI LANKA Government Protectionist Policies: After Independence to 1969 Sri Lanka’s 1948 independence from Britain was peaceful compared to the situation on the Indian subcontinent. After independence, Sri Lanka adopted inward-oriented policies and had an average 3.5 per cent GDP growth rate.17 Compared to many of its South Asian peers, Sri Lanka had an economic head start after gaining its freedom. The agricultural sector played a significant role in the economy, particularly the plantation op sector.18 During this period, Sri Lanka was considered a pioneer in tea, rubber, and coconut exports,19 and these exports contributed towards maintaining a good foreign exchange reserve. This enabled the adoption of a liberal trade policy and was sufficient to fuel the growth at the country’s initial stages of development.20 Socialist Industrialization Policies: 1970–1977 tC Sri Lanka had traditionally followed protectionist and socialist policies.21 The 1970–1977 period was characterized by enhanced state control and a socialist industrialization policy, along with the adoption of import substitution measures.22 These were a result of a structural balance of payment difficulties, given the country’s dependence on importing food fuel (see Exhibit 1) along with the country’s lack of export competitiveness23—Sri Lanka’s structure of exports had remained static for years. Agricultural products (including textiles and especially tea), garments, and rubber products had constituted a major component No of its exports for decades (see Exhibit 2), and food items made up approximately 27 per cent of its total exports during this time.24 The inability to diversify its exports and its protectionist policies remained key factors that led to weakness in trade competitiveness and adverse terms of trade conditions. External shocks caused by the first oil crisis also hit the Sri Lankan economy badly, leading to low levels of employment, low income, and a low savings cycle.25 These had a significant impact on the country’s economy, with domestic savings falling short of its investment (see Exhibit 3). Structural Change and Liberalization Era: 1977–1987 Do Liberalization was initiated in the period between 1977 and 198726 and saw a slate of reforms aimed at reducing tariffs and removing quantitative restrictions. There were export facilitation measures relating to attracting foreign direct investment, the formation of free trade zone schemes, the elimination of multiple exchange rates, and the devaluation of the currency.27 During this period, there was also a reduction in the role of the public sector and its participation in the overall economy. There were, however, limitations in the implementation of these measures, and a second round of liberalization measures was required at the later period.28 This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 3 W31827 t Continued low savings made the government rely on foreign sources of savings and debt. Sri Lanka had os the highest external debt stocks as a share of its gross national income in the South Asian region (see Exhibit 4). In 1980, the country’s budget deficit amounted to 19 per cent of its very high GDP.29 An increased budget deficit and continuous reliance on the external sector for both imports and capital inflow led to the depletion of foreign exchange reserves (see Exhibit 5). Foreign exchange pressure and assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required various structural changes leading to the new era of rP liberalization in 1988.30 New Era of Liberalization: 1988–2000 Though liberalization reforms had already taken place, they were not able to transmit to growth and led to a subdued GDP growth of 4 to 6 per cent throughout this period (see Exhibit 6). Inconsistencies in policy yo implementation and delays in reforms led to an unfavourable environment for domestic and foreign investors.31 This era started with political conflicts and drought and ended with high growth in the late 1990s due to another round of reforms and liberalization.32 These included the abolition of all textile tariffs, a streamlining of tariffs to a three-band structure, and the privatization of telecommunications and large plantations.33 These measures, however, could not fully meet their objectives and fiscal pressures arising from the ongoing civil war led to a loss in momentum. op Fiscal Pressure and the End of Civil War: 2001–2009 The civil war and terrorism that had prevailed for about three decades finally ended in 2009. However, this war and the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 were responsible for massive public expenditure which caused the country’s fiscal position to be reversed, with the budget deficit reaching 10 per cent of GDP.34 Inflation reached 15.6 per cent, total debt mounted, saving and investment decreased, tourism receipts and tC remittances fell, and economic growth took a backseat.35 Post-War Restructure and Reforms: 2010–2018 Another big structural change took place after the liberalization policies the country had adopted early in the first decade of the 2000s. Government expenditure and the flourishing tourism sector (see Exhibit 7) created a multiplier effect that led to 8 per cent economic growth for the first time. 36 From 2010 onwards, No infrastructure was scaled up as a part of the country’s post-war reforms. This period also witnessed a drive to revive the SME sector. Following these stages of growth, there was a gradual transition from an agrarian economy to an industry-driven economy to, finally, a service-based economy.37 Recovery also saw an increase in individual income and pent-up demand. However, there were supply-side bottlenecks in meeting this demand, which resulted in an increase in prices and a shortage of basic commodities. In the aftermath of war, “stop-go” macroeconomic policies led to high volatility in economic growth.38 However, to feed the pent-up demand and economic growth, the country remained heavily dependent on imports, which created high import bills and persistent current account deficits.39 Do POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF SRI LANKA In 2022, Sri Lanka’s former prime minister and the 76-year-old patriarch of the Rajapaksa family, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had been at the helm of Sri Lankan politics for two decades.40 Six members of the Rajapaksa family also held prominent government positions and had control over 70 per cent of the country’s budget.41 This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 4 W31827 t They lived luxurious lives even when poverty gripped the country during the onset of the COVID-19 os pandemic. The Rajapaksa family was alleged to have amassed a fortune, and, in many instances, members of the family faced major charges of corruption. Mahinda’s youngest brother, Yoshitha, and his eldest son, Namal, were accused of money laundering and having much of the money stashed in bank accounts in Dubai, Seychelles, and St. Martin. It was alleged that Chamal Rajapaksa, the speaker of parliament and another member of the Rajapaksa family, used his office to sign a deal with Airbus to purchase a fleet of rP A350 jets.42 During a probe in a UK court, Airbus admitted to bribery in this deal. In 2021, a consortium of journalists revealed that, as outlined in the Pandora Papers, the president’s niece, Nirupama Rajapaksa, and her husband had used shell companies to siphon off more than $18 million to tax havens.43 The Rajapaksas belonged to a rural district called Hambantota that was situated on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, and the 39-member clan had ruled Sri Lanka for decades. Mahinda’s younger brother, Gotabaya, joined the army in 1971, and Mahinda became a member of the parliament like his father.44 Gotabaya played yo a prominent role in military offensives against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) during the civil war. Gotabaya was the defence secretary during this time, and Mahinda had been president since 2005. Gotabaya escaped a suicide bombing attack by the LTTE45 in 2006; this incident was instrumental in strengthening the Rajapaksas’ political power as they fought the Tamil Tigers and ultimately emerged victorious. The war ended in 2009 amidst bombing in populated areas that led to civilian casualties. There were also charges of atrocities against suspected militants, journalists, and others who were thought to be insurgents. There were allegations against the Rajapaksas from human rights activists, and the Sri Lankan military was accused of war crimes.46 op The focus of the post-war period was not on reconstruction but on heavy infrastructure spending on roads and ports, as well as a land reclamation project in Colombo for a financial hub.47 A Chinese-funded port in the Rajapaksas’ home district of Hambantota drew much attention. During this period, there was an economic boom due to these infrastructure investments as well as a large inflow of tourists. Decisions to undertake most of these infrastructure projects were based on resulting commissions and kickbacks and not tC on residents’ welfare or potential for profitability. Hence, these investments did not generate a return. The Rajapaksas returned to power in 2019. By then, Sri Lanka was already showing signs of a brewing crisis, and the Rajapaksas further fueled the crisis through heavy tax cuts and regular unproductive spending.48 SRI LANKA’S CURRENT DEBT CRISES No As prime minister, Wickremesinghe was handed an economy on the brink of collapse; he took the reins at a time when the country was facing catastrophic suffering and devastation. Sri Lanka in May 2022 saw parents going without eating so that their children would have enough to eat, patients with serious medical conditions being deprived of lifesaving medicines, people spending days on the streets waiting in queues for cooking fuel, and armed soldiers and security forces waiting in the streets to quell any growing unrest.49 Wickremesinghe surveyed these obvious indicators of crisis as he pondered the best corrective action. Sri Lanka had a debt-ridden economy with a high debt-to-GDP ratio (see Exhibit 8) that was the result of poor government policies and a few external shocks. The start of the COVID-19 pandemic and the escalation of the Russo- Do Ukrainian War in 2022 had made the crisis worse. A ban on fertilizers adversely impacted the production and export of agricultural products.50 The cumulative effect of these events was catastrophic for the country. Sri Lanka’s growth story was led by its service sector, which comprised a larger per cent of Sri Lanka’s GDP contribution than any other South Asian country. High growth of the tourism and transport sectors had led to its dominant share in the export basket (see Exhibit 9). This had led to a change in the structure This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 5 W31827 t of the country’s GDP from 45 per cent agriculture and 36 per cent service sector in 1950 to 8 per cent os agriculture and 63 per cent service sector in 2019.51 The small-scale, informal sector also grew in importance, and Sri Lanka’s workforce participation played a prominent role in its economic growth. Working-age people comprised 65 per cent of the country’s population, and women made up nearly half of those employed in the service sector.52 Sri Lanka also enjoyed the status of having the highest Human Capital Index among South Asian countries. rP The COVID-19 pandemic hit the service sector hard and shattered the Sri Lankan economy. By March 2022, the state-owned Sri Lankan airlines were reporting losses of Rs. 372 million.53 During the COVID- 19 pandemic, the Sri Lankan government estimated that its transportation sector was operating at 14 per cent of the capacity it utilized before the pandemic began. Tourism was estimated to be just half of what it was in early 2020.54 However, some sectors were resilient and performed better than others. By March 2022, the telecom sector had experienced growth of more than 32 per cent, the IT sector 20 per cent, and yo the financial services sector 28 per cent.55 Due to the many economic transitions, challenges, and reforms of this period, economic growth was volatile and Sri Lanka’s economy was not resilient enough to cope. From independence until the early 21st century, Sri Lanka had faced a continuous high budget deficit of around 8 per cent of its GDP,56 with a large gap between primary and budget deficit (see Exhibit 10). Sri Lanka tried to control its budget deficits through its Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act in 2003, which was similar to what some of its neighbouring countries were doing.57 However, these fiscal rules were ultimately not enforced and were ineffective in op meeting the budget targets defined under the act.58 In April 2022, the IMF warned that Sri Lanka would face challenges related to the increase in its domestic and foreign public debt to unsustainable levels (see Exhibit 11), low international reserves, and persistently large financing needs projected for the coming years.59 Though twin deficits had existed for decades (see Exhibit 12), the mounting fiscal deficit and a large current account deficit had put the country’s economy tC into a difficult situation. When Wickremesinghe analyzed the triggers for these poor economic circumstances, it was no hidden truth that the most significant was the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic had set back the country’s already slowing and foreign-debt-ridden economy and sparked the current economic crisis. It had also caused a plummet in exports, a negative growth of 3.6 per cent in 2020, and a rise in unemployment levels, which resulted in a large number of Sri Lankans entering poverty almost all at once.60 The depletion of foreign No exchange reserves and high government debt impacted the business sentiment not only for domestic investors, but also for foreign investors, which exacerbated the situation. Half of Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves dwindled between February 2020 and February 2021;61 by November 2021, the reserves were at $1 billion, with an import cover of less than a month at that time.62 It was like adding fuel to the fire when the government announced a controversial policy banning the import and use of chemical fertilizers for agriculture.63 This impacted crop cultivation and led to a 30 per cent shortage of food and fuel and a subsequent rise in the price of both.64 The escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022 further ignited the food and energy crisis with Do the supply chain bottlenecks it created. By this time, Sri Lanka’s economy was already facing year-on-year inflation of 17.5 per cent (see Exhibit 13), with food inflation itself at 24.7 per cent.65 Food and fuel formed about 30 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total merchandise imports, representing heavy external dependence (see Exhibit 1). With low foreign exchange availability and a rapidly depreciating currency, the situation soon got out of control. In mid-April 2022, the government raised fuel prices by 33 per cent and rationed supplies This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 6 W31827 t of fuel and electricity. Despite these measures, towards the end of April 2022 there was only enough fuel os available to last until month end.66 The 2022 escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War also had a detrimental impact on Sri Lanka’s tea exports to Russia and the number of Russian tourists visiting the country. Even before the 2022 escalation, Sri Lanka’s trade deficit had increased from 6 per cent in 2020 to 8.1 per cent in 2021.67 Compared to its South rP Asian peers, Sri Lanka’s dependence on remittances had been consistently high (see Exhibit 14); however, there was a decline in remittances of 22.7 per cent in 2021. During this same period, tourism receipts decreased by 61.7 per cent.68 As a result, the current account deficit had already increased to 3.8 per cent of Sri Lanka’s GDP in 2021.69 The war escalation aggravated the situation, and Sri Lanka’s currency fell more than 37 per cent by April 2022, making it the worst-performing currency in the world.70 Sri Lanka’s public debt had risen from 91 per cent of its GDP in 2018 to 119 per cent in 2021.71 Missed yo interest payments on two $1.25 billion international sovereign bonds that were scheduled for mid-May 2022 were expected to trigger a downgrade of Sri Lanka’s foreign currency ratings to “selective default” by S&P,72 which in itself would potentially lead to a string of defaults.73 According to the World Bank, Sri Lanka’s total long-term debt stood at $45 billion in February 2022, of which $7 billion in interest and principal was due to be paid in 2022.74 Dollar-denominated bonds totaled $15 billion and traded at nearly half their value (see Exhibit 15). About one-third of the country’s debt was owed to international bondholders.75 Sri Lanka’s creditors also included countries such as India and China. Sri Lanka had started borrowing from China in 2000, and these loans were said to have had a significant bearing on its debt op problem. Though some estimates showed that Chinese loans accounted for only 10 to 15 per cent of Sri Lanka’s total debt, these loans were expensive and had been used to finance non-revenue yielding projects like the Hambantota International Port, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, and the Lotus Tower in Colombo.76 The Chinese-funded port in Hambantota, the former prime minister Rajapaksa’s home district, was ultimately handed back to the Chinese on a 99-year lease.77 tC Sri Lanka’s net international investment position (NIIP) reflected a large composition of loans rather than foreign investment (see Exhibit 16). Sri Lanka’s tryst with the global sovereign bond markets began in 2009 when it embarked on the arduous path of reconstruction and infrastructure-led growth after the civil war. Since then, Sri Lanka had extravagantly borrowed billions from the West as well as from China, Japan, and India (see Exhibit 17). Nonetheless, the country had never defaulted until now78 and had earned the reputation of being a disciplined borrower —this was about to change quickly. The imminent 2022 default was a consequence of large income tax and value-added tax cuts by the then-new government in 2019, No which fostered a high fiscal deficit and unsustainable government debt.79 The reduction in tax revenues coincided with a fall in non-resident remittances and a widening trade deficit sparked by falling exports80 (see Exhibit 18). All of this impacted the current account deficit as well. Rating agencies were quick to downgrade Sri Lankan bonds to junk status, thus ousting the country from the international debt market and making it almost impossible for the country to honour its debt.81 Given the profile of its outstanding debt and the country’s economic condition, a default seemed inevitable. Since April 2022, Sri Lanka had stopped payments on its government debt, thereby lowering the face value of its bonds even further and widening the gap between interest and growth rates 82 (see Exhibit 19). The Do world came to the country’s aid. Sri Lanka obtained assistance from the IMF; although this came with conditions such as hikes in the interest rate and taxes as well as other austerity measures, the assistance acted as emergency loans that enabled the country to pay off its debts and avoid defaults.83 A group of seven economic powers (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US) also pledged to provide support. India sent fertilizers and fuel and committed to providing the country with loans for debt relief and This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 7 W31827 t imports.84 There was also further support pending from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), os which was comprised of the US, Japan, India, and Australia.85 While these soft loans would help the country in the near term, some tough measures needed to be implemented if the country was to overcome its current crisis and sustain itself in the long term. rP THE WAY FORWARD The newly appointed prime minister’s announcement of a collaborative approach in dealing with the crisis pointed toward light at the end of the tunnel. Wickremesinghe’s plan was to form a national assembly with representatives from across all political parties to develop an action plan. “This will enable us to discuss with all parties and to arrive at decisions for short-, medium-, and long-term action plans that will enable yo us to rebuild our nation within a specified time frame. We have planned to present a new alternative budget to the development budget proposed for 2022. Intend to present it as a concessionary budget,” he stated.86 There were no easy solutions to revive Sri Lanka’s sinking economy. Short-term measures such as price controls, restrictions on capital outflows and imports, and reductions in government spending were only temporary quick fixes. These measures also had the risk of putting the economy on the back foot once again with its supply-and-demand-side implications. op How would the new prime minister draw up a restructuring plan to calm investors and, at the same time, conquer the repercussions of Sri Lanka’s mistakes and inefficiencies that had built up over the years? tC No Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 8 W31827 t EXHIBIT 1: FOOD AND FUEL IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MERCHANDISE IMPORTS os 40 Fuel imports (% of merchandise imports) Food imports (% of merchandise imports) 35 rP 30 25 20 15 yo 10 5 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 2021 op Source: Created by case authors using data from International Monetary Fund, “IMF Data Access to Macroeconomic and Financial Data,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://data.imf.org/?sk=85b51b5a-b74f-473a-be16-49f1786949b3. EXHIBIT 2: EXPORT COMPOSITION, 1995–2019 (US$ BILLION) 20.00 tC 18.00 Textiles Agriculture Stone Minerals 16.00 Metals Chemicals Vehicles Machinery 14.00 Electronics Services 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 No 4.00 2.00 0.00 Source: Created by case authors using data from The Growth Lab at Harvard University, “Sri Lanka: Export Basket 1995-2019”, The Do Atlas of Economic Complexity, accessed May 30, 2022, https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore/stack?country=128&year=2019&query Level=location&startYear=1995&productClass=HS&product=undefined&target=Product&partner=undefined. This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 9 W31827 t EXHIBIT 3: SAVING AND INVESTMENT GAP os 35 Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 30 25 20 rP 15 10 5 0 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 yo Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. EXHIBIT 4: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT STOCKS OF MAJOR SOUTH ASIAN NATIONS, 1976–2020 op 80 External Debt Stocks (% of Gross National Income) 70 60 50 tC 40 30 20 10 0 No Sri Lanka India Bangladesh Pakistan Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 10 W31827 t EXHIBIT 5: GROSS OFFICIAL RESERVES AND RESERVE ADEQUACY, 2014–2021 (US$ BILLION) os rP yo op Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “External Sector Performance–December 2021,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/pr/press_20220211_external_sector_performance_202 1_december_e.pdf. tC EXHIBIT 6: SRI LANKA’S ANNUAL GDP GROWTH RATE, 1975–2021 10 GDP Growth Rate (Annual %) 8 6 No 4 2 0 -2 -4 Do Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 11 W31827 t EXHIBIT 7: ROLE OF TOURISM IN TOTAL EXPORT BASKET, 1995–2020 os 30 International Tourism, Receipts (% of Total Exports) 25 rP 20 15 10 yo 5 0 Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. op EXHIBIT 8: DEBT-TO-GDP RATIO, 1954–2020 120 Debt-to-GDP Ratio (% of GDP) 100 tC 80 60 40 20 0 No 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 Note: 2021 data is provisional. Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: Fiscal Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/fiscal-sector. Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 12 W31827 t EXHIBIT 9: TRADE FLOW—EXPORT BASKET, 2019 os Other 12% rP Chemicals Services 6% 39% Travel and tourism - 18.87 Transport - 12.24 Information and Agriculture Communication 15% Technology, insurance and yo finance -7.99 Textiles 28% op Services Textiles Agriculture Chemicals Other Source: Created by case authors using data from The Growth Lab at Harvard University, “Sri Lanka: Export Basket 2019,” The Atlas of Economic Complexity, accessed March 15, 2023, https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore?country=128&queryLevel=location& product=undefined&year=2019&productClass=HS&target=Product&partner=undefined&startYear=undefined. tC EXHIBIT 10: PRIMARY DEFICIT AND BUDGET DEFICIT, 1990–2021 2 0 -2 No -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 2010 2013 2016 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2014 2015 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Do Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Primary balance (% of GDP) Note: 2021 data is provisional. Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: Fiscal Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/fiscal-sector. This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 13 W31827 t EXHIBIT 11: HISTORICAL TREND IN SRI LANKAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S OUTSTANDING os DEBT Domestic and Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP 120 Domestic debt Foreign debt Total debt rP 100 80 60 yo 40 20 0 1975 2007 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 op Note: 2021 data is provisional. Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: Fiscal Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/fiscal-sector. EXHIBIT 12: TWIN DEFICITS tC 0.00 -2.00 -4.00 -6.00 No -8.00 -10.00 -12.00 -14.00 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Current account balance (% of GDP) Fiscal balance (% of GDP) Do Note: 2021 data is provisional. Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: External Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/external-sector; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: Fiscal Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/fiscal-sector. This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 14 W31827 t EXHIBIT 13: INFLATION RATE os 22 17 rP 12 7 2 yo 1997 2014 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 -3 Consumer prices (% of change) Source: Created by case authors using data from International Monetary Fund, “IMF Data Access to Macroeconomic and Financial Data,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://data.imf.org/?sk=85b51b5a-b74f-473a-be16-49f1786949b3. op EXHIBIT 14: REMITTANCE INFLOW IN MAJOR SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, 1976–2020 12 Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) 10 tC 8 6 4 2 No 0 Sri Lanka India Bangladesh Pakistan Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 15 W31827 t EXHIBIT 15: FACE VALUE OF SRI LANKAN TREASURY BONDS ($US) os 3,500 3,000 rP 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 yo - 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: Fiscal Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/fiscal-sector. op EXHIBIT 16: NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION OF SRI LANKA ($US MILLION) As of March 31, 2022 Item Assets Liabilities Direct investments 1,525 14,288 tC Portfolio investment 0.1 6,261 Currency and deposits 1,385 6,375 Loans 28,729 Trade credits and advances 1,278 1,774 Other accounts receivable/payable 1,956 1,301 No Special drawing rights 1,314 Reserve assets 1,917 Total assets / liabilities 8,061 60,042 Total assets minus liabilities -51,981 Note: Data is based on monthly average of exchange rate. Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: External Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/external-sector. Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 16 W31827 t EXHIBIT 17: SRI LANKA’S FOREIGN DEBT IN 2020: MAJOR LENDER COUNTRIES AND os MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS Value of Debt Percentage Agency (LKR Million) Contributed Multilateral rP Asian Development Bank (ADB) 8,65,457 13% International Development Association (IDA) 5,93,238 9% International Fund for Agricultural Development 32,153 0% (IFAD) Other 1,10,634 2% Total Multilateral 16,01,482 23% Bilateral yo Japan 6,59,260 10% India 1,46,530 2% China 1,24,665 2% Other 2,32,518 3% Total Bilateral 11,62,973 17% Financial Markets op International Sovereign Bond 26,19,035 38% Export-Import Bank of China 5,28,403 8% Foreign Currency Term Financing Facilities 2,79,612 4% Other 6,83,131 10% Total Financial Markets 41,10,181 60% tC Total Debt 68,74,636 100% Note: LKR = Sri Lankan Rupee. Source: Created by case authors using data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Tables: Fiscal Sector,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/statistics/statistical-tables/fiscal-sector. No Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 17 W31827 t EXHIBIT 18: TRENDS IN MERCHANDISE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1960–2020 os Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 90 Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 80 Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 70 rP 60 50 40 30 20 yo 10 0 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. op EXHIBIT 19: GROWTH AND INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL, 2001–2019 11 tC 8 5 2 -1 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 No -4 -7 -10 GDP growth (annual %) Real interest rate (%) Source: Created by case authors using data from World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed May 23, 2022, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators. Do This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 18 W31827 t ENDNOTES os 1 This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this case are not necessarily those of the government of Sri Lanka or any of its employees. 2 Benjamin Parkin, “Crisis-Hit Sri Lanka Braces for Debt Default as Dollars Run Out,” Financial Times, May 17, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/89dea1c0-0b01-42c5-82ce-e27ac3eb410d. 3 All currency amounts are in US$ unless otherwise specified. 4 Parkin, “Crisis-Hit Sri Lanka.” rP 5 Benjamin Parkin, “Sri Lanka Forced into IMF U-Turn after Financial Crisis Sparks Protests,” Financial Times, March 17, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/c898054d-e76b-4c2e-985b-01418cf04109 6 Surojit Gupta, “How Lanka Became a Cautionary Tale about Faulty Economics,” Times of India, April 2, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/how-lanka-became-a-cautionary-tale-about-faulty-economics/articleshow/ 90604973.cms; “The World Bank in Sri Lanka: Overview,” World Bank, n.d., accessed June 6, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/overview. 7 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed in 1985 for regional cooperation and economic integration among South Asian nations. Sri Lanka was a founding member of SAARC, and there were eight member countries in 2022. “About SAARC,” South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, July 12, 2020, accessed February 16, 2023, https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/about-saarc/about-saarc. yo 8 United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, “Country Profile: Sri Lanka,” United Nations, November 20, 1997, https://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/lanka-cp.htm. 9 United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, “Country Profile—Sri Lanka.” 10 “The World Factbook: Sri Lanka,” Central Intelligence Agency, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sri-lanka/. 11 World Bank, “World Bank Open Data: Data Bank,” World Development Indicators, accessed May 23, 2022. 12 Premachandra Athukorala and Sisira Jayasuriya, Macroeconomic “Policies, Crises, and Growth in Sri Lanka, 1969-90,” The World Bank, August 31, 1994, https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-2297-4. 13 United Nations Development Programme, “The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene Briefing Note for Countries on the 2020 Human Development Report—Sri Lanka,” United Nations, accessed June 13, 2022, https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/LKA.pdf. op 14 United Nations Development Programme, “The Next Frontier.” 15 World Bank Group. 2022. “Macro Poverty Outlook.” World Bank Group. 16 Gordon, Nicholas. 2022. “How COVID and a nationwide pivot to organic farming pushed Sri Lanka’s economy to the brink of collapse.” Fortune. April 9, 2022. https://fortune.com/2022/04/09/sri-lanka-debt-crisis-inflation-rajapaksa-protest-imf-ukraine/. 17 Athukorala and Jayasuriya, “Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Growth.” 18 Athukorala and Jayasuriya, “Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Growth.” 19 International Monetary Fund, “Sri Lanka: Selected Issues,” IMF Country Report no. 18/176, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/06/19/Sri-Lanka-Selected-Issues-45998. Athukorala and Jayasuriya, “Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Growth.” tC 20 21 Athukorala and Jayasuriya, “Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Growth.” 22 Athukorala and Jayasuriya, “Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Growth.” 23 Dushni Weerakoon, Utsav Kumar, and Roselle Dime, “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges: A Tale of Two Deficits,” ADB South Asia Working Paper Series 63 (2019), https://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS190024-2. 24 “Press Release: External Sector Performance—March 2022,” Central Bank of Sri Lanka, May 15, 2022, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/press/press-releases/external-sector-performance. 25 P. Nandalal Weerasinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Macro-financial Developments: Issues and Challenges in Structural Transformation and Lessons from China’s Experience,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD/BRI Project/RP13, June 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/BRI-Project_RP13_en.pdf. No 26 Weerasinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Macro-financial Developments.” 27 Weerasinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Macro-financial Developments.” 28 Athukorala and Jayasuriya, “Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Growth.” 29 Kenneth De Zilwa and Shiran Illanperuma, “Debt Sustainability and Debt Management in Sri Lanka—a Reflection on the Applicability of Chinese Policy Lessons,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. UNCTAD/BRI Project/RP16, October 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/BRI-Project_RP16_en.pdf. 30 De Zilwa and Illanperuma, “Debt Sustainability and Debt Management in Sri Lanka.” 31 Sirimal Abeyratne, "Economic Roots of Political Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka,” World Economy 27, no. 8 (2004): 1295-1314. 32 Abeyratne, "Economic Roots of Political Conflict." 33 Abeyratne, "Economic Roots of Political Conflict." 34 De Zilwa and Illanperuma, “Debt Sustainability and Debt Management in Sri Lanka.” 35 Weerakoon, Kumar, and Dime, “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges.” Do 36 Aurolipsa Das and Narayan Sethi, “Effect of Foreign Direct Investment, Remittances, and Foreign Aid on Economic Growth: Evidence from Two Emerging South Asian Economies,” Journal of Public Affairs 20, no. 3 (2020): e2043. 37 International Monetary Fund, “Sri Lanka: Selected Issues,” IMF Country Report no. 18/176, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/06/19/Sri-Lanka-Selected-Issues-45998. 38 Weerasinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Macro-financial Developments.” 39 Weerasinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Macro-financial Developments.” 40 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Flight of the Rajapaksas: Sri Lankan Dynasty Faces Reckoning,” Nikkei Asia, May 23, 2022, accessed February 17, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Flight-of-the-Rajapaksas-Sri-Lankan-dynasty-faces-reckoning. 41 Macan-Markar, “Flight of the Rajapaksas.” This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860  Page 19 W31827 t os 42 Macan-Markar, “Flight of the Rajapaksas.” 43 Macan-Markar, “Flight of the Rajapaksas.” 44 Benjamin Parkin. “Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s Military-Minded Leader, Takes His Last Stand.” Financial Times. May 13, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/a271d216-ce6d-406d-a836-16bd92ea2046. 45 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers) was a militant separatist group in Sri Lanka. LTTE was demanding and fighting for an independent homeland for Hindu Tamils in northeastern Sri Lanka. “MMP: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam.” Center for International Security and Cooperation. Stanford. Stanford.Edu. Accessed June rP 13, 2022. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/liberation-tigers-tamil-elam. 46 Benjamin Parkin, “Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s Military-Minded Leader, Takes His Last Stand,” Financial Times, May 13, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/a271d216-ce6d-406d-a836-16bd92ea2046. 47 Parkin, “Gotabaya Rajapaksa.” 48 Parkin, “Gotabaya Rajapaksa.” 49 Ruth Pollard, “Economic Turmoil in Sri Lanka Is Small Preview of a Global Default Crisis,” Business Standard, May 23, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/what-is-happening-in-sri-lanka-is-small-preview-of-a-global-default-crisis- 122052300152_1.html. 50 International Monetary Fund, “Sri Lanka: 2021 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Sri Lanka,” IMF Country Report 2022/091, March 25, 2022, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/03/25/Sri- yo Lanka-2021-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-515737. 51 Annual Report of the Monetary Board to the Hon. Minister of Finance 2019, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2020, accessed March 5, 2021, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/publications/economic-and-financial-reports/annual-reports/annual-report-2019. 52 World Bank, “Population Ages 15-64 (% of Total Population) – Sri Lanka – World Development Indicators,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS?locations=LK. 53 “A Day’s Petrol Left, Power Cuts May Last 15 Hours: Lanka PM Wickremesinghe,” Business Standard, May 17, 2022, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/a-day-s-petrol-left-power-cuts-may-last-15-hours-lanka-pm-wickremesinghe- 122051700053_1.html. 54 “A Day’s Petrol Left,” Business Standard. 55 Faris Hadad-Zervos and Hans Timmer, “From Crisis to Inclusive Economic Growth in Sri Lanka,” World Bank Blogs, accessed June op 13, 2022, https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/crisis-inclusive-economic-growth-sri-lanka. 56 Weerakoon, Kumar, and Dime, “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges.” 57 Weerakoon, Kumar, and Dime, “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges.” 58 Weerakoon, Kumar, and Dime, “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges.” 59 Weerakoon, Kumar, and Dime, “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Challenges.” 60 Gupta, “How Lanka Became a Cautionary Tale.” 61 Ishaan Gera, “BS Number Wise: From Bad to Worse, Tracking Sri Lanka’s Economy,” Business Standard, April 13, 2022, https://www.business- standard.com/article/specials/bs-number-wise-from-bad-to-worse-tracking-sri-lanka-s-economy-122041201344_1.html. 62 Gupta, “How Lanka Became a Cautionary Tale.” tC 63 Gupta, “How Lanka Became a Cautionary Tale.” 64 Gupta, “How Lanka Became a Cautionary Tale.” 65 “Macro Poverty Outlook,” World Bank Group, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook. 66 Benjamin Parkin and Mahendra Ratnaweera, “Sri Lankan Businesses Struggle to Remain Open as Fuel Prices Surge,” Financial Times, April 25, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/413a7878-17e9-4d8c-ae2c-193f55048d40. 67 Parkin and Ratnaweera, “Sri Lankan Businesses Struggle.” 68 Parkin and Ratnaweera, “Sri Lankan Businesses Struggle.” 69 Parkin and Ratnaweera, “Sri Lankan Businesses Struggle.” 70 Hudson Lockett, “Sri Lanka Suspends Bond Payments as ‘Last Resort,’” Financial Times, April 12, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/c06a762f-3d78-44d1-94d5-82c393dbd647. No 71 Chloe Cornish, “Sri Lanka Becomes First Asia-Pacific Country in Decades to Default on Foreign Debt,” Financial Times, May 19, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/0e02eef2-8482-4caa-9b3d-3ccda19b041a. 72 S&P Global Ratings (previously known as Standard & Poor’s) rating was the global rating of stocks and bonds published by S&P Global, one of the largest credit rating agencies in the world. 73 Chloe Cornish, “Sri Lanka Becomes First.” 74 Benjamin Parkin and Tommy Stubbington, “Sri Lanka on Brink of Sovereign Bond Default, Warn Investors,” Financial Times, February 8, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/09e1159f-9c45-4379-b862-98cb5e30a4da. 75 Benjamin Parkin, “Sri Lanka Forced into IMF U-Turn after Financial Crisis Sparks Protests,” Financial Times. March 17, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/c898054d-e76b-4c2e-985b-01418cf04109. 76 Gupta, “How Lanka Became a Cautionary Tale.” 77 Tommy Stubbington, “How Hubris and Covid Transformed Sri Lanka from ‘Donor Darling’ to Default.” Financial Times, May 25, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/14cf5157-b798-44b6-a2dd-6c5a2ff011a0. Do 78 Stubbington, “Hubris and Covid.” 79 Stubbington, “Hubris and Covid.” 80 Stubbington, “Hubris and Covid.” 81 Stubbington, “Hubris and Covid.” 82 Ayeshea Perera, “Sri Lanka: Why Is the Country in an Economic Crisis?” BBC, May 20, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- 61028138. 83 Perera, “Sri Lanka.” 84 Perera, “Sri Lanka.” 85 Pollard, “Economic Turmoil.” 86 “A Day’s Petrol Left,” Business Standard. This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rupa Sarkar, Other (University not listed) until Dec 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860