The 1986 Constitutional Commission and the 1987 Constitution (PDF)

The 1986 Constitutional Commission and the 1987 Constitution: Background, Processes, and Outputs¹ MARIA ELA L. ATIENZA, Ph.D. Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman and Co-convenor, Program on Social and Political Change, UP Center for Integrative...

The 1986 Constitutional Commission and the 1987 Constitution: Background, Processes, and Outputs¹ MARIA ELA L. ATIENZA, Ph.D. Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman and Co-convenor, Program on Social and Political Change, UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies Constitution-making is one example of a political process. In one sense, constitutional conventions are official public meetings, and part of what happens is both the formal debate and the final result. However, this perspective alone would give an incomplete account of the whole process. Conventions are not merely performances on the stages of public auditoriums. The outcomes of political conflicts, contrary to what they appear to be, do not result exclusively from rational public debate and the persuasiveness of the argument. As a former delegate of a constitutional convention observes: Like a legislature, a constitutional convention is a swirl of personal rivalries and power plays, political battles and deals, alliances and treacheries, missed meals and missed families, raging emotions, strategic plotting, tense roll calls, procedural maneuvers, surprising reversals, and lucky or unlucky breaks (Schrag 1985, 5). These are the less visible aspects of the process of constitution-making. In addition, the environment of the process or the circumstances are equally important. As Ginsburg and Huq (2016, 6) noted the following: Constitutions are (usually) written texts … that were adopted in quite varied social, political, and geopolitical circumstances. A polity can reach for the instrument of a written constitution, indeed, with a wide range of purposes in view: Constitutions can be transformative, preservative, or even revolutionary. In this study of the constitution-drafting in the Philippines in 1986, the same political and personal factors were present, although their respective weights differ due to certain peculiarities and distinctions of Philippine society and politics. The succeeding pages show the social and political environment; composition; nature, processes and overall politics; prominent lobby groups; and the resulting product of the 1986 Constitutional Commission (ConCom), i.e. the 1987 ¹ Certain sections of this essay are revised versions of parts of the author’s MA thesis in Political Science, The National Language Policy in the 1987 Constitution: The Politics of Language in Constitution-Drafting, University of the Philippines Diliman, October 1993, pp. 58–72. 3 4 AT IENZA Constitution. It is the goal of this section not only to document the context, actors, processes, issues, and dynamics that led to framing and approval of the 1987 Constitution and in the process, make people appreciate and understand better the current Constitution, but also to make readers understand that constitution-making usually is a response to pressing social concerns and historical periods. The resulting document, though imperfect, also contains the values and goals for the country that it hopes the Filipino people to achieve. The Social and Political Environment The 1986 ConCom was convened three months after the EDSA People Power. Wilfrido V. Villacorta, ConCom member who also headed the Committee on Human Resources, explained that since this peaceful upheaval was mainly an “anti-dictatorship revolution” whose main objective was the overthrow of the martial law regime, its “ideology was not basically against foreign domination nor did it champion the liberation of the lower classes, having been led by the moderate middle forces” (Villacorta 1988, 301). Of course, the 1986 upheaval was merely a crescendo of sustained protests against the dictatorship since the declaration of martial law in 1972, as ConCom members Ponciano L. Bennagen, Edmundo Garcia, and Villacorta himself highlighted (Bennagen 2018; Garcia 2018; Villacorta 1988, 301). An assessment of the 1986 People Power, even if there is debate about whether to call it a “revolution” or not, would be incomplete if only the middle forces would be given credit. At the forefront of this anti-authoritarian movement were the so-called Leftists, the Democratic Socialists, the Muslim Secessionists, and the fragmented political opposition. More mainstream groups joined this movement after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino in 1983. Bennagen (2018) added that the 1987 Constitution did not originate solely from EDSA but the struggles of people against Marcos which actually blurred the distinctions among Filipinos in terms of class, gender, etc.; those in the struggle, for Bennagen, were all Filipinos belonging to “one family.” Nevertheless, at the helm of the urban middle-class movement at EDSA were the political leaders who consistently opposed the dictatorship. And according to Villacorta, the charisma of these luminaries sat well with “the patron-client proclivities of the traditional political culture.” At EDSA, “the celebration preceded the reason for it,” and this reflects “the native optimism of the Filipinos” (Villacorta 1988, 301). When the members of the ConCom were appointed, the People Power euphoria remained (Bennagen 2018; Villacorta 1988, 302). This is the reason why people’s participation was consciously included all throughout the processes of the ConCom (Bennagen 2018; Braid 2018). There was general confidence that the deliberative body would bring about the necessary structural reforms in a much weakened Philippine society. Selection of ConCom Members and Membership Profile In April 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino announced her administration’s plans to convene the ConCom and invited the public to submit nominations. The nominees endorsed by various political groups and sectors reached a large total, though written accounts vary from about 1,500 (Quijano 1986, 1) to 2,000 (Nolledo 1987, iii). Their names were published in the major newspapers along with the individuals and organizations which endorsed them. Feedback about the backgrounds of the nominees was submitted by the public and was fed into the computers of Malacañang. In contrast with previous constitutional conventions where the members were elected, this convention was appointed with emphasis placed on sectoral rather than regional representation (Aruego 1949; Gonzales 1980, 45-46, 135; Quijano 1986; and interview with Villacorta by the author, 14 May 1993 [Atienza 1993, 62]). Some quarters have criticized the selection process of the members of the  THE 1986 CON ST ITU TION AL C OM MISS ION AND TH E 19 8 7 C ONST ITUT ION 5 Commission, but the justification given by the administration was that an election at such an early time would be very costly and would be disrupted by counter-revolutionary elements. Administration supporters also claimed that constitution-making bodies can be appointed, like the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the West German Constitutional Commission, and even the Philippines’ Malolos Congress (Villacorta 1988, 302). The first forty-four (44) appointees were announced on May 25, 1986 during the “Reunion of EDSA Heroes” held at Camp Aguinaldo. Five (5) seats were offered to the opposition party Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) founded by Ferdinand Marcos and the remaining slot was offered to the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK). Four (4) slots were eventually filled by KBL while the INK declined the lone seat offered to it. As in other representative bodies of the country, the males were overrepresented. Of the forty-eight (48) appointees, only six (6) were women, representing 12.5% out of 48 members. In contrast, there were about twelve (12) elected women delegates in the 1971 Constitutional Convention (ConCon) where all members were elected by geographic districts. It was in 1971 that women first became part of a Philippine constitutional convention. However, there were a total of 320 ConCon delegates in 1971 as opposed to the 48 in 1986, making women less than 4% of the 1971 ConCon. In terms of educational background, lawyers dominated the ConCom. Thirty-three (66.75%) were university graduates of law. Fourteen (14) of these law graduates undertook master’s, doctor’s, and post-graduate degrees or studies. One also had a theology degree and another, military training. The educational background of the non-law graduates were as follows: three (3) had bachelor’s degrees; three (3) had theology degrees; three (3) had master’s degrees (anthropology, public health and teaching, and Latin American studies); three (3) had doctor’s degrees (economics, mass communication, and political science); one (1) was still a BA Philosophy student; and two (2) had no formal degrees. In terms of occupational background, thirty-two (32) were lawyers, three (3) of them retired justices (two in the Supreme Court and one in the lower court) and one (1) retired military officer; five (5) were from the religious sector, i.e. a nun, a priest, a bishop, and two pastors; six (6) were college or university professors (of anthropology, political science, public health/nursing, mass communication, and economics); one (1) was an activist movie director; one (1) was a university student leader; one (1) was a civic leader; one (1) was a journalist; and one (1) was a peasant leader. Of the forty-eight (48), thirty (62.5%) were sectoral representatives. They represent the following sectors: the religious; the professionals; the Muslims; education; communication and media; the youth; peasants; women in the judiciary; the Zamboanga Peninsula; cultural minorities; the military; the media; the academe; labor; farmers; national business; and health workers. The average age was fifty-four (54) according to Villacorta (1988, 302). Sixteen of the Commissioners were seventy (70) years old and above, seven (7) were in their sixties (60s), twelve (12) were in their fifties (50s), ten (10) were in their forties (40s), two (2) were in their thirties (30s), and one (1) was in his twenties (20s). Twenty (41.67%) of the Commissioners held elective offices prior to their appointments to the ConCom. Nine (9) were delegates to the 1971 ConCon; nine (9) were members of the Batasang Pambansa (the Marcos era parliament); and two (2) were former senators. Prior to their last elective positions, three (3) served in both the Senate and the House of Representatives; two (2) served in the Senate; two (2) served in the House; and two (2) served in the 1971 ConCon. 6 AT IENZA In terms of geographic representation, the Tagalog areas and Luzon in general were overly represented. Twenty-seven (27 or equivalent to 56.25%) were born in Tagalog areas (Bulacan, Quezon, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Palawan, and the National Capital Region). Thirty-five (35 or 72.91%) of the delegates were from Luzon, nine (9 or 18.75%) were from the Visayas, and four (4 or 8.33%) were from Mindanao. (Malaya 1986; Constitutional Commission 1986; and interviews by the author with ConCom members Ambrosio B. Padilla, 21 July 1993, and Francisco A. Rodrigo, 1 September 1993 [Atienza 1993, 65–66]) Thus, in terms of education, profession, gender, age and geographic background, the composition of the ConCom was clearly elitist. As explained by Villacorta, “(e)ven if members were elected, it could not probably have been more broadly based, given the nature of our electoral system.” (Villacorta 1988, 302–303). However, a caveat must be added. Had popular elections to select the members of the ConCom been held in 1986, just like how the delegates in the 1934 and 1971 ConCon were selected by geographic region, most of the ConCom members would not have been selected. Many of them, though considered “elite” in terms of professions and education, can be considered non- traditional personalities who would not have the machinery to run campaigns and were not household names. What they represented were sectors that were normally not represented in elective decision-making bodies. Aside from lawyers, businessmen, politicians and landlords, the 1986 ConCom was comprised of health professionals, religious leaders, labor and peasant leaders, journalists, and university professors. This is the added dimension of the ConCom compared with previous constitution-making bodies. Overall Nature, Processes, and Major Issues The ConCom formally convened on June 2, 1986. Elected officers of the ConCom were former Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma (the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court of the Philippines) as President, former Senator Ambrosio Padilla as Vice President, and 1971 ConCon delegate Napoleon G. Rama as Floor Leader. One of the major issues that preoccupied most Commissioners from the very beginning was the form of government. Most Commissioners were prejudiced against the parliamentary system because of its association with the Marcos regime. Villacorta said that he pointed out to his fellow Commissioners that “Marcos’ form of government was a corruption of the parliamentary system;” it was an authoritarian system with a rubberstamp legislature. However, he said that most Commissioners were set on the presidential system (Villacorta 1988, 303). In the formation of the various committees, the leadership asked each of the Commissioners a list of their priority or preferred committees. Based on these lists, the leadership decided on the committee assignments, including the chairs and vice-chairs of each committee (Interview with ConCom member Jose Martin Luis C. Gascon by the author, 2 September 1993 [Atienza 1993, 66]). These committees then set out to conduct public hearings aimed at assisting them in formulating their respective proposed articles. With only forty-eight (48) members, every Commissioner was a member of 3 to 5 committees and oftentimes had to work until late at night. With a September 30 deadline and conscious of the high operational costs, the committees worked from early morning to late hours in the evening (Villacorta 1988, 304-305; Nolledo 1987, iv). Aside from the committee assignments, the Commissioners had to submit several resolutions which contained their proposed provisions for the draft constitution, work that required careful research and preparation. Most of the younger and inexperienced Commissioners hired  THE 1986 CON ST ITU TION AL C OM MISS ION AND TH E 19 8 7 C ONST ITUT ION 7 “high-powered” researchers and legal consultants who were in touch with the grassroots because of their experience in the “parliament of the streets.” These assistants developed a pool of support personnel whose expertise was shared by a loose grouping of Commissioners that came to be known as the progressive or “nationalist bloc”. These assistants of the so-called progressive bloc were the most visible and active (Villacorta 1988, 305). As pointed out earlier, the euphoria associated with People Power defined the highly consultative work of the ConCom (Bennagen 2018). Another ConCom member, Jose N. Nolledo, authored the first resolution of the Commission calling for public consultations before the Constitution could be drafted (Nolledo 1987, iii). In addition to the public hearings conducted by the committees, four (4) weekends were reserved for provincial hearings, with the “more physically fit…farmed out to the provinces in teams” (Villacorta 1988, 307). Various sectors attended the hearings, which were organized by civic organizations, the Bishops-Businessmen Conference, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), and some cause-oriented groups in coordination with local officials. Provincial hearings throughout the country reached about ninety (90) (Villacorta 1988, 307). Garcia, who chaired the Public Consultations Committee, said that they consciously went to different parts of the country and met with various sectors with conflicting interests to get the sentiments of the people. People wanted to be heard. However, Garcia also recalled that some sectors were difficult to deal with or had very strong sentiments regarding the process or on specific issues. For example, the military at that time did not like too much emphasis on human rights while Commissioners were booed by Ilocanos who were still loyal to Marcos when they came for the consultations (Garcia 2018). The call for a very strong nationalistic policy was equally strong in all these hearings. In these hearings, there was preference for a unicameral legislature. There were also evident calls for more controls in foreign investment, industrialization, genuine land reform, free high school education, curbs to military abuses, and a broader-based national language. People were divided on the United States (US) bases, though the consensus was there should be less dependence on these foreign bases and on foreign aid and loans (Villacorta 1988, 307). Constitutional conventions are significant events in the life of a polity. Such conventions are “occasions for expressing ultimate public aims and concepts of democratic government.” In theory, they reflect the aspirations of the people and their views on the use of public power to achieve their goals. Because any subject that can be addressed in legislation can be treated in a constitution, conventions also tend to be “cauldrons into which social issues of significant controversy are thrust” (Schrag 1985, 4). We can see in the Philippine case that in 1986, there were a number of very prominent concerns that united and divided the people. Ideally, the constitution must be a reflection of “the interests, needs and aspirations of the people.” But as Villacorta notes, it has been discovered in the early stages that “varying interests represented by the drafters themselves colored their perceptions of what was the common good.” As the process of deliberations progressed, it became clearer that what was to be the new Constitution of the Philippines—as in all political processes—was to be a product of compromises where there was an accommodation of the interests articulated by the framers whose worldviews or perspectives were shaped by their social backgrounds and their self-interests. The ConCom member added that as in most cases where majority of the framers “came from the establishment, the guardians of the status quo conspired to maintaining the existing arrangement of forces and resources in society” (Villacorta 1988, 299). This was despite the fact that every Commissioner was also conscious of his or her historic role in the Commission and of the public’s scrutiny (ibid.). 8 AT IENZA But in contrast with the previous constitutional conventions of the country which were mainly concerned with political issues, the 1986 ConCom occupies a prominent place in the history of Philippine constitution-making as the only period where the dynamics had been so ideologically oriented, even if most of the Commissioners themselves may be unaware of this. The “heightened consciousness of the eighties was reflected in the fiercest debates” that occurred in the session halls of the former Batasang Pambansa (now the seat of the House of Representatives) from June to October 1986 (Villacorta 1988, 300). The ideological debate was particularly evident in the heated discussions about the role of foreign investments, the future of American bases, the ban against nuclear weapons, the land reform issue, and the rights of labor. The issue was not only property rights but also the sovereignty of the Philippines as a nation (ibid.). Political science professors and ConCom members Garcia and Villacorta identified the two major groups within the Commission (Atienza 1993, 69;2 and Villacorta 1988, 307). These were: (1) the mainstream or conservative bloc, which was composed of liberals and conservatives, and (2) the smaller nationalist or progressive bloc whose number fluctuated depending on the issue. The issue of Filipinization of industries clearly polarized the body into the conservative and nationalist blocs. The major point of contention during the discussions on the national economic provisions was the extent of Filipino participation in public utilities. Because of the close relationship of public utilities to national security, the nationalist bloc proposed that there be a 100% Filipino equity in the sector. Later, the bloc was willing to compromise and concede to the 75% equity. However, “the biggest shock” came when no less than Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, Chair of the National Economy and Patrimony Committee, went against the proposal of his Committee and voted along with the conservative majority who wanted only 60% equity for Filipinos. This resulted in the walk-out of five (5) commissioners, namely Bennagen, Minda Luz Quesada, Jose E. Suarez, Jaime S.L. Tadeo, and Villacorta. However, due to the pressure of different sectors of the public, they returned after a week accompanied by former Senator Lorenzo Tañada. They decided to come back after they received appeals from the public to return because according to some concerned citizens, they had already made their point and there were many other causes which they should champion inside the Commission (Villacorta 1988, 307–308). Villacorta recounts that they were also persuaded by the more senior Tañada to return because the Commission was going to collapse, given that its credibility had been shattered by the walk-out of five of its leading members (Interview with Villacorta 1993 [Atienza 1993, 70]). Even if the rest of the Commissioners were able to come up with an extensive draft constitution, it would be defeated in the plebiscite. In turn, the revolutionary government of President Aquino would be destroyed. So, for the sake of the country, the five came back, but on one condition: “that the nationalist bloc will not be pushed around, and that the majority will not be tyrannical but would listen to our recommendations” (Interview with Villacorta 1993 [Atienza 1993, 71]). Indeed, this mood of reconciliation after the walk-out facilitated the passage of certain progressive provisions on education and social justice, such as nationalism and patriotism in education; a stronger bill of rights; free high school education; right of labor to organize; extensive coverage of land reform; adoption of Filipino as the national language; etc. However, the conservatives remained steadfast as far as what they considered to be the non-negotiables were concerned: 40% equity for investors, congressional prerogative in determining retention limits and compensatory schemes for land reform, the maintenance of English as a medium of instruction, and the retention of the ² Garcia made this comment during the author’s master’s thesis proposal defense on 16 March 1993, at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, where the former served as panel member.  THE 1986 CON ST ITU TION AL C OM MISS ION AND TH E 19 8 7 C ONST ITUT ION 9 US bases until 1991 (Villacorta 1988, 308). Clearly, the interests of multinationals, the US bases and landlords were protected. There were initial agreements that were also changed during the plenary and adjustments in related sections were not made, perhaps due to the limited time available. These may have long-lasting impacts. For instance, the ConCom originally wrote the draft charter with a unicameral legislature in mind. The committee in charge of the article on the legislature approved a unicameral assembly; however, the plenary at the ConCom voted in favor of a bicameral Congress with just a one-vote difference. This change was not reflected in some parts of the final draft of the Constitution. Retired Justice Adolfo Azcuna, who was a ConCom member, explained that they had to rewrite parts of the draft to reflect the change to a bicameral legislative body; however, the committee in charge of Article XVII (revision and amendments) “failed” to adjust their provisions to suit the bicameral nature of Congress (Gavilan 2018). Azcuna added that even with an overall review of the draft, there was really an “oversight” and the problem went unnoticed (Gavilan 2018). Thus, to this day, the 1987 Constitution is unclear on whether or not the two chambers of Congress should vote jointly or separately in introducing changes to the Constitution. Lobby Groups, Position Papers, and Letters People’s organizations, delegations of indigenous peoples, and labor and farmers’ groups “lent life and color to the otherwise somber portals of the plenary session halls” (Villacorta 1988, 305). Villacorta enumerated some of the most prominent and memorable lobby groups. First, the “right to life” lobby headed by the Opus Dei led a sustained and “aggressive” “well-oiled” machine that overshadowed the lobbying efforts of feminist organizations like Gabriela with their fiery speeches at rallies outside Batasan (Villacorta 1988, 305–306). Second, business organizations like the National Economic Protectionism Association and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry were strongly lobbying for economic nationalism during the discussions on the national economy. They were countered initially in a subtle manner by multinational corporations “which expectedly had friends in the Commission”. The multinational lobby group only came out in the open “approaching their allies in the Commission” when the provision requiring 70% Filipino equity in all advertising firms was passed. They failed to have the voting reversed (Villacorta 1988, 305). Third, another aggressive group was the Spanish lobby, a group of Spanish language teachers who constantly went to Commissioners’ offices and session halls to convince the ConCom to retain the compulsory teaching of Spanish. They even managed to get a letter of support from Cardinal Jaime Sin. They lobbied up to the end but the Committee on Human Resources was not convinced. Fourth, the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) was alarmed about the original proposal of the Committee on Human Resources to make Filipino the sole medium of instruction. Clerics came in numbers to plead with Commissioners to retain English as a medium of instruction. They succeeded, probably because of the strong Catholic profile of the ConCom. Fifth, landlords were represented by “Commissioners with big landholdings.” However, there were a number of individuals, many of them old, that identified themselves as “small landlords” who lobbied for the protection of landowners’ rights. They held big rallies outside the Batasan (Villacorta 1988, 306). Sixth, there were “waves of gradeschool children who lobbied for an anti-nuclear policy.” According to Villacorta, these children held “spine-chilling die-ins” that won over majority of Commissioners who voted for the nuclear free option (Villacorta 1988, 306). 10 AT IENZA Finally, both Villacorta and Commissioner Florangel Rosario Braid acknowledged the American presence during the whole process. Highly noticeable was the daily presence in the galleries of Mr. Richard Holmes, at that time the chief political officer of the US Embassy. There were unconfirmed reports by two Commissioners that Holmes approached them in the comfort room to request them to vote in favor of retaining the US bases. Both Braid and Villacorta, however, recall that to their knowledge, Holmes to his credit avoided giving media interviews and refused to join the Commissioners in the lounge even when he was invited by some (Villacorta 1988, 306 and Braid 2018). Aside from these major lobby groups, ConCom members received “hundreds of letters every day,” with some of them coming from Filipinos abroad, mostly from Europe and the United States, as well as extensive research materials from their own staff, government offices, and civil organizations (Nolledo 1987, iv). Approval of the Draft Charter, Campaign, and Ratification through Plebiscite One Commissioner, movie director and activist Lino Brocka, walked out and formally resigned before the completion of the draft charter. In the end, an overwhelming majority, 45 out of 47, voted in favor of the draft constitution. Former Senator Decoroso Rosales had to affix his thumbmark to the final document because he could no longer write; he passed away soon afterwards. Suarez and Tadeo, both prominent members of the nationalist/progressive bloc, were the ones who voted “no” to the draft document. The final draft was presented to President Aquino on October 15, 1986. A period of nationwide campaign followed, with the Commissioners going around the country for educational campaigns, media appearances, convocations and fora, speaking engagements, etc. to convince people to vote for the draft charter (Nolledo 1987). During the campaign, the Commissioners made sure that the draft document was translated into different languages used in the country and popularized into comics as well (Braid 2018). Nolledo noted that the 1987 Constitution was “the most widely and exhaustively discussed document in our history”, with more than twenty million copies of the draft distributed in “all nooks and corners of the Republic of the Philippines” (Nolledo 1987, iii). ConCom members, their staff and volunteers went to far-flung areas of the country; rode buses, jeepneys and tricycles; and ate with their bare hands with impoverished Filipinos. Some of them spent their own personal funds. Some Commissioners were booed by Marcos loyalists. The opposition, especially KBL, criticized the draft Constitution and campaigned against its ratification. Francisco Tatad tore to pieces a copy of the draft. Arturo Tolentino said that Commissioners should be charged with treason for allegedly giving foreigners more rights than Filipinos in the Constitution (Nolledo 1987, iv–v). A plebiscite for the draft charter’s ratification was held on February 2, 1987. More than three- fourths of all votes cast (16,622,111 or 77.04% out of 21,785,216) were for ratification; thus, the 1987 Constitution took effect. Some Concluding Observations To recap, in terms of social and political environment of the ConCom, it benefited from the wave of the EDSA spirit. The 1987 Constitution is definitely a reaction to the country’s martial law experience. As ConCom member Braid said, this reactionary nature may be criticized as a weakness but it is also its strength; it reflects people’s frustrations about the past as well as  THE 1986 CON ST ITU TION AL C OM MISS ION AND TH E 19 8 7 C ONST ITUT ION 11 aspirations for the future (Braid 2018). The themes of participatory democracy, social justice, and human rights permeate the whole document. Despite the appointive nature of the members of the ConCom and the fact that members were elites and leaders in their own respective fields, members represented sectors that would not have been represented had the selection process been open to elections by geographic districts. Despite only four months of deliberations, the processes involved numerous provincial hearings and diverse groups representing various interests were allowed to express themselves. Ideological positions divided members of the ConCom on major issues. The sovereignty of the nation became the topic of many fierce debates. The members were divided into the conservative bloc and the much smaller progressive bloc. Studying the dynamics and processes of constitution-making has exposed the role of class and vested interests as well as some elitist tendencies. Commissioners were also influenced by both visible and subtler lobby groups. However, despite criticisms, it would be wrong to say that the 1987 Constitution had no positive features. The more sectoral bias of the members as well as the consciously embedded participatory process led to very important provisions. It actually contains some innovative features that can move the country forward “if genuinely implemented” and if the provisions are defended by the people who have the political will to do so (Villacorta 1988, 308–309).This include political leaders, various agencies, and personnel of government, as well as citizens who are conscious of the principles and goals of the constitution as well as their own rights and interests. This constitution enshrined the concepts of representative democracy and separation of powers by establishing a presidential system; established independent constitutional commissions; promotes local autonomy; and restored legislative and judicial powers vis-à-vis the presidency. It aspired to prevent a repeat of the tyranny that the Philippines had lived under in the past by establishing Presidential term limits, a bicameral Congress and Congressional approval over declarations of martial law. Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution has an expanded Bill of Rights, offering protection for human and civil rights as a result of the experiences under Marcos. It has also laid the foundation for a comprehensive program for social justice and educational development. The Philippine territory is required to be both ecologically safe and free from nuclear weapons. The charter also delineated the duties of the military vis-à-vis the supreme civilian authority. People’s participation is enshrined in both national (especially in the legislature) and local levels. However, once a constitution is ratified, it is important to assess if the provisions have been implemented, put into specific laws and defended by various sectors, whether the Constitution has achieved its transformative goals, and if the provisions are still relevant to the values and culture of Filipinos as well as the changing times and challenges. The succeeding chapters represent a preliminary attempt to look at how and to what extent the 1987 Constitution has influenced some of the institutions, actors and processes of the country since its enactment. A more systematic internal and external review of the 1987 Constitution focusing on internal and external criteria, using several dimensions and a number of institutions and processes, will be covered by succeeding research and publications.