Can the United States Afford to Fight Spain? PDF

University of Northern Iowa Can the United States Afford to Fight Spain? Author(s): A Foreign Naval Officer Source: The North American Review, Vol. 164, No. 483 (Feb., 1897), pp. 209-215 Published by: University of Northern Iowa Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25150945 Accessed: 03-06-2019...

University of Northern Iowa Can the United States Afford to Fight Spain? Author(s): A Foreign Naval Officer Source: The North American Review, Vol. 164, No. 483 (Feb., 1897), pp. 209-215 Published by: University of Northern Iowa Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25150945 Accessed: 03-06-2019 22:18 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms University of Northern Iowa is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The North American Review This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CAN THE UNITED STATES AFFORD TO FIGHT SPAIN? BY A P0REIGN NAVAL OFFICER. A discussion of such a subject as this by a foreigner is liable to arouse adverse criticism, and I realize that the task is both a difficult and a delicate one. But belonging, as I do, to a nation which has been, and is, the friend of this country, my opinion is given in anything but a hostile spirit. First then, let us see, what the status quo between the United States and Spain is. There is undoubtedly a good deal of ani mosity on both sides. In the United States the existing senti ment in favor of the Cuban insurgents can be assigned to sentimentality. The mere mention of the word " oppression " acts on the American mind as a spark of fire in a tinder box. In Spain things are different, and it is to be hoped the American people will not deceive themselves in regard to the origi of the animosity* on Spain's part. Among the people of Spain the feeling?unfortunately still growing?is that the United States are disposed to meddle officiously with affairs which do not concern them. They remember President Monroe's message de fining the Monroe doctrine: "With the existing colonies or de pendencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere." The most eager Pan-American must, if he stops to think, ad mit that, from an international point of view, the United States have no grievances whatsoever against Spain. To assert that they have because a few sugar and tobacco merchants have lost money would be absurd. Surely, it is not Spain that has taken the initiative in bringing about the perplexing conditions now existing in Cuba. The wholesale devastation in the rural dis tricts of Cuba was not perpetrated by troops of the mother vol. clxiv.?-no. 483. 14 This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 210 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. country. It is not Spain that has laid waste the commerce between the United States and the island. As a matter of fact, Spain has lost materially more during the two years of revolution in Cuba than she can recover in ten years, even if she remains, as she undoubtedly will, in possession of the island. The moving spirit with the insurgent leaders is partly ambition, partly cupidity. Most of them have little to lose and everything to gain. They are doing what the members of the Commune did in Paris during the siege of that city. They fired the first shot, not thinking of the consequences, nor reckoning the result of such a course, and then they burnt, killed, and plundered. lam well aware that, as a body, they do not burn, kill, and plunder maliciously, but they are forced to such courses in order, first, to live, and, secondly, to impress the doubtful and weak ones with their power. Sympathy is one thing?law another. As matters stand at present, the responsibility for the devastation of the " Pearl of the Antilles " rests not with Spain, but with the insurgents. To quote the Hon. E. J. Phelps : " The rebels in Cuba have no organized government and not even an abiding place which they can call their own. They are merely a guerilla force, which would be speedily annihilated if it allowed itself to?be drawn into a general engagement with the much superior Spanish army. If this country interferes by arms in that contest it must be by assisting the rebels in Cuba to displace the Spanish government and to set up another. This would be a declaration of war against Spain, a country with which we are and always have been at peace, and from which we have received no injury and no provocation. It would be a gross and utterly unjustifiable violation of international law which no country can afford to perpetrate in the eyes of the world. We cannot afford to go to war with any country at this time unless a war should be forced upon us in self-defence, which would be a grave calamity, of which there is happily no danger." But though the United States have no real cause to declare war against Spain, it is interesting to speculate on what would happen if, notwithstanding all this, war should be entered upon. If, as Mr. Phelps says, " it would be an utterly unjustifiable violation of international law," all Europe might be morally forced to oppose such a course in order to uphold the sanctity of international law, if for nothing else than self-protection. Equally important is the fact that the interests of nearly all European countries are so closely entwined with the national and material welfare of the United States that a war between this This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  CAN THE UNITED STATES AFFORD TO FIGHT SPAIN 9 211 nation and Spain would cause a financial panic all the world over. Approximately the foreign interests in this country represent a capital of more than two billions of dollars. What, then, in comparison to such a sum are the one hundred million dollars which Spain owes France, the sixty millions she owes England, and the thirty-three millions she owes the United States ? The course which the official relations between this country and Spain have taken of late seem to indicate that the Administra tion is wide awake to the gravity of the situation. As I said before, with regard to Cuba, Spain strictly stands not only on the basis of international law, but also on the basis of her individual rights. There can be no doubt that if she cannot have her laws respected within the limits of her own domain in a peaceful way, she has the legitimate right to enforce them, arms in hand. It is, indeed, hard to conceive from a moral stand point, how any foreign power could prevent Spain from declaring war, provided the provocation from the United States was such as to justify such a course. By provocation I mean the unlawful fostering (the few filibustering expeditions are of no account) of the insurrection, as by the granting of belligerent rights to the insurgents. Should this happen?and let us hope it will not? Spain would be forced out of self-respect to declare war. I have now arrived at the most critical point of the situation, and shall endeavor to discuss coolly, and without prejudice, the relative strength of both powers, their relative advantages and disadvantages for attack and for defence, and therefrom to draw a conclusion as to the probable issue of a war. I need hardly say that decisive engagements between the two powers could only take place either on the high seas, or in the stretch of water between Porto Kico and Cuba, or at either of the principal ports of the two islands. The question which above all others is of the greatest importance to Americans is simply whether the United States are at present strong enough to justify them in an embroil ment, and, further, whether this country possesses the means of guarding herself against tremendous losses. What, then, are the existing conditions ? A glance at the map shows first, that Spain has a great advantage over this country so far as geographical situation and coast defences are concerned. The minion seems to prevail in the United States that in order to punish Spain, it is only necessary for the President to order This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 212 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. the American fleet to that country and to Cuba and Porto Rico, and then besiege her coast, annihilate her commerce, and dic tate whatever terms the Administration may choose. Nothing could be more erroneous than this. The coasts of Spain are accessible with difficulty, and are well fortified. On the north and northwest coast, not to speak of the terrible cliffs by which nature aids her defence, Spain has fortified such places of access as Fuenterrabia, Pasages, the military ports of San tona, Santander, Ferrol, Coruna, and Vigo. The coast of the Mediterranean is effectively protected by the fortifications of Palamos, Barcelona, Tarragona, Malaga, Almeria, Carthagena, and Alicante. At the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar she is pro tected by the guns of Cadiz, and on the strait itself by those of the fortresses of Tarifa and Algeciras. I ask, then, what opportunity the American fleet could have under such conditions to inflict injury on Spain, operating, as it would be forced to do, from a base over 3,000 miles away ? With regard to Cuba and Porto Rico matters are some what different. The United States might succeed in making an attack on a few accessible places in these two islands, but they would first have to wipe the Spanish fleet from the seas. On the other hand, as long as Spanish vessels were afloat, only a few of the twenty-seven principal ports of this country would be absolutely safe from their guns. Owing to the enormous extent of the seaboard of this country the American fleet, with only a very few auxiliary vessels available, could not possibly defend the entire coast. The above statement is supported by such a recognized authority on the subject as General Miles. He says : " The pop ulation in the United States near deep water amounts to six mill ion people living within the reach of high-power guns, mounted on battleships, and there are also ten billion dollars' worth of property in the same condition in the twenty-seven principal ports of our country." Would it not be wiser for the United States to increase their navy and artillery before clamoring for war ? The jingo will reply : " No Spanish vessels could ever come near the coast; they would be destroyed before they could reach our shores." I think I can show, however, that as far as human foresight goes, a thorough defeat of the Spanish fleet by the American fleet would be almost impossible. This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  CAN THE UNITED STATES AFFOBD TO FIGHT SPAIN? 213 All the vessels worth speaking of, which the United States could bring into action on the Atlantic at present, number twenty nine, and these figures include thepassenger steamers the "Paris," the " New York," the " St. Louis," and the " St. Paul." Only the formidable ones are given in the following list : Battleships : 1, " Iowa," 11,410 tons' displacement.42 guns 2. "Indiana," 10,288 tons ".>.46 " 8. u Massachusetts,'* 10,388 tons' displacement.42 " 4. "Maine,"6,632 " ".30 " 5. "Texas," 6,315 " ".80 " Supposed speed from 15 to 17 knots. Coast defence vessels : 6. " Puritan," 6,000 tons' displacement.22 sung 7. " Amphitrite," 3,990 " "......12 ? 8. "Terror," 3,990 " "..10 " 9. " Miantonomah," 3,390 tons ". 9 " Supposed speed from 10 to 12>? knots. Ram: 10. " Katahdin," 2,155 tons' displacement. 4 guns Supposed speed 17 knots. Armored cruisers : It. " Brooklyn," 9,271 tons' displacement.28 sunt 12. "New York,' 8,200 " ".32 " Supposed speed from 20 to 21 knots. Protected cruisers : 13. "Columbia," 7,375 tons' displacement.31 guns 14. " Minneapolis," 7,375 " ".31 " 15. "Newark," 4,098 " ". 28 " Supposed speed from 17 to 22 knots. Apart from the above named, there are a few more protected cruisers of the "Newark" type and unprotected ones of the "Mont gomery" and "Marblehead" pattern ; one torpedo destroyer, the "Ericsson," and two or three torpedo-boats. This constitutes the whole strength of the American fleet in available men-of war. Of them only two-thirds could be used for the offen sive, while the rest would have to be kept in home waters for the protection of the coast, or, in other words, for the purposes of defence. Spain, on the contrary, could muster into action on the Atlantic about forty-five vessels, including the vessels of the Spanish Trans-Atlantic Company, ten of which could be con verted without delay into efficient cruisers. A comparison between the two fleets shows that the United States fleet, though stronger in powerful battleships and guns does not, from a naval point of view, form a unit, lacking aa it does the necessary auxiliary vessels for combat, such as swift gun boats, torpedo destroyers, and torpedo-boats. In other words, the This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 214 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. composition of her escadre, according to modern rules of naval warfare, is faulty. And this is not all. It is an open secret, known to every power abroad, that there is hardly a vessel in the United States navy that carries a full complement of officers and men. A most serious weakness, indeed, in time of war! To imagine that efficient crews can abundantly be drawn from the coast population to man a modern man-of-war is preposterous. The olden times, when a sailor could be turned into a fight ing man at short notice, have passed forever. At present, it takes quite a time before even a seafaring man used to the vessels of commerce can be drilled to understand intelligently his duties on board of a modern war vessel. Indeed, I have often found it easier to make an efficient man-of-war's man out of an enthusiastic landlubber than out of a stubborn fisherman. The Spanish fleet is perfectly homogeneous. Her battleships, while by no means as powerful as the American ones, are swifter and all carry a full complement of officers and men, a complement that, thanks to her system of conscription, can be constantly kept up by drawing on her reserves. These, however, are not the only advantages Spain would have in a naval encounter with the United States. Her plan undoubtedly would be to protect Porto Rico and Cuba to the best of her ability, and wage a naval guerrilla war on the coasts of the United States, dodging all serious engagements on the high seas except when the advantages were in her favor and her risks limited. With her auxiliary vessels, numerically stronger than those of the United States, she would harass the American ships until both offi cers and crews would be exhausted by the terrible strain of vigi lance and double watches. On the other hand, the officers and crews of the Spanish fleet would by no means be called upon'to undergo such exhausting fatigue. They would always be able to find relief, whenever necessary, by falling back on their bases of operation, Porto Rico and Cuba, where they could get all the rest needed to make them efficient again. The enormous coast trade of this country would be annihilated, and some of the Spanish vessels might have a chance to bombard the seaeoast towns. The United States would have to take the offensive and try to crush the Spanish fleet in one single engagement. Whether or not this could be done it is hard to predict. As matters stand the chances are against it. Spain could hardly be expected to This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms  CAN THE UNITED STATES AFFORD TO FIGHT SPAIN ? 215 venture too far away from her base of operations in Porto Eico and Cuba. Consequently, a good, real, old-fashioned sea fight between the opposing fleets on the high seas would not be prob able, as it could only be brought on by accident, should the Span iards be misinformed as to the movements of the American fleet. For the purposes of an attack on Spain in the West Indies the American fleet would necessarily divide itself into two squad rons, one ostensibly destined for Porto Eico, the other for Cuba. With the exception of a couple of small places, there is little to be attacked in Porto Eico; and as for Cuba, the American fleet would have to confine itself to the destruction of government property and abstain from inflicting injuries on private property. Otherwise the Cubans would have occasion to say: " God save us from our friends !" During day the American fleet might be able to bombard government property in Havana from the open sea. But what of the night ? Then innumerable small craft would slip out of har bor, and, going at a rate of 26 knots, threaten destruction to the ponderous ironclads. The loss of a torpedo-boat means little ; the loss of an ironclad means everything. In money it means from three to four million dollars ; in time it means from two to three years, and with regard to life it means a hundred to ten. I have shown that the United States stand no chance of at tacking Spain successfully at home, and I think I have also shown that their chances of inflicting a crushing defeat upon the Spaniards in West Indian waters are slight. Spain, before at tempting to inflict serious damage upon places on the American coast, would certainly try to cut off the connection between the two American squadrons operating in the West Indies and to attack each separately. Should she succeed in doing this, or be able only to force the American fleet into a position where she could make an attack front and rear in the seas between Cuba and Porto Eico, I cannot see how the American fleet could escape serious injury, if not defeat. To conclude, then, it is evident that the United States in such a war could do but little lasting damage to Spain, while the latter power, though she would not be able to defeat the United States, could easily inflict losses amounting to many hundred millions of dollars. This content downloaded from 174.240.4.78 on Mon, 03 Jun 2019 22:18:19 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms