B24 CPL PDF

B24 CPL 1\. Learning objectives 5 1.1. 1. To provide candidates with an overview of the prohibitions regarding antitrust and merger control as administered by the CCCS under the Competition Act 2004. 5 1.1.1. Schedule **** of Competition Act includes exclusions from both the section **** and ****...

B24 CPL 1\. Learning objectives 5 1.1. 1. To provide candidates with an overview of the prohibitions regarding antitrust and merger control as administered by the CCCS under the Competition Act 2004. 5 1.1.1. Schedule **** of Competition Act includes exclusions from both the section **** and **** prohibitions. 5 1.1.2. Schedule **** of Competition Act includes exclusions from the section **** prohibition. 5 1.1.3. Competition law distinguished from 5 1.2. 2. To provide candidates with exposure as to the **[theories of harm]** and defences as to the prohibitions under competition law. 6 1.3. 3. To provide candidates with an understanding as to the [enforcement] powers of the CCCS. 6 1.3.1. Behavioral mergers are regulated by sectorial regulators (e.g. IMDA, EMA) 6 1.3.2. What is the scale and scope of completition law cases in Singapore 6 2\. Learning competencies 6 2.1. o Identify competition issues within a factual scenario with reference to the Competition Act 2004, the **CCCS 12 Guidelines** and decided cases identified in the Learning Plan. 6 2.2. o Identify potential legal and economic theories of harm which the CCCS may have as regards **business conduct** or mergers. 6 2.3. o Understand generally the economic process of **market definition.** 6 2.4. o Identify potential legal and economic **defences** to theories of harm. 6 3\. Behavioural (Conduct) 6 3.1. Part III, Division 2 Section **** Prohibition -- anti-competitive **agreements (e.g. Cartel)** 6 3.1.1. Elements 6 \"**[Agreement]**\" includes \"gentleman\'s\" agreeemnt 6 Hardcore conduct (\"by object\" restrictions), **[where intent can be proven, regardless of the subjective intent of the parties]** 7 Specturm of sensitive information 8 CCCS 500/7002/14 -- CCCS Penalises Fresh Chicken Distributors for Price-fixing and 8 CCCS 700/002/14 -- CCCS Issues Infringement Decision against the Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information between Competing Hotel 8 CCS 700/002/13 -- CCS Fines Capacitor Manufacturers Involved in Global Cartel for Price-fixing and Information Exchange 9 CCS 500/001/11 -- Price fixing of monthly salaries of new Indonesian Foreign Domestic Workers by Employment Agencies 10 CCS 500/003/08 -- Express Bus Agencies Association ("EBAA") case 10 Vertical Agreements (**[including between competitors]**) 10 Other risk areas (potential \"by effect\" restrictions) , **[where intent cannot be proven]** 11 \[2.18\] Concerted Practice 11 \[2.22\] \"Object\" or \"Effect\" are alternative, not cumulative requirements 11 \[2.23\] By Object 11 \[2.25\] Scenarios where there are **[no appreciable Adverse Effect]** 12 Exclusions 12 [\[4.5\] If there is no appreciable adverse effect on competition] 12 Statutory exclusions 13 General economic interest s1 Third schedule 13 **[s34 does not apply if compliance to legal requirement is needed under s2(1) Third schedule Competition Act]** 13 **[s34 does not apply if inconsistent with public policy s4 Third Schedule]** 13 **[s34 does not apply if regulated by other authority (e.g. EMA) s5 Third Schedule]** 13 **[s34 does not apply to specified activity under s6 of the Third Schedule]** 13 if related to Automated Clearing House s7 of the Third Schedule 13 Vertical Agreements s8 of the Third Schedule 13 Net Economic Benefit s9 to the Third Schedule 13 Agreement or conduct related to implementation of merger s10 of Third Schedule 14 That would result in a merger s11(1) Third Schedule 14 3.1.2. Market Definition 14 3.1.3. Factors affecting market power 14 3.2. Part III, Division 3 Section **** Prohibition -- abuse of dominant **position (e.g. Monopoly)** 14 3.2.1. Three-step test 15 1. What is the relevant **[market]**? 15 Market Definition Chapter 6 of of the CCCS Guidelines 15 2. Is there a **[dominant]** position in the relevant market? 15 Market Definition Chapter 3 of of the CCCS Guidelines 16 3. Has there been **[abuse]** of the **[dominant]** position? 16 **[4. Dominance is not an offence in itself.]** 18 \[5.7\] Two dimensions of assessing dominance 18 3.2.2. Unliateral Conduct 18 Intel made its customer\'s buy exclusively from Intel 18 CCS 600/008/07 -- Abuse of a Dominant Position by SISTIC.com Pte Ltd 18 Case: Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages 19 Objective justification defence 20 CCCS 100/1303/08 -- Acquisition of Singapore Food Industries Limited by SATS Ltd 21 3.2.3. Statutory Exclusions 21 General economic interest s1 Third Schedule 21 contrary to any legal requirement s2 Third Schedule 21 **[s47 does not apply if compliance to legal requirement is needed under s3(1) Third schedule Competition Act]** 21 contrary to poublic policy s4 of the Third Schedule 21 regulated under another government authority s5 of the Third Schedule 21 Specified activities s6 of the Third Schedule 21 if related to Automated Clearing House s7 to the Third Schedule 22 if related to the implementation of merger s10 of the Third Schedule 22 if results in a merger s11(2) of the Third Schedule 22 3.2.4. Subtopic 22 3.2.5. **[Chapter 3 pf the CCCS guidelines on Section 47]** 22 4\. Structure 22 4.1. Part III, Division 4 Section 54 Prohibition -- **merger control** "substantial lessening of competition" 22 4.2. Assessment to issue notice 22 4.2.1. \[6.9\] **[Three categories of]** **[Statutory Exclusions to s54 under Forth Schedule of the Competition Act]** 23 4.2.2. \[6.11\] Exclusion from aniciallry Restrictions 24 Third Schedule 24 4.3. What constitutes a merger? 24 4.3.1. Types of mergers viewed by law 24 4.3.2. **[Assessment of mergers]** 25 4.4. **[Counterfactual]** 26 4.5. Chapter 4 CCCS Guidelines 27 4.6. **[Theories of harm]** 27 4.6.1. Market foreclosure 27 4.6.2. Coordinated effects 27 4.6.3. Non-coordinated effects 28 4.7. Net economic efficiencies 28 4.8. Filing Requirements 29 4.9. Case studies 31 4.9.1. Grab/Uber 31 4.9.2. Parkway/Radlink 31 4.9.3. Jobstreet 32 4.10. Enforcement 33 4.10.1. Penalties 33 4.10.2. Powers of investigation 34 **[Chapter 7 CCCS Guidelines]** 34 1. Learning objectives 1. 1\. To provide candidates with an overview of the prohibitions regarding antitrust and merger control as administered by the CCCS under the Competition Act 2004. 1. Schedule **** of Competition Act includes exclusions from both the section **** and **** prohibitions. 2. Schedule **** of Competition Act includes exclusions from the section **** prohibition. 3. Competition law distinguished from 2. []{#7oXnHPiUUUG6nwlEitVvIA==.anchor}2. To provide candidates with exposure as to the **[theories of harm]** and defences as to the prohibitions under competition law. -------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Relationship begins at [[Net economic efficiencies]](#1FB0U5YqekyzxhvMXxXJ/A==) -------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. 3\. To provide candidates with an understanding as to the [enforcement] powers of the CCCS. 4. Behavioral mergers are regulated by sectorial regulators (e.g. IMDA, EMA) 5. What is the scale and scope of completition law cases in Singapore 2. Learning competencies 4. o Identify competition issues within a factual scenario with reference to the Competition Act 2004, the **CCCS 12 Guidelines** and decided cases identified in the Learning Plan. 5. o Identify potential legal and economic theories of harm which the CCCS may have as regards **business conduct** or mergers. 6. o Understand generally the economic process of **market definition.** 7. o Identify potential legal and economic **defences** to theories of harm. 3. Behavioural (Conduct) 8. Part III, Division 2 Section **** Prohibition -- anti-competitive **agreements (e.g. Cartel)** 6. Elements - \"**[Agreement]**\" includes \"gentleman\'s\" agreeemnt - Hardcore conduct (\"by object\" restrictions), **[where intent can be proven, regardless of the subjective intent of the parties]** - Specturm of sensitive information - CCCS 500/7002/14 -- CCCS Penalises Fresh Chicken Distributors for Price-fixing and - CCCS 700/002/14 -- CCCS Issues Infringement Decision against the Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information between Competing Hotel - CCS 700/002/13 -- CCS Fines Capacitor Manufacturers Involved in Global Cartel for Price-fixing and Information Exchange - CCS 500/001/11 -- Price fixing of monthly salaries of new Indonesian Foreign Domestic Workers by Employment Agencies - CCS 500/003/08 -- Express Bus Agencies Association ("EBAA") case - Vertical Agreements (**[including between competitors]**) - Other risk areas (potential \"by effect\" restrictions) , **[where intent cannot be proven]** - \[2.18\] Concerted Practice - \[2.22\] \"Object\" or \"Effect\" are alternative, not cumulative requirements - \[2.23\] By Object - \[2.25\] Scenarios where there are **[no appreciable Adverse Effect]** - Exclusions - [\[4.5\] If there is no appreciable adverse effect on competition] - Statutory exclusions - General economic interest s1 Third schedule - **[s34 does not apply if compliance to legal requirement is needed under s2(1) Third schedule Competition Act]** - **[s34 does not apply if inconsistent with public policy s4 Third Schedule]** - **[s34 does not apply if regulated by other authority (e.g. EMA) s5 Third Schedule]** - **[s34 does not apply to specified activity under s6 of the Third Schedule]** - if related to Automated Clearing House s7 of the Third Schedule - Vertical Agreements s8 of the Third Schedule - Net Economic Benefit s9 to the Third Schedule ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Flags  Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- - Agreement or conduct related to implementation of merger s10 of Third Schedule - That would result in a merger s11(1) Third Schedule 7. []{#bwXbucCXCUuCViBz+f+yUQ==.anchor}Market Definition +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relationship | Market Definition (Chapter 6 CCCS | | | Guidelines) - points to [[Market | | | Definition Chapter 6 of of the | | | CCCS | | | Guidelines]](#hN7C/me | | | kI0i8fbV88G7F9g==) | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ 8. []{#ymyRp4E6UkeaNISCLUXMLA==.anchor}Factors affecting market power -------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Relationship Factors affecting Market Power - points to [[Subtopic]](#Cckh1ZOPQ0+txnckAwxBEA==) -------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9. Part III, Division 3 Section **** Prohibition -- abuse of dominant **position (e.g. Monopoly)** 9. Three-step test - 1\. What is the relevant **[market]**? - []{#hN7C/mekI0i8fbV88G7F9g==.anchor}Market Definition Chapter 6 of of the CCCS Guidelines -------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Relationship Market Definition (Chapter 6 CCCS Guidelines) - begins at [[Market Definition]](#bwXbucCXCUuCViBz+f+yUQ==) -------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - 2\. Is there a **[dominant]** position in the relevant market? - Market Definition Chapter 3 of of the CCCS Guidelines - 3\. Has there been **[abuse]** of the **[dominant]** position? ------- ---------------------------------------- Flags Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- ---------------------------------------- +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ |   | **[Horizontal | **[Vertical | | | foreclosure]{.underli | foreclosure]{.underli | | | ne}** | ne}** | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | **[Non-priced | **[Single | **[Discrimination]{.u | | exclusion]{.underline | branding] | nderline}** - | | }** | ** - | a refusal by a | | | an arrangement | dominant firm to | | | whereby a customer is | supply its | | | obliged to obtain all | subsidiaries | | | or most of its | competitors a key | | | requirements in | input required for | | | relation to a | downstream operations | | | relevant product from | may be viewed as anti | | | 1 supplier. | competitive | | | | exclusionary conduct, | | | **[Tying/Bundling]{.u | especially when the | | | nderline}** - | manufacturer has | | | a dominant firm | capacity and the | | | supplies a product on | buyer is prepared to | | | condition that the | pay market rates. | | | customers also buy | | | | another. | **[Constructive | | | | refusal]* | | | **[Line | * - | | | forcing]* | a dominant upstream | | | * -  | supplier offers to do | | | a form of sales where | business on such | | | in order to say, | restrictive terms, | | | obtain a must have | such as | | | product in a | unconventional, no | | | manufacturer range, | delivery conditions | | | the retailer is | that it is tantamount | | | required to stock all | to refusal to supply. | | | the products in that | | | | manufacturers range. | | | | | | | | **[Exclusive | | | | contracts]{.underline | | | | }** -  | | | | a retailer being | | | | required to stock all | | | | blends of a | | | | manufacturer\'s | | | | coffee beans | | | | | | | |   | | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ | **[Price based | **[Loyalty | Margin squeeze -  a | | exclusion]{.underline | rebates]* | vertically integrated | | }** | * - | firm dominant in the | | | structured anti- | supply of a key input | | | competitively | in a downstream | | | | market in which it | | | **[Predation]{.underl | also operates, sets a | | | ine}** | low margin between | | | - a dominant firm | its input price. In | | | sets its prices so | other words, its | | | low, especially below | wholesale price and | | | average variable | the price in the | | | cost, such that it | downstream market. | | | forces one or more | | | | competitor firms out | Constructive refusal | | | of the market. The | - | | | dominant firm may | | | | deliberately incur | | | | losses in the short | | | | run in order to force | | | | market exits with a | | | | view to extracting | | | | monopoly rent. | | +-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+ - **[4. Dominance is not an offence in itself.]** ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Flags  Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- - \[5.7\] Two dimensions of assessing dominance 10. Unliateral Conduct - Intel made its customer\'s buy exclusively from Intel - CCS 600/008/07 -- Abuse of a Dominant Position by SISTIC.com Pte Ltd ------- ---------------------------------------- Flags Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- ---------------------------------------- - Case: Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages - Objective justification defence - CCCS 100/1303/08 -- Acquisition of Singapore Food Industries Limited by SATS Ltd 11. Statutory Exclusions - General economic interest s1 Third Schedule - contrary to any legal requirement s2 Third Schedule - **[s47 does not apply if compliance to legal requirement is needed under s3(1) Third schedule Competition Act]** - contrary to poublic policy s4 of the Third Schedule - regulated under another government authority s5 of the Third Schedule - Specified activities s6 of the Third Schedule - if related to Automated Clearing House s7 to the Third Schedule - if related to the implementation of merger s10 of the Third Schedule - if results in a merger s11(2) of the Third Schedule 12. []{#Cckh1ZOPQ0+txnckAwxBEA==.anchor}Subtopic -------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Relationship Factors affecting Market Power - begins at [[Factors affecting market power]](#ymyRp4E6UkeaNISCLUXMLA==) -------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. **[Chapter 3 pf the CCCS guidelines on Section 47]** 4. Structure 10. Part III, Division 4 Section 54 Prohibition -- **merger control** "substantial lessening of competition" 11. Assessment to issue notice ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Flags  Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- 14. []{#vuvpFUN6Wk65Ow8LAJflRg==.anchor}\[6.9\] **[Three categories of]** **[Statutory Exclusions to s54 under Forth Schedule of the Competition Act]** -------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Relationship points to [[Net economic efficiencies]](#1FB0U5YqekyzxhvMXxXJ/A==) -------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. \[6.11\] Exclusion from aniciallry Restrictions - Third Schedule 12. What constitutes a merger? 16. Types of mergers viewed by law 17. **[Assessment of mergers]** ------- ---------------------------------------- Flags Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- ---------------------------------------- 13. **[Counterfactual]** ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Flags  Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- 14. Chapter 4 CCCS Guidelines 15. **[Theories of harm]** ------- ---------------------------------------- Flags Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- ---------------------------------------- 18. Market foreclosure 19. Coordinated effects 20. Non-coordinated effects 16. []{#1FB0U5YqekyzxhvMXxXJ/A==.anchor}Net economic efficiencies -------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Relationship points to [[2. To provide candidates with exposure as to the theories of harm and defences as to the prohibitions under competition law.]](#7oXnHPiUUUG6nwlEitVvIA==) Relationship begins at [[\[6.9\] Three categories of Statutory Exclusions to s54 under Forth Schedule of the Competition Act]](#vuvpFUN6Wk65Ow8LAJflRg==) -------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17. Filing Requirements 18. Case studies 21. Grab/Uber 22. Parkway/Radlink 23. Jobstreet 19. Enforcement 24. Penalties ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Flags  Risk; \[\"mmStockIconFlagRed\", \"\"\] ------- -------------------------------------------------------------- 25. Powers of investigation - **[Chapter 7 CCCS Guidelines]**