Actus Reus PDF

ELEMENTS OF A CRIME 1 ACTUS REUS TOPIC OUTLINE A/ Overview 1. Actus Reus and Mens Rea 2. Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea B/ Constituents of the Actus Reus 1. Types of ‘acts’ 2. Omissions 3. State of AJairs 4. Voluntariness C/ Causation 1. Factual Causation 2. Legal Causation 3. Intervening Causes LEARNING OUTCOMES Attending the lecture, independently studying the cases and materials, and preparing for and participating in the tutorial should help you to understand and to do the following: 1. Articulate the components of criminal liability 2. Describe the instances in which there may be a duty to act 3. Articulate the instances in which a defendant’s status may be the actus reus of a crime 4. Explain the meaning of factual and legal causation and the diJerence between the two 5. Discuss the situations and circumstances in which there may be a break in the chain of causation 5. Deﬁne and describe automatism and discuss its limits as a defence ESSENTIAL READINGS In addition to the cases mentioned herein, you should also read the relevant chapter in either Card, Cross & Jones or Smith & Hogan. 1Consult also one of the following: Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424 Glazebrook, ‘Criminal Omissions: The Duty Requirement in OJences against the Person’ (1960) 76 LQR 387 A. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES Each criminal oJence generally comprises two elements: the ACTUS REUS and the MENS REA: see McEwan v AG of Guyana CCJ 30, per Anderson JCCJ at paras. - Historically, these terms were loosely translated as the act and guilty mind, respectively, but those descriptions have long been recognised as too narrow and even misleading. In reality, a particular oJence may require proof of an act, an omission or failure to act, the existence of a particular state of aJairs, or any combination of these. Each by itself could also constitute the actus reus of an oJence. Likewise, the term ‘guilty mind’ is narrow, since the required state of mind for any given oJence could cover any number of mental states along a spectrum spanning intention at one end and failure to exercise a required degree of care (negligence) at the other. And whereas intent and recklessness undoubtedly refer to the state of mind of the perpetrator of the actus reus, negligence – being a failure to take care – may perhaps be more aptly described as the absence of a state of mind or a failure to address one’s mind to what one was doing. Nonetheless, despite these limitations, these translations each signal in their own, general way, the two main components of a crime. Generally, the two (actus reus and mens rea) must coincide for the oJence to be committed. This is summed up in another well-known Latin phrase: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: there is no guilty act unless the mind is also guilty. B. CONSTITUENTS OF THE ACTUS REUS 1. Types of Acts ‘Act’ is much too narrow a word to deﬁne the concept of what constitutes the actus reus. According to Cross and Jones: “…the actus reus is the act (or omission or other event) indicated in the deﬁnition of the crime charged together with any surrounding circumstances, other than the accused’s state of mind or any defence, and any consequence of that act indicated by that deﬁnition.” 2Note the diJerence between result crimes (where D’s conduct must cause or result in certain consequences, as in homicide) and conduct crimes (where D’s conduct may amount to the complete actus reus of the oJence, even where it fails to bring about the consequences he intends or indeed any consequences at all). Voluntary conduct: The vast majority of criminal oJences require acts or omissions on D’s part, which must ordinarily be willed or voluntary. Involuntary movements cannot ordinarily constitute the actus reus of any oJence, not even one of strict liability. 2. Omissions Generally, at common law (as distinct from other legal systems), there is no blanket duty to act in order to prevent harm or wrongdoing to another. That said, an omission to act can be legally blameworthy in certain situations where there is a duty to act, whether imposed at common law or by statute, and D has breached that duty. The following are examples of special relationships, where liability may attach for omitting some related act or obligation: (a) Between parent and child and certain other family relationships, like husband and wife R v Gibbins and Proctor (1919) 13 Cr App R 134 R v Downes (1875) 13 Cox CC 111 Lowe QB 702 (b) Voluntary undertakings R v Instan 1 QB 450 Stone and Dobinson 2 All ER 341 (c) OJicial, contractual or other public duties Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 Dytham QB 722 (d) Where D is responsible for creating a dangerous situation, and Fagan v MPC 1 QB 439 R v Miller 1 All ER 978* (e) Failure to provide medical treatment Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1 All ER 821 33. State of AJairs Voluntary conduct may not always have to be proved where D is charged with a strict liability oJence in which the actus reus takes the form of a prohibited state of aJairs. In this scenario, a person may be liable where certain circumstances exist. See: R v Larsonneur (1934) 24 Cr App R 74 4. Automatism and its Limits as a Defence Automatism refers to any external force that is applied to the accused that has the eJect of depriving him of control of his actions. In such a case, the accused may rely on the legal defence of automatism. Automatism strikes at the heart of the actus reus, which as established above must be voluntary. Thus, if the actions/omissions of the accused are involuntary or lacking in deliberation, then they are not truly the acts/omissions of the accused at all. Thus where the defence of automatism is successfully raised, the prosecution would have failed to prove that the accused has committed the actus reus of the oJence. Not every involuntary or unwilled act give rise to the defence of automatism. The reason for the accused being in this state is critical. The defence does not arise if the automatism has an internal origin, and can only be raised if the cause is external. Where the cause is internal, an accused may more properly be able to raise the defence of insanity – which is a defence related to mens rea. See: Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland AC 386 R v Quick and Paddison QB 910 Hill v Baxter 1 QB 227 C. CAUSATION The defendant’s conduct must have caused the result. There are two aspects to this requirement: FACTUAL causation and LEGAL causation. Generally, see: Gafoor v Thomas CA Guyana, (2018) 92 WIR 398 at paras. 8-25 41. Factual Causation There must ﬁrst be established a factual link between D’s conduct and the result he is alleged to have caused. One must be able to say that the AR would not have occurred but for the actions of the accused. R v White 2 KB 124 2. Legal Causation The extent of D’s contribution The conduct of the accused must comprise a substantial or signiﬁcant and operating cause of the actus reus. It need not be the principal or main cause of the actus reus, but its role must not be negligible or de minimis: R v Hennigan 3 All ER 133 Cf. Barbados, s 8 Multiple causes There may be a number of independent causes, but the accused’s conduct need only be one of them if each is suJicient to have brought about the result: Benge (1856) 4 F&F 504. Indirect causation D’s conduct need not be a direct cause of the proscribed result: McKechnie (1992) 94 Cr App R 51 The victim’s condition D must ordinarily take his victim as he ﬁnds him. This is often referred to as the ‘eggshell skull’ rule. It means that if a person is unusually vulnerable to physical injury as a result of an existing medical condition or even old age, D must accept liability for any unusually serious consequences which result from his assault. R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692 R v Blaue 3 All ER 446 R v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 Continuing Conduct It is unnecessary that the result should have been caused in the way intended or foreseen by the defendant. It is suJicient if the harm resulting is of the kind intended, even if produced in an unintended manner. Thabo Meli 1 All ER 373 Church 2 All ER 72 Le Brun QB 61 53. Intervening Causes It is quite possible to have more than one factor operating as a cause of an event. A second substantial and operating cause attributed to a third party does not break the chain of causation that links an earlier factor to the said event unless the second factor eJectively severs the link between the ﬁrst factor and the event. The second factor must relegate the ﬁrst to a status where it is merely part of the history of factors leading up to the event: where it ceases to operate as a substantial cause of the event. Intervening acts may be of several diJerent types, which we consider hereunder. Acts of third parties R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279 Medical Treatment R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 R v Smith 2 All ER 193 Ramkissoon v R (1962) 5 WIR 250 R v Cheshire 3 All ER 670 Gafoor v Thomas (2018) 92 WIR 398 Medical treatment is rarely ever considered an intervening act, partly because both the need for treatment and possibility of mistaken treatment are foreseeable. It is only in exceptional cases that medical treatment will break the chain of causation, as where it is (a) unforeseeably bad and (b) the sole signiﬁcant cause. The victim’s conduct R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 R v Williams 2 All ER 183* The above cases deal with an ‘escape’ situation, where death or serious injury occurs while the victim is trying to escape. If death or serious injury results, the issue that arises is whether the defendant is liable or whether the victim’s reaction is a break in the chain of causation. Conversely, D cannot be held responsible for ‘causing’ the voluntary and deliberate acts of the victim, merely because they were foreseeable responses to his own actions: R v Kennedy (No 2) 4 All ER 1083 Where a victim commits suicide as a result of some conduct perpetrated on him/her by D, it is possible that D may be liable if D’s conduct caused some kind of recognised psychiatric illness which in turn led the victim to commit suicide. The point arose in R v Dhaliwal 2 Cr App R 348, but it was not settled. Natural events A natural event (sometimes called an ‘act of God’) will only break the chain of causation if it was the sole immediate cause of the consequence and not foreseeable. 11:33 AM Chapter Two : Criminal Liability 1 : actus reus Review Notes: Liability for O:ences in Criminal Law 1. Actus Reus and Mens Rea Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea: This Latin maxim means "an act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty." Actus reus refers to the outward conduct or prohibited action. Mens rea refers to the guilty mind or state of mind with which the act was committed. 2. General Principles Criminal liability typically requires both the actus reus (the act) and mens rea (the guilty mind) to be present. However, some oJences (e.g., strict liability oJences) do not require mens rea. Criticism of the maxim: Stephen J criticizes the notion that mens rea is always required, as diJerent crimes have varying mental elements (e.g., intention, recklessness). Examples of mens rea: o Murder: Intention to unlawfully kill or cause grievous bodily harm. o Theft: Dishonesty and intent to permanently deprive another of property. o Criminal damage: Intention or recklessness in damaging another's property. 3. Mens Rea and Strict Liability Mens rea is not always required for criminal liability. Some oJences allow for conviction even if the defendant acted with blameless inadvertence. In cases of strict liability, mens rea is not a necessary component, and defendants can be held liable based solely on the actus reus. Courts have stressed the importance of mens rea, but exceptions exist where statutes explicitly or implicitly exclude it (e.g., regulatory oJences). 4. Justiﬁcation for Mens Rea Requirement Punishment and fault: The requirement of mens rea supports the principle that punishment should only be imposed when the defendant is at fault. Critique by Baroness Wootton: She argued for the abolition of mens rea, proposing that criminal liability should focus solely on preventing prohibited actions, regardless of the defendant's intentions. Even critics of mens rea acknowledge that punishment should not be imposed without some outward action, emphasizing that criminal law is intolerable if mere thoughts or wishes are punishable. 5. Importance of Actus Reus The requirement that actus reus should always be proven is more important than mens rea in many cases. Without actus reus, evil intentions do not justify punishment. There is a consensus that a criminal act must be carried out, not just planned, to merit punishment. 6. Practical Application While the actus reus and mens rea framework is useful for analyzing criminal oJences, it should not become the sole guiding principle. Some oJences, like conspiracy, do not easily ﬁt this division. In cases of automatism, where the defendant is unaware of their actions due to non-insane automatism, the prosecution fails unless it proves the defendant knew what they were doing. 7. Key Takeaways The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea provides a general framework for understanding criminal liability, but it is not absolute. Both actus reus and mens rea are important for establishing guilt, though exceptions exist in the form of strict liability oJences. Criminal law must consider both the defendant’s actions and their state of mind, but actus reus often takes precedence in ensuring justice. Actus Reus Deﬁnition: Actus Reus refers to the physical element of a crime, including acts, omissions, or states of aJairs. It encompasses: o The prohibited conduct as deﬁned by the oJence. o Any required consequences of the conduct. o Relevant surrounding circumstances, excluding considerations of mens rea (mental element). Acts, Omissions, and States of A:airs: 1. Acts: o The most common form of actus reus is a positive act. o Speciﬁc acts vary by o:ence. For example: Rape requires penetration. Causing death by dangerous driving requires driving. o Some o:ences combine act and consequence, like murder requiring the act of killing and resulting in death. 2. Omissions: o Liability for omissions arises in two situations: 1. The oJence deﬁnition refers to an omission. 2. D has a legal duty to act, and fails to do so. o Examples of omission o:ences: Wilful neglect of a child. Failure to report a motor accident. Legal Duties to Act: Common Law Duties to Act: A legal duty to protect others from harm may arise in certain situations, including: 1. Contractual duty (e.g., a crossing keeper fails to close a gate, leading to death in Pittwood). 2. Public o:ice duty (e.g., a police oJicer fails to intervene during an assault in Dytham). 3. Parental duty (e.g., a parent fails to feed their child, resulting in the child’s death in Gibbins and Proctor). 4. Voluntary assumption of care (e.g., taking care of a helpless person in Stone and Dobinson). Key Points: An actus reus does not always require an action; omissions or states of aJairs can suJice. Certain oJences explicitly require consequences, such as murder, where death must occur. Omissions are less common but can be criminal if a legal duty exists. Review Notes: Duty to Act 1. Termination of Duty to Act o A duty to act, especially in cases where a relationship (e.g., caregiver and patient) creates an obligation, ends when that relationship no longer exists. o A mentally competent adult has the right to release someone from a duty, even if this decision contradicts their own best interests. Example: If a mentally competent adult refuses to eat (as in the case of a hunger-striking prisoner), those responsible for their care must respect their decision, regardless of whether it is in their best interests. This right to self-determination is paramount and outweighs any conﬂicting state interests, reinforcing the principle that an individual has control over their own body and decisions, even in life-threatening situations. 2. Advance Refusal of Treatment o A mentally competent adult has the legal right to refuse speciﬁc treatments in advance for situations where they might later lack the capacity to consent or refuse. o This principle originated from common law but is now codiﬁed in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, sections 24-26. Under these provisions, an advance refusal of treatment does not need to be in writing, unless it involves life-sustaining treatment, which must be in writing and signed in the presence of a witness. Example: If a mentally competent hospital patient who has previously experienced heart attacks formally refuses resuscitation through written instruction, medical staJ are bound by this decision when the next heart attack occurs, provided the patient is incapacitated and cannot provide real-time consent or refusal. According to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a valid and written refusal of life- sustaining treatment must be honored, and any healthcare provider who disregards this could be liable for battery or more serious charges, depending on the harm caused. A refusal of treatment is legally binding, meaning medical professionals who perform procedures contrary to the patient’s advance directives may face legal consequences. 3. Liability in Creating Danger o When an individual (D) engages in actions that create or contribute to a dangerous situation, they have a legal duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate the danger before it leads to harm. o This principle applies even if the initial creation of danger was unintentional or accidental, and liability arises when the person becomes aware of the danger and fails to act. Key Case: R v Miller (1983): D fell asleep while smoking a cigarette and accidentally set his mattress on ﬁre. Upon waking and realizing the danger, D chose to move to another room rather than extinguish the ﬁre or alert anyone. His failure to act after becoming aware of the danger made him liable for arson. Lord Diplock in Miller emphasized that criminal liability arises from failing to take steps within one’s power to counteract a danger they have created, particularly if they become aware of the danger before the resultant damage is complete. Key Case: Evans (Gemma) (2009): Extending Miller, D supplied heroin to her half-sister (V), who self-injected and overdosed. While D did not directly create the danger, her involvement in supplying the drug contributed to it. D failed to seek medical help upon realizing V had overdosed, leading to a conviction for manslaughter. The case highlights that even contributing to a dangerous situation can create a duty to act, and failure to fulﬁll this duty can result in criminal liability. 4. Extent of Duty to Act o The scope and extent of a duty to act vary depending on the speciﬁc circumstances and the nature of the duty involved. For example, a person who owes a duty to a helpless individual (e.g., a parent or caregiver) must take reasonable steps to provide care, such as summoning medical help or ensuring the individual receives necessary sustenance. In situations where a person (like in Miller) accidentally creates a dangerous situation, they are required to take steps to mitigate or eliminate the danger—such as putting out a ﬁre or calling emergency services. If a person is under a contractual duty to act (e.g., a doctor or a ﬁreman), they must fulﬁll the obligations explicitly or implicitly outlined in their contract. However, the extent of such a duty may not always be clear in certain cases, such as whether an ambulance driver who stops working after their shift ends is still liable for failing to attend an emergency. If a person under a duty to act cannot reasonably take any steps to prevent harm, their failure to act is not considered culpable. The law requires reasonable actions, meaning that factors like age, physical ability, and personal risk are considered when assessing liability. The extent of risk a person is expected to undertake in performing their duty is not clearly deﬁned, but it is understood that "reasonable" steps are necessary, accounting for individual characteristics but excluding factors like inconvenience or ﬁnancial cost. 5. Medical Duty to Patients o A doctor’s duty to a patient is not absolute in terms of keeping the patient alive at all costs; rather, it is limited to taking reasonable steps to preserve life. o Key Case: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993): The House of Lords ruled that doctors could lawfully withdraw life-sustaining treatment from patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) if continuing treatment would be futile and o:er no beneﬁt to the patient. In the case of Anthony Bland, who was left in a PVS after being injured in the Hillsborough disaster, the court allowed the withdrawal of artiﬁcial feeding and hydration, which led to his death by starvation. The court emphasized that this withdrawal was considered an omission, not an act of euthanasia, and therefore was not unlawful. The case established that if a patient is incapable of expressing their wishes and has no prospect of recovery, life-preserving treatment can be lawfully discontinued as long as competent medical opinion supports this decision. The distinction between an omission (withholding treatment) and an act (administering a lethal drug) remains crucial in law. While euthanasia (a positive act to end life) remains illegal, withdrawing treatment can be lawful if it aligns with the patient's best interests. 6. Euthanasia and the Distinction Between Acts and Omissions o Euthanasia by administering a lethal drug is illegal, but withdrawing life support or treatment is lawful if certain conditions are met. This distinction, while legally signiﬁcant, is morally debatable. Some judges in the Bland case questioned whether there is a meaningful moral di:erence between allowing a patient to die slowly by withdrawing treatment and ending their life quickly through active intervention. However, in Inglis (2010), the Court of Appeal rea:irmed that the law recognizes a clear di:erence between the withdrawal of treatment, which may be lawful, and active euthanasia, which is illegal. 7. Application to Minimally Conscious State (MCS) o Key Case: W v M (2011): The principles established in Bland were extended to patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS), a condition less severe than PVS. In MCS cases, the decision to withdraw treatment must be made by carefully balancing the patient’s quality of life with the importance of preserving life. Unlike in PVS, where treatment is deemed futile, the decision in MCS cases requires more nuanced consideration. 8. States of A:airs o Some o:enses do not require a speciﬁc act or omission; merely being involved in a particular state of a:airs can result in liability. Examples include being found drunk in a public place (Licensing Act 1872) or being in possession of an o:ensive weapon in public without lawful authority (Prevention of Crime Act 1953). Such o:enses are statutory and depend solely on the existence of a speciﬁc situation rather than any positive or negative action by the defendant. Expanded Review Notes: Consequences and Circumstances in Criminal Law Consequences 1. Causation in Result Crimes: o In criminal law, some o:enses require proof that D's act or omission led to a speciﬁc outcome or consequence. This element is known as causation and is pivotal in crimes where the law mandates that D's behavior must cause a particular result. o Example: In murder and manslaughter, causation must be established by showing that D's actions or omissions resulted in the unlawful killing of another human being. If D’s conduct did not cause the death, D cannot be held liable for these o:enses. In the context of criminal damage, under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1), it must be proven that D's actions led to the destruction or damage of property belonging to another person. o This necessity to prove that a consequence occurred as a result of D’s behavior is central to what is known as result crimes, in contrast to conduct crimes, where no speciﬁc result is required. o Result Crimes vs. Conduct Crimes: Result crimes require the prosecution to demonstrate that a particular consequence (e.g., death, injury, damage) resulted from D’s actions. Crimes like murder, manslaughter, and criminal damage fall under this category. Conduct crimes, on the other hand, focus solely on D’s actions or behavior, regardless of the outcome. For example, oJenses like driving under the inﬂuence of alcohol or possession of illegal substances do not require a harmful consequence; the act itself is enough for liability. o Key Cases and Authorities: Treacy v DPP : In this case, Lord Diplock discussed the nature of crimes based on D’s behavior and its consequences. Berry : Lord Roskill provided clarity on distinguishing between result and conduct crimes. Steer : The court dealt with the issue of criminal damage and causation, further reﬁning the concept of result crimes. 2. The Role of Omissions: o Sometimes, omissions (failures to act) can lead to criminal liability if there is a legal duty to act. For result crimes like manslaughter, an omission can lead to conviction if it is proven that D’s failure to act caused the unlawful death. o Example: If a caregiver fails to provide necessary medical care, resulting in the death of a dependent, this omission may fulﬁll the actus reus of manslaughter if causation is established. Circumstances 1. Circumstantial Requirements for O:enses: o For many o:enses, the law requires that D’s behavior occurs under speciﬁc circumstances for it to be considered criminal. These circumstances are a critical part of the actus reus (the physical element) of the crime. o Examples: Sexual o:enses involving relatives (Sexual O:ences Act 2003, ss 64 and 65) must involve a speciﬁc family relationship between the parties, such as sex between an adult and a close relative. Burglary (Theft Act 1968, s 9) requires that D enter a building or part of a building as a trespasser. The act of trespassing is a necessary circumstantial element that makes the entry illegal. Bigamy (O:ences Against the Person Act 1861, s 57) can only occur if D is already married. The fact that D is already in a legal marriage is a requisite circumstance for the o:ense. o Relevance of Circumstances: In these examples, the circumstances make otherwise neutral actions (e.g., entering a building, marrying) criminal. Without these circumstantial elements, the conduct would not constitute a crime. 2. Negatively Deﬁned Circumstances: o Some o:enses are deﬁned by the absence of certain conditions or approvals, which act as critical circumstantial elements. o Examples: Driving without insurance: Under the Road Tra:ic Act 1988, s 143, using a motor vehicle on a public road is not inherently illegal, but it becomes an o:ense if D does so without valid insurance. The absence of insurance transforms lawful conduct into criminal behavior. Operating a tattoo business without registration: As per the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, s 15, operating a business such as tattooing or semi-permanent skin coloring is legal only if the business is registered with the local authority. Without this registration, the act becomes criminal. o Distinguishing Between Actus Reus and Excuse: These negatively deﬁned circumstances must be distinguished from situations where the law provides an excuse for otherwise criminal behavior. For example, in criminal damage cases, the law allows a defense of "lawful excuse" for damaging property (e.g., to prevent greater harm). This is di:erent from the negatively deﬁned elements of driving without insurance or operating an unregistered business, where the absence of a legal condition directly creates the o:ense. Deciding whether a circumstance is part of the actus reus or an excuse can sometimes be di:icult. Courts may need to interpret whether a statutory phrase is a circumstantial element or an excuse. Justiﬁcations and Excuses 1. Justiﬁcations vs. Excuses in the Actus Reus: o Some criminal o:enses include justiﬁcations or excuses as part of their deﬁnitions. The distinction between these two is important in determining criminal liability: A justiﬁcation renders D’s conduct lawful. For example, self- defense justiﬁes the use of force, making it lawful even though force is normally prohibited. An excuse acknowledges that D’s conduct is unlawful but excuses D from liability due to speciﬁc circumstances (e.g., duress). 2. Academic Debate on the Role of Defenses in Actus Reus: o Professor Williams: Argued that the absence of a justiﬁcation or defense is part of the actus reus. According to this view, the prosecution must prove not only that D committed the act but also that there were no justiﬁcations or defenses available. o Professor Lanham: Suggested that a crime consists of three elements: actus reus, mens rea, and the absence of a valid defense. In this model, defenses (whether justiﬁcations or excuses) are separate from the actus reus. o Intermediate Position (adopted in the text): This view posits that actus reus includes the absence of a justiﬁcation but not the absence of an excuse. Justiﬁcations form part of the deﬁnition of an o:ense because they make conduct lawful, while excuses do not a:ect the lawfulness of the act but simply exempt D from punishment. o Key Example: In the o:ense of knowingly making a record without the written consent of the performers, the absence of consent is part of the actus reus. Conversely, in the o:ense of delivering alcohol to a child, if done in a vessel sealed in a prescribed manner, the sealed vessel is an excuse, not part of the actus reus. Consequences and Circumstances in Criminal Law Consequences 1. Result Crimes vs. Conduct Crimes: o Result Crimes: These crimes require a speciﬁc outcome or consequence to occur as a result of D’s action or omission. It is not enough that D simply performs the conduct; the conduct must cause a prohibited result. Examples: § Murder and Manslaughter: In cases like murder, the prosecution must prove that D's action or failure to act caused the unlawful killing of another person. § Criminal Damage: Under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1), the prosecution must demonstrate that D’s actions caused the destruction or damage of property belonging to another person. These are examples of result crimes because the result (death or damage) is an essential element of the o:ense. o Conduct Crimes: These crimes do not require any particular outcome or result. The act itself is criminal, irrespective of its consequences. In these cases, it is the prohibited conduct itself that forms the essence of the crime. Examples: § Driving under the inﬂuence: Whether or not D causes harm while driving intoxicated is irrelevant to the o:ense. The mere act of driving while impaired is criminal. § Possession of illegal substances: Simply possessing a controlled substance is enough to constitute a crime, even if no harm results from it. 2. Causation in Result Crimes: o Causation is a fundamental requirement in result crimes. This means there must be a clear causal link between D’s act or omission and the prohibited consequence. Example: § In murder, it is not enough to prove that D committed an act of violence. The prosecution must also establish that this act caused the death of the victim. Causation is often broken down into two tests: § Factual Causation: This is typically assessed using the “but-for” test—but for D’s actions, would the prohibited result have occurred? § Legal Causation: Even if factual causation is established, legal causation must be shown, meaning D’s actions must be a substantial cause of the result and not too remote. 3. Omissions: o In certain circumstances, omissions (a failure to act) can lead to criminal liability. However, this typically applies when D has a legal duty to act. Examples: § In manslaughter by gross negligence, D’s failure to provide necessary care or assistance (where there is a legal duty to do so) can result in criminal liability if the omission leads to death. This applies to certain categories of individuals, such as parents (who have a duty to care for their children) or professionals like doctors (who have a duty to provide medical care). 4. Key Cases: o Treacy v DPP : This case distinguished between result and conduct crimes, reinforcing the importance of proving a consequence in result crimes. o Berry : Clariﬁed the role of causation in criminal law and further highlighted the distinction between result and conduct crimes. o Steer : This case demonstrated how causation must be established, particularly in relation to criminal damage o:enses. Whole of Actus Reus and Causation Whole of Actus Reus Must Be Satisﬁed 1. Actus Reus and Mens Rea Relationship: o Actus reus (the physical element of a crime) must be fully satisﬁed for a person to be criminally liable, even if they had the necessary mens rea (the mental element). Simply having the mens rea for an o:ense is not su:icient without fulﬁlling the actus reus. o Key Example: R v White : D put poison in his mother’s drink, intending to kill her. However, she died from a heart attack unrelated to the poison. Although D had the mens rea (intention to kill), he was acquitted of murder because his actions did not cause her death. Since causation—an essential part of the actus reus for murder—was missing, D could not be convicted of the o:ense but was convicted of attempted murder instead. o Mistaken Circumstances: A person cannot be convicted of a crime if the necessary circumstances for the actus reus are absent. For example, if someone handles goods believing they are stolen, they cannot be convicted of handling stolen goods unless the goods are actually stolen. This would only result in a conviction of attempted handling stolen goods. 2. Key Principles: o Criminal liability requires that all elements of the actus reus— conduct, consequences (if required), and circumstances—be satisﬁed. o Even if the consequence of an o:ense occurs (e.g., death in a murder case), the causal link between D’s actions and the consequence must be proven to establish criminal liability. Causation in Criminal Law 1. Factual Causation: o The prosecution must prove that D’s conduct was a factual cause of the speciﬁed consequence. o This is tested using the “but for” test: Would the consequence have occurred “but for” D’s conduct? o Example Scenarios: If D stabs V, and V is decapitated by another person (X) the next day, D's conduct is not a factual cause of V's death. V would have died from decapitation regardless of D's actions. In R v White, D’s conduct (poisoning) was not a factual cause of his mother’s death because she died of natural causes before the poison could take e:ect. o Factual Causation and Impossibility: Factual causation does not exist if D was incapable of preventing the consequence. For example, in Dalloway , D was driving carelessly, but even if he had been more careful, he would not have been able to prevent a child’s death. Therefore, D was not liable for manslaughter. 2. Legal Causation: o Even if factual causation is established, the consequence must be legally attributable to D’s conduct. Legal causation involves determining whether D’s actions were su:iciently connected to the consequence to hold D legally responsible. o Legal causation often applies in cases of homicide, where the death must be attributable to D's conduct. However, principles of legal causation can vary depending on the type of o:ense. o Substantial Cause: D’s conduct must be a substantial cause of the consequence, meaning it must be more than negligible or trivial. It does not need to be the principal or sole cause, but it must contribute signiﬁcantly to the outcome. Example: In R v Smith , D stabbed V, who later died. Despite the fact that inadequate medical treatment contributed to V’s death, D's stabbing was still considered a substantial cause of the death, making D liable. o Acceleration of Death: If D’s actions accelerate V’s death, even slightly, D can still be held liable. For example, if V is already dying from an illness and D’s conduct hastens their death, D can still be liable for homicide. 3. Intervening Acts: o Causation can be complicated by intervening acts (novus actus interveniens), which may break the chain of causation. However, not all intervening acts will absolve D of liability. Example: If D stabs V and a doctor provides negligent medical treatment that contributes to V’s death, the chain of causation may not be broken if D’s actions were still a substantial cause. o Key Case: In R v Pagett , D used his pregnant girlfriend as a human shield during a shootout with the police. When the police returned ﬁre, killing the girlfriend, D was held liable for her death because his actions had signiﬁcantly contributed to the fatal outcome. 4. Contributions by Third Parties: o D’s conduct does not have to be the sole or main cause of the consequence. The contributions of third parties do not necessarily break the chain of causation if D’s conduct remains a substantial cause. o Example: In R v Benge , D, a foreman, misread a railway timetable, causing a train accident that led to several deaths. Despite other individuals' mistakes (e.g., the driver not seeing a signal), D was still liable because his conduct was a substantial cause of the accident. Key Concepts and Cases 1. More than Minimal Contribution: o The courts often state that a speciﬁed consequence can only be attributed to D if D’s conduct was a substantial cause of the outcome. A contribution must be more than minimal or negligible. o Case Example: In R v Cato , D was convicted of manslaughter after injecting V with heroin, which caused V’s death. Although V may have voluntarily taken the drugs, D’s role in administering the heroin was more than a negligible contribution to the death. 2. Causation in Medical Cases: o Causation principles also apply to medical cases, particularly where doctors’ actions or omissions hasten death. o Example: In R v Adams , a doctor administered drugs to ease a patient's su:ering, knowing they would hasten death. The court held that if life is shortened by weeks or months, it can still constitute murder if done with the intent to cause death, though shortening life by a matter of minutes or hours may not meet the threshold for legal causation. Key Takeaways: Whole Actus Reus Requirement: All elements of the actus reus must be satisﬁed for criminal liability, even if D had the requisite mens rea. Factual Causation: D’s conduct must be a factual cause of the consequence, determined using the “but for” test. Legal Causation: D’s conduct must be a substantial and more than negligible cause of the consequence, and the consequence must be legally attributable to D’s actions. Intervening Acts and Third Parties: Intervening acts and third-party contributions may not always break the chain of causation if D’s actions remain a substantial Victim’s Contributory Negligence and Pre-existing Conditions Victim’s Contributory Negligence General Principle: The contributory negligence of a victim (V) does not prevent a defendant (D) from being held liable for the actus reus of an oJence unless the negligence is so gross that it breaks the causal chain between D’s actions and the consequence. o Example: In Longbottom (1849), D was driving too fast when he ran over V, who was deaf and walking in the middle of the road. Despite V's negligence in walking in a dangerous area, D was convicted of manslaughter. V’s contributory negligence was not suJicient to negate D’s liability. o Application: This principle emphasizes that even if V’s actions contribute to the outcome, it does not exonerate D if their conduct is a substantial cause of the harm or death. Pre-existing Conditions in the Victim General Rule: D must take the victim as they ﬁnd them, which means D is liable even if V has a pre-existing medical condition or susceptibility that makes the harm or death more likely. This is often referred to as the “thin skull rule.” o Example: In Hayward (1908), D chased his wife during a heated argument. She had an unknown medical condition (a persistent thymus gland) that made her more susceptible to death from fright and physical exertion. Although there was no direct physical violence, D’s threats and actions caused her death. The court held that D’s liability was not negated by V’s pre-existing condition. Expansion to Mental and Religious Conditions: The principle extends beyond physical conditions to include mental states or even religious beliefs that might inﬂuence V’s actions and their response to D’s conduct. o Example: In Blaue (1975), D stabbed V, who was a Jehovah’s Witness. V refused a life-saving blood transfusion due to her religious beliefs, leading to her death. The court held that D was still liable because the death was directly caused by the stab wound, not V’s refusal of treatment. The court aJirmed that D must take V as they ﬁnd them, including V’s religious beliefs. The court rejected the argument that V’s refusal to undergo treatment was unreasonable, holding that the physical cause of death (the bleeding from the stab wound) was the result of D’s action. V’s religious beliefs were considered part of the “whole person” that D must accept. Key Distinctions in Criminal vs. Tort Law: Under tort law, V’s refusal of medical treatment would likely break the chain of causation if it was not reasonably foreseeable. However, in Blaue, the criminal court emphasized the need for the criminal law to protect public order and maintain accountability for violent acts, refusing to apply the foreseeability test from tort law. o Policy Justiﬁcation: The court stressed that the purpose of criminal law is broader and focuses on public protection. Therefore, once D’s conduct is proven to be a substantial cause of the consequence, liability is not diminished by the victim’s personal choices (such as religious beliefs). Key Takeaways 1. Contributory Negligence: V’s negligence in contributing to the harmful outcome will not usually exonerate D unless V’s actions are so gross that they completely sever the causal link between D’s conduct and the outcome. 2. Pre-existing Conditions: D is liable even if V has a pre-existing condition (whether physical, mental, or religious) that makes them more vulnerable to harm. The “thin skull rule” ensures that D cannot escape liability due to unforeseen circumstances in V’s condition. 3. Blaue’s Signiﬁcance: The expansion of the “take your victim as you ﬁnd them” rule to include mental and religious factors highlights the criminal law’s focus on maintaining order and protecting victims, without allowing D to shift blame to V for their choices. Intervening Causes 1. Introduction to Intervening Causes Intervening causes refer to acts or events occurring after a defendant's conduct that may potentially break the chain of causation, impacting whether the defendant can still be held legally responsible for the outcome. The key legal principle is determining whether these intervening causes should absolve or maintain the defendant's responsibility. 2. Intervening Natural Events Principle: Foreseeability: An intervening natural event does not break the chain of causation if it was reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course of events, even if the exact details of the event were not predicted. The consequence remains a ‘natural’ result of the defendant’s actions. Examples: Case Example 1: If a defendant injures a victim and the victim later dies from exposure to cold weather, the death is attributable to the defendant’s actions if the weather was a foreseeable risk. Case Example 2: In Hart v. R (1986), a defendant who left a victim at a beach below the high water line was still responsible for the victim's drowning by the incoming tide. Exceptions: If the intervening event is highly unusual and not reasonably foreseeable (e.g., an earthquake or lightning strike), it may break the chain of causation. 3. Intervening Acts by the Victim or a Third Party General Rule: Immediate Cause: If the defendant's act is an immediate and substantial cause of the consequence, the defendant can be held legally responsible even if an intervening act by the victim or a third party also contributed to the outcome. Examples: Case Example 1: If a defendant stabs a victim, and another person subsequently stabs the victim, causing the victim’s death through a cumulative eJect of the wounds, both the defendant and the second attacker can be held responsible. Case Example 2: In Malcherek; Steel (1981), defendants were convicted of murder even though the immediate cause of death was the switching oJ of life- support machines. Non-Immediate Causes: If the defendant’s act is not the immediate cause but sets the stage for an intervening act by someone else, the chain of causation might be broken if the intervening act was free, deliberate, and informed. Key Test (Hart and Honoré): An intervening act by a victim or third party that is free, deliberate, and informed breaks the chain of causation from the defendant’s act. For example, if a victim self-administers a harmful substance voluntarily and with full knowledge, this act might break the chain of causation. Cases: Pagett: The Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s responsibility where police shot the victim in self-defense while the defendant was using the victim as a shield. Latif and Shahzad: The House of Lords conﬁrmed Hart and Honoré’s principle, emphasizing that free and informed actions of a second party can relieve the ﬁrst actor of responsibility if not acting in concert. 4. Recent Developments and Criticisms Kennedy (No 2) (2007): ReaJirmed the Hart and Honoré principle, rejecting the argument that the provision of heroin alone could be considered administering the substance. The critical factor was whether the victim’s act of self-injection was voluntary and informed. Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd (1999): Concerned a strict liability oJense involving pollution. The House of Lords held that if a third party's act was not extraordinary, it could still be attributable to the defendant, despite the Hart and Honoré principle. Girdler (2009) and MH (2010): The Court of Appeal held that in cases of causing death by dangerous or careless driving, an intervening act by another person that was not reasonably foreseeable could break the chain of causation. 5. Summary Natural Events: If foreseeable, do not break the chain of causation. Victim or Third-Party Acts: Free, deliberate, and informed acts may break the chain; otherwise, the defendant may still be liable. Legal Principles: The application of causation principles can vary depending on the context, including strict liability and criminal oJenses. 1. Neglect or Maltreatment by the Victim 2.49 If V neglects or mistreats themselves following D's act, this does not prevent V's subsequent death from being legally attributed to D, as long as D's act remains a substantial and operating cause of the death. Case Law: Wall (1802): In this historical case, D, the governor of a colony, was charged with murder after sentencing V, a soldier, to illegal ﬂogging. It was argued that V's death might have been avoided if he had not consumed alcohol while hospitalized due to the ﬂogging. The judge directed the jury that there was no defense if D's actions placed V in a hazardous situation where V's own negligent behavior could contribute to the fatal outcome. The jury convicted D, indicating that D's initial act remained a substantial cause despite V's subsequent actions. Holland (1841): D inﬂicted wounds on V, leading to blood poisoning. V was advised to have his ﬁnger amputated to prevent death, but he refused. V eventually died from lockjaw. The court held that whether V's refusal of treatment made the wound instantly mortal or caused death only through V's failure to seek the best treatment was irrelevant. The jury returned a guilty verdict, aJirming that D's act was a substantial cause of death. 2.50 The judgment in Wall recognized that a victim’s unreasonable neglect or maltreatment could potentially impact legal attribution, but this is considered in light of the circumstances and the reasonableness of the victim's actions. Blaue (1975): This case reaJirmed the principle that despite advancements in medical science, a victim's refusal of a reasonable medical treatment does not break the chain of causation if D’s act remains a substantial cause of death. Dear (1996): D slashed V, who later died either by reopening his wounds or failing to stop the bleeding, potentially due to suicide or neglect. The Court of Appeal upheld D’s conviction, aJirming that D’s acts were still a substantial cause of death regardless of V’s conduct. 2. Death or Injury in Attempting to Escape 2.52 If D instills fear in V, and V is killed or injured while trying to escape, D can still be held legally responsible if V’s reaction was within the range of responses that could reasonably be expected. The test is whether V's actions were a natural consequence of D's conduct. Roberts (1971): In this case, D’s attempt to remove V's coat led V to jump from a moving car and get injured. The Court of Appeal found that V's reaction was foreseeable, and D was held liable. Marjoram (2000): The Court of Appeal clariﬁed that the reasonable person in D’s shoes is not considered in determining causation. The focus is on whether V's response was a natural and foreseeable result of D's conduct. 2.53 This principle may be relevant in cases where V commits suicide as a response to abuse by D. Dhaliwal (2006): The court recognized that if D’s conduct caused a psychiatric illness leading to V’s suicide, D might still be liable, but the legal attribution would depend on causation principles. The principle applied would assess whether V's suicide was a foreseeable consequence of D's actions. 3. Intervening Medical Treatment 2.54 Medical treatment, whether surgical or medicinal, will not exonerate D if the treatment is not negligent. The chain of causation remains intact if the treatment is given with proper care and skill. 2.55 Even if medical treatment is negligent, it generally only breaks the chain of causation in exceptional cases. The negligence must be so signiﬁcant that it independently causes death. Smith (1959): D’s stabbing of V was followed by inadequate medical treatment. The Court held that if the original wound was still a substantial cause of death at the time of V's death, D was still legally responsible. Jordan (1956): The case involved fatal treatment errors after D’s stabbing. The Court found that treatment errors, which were ‘palpably wrong,’ broke the chain of causation. This case was distinguished in later judgments. Cheshire (1991): The Court of Appeal conﬁrmed that negligent medical treatment would only break the chain of causation if it was so independent of D’s actions and potent in causing death. Cheshire involved a rare complication following a tracheotomy. 2.59 The principles in Jordan and Cheshire apply when the injury prevents life-saving treatment for a pre-existing condition. McKechnie (1991): Injuries inﬂicted by D prevented necessary treatment for a duodenal ulcer, leading to death. The Court held that only an extraordinary decision that treatment was impossible would break the chain of causation. Summary Neglect/Maltreatment: Victim’s own neglect or maltreatment does not absolve D if D’s actions are still a substantial cause of death. Escape Reactions: D is liable if V’s response to escape was reasonably foreseeable. Medical Treatment: Negligent medical treatment generally does not break the chain of causation unless it is extraordinarily severe and independent of D’s actions. Omissions as a Cause of Death 2.60 The issue of omissions and causation often revolves around the challenge of linking a failure to act with the resultant harm. An omission, or failure to act when legally required, does not in itself start the causal chain leading to harm. Instead, it reﬂects a failure to prevent other factors from causing the harm. Legal Duty to Act: A person may be legally obligated to act, such as rescuing a child from drowning. Failure to act in such situations can lead to criminal liability if the omission results in harm that could have been prevented by fulﬁlling the duty. Attribution of Consequence: For an omission to be legally attributable to the harm, it must be shown that: o The harm could have been prevented if the duty had been fulﬁlled. o The failure to act was the proximate cause of the harm. Case Example: If a parent neglects to seek medical help for a sick child, and the child dies as a result, the parent can be held legally responsible if the child’s death would have been prevented with timely medical intervention. However, if the medical attention would not have altered the outcome (i.e., the child might still have died), the omission is not considered the legal cause of death. Comparison: Others who fail to act without a legal duty (e.g., bystanders) cannot be held legally accountable for the resultant harm, even if their failure to act satisﬁes the 'but for' test of causation, because they lack the requisite legal duty. Causation: The Role of Judge and Jury 2.61 The determination of causation in criminal cases involves both judicial and jury functions: Role of the Judge: The judge is responsible for: o Directing the jury on the relevant principles of causation. o Ensuring that the jury understands how to apply these principles to the facts of the case. Role of the Jury: The jury must: o Apply the legal principles provided by the judge to the facts presented. o Determine whether the prosecution has established the causal link between the defendant’s actions (or omissions) and the harm. Case Law Guidance: o Pagett (1983): The Court of Appeal emphasized that while it is typically unnecessary to detail causation directions if the facts are clear, a judge must not remove causation from the jury’s consideration merely because it seems clear-cut. The judge must guide the jury on the relevant causation principles and then let the jury decide based on those principles. o Blaue (1975): Conﬁrmed that if causation is not in dispute and only the application of law to facts is needed, the judge may direct the jury on the outcome. However, the judge cannot preemptively conclude causation to the exclusion of the jury’s role. Speciﬁc Causation Issues: When particular issues of legal attribution arise (e.g., intervening acts or speciﬁc types of omissions), the judge must provide precise instructions on the applicable legal principles. The jury must then evaluate the facts against these principles to determine causation. Judicial Discretion: Although judges have some discretion in directing the jury, they cannot withdraw the causation issue from the jury’s consideration based on a belief that the evidence is conclusive. The jury retains the ﬁnal role in determining whether the prosecution has proved causation beyond reasonable doubt.

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