Criminal Law PDF

voluntary v involuntary 1) Was there an act? 2) Was it voluntary? Liability for Omission in order to prosecute: - legal duty to act - failure to act causes harm - physically capable of performing the act - fyi there is no duty to rescue Concurrence Requirement - mens rea and actus reus of an offe...

voluntary v involuntary 1) Was there an act? 2) Was it voluntary? Liability for Omission in order to prosecute: - legal duty to act - failure to act causes harm - physically capable of performing the act - fyi there is no duty to rescue Concurrence Requirement - mens rea and actus reus of an offense must be met simultaneously - a link between all three elements of an offense - actus reus (voluntary act) - mens rea (defendant’s state of mind) at the time of the actus reus - the result (if one is needed) caused by the actus reus People v Newton; State v. Martin = no voluntary act - Newtown “semi unconscious” from shot - Martin did not voluntarily appear per statute People v. Decina = broader time scope of voluntary act means voluntary act present - Decina’s voluntary act was to operate the vehicle, though the seizure caused the accident Legality, Culpability, Proportionality Legality - no crime without law - state cannot punish an action as criminal unless there is a law against it - ex post facto = can only apply law to future behavior Culpability - something blameworthy (wrong) Proportionality - scale of punishment fits scale of crime - actus reus / mens rea Criminal Law Purposes - deterrence for disobeying law - specific (consequence) - general (existence of law sends message to society) - rehabilitation - retribution / punishment - validation for victim - incapacitation - removal of criminal to ensure no further crime Material Elements: actus reus = physical or external portion of crime (evil/guilty act) mens rea = mental or internal feature (guilty mind, awareness, want, intent) (culpable state of mind when committing crime) result requirement = cannot prove unless x happened causation = defendant caused result attendant circumstance = fact or circumstance which must be true for defendant to be guilty Actus Reus - voluntary act (or failure to act) 1 - causes (2) social harm (3) - no one is punishable for thoughts, must be an action (pragmatically can’t read minds) - still have the opportunity to desist from a plan Voluntary Act - not guilty unless voluntary act (common law support) - act is a bodily movement; physical not necessarily visible - excludes mental act (thinking) - does not include the harm/results - voluntary v involuntary - duress / mental disorder (insanity) - insufficient free choice to be blamed - habitual act = voluntary - hypnotism, sleep walking could be involuntary - MP/DID voluntary - rationale ~ law cannot deter involuntary movement - involuntariness is not a defense, but an element Crimes of Possession - inchoate offenses (incomplete) - purpose is to provide basis for arrest to stop a socially injurious act - equal to omission; statutory duty to dispossess property Robinson v California - made status illegal = not constitutional Mens Rea - Culpable mental states “an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at all” - Blackstone broad sense = synonymous with moral fault narrow sense = formal and technical requirement - kind of mental awareness or intention that must accompany the prohibited act - relating to statute defining the offense - did the defendant intend, expect, or should have expected his actions would produce particular consequences? actus reus (guilty / evil act) mens rea (guilty mind) CL - intent (knowledge) - recklessness (consciously aware of risk, consciously disregards) = subjective standard - negligence (should the defendant have been aware) = objective standard MPC = 2.02 (2) (a-d) - purpose - knowledge - recklessness - negligence - malice (intent or recklessness) - mens rea for each element of the statute - requisite mens rea (required in statute to violate) - possessed mens rea (what did the perp actually have) Regina v. Cunningham = gas meter - requisite mens rea absent per “maliciously” which is knowledge or intent Regina v. Faulkner - requisite mens rea absent; stealing rum does not include intent to burn down ship mens rea when not in statute (strict liability) basic presumption of mens rea for criminal law mala in se = in itself evil - needs mens rea to prove culpability for wrong behavior malum prohibitum = evil because it’s prohibited - statutes not requiring mens rea usually here - United States v. Dotterweich - drugs were mislabeled and therefore violated interstate commerce law - those with the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than hazard the public - United States v. Balint - “the act’s manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) Plaintiff entered an Air Force practice bombing range and took spent bomb casings, flattened them, and sold them at a flea ma rket for $84. He was charged and convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §641 (crime to knowingly convert government property with jail time dependent on profit). The “knowingly convert” statute leaves no mens rea requirement, supreme court held that the statute should be interpreted so the defendant must be proven to have known the facts that made the conversion wrongful (that the property had not been abandoned by its owner) Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) Defendant charged with violating the National Firearms Act (§5861) as a rifle found in his possession was determined to be a “firearm” as defined in the statute. He requested that the jury be instructed to find that he “knew the gun would fire fully automatically” which the court refused. The §5861 (d) is silent on a mens rea requirement. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §2252, which has a misleading mens rea requirement, SC overturned conviction citing public welfare offense as in Balint and Dotterweich did not apply, more similar to Morissette and Staples; the court should have had the jury find proof that it was known that the pornography contained minors. *The more serious the penalty, the less likely the court is to assume strict liability* Vicarious Liability State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986) waitress served alcohol to underage patrons; she was arrested and charged with violating a statute. Guminga was also charged with a separate charge for vicarious criminal liability on the employer whose employee serves intoxicating liquor to a minor. Guminga was unaware that the waitress served the alcohol. The court held that the statute violated Guminga’s due process rights. “no one can be convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for an act he did not commit, did not have knowledge of, or give express or implied consent to the commission thereof” Mistake of Law §2.04 (1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of law or fact is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense mistake of the same law (mistake of fact) o made a mistake as to, or was unaware of, the law of which he was charged o subject of the prosecution mistake of a different law o he did not have the mens rea to violate the law o general intent offense = no defense intentional or reckless based crime, reasonable mistake = defense general intent offense, reasonable mistake = no defense (2) Defense is not available when: (mistake of the same law / fact) - defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed - reduces the grade and degree of the offense, guilty of what he supposed (3) Defense when: (mistake of a different law) - statute or other defining offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably available prior to the alleged conduct (two element test) - acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law later determined to be invalid or erroneous contained in a (1) statute, (2) judicial decision, (3) administrative order or grant of permission, or (4) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or enforcement of the law defining the offense (4) DEFENDANT MUST PROVE A DEFENSE UNDER (3) by a preponderance of evidence (beyond reasonable doubt) People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987) Defendant, a federal corrections officer in CT, was charged with unlicensed possession of a.38 caliber pistol in NYC in violation of statute. The statute exempted peace officers as defined in another statute, which he believed applied to him. Was his mistaken belief based on something written in the law? Here, yes. Majority opinion was that he was guilty and there was no error in the law. Dissent holds that his defense of mistake of law was correct under the model penal code due to the statute later being found to be erroneous. Causation When a crime is defined without regard to result of defendant’s conduct (ie an attempt), no need for causation Where a particular result is a necessary element of the crime, defendant’s act or culpable omission must cause the result Prosecution must prove the casual link beyond a reasonable doubt Most frequent problem cases = homicide People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1991) Acosta appeals his conviction of three counts of second degree murder for the deaths of three helicopter pilots. Acosta was in a stolen vehicle and was approached on the ground by officers. He lead them on a 48-mile chase through Orange County, CA. Police helicopters were deployed to track his escape. As Acosta crossed city lines, two helicopters communicated to swap the track. During the switch, the helicopter from Costa Mesa collied with the helicopter from Huntington Beach, killing all three aboard. The pilot from CM violated 2 FAA regulations in the swap. Acosta claims that there was insufficient evidence that he was the proximate cause of the collision, as he says a collision between ground vehicles was a foreseeable reasonable result of his actions, one between airborne craft was not. Also claiming the FAA violations were the superseding case. Sine qua non test: but for the defendant’s act would the injury have occurred? Unless an act is an actual cause of the injury, it will not be considered a proximate cause. Was the death of the helicopter pilots foreseeable? “common sense of the common man as to determine common things” Does not involve the defendant’s state of mind, but focuses upon the objective conditions present when he acts. Here, but for Acosta fleeing, the helicopters would not have been in the position for the crash. The crash was a reasonably contemplated consequence; given the dynamics of any police pursuit, there is an appreciable probability that one of the pursuers may act negligently or recklessly to catch the perp. The mens rea requirement for second degree murder, however, was found to have insufficient proof. The evidence did not show that Acosta deliberately consciously disregard the risk to the helicopter pilots. The second degree murder charge was reversed. Similar results in: People v. Brady, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286 (2005) for airplanes that collided while fighting a fire; the defendant who recklessly started the fire was guilty of both deaths. People v. Skiff, 59 Cal. App. 5th 571 (2021) for an elderly man at a care home with dementia signs allowed to wander around the grounds unsupervised; he wandered into the street and was struck and killed; the administrator was guilty of involuntary manslaughter People v. Ryan, 77 N.Y.S.3d 411 (2018) for a police officer who was hit by a third party vehicle after responding to a drunk driving accident; the drunk driver was guilty of causing the officer’s death; the dangerous driving se tin motion the events that caused it Factual cause = sine qua non (but for); the harm would not have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s act Proximate cause = the act, in addition to being a but for cause, must have a close relationship to the resulting harm - foreseeability - scope of the risk created by conduct Can conduct be treated as legal cause when it is not factual cause? State v. Montoya, 61 P.3d 793 (2002) = a private body guard shot and severely wounded Lowery. Montoya, one of the shooter’s associates, drove the victim to a secluded location where he died. Montoya was convicted of murder because he caused the death by preventing medical care, though that only “could have” saved Lowery’s life. State v. Muro, 695 N.W.2d 425 (2005) = Muro came home to discover that her husband had beaten their daughter and fractured her skull. Muro waited four hours before getting her medical attention and she died. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the state had only proved only the possibility of survival with earlier treatment, it failed to prove but-for causation beyond a reasonable doubt. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) = Burrage was convicted in the death of Banka for a drug overdose after supplying him with heroin. He had several other substances in his system. Without the heroin, his death would have been possible but much less likely. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the lack of but-for causation beyond a reasonable doubt as the drug supplied was not an independently sufficient case of the victim’s death. People v. Arzon, 92 Misc. 2d 739, 401 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1978) Arzon was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and third degree arson after he intentionally set fire to a couch, causing a severe fire on the fifth floor of an abandoned building in NYC. Two firefighters perished in the smoke from another independent fire on the second floor. His conviction was due to “engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person.” Arzon contended that the evidence was insufficient, as murder requires a causal link between the underlying crime and the death. The court cites two cases and reasons that the conduct need to be the sole and exclusive factor in the victim’s death. Defendant is criminally liable if his conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the death and the ultimate harm was foreseeable as being reasonably related to the act. It was reasonably foreseeable that the firefighters would respond to the fire and expose them to life threatening danger. The fire was an indispensable link in the chain of events that resulted in the death. Does an intervening cause break the chain of causation? Here, no. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660 (1980) The corp was indicted for second degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide when a massive explosion occurred at one of their chewing gum factories. They used magnesium sterate (MS) which is potentially explosive. They had been warned by their insurance company that the high concentration of dust created an explosion hazard and the hazard had not been mediated at the time of the explosion. The court held that there was no hard proof as to what (act) caused the explosion, therefore the e vidence was insufficient to establish the foreseeability of the immediate triggering cause. Most statutes do not include explicit rules for determining causation Specific causal mechanism = ie Warner Lambert Co. dependent on nature of intervention foreseeability & coincidence = shit happens - is it foreseeable or not - no actual intent of outcome human intervention - actual cause was not the person who is charged, but argument is an intervening superseding cause brought about by another person (1) person purposefully (intentionally) caused intervening act (2) person recklessly caused intervening act - defendant tries to argue he is not the proximate cause due to intervention if a death is directly caused by an intervening person, it breaks the chain of causation Is medical malpractice foreseeable? Regina v. Cheshire, 3 All E.R. 670 (1991) = if at the time of death the original wound is still an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can be properly said to be the result of the wound even though some other cause of death is also operat ing. State v. Shabazz, 719 A.2d 440 (1998) = defendant stabbed the victim in the abdomen, lung, and liver. He underwent surgery and post op room. He died the following morning in a normal room due to heavy bleeding as a result from the liver surgery. The tr ial judge barred the defense from including testimony in regards to hospital’s negligence (he was placed on blood thinners and in a normal hospital room); the appellate court held that the testimony was properly excluded as there was no evidence that the hospital’s negligence was the sole cause of the death. The stab wounds would have been fatal in the absence of any medical treatment. The defendant should not escape liability because the hospital may have contributed to the death. United States v. Main, 113 F.3d 1046 (1997) = while fleeing police at high speed, defendant’s truck hit an obstacle. He was thrown but the passenger was stuck. Responding officer did not move the passenger for fear of a neck injury; the passenger died because they were in a position where they could not breathe. The trial court did not instruct that the defendant’s actions could not be the proximate cause and that failure to summon medical assistance was possible. The trial court agreed that the jury should have to find which was the proximate cause. Transferred Intent if an actor intends to kill someone and accidentally kills someone else instead, the intent is transferred and he is guilty of intentionally killing that person People v. Campbell, 124 Mich. App. 333, 335 N.W.2d 27 (1983) Campbell gave Basnaw a gun after drinking with him and convincing him to kill himself after he had sex with Campbell’s wife. Campbell moved to dismiss on the ground that a homicide charge could not be based on the act of providing a weapon. The court of appeals granted the motion. Due to the statutory definition of murder, suicide excludes by definition a homicide. Campbell had no intention to kill; he provided the weapon and departed. He hoped he would kill himself but hope does not equal the intention needed for a murder charge. People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714 (1994) Procedural Posture The state assisted suicide statute was not violative of the state constitution because it embraced only one object and was thus validly enacted and because it was not enacted in violation of a change in purpose clause of the state constitution. Overview The prosecution appealed the court of appeals' determination that an assisted suicide statute under which defendants were charged was enacted in violation of Mich. Const. 1963, art. IV, § 24. The court held (1) the assisted suicide statute embraced only one object and was thus validly enacted, (2) the statute was not enacted in violation of the Change in Purpose clause of the state constitution, (3) the United States Supreme Court would not find a liberty interest in suicide, let alone assisted suicide, that was protected by the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV , (4) the principles that guided the analysis of substantive due process did not support the recognition of a right to commit suicide, (5) it was incorrect to conclude on the basis of the absence of criminal penalties for an act of suicide itself that there was a constitutional right to commit suicide, (6) there was no fundamental right to commit suicide that was protected by the Due Process Clause. Outcome The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to the claimed state constitutional violation and remande d the case to the circuit court. Foreseeability v autonomy foreseeability is interceded when free will takes causation Physical events produced by a persons actions are caused by that person second person’s actions are chosen and caused by the second person alone novus actus interveniens = later action by another person that displaces the relevance of prior conduct and provides a new foundation for causal responsibility Only actions that were chosen freely are independent subsequent actions that recklessly risk the result a. People v. Kern, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1989) = Howard Beach Incident; group of white teenagers assaulted several black men in the neighborhood after the later group’s car broke down. The former chased the men with bats and racial epithets and threatened death. One of the men tried to escape by running across a highway and was struck and killed. Former tried to argue that there was insufficient evidence for causation in their manslaughter charge. It was upheld b. People v. Matos, 83 N.Y.2d 509 (1994) = defendant ran from police following robbery, climbed a ladder to the roof of a building and fled across rooftops. Pursuing officer fell down an air shaft and died. Matos was convicted of felony murder because the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s crime and flight. Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961) Root was found not guilty of manslaughter after drag racing with the decedent. Root’s behavior was found to be negligent and not the direct causal connection to the decedent’s death due to the decedent’s “reckless and suicidal” swerving of his car State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608 (1982) Defendant was convicted of two counts of manslaughter following a drag race with a deceased man. The decedent’s vehicle hit one car and then veered into oncoming traffic, striking a third vehicle which resulted in the death of a 6yo passenger. McFadden argued that the direct causal connection was lacking, as in Root. The court here applied an arguably lesser standard to affirm McFadden’s charge by the court determining that a distinction between civil and criminal proximate cause, which the court refused to modify. The court reasoned that McFadden’s reckless driving was the proximate cause of both deaths. Commonwealth v. Attencio, 345 Mass. 627 (1963) Several defendants were convicted of manslaughter for the death of Stewart Britch after the group spent the day drinking wine , one of them came in with a gun and a single bullet to “play” Russian roulette. Marshall shot the gun at his head (blank), passed it to Attencio (blank), who then passed it to Britch (bullet). The court reasons that a civil case may not be successful due to Britch’s voluntary act, but holds that they are guilty of manslaughter due to the concerted action and cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about Britch’s “foolish act.” The court reasons that the defendants had a duty to not cooperate or join at a crime (the game), and therefore they were more than just present as a crime occurred. not just a deliberate act, but a deliberate act which has a certain result = other defendants not liable, chain of causation broken not just deliberate act, but a deliberate act which has an uncertain result = other defendants liable, part of chain of causation MPC 2.03 proximate cause is not a MPC concept culpability (CL mens rea) cause in fact purpose or knowledge start: What is the requisite mens rea for the statute of the crime? then: apply relevant rule Attempt attempt to commit a crime is a separate offense from the underlying crime is someone guilty of attempt? crime must be tried but not successfully committed mens rea issue, actus reus issue has to be mens rea = specific intent to bring about result (higher than recklessness) Attempt usual punishment for attempt is a reduced factor of the punishment for the completed crime - maximum term of not more than 1/2 the maximum term for the offense defendant has to be proved to have specific intent to bring about result (mens rea requirement) Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512 (1996) Smallwood raped three women while being infected with HIV. He was charged with assault with intent to murder and three counts of attempted second-degree murder. Smallwood argued that the act was insufficient to infer an intent to kill and at best was reckless endangerment. The state argued that Smallwood’s HIV status was equivalent to a deadly weapon. The court reasons that intent to kill can be interpreted from circumstantial evidence as in Raines where a deadly weapon was directed at a vital part of the human body. The test there was (1) Raines knew his weapon was deadly and (2) Raines knew he was firing it at someone’s head. The court here finds more factors; Raines rested on it being permissible to infer that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act when a deadly weapon is fired at a vital part because the risk of killing is so high that it becomes reasonable to assume that the defendant intended the victim to die “as a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s actions.” Although the risk Smallwood exposed his victims too was significant, it cannot be fairly concluded that death by AIDS was his intent. There was no further evidence that Smallwood intended to kill, his actions were fully explained by an intent to commit rape and armed robbery. an attempt requires “specific intent” even when recklessness or lesser mens rea would suffice for a conviction of the completed offense Preparation v. Attempt People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334 (1927) Rizzo and others had a plan to rob Rao of payroll which he was picking up at a bank. Rizzo was to identify him while the others did the hold up. They had trouble locating Rao and were trailed by police, who arrested them at a location where Rao was not. The court reasons that to be guilty of attempt to commit, the preparation must not be too remote from a potential commission. Here, the defendants were still in preparation and looking for the opportunity to attempt, but the opportunity did not arise. Commonwealth v. Bell, 917 N.E.2d 740 (2009) Undercover police officer agreed to let Bell prostitute her (fake) 14yo daughter for $200 if he followed her to where she “was” a mile away. When they left the parking lot, he was arrested for soliciting prostitution and attempted rape. The court overturned the attempted rape charge: “we look to the actions left to be taken, or the distance or gap between the defendant’s actions and the (unachieved) goal of the consummated crime — the distance must be relatively short, the gap narrow, if the defendant is to be held guilty of a criminal attempt.” proximity test - how close to the crime being committed unequivocality test - what he did by himself before intervened shows intent to complete does the conduct already carried out unequivocally demonstrate that he was going to go through with the crime McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388 (1953) a black man was convicted of attempt to commit assault with intent to rape after allegedly following Allen near her home after seeing her outside a diner. The police testified that he confessed that he intended to rape or kill her. Despite no actual attempt, he was convicted in a racially tumultuous era. United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (1977) MPC analysis of attempt Defendants had sawed off shotguns and masks, etc, in their car and were canvassing a bank. FBI agents arrested them. In opposition to the proximity test where there was still a substantial step to be taken, the MPC looks at the steps already taken which the court reasons the items would serve no lawful purpose and constituted a “substantial step” and strongly corroborated their criminal purpose and the firmness of the appellant’s criminal intent. Impossibility People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497 (1906) Jaffe was charged with receiving stolen fabric which had been feloniously stolen in violation with 550 of the Penal Code which provides a person who buys or receives any stolen property knowing to have been stolen is guilty of criminally receiving. Issue: can defendant be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime where it appears without dispute that the property he sou ght to receive was not in fact stolen property? If all which an accused person intends to would constitute no crime it cannot be a crime to attempt to do with the same purpo se a part of the thing intended: Act, intent, the knowledge of an existing condition People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155 (1977) If a person engaged in conduct which would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impos sible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the person believed them to be. Issue: is Dlugash guilty of attempted murder even though the target was already slain by the hand of another? Dlugash and Bush were out drinking with Geller. Geller was asking Bush to contribute to rent money and after drinking, Bush shot Geller at the apartment three times. Geller fell to the floor and Dlugash pulled out his gun and shot Geller 5 times in the h ead and face. Dlugash’s defense is that Geller was already dead. Medical testimony supported that Bush would have died from the initial shots from Bush, but could not confirm that he would h ave been dead when Dlugash shot him. what would the result be in MPC jurisdiction or common law? MPC what has been done; common law what is left to be done (how close to commission) which would you choose as the better result and why?