Electricity Final Exam Notes PDF
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This document covers electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, along with concepts of deregulation, cost minimization, price fluctuations, and reliability. It discusses different power generation resources like hydro, nuclear, and coal, and details various market mechanisms and regulations. The document explores concepts like marginal cost, heat rate, capacity factor, and nodal pricing.
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Electricity Final upper generation stream : Middle stream-transmission Downstream-distribution Power plants > - transmission > -...
Electricity Final upper generation stream : Middle stream-transmission Downstream-distribution Power plants > - transmission > - substation > distribution - Subtransmission Customer 26 KV and 69kv Primary customer 13 KV and 4kV (homes secondary customer 120V and 240v avoid monopolies Regulation to and overcharging - and demand Regulated price caps don't reflect true at supply regulated rates Under regulation all prices are # ESO - Alberta IESO- Ontario Deregulation Pros and Cons Pros : cost minimize incentives marginal market , cost , pricing cons-price fluctuation , congestion Power (watts) (seconds) Energy (joules) = = Time Watt Kilowatt-> megawatte Eigawatte terawatt 1000 watts = 1 KW Peakload-highest demand (11. 5 GW) Baseload-minimum amount of demand to be met (7 6 GW). Baseload generators - hydro ; nuclear , coal , gas Electricity generation-hydro , nuclear , natural gas Main resource BC Wil Alb > coal Yukon) hydr a NB) nuclear Sask FEI) wind Que alternates frequency-rate at which a current North - american frequency 60 Hr - amount of Votage electrical pressure that pushes current - a the market Marginal costs in electricity I ↓ system costs operating costs heat rate-efficiency of a generator to utilize heat content (1 kwh of electricity BTU-british thermal units Capacity factor actual - output of plant to its max possible output Total cost = heat rate x Eas price X O & M cost for competetive prices Design > auction - sealed bid auction increase competition Truth telling-generator offers marginal cost and reliable Submarkets real facilitate better - functioning time market Registration Suppliers register to participate - Network modelling analyze grid behaviour - CRR auction-auction to receive payments when congestion occurs Day Ahead : submit offers to buy/sell electricity for the next day Reliability : enough generation demand capacity to meet Adjustment period : make last minute adjustments to generation ( consumption plans Real time : actively to customers supplying settlement : parties are paid/charged for transactions Real Time · physical reliability, , penalties /contracts) Day Ahead · financial , one day ahead of real time , voluntary Ancillary sold in ahead, stability demand supply reliability day - = , , , physical Transmission right - financial , arbitrage , hedging annually , Monty weekly) , Capacity - physical , financial (annual month (n) , Bilateral contracts contracts between · signed parties privately Two settlement system - forward market converge with real time -reduce issues gaming - prices converge in every market negative balance for producer = loss negative balance for Consumer = consumer recieves Revenue Q =. +P , + /G2 · Q. ) + P2 Locational Marginal pricing/LMP) Nodal-prices car be different in all locations Zonal-prices can be different in zones but same within Alberta : zonal LMP specific to nodal When there all LMP's equal is no congestion rent used to fund Congestion CRR's Price of transmission right Psink = - Psource the with transmission rights consumer will be paid the difference FTR payoff = /Loc A-Loc B) x.. Quantity Obligation-get paid/pay out no matter what Options - no need to get paid/pay out Acquiring transmission rights auctions special allocations , bilateral trades · , Frequencyofaction, monthly day and a , Ancillary Service Regulation respond to control within 3 to 5 seconds signals · Regulation up : amount avaliable above outpul level but below highest sustainable level down : amount available Regulation below outpult level and is above its own lowest sustainable level Reserves Spinning help restore system frequency - - provided by online resources · respond in 10 minutes (EA) Energy Emergency alert Non Spinning reserves ina longerresponse ' : · offline resources sustained limit # SL , LSL high/low Service limit HASL , LASL high/low ancillary its Ramp rate-how fast a generator changes output #DLLHASL high/low dispatch limit LDL ? LSL point + /Suramp x5) HDL = operating LDL = operatingPoint - (SDramp x5) Reliability Unit Commitment available for serving is - enough capacity ensure forecasted demand RUC payments uplifted: shared cost by all consumers Alberta is an energy only market Price caps Texas $9 , 000 - Netherland Euro - 100 000 , Alberta - $1 ,000 Australia - $13 , 800 weakness - no price clastic demand - price set by supply · market power problems Combustion turbine Investment barriers to immediate cost entry-high ($80-105kW/) · Combine cycle turbine 110-130kw/yr Centry costs) - Capacities a System Cannot Use - planned outage /maintenance forced outage /unexpected due to issue) · · Generation deration (intentional reduction of power output/reduced demand , maintenance , environmental regulations() Capacity margin : capacity in excess of system forecasted pat reserve = (total supply = peals load) /peak load VOLL (value of Lost Load) amount customer is willing to pay when electricity is · lost - no accurate estimation VOLL pricing is regulatory - VOLL: price es VOLL Price caps ERCOT -$9 , 000 Australia - $13 , 800 Alberta -$1 , 000 Netherland - Euro $100 , 000 VoLL and Scarcity balance supply and demand Transient Local Shortage - Peakers allowed to use marginal cost/includes star up cost Peaker pricing is not VOLL pricing - ↓ downward sloping = optimal scarcity pricing - operation reserve pricing is not regulatory Realtime,pricinshedding events Reserve drop below 2000 immediatley adjust to VOLL - Compare operation reserve and VOLL - operation : more market driven risk but operation reserve low occur more frequently · risk and VOLL has more system occurs less frequent · operation = more complex · operation curbs market power voll invites market power Capacity Market sufficent capacity is built - Price of capacity : through capacity market auction - -energy price cap low , since capacity price is to recover fixed cost - Annual auction 3 ahead years smaller balancing auctions leading up to delivery date · - older resources cheaper Market Power - ability to alter prices away from competetive levels strategies Physical witholding - resources not offered to market (whole plant shut down) Economic witholding -resources offered to market but a very high price to evade market (looks like they are still running) the marginal drive up clearing market price Groups Geothermal-consolidated us. Fragmented what country is USA Asia Canada Africa not consolidated Europe Latin America Agriculture to methane rich bio - converting ~ organic waste harder for smaller farms to do it gas - waste and emissions reduction Solar key players - canadian solar , Sun power , Jinko solar, Logni solar * 4 companies > which is key player - hydro · makes up 83 % of Lanada's renewable energy sector Wind of Alberta ruled out 23 % right now · Hydrogen Selectroysisslide Current 60-75 % future 70. 85 % Germany pledged 10 8 billion. for expansion