Case Review on Latheefa Beebi Koya & Anor v Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia & Ors PDF

3.2 Case Review on Latheefa Beebi Koya & Anor v Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia & Ors Facts of the case and the court decision Latheefa Beebi Koya and another lawyer represented Datuk Shamsubahrin Ismail in a corruption investigation involving NFC’s Datuk Seri Dr. Mohamad Salleh. While acco...

3.2 Case Review on Latheefa Beebi Koya & Anor v Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia & Ors Facts of the case and the court decision Latheefa Beebi Koya and another lawyer represented Datuk Shamsubahrin Ismail in a corruption investigation involving NFC’s Datuk Seri Dr. Mohamad Salleh. While accompanying their client to the MACC premises, they were issued notices under Section 30(1)(a) of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009, requiring them to provide statements. The notices warned of criminal penalties for non-compliance. The lawyers challenged the notices through judicial review, arguing that they were ultra vires as they violated solicitor-client privilege and interfered with their constitutional rights under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution (FC). They contended that compelling lawyers to disclose privileged information undermined their professional duties and exposed them to criminal liability. The issue of the case is whether the issuance of notices by MACC is ultra vires, violating the principle of legal professional privilege and the constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 5 of the FC. The court ruled in favor of the lawyers, declaring the notices invalid for exceeding the MACC’s authority. Analysis on the concept of ultra vires was applied in this case The applicants argued that the MACC exceeded its legal authority by issuing notices requiring lawyers to give statements under Section 30 of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Act 2009 (Act 694). The court highlighted that MACC could not compel the lawyers to give statements just because they accompanied their client. The notices violated Section 46 of Act 694, which protects privileged solicitor-client communications. In addition, the independence of lawyers is a globally recognized principle. The MACC’s notices undermined this by forcing lawyers to act against their duty of confidentiality. Thus, the notices were ultra vires because they went beyond the MACC’s powers and interfered with fundamental principles of legal representation. Furthermore, the applicants challenged the validity of the notices through judicial review, arguing that the MACC’s actions affected their legal rights and obligations as lawyers. Judicial review is applicable when a decision alters the rights or obligations of the affected party. The court cited Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service, the House of Lords has stated that for a decision to be amenable to the court’s reviewing powers, there must first be a decision by a decision maker or a refusal by him to make a decision and that decision must impact the aggrieved party either by changing his rights and obligations or by stripping him of the benefits which he has been allowed to enjoy. In this case the notices compelled the applicants to undertake activities that were against their legal responsibilities, in essence the applicants could only choose to obey or face the consequences of Section 30(10) of Act 694. Therefore, The court determined that the issuance of notices was a legal “decision” for judicial review because it directly interfered with the applicants’ rights and obligations. The court held that the applicants were entitled to judicial review, as the notices violated their rights as lawyers and affected their obligations to their client.