Existential Projection of an Authentic Being-towards-death PDF

53· Existential Projection of an Authentic Being-towards-death Factically, Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in an inauthentic Being-towards-death. How is the ontological possibility of an authentic Being-towards-death to be characterized 'Objectively', if, in the end, Das...

53· Existential Projection of an Authentic Being-towards-death Factically, Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in an inauthentic Being-towards-death. How is the ontological possibility of an authentic Being-towards-death to be characterized 'Objectively', if, in the end, Dasein never comports itself authentically towards its end, or if, in accordance with its very meaning, this authentic Being must remain hidden from the Others ? Is it not a fanciful undertaking, to project the existential possibility of so questionable an existentiell potentiality-forBeing? What is needed, if such a projection is to go beyond a merely fictitious arbitrary construction? Does Dasein itself give us any instructions for carrying it out ? And can any grounds for its phenomenal legitimacy be taken from Dasein itself? Can our analysis of Dasein up to this point give us any prescriptions for the ontological task we have now set ourselves, so that what we have before us may be kept on a road of which we can be sure ? The existential conception of death has been established; and therewith we have also established what it is that an authentic Being-towards-theend should be able to comport itself towards. We have also characterized inauthentic Being-towards-death, and thus we have prescribed in a negative way [prohibitiv] how it is possible for authentic Being-towardsdeath not to be. It is with these positive and prohibitive instructions that the existential edifice of an authentic Being-towards-death must let itself be projected. Dasein is constituted by disclosedness-that is, by an understanding with a state-of-mind. Authentic Being-towards-death can not evade its ownmost non-relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by thus fleeing 1 'Weil das Dasein existiert, bestimmt es sich als Seiendes, wie es ist, je aus einer Moglichkeit, die es selbst ist und versteht.' II. I Being and Time from it, or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of the "they". In our existential projection of an authentic Being-towardsdeath, therefore, we must set forth those items in such a Being which are constitutive for it as an understanding of death-and as such an understanding in the sense of Being towards this possibility without either fleeing it or covering it up. In the first instance, we must characterize Being-towards-death as a 261 Being towards a possibiliry-indeed, towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. "Being towards" a possibility-that is to say, towards something possible-may signify "Being out for" something possible, as in concerning ourselves with its actualization, Such possibilities are constantly encountered in the field of what is ready-to-hand and present-athand-what is attainable, controllable, practicable, and the like. In concernfully Being out for something possible, there is a tendency to annihilate the possibility of the possible by making it available to us. But the concernful actualization of equipment which is ready-to-hand (as in producing it, getting it ready, readjusting it, and so on) is always merely relative, since even that which has been actualized is still characterized in terms of some involvements-indeed this is precisely what characterizes its Being. Even though actualized, it remains, as actual, something possible for doing something; it is characterized by an "in-order-to". What our analysis is to make plain is simply how Being out for something concernfully, comports itself towards the possible : it does so not by the theoretico-thematical consideration of the possible as possible, and by having regard for its possibility as such, but rather by looking circumspectively away from the possible and looking at that for which it is possible [das Wofiir-moglich]. Manifestly Being-towards-death, which is now in question, cannot have the character of concernfully Being out to get itself actualized. For one thing, death as possible is not something possible which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but a possibility of Dasein's Being. So to concern oneself with actualizing what is thus possible would have to signify, "bringing about one's demise", But if this were done, Dasein would deprive itself of the very ground for an existing Being-towards-death. Thus, ifby "Being towards death" we do not have in view an 'actualizing' of death, neitheX : can we mean "dwelling upon the end in its possibility". This is the way one comports oneself when one 'thinks about death', pondering over when and how this possibility may perhaps be actualized. Of course such brooding over death does not fully take away from it its character as a possibility. Indeed, it always gets brooded over as something that is coming ; but in such brooding we weaken it by calculating 306 Being and Time II. I how we are to have it at our disposal. As something possible, it is to show as little as possible of its possibility. On the other hand, if Beingtowards-death has to disclose understandingly the possibility which we have characterized, and if it is to disclose it as a possibility, then in such Being-towards-death this possibility must not be weakened : it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it. However, Dasein comports itself towards something possible in its possibility by expecting it [im Erwarten]. Anyone who is intent on something 262 possible, may encounter it unimpeded and undiminished in its 'whether it comes or does not, or whether it comes after all'.1 But with this phenomenon of expecting, has not our analysis reached the same kind of Being towards the possible to which we have already called attention in our description of "Being out for something" concernfully? To expect something possible is always to understand it and to 'have' it with regard to whether and when and how it will be actually present-at-hand. Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that actualization [ ein Warten auf diese]. Even in expecting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a foothold in the actual. It is for its actuality that what is expected is expected. By the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual, arising out of the actual and returning to it. 2 But Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is "anticipation" of this possibility. 3 But in this way of behaving does there not lurk a coming-close to the possible, and when one is close to the possible, does not its actualization emerge ? In this kind of coming close, however, one does not tend towards concernfully making available something actual ; but as one comes closer understandingly, the possibility of the possible just becomes 'greater'. The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything 1 'Fur ein Gespanntsein auf es vermag ein Mogliches in seinem "ob oder nicht oder schliesslich doch" ungehindert und ungeschmalert zu begegnen.' 2 'Auch im Erwarten liegt ein Abspringen vom Moglichen und Fussfassen im Wirklichen, dafiir das Erwartete erwartet ist. Vom Wirklichen aus und auf es zu wird das Mogliche in das Wirkliche erwartungsmassig hereingezogen.' 3 ' Vorlaufen in die M oglichkeit.' While we have used 'anticipate' to translate 'vorgreifen', which occurs rather seldom, we shall also use it-less literally-to translate 'vorlaufen', which appears very often in the following pages, and which has the special connotation of 'running ahead'. But as Heidegger's remarks have indicated, the kind of 'anticipation' which is involved in Being-towards-death, does not consist in 'waiting for' death or 'dwelling upon it' or :actualizing' it before it normally comes; nor does 'running ahead into it' in this se e mean that we 'rush headlong into it'. II. 1 Being and Time 307 actual. The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all. Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 'actualized', nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing. In the anticipation of this possibility it becomes 'greater and greater' ; that is to say, the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence. In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, 'picturing' to oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility. Being-towards-death, as anticipation of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible, and sets it free as possibility. Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. 1 In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-Being means to be able to understand itself in the Being of the entity so revealed-namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be 263 the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentialityfor-Being-that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. How are we to delimit this structure phenomenally? Manifestly, we must do so by determining those characteristics which must belong to an anticipatory disclosure so that it can become the pure understanding of that ownmost possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped-which is certain and, as such, indefinite. It must be noted that understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a meaning, but rather understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals itself in projection.xvu Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from the "they". This means that in anticipation any Dasein can have wrenched itself away from the "they" already. But when one understands that this is somethi g which Dasein 'can' have done, this only reveals its factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-sel£ 1 '. dessen Seinsart das Vorlaufen selbst ist.' The earlier editions have 'hat' instead of 'ist'. 308 Being and Time II. I The ownmost possibility is non-relational. Anticipation allows Dasein to understand that that potentiality-for-being in which its ownmost Being is an issue, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the 'there' is disclosed for existence. It makes xnanifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-forBeing is the issue. Dasein.can be authentically itself only if it xnakes this possible for itself of its own accord. But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. As structures essential to Dasein's constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever. Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility ofthe they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, 264 is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord. The ownmost, non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped. Being towards this possibility enables Dasein to understand that giving itself up impends for it as the uttermost possibility of its existence. Anticipation, however, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped ; instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust the nselves upon one ; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped.1 Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached. In anticipation, Dasein guards itself a ainst falling back behind itself, or behind the potentialityfor-Being which it has understood. It guards itself against 'becoming too old for its victories' (Nietzsche). Free for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the end and so are understood as finite [endliche], Dasein dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of Others, or rather that it may explain these possibilities wrongly and 1 ' die der uniiberholbaren vorgelagert sind.' See note 1, p. gog, H. 259 above. II. I Being and Time force them back upon its own, so that it may divest itself of its ownmost factical existence. As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes -but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understar{ding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others. Since anticipation of the possibility which is not to be outstripped discloses also all the possibilities which lie ahead of that possibility, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance [V orwegnehmens] in an existentiell manner; that is to say, it includes the possibility of existing as a whole potentialityfor-Being. The ownmost, non-relational possibility, which is not to be outstripped, is certain. The way to be certain of it is determined by the kind of truth which corresponds to it (disclosedness). The certain possibility of death, however, discloses Dasein as a possibility, but does so only in such a way that, in anticipating this possibility, Dasein makes this possibility possible for itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. 1 The possibility is disclosed because it is made possible in anticipation. To maintain oneself in this truth-that is, to be certain of what has been disclosed-demands all the more that one should anticipate. We cannot compute the certainty of death by ascertaining how many cases of death we encounter. This certainty is by no means of the kind which Inaintains itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When something present-at-hand has been uncovered, it is encountered most purely if we just look at the entity and let it be encountered in itself. Dasein must first have lost itself in the factual circumstances [Sachverhalte] (this can be one of care's own tasks and 265 possibilities) if it is to obtain the pure objectivity-that is to say, the indifference-of apodictic evidence. If Being-certain in relation to death does not have this character, this does not mean thadt is of a lower grade, but that it does not belong at all to the graded order of the kinds of evidence we can have about the present-at-hand. Holding death for true (death is just one's own) shows another kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-the-world, or to formal objects ; for it is certain of Being-in-the-world. As such, holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but demands Dasein 1 'Die gewisse Moglichkeit d; s Todes rsch iesst d Dasein ber. als M gli hkeit n. so, dass es vorlaufend zu ihr d1ese Moghchke1t als e1genstes Semkonnen fur 1ch mno - licht.' While we have taken 'Die gewisse Moglichkeit des Todes' as the subject of this puzzling sentence, 'das Dasein' may be the subject instea:I. ;rhe. e o[ t e preposi i