3. Search and Seizure - Premises Etire Section.docx

3 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PREMISES Reasonable expectation of privacy; plain view; emergency entries and searches; knock and notice; consent searches; searches incident to arrest; abandonment. I.   INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses warrantless searches and seizures in and around the home.  Included...

3 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PREMISES Reasonable expectation of privacy; plain view; emergency entries and searches; knock and notice; consent searches; searches incident to arrest; abandonment. I.   INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses warrantless searches and seizures in and around the home.  Included will be the topics of "privacy" and "plain view," as well as the three major exceptions to the warrant requirement:  emergency searches, consent searches, and searches incident to arrest.  Note that some important general considerations that apply to this chapter but are not being repeated here may be found in the "Introduction" section of Chapter 2.  All cases concerning "standing" with regard to permanent or temporary residences are discussed in Chapter 2-I-B-2. II.   REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY A.   Definition Both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee everyone the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.  This right is personal to every citizen.  It can exist almost anytime and any place as long as:  -   the individual has indicated--typically by taking some action to preserve privacy--that he or she personally (subjectively) expects privacy in the object of the search; and -   the individual's expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate, i.e., objectively reasonable.  (Bond (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338; Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 95-96; Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, 39; Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109; Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954.) "The correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."  (Oliver (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 182-183; Carter (1998) 525 U.S. 83, 88.)  The courts will look to whether a search was accomplished by an "unlicensed physical intrusion" on the property.  Although a residence is available in many respects to public access, the "implied license" to enter is not an invitation for the government to engage in an invasive forensic investigation on the property.  (Jardines (2013) 569 U.S. 1.) B.   General Rule It is illegal for a peace officer to physically enter into an area where a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in order to conduct a search or for the purpose of seizing something unless: -   you have a warrant; or -   an emergency or exigent circumstances exist; or -   you have obtained a valid consent.  (Stoner (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 486-490; Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 477-478.) Of course, if you are already lawfully inside a home and make an arrest there, you may then be able to conduct a search into protected areas, such as a cupboard or drawer (within the limitations of Chimel (1969) 395 U.S. 752) incident to that arrest.  The lawfulness of an entry is always a separate inquiry.  An entry into a protected area without a warrant, search conditions, exigent circumstances, or consent will be invalid:  -   regardless of how much probable cause you have (Payton (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 588, fn. 26); and -   despite the fact that you see incriminating evidence inside the protected area from a place outside where you have the right to be (Horton (1990) 496 U.S. 128). Also keep in mind the concept of "curtilage."  The curtilage of a home enjoys the same protection as the home itself.  (Jardines (2013) 569 U.S. 1.)  Curtilage is the real property "so intimately tied to the home" that it is placed within "the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection."  (Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 301; Collins (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1663.)  See discussion of "curtilage" versus "open fields," below at Ch. 3-II-C-9. C.   Specific Situations The following is a discussion of specific situations and how they relate to a person's expectation of privacy. Note:   Remember that all these examples illustrate where you may go to investigate (sometimes involving an "investigative trespass"), not what you may do in an arrest situation where the area must be secured to prevent an escape. 1.   A Home Everyone, of course, can reasonably expect privacy inside his or her own home--at least to the extent that no officer will enter unless the officer has a warrant, exigent circumstances exist, consent has been obtained, or the person is on parole, postrelease community supervision, searchable mandatory supervision, or searchable probation.  (Stoner (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 486-490; Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 477-478; Wilson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1058, 1059; Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743; Pen. Code, §§ 3067, subd. (a), 3465.) Almost anything, anywhere, can qualify as a "home," such as a boat, van, motel room, tent, etc. Example:   Boot Hughston arrived at the Mendocino County Fairgrounds World Music Festival in a rented Hummer and pitched a 10' x 30' tent-like structure that enclosed the vehicle and provided additional living space.  The structure was made of an aluminum frame and tarps that draped over the frame and the Hummer.  After an undercover BNE agent observed a number of drug sales by Hughston on the fairgrounds, Hughston was detained, searched, and arrested.  Officers then located the rented Hummer and entered the tarp structure to conduct a full search of the vehicle.  HELD:  The tarp structure was equivalent to a large camping tent, and the officers' warrantless entry into the "structure" was unlawful.  (Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062.) Example:   Officers, who had probable cause but no warrant to arrest Oaxaca, saw him standing in his open garage, which was attached to his house.  Nevertheless, it was illegal for the officers to walk into the garage through its open door without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances.  "Simply put, a person's garage is as much a part of his castle as the rest of his home."  (Oaxaca (9th Cir. 2000) 233 F.3d 1154, 1157.) On the other hand, a person can hardly claim she has a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas around her home where the general public (mail carriers, salespersons, visitors, etc.) would reasonably be permitted to go.  For example, the garage of a condominium apartment, which is available to all tenants and readily accessible by members of the general public, would not have Fourth Amendment protection.  (Galan (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 786, 792-793.)  Any expectation of privacy must be legitimate.  (Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954.) Example:   Suspect had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior hallway outside his apartment in his high-rise, high-security apartment building, even assuming that the officers had trespassed to get there--which, here, they had not.  (Nohara (9th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 1239, 1241-1242.) Example:   Chavez did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area in front of the side gate to his back yard.  The side gate was located on a paved walkway only a short distance from the front door, and it "was not a substantial or unreasonable departure from the normal access to the house."  Also, there were no barriers, such as trellises or planters, blocking public access to the gate.  Chavez could not have had an expectation of privacy in an area impliedly open to the public.  (Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1501.) Example:   Defendant, who was camping on a public preserve without a permit, had been evicted recently from at least four other campsites in the preserve.  After he was arrested for threatening a public official via emails he sent to the Department of Defense, his tent and possessions were searched.  HELD:  The search was lawful.  "Defendant was not in a position to legitimately consider the campsite--or the belongings kept there--as a place society recognized as private to him."  (Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 961; compare Sandoval (9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3d 659, 660-661--unlawful entry of defendant's makeshift tent on BLM land near marijuana gardens where it was not shown that defendant knew camping was prohibited.) 2.   A Driveway Typically, it is proper for you to access a person's driveway or to view areas and objects from that location (Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80), and the fact the driveway is within the "curtilage" is not, by itself, determinative (Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 953-954). Example:   No violation for officers to observe footprints in front yard and on front porch and driveway because they were in plain view of anyone approaching the front door.  (Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1015.)  Same for officers accessing a car parked in a private driveway (Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 944, 954) and for observing, from a driveway, marijuana plants 30-40 feet away (Johnson (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 884).    Example:   It was lawful to enter private driveway through two unlocked gates to check out why a man was stripping copper wire from an air conditioning unit.  (Lujano (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175.) It is possible, of course, for a driveway, or part of it, to receive Fourth Amendment protection under certain circumstances. Example:    Where the owner, a practicing nudist, took steps to protect his privacy by posting "no trespassing" signs and growing thick shrubbery, and where the officer took an access route that would not normally be used to make clandestine observations on the driveway, the observations were illegal.  (Depew (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1424.) A residential carport structure, which is not a common structure used by multiple dwellings, will probably be protected.  (See Perea-Ray (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3d 1179.) 3.   The Front Yard A person normally has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas around the front of his or her home "where members of the public having business with the occupants" would naturally go or see.  Indeed, the test for any area immediately surrounding a residence is whether it is an area where the public has been implicitly invited.  (Thompson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 923; Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1501.) Example:   An officer missed a turnoff and ended up driving on a circular "loop" road that provided access to seven houses.  When he turned into a driveway to ask Gray (who was outside) for directions, he noticed that Gray was carrying a trash bag filled with marijuana protruding from the top of the bag.  The officer arrested Gray and seized the marijuana.  His observations were legal.  Even though the road had some "no trespassing" signs, the officer was not there searching for contraband in an area where the desire for privacy was obvious.  The "loop" was open and accessible and used by the residents.  Turning around in the driveway was an act that could have been done by any one of the residents or their guests who regularly used the roadway, and Gray could have been seen from the roadway as well as his own driveway.  (Gray (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 445.) Example:   An officer went through an unlocked gate in a chain-link fence to talk to the occupant/suspect who was standing in the front yard about 75 feet from the gate. Up close, the officer could see the suspect was under the influence of an opiate. The court held that the suspect had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his front yard, despite the fence, because the fence was more for "discouraging dogs, children, handbill deliverymen and others from walking across the front lawn and flower beds," than it was for "excluding the public." However, the result would probably have been different if there had been "a locked gate, a high solid fence blocking the front yard from view, a written notice to keep out or 'beware of dog,' or perhaps a doorbell at the front gate, . . . warning that the visitor was unwelcome." (Mendoza (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d Supp. 12.) Example:   Overflying Hammett's makeshift residence on rural property in Hawaii, police saw what they suspected to be marijuana plants growing inside the house.  They landed nearby, walked to the front door, and announced their presence but got no response.  They then walked around the outside of the residence to see if anyone was there, and were able to see, through a fairly large crack in the house, "from a distance of approximately five to six feet without making any contortions," marijuana plants inside the house.  HELD: All the police actions were legal.  (Hammett (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 1054, 1059-1061.) 4.   The Back Yard Normally, a person has a higher reasonable expectation of privacy in his back yard than his front yard. This is because, by common sense and custom, members of the public are not normally invited into or expected to enter the back yard of an average residence, depending, of course, on the nature of the surrounding property, whether or how it is fenced, etc. Therefore, you may not normally enter the back yard to search or seize without a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances. Example:   Officer went to a house to investigate a malicious mischief matter. Seeing no one inside the house, he walked into the fenced back yard through a closed, posted but unlocked gate and found marijuana. The warrantless entry was illegal. (Winters (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 705.) Example:   Officers responded to an anonymous tip concerning narcotics activity at a certain residence.  Arriving there about 7:30 p.m., they drove down an alley and observed a Hispanic male standing in the rear yard of the residence.  One officer recognized him, from an earlier arrest, and knew he did not live there.  Upon seeing the officers, the man stepped back, away from them.  The officers got out of their car and "hopped over" a three-and-a-half-foot chain-link fence, detained the man, and ultimately discovered contraband, legally, in a nearby chicken coop.  HELD:  Warrantless entry into the fenced yard was legal.  (Thompson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 923.) Example:   Following a tip from an informant that an armed and dangerous parolee at large was staying with defendant, officers went to the residence to serve a parole arrest warrant.  One officer opened a gate off the driveway, walked through the back yard, and knocked on the rear door.  Everyone except the parolee ran toward the front door.  The police ordered everyone out, and defendant eventually consented to a search for the parolee.  Contraband was observed in plain view during the search.  HELD:  The technical trespass into the back yard was not controlling.  The exigent circumstances, which included the need to apprehend an absconding armed parolee hiding in a home in a residential neighborhood, "strongly outweighed the marginal relevant impact of the trespass."  (Manderscheid (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355.) Example:   Officers were trying to locate a resident regarding a domestic disturbance earlier that day.  They believed he was home (warm car hood and light on in garage), but he was not responding to their knocking and requests.  One officer went to the side yard gate, raised himself three inches on his tip toes, and shone his flashlight into the back yard.  He saw a cocked revolver and could not tell if the gun was loaded.  HELD:  The officer lawfully entered the back yard to seize the revolver to protect himself and the seven-year-old child who lived in the residence.  (Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1503.) If the yard or other area is protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy, your warrantless entry into it (without exigent circumstances or consent) will be illegal even if you observe the crime-related evidence while looking from a lawful position outside the back yard.  (Lovelace (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 541.)  On the other hand, if the rear yard of a residence can be viewed from, for example, an adjacent house that is nearby, then it does not violate the yard owner's privacy to observe objects in his yard.  (Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 742-743.) Example:   Officers did not violate defendant's privacy by observing marijuana plants growing in his fenced back yard since they were plainly visible from the adjacent, higher property.  The fact that the officers may have been trespassing on the adjacent property (i.e., were there without permission) was irrelevant.  (Claeys (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 55; see Dillon (1972) 7 Cal.3d 305, 311 [observation from a neighbor's second-floor window].) Example:   An officer got reliable information that a suspect was growing marijuana in the back yard of her apartment complex residence.  He went there, but no one was home, so he walked along the common carport area to the back patio.  The patio was enclosed but had no gate.  Instead, a tree was growing where the gate should have been.  The officer looked around the tree, saw a marijuana plant, and then entered the patio to seize it.  The court held that his observation of the plant from the common carport area was proper, but that the warrantless entry of the yard was not.  (Arroyo (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d Supp. 27.) Note:   Since a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is less in his back yard than inside his house, it would take less urgent exigent circumstances to justify your warrantless entry into his yard than into his house. (Westmoreland (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 32.)  Apartment dwellers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared back yard of a multi-unit complex.  (Shaw (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.) Example:   After receiving complaints of narcotics activity in a four-unit apartment building, officers observed defendant twice walk into the back yard, reach down near the fence, and then return to his apartment.  One officer entered the back yard and lifted up a 4x4 piece of wood covering a hole in which a bag of rock cocaine had been stashed.  The court upheld the search and found that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hole in a yard accessible to all the occupants in the complex.  (Shaw (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.) Also, every entry into a back yard is not, necessarily, illegal. Example:   An electrical meter installed on a utility pole in the defendant's back yard by P.G. & E. at the request of police to monitor the theft of electricity did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it revealed nothing about "the intimate details of activities within the house" such as "what electrically powered devices are inside the house or what activities the power is supporting."  (Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1553-1554.) 5.   Windows If you look through a window from a place where the public (which includes police) has implicitly been invited, by means of a pathway, walkway, etc., then your observations will be legal.  The fact you may have committed a "technical trespass" to stand there is irrelevant.  However, even if you are standing in a "public" place, your observations will probably be ruled illegal if you have to peek through a hole or small area, for example, a small gap in a blind.  Your observations would be lawful if justified by an exigency.  (Gemmill (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958.) Absent exigent circumstances, if you enter a back yard, side yard, or other area where the public has not been implicitly invited, your observations will constitute an illegal invasion of privacy, even if the window, for example, is entirely uncovered.  (Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824; Lorenzana (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626; see Gemmill (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958 regarding "emergency aid" exception.) Example:   It was illegal for officers to look through a side yard window, located about 20 feet from the front of the house and 40 feet from the sidewalk, even though there was no window covering and even though there was no "barrier" to the public, such as a fence or shrubbery.  There was no implicit "invitation" to the public to go there, such as a pathway or entrance to the residence, and passers-by on the street or sidewalk could not see into the room.  The officers, who were responding to a "loud party" report at 11 p.m., had not knocked on the front door first and they were not faced with an exigency or evidence of criminal conduct before they looked through the window.  (Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824.) Example:   It was illegal for police to make observations through a side yard window that was mostly covered, when the officer had to crouch down and peek through a two-inch opening in the window shade.  (Lorenzana (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626.) Example:   From a planter area 18 inches from a window, an officer peeked through a narrow gap in a defective portion of a closed Venetian blind to investigate suspicious after-hours activity in a business establishment and saw criminal activity.  The evidence was suppressed.  (Jacobs (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 489.) If, however, you enter a non-public area to make observations into a residence based on an exigency justifying the intrusion, the search is legal.  (Gemmill (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958.) Example:   Deputies responded to a report of a two-year-old child standing in the road in traffic.  The deputies determined through neighbors where the child lived.  They went to the home and knocked hard on the door; there were no cars in front and no one answered.  After taking the child to Child Protective Services, one deputy returned to the house and again pounded on the front door, yelling "Sheriff's Office!"  He then walked around the perimeter of the property and looked into the house through a five- to six-inch gap in the blinds on a back window.  He saw a nonresponsive adult male and an infant playing with a plastic bag near its face, and he immediately entered the residence.  HELD:  The observations through the rear window were lawful.  The unattended child outside the house and the lack of information as to whether someone in need of aid was inside justified waking around the house and looking through the window.  (Gemmill (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958, 967.) 6.   Fences and Walls The general rule relating to the expectation of privacy created by the erection of walls and fences is that if, while standing in a lawful place, you can see over or through the fence or wall (1) without extraordinary effort (e.g., without using a stepladder or standing on a car or cinder block), or (2) without getting very close and "peeking," the viewing will normally not be considered a "search;" i.e, the person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area viewed.  Example:   Officer was trying to locate Chavez, whom he believed to be home, and walked a few feet from the front door to the side yard gate to call into the residence.  He raised himself on his tip toes to look over the fence and saw a cocked revolver in the side yard.  The observation was lawful (i.e., it was not a search).  (Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493.) Example:   An officer was told by an informant that Lovelace was growing marijuana.  The officer went to the Lovelace residence and, while standing in the alley, looked through a small knothole in a six-foot-high wooden fence and saw marijuana growing.  The officer then got a warrant and seized the marijuana (and other drugs in plain view).  The evidence was suppressed because looking through the knothole was a warrantless "search."  (Lovelace (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 541.) Climbing over a fence or wall may or may not be a "trespass" depending on the nature of the area behind the wall or fence ("curtilage" vs. "open fields" or accessible to public). Example:   In the course of a narcotics investigation, officers climbed over the wrought-iron fence surrounding a large, gated apartment complex and proceeded to a carport where they observed contraband.  HELD:  There was no trespass, and even if there was, it was "a simple trespass [which] would not invalidate their subsequent observations."  (Arango (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 450, 455.) 7.   Views from Neighboring Premises You may view the suspect's home, yard, or property from a neighbor's home or property if invited to do so, at least in situations where members of the public could also see the suspicious object. Example:   Dillon's neighbor called police and said that Dillon was growing marijuana in his back yard, which had a fence around it.  An officer responded and viewed the marijuana from the neighbor's second-story window (40 feet away).  The court ruled that this viewing was proper, but emphasized that "[t]he view of the back yard was vulnerable to observation by any of the petitioner's neighbors, in essence, open to public view."  (Dillon (1972) 7 Cal.3d 305.)  8.   Other Structures on the Premises The expectation of privacy associated with other structures on the premises is somewhat less than the privacy associated with a house.  (Medina (1972) 7 Cal.3d 30.) The difference, however, is not significant, and you should, whenever possible, follow all of the same rules as you would with respect to the house itself.  (Bruce (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 580.)  9.   "Curtilage" vs. "Open Fields" What falls within the curtilage is determined by (1) the proximity of the area to the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure, (3) how the area is used, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by the public.  (Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 301.)  A front porch is, necessarily, within the curtilage of a home and protected under the Fourth Amendment.  (Jardines (2013) 133 S.Ct. 1409.) Areas beyond the curtilage are "open fields."  "Open fields" do not have to be either "open" or real "fields" to qualify.  (Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 304; Van Damme (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 461, 464.) "Open fields" are areas of land so open to public view that the owner or possessor is deemed to have "implicitly invited" the police to observe his contraband. Because of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in such areas, the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to them.  Therefore, your warrantless entry into "open fields" is perfectly legal, as are any observations made from them.  (Lorenzana (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626; Freeman (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 894.) Example:   Police, acting on an anonymous tip, went out to the suspect's property, walked past his house, went around a locked gate posted with "no trespassing" signs, and walked over a mile onto his private property to find a secluded parcel of marijuana that could not be seen from anywhere else.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld all these actions as involving only "open fields."  The fact that the officers committed a technical trespass also made no difference.  (Oliver (1984) 466 U.S. 170.) Example:   Officers who were following up on aerial photographs crossed over the suspect's perimeter fence and over several similarly constructed interior fences before coming to the locked front gates of a barn.  They shone their lights into the barn and observed a drug lab.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld all the observations, emphasizing that the officers never physically entered the curtilage and that observations from "open fields" into the curtilage or other protected area are permissible anyway.  (Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294.) Example:   Officer trespassed a few hundred feet onto private rural property to a point he could see marijuana growing inside Channing's curtilage.  HELD:  Because the observations were made from "open fields," they were legal.  The trespass was irrelevant; the situation was no different than making the observations from a public place.  (Channing (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 985, 993.) Example:   It was legal for officers to trespass on defendant's land late at night, walk through his forest, climb over his wire fence, and look through large openings in a 12' high wooden fence into greenhouses through their open doors.  (Van Damme (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 461, 464.) Example:   Acting on a tip, officers walked into remote, heavily overgrown land and observed incriminating activity in and about a trailer located in a small clearing, using their observations as a basis to obtain a warrant.  Their warrantless observations made from "open fields" were valid.  (Freeman (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 94.) Example:    Officers responding to a tip went around a gate, passed a "no trespassing" sign, crossed through the curtilage and knocked on the door of the residence, then walked up to the unfenced side of a "shop," 75 feet away, where they smelled marijuana and heard the buzz of lights commonly used for indoor cultivation.  HELD:  These observations were lawful and could properly support a search warrant because the shop itself, where the incriminating observations were made, was not within the curtilage and was thus in "open fields."  (Traynor (9th Cir. 1993) 990 F.2d 1153, 1158; Brady (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 177, 178-179; but see Depew (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1424.) Example:   A sheriff's sergeant walked along the driveway to the Lieng residence at 4:30 in the morning and noticed the smell of fresh marijuana in the air and the sound of electric devises, such as fans, operating inside a metal building located 20 feet from the driveway.  The Lieng residence was the last on a common driveway to numerous residences, and there were no gates obstructing the driveway.  Staying on the driveway, the sergeant could see lights coming from the garage attached to the Lieng residence, he smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming from the garage, and he heard noise consistent with a marijuana grow operation.  The sergeant went onto the property a second time ten days later at 12:30 a.m, and the odor of marijuana was even stronger.  He, again, stayed on the driveway.  HELD:  Applying the four Dunn factors, the sergeant's observations and surveillance on both nights from the driveway occurred outside the curtilage of the defendants' residence.  (Lieng (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1226.) Example:   Agents positioning themselves outside the uncovered window of defendant's travel trailer parked on a rural ranch observed evidence of an operational methamphetamine lab inside the trailer.  Because the travel trailer was not being used as an occupied dwelling, the clearing surrounding the trailer was not "curtilage."  The "curtilage doctrine applies to the area immediately surrounding a home, not to an empty structure used occasionally as sleeping quarters."  (Barajas-Avalos (9th Cir. 2004) 359 F.3d 1204, 1216.)  Example:   A citizen told officers that a cache of explosives and contraband weapons was located in a bunker in an uninhabited desert area.  The officers went onto Scheib's property without a warrant and seized the evidence.  The court ruled the evidence admissible because the evidence was in "open fields."  In addition, the presence of explosives and dangerous weapons created an exigency requiring "immediate neutralization."  (Scheib (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 820.) 10.   Surveillance It is not a "search" to conduct surveillance of private premises or to follow people who leave the premises, as long as the observations are made from a place you have a right to be.  (Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294; Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207; Freeman (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 894.)  (For a discussion of electronic tracking devices, aka "beepers," see Ch. 5-X, "Electronic Surveillance/Beepers.") 11.   Binoculars/Vision Aids Binoculars may be used to look onto premises or into a building if what is being viewed could be seen with the naked eye from a lawful position (such as the driveway).  In other words, you may properly use binoculars to get a "better look." Example:   Arno was selling pornographic films.  An officer stationed himself on a hill 200-300 yards from the 8th floor window where Arno was "working."  Using binoculars, the officer could see through the window and viewed crime-related evidence.  This fact was placed in an affidavit for a search warrant.  The evidence was suppressed because the officer could not have seen the evidence with his naked eye and because there was no public or semi-public vantage point from which the public could have seen the contraband with the naked eye.  (Arno (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 505.) Example:   With his naked eye, from an apartment he was lawfully in, an officer could see that suspects in a large ($150,000) jewelry robbery were sitting around a table using a scale to weigh objects with a "gold glint."  Using binoculars, he could determine the exact nature of the items being weighed.  These observations were proper.  (Cooper (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 499.) Similarly, the use of night vision goggles to amplify ambient light to see something that is already exposed to public view is not a Fourth Amendment search.  This type of technology, which is used by the military, police agencies, and the border patrol and is available to the general public, is no more intrusive that the use of flashlights or binoculars.  It is distinguishable from the use of thermal imaging devices prohibited in Kyllo (2001) 533 U.S. 27, which penetrate walls or detect something that would not otherwise be observable.  (Lieng (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228.) 12.   Overflights Federal law is clear that persons on the ground have no privacy from warrantless aerial observations made from aircraft flying in a physically nonintrusive manner in publicly navigable airspace, typically 1,000 feet or more above the ground.  (Ciraolo (1986) 476 U.S. 207.)  Aerial observations are legal regardless of whether the flight (1) is part of a random, routine surveillance program or (2) is carried out to look at specific property in response to a tip.  Likewise, it makes no difference where the marijuana is growing.  From a lawful altitude, you may look not only into "open fields," but also into the curtilage of the residence, i.e., the yard or private area immediately surrounding a home.  (Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294.) Although the observations in Ciraolo were made with the naked eye, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a companion case (Dow Chemical (1986) 476 U.S. 227) that it is legal to use aerial photography, including a camera which provides moderate enhancement.  (See also Van Damme (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 461, 463--use of 35 mm camera with a 600 mm lens upheld.)  In both Dow and Ciraolo, however, the court warned that its opinion might well be different if the police used sophisticated "high-tech" equipment, not generally available to the public, which would reveal "intimate associations" below, i.e., activities not otherwise visible. The court also warned that overflights which are too "physically intrusive" (i.e., too low, loud, frequent, prolonged, etc.) could make aerial observations illegal. Concerning elevation, this means you should conform to FAA rules and stay a minimum of 1,000 feet above ground level in "congested" areas and 500 feet in other, sparsely populated areas when flying a fixed-wing aircraft.  Although federal law permits helicopters to legally fly as low as 400 feet (Riley (1989) 488 U.S. 445), California law is less clear on this point.  (See Romo (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 581 and cases cited therein; and McKim (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 766; see also Van Damme (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 461, 463-464.) The California Supreme Court has also approved random or routine overflights (i.e., the "CAMP" program) where the primary purpose is to inspect "openfields."  (Mayoff (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1302.)  However, in Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373, the California Supreme Court struck down aerial observations that were purposely made into a fenced, residential yard or "curtilage," even though they were made with the naked eye and from a lawful elevation.  Cook may no longer be valid, however, since both federal and state courts have gotten away from looking at an officer's subjective thinking--i.e., the reason he was making an overflight--and instead focus only on the objective legality of the search or seizure.  In any event, the results of any aerial observations will always be admissible in court as long as there was no violation of federal law. In light of these (and other) cases, the Department of Justice advises that: -   aerial observations of open fields, rural, noncurtilage, and/or public lands are legal in California (Mayoff (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1302; Eckstrom (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 323; Messervy (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 243; Van Damme (9th Cir. 1995) 48 F.3d 461); -   flights conducted for purposes other than the detection of marijuana (e.g., traffic control, search and rescue, attempts to find or follow a fleeing felon) remain legal (Spielman (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 342); -   random or routine overflights, made for the purpose of detecting marijuana generally and not in response to a tip regarding a specific person or parcel, may continue (Mayoff (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1302; Stanislawski (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 748); -   warrantless overflights undertaken specifically for the purpose of looking into an enclosed residential yard which is not open to ground-level view, for suspected evidence of a crime within the yard, may be illegal under this state's Constitution (Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373), but the evidence would always be admissible, thanks to Proposition 8, because there would be no violation of federal law; -   any aerial photograph should serve only to corroborate what a qualified officer has already tentatively identified with his unaided eye; -   any aerial photographs are taken with a lens approximating what the naked eye sees (i.e., approximately 120mm), although use of a telephoto lens on a 35mm camera, providing magnification of three to four times will undoubtedly pass constitutional muster (Mayoff (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1302); -   any relevant aerial photographs are attached to the affidavit for a search warrant, and the warrant contains language showing that the photographs merely corroborated naked-eye probable cause (e.g., "The photographs attached to this affidavit show what I, by naked eye, observed to be marijuana."); -   the aerial observations are conducted from an elevation of atleast 500 feet above the ground in rural areas and 1,000 feet in congested areas. 13.   Videotaping Videotaping someone's activities is a form of surveillance and will be subject to the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, that is, whether it constitutes an invasion of the suspect's reasonable expectation of privacy.  Thus there can be civil, and possibly even criminal, ramifications.  (Sacramento County (1996) 51 Cal. App.4th 1468, 1477-1478; Civ. Code, § 1708.8; Lab. Code, § 435.) Furthermore, because a video recorder is a "recording device," the Privacy Act (Pen. Code, § 630 et seq.) may have to be considered, at least if the video is used to record a "private communication" involving an audio component.  (See Drennan (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349, and Ch. 5-IX-D.) Example:   The owner of a condominium permitted DEA agents to install audio and video equipment inside his residence, which the owner's brother-in-law was planning to use for a few days to manufacture some methamphetamine.  The recordings constituted a violation of the defendant's privacy.  "Clandestine observations into a private residence from a vantage point inaccessible to the public or an uninvited guest is a search which, if conducted without a warrant, is the type of activity the Fourth Amendment proscribes." (Henderson (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1632.) Example:   Undercover agents invited defendants to their motel room, which had been rented by the police and had a secret video camera, for a narcotics transaction.  HELD: Taping the defendants' activities in the room, after the agents had left, violated their privacy, in part because of the severe nature of the intrusion.  (Nerber (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 597.) However, the Fourth Amendment does not protect those who wish to hide in plain sight. (Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 543, 545.) Example:   Belgium Customs officials learned that a large quantity of the illegal drug "Ecstasy" was being shipped via Federal Express to a Kaiser Medical Center in California.  The DEA arranged a controlled delivery and installed a covert video camera in the hospital mailroom.  Defendant and another hospital employee were videoed retrieving the package.  HELD:  Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the public mailroom of a community hospital.  (Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 543, 548 ["Gonzalez would have to adopt a theory of the Fourth Amendment akin to J.K. Rowling's Invisibility Cloak, to create at will a shield impenetrable to law enforcement view even in the most public places."].) 14.   Thermal Imaging A thermal imager is a device that from outside a building can detect infrared radiation on a structure's surfaces and then produce images based on their relative warmth.  This device is often used to discover or confirm that a suspect is using high-intensity lights in connection with an "indoor grow" of marijuana. In Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device upon a private residence constitutes an illegal "search."  (Kyllo (2001) 533 U.S. 27.)  The majority decision concluded that thermal imaging reveals information about what is going on inside a home, the most constitutionally protected area that exists.  The fact that this information (namely, that unusual warmth is being generated) may not qualify as an "intimate activity" of daily life makes no difference:  "In the home, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."  The majority found that where "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." As with all search warrants, if a thermal imaging warrant fails to establish probable cause on its face (e.g., insufficient corroboration of information from an anonymous informant), an officer cannot, in good faith, rely on the magistrate's issuance of the warrant and the evidence obtained will be suppressed.  (Gotfried (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 254.) The use of other technologies that are available to the public and are not intrusive into protected areas are distinguishable from the thermal imaging device in Kyllo.  For example, the use of night vision goggles is not a Fourth Amendment search.  (Lieng (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228.) 15.   Closed Containers Opening closed containers is a search necessitating a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.  "The fact that law enforcement agents are lawfully in possession of containers does not give them authority to conduct a warrantless search of the contents of those containers."  (Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) Example:   Compact discs containing computer data images and belonging to defendant were closed containers and could not be searched without a warrant.  The discs were handed over to police by a roommate who had viewed the discs and reported that they contained evidence of criminal conduct.  The content of the discs was not apparent without opening the files.  Although officers could view images on the discs already viewed in the private search by the roommate, they could not direct the roommate to look through additional discs for more evidence of sexual content.  (Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1569-1572.) A person can, through her actions, waive an expectation of privacy in a closed container.  For example, "an unequivocal, contemporaneous, and voluntary disclosure" to a peace officer that a container or package contains contraband would waive "any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents."  (Monghur (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3d 975, 980.) 16.   Outer Door Locks In a single decision, one California appellate court has found that inserting a key into a front door lock fell within a "minimal intrusion exception" to the warrant requirement so that an officer in lawful possession of a key could insert the key into the defendant's front door, establish that the key unlocked the door, and then use that information as support for a warrant to search the residence.  The court did not determine if testing the key was an actual search:  it limited its holding to a finding that testing the key was reasonable and served legitimate investigative purposes.  (Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 232.) 17.   Businesses A business establishment may not be searched based solely on evidence of illegal drug sales by someone who is neither an owner nor employee of the business. Example:   Police obtained a search warrant for a West Valinda bar based on information that a bar patron was routinely selling methamphetamine from the bar.  Nothing in the affidavit indicated that the narcotics were being stored in the bar or that the patron was affiliated with the business.  HELD: The sale of controlled substances by someone unconnected to the business establishment does not provide sufficient probable cause for a warrant.  (Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715.) 18.   Hospital Rooms The courts have identified a hospital room as "unique" when determining if a patient has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room under the Fourth Amendment.  In two cases, the courts have issued very narrow holdings that, because a hospital room is under the joint dominion of the hospital and the patient, officers may enter a private room if hospital staff permit entry and a patient who is "sentient" does not object.  Those cases imply that the objective purpose for entry must be for something other than a warrantless search.  (In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177; Brown (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 283.) 19.   Private Searches It is not a search, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for government officials to examine an item already searched by a private person and made available for inspection if law enforcement stays within the scope of the intrusion effected by the private party.  The reason is that the legitimate expectation of privacy in the item is extinguished by the private party's intrusion.  (Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109; Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554; Tosti (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 816, 821.)  This rule would not apply if the private person was working as a government agent. Examples:   Private freight employees inspecting a damaged parcel observed a loose white powder.  Opening the package, they found a tube containing plastic bags of powder.  They called the DEA, whose agents limited their visual inspection to what the freight employees had removed.  HELD:  The DEA inspection was not a search because the agents infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy. (Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109.) Example:   Tosti took his computer to CompUSA for service, where employees found files with child pornography and called the police.  After observing numerous thumbnail images of child pornography on the monitor, detectives had the employee open the images in a slide show format.  HELD:  The officers did not conduct a "search" because the CompUSA employee's viewing of the images had extinguished Tosti's reasonable expectation of privacy in them.  Looking at the enlarged images did not exceed the scope of the private search because their depiction of child pornography was evident from the thumbnails.  (Tosti (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3d 816; accord, Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554 [inspection of previously viewed computer disks]; but see Michael E. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261 [nothing indicated that additional files were child pornography until after the police had them opened and examined].) III.   PLAIN VIEW Under the general rule, when you see something in "plain view" from a place you have a right to be, no "search" has taken place in any constitutional sense because no one can have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to items in plain view.  (Horton (1990) 496 U.S. 128.) You may seize any object that is in plain view, as long as: -    you have a lawful right to be in the place from which you are viewing the object; -   the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, i.e., you have probable cause to believe it is crime related; and -   you have a lawful right of access to the location of the object.  (Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366; Horton (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 136; Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321; Ortiz (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 286, 291; Calvert (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820, 1829; LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 166.) Simply because you see an object in plain view--even contraband--does not automatically mean that you may legally enter without a warrant to seize it.  You will need consent or exigent circumstances.  (LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 164, 167; Hull (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1452.) Example:   Officer who was trying to locate resident stood on the public side of a side yard gate and raised himself three inches on his tip toes to look over six-foot fence.  His observation of a cocked revolver in the side yard did not amount to a search.  Suspecting that the resident was home (warm car hood and light on in garage) and knowing that a seven-year-old child lived there, the officer lawfully jumped over the fence to retrieve the gun based on exigent circumstances.  HELD:  His observations and the entry to seize the revolver were lawful.  (Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1501, 1503.) If officers observe evidence during an exigency--such as during a lawful "protective sweep"--they may re-enter a residence to seize the evidence if the seizure is close in time during an uninterrupted police presence.  (Chapman (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1016.)  Example:   Officers responded to a shooting in a residence and were instructed by defendant to help his son (whom he had shot) in the house.  Officers conducted a protective sweep and found the deceased victim in the kitchen.  During the sweep, they also observed evidence related to the shooting.  Second-wave responders re-entered the house to examine the scene.  The coroner found a shell casing and a divot in the floor under the body amidst the pool of blood; all of the other evidence was in plain view.  HELD:  The second-wave responders' close-in-time seizure of plain view evidence was lawful.  Courts will not require that first-responders hamper their primary duty and increase the danger to themselves and others by stopping to seize evidence observed in plain view during a protective sweep. (Chapman (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004.) There is no requirement that you discover an object "inadvertently."  (Horton (1990) 496 U.S. 128; Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046.)  It does not matter that you "may have gone to the spot from which the evidence was seen with the hope of being able to view and seize the evidence" so long as you were lawfully in the place where you made the observation.  (King (2013) 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858.)  And the use of a flashlight does not convert a plain view observation into a search.  (Chavez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1501.) Also note that the Ninth Circuit distinguishes a "plain view" nonsearch from a "visual entry" search.  A "visual entry" search occurs, for example, when a door to a residence is opened in response to a threat or command or kept open against the occupant's wishes.  Like all residential searches, it requires a warrant or probable cause plus an exception to the warrant requirement.  (Washington (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 1060, 1070.) A.   Lawful Intrusion Requirement Before you may seize an object in plain view, you must lawfully be where the object is located.  (Coolidge (1971) 403 U.S. 443.)  Typically, if you are already lawfully inside the premises conducting some type of search, it will be because: -   you have a search warrant or an arrest warrant; or -   exigent circumstances exist; or -   you have consent. However, you must remember that no matter which of these justifications explains your presence in the building, the doctrine of "plain view" does not expand that justification.  (Meyers (1979) 25 Cal.3d 67; Williams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 873.)  Also, if you are lawfully inside the premises because of "consent," that consent must be valid.  If the consent to enter or search was given in response to your assertion of authority (coercion) or because you misrepresented your purpose (trick or ruse), it is invalid, and seeing something in plain view inside does not remedy the situation. Example:   If you are lawfully inside on the basis of an arrest warrant, you may only look for the suspect in places where a person could hide.  Similarly, if you find him, arrest him and question him in the living room, you may not later take him into a different room, just to get a "plain view" look at the contents of that other room.  (Sanderson (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 264.) Example:   Police, while arresting a suspect at the door to his hotel room pursuant to two arrest warrants, observed in plain view two glass cocaine pipes inside the room.  The officers were entitled to seize the pipes.  However, even though the pipes provided probable cause that there were more narcotics or paraphernalia inside the room, a search warrant was needed before the officers could lawfully search the room.  (LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 166-167.) Example:   Officers were conducting a valid, warrantless administrative inspection of an automobile repair shop when they came across evidence of drugs in plain view and plain smell. The fact that, in deciding to conduct the inspection, the officers may have subjectively hoped to find evidence of other crimes was irrelevant. (Calvert (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820, 1829-1831.) Example:   Trial court found voluntary consent when officers asked Smith through an open front window for permission to enter her apartment to conduct a probation compliance check on Jones.  Smith said she had to get dressed, walked out of the front room, returned, opened the door, and said, "You can check but [he's] not here."  The officers walked into the first-floor kitchen, where a dryer was making a loud banging noise.  One of the officers opened the dryer door to stop the noise and saw a cellophane-wrapped package of marijuana inside.  HELD:  The officer lawfully opened the dryer door to eliminate the noise so that they could call to others in the apartment and safely hear the movements of others in the residence.  The marijuana was then in plain view.  (Smith (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 572.) Example:   Acting on an anonymous tip, an officer went to a storage facility to check out the reported "drugstore" in locker 17.  The complex was open to the public, and the door to locker 17 stood ajar a couple of feet, apparently due to a recent burglary.  Through the open door, the officer saw so many boxes of pharmaceutical narcotics (morphine, Demerol, codeine, etc.) that he concluded they must have been stolen.  He walked inside to take a closer look, then got the renter's name and address from the manager, drove to the defendant's residence and arrested him.  The court held that even though the warrantless entry into the locker was illegal, the prior plain sight observation of the drugs from the hallway outside provided probable cause to justify the arrest.  (Campobasso (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1480.) Note:   If there is an irregularity with a plain view seizure or re-entry to seize evidence, prosecutors may be able to invoke the doctrine of inevitable discovery.  This doctrine is not based on a showing that officers had sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant but failed to do so.  Rather, it requires a showing that a particular item of evidence would have been discovered independently.  For example, where a dead body was discovered in a residence, it was reasonable to expect that the coroner in the normal course of his duties would have examined and moved the victim's body and thus found the shell casing and other evidence underneath the body.  (Chapman (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022-1023.) B.   The "Nexus" Rule One of the requirements for lawfully seizing an object in plain view is that you must be aware of some connection or "nexus" between the object and criminal behavior.  In other words, you must never seize evidence in plain view unless you can specifically state why you have "probable cause to believe that the seized article will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction."  (Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294.) This "nexus" exists automatically in the case of "fruits" of the crime, instrumentalities of the crime, or contraband.  But in the case of less obvious crime-related objects, you will need more than your personal hunch or suspicion.  You will need some specific facts.  (Nunes (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 915; Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046.)  Your information must amount to more than just "reasonable suspicion."  Normally, you will need actual probable cause to believe an object in plain view is contraband or evidence of a crime before you may legally search it (i.e., move it at all) or seize it.  (Horton (1990) 496 U.S. 128; Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321; Williams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 873.) Example:   Officers were legally inside a rundown apartment without a warrant because of exigent circumstances (gunshots).  They discovered several firearms and noticed some fancy stereo equipment, which they suspected was stolen.  The officers copied down the serial numbers from the equipment, phoned them in and verified that the objects were stolen before confiscating them.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that (1) it did not constitute a search--and it was therefore legal and proper--to obtain and run the serial numbers that were truly in plain sight, i.e., that could be obtained without moving the object at all; (2) however, it was an illegal search to move some of the items, even slightly, to observe the numbers; and (3) this movement or "search" was illegal because it was based only on "reasonable suspicion" and not "probable cause."  Furthermore, it was "unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion."  (Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 325; see also Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 980.) Example:   Officer had probable cause to believe a VCR he saw in the front seat of a vehicle was stolen and therefore seize it because (1) he had seen the suspect, who was nervous and had prior burglary arrests, carrying an object hidden in a blanket out of a mobile home park where he did not live, (2) the suspect had a screwdriver in his back pocket, and (3) when the officer approached the car where the suspect had put the object, the passenger said to the suspect, "I told you not to do it."  (Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 721.) IV.   EXIGENCIES/EMERGENCIES Warrantless entries by police into a residence are presumed illegal unless justified by consent or exigent circumstances.  (Huff (2012) 565 U.S. 469; King (2011) 563 U.S. 452; Payton (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586; Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 575; Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 989; Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 384.)  "Exigent circumstances" include an emergency requiring swift action to prevent: -   imminent danger to life or welfare (including yours); or -   serious damage to property; or -   imminent escape of a suspect; or -   the destruction of evidence.  (King (2011) 563 U.