2024 Remedial Law Bar Exam Prep (PDF)

REMEDIAL LAW 2024 BAR EXAMS MA. SOLEDAD DERIQUITO-MAWIS Dean College of Law, Lyceum of the Philippines University DISCLAIMER The images in this presentation are NOT original works. All are lifted from the internet using google images. DISCUSSIONS ON RULES ON EXPEDITED PROCEDURES IN THE FIRST LEVEL COURTS RETROACTIVITY OF RULES OF PROCEDURE Colmenar vs. Colemenar, G.R. No. 252467, June 21, 2021 Facts: Petitioner faults Judge Gill for applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case, and based thereon, motu proprio acted on the affirmative defenses of respondent companies despite the clear injustice it caused to him. He asserts that although admittedly procedural rules may be applied to actions already pending prior to their effectivity, the 2019. Amendments expressly proscribe their application to pending actions when "in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern." Here, Judge Gill motu proprio acted on and granted the affirmative defenses of respondent companies despite previously denying them through her Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. This hasty turn-about caused him great prejudice as he was peremptorily deprived of the opportunity to assert his claim against respondent companies. More so considering the trial court's earlier pronouncement that the issues presented could be better threshed out through a full dressed trial. Worse, he could not even seek a reconsideration from the assailed disposition because Section 12, Rule 15 of the 2019 Amendments prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Further, by motu proprio resolving the affirmative defenses, Judge Gill totally disregarded the requirement set forth under Section 12(c), Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments that the court "shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the answer." ProFriends filed its answer with affirmative defense as early as December 2018; PEC and Crisanta Realty, on January 3, 2019; and Amaia on February 27, 2020. Thus, when she resolved their respective affirmative defenses on May 22, 2020, she did so way beyond the 30-day period provided under the 2019 Amendments. Lastly, Judge Gill was alleged to have gravely erred when she decreed that the complaint failed to state a cause of action as against respondent companies in view of the absence of a material allegation that they were purchasers in bad faith or had notice of a defect in the sellers' titles. Issues: 1. Does the instant petition raise pure questions of law? 2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (now known as the 2019 Rules of Procedure) to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent companies? 3. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it dismissed the complaint against respondent companies on ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them? First issue: The petition raises pure questions of law. The issues for resolution are: First. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent companies, albeit the case was already pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect?; and Second. Assuming the allegations in the complaint to be true, does the complaint state a cause of action against respondent companies? A "question of law" exists when the doubt hinges on what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. If the question posed, however, requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual. Here, the first question of whether the trial court committed reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by the respondent companies, albeit the same was already pending when these Amendments took effect is one of law. In Central Realty and Development Corp. v. Solar Resources, Inc., the Court held that the issue of whether the trial court correctly applied a specific law or rules to a particular case is a question of law, viz: Was the denial of petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings correct? Is Solar's action for specific performance barred by res judicata? Is summary judgment in the case proper? These are precisely the questions being raised here. The resolution of these questions rests solely on what the law or the rules provides on the given set of circumstances. xxxx As for the second issue, whether the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true, state a cause of action against respondent companies is also one of law. The Court stressed in Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes that where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. Indeed, in resolving whether the complaint here, based on its allegations, states a cause of action against respondent companies, the Court need not re-evaluate the credibility of any witnesses or the veracity of any evidence. The Court only needs to examine the complaint itself, the allegations of which are assumed to be true, in order to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action against respondent companies for declaration of nullity of deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and damages against respondent companies. To repeat, this is a pure question of law. The trial court gravely erred when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent companies Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules, provides: The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all cases filed after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all pending proceedings, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. As worded, the 2019 Amendments shall also govern all pending cases commenced before they took effect on May 1, 2020, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case, the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. Here, the case commenced with the filing of the complaint in September 2018 and remained pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect. The records though readily show that when Judge Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses on May 22, 2020, the prescribed thirty (30) day period had long expired. ProFriends filed 1ts answer with affirmative defense in December 2018; PEC and Crisanta Realty on January 3, 2019; and Amaia on February 27, 2020. Judge Gill should have, therefore, desisted from applying the 2019 Amendments to the case below, specifically Section 12, Rule 8 thereof, because when she did, the same was no longer feasible. It was inaccurate for Judge Gill to say that she was motu proprio acting on the affirmative defenses. In truth, she had already resolved this common affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action, together with the other affirmative defenses in her Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. There, she denied the motions to dismiss and motions to set the affirmative defenses for hearing because in her words, "the issues x x x are complex x x x and are x x x better threshed out in trial.xxx But this is not all. The worst part is when Judge Gill ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019 Amendments to the case. For as a consequence, petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. The complaint stated a cause of action against respondent companies. A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In essence, petitioner essentially avers that: (a) he is the legitimate son and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar; (b) his father left real properties in the Philippines, the rights and interests of which would legally pass on to his heirs upon his death; (c) the individual respondents are not the lawful heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, thus, have no claim to the properties left by the latter; (d) the individual respondents, nonetheless, despite being devoid of any right in or authority over the estate of his father, were able to effect a void extrajudicial settlement of his father's estate, and thereafter, a void sale of his father's properties in favor of respondent companies, which, as a consequence, also did not acquire a valid title hereto. Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true, petitioner as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for. i.e., to declare as void the extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by the individual respondents who, not being lawful heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare as void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of respondent companies which consequently also did not derive any valid title from the individual respondents. Xxx xxx xxx Hence, whether respondent companies were buyers in bad faith or had knowledge of the defect in the title of the seller is not the issue nor the trigger that gave rise to the complaint. Petitioner's causes of action hinged on his averment that the individual respondents are not the owners of the properties, hence, they cannot validly sell the same to respondent companies, nor convey any title to the latter by reason of the invalid sale. The spring cannot rise above its source. Xxx xxx xxx. JURISDICTION BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCATION VS. BIAZON, G.R. No. 205836. July 12, 2022 FACTS: BOCEA filed the instant petition seeking to invalidate several administrative orders, circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs, which put an end to the long practice of Customs employees charging overtime pay against private airlines and other private entities served. On the basis of their assertion that the discontinuance of the practice of charging private entities for overtime work has "worsened the situation of the already economically dislocated customs personnel,” petitioners posit that the assailed administrative issuances are unconstitutional, patently illegal and issued with grave abuse of discretion. Claiming that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners seek direct recourse to the Supreme Court through the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. ISSUES: 1)Whether the instant petition seeking direct recourse to the Supreme Court via the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction is proper; and 2) Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed administrative orders and memoranda laying down a policy of 24/7 shifting and of charging overtime work for Customs employees only against the government and not against private entities or airline companies. In seeking direct recourse to the Court via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' choice of remedy to question the validity of the assailed administrative issuances falls under the Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction brought about after 1987, when the new Constitution "expanded" the scope of judicial power by providing in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." This expanded jurisdiction was meant "to ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities of government.' Thus, for the first time in its history, the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 engraved into black letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, whose nature and purpose had been provided in the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice and Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, as follows: "Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. This expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the courts is in contrast to the concept of certiorari under Rule 65 as a "supervisory writ whose function is to keep inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies within the bounds of their jurisdiction.” Thus, even though respondents in this case were exercising quasi- legislative – not judicial or quasi-judicial – powers in issuing the assailed administrative orders, memoranda and memorandum circulars, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction is the appropriate remedy to question the assailed issuances under the Court's expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Limitations on the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the courts; exception. Even when the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the courts is properly invoked, the petition must still be filed with the lowest court of concurrent jurisdiction, following the principle of hierarchy of courts. Further, petitioners should have first exhausted their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial recourse through the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the courts in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to correct its mistake, if any. ARCIGA VS. BALUYUT, G.R. No. 256612, June 14, 2023 FACTS: On June 26, 2008, Jaycee P. Baluyut (respondent) filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage against petitioners and alleged that: (1) on December 5, 2002, petitioners, as heirs of Simplicio Arciga, executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate/Partition with Special Power of Attorney (EJS-SPA) over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 142572 located in Concepcion, Tarlac (property); thus, TCT No. 142572 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the names of petitioners under TCT No. 395377; (2) on August 11, 2005, Relia took a loan from respondent in the amount of P500,000.00 with interest at the rate of 8% per month, payable after 5 months; (3) using the same EJS-SPA, Relia secured the loan and executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over the property in favor of respondent; and (4) upon maturity of the loan and despite respondent's repeated demands, Relia refused to pay her obligation. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the complaint. The RTC ruled that the decision sought to be annulled had been fully implemented and satisfied, and consequently, denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion for lack of jurisdiction. Undaunted, on September 18, 2019, petitioners filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA). In support of their petition, their argument is that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the payment of the monthly interest of 8% on the principal loan of P500,000.00 for being excessive, exorbitant, and contrary to morals and public policy. CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that first, petitioners failed to show that they could not have availed themselves of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies without their fault; second, the RTC's award of the monthly interest of 8% in favor of respondent does not amount to extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, which are the only grounds for annulment of judgment; third, assuming that the RTC had no jurisdiction, the petition was already barred by laches as it was filed only on September 18, 2019, or after more than 3 years since the decision of the RTC was rendered; and fourth, petitioners failed to allege with particularity the facts to support their claim of the RTC's alleged lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly dismissed petitioners' petition for annulment of judgment? RULING: Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions of regional trial courts in civil cases. It is only available when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party seeking it. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the same rules, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is deemed extrinsic where a party has been prevented by his or her opponent, through fraud or deception, from fully participating in the trial by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. Here, petitioners attribute their failure to appeal the RTC's decision to the CA to their counsel and anchor their claim of extrinsic fraud on the alleged gross negligence of their lawyer in handling their case. With regard to the question of the RTC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, petitioners are already estopped from questioning it. As could be gleaned from the foregoing, the complaint did not contain any allegation on the assessed value of the subject property. Without such allegation, it cannot be readily determined whether the RTC or the Municipal Trial Court had exclusive original jurisdiction over respondent's complaint. Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the assessed value, or even the market value of a land subject of litigation. On this point, the Court agrees with petitioners that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and resolve respondent's complaint. However, while the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter may generally be raised at any time in the proceedings, even on appeal, petitioners are already estopped from questioning the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. In the case of Lagundi v. Bautista (Lagundi), the Court, reiterating Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, has ruled that estoppel by laches may bar a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction when the issue is raised only after the party raising the argument has actively participated during trial and lost. Here, as in Lagundi, it took petitioners twelve (12) years since the filing of the complaint in 2008 before they raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction. More, they only raised it for the first time in their motion for reconsideration after the CA dismissed their petition for annulment of judgment through its Resolution dated February 17, 2020. Verily, it is already too late for petitioners to challenge the RTC's jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property. For participating in all stages of the case before the lower court, petitioners are indubitably barred by estoppel from challenging the lower court's jurisdiction. RULE 8 BOHOL RESORT DEVELOPMENT, INC. VS. DUMALUAN, G.R. No. 261292. February 15, 2023 The Rules of Court defines an affirmative defense as an "an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him or her." Affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. Under the 1997 Amendments to the Rules of Court, the set of rules applicable at the time the RTC dismissed the Complaint, prescription may be raised either under a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense. Where prescription is raised as an affirmative defense in an answer, and not as a ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, a court has the discretion to conduct a preliminary hearing as if a motion to dismiss has been filed and proceed to determine if the affirmative defense of prescription warrants the dismissal of the case. Further, under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Amendments to the Rules of Court (which is the same Rule 9, Section 1 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Court), prescription as a ground for dismissal is not deemed waived even if not raised by the parties. The court has the power, motu proprio, to dismiss the claim where it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the action has already prescribed. The 2019 Amendment to the Rules of Court, which now applies to this case, slightly modified the procedure involving affirmative defenses. In particular, Section 12 of Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Court reads: "Section 12. Affirmative defenses. — (a) A defendant shall raise his affirmative defenses in his or her answer, which shall be limited to the reasons set forth under Section 5(b), Rule 6, and the following grounds: (1) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; (2) That venue is improperly laid; (3) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (4) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; and (5) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. (b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof. (c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the answer. (d) As to the other affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Section 5(b), Rule 6, the court may conduct a summary hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days from the filing of the answer. Such affirmative defenses shall be resolved by the court within thirty (30) calendar days from the termination of the summary hearing. Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, but may be among the matters to be raised on appeal after a judgment on the merits." Thus, where prescription (which is an affirmative defense mentioned in Section 5(b) of Rule 6 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Court) is raised as an affirmative defense in an answer, the court may conduct a summary hearing. The affirmative defense shall then be resolved within 30 days from the termination of the summary hearing. When the RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of prescription even without conducting further hearing, it simply exercised its authority to do so under the 1997 Amendments to the Rules of Court's Rule 16 and Rule 9. Similarly, when the CA reversed the RTC, it determined that the proper route to ascertain whether the case should be dismissed on the ground of prescription is not through Rule 16 or Rule 9 of the 1997 Amendments to the Rules of Court nor Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Court. Instead, the CA made a determination that the question of prescription cannot be resolved unless there is a full-blown trial on the merits. Stated more simply, the CA ruled that the issue of whether the Complaint should be dismissed on the ground of prescription cannot be determined based on the pleadings or the evidence already on record nor through a mere summary hearing. The CA's ruling is supported by jurisprudence. This Court has consistently ruled that where the ground for dismissal is not indubitable, the court should defer the determination of the issue until after trial of the case on the merits. ORIGINAL SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS DECLARATORY RELIEF REPUBLIC VS. PRYCE CORPORATION, INC., G.R. No. 243133. March 08, 2023 FACTS: Respondent Pryce Corporation, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling memorial lots and offering interment services. Respondent filed a special civil action for declaratory relief, asking the RTC to construe whether Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7432, as amended by RA 925 and further amended by Section 4(a)(9) of RA 9994, includes interment service as among those granted the 20% discount on funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Respondent contended that interment services are not among the services entitled to the 20% discount provided under the law. Petitioners, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA), and the DSWD, represented by the OSG, moved for the dismissal of the Petition, arguing that: (1) the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are not all present; and (2) the wordings of the law are not ambiguous; hence, there is no need for any interpretation. Moreover, petitioners argued that the term "funeral and burial services" must be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. The RTC found all the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition present in this case. Citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9994, the RTC ruled that the term, "funeral and burial services," does not include interment service. The RTC stated that the IRR only mentioned the following services: (1) purchase of casket or urn; (2) embalming; (3) hospital morgue; and (4) transport of the body to the intended burial site in the place of origin. Since interment was not included as one of the benefits under the IRR, the RTC concluded that the digging of land for the deceased person's grave, concreting of the gravesite, and other services done during the actual burial are not covered in the discount provided by law. Thus, respondent cannot be compelled to give the 20% discount in interment services since it is not one of those provided by law and the IRR. Issue The sole issue for resolution, a purely legal question, is whether interment services are covered under RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257 and RA 9994, and thus, subject to a 20% discount on funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Requisites for an Action for Declaratory Relief The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.25 At the outset, the Court finds that all the elements of declaratory relief are present in this case. Section l, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before the RTC by any person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, before breach or violation thereof, to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the terms of the assailed statutes, especially in relation to the pertinent IRR, have created doubts on the proper application of the 20% discount on funeral and burial services. Respondent, a corporation engaged in selling memorial lots and providing interment services, is directly affected by the assailed statutes and the IRR. As held by the RTC, there is justiciable controversy on whether respondent may be compelled to grant a 20% discount on their interment services. In this case, respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief to avoid being compelled to grant the 20% discount on interment services for senior citizens. It should be stressed that respondent, in filing the action for declaratory relief before the RTC, is not assailing the constitutionality of the law/sand the IRR. Respondent is merely seeking a definitive construction of the terms of the law – that is, whether Section 4(a) of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257 and RA 9994, includes interment services as among those granted the twenty percent (20%) discount on the funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Respondent precisely filed the action for declaratory relief, alleging that there is ambiguity in the law and its IRR. Respondent maintains that since "interment services" were not among the services mentioned in the law and the IRR, it should not be compelled to grant the 20% discount. On the other hand, petitioners insist that the wordings of the law are unambiguous and that the term "funeral and burial services" must be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes the ceremony held for a dead person and the actual act of putting a dead body in the ground. The contrariety of the parties' interests is apparent. Moreover, the case is ripe for judicial determination considering that respondent, a corporation selling memorial lots and providing interment services, would inevitably be asked to grant the 20% discount on interment services for senior citizens, to which it insists, is not required to grant under the provisions of the law and the IRR. It bears stressing that this case does not involve a theoretical issue, which calls for an advisory opinion. Indeed, one cannot file an action for declaratory relief based on theoretical or hypothetical questions because our courts are not advisory courts. In this case, respondent has shown that there is an actual controversy. Respondent is seeking the correct interpretation of the law and the IRR to determine its rights. To repeat, respondent is in the business of selling memorial lots and providing interment services. Thus, while it insists it is not required to grant a 20% discount on interment services of senior citizens as provided under the law, it is inevitable that its clients or customers would demand the said discount. The issue of whether interment services for senior citizens are entitled to a 20% discount needs to be settled once and for all. Otherwise, respondent and those in the business of selling memorial lots and providing interment services could unjustly refuse to grant the 20% discount by claiming that it is not explicitly mentioned in the law and IRR as among those entitled to the 20% discount. An official declaration of the correct interpretation of the law and the IRR will hopefully prevent further litigation. Based on the definition of the term burial as it is commonly understood, burial service means any service offered or provided in connection with the final disposition, entombment, or interment of human remains. It follows that burial services necessarily include interment services, such as digging the land for the deceased person's grave, its concreting, and other services being done during the actual burial. This conclusion is supported by the IRRs prescribing the guidelines in the application of the 20% discount on funeral and burial services. A comparison of the IRRs of RA 9257 and RA 9994 shows that they are substantially the same, except that the IRR of RA 9994 expounded on the term "other related services," by including a sample list of "services" and excluding two expenses, namely obituary publication and cost of memorial lot. In ruling that the term "funeral and burial services" does not include interment services, the RTC strictly construed Section 6 of the IRR of RA 9994 as an exclusive list of the services entitled to the 20% discount. VENUE ODILAO VS. UNIONBANK, G.R. No. 254787, April 26, 2023 FACTS: Petitioner, represented by her son, Ariel Odilao, filed before RTC Davao City a Complaint for reformation of mortgage, nullity of foreclosure, damages, and attorney's fees with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Union Bank of the Philippines (respondent bank) and Atty. Natasha M. Go-De Mesa, the Register of Deeds of Davao City. The complaint prays that it renders a decision declaring that the subject loan and mortgage agreements which she and her husband, Tyrone Victor G. Odilao, executed in favor of respondent bank, are contracts of adhesion and therefore, must be reformed to reflect their true and mutual intention. Respondent bank asserted that the loan documents signed by the parties stated that the venue of the action should be before the courts of Pasig City. Thus, pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the complaint is dismissible on the ground of improperly laid venue. The RTC granted the aforesaid motion and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the court’s order but the trial court denied her plea. Dissatisfied, she filed an appeal before the CA, contending that the trial court erred when it dismissed her complaint due to improper venue. All the same, in the now-assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the orders of the trial court. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was given short shrift by the CA in the equally impugned Resolution. Hence, through the present recourse, petitioner asserts that the CA committed error when it dismissed the complaint for improper venue. She cites the case of Briones vs. Court of Appeals (Briones), wherein this Court held that venue stipulations in a contract are not controlling if the contract itself, is assailed as in this case. Moreover, venue stipulations that impose an exclusive option to choose the venue of suits are void. Such are contrary to the provisions of Rules of Civil Procedure on venue which simply allow 'exclusive venue' and not an 'exclusive option to choose venue.' ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improperly laid venue was erroneous? RULING: The Court explicates. Notably, Briones is indeed not on all fours with the case at bench. In that case, petitioner Briones directly assailed the validity of the loan agreement, promissory note, and deed of real estate mortgage, claiming forgery in their execution. The Court, thus, declared that Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Certainly, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue.16 Plain as day, the foregoing facts differ with the instant case given that petitioner herein does not dispute the authenticity of the loan and mortgage documents but merely seeks the reformation thereof as they are purportedly contracts of adhesion and do not reflect hers and the bank's true mutual intention. Nevertheless, while the facts in Briones and this case are dissimilar, the Court's disquisition in the former on the matter of venue is instructive, viz.: Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit: Rule 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. SEC. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found. SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply — (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or (b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.: The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. The Court examined the Real Estate Mortgage entered into between petitioner and respondent bank, which relevantly provides— Section 8. Venue. - The venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Mortgage shall be Pasig City or in the place where any of the Mortgaged properties are located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any other venue. Clearly, the aforesaid venue stipulation is not permissive but restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) Pasig City; or (b) in the place where any of the Mortgaged properties are located. Such being the case, petitioner's complaint, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where the mortgaged property is located, should not have been dismissed as the same complied with the venue stipulation stated in the Real Estate Mortgage. It must be borne in mind that rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts. It simply arranges for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts. Appositely, an exclusive venue stipulation can only be valid and binding, when: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit. Simply put, the preferred venue must be stipulated in writing before an action is instituted. FORUM SHOPPING QUIAMBAO VS. SUMBILLA, G.R. No. 192901, February 01, 2023 FACTS: Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and Aderito Z. Yujuico (collectively, respondents), members of the Board of Directors of Pacifica, Inc. (Pacifica), filed three separate complaints, namely: (1) Securities and Exchange (SEC) Case No. 07-95 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Pasig Case); (2) Civil Case No. 07-117901 in the RTC of Manila (Manila Case); and (3) Civil Case No. 07-831 in the RTC of Makati City (Makati Case). The three complaints were filed against Cesar T. Quiambao (Cesar), Owen Casi Cruz (Owen), and Anthony K. Quiambao (Anthony; collectively, petitioners), and Pacifica. Institution of the Pasig Case The Pasig Case sought to enjoin Pacifica's Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) scheduled on August 23, 2007 on the ground that it was called in violation of Pacifica's by-laws and the Corporation Code. However, for failure to serve summons and notices of hearing upon petitioners and Pacifica, the application for injunctive relief was denied. Thus, the ASM pushed through as scheduled. Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint where they additionally prayed that the ASM conducted be declared illegal, and that the election of the new set of Board of Directors of Pacifica be nullified. Institution of the Manila and Makati Cases In both the Manila and Makati Cases, respondents similarly prayed that the ASM conducted on August 23, 2007 be declared invalid, and that the election of the new set of Board of Directors of Pacifica be nullified. Notably, respondents, likewise, stated in their complaint in the Manila and Makati Cases that they were constrained to file the three identical cases because there were doubts as to Pacifica's principal place of business, and that they could not afford to wait for SEC's response to their letter to avoid the possibility of foreclosing their remedies. Nonetheless, respondents manifested that once the SEC clarifies Pacifica's principal place of business and which among their cases should be maintained, they would immediately withdraw the others. Such manifestation was, likewise, included in the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping attached to their complaints. Withdrawal of the Pasig and Manila Cases On November 19, 2007, the SEC finally issued its response and disclosed that per the latest amendment to Pacifica's Articles of Incorporation, its principal place of business is in Makati City. Thus, respondents immediately filed their Notice of Withdrawal in the Pasig and Manila Cases. Such withdrawal of the Complaints in the Pasig and Manila Cases were done even before any responsive pleading was filed therein. Proceedings in the Makati Case Being filed in the proper venue, the Makati Case proceeded. Significantly, on September 1, 2008, Process Server Fernando Vinluan and Sheriff IV Robert V. Alejo submitted an Officer's Return before the RTC, which declared that summons have been duly served. Because no answer was filed, respondents filed a Motion to Render Judgment by Default, which was granted by the RTC in its Order dated April 15, 2009. Thereafter, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion, where they argued that they were not adequately notified of the case and that service of summons was improperly made. As such, petitioners prayed that the RTC Order granting the Motion to Render Judgment by Default be set aside. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA found that the summons were improperly served upon petitioners. However, as regards the issue on forum shopping, the CA stated that respondents' act of filing three separate cases was justified and that there was no willful or deliberate intent on the part of respondents to commit forum shopping. Petitioners argued that the CA erred when it refused to dismiss the Makati Case notwithstanding respondents' admitted act of forum shopping. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it declared that respondents are not guilty of forum shopping? RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. The CA did not err when it found that respondents' act of filing three separate cases was justified and reasonable given the circumstances. The elements of forum shopping have been discussed by the Court in several cases. In San Juan v. Arambulo, Sr., the Court held: Forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. A party violates the rule against forum shopping if the elements of litis pendentia are present; or if a final judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: "(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites [are] also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens." (Emphases supplied) Thus, to constitute forum shopping, the filing of several suits in different fora, which involve the same parties, causes of action, or reliefs prayed for, must be for the purpose of increasing the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. Such is not the case here. To recall, respondents filed three similar cases in three separate courts. However, as borne by the records, they did so not for the purpose of increasing their chance of obtaining a favorable judgment. Rather, respondents filed their cases in three different courts because of the uncertainty as to the proper venue of their action. As shown by the documents submitted before the Court, Pacific's corporate records indicate three different venues as regards its principal place of business. While respondents sought clarification with the SEC, the Court cannot fault them for failing to wait for SEC's response because waiting for the same could have resulted in the foreclosure of their available remedies. Moreover, immediately after their receipt of the SEC's response, respondents withdrew the Manila and Pasig Cases. Undeniably, therefore, the danger which the rule on forum shopping seeks to prevent – that tribunals render contradictory decisions – is not attendant in this case because only the Makati Case remained. From the foregoing, it is clear that there is no forum shopping in this case. Again, the Pasig and Manila Cases were immediately withdrawn, even before the filing of any responsive pleadings therein. This means that such withdrawal, at the instance of respondents, could not have resulted to litis pendentia or res judicata. More compellingly, there is no possibility of conflicting decisions in this case, because only the Makati Case remained. DEFAULT SIOLAND DEVELOPMENT COR. VS. FAIR DISTRIBUTION CENTER CORP., G.R. No. 199539*, August 09, 2023 FACTS: Fair Distribution Center, a distributor of UFC products, delivered merchandise to Sioland Development Corporation in November and December 2007. Transactions were documented through charge and sales invoices. On September 8, 2008, Fair Distribution Center sent a demand letter to Sioland Development Corporation for P800,894.27 in unpaid accounts. Due to non-payment, Fair Distribution Center filed a complaint for collection before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch 29. Sioland Development Corporation received the summons on September 29, 2008, and filed multiple motions for extensions to file a responsive pleading, citing a heavy workload and the need to collate documents. Despite extensions, Sioland Development Corporation failed to file an answer and was declared in default by the RTC on January 8, 2009. The RTC conducted an ex parte reception of evidence and ruled on April 14, 2009, holding Sioland Development Corporation liable for the principal amount plus legal interest, attorney's fees, and costs. Sioland Development Corporation's motion for a new trial was denied, leading to an appeal to the CA. The CA set aside the RTC's decision for non-compliance with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution but affirmed Sioland Development Corporation's liability, removing the award for attorney's fees. Sioland Development Corporation filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of default against petitioner was proper? RULING: The Court denies the petition. Declaration of default was proper Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 3. Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. Petitioner insists that it should not have been declared in default. However, the Court is not convinced. The Court is not unmindful of the settled rule that an Answer that was belatedly filed, but before a declaration of default was made, may still be admitted provided that the defendant has no intention to delay the proceedings. In Sablas v. Sablas, the Court enunciated that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant not only to extend the time to file an Answer, but also to allow the filing of an Answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period. Further, in Vitarich Corporation v. Dagmil, reiterating Hernandez v. Agoncillo, the Court emphasized that the trial court may permit the filing of an Answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided that there is justification for the belated action and there is no showing that the defendant intended to delay the proceedings. In here, the records clearly show that petitioner failed to timely file an Answer despite the grant of its two motions for extension. Notable that in granting petitioner's second motion for extension, the RTC gave petitioner an "unextendible period of another ten (10) days." Despite this clear Order from the RTC, petitioner still filed its third motion for extension praying for an additional period of 10 days which fell on November 8, 2008. However, petitioner belatedly filed its Answer with Counterclaim only on November 19, 2008 through registered mail, or more than 10 days from November 8, 2008. Furthermore, petitioner did not only fail to sufficiently justify its belated filing of an Answer, but it also successively filed three motions for extension by using the trite justification of "heavy workload." It bears emphasizing that heavy workload, standing alone, is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason to allow extensions of time to file pleadings. Personal obligations and heavy workload do not excuse a lawyer from complying with his obligations particularly in timely filing the pleadings required by the Court. Indeed, if the failure of the petitioner's counsel to cope with his heavy workload should be considered a valid justification to sidestep the reglementary period, there would be no end to litigations so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced. Hence, the RTC acted well within its discretionary authority when it declared petitioner in default. Verily, the presentation of evidence ex parte by respondent can solely be attributed to petitioner's own omission. RULE 10 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MENDOZA VS. PILIPINAS SHELL, G.R. No. 209216, February 21, 2023 FACTS: In September and October 2009, typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng successively ravaged Luzon, severely affecting over 9 million people and leaving almost 1,000 casualties, 700 injured, and 84 missing. On October 2, 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared a state of calamity through Proclamation No. 1898. Shortly after, she issued Executive Order No. 839, directing oil industry players to maintain the oil prices of their petroleum products during the emergency. Executive Order No. 839 found basis in Section 14(e) of Republic Act No. 8479, which provides: (e) In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the DOE may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any person or entity engaged in the Industry. Finding this prejudicial to oil companies, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Injunction (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) against then Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Executive Secretary Ermita), the joint task force, and then Energy Secretary Reyes. It assailed the validity of Executive Order No. 839 and Section 14(e) of Republic No. 8479, asserting that these formed an unreasonable, oppressive, and invalid delegation of emergency powers to the Executive. The RTC dismissed the petition for being moot, but upon motion for reconsideration by respondent, it reversed the dismissal and declared R.A. 8479 void. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals declared Section 14(e) of R.A. 8479 unconstitutional for unduly delegating the takeover power to the DOE. This prompted the petitioners to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the power to determine the existence of war or other national emergency lies in the hands of the president, and that the delegation to the DOE was proper. They further argued that Section 14(e) provides the specific duration of and restrictions in wielding the takeover power. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that Section 14(e) improperly delegated legislative authority to an entity other than the president, amounting to a violation of Article XII, Section 17 and Article VI, Section 23 (2) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the delegation of legislative authority to the DOE is improper, thus making Section 14(e) of R.A. 8479 unconstitutional. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court held that a temporary takeover of oil industry entities by a president’s alter ego, pursuant to the well-established doctrine of qualified political agency, is in line with Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. SECTION 17. The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This doctrine of qualified political agency posits that the heads of various executive departments as the president’s alter egos are permitted to act on behalf of the Office of the President. Nevertheless, the doctrine of qualified political agency cannot apply to situations that call for positive action from the president alone, such as the president’s power to pardon, to declare martial law, and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As observed by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the exercise of temporary takeover power, in this case, does not belong to the “special class of constitutionally vested powers” exclusive to the president; hence, the doctrine of qualified political agency applies. A temporary takeover from the oil industry entities does not require the president to personally handle the takeover since it does not involve a suspension of constitutionally protected liberties. Furthermore, while the language of Section 14 (e) appears to allow an interpretation that permits the energy secretary to act independently or without instructions from the President, the doctrine of qualified political agency entails that a cabinet secretary may only exercise the authority acting as the president’s alter ego. As such, the acts of the alter ego are valid and binding unless the president disapproves or repudiates them. Finally, since there is no clear showing that the energy secretary acted without the imprimatur of the president pursuant to the doctrine of qualified political agency, the Supreme Court ruled that the presumption of constitutionality of Section 14(e) of Republic Act No. 8479 must prevail. RULE 14 SOLIS v. LAYNES, G.R. No. 235099, 29 March 2023 FACTS: Solis filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title or Reconveyance of property against Leynes. Alleging among others, fraud and unlawful intent. The Complaint averred, among others, that Leynes and his husband are now American citizens but may be served with summons in Poblacion, San Agustin, Romblon. There were three (3) attempts to serve summons but the same was returned undelivered because the recipient is "out of town/abroad" and the relatives refused to accept the summons. Consequently, Salvador moved that Marivic be served with summons by publication, which the RTC granted, to wit: “Acting on the Motion For Leave To Serve Summons By Publication filed by plaintiff's (sic) counsel dated September 13, 2013 for being meritorious, the same is hereby granted. Let a summons by publication be served to defendant MARIVIC SOLIS LAYNES at her last known address at 4304 Pebble Creek Ct., Saginaw Michigan, U.S.A. SO ORDERED.” While publication was made accordingly, Solis failed to send summons by publication to Leynes’ USA address as Solis sent the same to her PH address. Leynes failed to file her answer. Solis then moved that Leynes be declared in default which the RTC granted. Solis was also allowed to present evidence ex parte. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Ruling. It ratiocinated that since the actio n is quasi in rem, service of summons should have been done in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure on the part of Salvador to send a copy of the summons to her las known address in USA is a fatal defect in the service of summons on Leynes. ISSUE: Whether summons were properly served to Leynes. (NO) RULING: The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. Indeed, proper service of summons is important because it serves to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent, or to notify said person of the action filed against them and to afford an opportunity to be heard on the claims made against them. As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against such him/her because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his/her person unless such defendant voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such actions, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential, although summons must still be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements. In such instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant. Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. Following the tenor of Section 15 of Rule 14 and the September 18, 2013 Order of the RTC, publication must be duly observed and copies of the summons and the complaint be served at Leynes’ last known correct address by registered mail, as a complement to the publication. Notably, it was Salvador himself who manifested before the RTC that Marivic is no longer in the Philippines. Not only that, he even provided the said court with Marivic' s current residence address in the USA. These clearly belie his claim of good faith. He cannot feign ignorance of the requirement that mailing of copies of the summons and the complaint must be to Leynes’ last known correct address, more so in light of the RTC's directive that summons by publication be served at Leynes’ specified US address. From the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that Solis’ failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons on Leynes. However, Leynes has submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the RTC by her filing of a Motion for New Trial before the RTC; and such voluntary submission cured the defect in the service of summons. SURVIVORS OF AGRICHEMICLS IN GENSAN (SAGING) v. STANDARD FRUITS, G.R. No. 206005, 12 April 2023 FACTS: The Petition originates from a Complaint"4 for damages filed by SAGlNG and its members against the foreign corporations (respondents) and others for the illnesses and injuries its members suffered due to the use of products with nematodes containing dibromochloropropane (DBCP). In a Consolidated Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Complaint without prejudice for improper service of summons. The trial court dismissed SAGING 's Complaint. It held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the foreign corporations as the service of summons upon them at their headquarters in the United States through the Philippine Consulate General was improper and ineffective. It found that summons could not have been served on the foreign corporations in accordance with Rule 14, Section 12 of the Rules of Court absent allegation of specific facts in the Complaint that they transacted business in the Philippines. It held that the allegation that "they are doing business in the Philippines" is insufficient as it is a conclusion backed by general allegations. ISSUE: Whether the summons were properly served. (NO) RULING: The rule for service of summons on foreign private juridical entitles that have transacted business in the Philippines is found in Rule 14, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. It reads: SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. - When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. Foreign corporations need not be doing business in the Philippines for the provision to apply to them. They only need to have transacted business in the Philippines. Considering the Complaint states that respondents have manufactured, sold, or distributed in the Philippines products that contain DBCP, there is sufficient allegation that they have transacted business in the Philippines. Thus, the rule applies to respondents. Respondents contend that assuming extraterritorial service of summons is allowed, it was not served upon them in person as required by the provision. Instead, it was served only via registered mail without any publication. We reject this argument for failure of respondents to present evidence to show that summons was served upon them only via registered mail. In this case, respondents presented no evidence to show that summons was not validly served upon them. Their allegations that it was served only by mail are unsubstantiated. This Court cannot assume that the Department of Foreign Affairs did not regularly perform its duties. RULE 22 ROMULO ESTRELLA v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, G.R. No. 257814, 20 February 2023 FACTS: The purported heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (Vidal) prayed for the substitution of their names with the OCT, which the court granted. Their prayer for partition and accounting was also granted an three (3) commissioners were appointed to determine the most equitable division of the properties. However, no recommendation was submitted. Later, the heirs filed a case for nullification and cancellation of title against Gotesco. Gotesco anchors its claim on a sale between them and the City of Caloocan. Tri-City filed a Petition for Intervention on the ground that they are assignees of the heirs. SM filed a Motion for Substitution pursuant to the sale between them and Gotesco. SM Prime filed a Demurrer of Evidence which was granted by the court. The CA explained that Estrella et al. were given 45 days, or until September 7, 2019, within which to file their Brief. However, despite receipt of the notice of the CA instructing them to file their Brief and the October 9, 2019 Minute Resolution, they failed to file on time. It took them six months, or on February 14, 2020, to file their Brief. The explanation proffered by Estrella et al. was found to be unacceptable. The CA ruled that the attribution of negligence to the counsel's messengerial staff does not automatically shield the client from the adverse consequence of such negligence and relieve the client from the unfavorable result of such lapse. ISSUE: Whether the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 257814 is marred with procedural infirmities, warranting its outright dismissal. (YES) RULING: At the outset, procedural defects were noted, warranting the dismissal of the case docketed as G.R. No. 257814. The Petition lacks (1) proof of service on the CA; (2) clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed Resolution dated January 31, 2020, as only a photocopy was attached; and (3) competent evidence of identity of the counsel for petitioner who signed the affidavit of service. Estrella et al. stated that they received a copy of the assailed Resolution of the CA on November 5, 2021. As such, Estrella et al. were given until November 20, 2021 to file the Petition or a motion for extension. Since the last day to file fell on a Saturday, the petition or motion for extension may be filed on the next working day, November 22, 2021. However, for purposes of computing the last day to file the petition during the extended period, it should be reckoned from November 20, 2021, the actual last day, even if it fell on a Saturday. Applying A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, it is clear that though the original due date fell on a Saturday and the motion for extension of time was filed on November 22, 2021, the reckoning date to compute the extended period within which to file the petition should still be November 20, 2021. Thus, Estrella et al. only had until December 20, 2022 to file their petition. Despite the additional modes of filing and service introduced in the 2019 Amendments, initiatory pleadings such as the present Petition for Certiorari should be filed either personally or through registered mail. The provision does not permit the filing of an initiatory pleading via private courier. As such, the Petition dock ted as G.R. No. 257814 shall be treated as if filed via ordinary mail.79 As a pleading filed via ordinary mail, it is the date when this Court actually received a copy of the Petition, January 11, 2022, that shall be considered- the date of filing, and not the date of mailing on December 23, 2021. Hence, even assuming for the sake of argument that Estrella et al. timely filed their motion for extension, the Petition was still filed beyond the allowed extended period. MODES OF DISCOVERY REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TANTOCO, G.R. No. 250565, 29 March 2023 FACTS: On July 21, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a Complaint5 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the respondents. The complaint sought to forfeit all properties held by them, alleged to have been illegally gotten and accumulated during the incumbency of former President Marcos. Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago moved for the Production and Inspection of Documents, praying that petitioner be required to submit before the Sandiganbayan all the documents and other evidence proving the allegations of the Complaint and supporting its Pre-trial Brief, which the Sandiganbayan granted on the ground that the purpose of the discovery proceedings is to make the relevant documents and objects in the possession of one party available to the other, thus eliminating strategic surprise, permitting the issues to be simplified, and expediting the trial. Discovery proceedings ensued and documents were temporarily marked as Exhibits "A" to "LLL" with submarkings. Thereafter, petitioner manifested that it had no more documents to produce. Pre-trial ensued, after which petitioner's evidence were pre-marked on September 23 and 25, 1996 by adopting the temporary markings made during the discovery proceedings, namely: Exhibits "A" to "LLL" with submarkings. Then, despite its manifestation that it had no more documents to produce, petitioner produced and caused the pre-marking of additional documents marked as Exhibits "MMM" to "QQQ-5." After this, petitioner again manifested that it had no further documents to produce. During the hearings held on September 11, 2001 and October 15, 2001, petitioner again presented and marked additional Exhibits "RRR" to "YYY," which were not presented during the discovery proceedings. Sandiganbayan denied admission of Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA”. When elevated to the Supreme Court, Sandiganbayan’s ruling was upheld. ISSUE: Whether documents introduced after discovery proceedings shall be admitted. (NO.) RULING: In the case at bar, while petitioner did not directly refuse to submit to the requests for discovery made upon it by respondents, petitioner presented documentary evidence that it did not produce during the discovery proceedings despite having clearly manifested several times that it had no other documents to disclose or produce apart from Exhibits "A" to "LLL." Thus, despite its unequivocal manifestation during discovery proceedings that it had disclosed all documents in its possession, petitioner produced and caused the pre-marking of additional documents marked as Exhibits "MMM" to "QQQ-5" during pre-trial. After this, petitioner again manifested that it had no further documents to produce. During the hearings held on September 11 and October 15, 2001, petitioner again presented and marked additional Exhibits "RRR" to "YYY," which were not presented during the discovery proceedings. Then, in brazen disregard of the Rules and in defiance of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 90478, petitioner formally offered not only all of the foregoing documents, but even more additional exhibits up to Exhibit "AAAAAAA-105" in its Formal Offer of Evidence filed on March 16, 2007. Thus, in G.R. No. 18888180 — the second case filed by petitioner before this Court, assailing the Sandiganbayan's disallowance of the documents that it did not disclose during discovery proceedings — We considered petitioner's presentation and Formal Offer of Evidence beyond Exhibit "LLL" during pre- trial and trial as an intentional concealment of evidence, in defiance of the Court's clear mandate in G.R. No. 90478. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 188881, underscored the consequence of not complying with discovery proceedings in good faith: if, during pretrial or discovery, when a party is required to disclose all evidence supporting his or her assertions, the contending party must produce such evidence; otherwise, all evidence existing but not so disclosed shall be considered as intentionally concealed by him or her and, consequently, denied admission if formally offered. RULE 39 RON ZABARTE v. GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, G.R. No. 234636, 13 February 2023 FACTS: In January 1994, Zabarte filed a Complaint before the RTC against respondent Gil Miguel T. Puyat (respondent) for the enforcement of a money judgment rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Contra Costa, United States of America. After respondent filed his Answer, petitioner moved for summary judgment, which the RTC granted. Judgment was rendered directing the respondent to pay. The CA affirmed the Decision and it became final and executory. As the Writ remained not fully satisfied despite the lapse of three years, petitioner moved for the amendment of the Writ, which the RTC granted. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Examination of Judgment Obligor, which respondent opposed on the basis of Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The respondent argued that he, being a resident of Mandaluyong City, cannot be compelled to appear before the RTC in Pasig City. Without resolving the motion, the RTC conducted a clarificatory hearing and required the parties to submit their respective proposal and counter-proposals as basis for a possible compromise agreement. Several hearings were mutually cancelled by the parties as they were having settlement talks. Later, petitioner filed via registered mail a motion to revive with motion to resolve the pending motion to compel respondent to appear. Subsequently, petitioner also filed an Ex- Parte Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution, followed by an ex-parte motion for the replacement of the assigned sheriff. In an Omnibus Order, the RTC purportedly denied the motions to revive and issue an alias writ, but later assigned a new sheriff to fully implement the amended Writ. The new sheriff garnished the amount of P280,160.27 from China Bank and turned it over to petitioner. He also levied two condominium parking lots under the name of respondent and his wife. Initially, RTC directed respondent to appear upon motion of petitioner, but later agreed with the respondent that it was beyond his place of residence. Subsequently, petitioner filed a partial motion for reconsideration while respondent countered with an omnibus motion seeking, among other things, the termination and nullification of the execution proceedings for being functus officio. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the execution proceedings. ISSUES: 1. Whether the dismissal of the execution proceedings was proper. (NO) 2. Whether there was a territorial restriction under Section 36 of Rule 39 of the Rules for examination of respondent. (NO) RULING: To be sure, the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgment by action is precisely to prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights. Moreover, the statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control. Accordingly, when the delay could not be attributed to the prevailing party, a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be resorted to where a literal and strict adherence will most likely result in miscarriage of justice. Petitioner could not be said to have slept on his right. From the entry of judgment on 16 July 2001, he seasonably moved for execution of the same, and thus obtained a writ on 04 September 2002. However, the Writ could not be enforced fully because of respondent's opportunism. The Court does not fail to see that respondent was willing to spend on a costly litigation, but refused, for no valid reason, to pay a dime to petitioner. When petitioner filed a motion to examine respondent, the latter vigorously opposed the same, all because he was a resident of Mandaluyong City. Moreover, clarificatory hearings on the matter were postponed several times due to respondent's absence. The case was even sent to the archives for a while because of the settlement talks between the parties. The negotiation ultimately fell through because respondent was bargaining unreasonably. Also, as repeatedly pointed out by petitioner, respondent tried to evade the satisfaction of judgment by selling his parking lots only two days after Sheriff Boco caused the annotation of the notice of levy on the certificates of title of said properties. Aside from respondent's schemes, which undoubtedly benefited him, the original sheriff in this case, Sheriff IV Joel R. Ordonez (Sheriff Ordonez), and the RTC inarguably also had a big hand in the failure of petitioner to fully enforce the Writ within the required period. On Section 36 Contrary to the CA's view, petitioner cannot be faulted for availing the benefits of Section 36, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court since the Writ remained not fully satisfied even after the lapse of three years from its issuance. Petitioner was indubitably entitled to the issuance of a pertinent order from the RTC. In statutory construction, the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. To underscore the importance and mandatory nature of this rule, Section 38, Rule 39 states that "[a] party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases." Relative to this, even conceding respondent could not be compelled to appear before a Pasig Court for examination because he is a resident of Mandaluyong City, this does not mean that the RTC was already justified in denying petitioner's motion or in delaying its ruling thereon for a long period of time. The RTC could have easily appointed a commissioner who can go to Mandaluyong City to conduct the necessary examination of respondent concerning his property and income. To have a literal interpretation of the last sentence of Section 36, Rule 39 would only bring iniquitous results, as what happened in this case. Certainly, this rule is not designed to make it any more difficult, much less impossible, for a winning party to satisfy a judgment in his or her favor. The RTC should have acted logically or equitably in resolving such issue. In fact, the Court had, in so many instances, even emphasized that the rules may, under certain circumstances, be liberally construed in order to ensure the satisfaction of a final and executory judgment. JULIETTE GOMEZ ROMUALDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 230391, 5 July 2023 FACTS: FPHC was the former owner of shares in PCIB. It was later sold to TMEE and one of its incorporators Narciso. The Republic sequestered the shares as these were deemed as ill-gotten wealth. FPHC filed a Compliant-in-Intervention praying for the return of the shares to FPHC, which the Sandiganbayan dismissed on the ground of prescription. It filed a second Compliant-in-Intervention but the same was likewise dismissed on the ground that it was similar to the first one filed. FPHC then file a petition for review on certiorari. During the same time, it filed a petition to perpetuate the testimony of the petitioner, which the RTC granted. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Thus, Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. While said appeal was pending, FPHC filed before the appellate court an Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal [Re: Order dated 27 April 2015 and Omnibus Order dated 21 September 2015. In response, petitioner filed her Comment/Opposition [Re: Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal dated November 24, 2015. The CA ruled in favor of FPHC and directed the RTC to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether the allowance of the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s Order was proper. (NO) RULING: Here, the Court is asked to determine the propriety of the CA's Decision to allow execution pending appeal of the twin Orders of the RTC. To do so, the Court has to be guided by the long-standing doctrine that an execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy. It is usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal. Accordingly, executions pending appeal require the observance of the following requisites: (a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. Parenthetically, being an exception rather than the rule, it is strictly required that the reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. While the exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution of the RTC's twin Orders was addressed to the sound discretion of the appellate court, the existence of good reasons was indispensable to the latter's grant of FPHC's motion for execution pending appeal. Absent any such good reason, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued by the CA with grave abuse of discretion. The CA merely looked into the physical and medical condition of petitioner without even considering that FPHC's complaints-in-intervention were already denied by the Sandiganbayan twice on the ground of prescription of action. What is more, this Court had already affirmed with finality the first Sandiganbayan ruling against FPHC's right of action to assail the validity of TMEE's acquisition of said PCIB shares. These facts alone should have been enough for the CA to take a pause and further assess the merits of FPHC's motion. Indeed, had the CA been more circumspect in scrutinizing all the available facts before it, it could have, and should have, also duly weighed the possibility that a failure of justice would also ineluctably result if petitioner's testimony were to be unceremoniously taken despite the loud of uncertainty on the existence of FPHC's cause of action to assail the validity of the acquisition of the PCIB shares and to recover ownership of the same. As it turns out, the precipitate ruling of the CA, if it had been implemented, could have unduly prejudiced petitioner's right, in view of FPHC's rather adamant, albeit clearly baseless, intent to perpetuate her testimony, as will be discussed hereunder. ORIGINAL CIVIL ACTIONS DECLARATORY RELIEF REPUBLIC VS. PRYCE CORPORATION, INC., G.R. No. 243133. March 08, 2023 F: Respondent Pryce Corporation, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling memorial lots and offering interment services. Respondent filed a special civil action for declaratory relief, asking the RTC to construe whether Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7432, as amended by RA 925 and further amended by Section 4(a)(9) of RA 9994, includes interment service as among those granted the 20% discount on funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Respondent contended that interment services are not among the services entitled to the 20% discount provided under the law. Petitioners, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the Senior Citizens Affairs (OSCA), and the DSWD, represented by the OSG, moved for the dismissal of the Petition, arguing that: (1) the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are not all present; and (2) the wordings of the law are not ambiguous; hence, there is no need for any interpretation. Moreover, petitioners argued that the term "funeral and burial services" must be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. The RTC found all the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition present in this case. Citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9994, the RTC ruled that the term, "funeral and burial services," does not include interment service. The RTC stated that the IRR only mentioned the following services: (1) purchase of casket or urn; (2) embalming; (3) hospital morgue; and (4) transport of the body to the intended burial site in the place of origin. Since interment was not included as one of the benefits under the IRR, the RTC concluded that the digging of land for the deceased person's grave, concreting of the gravesite, and other services done during the actual burial are not covered in the discount provided by law. Thus, respondent cannot be compelled to give the 20% discount in interment services since it is not one of those provided by law and the IRR. Issue The sole issue for resolution, a purely legal question, is whether interment services are covered under RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257 and RA 9994, and thus, subject to a 20% discount on funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Requisites for an Action for Declaratory Relief The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.25 At the outset, the Court finds that all the elements of declaratory relief are present in this case. Section l, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before the RTC by any person whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation, before breach or violation thereof, to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the terms of the assailed statutes, especially in relation to the pertinent IRR, have created doubts on the proper application of the 20% discount on funeral and burial services. Respondent, a corporation engaged in selling memorial lots and providing interment services, is directly affected by the assailed statutes and the IRR. As held by the RTC, there is justiciable controversy on whether respondent may be compelled to grant a 20% discount on their interment services. In this case, respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief to avoid being compelled to grant the 20% discount on interment services for senior citizens. It should be stressed that respondent, in filing the action for declaratory relief before the RTC, is not assailing the constitutionality of the law/sand the IRR. Respondent is merely seeking a definitive construction of the terms of the law – that is, whether Section 4(a) of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257 and RA 9994, includes interment services as among those granted the twenty percent (20%) discount on the funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Respondent precisely filed the action for declaratory relief, alleging that there is ambiguity in the law and its IRR. Respondent maintains that since "interment services" were not among the services mentioned in the law and the IRR, it should not be compelled to grant the 20% discount. On the other hand, petitioners insist that the wordings of the law are unambiguous and that the term "funeral and burial services" must be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes the ceremony held for a dead person and the actual act of putting a dead body in the ground. The contrariety of the parties' interests is apparent. Moreover, the case is ripe for judicial determination considering that respondent, a corporation selling memorial lots and providing interment services, would inevitably be asked to grant the 20% discount on interment services for senior citizens, to which it insists, is not required to grant under the provisions of the law and the IRR. It bears stressing that this case does not involve a theoretical issue, which calls for an advisory opinion. Indeed, one cannot file an action for declaratory relief based on theoretical or hypothetical questions because our courts are not advisory courts. In this case, respondent has shown that there is an actual controversy. Respondent is seeking the correct interpretation of the law and the IRR to determine its rights. To repeat, respondent is in the business of selling memorial lots and providing interment services. Thus, while it insists it is not required to grant a 20% discount on interment services of senior citizens as provided under the law, it is inevitable that its clients or customers would demand the said discount. The issue of whether interment services for senior citizens are entitled to a 20% discount needs to be settled once and for all. Otherwise, respondent and those in the business of selling memorial lots and providing interment services could unjustly refuse to grant the 20% discount by claiming that it is not explicitly mentioned in the law and IRR as among those entitled to the 20% discount. An official declaration of the correct interpretation of the law and the IRR will hopefully prevent further litigation. Based on the definition of the term burial as it is commonly understood, burial service means any service offered or provided in connection with the final disposition, entombment, or interment of human remains. It follows that burial services necessarily include interment services, such as digging the land for the deceased person's grave, its concreting, and other services being done during the actual burial. This conclusion is supported by the IRRs prescribing the guidelines in the application of the 20% discount on funeral and burial services. A comparison of the IRRs of RA 9257 and RA 9994 shows that they are substantially the same, except that the IRR of RA 9994 expounded on the term "other related services," by including a sample list of "services" and excluding two expenses, namely obituary publication and cost of memorial lot. In ruling that the term "funeral and burial services" does not include interment services, the RTC strictly construed Section 6 of the IRR of RA 9994 as an exclusive list of the services entitled to the 20% discount. CONTEMPT ABS CBN vs. AMPATUAN, G.R. No. 227004, April 25, 2023 FACTS: Cariño, a reporter for ABS-CBN, interviewed Lakmodin "Laks" Saliao (Saliao), which aired on TV Patrol World. In the interview, Saliao narrated that he was present when the Ampatuan family planned what became the Maguindanao Massacre. Saliao named the Ampatuan family members who were present at the meetings. He also discovered that he was about to be killed for knowing too much about the massacre. Andal filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against Saliao, ABS-CBN, and Cariño. Andal claimed that Saliao's interview was "calculated to interfere with court proceedings to serve Saliao's own interest without passing through the scrutiny of the police of the National Prosecution Service if it indeed is to form part of or used as evidence in the murder cases aforesaid. “He averred that Saliao's interview fell under contemptuous conduct punishable under Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Andal prayed that Saliao, ABS-CBN, and Cariño be cited for indirect contempt for their respective participations in the interview and that they be prohibited from making further statements in any forum or media during the pendency of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. ABS-CBN and Cariño jointly filed their Answer with Counterclaims, claiming that the Petition for Indirect Contempt failed to state a cause of action. They cited People v. Teehankee, Jr. in claiming that pretrial news about an ongoing criminal case is potentially prejudicial to an accused only in a trial by jury, not in a trial by judge. They asserted that the broadcast of Saliao's interview was made in good faith and within the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. They prayed for the dismissal of the Petition and the grant of compulsory counterclaims of attorney's fees, litigation expenses, costs of suit, and moral damages. RTC denied the Affirmative Defense of ABS CBN and Carino. CA dismissed they filed assailing the ruling of the RTC. Hence, ABS-CBN and Cariño filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the lower courts committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss the Petition for Indirect Contempt against petitioners ABS- CBN Corporation and Jorge Cariño for failure to state a cause of action. Subsumed in this issue is the determination of the required allegations sufficient to allege a cause of action for this Court to punish for contempt. On the merits, we have to determine whether petitioner Jorge Cariño's interview of Lakmodin "Laks" Saliao, an alleged witness to the planning of the Maguindanao Massacre, and petitioner ABS- CBN Corporation's broadcast of the interview during the pendency of the criminal case violate the sub judice rule. SC granted the petition. Basic Principles Discussed by the SC: Direct contempt is committed in facie curiae or "in the face of the court” which may occur within or outside judicial proceedings. Any conduct "directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act” is direct contempt and may be punishable summarily without hearing. Declaring a person in direct contempt is summary and requires no other proof to establish the contumacious act that the judge personally witnessed. On the other hand, indirect contempt is limited in scope and application as provided in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Compared to direct contempt, indirect contempt is committed "out of the presence of the court.” These acts are also beyond the personal knowledge or perception of a judge. A separate proceeding is necessary to punish indirect contempt, which may either be instituted motu proprio by a judge or by a verified petition, with the respondent having the opportunity to be heard. Contempt proceedings may either be criminal or civil in nature depending on the purpose for which the court is exercising its inherent power: A. As to the Nature of the Offense. A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured sui

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