Moral Point of View Chapter 6 PDF

cHAPTER 6 The Moral Point of View I. Overridingness(an different Pov\'s) So far I have mostly concentrated on the issue of relativism versus universalism in morality. Having first given the relativist perspective, as developed in both modern and postmodern Western thought in my 1st and 2nd Chapters,...

cHAPTER 6 The Moral Point of View I. Overridingness(an different Pov\'s) So far I have mostly concentrated on the issue of relativism versus universalism in morality. Having first given the relativist perspective, as developed in both modern and postmodern Western thought in my 1st and 2nd Chapters, I have sought to critically evaluate them in my 3rd and 4th Chapters. Then in my 5th Chapter I have given a general account of two non-relativistic trends in contem- porary Western thought, that is, realism and universalism. In the present Chapter my aim would be to develop the idea of a universal moral point of view which does not negate or even undermine separate moralities, but which still claims to have an overriding authority over them, that is, which has cross-cultural validity. Having presumed this, I shall try to understand and explicate the nature of this moral point of view. When the relativists contend that a people\'s morality is relative to their culture and its conceptual framework, the crucial concept of morality is deliberately left undefined by them. The ambiguity in the conception of morality helps them in clubbing together all kinds of beliefs, practices, mores, customs, taboos and norms as morality; and thereby overemphasizing their immense diversity. What is morality, and what is its extension? The idea that morality covers the whole of life has a natural appeal at first glance. But this broad understanding of morality involves a big confusion between customs, norms and rules of interpersonal behavior in a particular society on one hand and morality proper on the other. If Westerners take off their hats and Indians cover their heads to show respect, this has nothing to do with morality. Not only customs associated with different occasions but also patterns of customary Enter You sent behaviour are different from society to society (e.g. Indian bride is dressed in red, heavily bejewelled and is expected to act subdued and coy, as against her Western counterpart who is dressed in white and is vivacious and bubbling). These patterns of behavior are naturally related to, or conditioned by, the system of moral norms and-values of that society. And yet, there is every need to make a distinction between these customary norms and patterns of behaviour which are totally culture-specific, and morality proper. Failure to make this-distinction results first, in undermining the normative of regulative character of morality, and second, in encouraging relativistic arguments which cash in on this confusion.\' If having described the various practices and ways of a different society, an anthropologist or sociologist goes on to assert that these different \'patterns of life\' are deserving equal respect etc., she is guilty of two confusions. First, she is confusing morality proper with the culture-specific norms and patterns of behaviour etc. And second, she is declaring all of them as valid for that particular society lyr and immune from (rational criticism. A large number of social practices, role models, and patterns of interrelationships are totally culture-specific and relative; they are also in most cases beyond rational criticism or an evaluation from a moral point of view, that is, they are morally neutral. At the same time, no social practice, norm, or-pattern of behaviour is beyond the purview of critical evaluation from the moral point of view. Neither the practice of untouchability in India, nor that of slavery in the West, was a moral institution. But they could still be evaluated from the moral point of view, and found immoral or wrong. I am here trying to put two counter theses to the relativist thesis based primarily on cultural diversity First, not all social norms and patterns of behaviour are morality proper. And it means that any observation regarding their relative character can have no bearing on the relativity or otherwise of morality. Second, while many of these social practices are morally neutral, many others are not so, and should be judged or evaluated from the moral point of view. Rather, all social practices are potentially objects of moral evaluation. The latter observatiort strengthens the first, that morality should Enter You sent be necessarily distinguished from social customs and practices as a normative discipline which claims to guide, regulate, and critically evaluate all our activities. from Arguably, the claim to overridingness on the part of the moral point of view requires rational justification. Kurt Baier has tried to present the moral point of view which is at once universal and applicable in the context of a particular society Baier recognizes that morality can be conceived and practised only in the social context, because society, its institutions and rules are necessary for the realization of all human goals. Each society further develops primary and secondary moral rules to regulate interpersonal behaviour. Above all, these moral rules are applicable to everyone and are for the good of everyone alike. Moral rules have overriding authority over reasons of self-interest because they are expected to produce a state of affairs which serves everyone\'s interest much better than if everyone pursued her interest exclusively. The moral point of view is that of everyone and anyone, and hence is superior to the point of view of individual interests: The very raison d\'etre of a morality is to yield reasons which overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone\'s following self-interest would be harmful to everyone. Hence moral reasons are superior to all others. I am afraid that Baier is here not able to give a rational justification for the moral point of view, except the egoistic argument that it is in the interest of everyone alike to follow the moral rules. He is also-not able to do justice to the other-oriented nature of morality.. R.B. Perry similarly understands morality in terms of its social function. He defines morality as \"man\'s endeavour to harmonize conflicting interests: to prevent conflict when it threatens, to remove conflict when it occurs,\" Unlike Baier and Rawls, Perry believes that the interests of totality, being more sinclusive, are superior to those of separate individuals. This is a utilitarian-position; but Perry is saved from the inconsistencies of the former by understanding the interests of the whole in terms of harmony, rather than as maximization of satisfactions. Enter You sent dharma is integrally related to that of debt (rna). A person is said to owe his/her life to various sections of the society, eg. to parents and teachers, to fellow human beings, as also to the tradition; and finally to the entire creation. Since the moral subject owes debts to so many persons and nature, he/she is expected to lead his/ her life in such a way that all these debts are paid fully in the process.\" This conception of morality includes: first, the idea of every person being integrally related to the society and the entire creation; and second, the idea of morality or dharma as the supreme regulating principle of human life, both at the personal and interpersonal levels. At the social level dharma was the principle of harmony between various sections of society, and was declared as the basis of the social order. Whether at the individual or the social level, the overriding claim of dharma as the supreme regulating principle of all aspects and activities of human beings was emphasized it every stage. The conception of morality, dharma, or the moral point of view implies the idea of some supreme regulating principle(s). Various sociological phenomena can be understood from different points of view, as anthropological, sociological, historical, psychological and moral. The moral point of view may be conceived as one of the several points of view; or as one which claims the right to offer the supreme criteria of judgment over and above all other points of view. The assertion of a distinct (universal) moral point of view means that it has superior-authority than the customs, mores and other sociological aspects of human life. It also means that it is some unique or rationally superior point of view which can in no way be equated to the diverse moral codes or moralities. When we talk of \'moralities\', which talk is right from an anthropological- sociological point of view, we are e taking a naturalistic position. When we talk of the mor the moral point of view, we are not denying the existence, value and even limited validity, of separate moralities which are suited or integral to different societies and their ways of life. We are rather affirming the moral point of view in addition to all these moralities, and contending that the latter are subject to critical Who ENG Enter You sent evaluation from the moral point of view. We are asserting the supreme authority and the universal or cross-cultural validity of the moral point of view.\" The moral point of view is at once different from other points MY of view which are concerned with other areas of human activity, such as science, sociology, art and religion, as well as from separate moralities. It makes an overriding claim. Art and literature, and even religion to a certain extent, are culture-specific; so are all other human sciences, as sociology, economics and history, as also socio-political ideologies. They are the products of their times, and are relative to their respective cultures, and conceptual frameworks. They cannot, therefore, claim universal validity. Also, these points of view or perspectives conflict with each other even within a given culture. The same is true of separate moralities. They are culture-specific and have limited validity, as the relativists so candidly admit. The moral code of your society is not applicable to, or valid in, my society. And the code of my society leaves all other human beings, except those belonging to my society, untouched. These moral codes or moralities are further supposed to be extremely diverse, con- tradictory, or incommensurable. The moral point of view claims to be overriding; that is, when an action, character trait, practice, or state of affairs is being considered from different points of view, and the evaluations from them come out divergent and heterogeneous, then the evaluation from, and the demands of, the moral point of view have the highest authority which can under certain circumstances override the claims of other ther points of view, as well as of separate moral codes This overriding claim of morality is liable to be challenged by religion (excepting perhaps contemporary Protestant Christianity). Semitic religions which are based on distinct historical \'revelations\' claim their respective revelations as the supreme arbiter or deter- miner of all aspects of human life. If religion is \'the ultimate concern of man\' (Paul Tillich), it cannot allow itself to be judged or sanctioned from the moral point of view. It is, of course, being taken for granted There here that that religion-can-never religion-can-n sanction immoral activities, and insofar as it does (as in fanatic acts) it is open to criticism from the moral point of view. But when religions claim Enter You sent to determine the entire personal and interpersonal lives of their followers, there is bound to be a conflict between the claims of two points of view moral and religious. Various practices, enjoined, allowed, or prohibited, by various religious texts, such as untouchability in Hinduism and practices of polygamy and instant divorce in Islam, are open to criticism from the moral point of view, if they contradict our sense of justice, the dignity of the individual, or some other humanitarian considerations. Take another example: the refusal for blood transfusion to save a human life by Seventh Day Adventists is totally unacceptable from a moral point of view. None of these practices can claim immunity to criticism from the moral point of view simply because it is prohibited or permitted in a particular religion. Of course, the highly secularized Western societies do not need any convincing regarding the superiority of the moral point of view to the religious point of view. But Islam, Hinduism, and to some extent Catholic Christianity, persist in their separate claims to provide norms and rules which have superior or overriding authority in all fields of human life. The problem of the relative superiority of moral and religious points of view is too profound and complex to take it up here. I would, however, refer the readers to my views, presented elsewhere, regarding the need to distinguish the essential from the peripheral matters of a religion.\" I believe that while the essence or faith of any religion is above all critical evaluation, including the one from the moral point of view, the peripheral beliefs, laws, taboos, and practices sanctioned by different religions are open to critical-moral evaluation and sanction. All the practices referred to above are peripheral to their respective religions - so I believe- and can therefore be chal challenged from a rational-moral point of view. I am assuming here: First, no amount of relativistic reasoning can make such practices which undermine justice and other humanitarian considerations immune to sanction from the moral point of view, even though they have all the support of some religious tradition, or the other. Secondly, any criticism of religious practices is possible only from the \'moral point of view\', and not from the points of view of various moralities.