11th Module.pptx

IV REALITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EU (BEFORE, NOW, AND FUTURE) Brexit (II); COVID-19 and the EU 11th MODULE Marco da Costa, Ph.D Department of Political Science Saint Louis University BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS Negotiations: Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)  The Br...

IV REALITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EU (BEFORE, NOW, AND FUTURE) Brexit (II); COVID-19 and the EU 11th MODULE Marco da Costa, Ph.D Department of Political Science Saint Louis University BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS Negotiations: Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)  The Brexit negotiations under Article 50* (Treaty on European Union, 1992) started on 29 March 2017 and continued until 31 January 2020 (departure day).  The EU´s negotiating position was outlined in the European Council’s successive mandates and acted upon by the European Commission.  The negotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) were structured around two phases: The first phase focused on withdrawal issues, for example: The status of UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK: Protecting the rights of Union citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU. Crucially on this issue the UK and the EU agreed to provide reciprocal protection for EU and UK citizens exercising free movement rights by the date of the UK’s departure. Article 50 (TEU) 1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a QMV, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. STRATEGIES SPEXIT While accepting the democratic choice of the British electorate, the EU27 made it clear that there were no winners in the Brexit process and their main concerns were to protect the EU Single Market, citizens, and businesses, to avoid a domino effect, and ensure an orderly British departure (Duchexit, Spexit, etc.). Unity: The EU27 were to act with one voice with no room for informal talks or bilateral negotiations between the UK government and any individual member state.  Future relationship: The EU was ready to consider establishing an ambitious STRATEGIES  The British government committed to repatriating powers from Brussels.  Leaving the Single Market but ensuring an ambitious free trade agreement that would ensure an independent trade policy at the same time as free trade in goods and services, including financial services, with the EU.  The UK government was also ready to cooperate on cyber security and the fight against terrorism.  Ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the UK but honouring international commitments and following international law.  No payments into the EU budget unless beneficial to the UK, such as to facilitate access to EU research programmes.  English Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s (2023) immigration policy: criticism from NGOs and a challenge to international legality.  Despite Brexit (REMEMBER the slogan “take back control” over borders and immigration) and the UK's immigration policy, the entry of “illegal immigrants” (“irregular”) to English shores has increased: 2023: 34.000 2022: 46.000 2021: 28.500 2020: 8.466  The Bibby Stockholm, a giant ship in which Downing Street wants to Supreme court rejec ts Rishi Sunak’s pla n to send asylum se ekers to Rwanda (Nov., 2023) Tories could be left with 'fewer than 100' MPs after next general el ection, major poll sugges ts. SHIP or PRISON? Labour would be swept into pow er with a landslide of 468 seats , the study forecasts THE TRADE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT (TCA)  The TCA was negotiated in a record time (in a record eight-month period between 31 March and 24 December 2020).  The EU signed the agreement on 30 December 2020 and on 28 April 2021, the European Parliament ratified the TCA by 578 votes, with 51 against and 68 abstentions.  The TCA is the comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that frames the relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit. HE MAIN CONTENT  The TCA affords zero quotas and zero tariffs trade in goods between the UK and the EU.  Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters: it allows for cooperation between national police and judicial authorities, including extradition arrangements, and the exchange of data.  Cooperation in the field of health security: for example to fight a pandemic.  Cooperation on cybersecurity.  Participation in EU programmes: These include the terms for the UK’s financial contribution towards the programmes, fair treatment of UK participants, and sound financial management of programme funding and governance arrangements. Programmes include Horizon Europe, the Euratom Research, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), and Copernicus. Erasmus is excluded. EFFECTS OF THE UK´S EXIT FROM THE EU 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Brexit could weaken the EU and challenge the integration fueled by populist parties from the left and the right, and by the demands of EU citizens for a more democratic Union. The UK’s exit offers an opportunity to reform and strengthen the EU. Brexit may weaken the international standing of both the UK and the EU. Viewed from China, India, and the USA, Brexit may suggest a weak and divided Europe. Brexit affects short-term and long-term EU-UK relations: challenges such as climate change, security concerns, upholding the universal values of democracy and the rule of law, or a public health crisis (the COVID-19 pandemic). It has become obvious that the UK’s departure from the EU is not just a matter of high politics; rather it affects the lives of individuals whether business people, students, musicians, or COVID-19 AND THE EU INTRODUCTION  Health is an area in which member states have historically been reluctant to cede powers. So…  The EU's treaty competences in health are limited: the founding treaties reserve health as a national competence and grant the EU a narrow and supporting role.  THREE traits of the EU’s public health BEFORE the response to Covid: Public Health Internal market Fiscal governance A) Public Health: - The objective is to safeguard the EU population as a whole and protect it from health risks; These efforts include binding regulation in the areas of food safety, plant and animal health, blood products, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals. B) Internal market: - - Using its powers to create an internal market where goods, services, people, and capital can move freely, the EU has introduced regulations on (healthcare) professional qualifications, medicines (including vaccine approval), tobacco manufacturing and advertising, and cross-border healthcare provision. Furthermore, its wide-ranging regulations on workplace safety, the application of competition law to health care, and the right to establish services, to use just three examples, affect the working conditions of doctors, the financing of health service delivery, and the provision of health care. C) Fiscal governance: - This involves the surveillance of member states’ taxing, spending and policies affecting their economic stability. WHY? Health is a large and expensive item in national budgets and it was naturally of interest THE EU´S RESPONSE TO COVID-19  These THREE traits of the EU’s public health DURING the response to Covid: A) Public Health: - The EU's immediate public health response drew on its health security and civil protection  ECDC regimes, supported by the (The European for Disease Prevention and Control): Established in 2004,Centre the ECDC is a decentralized EU health agency based in Stockholm whose mission involves identifying, assessing, and communicating emerging health threats.  It works in partnership with the European Commission, national experts nominated by member states, and other EU agencies, including the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).  However, its powers and resources are limited. The ECDC has no binding authority outside its own staff and, due to its lack of executive and operational powers, it is weaker than other EU agencies such as the EMA.  During the COVID-19, the ECDC´s primary role was to release periodically updated “rapid risk assessments” and provide scientific advice on public health responses to member states and the Commission. Additionally, it set up a COVID-19 website B) Internal market: The Member States took action to different challenges… - Borders: the closure of borders for people and exports was resolved quickly. PROBLEM? It represented a challenge to the Schengen Agreement (Module 9th): border closures, quarantines, lock-downs, and a pivot to national efforts during the pandemic put significant strains on the Schengen system and the freedom of movement in the EU. - The EU Vaccine Strategy and the EU Pharmaceutical Strategy: they have been beset by difficulties, both logistical and political. By the end of 2020, the Commission had signed “advanced purchase agreements” (APAs) with The Strategy (vaccine and Pharmaceutical) aims to ensure equitable access for all member states to an affordable vaccine, as well as establishing the EU’s contribution to global vaccine equity. THEORETICAL  The regulatory basis for the Vaccine Strategy gives LY, the EU more centralized power in the purchasing and distribution of vaccines. BUT… Although the APAs theoretically prevent member states from engaging in parallel negotiations, several EU countries purchased more vaccine doses on their own: Germany, for instance, bought an additional 30 million doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech and CureVac vaccines in the autumn of 2020. Several member states began to seek vaccines from beyond the EU, namely in Russia and China. Hungary has led this initiative but Poland, Austria, Slovakia, Denmark, and the Czech Republic are all reported to have engaged in discussions about procuring Russian ‘Sputnik V’ or Chinese ‘Sinovac’ doses. There were delays in their supply. REFLECTION: There was a brief moment in the spring of 2020 when narratives of failure and disintegration were everywhere based on member states’ egotism and border closures (AND BREXIT). Similar narratives of failure arose early in 2021 vaccination programmes. For some eurosceptic Member states who always blamed the EU for any policy failure… vaccines were no exception. C) Fiscal governance: - Weaknesses revealed by the pandemic prompted the adoption of a new public health programme, with a significantly increased budget, and a new Pharmaceutical Strategy. These have the potential to underpin a greater EU role in health in the future. - Shared good public health was always part of a viable European Union; in 2020, member states realized that this would take investment. And invest they did. In short, the example of COVID has proven right to those who defend increasing the HEALTH BUDGET. CRISIS OF THE SPANISH HEALTH SYSTEM? Public health spending in the EU: millions of euros, percentage of GDP and euros per inhabitant according to the countries of the European Union (EU-27 + United Kingdom) LINK REMEMBER: In Spain, the “Comunidades Autónomas” have “NEW” POLICIES AFTER THE COVID-19  COVID-19 highlighted the importance of cooperation in health and the value of EU health policy.  In response to this increased salience, the European Commission proposed a new version of the 2021-27 health programme, known as the EU4Health programme: A budget of €5.1 billion was agreed, more than ten times the budget of the previous health programme It provides funds for collaborative projects and facilitates voluntary cooperation, exchange of best practices and sharing of information between health officials, civil society actors and health professionals The EU4Health programme does NOT transfer legal power in this area to the EU but it does establish a significant ‘carrot’ to encourage cooperation and engagement with common capacity-building actions REMEMBER: The EU's treaty competences in health are limited LINK Objectives of the EU4Health programme (2021-