Powering Hydrodiplomacy: A Broader Power Palette PDF

Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Environmental Science and Policy...

Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Environmental Science and Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci Powering hydrodiplomacy: How a broader power palette can deepen our understanding of water conflict dynamics Jeroen Warner a, *, Rens de Man b a Jeroen Warner, Social Sciences Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706KN Wageningen, the Netherlands b Water Governance Consultant, P2, the Netherlands A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: The present contribution argues for taking power in hydrodiplomacy seriously and claims that the hydro­ Hydrodiplomacy diplomacy literature is too focused on the ‘puzzling’ of diplomacy at the expense of the ‘powering’. Legitimate Power rule needs a combination of hard (coercion) and soft power (consent). We posit that different styles can be Negotiation distinguished in negotiation by focusing on the use of power resources. With this understanding, negotiations can Negotiation styles be analysed with greater clarity. To transpose the ‘powering’ and ‘puzzling’ from the policy sciences to diplo­ macy, we will draw on the main schools of International Relations theory: Realism, Institutionalism, Construc­ tivism, and Critical theory. Each of them brings insights relevant to different uses of power and in order to understand the negotiations in practice we need all four perspectives. We combine this approach with insights from a particular power typology, and various aspects of time, including uncertainty and path dependency. To exemplify our approach, we draw on a transboundary example involving state and non-state actors (dispute over the use of the Scheldt between The Netherlands and Belgium) and a local example of hydro-political interactions (irrigation system in Yemen). While the Scheldt case appears a good example of a move to common institution building over time, a closer look reveals the influence of “back tables”, popular movements and decision-making supported by crises, past traumas and future uncertainties, highlighting the time factor. The Yemeni case il­ lustrates likewise that institutions and better arguments do not necessarily win out while different sources of power are mobilised. We conclude that a focus on institutions, as in the dominant literature, does not tell the whole story in hydrodiplomacy. Our approach enables us in a structured manner to identify additional insights about preferred styles of negotiation. 1. Introduction water has multiple uses and users. Water however is also highly visible and symbolic (‘water is life’) and is often bound up with national Are analysts using the right analytical frameworks to understand identity (Hanna and Allouche, 2018), making water an explosive issue hydrodiplomacy and (transboundary) multi-stakeholder negotiation? when non-water relations are already tense. Since the late 1980s, water One element we will argue that is missing is power. A notable shift has wars have been widely predicted, echoed in the 2000s in climate wars. been observed in recent decades from state-to-state diplomacy to a While interstate water wars have failed to break out, water relations are network of state and non-state actors to tackle collective problems in often problematic; especially large infrastructural projects bring ten­ various domains of International Relations, from mobility to human sions and conflicts. Where, collective challenges also motivate cooper­ rights and public health. New actors vie for a place at the table or are co- ative initiatives, their implementation can bring stand-offs, as our cases opted by state actors to achieve certain objectives and may attempt to will illustrate. Engaging in the tricky domain of international water re­ mimic established actors in dijongplomacy (Adler Nissen & Pouliot lations, an actor will have to decide what is going to be their strongest 2014). suit in terms of the power resources they bring along to achieve their One domain of diplomacy receiving increasing attention in Interna­ objective. tional Relations is transboundary water governance. Transboundary As observant analysts we will have to live with the given that we water governance crosses multiple spatial and temporal scales, and have only partial vision on how the diplomatic game is played. Also, * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J. Warner), [email protected] (R. de Man). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.08.015 Received 8 March 2020; Received in revised form 25 August 2020; Accepted 26 August 2020 Available online 11 September 2020 1462-9011/© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 what is said or written by public speakers in the arena may be different new domains of diplomacy as water is a collective action problem, hence from their actions on the ground. But what we can observe appears to us requiring the effort of multiple actors ’to get things done’. This brings as relatively patterned behaviour. In seeking to understanding this new actors into the diplomatic realm, such as Non-Governmental Or­ diplomatic behaviour, we surmise different ‘styles’ can be analysed. ganisations (NGOs) and Transnational Companies (TNCs), who may Some play it rough, others more elegantly; some believe in collaborative mimic norms and functions of traditional diplomats (Adler-Nissen and teamwork, others are prima donnas or prefer a bystander role. We see Pouliot, 2014) but bring a fundamentally different dynamic to the mobilisation of forms of power as central to our understanding of diplomacy. diplomacy. The choice of style of course also depends on their sense of P2 (Section 3) The range of power resources used in diplomacy do not identity, the state of play, who they contend with, what their counter­ command adequate attention. The dominant discourse and literature on parts (can be expected to) bring. These factors may force them to adopt a hydrodiplomacy tends to be shy of ‘hard’ power. Current definitions of suboptimal position compared to their preferred style, but also bring hydrodiplomacy are not very realistic as they assume the benevolence of opportunities to be exploited. the actors to find solutions (Klimes et al., 2019) and build peace on Power is a surprisingly underanalysed aspect of water diplomacy. contested water issues and are shy of mentioning power as a key While diplomacy is ‘power in practice’ (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014) determinant in negotiation. We will argue that this in turn diminishes power is hardly discussed in the (water) diplomacy policy and academic the effectiveness of tackling a water-related conflict, as important di­ literature. This is strange, as we can clearly observe power play in mensions of a conflict and diplomacy are lost. We will argue that hard hydrodiplomatic interactions (as illustrated by our cases). We would not and soft forms of power helpfully describe the forms of power used in go so far as claim that diplomacy is warfare by other means (though diplomacy and bargaining between states in the global society of states gunboat diplomacy is part of the power arsenal), or that “diplomacy is and contextualize what we see as the ‘power gap’ in hydro-politics. perceived by an imperial power as a waste of time and prestige and a P3 (Section 4) Different power sources can be used in chosen negotiation sign of weakness” (Brooks, 2011), a quote attributed to former United styles. As part of the negotiation, actors can to a degree choose their Nations Secretary-General Boutros Ghali. Turning this insight on its negotiation style. In international relations (IR) shorthand, these styles head, though, we would argue that power is also never only ‘soft’ either. roughly translate as realist, institutionalist, constructivist and critical, Soft power strategies such as persuasion and attraction tend to need the and each of these styles has their own qualities which are productive in a shadow of hard power to be implemented. However, we do not see certain context. This ability to adopt a negotiation style co-depends on power as necessarily negative. Rather, we would agree that exercise of the (organization) culture, (power) resources an actor has, the arena it power (after Heclo (1974): powering, providing ’power to’) is needed to participates in (its position in the hierarchy, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, get things done. 2014) and its own home base (‘back-table negotiations’). Legitimate rule, hegemonic or otherwise, needs a combination of Our approach for remedying the power blindness we identify is based hard (coercion) and soft power (consent). Diplomatic strategy likewise on International Relations theories. Section 5 combines this approach mixes and matches hard and soft power (Hocking, 2005). We will need with insights from a particular power typology, ‘power animals’. We add to understand how power (over, to, with) and power resources are put to one more element to this framework: time/timing, including the use. The exercise of power can have productive (breakthrough) or less ‘shadow of the future’ and ‘shadow of the past’ (Poppo et al., 2008), productive (veto) outcomes. The present contribution will zoom out to including the path dependency of diplomatic traditions in particular include other approaches to power, as power plays a role even in territories, which may act as ‘attractors’ to (or repellents from) a constructivist approaches. particular course of action, and the emergence of ‘ripe’ moments and In this article we claim that different styles can be distinguished in windows of opportunity. negotiation with particular use of power resources. With this under­ Section 6 exemplifies our approach by drawing on a transboundary standing, negotiations can be analysed with greater clarity. In each example and an example of local hydro-political interactions. We diplomatic move, forms of power are brought to bear. Their access to conclude the article by reflecting on the cases and propositions and their and use of these ‘power tools’ in an episode of interaction (tactics) implications for how power is dealt with in the literature on constitute their ‘negotiation style’. hydrodiplomacy. While the hydrodiplomatic literature and course materials tend to take an institutionalist approach, we contend that this approach is only 2. From classical state diplomacy to network diplomacy? one out of a range of possible, and practiced, avenues. If we analyse diplomatic patterns through the lens of the main International Relations Attitudes to diplomacy are far from uniform. While American schools, we gain a broader, and we would claim, more realistic palette scholarship has long ignored the study of diplomacy and Americans actors choose from. tended to see diplomats as ‘untrustworthy figures’ (Wiseman, 2011), the Our intuitions, supported by literature, interviews and interactions English school of International Relations depicts diplomacy as the during the HH9 and HH10 conferences1 in The Hague, lead us to expect ‘master institution of international relations’. Yet, Criekemans (2010), a a reflective understanding of their styles related to the context in use to Belgian analyst of diplomacy, would claim that the real action appears to also be helpful to practitioners of water diplomacy in positioning be in continental Europe, which has been and still is a nursery for themselves in future transboundary interactions. sub-state diplomacy. The following propositions, reflecting the challenges we perceive in Sub-state actors such as federal states, cities, NGOs, may carve out a improving the analytical power of current frameworks, will be elabo­ niche for themselves in the diplomatic arena. Since the late 1990s, the rated in subsequent sections: spectrum of diplomatic instruments and the strategies that accompany P1 (Section 2) Classical diplomacy and network-based hydrodiplomacy sub-state entities have become more diverse and complex. In that sense coexist. New forms of network-based and public diplomacy are highly “To a certain extent, today’s diplomatic practices resemble a pre-Westphalian visible, but that does not mean the old ways have disappeared, espe­ world in which realms of different territorial sizes generate their own diplo­ cially in a ‘securitized’ issue (Allan and Mirumachi, 2010). Hydro­ matic identity and practices […] diplomacy has become a ’multi-level’ diplomacy is considered a special kind of diplomacy compared to other endeavour, in which different policy levels (macroregional, national, cross- border, sub-state: regions and cities) each generate specific types of diplo­ matic activities reflecting specific needs felt at their respective territorial 1 HH9: (Em)Powering Hydro-diplomacy conference The Hague, 5- 6 October levels.” (Criekemans, 2010). 2018. HH 10: ’The Power of Representation & the Representation of Power in Formally, the state is still the prime mover linking the national and Water Conflict and Cooperation’ 4− 5 October 2019 international levels. However, the state may not necessarily be, or want 284 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 to be, the dominant player, and may be outmanoeuvred by non-state The interdependencies of water issues with different decision- actors. States may be intentionally or unintentionally leave gaps and making arenas and geographical and temporal scales make it difficult niches for non-state transboundary and sub-state level diplomacy. As a to steer a water issue towards a certain solution. Drivers for conflict result, diplomacy is starting to look a multi-stakeholder (governance) (such as drought, upstream dam construction, pollution) and conflict network in which state and non-state actors perform diplomatic functions. maintainers (e.g. grievances, current livelihood dependencies) may In the ‘new diplomacy’, “diplomacy is becoming an activity concerned with persist and cause a conflict to erupt and continue; ‘conflict escapers’ may the creation of networks, embracing a range of state and non-state actors offer acceptable ways out of conflict for the parties involved. focusing on the management of issues that demand resources over which no To deal with uncertainties, people make individual assumptions single participant possesses a monopoly” (Hocking, 2006: 13). based on their own interpretation of reality and the knowledge available Sharp (2009) follows Martin Wight’s English School which ac­ to them. These individual understandings may create problems when knowledges three traditions: Hobbesian (might), Lockeian (interests and people need to address a common challenge, such as the governance of rights) and Kantian (revolutionary change). Accordingly, he states that: shared waters. Stakeholders will frame the issue and their interests in it, “Diplomacy does not take place simply between states but wherever people making (water) conflicts even more complex (de Man, 2016). For Islam live in different groups” (p. 3). It is more than statecraft, but diplomats and Susskind (2012), this complex nature is even the main problem, cannot be reduced to mere operatives in networks of power and influ­ increasing the attraction of excluding certain issues or actors. ence. People live in groups, in relations of separateness and diplomacy Complexity increases even more when non-state actors become develops to manage these relations. We follow his definition (p. 13): embroiled in a water conflict. Also, as the cases will show, power voids “Diplomacy is, first and last, a set of assumptions, institutions and processes - can create political space for sub-state actors to mobilise their power, a practice – for handling of certain kinds of relations between human beings”. whether or not in alternative diplomatic tracks. Part of the reason why Non-state and multilateral actors often mimic diplomatic norms, i.e. many shared water conflicts find themselves in an impasse, is because behaving the way they think state diplomats behave (McConnell et al., the conflict transformation process is complex and not well understood2 2012; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014), but bringing a fundamentally. But another reason for this space may be unwillingness at the interstate different dynamic to diplomatic culture, partly depriving it of its ‘culture level to commit to a deal or its implementation, leading to an active or of exclusivity’. Network diplomacy flattens, but does not eliminate the passive pursuit of a non-decision (Vij et al., 2019). Non-state actors do hierarchy in world relations, “among states but also other kinds of actors not have the natural authority to claim a seat at the table but can as well, and often even a mix of different actors within a single structure mobilise their substantive or moral authority or constituency (Meissner, of differentiation” (Mattern and Zarakol, 2016). 2005). In each of these cases we should recognise that power matters a Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), diplomacy has been under­ great deal, if in different forms. stood as a communication mechanism between sovereign states. The Finally, a note on scale. Hydrodiplomacy tends to focus on rivers, as new diplomacy promises transparency, accountability, networking, and managed and negotiated by states. However, Shapland (1997) and inclusion of non-state actors. In the ‘new diplomacy’ communication is Ferragini & Greco (2005) have concentrated on transboundary aquifer not only between state actors, but actively directed at domestic and diplomacy. Farnum (2018) moreover claims that we may be focusing on international publics to win ‘hearts and minds’ for a particular agenda or the wrong level when studying hydrodiplomacy by default as dealings course of action. This means a diversification of publics, and the message between states over rivers and advocates a more diverse scalar focus – sent at different audiences may contain different or even contradictory her own case focuses on sub-state interactions over fog harvesting. We framings or meet with clashing understandings. In this messaging, the likewise advocate not limiting our analyses to states and rivers. Our agency (and technology) of non-state actors, both private, civil-society Yemen case illustrates a case of sub-state diplomacy on a flood-based and multilateral, has come to gain considerable influence, and each irrigation system (ephemeral wadi river) in the absence of a functional may piggyback on the other to convey particular narratives to particular national government. In the Scheldt case, transboundary hydro­ audiences. Two-level game theory (Putnam, 1988) and the literature on diplomacy had a multi-stakeholder design and aspects of para-diplomacy3 multitrack diplomacy (e.g. Dore, 2007) likewise call attention to the role. of sub-state actors in state-to-state relations. As a field of practice, hydrodiplomacy has a much longer pedigree 3. Problems with the hydrodiplomacy discourse than its current rise. For example, state-to-state treaties on the Rhine were concluded in the 19th century, and negotiation, violence and After an initial ‘water wars’ scare in the 1990s (e.g. Bulloch and powerplay between states over water precede those. According to Jan Darwish, 1993), hydro-political literature started to focus on ‘water Eliasson (2015), deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations peace’. Likewise, influential hydro-diplomatic literature tends to focus 2012–2016, the age of hydrodiplomacy is now upon us. The hydro­ on soft power, from its preoccupation with institutions. diplomacy concept has indeed seen an inexorable rise in recent years This literature productively embraces the ‘new culture’ of pluralism, (Pohl et al., 2014), with varying interpretations. Yet, while water problem-solving and accountability. It believes in creating a level cooperation is more frequent than violent conflict (Wolf, 1995), many of playing field, multi-stakeholder participation, the (rational) power of the world’s 310 (2018 figures, in McCracken and Wolf, 2019) trans­ argument on framing and reframing and developing shared meaning, boundary rivers and lakes remain conflictive. Geography deals different countries different hands. When upstreamers start harnessing the river in infrastructural works, down­ streamers start to worry about the upstreamers’ ability to cause drought 2 Interviews in 2015 and 2016 amongst professionals resulted in the identi­ or floods downstream. This makes water a geopolitical resource, un­ fication of the following challenges for hydrodiplomacy: 1) The ability to build evenly distributed over territories, making it a ‘special case’ (Giordano, trust among competing stakeholders; 2) The ability to organise multi-sector and 2003) especially for states in arid areas. As Lowi (1995) noted, multi-level interactions; 3) The ability to manage a growing multi-actor policy upstreamers find it easier to ignore downstreamers. Warner (1992) environment; 4) The ability to deal with uncertainties; 5) Sustainable financing: Transboundary water cooperation is often underfinanced; 6) Sustainable leg­ noted that ‘upstreamers use water to get more power, downstreamers acy: how to build an enduring capacity among all stakeholders to prevent and use power as leverage to get more water’ - although history also has resolve conflicts (Huntjens and De Man, 2017) shown a downstreamer like the Netherlands may find themselves at an 3 “direct international activity by subnational actors supporting com­ advantage on issues of navigation and fishing. Downstreamers moreover plementing, correcting, duplicating or challenging the nation-state’s diplo­ can mobilise resources, alliances and knowledge as countervailing macy” (Michelmann, H. J. & Soldatos, P. eds., 1990. Federalism and power resources. Brief, power can be both a tool and a goal. international relations: the role of subnational units. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) 285 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 redolent of Habermasian ‘communicative rationality’. Science and jointly paint a fuller picture of the range of actual interactions. To expose technology, a particular strength of the Dutch water sector, are brought the underlying world views of current analysis and prescription is not to in to reduce uncertainties and increasing the solution space. This say it is wrong, and that another view is essentially right. As Menga rational collective problem-solving by multi-stakeholder negotiation, (2016) notes, theories of International Relations should not isolate but may be summarised as ‘puzzling’ (Culpepper, 2002). converse with each other (see Stucki, 2005, Julien, 2013 and Warner, The going hydrodiplomacy literature reflects this idealist, liberal- 2012 for such multi-focal approaches in transboundary hydro-politics). internationalist outlook advanced by Woodrow Wilson in the 1910s. We will argue this approach in the next section. In currently popular writings on hydrodiplomacy, power seems only an afterthought. This may be related with the self-image of the discipline. 4. A broader palette: the four main schools of IR The majority of literature on hydrodiplomacy is remarkably power-shy. Various publications and going definitions consider hydrodiplomacy a To transpose the ‘powering’ and ‘puzzling’ from the policy sciences type of environmental peace-making. In popular notions such as the 4i- to diplomacy, we will draw on the main schools of International Re­ framework (Jarvis and Wolf, 2010) or ’benefit sharing’ (Sadoff and lations theory. In the study of International Relations four paradigms are Grey, 2002) and the water-food-energy Nexus (Hoff, 2011) we note a generally identified: Realism, Institutionalism, Constructivism, and Critical tendency to bracket out politics in favour of technical modelling, insti­ theory (Viotti and Kauppi, 2019 ). The different schools, and tutional tinkering, and technical support. This reflects an underlying sub-schools have different preferences on what are the building blocks of linear worldview in which interventions lead to improvement. While international relations. Actors, interests, rules/institutions, discourses desirable from an eco-centric perspective, it soon meets a reality check and resources are frequently advanced, if in different permutations and where administrative and eco-systemic scales fail to align (Warner et al., conceptualisations, though not mutually exclusive. While adherents of 2014). one often ignore the other three paradigms, each of them brings Donahue and Johnson (1997) noted that many water conflicts can be particularly useful insights relevant to different uses of power. In order understood with respect to crucial differences over what constitutes the to understand the negotiations in practice we need all four. primary value of water: water as an economic good, as a political good a. Realism: "We respect a treaty as long as we expect to benefit and as a cultural good. Yet, because water is so symbolic, it can easily from it" become a focal point for non-water conflicts, such as identity politics For (neo)Realists, students of Realpolitik, diplomacy is the instrument (Pohl et al., 2014). When threats are being made over water, there is by which actors attempt to achieve their aims, in relation to those of often a non-water history (land claims, grievances, political rivalry) that others. It presumes a state-centric world, seeking stability in a context of fuels it, while water also attracts the attention of external actors like global anarchy but rejecting interdependence. Power asymmetry is donors, e.g. on the Nile, making it beneficial to play water conflict up considered productive and game theory helps determine a coordination (Warner, 2012). Also, puzzling may obscure or negate the overhang of strategy where communication is lacking. The transactional ‘old culture covert conflicts (e.g. the ‘shadow of the past’) that may suddenly erupt, of diplomacy’ Ruggie (2005) relates to is close to a classical Realist and surprise diplomats involved. approach to International Relations. Inspired by classical European Hence, we need to carefully consider aspects which may not be statecraft and adopted by US Cold War statesmen like Henry Kissinger, it immediately visible through a puzzling approach. All these forms of sees ‘might’ as right, the state as the prime mover, and hard power assets puzzling are helpful (e.g. where political relations have broken down), (force, coercion and intelligence) and stability as its key objectives. increasing the solution space by ‘empowering knowledge’, but will not Realists see diplomacy as a ‘more palatable form of force’ to be brought get us anywhere without powering: the wherewithal to get things done, to bear in the national interest (Kissinger, 1995). Criekemans (2010) to mobilise support and buy-in. While puzzling may identify the best notes that in recent times, emergent powers such as China or Brazil have option based on best knowledge, the best option is not necessarily the ‘used diplomacy to ‘test’’ their relationship vis-a-vis each other and, most feasible option. In the end, the result of strenuous puzzling does more importantly vis-a-vis the hegemon, the United States of America – need ’powering’ to make it happen (e.g. De Man, 2016). Nothing goes and we would add, the US under Trump seems to be acting much the without the judicious use of power in hydrodiplomacy to get things same. done, or not to get things done. For Realists, water normally isn’t ‘high politics’. A Realist mind-set In our terms, borrowed from Heclo (1974), we not only argue that will raise the bar pretty high before bringing water on board in diplo­ the popularity of ‘puzzling’ obscures that powerplay hasn’t fallen out of matic interactions. Water and environment may be relegated to tech­ practice, but also that it has its uses for certain actors at certain moments nical issues, which also reduces political accountability for agreements – puzzling and powering go in tandem. We would argue, then, that with far-reaching consequences. Still, in hydro-politics states purse ac­ power is central to diplomacy, not just an aside. tions such as unilateral dam building or diversion and proxy war that It is certainly true that ’new diplomacy’ emphasises transparency may be labelled ’Realist’. and networked governance. We believe however that Ruggie (2005) was b. Institutionalism: "A treaty is better than no treaty at all" on to something when claiming the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ culture of in­ For institutionalists, the key elements are creating value and building ternational diplomacy are living side by side in today’s diplomatic trust as the key elements in a presumed level playing field. They look for practice. The ‘old diplomacy’, as practiced during, say, the Concert of linkages and institutions for collective action that can cushion against Vienna and throughout the Cold War, was characterised by exclusivity, destabilising shocks and promote regional integration. This school of secrecy and self-interested powerplay. Even when one is loath to use thought is functionalist (looking for the perfect ‘fit’ for problem-solving) hard power, the actual outcome of a situation depends also on the power and does not assume the state is the only or even key actor. Complex sources of other actors. Broadening the base brings in a broader palette interdependence brings multiple centres of authority (polycentricity) of diplomatic tools and strategies, from outright confrontation to initi­ and opens the door for other transboundary interactions to tackle shared ating multilateral initiatives, or, as the TWINS model (Mirumachi and water issues as an alternative to ‘high politics’ through ‘multilevel di­ Allan, 2007) suggests, a mix of conflictive and cooperative moves. plomacy’4. Many international policy fields are believed to be struc­ This impels us to broaden the usual understanding of conflict and tured in terms of ‘international regimes’ governing an issue-area - power. Not only because even if one’s own intentions are pure, one should be prepared for others that are not; conflict can be productive by making interests explicit which cooperation may obscure, while power 4 Tracks 1.5/2/3/4 are shorthand for alternative diplomatic channels when can be the sine qua non of deal making. We argue that adding other formal government-to-government diplomacy has broken down, paving the concepts of power and diplomacy add to the analytical depth as they way or serving as an alternative avenue for a resumption of negotiation. 286 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 norms, procedures, practices (Krasner, 1983) or patterned behaviour types of elite power in Scott’s typology (see below). But non-rulers, the (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982). These issue-areas may also be described as subaltern, may wrest hard and soft power from the hands of that elite transboundary policy arrangements - a set of rules, resources and dis­ and make other means of coercion, inducements, authority, expertise courses (De Jong, 2000; Barnes-Dabban et al. (2018). count. The Cuban, Venezuelan, Bolivian and Uruguayan governments The creation of institutions and regimes is believed to help structure purported to revolutionise the right to water at a global level5 and in the international behaviour, promoting complex interdependence. Complex 4th World Water Forum in Mexico (2006), while elsewhere global social interdependence between states will then reduce chances of future and environmental movements operate with this goal. warfare, creating stability of expectations (lengthening the ‘shadow of While Ritchie and Egeland (2018) mainly consider the resistance of the future’, Axelrod and Keohane (1985)) and reducing the prominence some states to the hegemony of others, we may also scrutinise resistance of the state and the attraction of independent ‘going it alone’. or norm transformation by non-state actors. This resistance not only Institutionalism sets great store by law and norm creation and in so takes place through institutionalist strategies such as (influencing) norm doing contributes to ‘eroding the effect of power and hegemony on in­ creation (Haufler, 1993) and forum shopping (von Benda-Beckmann, ternational agreements’ (Gupta, 2016). Domestic and international 1981). It can also take the form of extra-parliamentary action to seek politics may spill over into each other. The national policy arena (the entry to the diplomatic playing field or to undermine the legitimacy of ‘back table’) however may well be characterised by a different set of formal processes (Scott, 1985). This might extend to combining rules, resources and discourses than the international chessboard. Indi­ collaborative strategies within the arena with adversarial strategies vidual actors may decide, or be persuaded, to conform or ignore the outside the arena to address perceived iniquities. For the radical/critical norms governing the decision-making arena. This discrepancy between school, finally, power, and especially power difference, is core to the the levels is, to a degree, found in the Scheldt case discussed below. approach. It focuses on exposing, analysing and resisting exploitation Contrary to Realists, institutionalists do not assume the state to be and dependency, arguing the playing field is never level, and seeks to the leading and unitary actor. It takes a network perspective of Inter­ identify transformational alternatives and empower social actors to national Relations, in which different sub-state actors may compete or attain them. The power may not be visible but structural, so that our form competing alliances, e.g. the Dutch Environmental Ministry may analysis should drive at the root causes. The last column in the below ally with other European Environmental Ministries to provide a coun­ Table 1 lists the key drivers for changing power positions according to terweight to the dominance of agricultural ministries – or federal states the four schools6. or cities may conduct their own diplomacy, co-opted or contradicted by e. Power sources central government actors (see Scheldt case). As diplomatic actors enter the negotiation arena, they ‘take’ different c. Constructivism: "A treaty is based on shared problem sources of power with them, they can mobilise in the interaction with perception " the other actors. Given the role diplomacy has often played as an The constructivist paradigm sees co-operation and conflict not as alternative channel to warfare, diplomacy itself tends to be considered outcomes of power calculus underpinned by material resources but ’soft (i.e. noncoercive) power’. Not only would we argue that diplomatic related to identity (Jarvis and Wolf, 2010). Power relations are under­ arm-wrestling can be experienced as pretty coercive, however, we also pinned by normative or ideational structures and actors engaging in note that hard power (threats and inducements) is part and parcel of social interaction and interplay to bridge perceptual gaps. Knowledge international relations. and ideas are important power resources here. Key examples in the Political science has produced countless theories and typologies of environmental domain are the Stockholm treaty and the Plan Bleu to power, all intensely debated. Our choice of framework draws on the clean up the Mediterranean (Haas, 1990). The common understanding sociologist John P. Scott (2001, 2008) who, after Max Weber, sees power of a joint challenge is shaped, often led by members of an epistemic as the capacity to affect others, as ’the production of social effects’. Scott community. Scientists, currently most visibly IPCC, consciously use the identified four disciplines, metaphorically represented by four ‘power power to shape the terms in which the problem is understood to trigger animals’ that dominate power elites in particular political settings. (‘power’) collective action, mobilising ‘power with’ rather than ‘power While he identified the forms of power they carry (coercive, financial, to’ or ‘power over’. This analytical tradition is like a sociology of relationships in Inter­ Table 1 national Relations (Wendt, 1999) where states have identities and per­ Four IR views of changing power positions. sonalities: they want to be liked or feared and may learn from School of View of treaty Force of change experience. They may redefine their identities and interests such that thought they redefine their relations with other actors. Frustrated, ontologically Realist We respect a treaty as long as we Change in material (existentially) insecure states may consider it beneficial spreading expect to benefit from it power position chaos, and therefore thwart water cooperation (Mitzen, 2006). Other Institutionalist A treaty is better than no treaty at all Changing cost- states may seek to endeavour to change this state’s ’self-image’ to get benefit ratio them back to the negotiating table. (assessment) Constructivist A treaty is based on shared problem Progressive insight d. Critical theory: "Cooperation negates structural inequalities" perception and facts (different from While much of the governance and diplomacy literature suggests that material interests) everyone is equal or has an equal opportunity to make the best argument Critical Multilateral treaties institutionalise Changing concept of prevail, there is always the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Jessop, 2002). Ma­ manufactured ‘common sense’ and control; resistance structural inequalities terial resources matter in the international arena. As Foucault noted (see Heller, 1996), there is no power without resistance, no hegemony without counter-hegemony. Critical theory is well placed in promoting an understanding of resistance to seemingly collaborative, win-win type agreements. Critical theory purports to look beyond the interests of the 5 Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba & Uruguay, Declaracion complementaria en el elites characterising diplomacy, and indeed are the basis for all four Marco del IV Foro Mundial del Agua [Complementary Declaration of the Fourth World Water Forum], 22 March 2006 6 Different schools also have different conceptualisations of what the arena itself is like, which would technically require four different arena representa­ tions as well. We will for now leave this outside the scope of the present contribution. 287 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 authoritative, cognitive) in a domestic context, we argue that these (organization) culture, (power) resources an actor has, the arena it forms of power also helpfully describe the forms of powers dominating participates in (determining its position/ hierarchy) and its own home diplomacy and bargaining between states. As others in the arena may base (back table negotiations). Meerts (2014) notes: “Power and influ­ use or be open to different sources of power, we may surmise diplomatic ence create boundaries for the weak and remove them for the strong. Yet services are well advised to compose multidisciplinary teams when power and influence are not only structural, but also situational. The question dealing with their diplomatic interlocutors from other nation-states, and is not only what the resources are, where they are and who is controlling deciding which form of power would, could or should dominate them, but also how they are dealt with in the process needed to go from A to B, proceedings. and how they are influenced by that process.“ This is to a degree bound up Among these power resources, hard power is represented by the lion with cultures and personalities, but also with strategy. By identifying the (strength, threat of violence, coercion, physical force) and the fox paradigms in negotiations, we are able to identify the sources of power (cunning, offering inducements such as side payments). Machiavelli and hence to deepen the “flat” character of the power animals. (1952: 69) noted that leaders have to be like lions as well as foxes, as the Below we will describe the episodes in a transboundary water con­ lion is defenceless against traps, and the fox is defenceless against flict as rounds in a boxing match or the moves in a chess board game, wolves – which also highlights the situatedness of apt power resources. part of a longer match. Bringing in the time element, we can consider Both can change the structure of constraints with a view to inducing multiple rounds of negotiation (Teisman, 2000) where actors make de­ conformity of conduct with goals desired by the actor exercising power. cisions in multiple rounds of interaction. Rather than one actor bringing Soft power comprises the powers of the bear (authority, command, a solution, various courses of actions may be proposed by various actors rules and institutions, treaties) and the owl (wisdom, knowledge, in pursuit of various goals, which may change over time. These actors, expertise). Modes of Alternative Dispute Resolution such as mediation strategies and goals find themselves in multiple rounds of bargaining. rely on the power of argument (Gazal-Ayal & Perry 2014), on recog­ Multiple chessboards may be at play which may be coupled (e.g. the nising interests rather than position (Fisher et al., 2011). While Scott Rhine, Scheldt and Meuse). relates these to (domestic) elites, we can also imagine them as the power The ‘shadow of the future’ (uncertainty, e.g. climate change) and base of diplomacy. Dependent on the goals and context, a diplomatic ‘shadow of the past’ (overhang of perceived ‘wrongs’ or slights in the actor will emphasise one of those power varieties, and if necessary past) are attractors for behaviour. Path dependencies also shape diplo­ mobilise professionals (which we will consider ‘resources’ for the sake of matic culture over time. the argument) within or outside the diplomatic force that can ’power’ Temporising (speeding up or slowing down) is biding one’s time waiting the strategy: in COP climate negotiations we expect a country to bring for the ‘right moment’ to act when a new more amenable counterpart experts to further ’Nexus’ goals, maybe buttressed by financial in­ comes around, or a time when unwelcome messages or actions are likely centives (carrots) or sanctions (sticks) rather than military threats, while to be drowned out by other news (Warner and van Buuren, 2016). on water in historically disputed territory, water expertise may be far Successful diplomacy is often said to depend on’ ripe moments’ (Zart­ less salient. However, a state with identity issues may prefer a coercive man, 2001); actors may rush to take advantage of a window of oppor­ strategy on everything (Table 2). tunity before it closes. Political or administrative crisis mode provide f. Negotiation styles such ripe moments. The ripe moment arises when parties discuss what The above types of power may align to a higher or lower degree with they want to resolve: the moment when a stalemate becomes mutually rationalist/functionalist strategic approaches to International Relations: hurting and attrition sets in. Sudden disasters may also provide them what is the best fit to situation and goals. We have also seen that states (Kreutz, 2012), although such windows in ‘disaster-diplomacy ‘tend to may ignore or thwart other states (realism), may not speak with one accelerate emerging trends rather than create entirely new situations voice (institutionalism), may have identity issues but also change their (Kelman, 2007). Ripeness should be matched by a readiness of ‘credible interest perception (constructivism) or be a front for structural power people to begin talks about reframing the problems’ (Jones, 2017: 18). inequalities that may erupt and destabilise or revolutionise the ruling The figure below summarises the conceptual framework. The figure elite (critical theory)7. The ‘multiple personalities’ hiding behind the schematically depicts a diplomatic actor (centre rings in blue) entering a united front may not align and may be schizophrenically (or pragmati­ negotiation arena (outer rings in green). The negotiation arena consists cally) deployed. There isn’t always a coherent ‘method to the madness’. of the ‘other actors’. The perceptions and type of power sources applied Each of the ‘animals’ may dominate at any one time, though mixes are are indicated through stars pointing to the corresponding ring. We certainly possible, and patterns may be observed that become charac­ differentiate between different ‘rounds’ in which the interaction takes teristic of the actor’s ‘negotiation style’. place. Each round is consistent in style. Hence, we can visualise how The ability to choose a negotiation style is depending on the styles change through time through interactions between the diplomatic actors but also through external shocks (as will be demonstrated through the Scheldt case) (Fig. 1). Table 2 Four types of power. 5. Case study analysis Style Instrument Mascot To exemplify our approach, we draw on a transboundary example Corrective Coercion Force. Restricting other’s action scope Lion (hard power) (Scheldt) and a local example (Yemen) of hydro-political interactions. Inducement Incentives, manipulation of access to Fox I. The Scheldt estuary case8 resources, costs and benefits, e.g. side The Scheldt case is a case in point, both in terms of the broadening payments (Dinar, 2006) actor base in hydrodiplomacy, and a palpable oscillation between Persuasive Expertise (Specialised) knowledge Owl (soft power) Command Legitimate authority Bear 8 The Scheldt (Escaut) originates in the Northwest of France before it enters Belgian territory at Tournai (Doornik). While France has had some disputes with Belgium over the Scheldt, most recently over pollution in 2020 (Strauss and de La Hamaide, 2020), the river is not central to French concerns. Since 7 An ‘owl’ as the voice of science would be expected in constructivist envi­ co-signing the Scheldt Agreement in 1994, French has hardly spoken out about ronmental treaty making, but may also rationalise Realist geopoliticking (game the river. The key transboundary conflict dynamics has been over the river theorists). Scheldt estuary, shared by the Dutch and Belgian coriparians. 288 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 Fig. 1. Schematic overview of the application of the conceptual framework. various negotiation styles, which we will analyse through the prism of maintained the right to levy toll. Unsurprisingly, describing Belgium’s Dutch hydrodiplomacy9. Both basins have a long history of powerplay diplomatic style after independence, Helmreich (2019) identifies a and litigation before environmental river rehabilitation goals formed an ’willingness to resort to arms’, a belligerence resonating even today. We important part of multilateral deals arrived at in the late 20th century. A can thus note a Realist mindset on both sides: The Netherlands also has multiplicity of sub-state actors (the Flemish authorities; Antwerp’s port proved not to be above Realist powerplay through shifting alliances, authorities; environmentalist NGOs) was allowed to play a role in while the Belgians were willing to fight fire with fire. After Belgian in­ pressing for maintaining the natural beauty of the Scheldt in the face of dependence, the Belgians set out to develop the Antwerp harbour. deepening the river’s fairway desired by the Flemish. But the Dutch dragged their feet each time the Belgians requested However, in both cases domestic interests fearing damage reared something they needed Dutch cooperation for deepening the Scheldt, their heads and persuaded the national government to change tack. A and applied linkage politics encumbering a Scheldt treaty (Meijerink, relative domestic power void in the early 2000s had enabled parochial 2008) until the federalisation of Belgium in 1993 enabled it, making interests to hijack international negotiations. After a centre-right coali­ Flanders and Walloon separate diplomatic entities. tion took power the Dutch started to play hardball with Realist arm- Round 2: twisting on both basins around 2010, powerplay defeating institu­ Federalisation among other things enabled Flemish ‘para-diplomacy’ tional weakness. This delayed the implementation of transboundary with the Netherlands for the Scheldt estuary visioning without Walloon agreements on both rivers and risking total breakdown until the Euro­ meddling (Criekemans, 2006). But another actor took the stage: Dutch pean Commissioner stepped in threatening punitive measures. and Flemish environmental NGOs who, mimicking state diplomacy, in The rounds: 1997 signed the Saeftinge treaty. As ‘constructivist owls’, their gesture Round 1: helped the Dutch and Flemish state actors reinterpret their stance, and to The Netherlands has taken advantage of its geography in navigation, engage in a visioning process for the Scheldt estuary. They signed a chaining the harbour in the 17th and 18th century then levying toll on collaborative memorandum in 2001. Led by environmentalist NGOs a the river Scheldt in the 19th). host of non-state actors came together under the supportive but In Realism hard power dominates (lion - coercion) expressed in hands-off binational aegis. Dutch and Flemish knowledge institutes blockades, toll levy, lawsuits, negative linkage politics. In 1648 the supported joint fact finding on the consequences of deepening for nat­ Dutch won the right to materially close the Scheldt so that Rotterdam ural values. But a long previous history of Dutch hegemony cast a could thrive ’as grass grew in the streets of Antwerp’ (George, 1927). In “shadow of the past” on Belgium which continued their view of Dutch as its struggle for emancipation from the Dutch in the 19th century, imposing and insensitive, looming over negotiations. When the Belgium mobilised the support of Great Britain, a global Great Power at well-liked Dutch co-chair sadly died in a car accident however, this the time, which as a strong naval and commercial power stood to benefit shock triggered a will to honour his effort with an agreement. It was a from promoting free navigation. After Belgian independence the Dutch ripe moment propelling participants to action, leading to a deal in 2005. A deal between the harbour and NGOs on a more sustainable way of fairway dredging provided the breakthrough (owl) (van Buuren and Warner, 2009; Verhallen and van Densen, 2012). 9 This means backgrounding of less prominent players in both cases. The Round 3: cases seek to illustrate rather than to be comprehensive 289 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 From 2008, and especially in 2010− 11 the Netherlands returned to Realism as Dutch leaders tried to duck their international re­ Netherlands gives in. Implementation Domestic pressure leads to ignoring sponsibilities under populist domestic pressure, leading to an escalating Signing of vision agreement 2005 agreement, upstream retaliation row with both Scheldt riparian states. Local protest against the flooding of treaty from 2019 onwards of adjacent Dutch and Flemish polders under the 2005 deal were suc­ 2005 Estuary agreement* cessfully ‘upscaled’ to the national political level in the Netherlands. Angry missives from Flanders met with Dutch promises for ‘more Scheldt treaty 1995 research into alternatives’ as apparent delay tactics. The Flemish then threatened retaliation in non-water domains. Rapped on the knuckles by the European Commission and aware of reputational risk abroad, the Output Dutch eventually demurred (Warner and van Buuren, 2016). A new domestic governing coalition saved the day getting the Dutch back in line steering towards implementation of the Scheldt agreement. Silent Institutionalist-Bear international cooperation (successful countervailing power) ensured long-term co-riparian trust. Belgium and the Netherlands’ common Enter European Commission: European Union membership had provided a brake on Dutch “rogue” Commission European action. (law) Table 3 below summarises the rounds and reveals presumed ‘power animals’ The Scheldt case is illustrated through the overview presented earlier. For reasons of readability, only round 2 and the start of round 3 Enter NGOs: Constructivist Owls are depicted. In this overview the interactions between Belgium, The Realist Bear, Lion (litigation, with occasional Fox strategy Netherlands and the NGOs are visualised. In round 2, the interaction between the parties is influenced through the sad loss of the co-chair. In round 3 the Netherlands has come under pressure to change its position, leading to a repositioning of the other parties at the table (Fig. 2). II. Local power play in Yemen (short case) threats) Research in Yemen (by Huntjens and De Man, 2014) on the effec­ NGOs tiveness of conflict resolution in water conflicts prior 2014 draws attention to the role of power and the use of legal pluralism in a number of water conflicts playing out as the central state keeps failing. The tribal structure strongly affects the implementation of legislation and the way Constructi-vist Owl/ Institutionalist Bear conflicts are dealt with. Through former President Saleh’s patronage system, a political elite gained control over water resources through Realist-Lion Realist Lion financial power at the expense of the rural poor. The legal system in Flanders Yemen is pluriform and disjointed: contradictions exist between the various sources and legal references, such as sources of pre-Islamic, sharia and formal law. Legal pluralism allows powerful newcomers to deviate from customary rules. Round 1: Realist-Lion Realist Lion, then Bear Realist-Fox (and Owl) Constructi-vist Owl/ Institutionalist-Bear Institutionalist-Bear As in Yemen the state failed, existing agents are incapable of creating Negotiation style stability as they lack hard power assets. In this context new actors can do Nether-lands what they want. One of these cases concerns a water conflict as a result of a newcomer buying land upstream in an existing irrigated area. This newcomer changed the scene since 2004 by imposing a material barrier, a gate, hence allowing him to use the upstream irrigation water for his own purpose. His action ran counter to the customary rules of prior Dutch power play, Belgium European Commissioner’s NL-B join learning-based appropriation. As a result of the blockage, the canal irrigates a much smaller area Domestic pressure ‘Internal’ to arena Overview of the Dutch negotiation styles in the Scheldt. than the original 1000 ha and several downstream farmers haven’t been *Preparation of implementation, no diplomatic events. vision building able to irrigate their lands since. These farmers have no other choice but ultimatum aggrieved to rely on very expensive groundwater as the diesel price for the diesel pumps skyrocketed after the 2011 revolution. Several farmers did not have any choice but to leave for Saudi Arabia to find a job. Round 2: Institutionalist-Owl As the water conflict relates to an irrigation structure, farmers turn to climate fears rising ‘External’ to arena Domestic pressure Co-chair advisory the irrigation agency to solve the conflict. The irrigation agency was the Federalisa-tion Floods (1995), sole organization to take some initiative to solve the conflict by pro­ board dies posing technical alternatives, but the newcomer boycotted all those. The Events agency could not procure any help to force the person into cooperation either, although sometimes it requested the help of local wise men. Round 3: Realist-Bear 1. Up to 1990s 2. 1995− 2005 2008− 2011 2011− 2019 As the irrigation agency was unable to settle the conflict in 2006, a Negotia-tion well-respected sheikh forced the offender into cooperation – or else face Table 3 round consequences. 1993 2005 3b. 3a. Round 4: Realist-Bear, but with weak authority 290 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 Fig. 2. Schematic overview of the power positions in Scheldt hdyrodiplomacy rounds 2 and 3. However, after the sheikh’s death in 2010, his son took over, but he between formal law and traditional law could be bridged and the lacks his father’s authority, and despite the agreement, the offender legitimacy of the court rules improved, making justice accessible even started blocking the stream again. for the most disadvantaged groups. Mobility also has the advantage that Round 5a: Institutionalist-Bear political-economic connections of a ‘crony capitalist nature’ (that pro­ Since the district government also bears a role in settling disputes vide opportunities for rule, self-enrichment and prestige) have less around water, the affected farmers and the agency submitted a formal impact on the objectivity and legitimacy on court rulings (‘anti-fox’ complaint to the district director in 2010 to resolve the situation and get countermeasures). the newcomer to cooperate. Despite this, no action is taken, as the offender is powerful. 6. Discussion and conclusions Round 5b: Institutionalist-Bear The person, a contractor, is well-connected with influential people in In the present contribution we have argued that current hydro­ the government and security who back him up. He uses his resources to diplomacy literature is too focused on the ‘puzzling’ of diplomacy at the maximise his control of the water. The transitional period since 2011 expense of the ‘powering’. Next, we have posited that different styles can contributed to the continuation of this situation as government’s influ­ be distinguished in negotiation by focusing on the use of power ence has grown even weaker. Powerful landowners wield great influ­ resources. ence on water allocations and by cutting off floodwater from The cases illustrate that a focus on institutions, symbolised by the smallholders they aim at pressuring them to sell their land at a low price. ‘Institutionalist-Bear’ (authority-based) negotiation style, does not tell Round 5c: Institutionalist-Bear the whole story in hydrodiplomacy. Fledgling institutions can be tested Appealing to the court also seemed not an option for local farmers, and counteracted (Scheldt case) or even swept aside (Yemen case). By who pointed out that the court does not have a “very good reputation” in focusing on the different styles in the analysed cases we gained addi­ the area. Affected landowners asked neighbours for their support tional insights about how power was used in these real-world negotia­ (mobilising “power with”), but they lacked the required social power and tions in practice. Therefore, we consider the framework a promising tool were too afraid of retaliations. in obtaining a different insight into diplomacy and power by covering a In this case various forms of power were used to exercise control over broader power spectrum, at the transboundary but also substate level. water and settle the water conflict. This case seems to support the need We could have illustrated this by starker instances - one reason why, for neo-institutional strengthening, however, to achieve this counter- for example, the Kingdom of Lesotho has not made a noise about the power will need to be organised to defeat the power of the lion and meagre South African royalties it receives for its water exports (through fox. Downstream landowners avail of no salient sources of power. the Lesotho Highlands Project), although the 1986 protocol expressly Huntjens and De Man looked into the development of mobile water enables a 12-year agreement revision cycle, may well be the memory of courts for water related conflicts. Mobile courts have been recom­ South African’s 1998 incursion (i.e. hard power) into Lesotho safeguard mended before and are corruption prone. Next to court rulings, these water for its economic powerhouse (Gauteng province) at a time of mobile courts should provide education (owls) on the applicable laws political turbulence in its neighbour state (Meissner and Warner, 2017). and provide technical advice in relation to water issues, thereby facili­ Old-school Realism explains the status quo much better than does the tating conflict resolution outside the courts. In this manner the gap ‘new diplomacy’, supporting proposition one. Treaties or 291 J. Warner and R. de Man Environmental Science and Policy 114 (2020) 283–294 non-engagement do not exclude proxy warfare or obstruction. Yemen, sheikhs were traditionally selected based on heredity and With the apparent breakdown of the World Trade Organisation and acceptability within the tribe (Philips, 2011). As a consequence of the the rise of illiberal nationalist democracies, diplomatic mores seem to be patronage system of former president Saleh, rent-seeking groups were hardening, in a move from rule-based to power-based bargaining (see formed stimulating nepotism and corruption. While Yemen’s legal plu­ also Suri, 2019). The American withdrawal from climate agreements riformity is sufficiently known, a systematic identification of the suggests this also affects environmental diplomacy. different kinds of power and strength of the parties in disputes have not Many hydrodiplomacy cases obviously do not go that far. But the received adequate attention. The Yemeni case illustrates that in­ framework we have shown enables us the ability to identify the dy­ stitutions and better arguments do not necessarily win out while namics in power positions in time between the parties involved in a different sources of power are mobilised (proposition two). A lack of water related conflict. With this understanding, negotiations can be institutional authority (’bear’) was offset by brutal upstream interven­ analysed with greater clarity. tion (‘lion’). States may endeavour to instrumentalise countervailing Take the Scheldt estuary case’ dynamics. The prevailing discourse in power animals, but these may prove weak or have their own agendas. In hydrodiplomacy is reflected in the Dutch professed self-image of a non- the Yemen case sources of authority mobilised (bears) proved weak or to coercive ‘Dutch approach’ emphasising institution- and knowledge go their own way. building (van Genderen and Rood, 2011). Zooming out to a centennial The paradigm lenses and ’power animals’ enable us to identify scale, the Scheldt case appears a good example of a move from Real­ additional insights about actors’ preferred styles of hydrodiplomatic politik to common institution building. But zooming in, we see telling negotiation, which otherwise would not be put forward in a structured centrifugal moments. manner. We hope that this approach contribute to the recognition of the A prevailing institutionalist discourse, which in the Dutch case maps role power plays in diplomacy and gain practical relevance in negotia­ onto its self-professed diplomatic culture and non-coercive ‘Dutch tions, and potentially prove beneficial to the analysis of negotiations in approach’. arm-twisting is not ruled out, but more likely to happen other environmental domains. behind closed doors as public diplomacy, especially in water, empha­ sises institutions and knowledge (van Genderen and Rood, 2011). Author statement Building on its legalist history (from Grotius on), the Netherlands reckons a small country stands to benefit from treaties and its mem­ While the original impetus came from Jeroen Warner, both authors bership of Benelux and European Union. The Netherlands government have roughly equally contributed to the analysis, write-up and revisions. has however used diverse sources of power crisis windows on the Jeroen Warner is responsible for the Scheldt case, Rens de Man for the Scheldt, changing tack over time, sometimes strategically, sometimes Yemen case. Rens also crafted the Figures. responding to a change in the domestic power base. The 1990s had seen a knowledge-dominated stage on the Scheldt bringing a different framing of interests (proposition three), as crises Declaration of Competing Interest created ‘ripe moments’ for joint action. Research to tackle ‘wicked problems’ depoliticised the issue by forging an agreement on concepts The authors declare that they have no known competing financial and a baseline. Common ‘shadow of the future’ challenges requiring interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence joint action, such as fears of climate-induced sea level rise, would seem the work reported in this paper. to make this a herald of the diplomacy of the future. But fears of the future did not erase the ‘shadow of the past’ going back centuries – References hence we should not be surprised other basins being beset by more Strauss, M., de La Hamaide, S., 2020. Belgium Blames France After Finding Tonnes of recent historic traumas. Dead Fish in River. Reuters. 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